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ABSTRACT

Prepared by scholars from across the United States, the more than 80 papers in this collection address new developments and recurrent problems in the theory, practice, criticism, and teaching of argumentation. The papers are organized according to 10 broad categories: argumentation theory, argumentation in special fields, political argumentation, public argumentation, forensics, value and policy debate, interpersonal argumentation, group communication, argumentation and conflict, and the practice and teaching of forensics. Specific topics discussed in the papers include the following: (1) Aristotle's indebtedness to the Sophists; (2) knowledge and argument; (3) argument-as-epistemic and the matter of unsolvable problems; (4) argument in modern economics; (5) moral argument in political history; (6) rhetoric in the human sciences; (7) technical writing as argumentation; (8) the American concept of progress in liberal argument; (9) creationism; (10) storytelling as a mode of moral argument; (11) conventional postulates of interpersonal argument; (12) interpersonal disagreement; (13) root metaphors and terministic screens; (14) value argumentation in a competitive setting; (15) "liberty," "order," and "public trust" in eighteenth century Anglo-Whiggism; and (16) the influence of the judge on the debate round. (FL)

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ARGUMENT IN TRANSITION:

Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation

Edited by

David Zarefsky
Northwestern University

Malcolm O. Sillars
University of Utah

Jack Rhodes
University of Utah

Sponsored by the Speech Communication Association
and the American Forensic Association

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ARGUMENT IN TRANSITION:

PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD SUMMER CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION

Edited by

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Sponsored by the Speech Communication Association
and the American Forensic Association

Hosted by the University of Utah
July 28-31, 1983
at Rustler Lodge, Alta, Utah

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Date of Publication: October 15, 1983

Preface

One hundred twenty scholars of argumentation assembled in July of 1983 for the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation. This biennial event, sponsored jointly by the Speech Communicaton Association and the American Forensic Association, was again held at the Rustler Lodge in Alta, Utah, and was hosted by the University of Utah.

Like its predecessors, this conference had the goal of bringing together scholars from across the nation to discuss new developments and recurrent problems in the theory, practice, criticism, and teaching of argumentation. Some of the themes echo those of previous conferences; others are fresh and reflect advances in the discipline. The 1983 conference was organized in four divisions: Theory and Philosophy of Argumentation, Public Argumentation, Interpersonal Argumentation, and Forensics. A cross-divisional Workshop in Pedagogy and Curriculum Development also was included in this year's program. Eighty-eight papers were presented; most are reproduced here with the permission of their authors. The individual papers remain the property of the individual authors. No volume, of course, can capture the give-and-take of question periods, the spirited discussion, or the follow-up conversations which were so much a part of the success of the conference.

Many people were responsible for the 1983 Summer Conference. Our greatest debt is to Jack Rhodes of the University of Utah who has been integrally involved in this project since the first conference and who served this year as co-host. Much of the success of this year's venture reflects the concerted effort of the program planners--J. Robert Cox, B. Aubrey Fisher, G. Thomas Goodnight, Sally Jackson, Michael Calvin McGee, Robert Rowland, David A. Thomas, Joseph W. Wenzel, and George Ziegelmueller. Valuable administrative assistance was provided by Ed Schiappa and Jeanine Congalton. We are grateful for the moral and financial support of both SCA and AFA, whose Presidents, Kenneth E. Andersen and Jack Rhodes, were both in attendance. We also acknowledge the many contributions of faculty and staff of the Department of Communication at the University of Utah. The staff at the Rustler Lodge made the conference gracious and pleasant. Jackie Byrd provided invaluable assistance in the final preparation of this volume. Of course, all these efforts would have been for naught were it not for the ideas, interest, and enthusiasm of all the conference participants.

David Zarefsky
Malcolm O. Sillars

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WORKSHOP IN PEDAGOGY AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

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PARTICIPANTS IN THE 1983 SCA/AFA SUMMER ARGUMENTATION CONFERENCE

Katherine Adams	California State University, Fresno
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Patricia Bizzell	College of the Holy Cross
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Jeanine Congalton	University of Utah
J. Robert Cox	University of North Carolina
John E. Crawford	Arizona State University
Gary Cronkhite	Cleveland State University
Steve Depoe	Northwestern University
Debbie Dixon	University of Utah
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Craig Dudczak	University of Oklahoma
Thomas Farrell	Northwestern University
B. Aubrey Fisher	University of Utah
Walter R. Fisher	University of Southern California
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Thomas Frentz	University of Colorado
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Ed Hinck	University of Kansas
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Allan Megill	University of Iowa
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Jack Rhodes	University of Utah
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Robert C. Rowland	Baylor University
Janice Rushing	University of Colorado
Jack Samosky	California State University, Hayward
Ed Schiappa	Northwestern University
Beatrice Schultz	University of Rhode Island
Marjorie Bennett Scott	Hennessey, Oklahoma
Marie Secor	Pennsylvania State University
Sally Sheppard	University of Utah
Alan L. Sillars	Ohio State University

Malcolm O. Sillars	University of Utah
Herbert W. Simons	Temple University
Douglas B. Smith	California Polytechnical State University
Richard Somer	Hamilton College
J. Michael Sproule	Indiana University Southeast
Bob Stockton	Western High School, California
Randall Stutman	Utah State University
Mina Tate	University of Utah
David Thomas	University of Houston
Robert Trapp	University of Northern Colorado
Walter Ulrich	Vanderbilt University
Philip Wander	San Jose State University
Robert O. Weiss	DePauw University
Joseph Wenzel	University of Illinois
Charles Willard	University of Pittsburgh
David Zarefsky	Northwestern University
George Ziegelmueller	Wayne State University

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Third SCA/AFA Summer Conference on Argumentation

Rustler Lodge
Alta, Utah
July 28-31, 1983

Sponsors: Speech Communication Association
American Forensic Association

Host: University of Utah

Conference Committee:

Director: David Zarefsky, Northwestern University

Assistant to the Director: Ed Schiappa, Northwestern University

Hosts: Jack Rhodes and Malcolm O. Sillars, University of Utah

Theory and Philosophy of Argument: G. Thomas Goodnight, Northwestern University; Joseph W. Wenzel, University of Illinois

Public Argumentation: J. Robert Cox, University of North Carolina; Michael Calvin McGee, University of Iowa

Interpersonal Argumentation: B. Aubrey Fisher, University of Utah; Sally Jackson, Michigan State University

Forensics: Robert C. Rowland, Baylor University; George Ziegelmueller, Wayne State University

Workshop in Pedagogy and Curriculum Development: David A. Thomas, University of Houston

Local Arrangements:

Jackie Byrd, University of Utah
K. Jeanine Congalton, University of Utah
Tauni Feller, Rustler Lodge
Tom Lundstrom, University of Utah
Judi Voye and Rob Voye, Rustler Lodge

SCHEDULE

THURSDAY, JULY 28

4:00 - 5:00 pm

GENERAL SESSION

Chair: David Zarefsky, Northwestern University

Welcome: Robert K. Tiemens, University of Utah

Announcements: Malcolm O. Sillars and Jack Rhodes, University of Utah

Conference Preview: David Zarefsky, Northwestern University

Keynote Address: "The Contemporary Renaissance in the Study of Argument," Wayne Brockriede, California State University, Fullerton

FRIDAY, JULY 29

9:00 am - 12:15 pm

ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY DEBATE THEORY

Chair: George Ziegelmueller, Wayne State University

"A Theory of Fiat," Kenneth M. Strange III, Dartmouth College

"Can We Save Policy Making?" Thomas J. Hynes, Jr., University of Louisville

"Solvency and Inherency: Comparing the Efficacy of Policies," Carl D. Flaningam, University of South Dakota

"Debate Formats: For Whom?" Richard A. Parker and Sharon B. Porter, Northern Arizona University

"Stasis and the Development of Hierarchies for the Resolution of Topicality," Edward A. Hinck and Andrew J. Rist, University of Kansas

"The Philosophical Presuppositions of Value Debate," Robert Rowland, Baylor University

9:00 - 10:30 am

A. ARISTOTLE AND ARGUMENTATION

Chair: Michael C. Leff, University of Wisconsin, Madison

"Rhetoric as Literature: The Poetic Limits to Rhetorical Discourse," Thomas B. Farrell, Northwestern University

"Ethical Proof: A Re-Examination of Artistotelian Theory," Joseph W. Wenzel, University of Illinois

"Aristotle's Indebtedness to the Sophists," John Poulakos, Pennsylvania State University, Delaware County

B. INDIVIDUALITY IN ARGUMENT AND REASONING: STYLE, SKILL, AND SOCIALIZATION

Chair: Dale Hample, Western Illinois University

"Interpersonal Argumentation Across Four Social Styles: A Theoretical Direction for Receiver Adapted Messages," John C. Reinard and John E. Crawford, Arizona State University

"Reciprocity of Communication and the 'Social Skills' Approach to Marriage," Alan L. Sillars and Gary R. Pike, Ohio State University

"Interactional Antecedents of Social Reasoning Development: Interpreting the Effects of Parent Discipline on Children," Brant R. Burleson, Purdue University

"Moral Reasoning Development: An Introductory Review of Correlates and Antecedents," Susan L. Kline and Judith A. Woloschuk, University of Pittsburgh

Critic: "The Arguer in Interpersonal Argument: Pros and Cons of Individual-Level Analysis," Sally Jackson, Michigan State University

10:45 am - 12:15 pm

A. UNDERSTANDING "THE PUBLIC" IN PUBLIC ARGUMENT

Chair: J. Robert Cox, University of North Carolina

"Problems, Puzzles, and Progress: A Micro-Sketch Toward a Philosophy of the Public Sphere," Charles Arthur Willard, University of Pittsburgh

"An Essay on the Flip Side of Privacy," Michael Calvin McGee, University of Iowa

"Theorists Understanding 'The Public': An Informal Study in Technical Argument," Ed Schiappa, Northwestern University

B. THE ROLE OF TIME IN ARGUMENTATION

Chair: Joseph W. Wenzel, University of Illinois

"Creationism: The Argument That Time Forgot?" John Angus Campbell, University of Washington

"Becoming the Past: The Rationale of Renewal and the Annulment of History," Jeff D. Bass, Baylor University

"The Language of Time: Toward a Temporal Grammar of Argument," G. Thomas Goodnight, Northwestern University

"Conversation, Time, and Moral Action," Thomas S. Frentz, University of Colorado

12:30 pm

LUNCHEON

Remarks: Kenneth E. Andersen, University of Illinois: President, Speech Communication Association

2:00 - 5:15 pm

WORKSHOP IN PEDAGOGY AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

Chair: David A. Thomas, University of Houston

Papers:

"Graduate Courses in Argumentation Theory," William L. Benoit, Bowling Green State University; Vincent Follert, Western Illinois University

"Teaching Oral Argument to Beginning Public Speakers," Laurie Schultz Hayes, University of Minnesota

"Teaching the Forensic Progression: Sequential Instruction in Debate," Maridell Fryar, Midland (Texas) Independent School District

"The California 'Critical Thinking' Requirement and its Impact at the Departmental Level," Gary T. Hunt, California State University at Los Angeles

Workshop Group Leaders:

Pamela Benoit, Bowling Green State University;
Group Focus: Discourse Analysis as a Research Method in Argumentation.

Laurie Schultz Hayes, University of Minnesota;
Group Focus: Teaching Oral Argument to Beginning Public Speakers.

Sharon Porter, Northern Arizona University;
Group Focus: Planning an Undergraduate Course Emphasizing General Argumentation.

Malcolm O. Sillars, University of Utah;
Group Focus: Undergraduate General Argumentation Course.

William Benoit and Joseph W. Wenzel, University of Illinois;
Group Focus: Planning a Graduate Seminar in Argumentation.

Closing Assembly and Debriefing

2:00 - 3:30 pm

A. THE "PUBLIC" IN SPECIAL SPHERES OF ARGUMENT

Chair: Michael Calvin McGee, University of Iowa

"Ways of Going Public: The Projection of Expertise in the Sociobiology Controversy," John R. Lyne, University of Iowa

"'Creation-Science' Is Not 'Science': Argument Fields and Public Argument," James T. Hayes, Gustavus Adolphus College

"On Questions of Evacuation and Survival in Nuclear Conflict: A Case Study in Public Argument and Rhetorical Criticism," G. Thomas Goodnight, Northwestern University

"Direct Mail Fundraising Letters: 'Objectifying' Arguments in a Personal Medium," J. Robert Cox, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

B. ARGUMENTATION AS EPISTEMIC

Chair: Charles Arthur Willard, University of Pittsburgh

"Argument-as-Epistemic and the Matter of Unsolvable Problems," Michael S. Bruner, University of Pittsburgh

"Rhetorical Argument in Science: The Function of Presumption," Anne Holmquest, Hope College

"Interrogation and Understanding: The Argumentative Basis of Experience," Frank J. Macke, Western Illinois University

"Rhetorical Criticism as Analogic Argument," Janice Hocker Rushing, University of Colorado

3:45 - 5:15 pm

A. FUNCTIONS OF ARGUMENT IN GROUP COMMUNICATION

Chair: B. Aubrey Fisher, University of Utah

"A Content Analytic Scheme for the Processual Study of Argumentation," Steven M. Alderton, Howard University; Lawrence R. Frey, Loyola University of Chicago

"Argumentativeness: Its Role in Leadership Perception and Group Communication," Beatrice Schultz, University of Rhode Island

"Complexity: The Function of Leadership," G. Lloyd Drecksel, University of Utah

"Communicative Influences on Inferential Judgments in Decision-Making Groups: A Descriptive Analysis," Dennis S. Gouran, Indiana University

"On the Relation Between Argumentative and Compliance Gaining Strategies," Jo Liska, Cleveland State University

B. PUBLIC MORAL ARGUMENT

Chair: Thomas B. Farrell, Northwestern University

"Public Moral Argument: The Nuclear Controversy," Walter R. Fisher, University of Southern California

"Storytelling as a Mode of Moral Argument: A Response to Professor Fisher," Bruce E. Gronbeck, University of Iowa

"Modes of Morality: A Reply to Professor Fisher," John S. Nelson, University of Iowa

"An Informal Response to Professor Fisher," Herbert Simons, Temple University

SATURDAY, JULY 30

9:00 am - 12:15 pm

RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES: THE ROLE OF ARGUMENTATION

Chair: Bruce E. Gronbeck, University of Iowa

"Notes on the Character of Argument in Modern Economics," Donald N. McCloskey, University of Iowa

"Some Tentative Reflections on Ethos, Argument, and Methodology in the History of Ideas," Alan Megill, University of Iowa

"Moral Argument in Political History: The Case of the Lincoln-Douglas Debates," David Zarefsky, Northwestern University

"Models, Statistics, and Other Tropes of Politics: Or, Whatever Happened to Argumentation in Political Science?" John S. Nelson, University of Iowa

"Rhetoric in the Human Sciences: A Response to Professors Megill, Zarefsky, McCloskey, and Nelson," Michael Osborn, Memphis State University.

9:00 - 10:30 am

A. FORENSICS AS A LABORATORY FOR ARGUMENT

Chair: Donn W. Parson, University of Kansas

"Lessons Learned: The Philosophy of Ordinary Language and the Theory of Debate," David B. Hingstman, Baylor University

"Value Argumentation in a Competitive Setting: An Inhibition to Ordinary Language Use," Craig A. Dudczak, University of Oklahoma

"Rapprochement of World$_1$ and World$_2$: Discovering the Ties Between Practical Discourse and Forensics," Jack Kay, University of Nebraska

"Rhetorical Criticism as Argument: A Need for Social Criticism," John M. Murphy, University of Kansas

B. SOCIAL CONFLICT IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Chair: B. Aubrey Fisher, University of Utah

"Conventional Postulates of Interpersonal Argument," Gary Cronkhite, Cleveland State University

"Control and Intent Profiles of Interpersonal Conflict," Frank E. Millar, Cleveland State University

"Interpersonal Disagreement: The Study of Social Confrontation," Sara E. Newell and Randall K. Stutman, Utah State University

"Negotiating Social Conflict in Varying Relational Contexts," Katherine Adams, California State University, Fresno

10:45 am - 12:15 pm

A. COMPETITIVE PAPERS IN PUBLIC ARGUMENTATION

Chair: J. Michael Sproule, Indiana University Southeast

"The Institute for Propaganda Analysis: Public Education in Argumentation, 1937-1942," J. Michael Sproule, Indiana University Southeast

"Categories of Reasoning in Legal Argument," Sally Asbell Sheppard and Richard D. Rieke, University of Utah

"Toward a Model of Effective Public Argumentation: A Case Study of Executive Presentations to City Councils," John E. Crawford, Arizona State University

"The Johnstonian Predicament in Moral Argument: The Case of the Abortion Controversy," Randall A. Lake, University of Southern California

B. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT FORENSIC PRACTICE

Chair: Thomas Kane, University of Pittsburgh

"A Jurisprudential Approach to Final Rebuttal," Scott L. Harris, Northwestern University

"First Negative Strategies," Dwaine R. Hemphill, Kansas State University

"Cross Examination Re-examined," George Ziegelmueller, Wayne State University

12:30 pm

LUNCHEON

Remarks: Jack Rhodes, University of Utah: President, American Forensic Association

2:00 - 3:30 pm

A. THE STUDY OF ARGUMENTATION IN ENGLISH DEPARTMENTS

Chair: S. Michael Halloran, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

"Knowledge and Argument: An Example from English Studies," Patricia Bizzell, College of the Holy Cross; Bruce Herzberg, Bentley College

"Grounds for Argument: Stasis Theory and the Topoi," Jeanne R. Fahnestock, University of Maryland; Marie J. Secor, Pennsylvania State University

"Technical Writing as Argumentation," Douglas Bradley Smith, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

"Fields of Argument and Special Topoi," Carolyn R. Miller, North Carolina State University

B. ISSUES IN JUDGING DEBATE

Chair: Robert C. Rowland, Baylor University

"Root Metaphors and Terministic Screens: Another Look at Paradigms," Donn W. Parson, University of Kansas

"Some Reflections on Judgment Calls in Academic Debate," Thomas Kane, University of Pittsburgh

"The Influence of the Judge on the Debate Round," Walter Ulrich, Vanderbilt University

C. ARGUMENTATION AND CRITICAL THEORY

Chair: Thomas B. Farrell, Northwestern University

"Deconstructing Habermas," James A. Aune, University of Virginia

"The End of Reason: The Critique of Rationality as Argumentative Strategy in Horkheimer," David B. Hingstman, Baylor University

"Rhetorical and Dialectical Matrices in Public Argument," John Louis Lucaites, University of Alabama

"The Aesthetic Dimension: A Note on Ideology, Criticism, and Reality," Philip Wander, San Jose State University

D. STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ARGUMENT

Chair: James F. Klumpp, University of Nebraska

"Reasoning: An Analysis of Unplanned, Interactional Discourse," Clark D. Olson, University of Minnesota; Patricia M. Ganer, Cypress College

"Characteristics of Arguing from a Social Actor's Perspective," Pamela J. Benoit, Bowling Green State University

"Generic Characteristics of Argumentation in Everyday Discourse," Robert Trapp, University of Northern Colorado

"When Worlds Collide: An Application of Field Theory to Rhetorical Conflict," Scott Jacobs, Michigan State University

"The Functions of Argument," Dale Hample, Western Illinois University

Critic: James F. Klumpp, University of Nebraska

3:45 - 5:15 pm

A. THE LIBERAL ARGUMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Chair: J. Robert Cox, University of North Carolina

"The American Concept of Progress in Liberal Argument," Thomas Kane, University of Pittsburgh

"The Impasse of the Liberal Argument: Speculation on American Politics in the Late 1960's," David Zarefsky, Northwestern University

"Why the New Deal Still Needs a Hero: Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s Arguments for Liberalism in the 1980's," Steve Depoe, Northwestern University

B. THE IDEOGRAPH AS A UNIT OF ANALYSIS IN ARGUMENT

Chair: Ray E. McKerrow, University of Maine

"The Coercive Power of Ideographs: The Rhetorical Creation of the Fascist Ideology," Lawrance M. Bernabo and Elizabeth Jean Nelson, University of Iowa

"Social Change and Social Actors: Ideographs and the Civil Rights Movement," Celeste Condit Railsback, Tulane University

"Substantive and Regulative Functions of Ideographs: 'Liberty,' 'Order,' and 'Public Trust' in Eighteenth-Century Anglo-Whiggism," John Louis Lucaites, University of Alabama

C. CEDA AND NDT DEBATE

Chair: Walter Ulrich, Vanderbilt University

"Comparison of CEDA and NDT: Differences in Program Characteristics and Forensic Director Attitudes," Ronald Lee, Karen King Lee, and Matthew Seeger, Indiana University

"A Comparison of Judging Paradigms," David C. Buckley, Southern Illinois University

"A Content Analysis of Selected CEDA and NDT Judges' Ballots," Thomas A. Hollihan, Patricia Riley, and Curtis C. Austin, University of Southern California

"A Content Analysis of Selected NDT and CEDA Transcripts," Michael Bryant, Eastern Illinois University

SUNDAY, JULY 31

CONCLUDING BRUNCH

THE CONTEMPORARY RENAISSANCE IN THE STUDY OF ARGUMENT

Wayne Brockriede

California State University, Fullerton

This conference marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the contemporary renaissance in the study of argument. Twenty-five years ago Dr. Chaim Perelman and Mme. Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca produced The New Rhetoric.[1] The book went largely unnoticed by persons in this country until 1964 when Robert T. Oliver and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. co-hosted a conference in rhetoric and philosophy and invited representatives of both disciplines, including Chaim Perelman, philosopher and rhetorician. While preparing for that conference I read essays of Perelman appearing in philosophy journals in English and browsed The New Rhetoric, but because my French was so feeble my discoveries were limited virtually to seeing an astonishing range of works on rhetoric and philosophy cited in footnotes. The essays in English manifested a sophisticated and innovative view of rhetoric in general and argumentation in particular. For some time I tried in vain to interest a doctoral candidate proficient in both French and argumentation to introduce Perelman's work in this country. Someone else's student, Ray Dearin, wrote a dissertation on Perelman and a subsequent article[2] that appeared at about the same time The New Rhetoric, in English translation, appeared in 1969.[3] Since then, through further writing and lecturing in this country, Chaim Perelman continues to be a major force in the contemporary renaissance in the study of argument.

Also twenty-five years ago, in the summer of 1958, I was at work on a convention paper for the Speech Association of America on an assigned title, "The Anatomy of Argument." I'm not sure what Paul Carmack had in mind when he asked me to write a paper on such a title, and until late June I had no idea what I was going to do. Erwin Bettinghaus, then a forensic assistant supervising library study at our summer high school debate workshop, but now only a dean, suggested that I look at a new book he had spotted that afternoon. It was Stephen Toulmin's The Uses of Argument,[4] and it became the basis for my convention paper, now with the new title, "The Physiology of Argument."[5] On the same convention program Douglas Ehninger presented a paper that later became Chapter 2 of Decision by Debate,[6] a collaboration we struck up over coffee after the convention program.

Toulmin's influence on the renaissance of argument was rapid. Within ten years most textbooks on argumentation, public speaking, and other assorted topics included several pages on the Toulmin layout of argument, with an amazing array of variations on the theme. In the 1970s writers began to emphasize his more recent work, Human Understanding,[7] and ideas of The Uses of Argument other than the layout in Chapter 3. During the past seven years his work has been the subject of a controversy consisting of many long articles on whether arguments usefully may be diagrammed at all. His concept of fields of argument has spawned still another controversy. Clearly, he and Perelman are the two most important influences on the study of argument during the past twenty-five years. Coincidentally, both of their seminal books were published in 1958.

I feel honored by the invitation to speak to you this afternoon. I intend my presentation to keynote an epideictic celebration here. Four years ago Bruce Gronbeck in his keynote address to the first summer conference on argumentation[8] deplored fifteen years of identity crisis, spoke of the theory of argumentation as manic depressive, called the criticism of argumentation neuroses, and concluded with some recommendations for mental health. I shall take a longer view--twenty-five years instead of fifteen--and look at the bright side of what has happened during that period. I do not mean to try to refute Gronbeck's claim that some of our distinctions are fuzzy, that some of us may have poeticized a vision of argumentation (a heresy several papers at this conference happily will continue), and that some of us had become evangelical perspectivists. His is not a view to refute or ignore, but one to consider alongside others.

But I do mean to try to dispel a mood of gloom and doom. We justly can be proud to have been a part of twenty-five years of exiting studies on argument. Although some persons may deplore an elasticity in the construct of argument, wince when someone declares argument is anywhere in the vicinity of people, and wish for the good old days when everyone knew what an argument was, a candid look at the status of argument in 1958 and in 1983 should suggest that the old days were not all that good. At this conference we have programs on five general topics. I intend to take them up, one by one, and look at what we have accomplished during the past twenty-five years in comparison with the preceding twenty-five years from 1933 to 1958.

Theory and Philosophy of Argument

This first topic of the conference includes programs on Aristotle and argumentation, the role of time in argumentation, argumentation as epistemic, rhetoric of the human sciences, and argumentation and critical theory. With the exception of the program on Aristotle, they could not have been presented at a conference on argumentation in 1958. These programs will include papers with such titles as "The Language of Time: Toward a Temporal Grammar of Argument," "Interrogation and Understanding: The Argumentative Basis of Experience," "Models, Statistics, and Other Tropes of Politics: Or, Whatever Happened to Argumentation in Political Science," and "Deconstructing Habermas." None of these papers could have been presented in 1958. But the very idea of discussing the philosophy or theory of argument at a national conference at that time would have seemed fanciful in the extreme. Who would the speakers have been? What would they have said?

What *were* people saying about the theory and philosophy of argument in 1958? Not much. Perhaps the only truly notable work during that era was Richard Weaver's *The Ethics of Rhetoric* in 1953.[9] Ronald Matlon's *Index* of the category of pragmatic communication, subcategory of argumentation, subheading of philosophy and argument,[10] shows sixteen entries, the earliest of which was published in the *QJS* in 1962, Maurice Natanson's "Rhetoric and Philosophical Argumentation."[11] Other major works written at the beginning of the renaissance of the past twenty-five years would include Lloyd Bitzer's "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," published in 1959 in the *QJS*,[12] and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.'s book, *Philosophy and Argument*, which also came out in 1959.[13] A few other entries before 1958 related loosely but not, I think, importantly to an understanding of theory or philosophy of argument. The pickings were slim between 1933 and 1958. I won't claim the title of a two-page article in *Today's Speech* in 1957 was representative of writing during the pre-renaissance era, but I am quite confident no editor of *Communication Quarterly* during recent years would have published an essay with the title, "How to Argue With a Red-Headed Woman."[14]

To be sure, classical studies of *logos*, *stasis*, the enthymeme, and other classical concepts related to argumentation have appeared from time to time, and *logos* still sometimes receives its once obligatory paragraph or page in critical studies of ancient, British, or American orators. Convention papers on Aristotle, Whately, and others recurred. But the kind of papers now produced regularly in regional and national journals dealing with theoretical and philosophical issues in the study of argument, and doing so quite directly, were somewhere between rare and none in 1958.

Contrast that situation with the contemporary scholarship that produces a book like *Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research*, edited by J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, and published in 1982.[15] The book was dedicated to me, and I am delighted to have my name associated with such an undertaking. Willard's own book, published earlier this year, *Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge*,[16] could not have been conceived in 1958. We've come quite a long way.

Public Argumentation

Our advance in the study of argumentation in public communication is different. In the twenty-five years preceding 1958, the study of argument as a part of public discourse was well entrenched. Rooted in the essay by Herbert Wichelns[17] and nurtured by elaborate categories in Thonssen and Baird,[18] hardly any study in public address was produced without some reference to the arguments of speakers. In addition, many studies focused on aspects of argumentation and debate in the public forum. In Arthur Kruger's *Bibliography* of 1964[19] one can count two books, fifty-two theses and dissertations, and thirty-three articles on debaters and debates from 1933 to 1958. I suspect Matlon's *Index* would turn up other items, but without further counting the conclusion is well justified that the period was rife with studies emphasizing the arguing or debating abilities of speakers or keying on particular debates. In addition, thousands of studies in the history and criticism of public address devoted some pages to *logos*.

These studies, later castigated by Edwin Black[20] and others with the pejorative label of neo-Aristotelianism, made use of classical constructs and terminology, all of which carried with them the baggage of assumptions that worked wonderfully well in understanding classical oratory, but less well in dealing with differences in people, issues, situations, and cultural norms in this country during the twentieth century. But the question of "goodness of fit" between classical doctrine and contemporary practice was raised rarely before 1958. The best of several such criticisms, in my judgment, was Albert J. Croft's "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism," published in the *QJS* in 1956,[21] a paper too little recognized for initiating arguments developed later in the 1960s.

Little interest in 1958 was attached to the topic of one of the programs at this conference, "Understanding 'the Public' in Public Argument." No interest was shown in 1958 on "Ways of Going Public," the title of a paper on that program, because at that time we would have assumed that one went public by making public speeches. The idea that one might go public by sending direct-mail fundraising letters, the topic of another paper on the same program, would have provoked either amusement or annoyance. A paper like Walter Fisher's at this conference, in which he takes the status of the revered rational-world paradigm and gives equal status to, would you believe it, telling stories, might have been construed as a paper on the ethics of evidence on a forensics program. The topics of competitive papers on public argumentation might have been addressed in 1958, although at that time a writer on the Johnstonian predicament would not have had the benefit of Johnstone's best work. A program on the ideograph would have been impossible in 1958.

In addition, I suspect strongly that all the papers on all the programs will be more sophisticated at this conference than they would have been had such a conference been possible in 1958. In public argumentation, too, we've come quite a long way.

Interpersonal Argumentation

We've come even a longer way in advancing our understanding of interpersonal argumentation. I can't treat this topic comparatively for one simple reason: we had no concept of argument viewed as interpersonal interactive process in 1958. Persons then would have been bewildered thoroughly by programs on argumentation with titles such as "Individuality in Argument and Reasoning," on "Functions of Argumentation in Group Communication," on "Social Conflict in Interpersonal Relationships," or on "Studies in the Sociology of Argument." Even young Turks like myself in 1958 might have wondered a bit about papers titled, "Interactional Antecedents of Social Reasoning Development," or "A Content Analysis Scheme for the Processual Study of Argumentation," or "Negotiating Conflict in Differing Relationship Contexts," or "Characteristics of Arguing from a Social Actor's Perspective."

Some persons in 1983 might still question the legitimacy of such studies of argumentation. But the number is dwindling, and clearly I am not among them. I applaud the idea of looking at arguing as an interaction process persons engage in as one of the useful perspectives students of argumentation may take. I predict it will continue to attract the attention of some of the best minds in our discipline. I see it as one of the advances that has spawned the contemporary renaissance in the study of argument. We've come quite a long way, especially since we started at square one.

Forensics

I see several special problems in comparing forensics in the twenty-five years before and the twenty-five years after 1958. First, the number of persons who were involved actively in debating or in directing debate both in 1958 and 1983 is quite small. Probably over half the members of this audience once were so involved and now are not. I'm one of the earlier forensics emeriti, and my colleague Lucy Keele is one of the newest. We left forensics after too many miles, too many hours, too many Motel 6s, too many quick-stop fast-food places, and with the hard realization that our best shot at achieving other professional goals would come with retirement from the forensics community. I have wondered at times whether anything I've done since 1963 was as useful and as rewarding as seeing bright people develop abilities in arguing and communicating. Probably almost another half the audience are still working in forensics but are too young to have experienced the activity in 1958.

So the first problem with this comparison is that some persons in this room were not around in 1958, and the rest of us had intimate acquaintance with the before and not much knowledge of the hereafter. In that regard I may come closer than most persons to be equipped to hazard some comparisons because from 1973 to 1977 I went to debate tournaments, worked in tab rooms, judged debates, talked with coaches and debaters, and one quarter served as a Visiting Assistant Debate Coach for Jack Rhodes at the University of Utah.

A second problem is that the world at large and persons in this room may tend to become polarized into the two groups implied by what I have just said: the working stiffs who toil long hours with much emotional involvement and the old buffalo out to pasture who shake their heads sadly at what they see. Each group has a hard time understanding the other. When I was a director of forensics in the 1950s I resented the oldtimers of the 1940s who saw their activity being led to ruin by us youngsters. Many directors of forensics of my era now see present-day forensics in a similar way. Although I share some of their concerns, I must tell my fellow buffalo that I have some appreciation for the feeling of workers when condemned by exworkers.

For one thing we "ex"es sometimes engage in selective recall. We probably remember the dozen or so best debaters we heard better than we do the thousands of persons who had relatively little skill or ambition and sometimes engaged in questionable ethical practices. One friend of mind who debated in the 1950s and coached in the 1960s told me of a fellow debater who had advanced to the final round of the West Point Tournament. He once prayed on his way to his first tournament of the year that he would draw negative in his first round so he could appropriate his opponents' case for his second round on the affirmative. Most debaters in 1983 are far better prepared than very many debaters were in 1958. Other comparisons no doubt also would favor debaters today over those of twenty-five years ago.

But I do believe all changes are not gains. I hope you will take my comments about current debate practices as friendly and well-intentioned, even if you are right in assuming I know too little about 1983 and remember too little about 1958. I have three major concerns. First, although debaters now have more information, they do not put it into arguments better than their 1958 counterparts. Sometimes warrants are not only unproved and unstated but unable to withstand critical scrutiny. Sometimes to say an opponent's warrant out loud is to refute the argument. My impression is that not enough debaters do this in 1983, nor did they do it often enough in 1958.

Second, although the omnibus propositions of today that invite fifty or so legitimate affirmative cases and admit another hundred or so where topicality is suspect or absurd can prevent a debate season from getting tedious (as admittedly propositions sometimes got during the 1950s when affirmative teams were limited to a few variations on a few legitimate approaches), today's propositions create problems. They tend to confuse students about the nature of policy debating, encourage quibbles about topicality, invite trick cases that make our 1958 squirrels look like sable, and produced canned negative attacks designed to fight spreads with spreads. The best negative debaters in 1958 would tailor precise objections to practicability and arguments about disadvantages to fit closely the individual affirmative case they were opposing.

Third, although expert judges of championship debates selected through elaborate strike systems can hear more efficiently, write flow sheets in more sophisticated ways, and certainly write far more lucid criticism than we used to do in 1958, not enough judges demand consistently that debaters make arguments instead of read evidence or require them to communicate clearly rather than expect judges to fill in the blanks.

If these criticisms were only my idiosyncratic objections, merely the musings of a nostalgic buffalo, you could write them off with a clear conscience. You cannot dismiss so easily what present leaders in intercollegiate forensics see as serious problems, however. At the last convention of the Western Speech Communication Association I attended a program on problems of NDT debate. Our buffalo were represented by Malcolm Sillars who, with his customary modesty, admitted he was the very first college debater to utter those immortal words, "Carry that across your papyrus!" The other members of the panel included influential directors of forensics who voiced some of the concerns I just mentioned. I am told that in formal seminars and informal coffee conversations, the forensics community is much concerned and takes seriously the idea that the responsibility for intercollegiate debating rests on directors of forensics who, through their coaching and judging, provide a system of rewards and punishments. Perhaps the next twenty-five years may represent a renaissance in these activities.

In the realm of writing about forensics, some significant advances have occurred. Not only have general articles on argumentation theory and philosophy in *JAFA* improved considerably in the past twenty-five years, so have articles that deal specifically with theories of contest debating. I do not wish to belittle authors of papers in the early issues of *JAFA*, or in the preceding magazine, *The Record*, for which I wrote an article and served as associate editor. We did the best we could in those early years. But articles on academic debate theory are better during the past ten years than in the preceding ten, and articles are much better during the past twenty-five years than during the preceding twenty-five. Since articles about intercollegiate debate are still written mostly by forensics educators who regularly work twice as long as the rest of us, the increased quantity and quality is especially praiseworthy.

If one reasonably can date the renaissance of interest in the general study of argument at 1958, perhaps 1964 is as good a candidate as any for starting a renaissance in the theory of academic debate. In that year Patrick Marsh wrote an essay in *Speaker and Gavel* entitled "Is Debate Merely a Game for Conservative Players?"[22] The essay questioned the traditional perspective on presumption and burden of proof followed for years in the name of Bishop Whately, and it proposed an alternative view that change is not necessarily evil nor the status quo necessarily a gem to preserve. Within a few years comparative advantages cases, once used only by a few eccentric teams, became the majority approach of intercollegiate debating.

Other developments in academic debate theory include some new thinking about inherency, counterplans, and the fiat; alternative perspectives on judging contest debates, notably that of hypothesis testing; and an increased interest in debating questions of value. Some of these topics will be explored further at this conference. In both the theory and the practice of intercollegiate forensics we have made some progress even though some problems remain to be resolved.

Workshop in Pedagogy and Curriculum Development

The word "workshop" in the title of this series of programs may suggest that work needs to be done in teaching methods and in argumentation and debate courses. I'm not aware that many writers have faced such objectives directly.

Clearly, textbooks have changed from 1959 to 1983, and I take the changes to constitute improvements, although I may have a vested interest in thinking so. I know changes have been much greater from 1958 to 1983 than during the preceding twenty-five years. In 1958 a colleague of mine still was using the 1917 edition of William Trufant Foster's book.[23] Not many textbooks were available. By 1966 or so many new ones had emerged. They had a new look. For example, the obligatory chapter on the syllogism in the older books, which authors typically ignored when they got down to the serious business of discussing evidence, reasoning, and proofs, was replaced by informal approaches to reasoning, notably variations on the layout of argument by Toulmin. In addition, advances in thinking about theory and philosophy of argument in general and about academic debate theory in particular found their ways into many new textbooks.

During the past twenty-five years many courses and textbooks on argumentation and debate are becoming bifurcated. I'm not sure this change constitutes progress. Although some textbooks and courses still combine a general study of argumentation with a study of academic debating, some books deal exclusively with principles of argumentation, and others are concerned only with procedures and tactics of academic debating. But if forensics is truly to serve as a laboratory for argument, as the title of a program Saturday morning implies, one wonders why a course should not deal with the principles of argument useful for public and interpersonal debating *and* with the opportunity to apply such principles in academic debate situations. The advantages of such a connection are implied by the title of one of the papers on that program, "Rapprochement of World$_1$ and World$_2$: Discovering the Ties Between Practical Discourse and Forensics." Putting one world into one textbook and one course and a second world into another course and textbook may effectively conceal such ties from students.

I have two concluding observations. First, let me end where I began. Let us celebrate at this conference twenty-five years of solid achievement in the study of argument. The people and the titles of papers here represent many of our advances. I shall be surprised if some of the presentations do not honor Chaim Perelman by exploring new rhetorics that focus on argumentation and honor Stephen Toulmin by finding new uses of argument. As we celebrate past renaissance and enjoy present stimulation, we must realize we have not exhausted either our perspectives or our uses of argument, nor have we advanced adequately present perspectives or uses. We face a lot of hard but interesting work during the next twenty-five years to continue improving our understanding of what argument is, where it applies, and how it works.

Second, we can rejoice as the applicability of an understanding of argument expands to new fields and as our perspectives on its study increase. Let us worry less about identity crises. We need not be overly concerned about hard and fast distinctions from which we must pick an *either* or an *or*. The study is rich enough to accommodate both public argument and interpersonal argument, both philosophy of argument and forensics, both theory and practice, both product and process and method; both naturalistic description and idealized visions; both the world of the classroom and the world outside. No one of us can deal with all these concerns at once and still engage in the kind of rigorous scholarship that truly advances the perspective of our choice. But in a community of scholars specialties can coexist harmoniously, especially if some of us try to build bridges between them so an understanding of one approach enriches an understanding of another.

Notes

[1] Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *La Nouvelle Rhétorique: Traité de l'Argumentation* (Paris: Presses Universitaires des France, 1958).

[2] Ray D. Dearin, "The Philosophical Basis of Chaim Perelman's Theory of Rhetoric," *QJS*, 55 (1969), 213-224.

[3] Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969).

[4] Stephen E. Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

[5] Wayne Brockriede, "The Physiology of Argument" (unpublished paper presented at a convention of the Speech Association of America, 1958).

[6] Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, *Decision by Debate* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1963).

[7] Stephen E. Toulmin, *Human Understanding*, Vol. I, *The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).

[8] Bruce E. Gronbeck, "From Argument to Argumentation: Fifteen Years of Identity Crisis," in *Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation*, ed. Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell (Alta, Utah: Speech Communication Association and the American Forensic Association, 1980), pp. 8-19.

[9] Richard M. Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric* (Chicago: Regnery, 1953).

[10] *Index to Journals in Communication Studies Through 1979*, comp. Ronald J. Matlon (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1980).

[11] Maurice Natanson, "Rhetoric and Philosophical Argumentation," *QJS*, 48 (1962), 24-30.

[12] Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," *QJS*, 45 (1959), 399-408.

[13] Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., *Philosophy and Argument* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959).

[14] Flora C. Perkins, "How to Argue With a Red-Headed Woman," *Today's Speech*, 5 (1957), 5-6

[15] *Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research*, ed. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982).

[16] Charles Arthur Willard, *Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1983).

[17] Herbert A. Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," in *Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James A. Winans* (New York: Century, 1925), pp. 181-216.

[18] Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, *Speech Criticism* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948).

[19] *A Classified Bibliography of Argumentation and Debate*, comp. Arthur N. Kruger (New York: Scarecrow Press, 1964).

[20] Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method* (New York: Macmillan, 1965).

[21] Albert J. Croft, "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism, *QJS*, 42 (1956), 283-291.

[22] Patrick O. Marsh, "Is Debate Merely a Game for Conservative Players?" *Speaker and Gavel*, 1 (1964), 46-53.

[23] William Trufant Foster, *Argumentation and Debating*, rev. ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1917).

ARISTOTLE'S INDEBTEDNESS TO THE SOPHISTS

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In one of the most central passages of his Rhetoric, Aristotle says that the σῶμα (body, substance) of persuasion consists of enthymemes and that everything else is προσθῆκαι (additions, appendages, accidents). In the same passage, he also says that the present day rhetoricians have mostly concerned themselves with τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος (those things outside the main thing, the non-essentials of the art).[1] Clearly, the above two observations imply a distinction between "substance" and "non-substance" in the region of rhetoric, and hint at a certain relation between the Aristotelian and sophistical versions of the art of discourse.

For the most part, this relation has received inadequate attention from students of rhetoric. Over the years, we have tended to dismiss the Sophists[2] as "non-substantial" thinkers and to read Aristotle's Rhetoric in its majestic singularity. The first tendency seems to be largely due to Plato's influential critique of rhetoric as an idea, and the second to the curious habit of reading texts formalistically, as self-enclosed entities divorced from those personal and suprapersonal forces that led to their production. The reasons notwithstanding, neither history nor Aristotle have helped us study the relation of sophistical and Aristotelian rhetoric. History has preserved for us a set of puzzling fragments[3] on the one hand, and a fairly comprehensive treatise on the other. And Aristotle, a critic of the Sophists himself, has given us reason to believe he is reinforcing Plato's verdict against them; and as the author of "the most admired monument of ancient rhetoric,"[4] he has made it difficult for us to get outside his text and see the horizon of rhetoric in its entirety. Thus, from the rhetorical remnants of history we have tended to privilege that which is more complete; and from Aristotle's distinction of "substance" and "non-substance" we have learned to prefer "substance" and to disregard "non-substance" or the relation of the two.

However, it would be inaccurate to say that the relation of sophistical and Aristotelian rhetoric has escaped us altogether. Yet, its precise nature remains unclarified, and opinions about its character are divided. One camp claims that Aristotle refutes and ultimately rejects as defective what the Sophists had to offer. For example, E. M. Cope, the most thorough commentator of the Rhetoric, rarely misses a chance to point the reader to Aristotle's opposition and superiority to sophistical precepts.[5] A more extreme view is taken by Lane Cooper, who goes so far as to say that Aristotle is "absolutely free from the Greek Sophistical tradition."[6] A second camp focuses on certain similarities between the two traditions. Friedrich Solmsen, for instance, argues that in some sections of the Rhetoric Aristotle "does little more than endorse the time-honored devices . . . which experts 'use' to their own advantage."[7] Similarly, George Kennedy claims that the Rhetoric "draws heavily on sophistical rhetoric,"[8] something he attributes to Aristotle's "increased interest in the nature of existing practice and much less desire to impose an ideal system upon contemporary life."[9]

Apparently, the first camp is concerned only with the rectifying changes Aristotle's innovations brought into the field of rhetoric. But by so doing, it seems to disregard certain constancies in the background of the Aristotelian treatise, constancies which make the changes perceptible in the first place. True, Aristotle did influence the direction of rhetorical study when he introduced some variations of his Analytics, Politics, Ethics, and Poetics into his Rhetoric.[10] But the importation of new considerations in an established area of study seldom alters radically the area itself; more often than not, it only adds to it. Thus, when Aristotle made his contribution to rhetoric, he did not undo the sophistical tradition; rather, he complemented it by showing that enthymematic reasoning was too significant a component to be ignored. Despite, then, Aristotle's innovations, rhetoric maintained its central focus: persuasion.

The second camp, while acknowledging some differences between the two traditions, argues that Aristotle attempts to rise above his predecessors but ultimately cannot do so. After his introductory theoretical remarks, he gradually allows more and more practical considerations to enter his treatise; and by the time he gets to Book III, he abandons the ship of teleology altogether. Like the argument of the first camp, this argument assumes that Aristotle's "substance" is superior to the "non-substance" of the Sophists; hence the implicit charge that Aristotle fails to give us a consistently "substantial" version of rhetoric. However, this position does not establish a connection between sophistical and Aristotelian rhetoric; it merely points to those elements in the Rhetoric that can also be found in the surviving fragments of the Sophists.[11] Aristotle, who never fails to disclose his intentions to his reader, nowhere indicates that his aim in the Rhetoric is to replace the notions of his precursors; his tone rather suggests that he is interested in working out a version of rhetoric more systematic and more encompassing than theirs. That this is so can be seen in a telling passage at the conclusion of On Sophistical Refutations (184a 10-b 3), where he hints that his original contribution is to reasoning, not to rhetoric qua rhetoric

and its rich past: "καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥητορικῶν ὑπῆρχε πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ συλλογίζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἴχομεν πρότερον ἄλλο λέγειν ἀλλ' ἢ τριβῇ ζητοῦντες πολὺν χρόνον ἐπονοῦμεν."[12]

In view of the above preliminaries, the purpose of my paper is to shed some light on the relation between sophistical and Aristotelian rhetoric. To do so, I will argue that Aristotle is indebted to the Sophists both historically and conceptually. My thesis will be developed in three stages. First, I will discuss the notions of τὸ πρέπον (the fitting) and καιρός (the opportune moment in time) as two defining elements of sophistical rhetoric.[13] Next, I will show the key role both notions play in Aristotle's treatise. Finally, I will substantiate my claims through a discussion of the interdependence of σῶμα and προσθῆκαι. But before undertaking the above outlined task, a few words about Aristotle's attitude toward his predecessors in general and the Sophists in particular are in order.

How Aristotle feels about past Greek thinkers is well known.[14] He criticizes and refutes, he opposes and corrects them, all in an effort to sharpen the differences between his system and their thought, which he usually finds defective or inadequate. This has been noted by Cope, who observes that Aristotle "hardly ever mentions one of his philosophical predecessors except for the purpose of finding fault." Cope goes on to say that "criticism and opposition [are] his ordinary rule of proceeding with his philosophical competitors, and compliment the rare exception."[15] However, Aristotle seems to attribute the overly critical attitude to our habit of directing our inquiries not toward the object at hand but against those who hold views opposite to ours. As he says in *On the Heavens* (294b 8), "πᾶσι γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σύνηθες, μὴ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ζήτησιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν τἀναντία λέγοντα." In another relevant passage, *Metaphysics* (993b 12-19), Aristotle says that the proper attitude toward our precursors is gratitude; for they have all helped shape our present way of thinking. In his own terms, "Οὐ μόνον δὲ χάριν ἔχειν δίκαιον τούτοις ὧν ἄν τις κοινώσαιτο ταῖς δόξαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀποφηναμένοις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι συνεβάλοντό τι· τὴν γὰρ ἕξιν προήσκησαν ἡμῶν."[16] On a still more focused passage, *On Sophistical Refutations* (183b 17-30), Aristotle shows his awareness of the historical development of rhetoric. Without naming the first inventors of the art, he points out that rhetoric has benefited from many people, all of whom have made, by virtue of their contributions, its present stage of development possible. After commenting on the difficulty and value of original discoveries and the relative ease of adding to them, once they are made, he says: "ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς λόγους συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὑρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρόν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἷον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως ηὐξήκασι, Τισίας μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρώτους, Θρασύμαχος δὲ μετὰ Τισίαν, Θεόδωρος δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον, καὶ πολλοὶ πολλὰ συνενηνόχασι μέρη· διόπερ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἔχειν τι πλῆθος τὴν τέχνην."[17]

The extent to which the above attitudes are operative in the *Rhetoric* is difficult to establish. Aristotle is not consistent throughout; now he gravitates toward his own philosophical commitments, now toward sophistical perspectives. As Carl Classen has recently shown, Aristotle's view of the Sophists is a mixture of criticism and implicit praise; referring to them either as a class or individually, he uses them to illustrate both what one should and should not do. And even though his attitude toward the Sophists shows some Platonic influence, he neither ridicules nor ignores them. At times, he seeks to refute them but does so by attempting "to reveal the reasons for their fallacies and the basis of their errors."[18] Other times, he refers to them approvingly.[19]

As the above discussion shows, Aristotle has a good sense of his place in history. However, the commentators of the *Rhetoric* have projected the two traditional images of this influential thinker: the philosopher, and the classifier of existing knowledge. But as Werner Jaeger has argued, these two images alone are not only limited; they are erroneous.[20] To fully understand the thought of the Stagirite, we must also take into account Aristotle the person and Aristotle the historian. As the citations from the *Metaphysics* and *On Sophistical Refutations* indicate, he was well aware of the historically determined process of thought and its development. Moreover, this awareness would seem to suggest that when writing the *Rhetoric* he realized he was stepping into an already established tradition, a tradition worthy of continuation but with room for development. But if this is so, Aristotle is indebted to the Sophists historically. The evidence in the *Rhetoric* points out that his criticism of the early practitioners and instructors of rhetoric does not amount to a wholesale dismissal of their rhetorical doctrines but to a deliberate effort to overcome their shortcomings. Ultimately, Aristotle does surpass the Sophists but does so not by breaking away from them but by developing what they left undeveloped. This is so even in the area of argumentation--Aristotle's province proper.[21]

The rhetoric of the Sophists has come down to us as a story, a legacy if you will. Unlike Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, a coherent, unified, and relatively complete text, their rhetorical precepts remain "unofficial" because unwritten in the form of a treatise. Yet, much of what must have been their perspective on the art of discourse continues to invite scholarly investigation and study. Whether they wrote technical accounts of the art is not certain.[22] Even if they did, the preserved titles of some of their lost works do not warrant safe inferences regarding their content. What is more certain is that the Sophists were the heirs of the pre-Socratic poets and scientists, and that they practiced and taught rhetoric so as to elicit a variety of comments from playwrights, philosophers, historians, rhetoricians, and doxographers. Consequently, much of their rhetoric is a transformation of and a response to the past from which it arose, or a stimulus to the responses it invited.[23] As such, the study of sophistical rhetoric often entails an investigation of the earlier forms of Greek literary production, or an examination of the more familiar sources--Aristophanes' *The Clouds*, Plato's dialogues, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Isocrates' *Against the Sophists*, and Diogenes Laertius' *The Lives of the Sophists*. The rhetoric of the Sophists, then, resides not only in the preserved specimens of their statements but also in the consciousness of their predecessors and the reactions of their contemporaries and successors. And where the artifacts of the latter are more intact and more extensive, we must consult them and extract and extrapolate from them the positive dimension of sophistic rhetorical notions.

Two such notions are *to prepon* and *kairos*. Although neither term is sophistic in origin, the Sophists inherited both from the poetical tradition[24] and placed them at the service of rhetoric. In their new domain, both terms came to designate two rules that ought to guide man's rhetorical endeavors, and the two most fundamental criteria of the value of speech.[25] Jaeger observes that *to prepon* is derived from the concept of harmony, the first principle of Pythagoreanism.[26] In the rhetoric of the Sophists, *to prepon* remains consistent with the idea of harmony, and underscores the necessity of discovering and observing the aesthetics of form and sound in speech. To be worthwhile and ultimately persuasive, discourse must be formulated and spoken according to theintuitively sensed and consciously applied standard of fitness, or propriety. Far from being rigid and inflexible, this standard is conditioned by the different features particular ideas, people, and situations exhibit. Thus, no speech is suitable in and of itself; rather it is suitable because it suits something other than itself: the speaker, the subject, the audience, and the occasion.

Along with *to prepon*, the Sophists developed the related concept of *kairos*, which had already received extensive treatment in the hands of Pindar. Robert Otten, who traces the various meanings of the term from Homer to the *Hippocratic Corpus*, has shown that it is nearly impossible to define *kairos* narrowly without regard to a particular period, writer, or context. While the meaning of the term ranges from "due measure" to "right choice" and from "poetic sensitivity" to "fulfillment," in the rhetoric of the Sophists *kairos* assumes a predominately temporal sense which can best be rendered as "the opportune moment in time."[27] On the assumption that discourse exists in time, what is said must be timely, said at the right moment, that moment when the situational need for speech and the receptivity of the audience are at their highest. Like fitness, the standard of timeliness is a matter of intuition and its application is conditioned by considerations of time and circumstance. Speech, then, becomes timely if spoken neither prematurely nor belatedly but at the precise time it needs to be spoken.

To prepon and *kairos* stress the importance of adaptation in rhetoric. While the former emphasizes the formal and the latter the temporal aspect of the word, the two together form the basis of an aesthetics of rhetoric. Assuming that "human experience can only be apprehended and communicated aesthetically,"[28] the Sophists posit that the impact of speech depends on its ability to bring to a point of equilibrium the forces of the formal and the temporal. To have appeal, speech must be guided by and conform to both the what and the when of the situation it seeks to address. Although theoretically sound, this directive is difficult in practice for two reasons: 1) situations which demand the intervention of speech tend to recur and become "typical"; 2) "typical" events (i.e., festivals, trials, funerals) are often given "typical" responses (i.e., the encomium, the apology, the eulogy). Over time, a "typical" response evolves into a rhetorical genre which, by virtue of its relatively stable form, can address a situation only in its typicality, its resemblance to similar situations of the past. But insofar as a situation is also unique, a fixed genre cannot address it in its uniqueness and singularity. This is where *kairos* comes in and forces the closed rhetorical form to open so as to acommodate a situation, however "typical", in its peculiarity. Thus, while *to prepon* tends to discover the "typical" in the singular, *kairos* strives to identify the "unique" in the commonplace. While *to prepon* closes and formalizes, *kairos* opens and temporizes. Together, the two motifs aim at a perfect balance which renders speech aesthetically delightful and ultimately persuasive.[29]

Like the Sophists, Aristotle is interested in the power of the word to influence people's thoughts and actions. But whereas they regard *logos* as an entity that may have nothing to do with the empirically real, he views it as a system of symbols derived from and referring to the nature of things and their relations. The diversity of these two perspectives is understandable if we recall the different axiomatic impulses each carries. On the one hand, the Sophists carry the burden of the poetical tradition, and find the power to move in the beautiful creations of art. As such, their rhetoric is grounded on an aesthetics of sound, and appeals to the human ear and its moments of affinity for the harmonious. Identifying those moments (*kairos*) and filling them with aesthetically delightful speech (*to prepon*), is the essence of sophistical rhetoric. On the other hand, Aristotle carries the burden of Plato's systematic conceptualism[30] and locates the power to move in the orderly arrangements of reason. As such, his theory of discourse is founded on a metaphysics of structure, and appeals to the human mind and its innate affinity for the rational. Discovering those linguistic combinations (arguments) that are potentially convincing is the essential function of the practical faculty we know as rhetoric.[31]

All this is not to say that the two respective rhetorics are incompatible--the beautiful and the rational are not mutually exclusive categories. Rhetoric occupies a middle ground overlapping with and borrowing from the theoretically true and the poetically beautiful.[32] The Sophists' excesses and Plato's extremism aside, Aristotle attempts to work out a synthesis from the sophistical thesis and the Platonic antithesis. And despite his intellectual proximity to Plato and his own objections to several sophistic positions, his *Rhetoric* is more at home with the thetic notions of the rhetoricians and less so with the antithetic line of the master dialectician. Of course, this is most evident in Book III, where his theoretical resistance to stylistic elegance is overcome by the internal requirements of rhetoric and yields twelve chapters on style. As shown earlier, Aristotle acknowledges at least implicitly his historical indebtedness to the Sophists. And as his use of *to prepon* and *kairos* in the *Rhetoric* shows, he is also indebted to them conceptually.

Both *to prepon* and *kairos* are part of the background of the *Rhetoric*. Neither term is treated extensively; at best, their treatment is parenthetic. Whether Aristotle took them as givens or did not regard them worthy of particular attention we cannot tell. Yet, both terms are part of his vocabulary and his overall perspective on rhetoric. Together, the two notions serve to highlight the importance of contingency in rhetorical matters and to counterbalance Aristotle's own insistence that the core of rhetoric should consist only of facts and their proof. *To prepon* is part of a constellation of terms that includes τὸ ἁρμόττον, τὸ προσῆκον, τὸ δέον, and τὸ χρέον. Some of the meanings of the whole complex include the proper, the fitting, the suitable, the appropriate, the seemingly, the moderate or mean, and the binding according to nature, morality, and expediency.[33] On the other hand, *kairos* is a sub-topic of the topic of time, and signifies the right time, the particular occasion, the seasonable, and the critical moment.[34] The following representative passages illustrate the various meanings of each concept.

TO PREPON

χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διά τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ *προσῆκον* αἱ κρίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἄξιον ἐπιτιμήσεως. A, 1.12
Rhetoric is useful because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of the judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly.

χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαΐειν τίς πολιτεία συμφέρει ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέναι, αἱ ποῖαι ποίοις *ἁρμόττουσιν*. A, 4.13
It is useful, in framing laws, not only to study the past history of one's own country, in order to understand which conutitution is desirable for it now, but also to have a knowledge of the constitutions of other nations, and so to learn for what kind of nation the various kinds of constitution are suited.

καὶ τὰ *ἁρμόττοντα* αὐτοῖς· τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε *προσήκοντα* κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν, καὶ ὧν ἐλλείπειν οἴονται, κἂν μικρὰ ᾖ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον προαιροῦνται ταῦτα πράττειν. A, 6.28
So [good] are things which befit the possessors, such as whatever is appropriate to their birth or capacity, and whatever they feel they ought to have but lack--such things may indeed be trifling, but none the less men deliberately make them the goal of their action.

καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις· οἴονται γὰρ *προσήκειν* μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἢ μή. B, 2.15
Again, we are angrier with our friends than with other people, since we feel that our friends ought to treat us well and not badly.

καὶ ἐπεὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἄξιον, ἀλλά τις ἐστιν ἀναλογία καὶ τὸ *ἁρμόττον*, οἷον ὅπλων κάλλος οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ *ἁρμόττει* ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ, καὶ γάμοι διαφέροντες οὐ τοῖς νεωστὶ πλουτοῦσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς εὐγενέσιν. ἐὰν οὖν ἀγαθὸς ὢν μὴ τοῦ *ἁρμόττοντος* τυγχάνει, νεμεσητόν. B, 9.11
Further, it is not any and every man that deserves any given kind of good; there is a certain correspondence and appropriateness in such things; thus it is appropriate for brave men, not for just men, to have fine weapons, and for men of family, not parvenus, to make distinguished marriages. Indignation may therefore properly be felt when anyone gets what is not appropriate for him, though he may be a good man enough.

ὡς δὲ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, ὅσα μὲν διῄρηται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας τῶν ὠφελίμων, ταῦτα ἄμφω ἔχουσιν, ὅσα δ' ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἢ ἐλλείπουσι, τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ *ἁρμόττον*. B, 14.3
To put it generally, all the valuable qualities that youth and age divide between them are united in the prime of life, while all their excesses or defects are replaced by moderation and fitness.

περὶ δὲ γνωμολογίας, ῥηθέντος τί ἐστι γνώμη, μάλιστ' ἂν γέ-

νοιτο φανερὸν περὶ ποίων τε καὶ πότε καὶ τίσιν *ἁρμόττει* χρῆσθαι τὸ γνωμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. B, 21.1
We now turn to the use of Maxims, in order to see upon what subjects and occasions, and for what kind of speaker, they will appropriately form part of a speech.

καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ *πρέπουσαν*· ἡ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἴσως οὐ ταπεινή, ἀλλ' οὐ *πρέπουσα* λόγῳ. Γ, 2.1
It [style] must also be appropriate, avoiding both meanness and undue elevation; poetical language is certainly free from meanness, but it is not appropriate to prose.

δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα καὶ τὰς μεταφορὰς *ἁρμοττούσας* λέγειν. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον· εἰ δὲ μὴ *ἀπρεπὲς* φανεῖται διὰ τὸ παρ' ἄλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι. Γ, 2.9
Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this, their inappropriateness will be conspicuous: the want of harmony between two things is emphasized by their being placed side by side.

τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δεῖ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι ἀλλὰ *πρέπουσαν*; ἄν τε γὰρ ἀδολεσχῇ, οὐ σαφής, οὐδὲ ἂν σύντομος. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μέσον *ἁρμόττει*. καὶ τὸ ἡδεῖαν τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει, ἂν εὖ μιχθῇ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικόν, καὶ ὁ ῥυθμός, καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν ἐκ τοῦ *πρέποντος*. Γ, 12.6
For what other reason should style be 'clear' and 'not mean' but 'appropriate'? If it is prolix, it is not clear; nor yet if it is curt. Plainly the middle way suits best. Again, style will be made agreeable by the elements mentioned, namely by a good blending of ordinary and unusual words, by the rhythm, and by *the persuasiveness that springs from appropriateness* (my emphasis).

εἴρηται πόσα εἴδη γελοίων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν *ἁρμόττει* ἐλευθέρῳ τὸ δ' οὔ. ὅπως οὖν τὸ *ἁρμόττον* αὐτῷ λήψεται. Γ, 18.7
Jests have been classified in the *Poetics*. Some are becoming to a gentleman, others are not; see that you choose such as become *you*.

KAIROS

Καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν ᾧ *καιρῷ* μεῖζον δύναται, ἐν τούτῳ καὶ αἱρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ἀλύπως ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῇ νεότητι·
Topics, 117a 26
Also *everything is preferable at the time when it has greater importance*; for example, freedom from pain in old age is preferable to freedom from pain in youth (my emphasis).

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ σπανιώτερον μεῖζον, καὶ οἱ *καιροὶ* καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ποιοῦσι μεγάλα· A, 7.32

And since a thing is better when it is harder or rarer than other things, its superiority may be due to seasons, ages, places, times, or one's natural powers.

καὶ οἱ δυνάμενοι ἀδικεῖν τοῖς δυναμένοις ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὅταν δύνωνται. καὶ οἱ ἠδικημένοι ἢ νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἀεὶ γὰρ τηροῦσιν *καιρόν*.
B, 5.8
And those who can do us wrong are terrible to us when we are liable to be wronged; for as a rule men do wrong to others whenever they have the power to do it. And those who have been wronged, or belive themselves to be wronged, are terrible; for they are always looking out for their opportunity.

καὶ μάλιστα τὸ σπουδαίους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις *καιροῖς* ὄντας ἐλεεινόν· B, 8.16
Most piteous of all is it when, in such times of trial, the victims are persons of noble character.

τὸ δ' *εὐκαίρως* ἢ *μὴ εὐκαίρως* χρῆσθαι κοινὸν ἁπάντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστίν. Γ, 7.8
All the variations of oratorical style are capable of being used in season or out of season.

περὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, *εὔκαιρόν* ἐστι ποιεῖσθαι μάλιστα μὲν ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον εἰρηκὼς ᾖ, ὥστε ἑνὸς προσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει τὸ ἄτοπον· Γ, 18.1
Next to Interrogation. The best moment to employ this is when your opponent has so answered one question that the putting of just one more lands him to absurdity.

As the above passages indicate, Aristotle not only mentions but also adds depth to the notions of *to prepon* and *kairos*. His treatment of the two concepts amounts to a typology of commonly encountered situations and the appropriate responses to them. According to this typology, some feelings and expectations are justified because they are naturally caused and because they are part of the situations that elicit them. Certain personalities, purposes, or cases correspond to and are best served by certain linguistic inventions known as figures of speech. Knowing oneself, the audience one is addressing, the three kinds of rhetoric, and the case at hand are imperative for the rhetor wishing to avoid excesses and to speak aptly. For Aristotle, the accomplished rhetor knows not only the world but also its precise correspondence in language; in short, he knows what in reality goes with what in language. However, Aristotle's distinction between things and speech about things is a distinction the Sophists are not willing to make. For him, things exist independently of language and man speaks suitably only if he knows the nature of things and has mastered the uses of language. For them, however, things are immersed in language and man speaks aptly when he brings forth that aspect of things that satisfies human needs and fills communally shared voids. The differences of the two traditions aside, the point remains: Aristotle's use of *to prepon* and *kairos* shows a certain continuity in Greek rhetoric and demonstrates that the *Rhetoric* has some room for the sophistical perspective on the art.

To return to the Aristotelian distinction noted at the opening of this essay, it would seem that considerations of appropriateness and timeliness in discourse fall under the προσθῆκαι of rhetoric, not its σῶμα. But if this is so, how can we explain Aristotle's attention to them? Is he being inconsistent? Does he compromise his philosophical position? The answer to these questions depends on our interpretation of his opening remarks in 1.3: "νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες ὀλίγον πεπορίκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον· αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, οἱ δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται." Like most writers, Aristotle begins by identifying a problem, a lack, which we are to assume he subsequently will attempt to solve, to fill. Now, this identification and implicit promise do not confine him to only strictly relevant considerations. On the contrary, they leave open the possibility of pursuing even tangents so long as they help him make his case. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle usually goes as far back into history as he finds useful and works his way to the present, at which point he makes his contribution. Those commentators who take Aristotle's opening remarks too literally seem to neglect three important points. First, Aristotle sets out to write a treatise on rhetoric, not a monograph on the enthymeme; as such, he needs to concern himself with the non-enthymematic background of the art. Second, introductions are rhetorical because they attempt to persuade the reader that what follows is new, substantive, and worthwhile. By saying that the early framers of rhetoric have missed the point, which he will make, Aristotle shades the historical past and illumines the point he is about to make. Third, Aristotle needs his predecessors to make his case; as the last part of this essay will show, it is precisely their προσθῆκαι that permit him to discuss the σῶμα of persuasive discourse. If the above three points are not considered, the conclusion that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is mostly concerned with non-essentials is unavoidable.

But even if we follow those who claim that the Aristotelian version of rhetoric is superior to its sophistical counterpart, we still have to explain the superficiality of sophistical rhetoric, and the direction and development of the art of discourse in Greece. From the lines of thought judging the Sophists' perspective inferior, we may distinguish two: one inspired by Plato, and one informed by the progressivist view of history. According to the first, the sophistical views on rhetoric are "superficial" because their authors were inferior thinkers or immoralists, who placed worldly success above true theory. According to the second, that which is prior is always inferior to that which is posterior--initially, man knows only the appearance of things; and with the passage of time he gets increasingly closer to their core, their essence.

Both of these explanations are unsatisfactory because they equate the superficial with the inferior and because they leave out of account the nature of rhetoric. As the art of speech, rhetoric is by definition concerned with externals. Aristotle acknowledges this when he says that the whole business of rhetoric is about appearances (ἀλλ᾽ ὅλης οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικήν) Γ, 1.5. Words like "ex-press" "utter" and "ad-dress" still preserve rhetoric's preoccupation with what lies outside. But this does not only mean that the "outside" is inferior to the "inside"; it also means that the one is an extension of the other. As Gorgias is said to have held, "τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἀφανὲς μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ δοκεῖν, τὸ δὲ δοκεῖν ἀσθενὲς μὴ τυχὸν τοῦ εἶναι." DK B26. This view conceives "inner" reality and "outer" appearance not as two separate categories but as as two interdependent aspects of a unity. In rhetoric, this unity is best represented by the term "*logos*."[35]

The Sophists' concern with τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων may be easily seen as a concern with the arts of appearance. But insofar as *logos* means both speech and thought, speech is never "mere" appearance; "empty" talk for the Sophists is simply not possible. Speech is always that in which non-logos manifests itself. Accordingly, the arts of speech are concerned with the way things appear, the way they reveal themselves. Aristotle agrees with the Sophists: rhetoric is not an ἐπιστήμη ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων but a δύναμις λόγων (A, 4.6). As pointed out earlier, it is for strategic purposes that Aristotle accenuates the difference between the inner and the outer parts of rhetoric, and purports to inquire into its σῶμα. At the same time, he calls its outer part προσθῆκαι, thus making his own pursuit seem worthier. Unfortunately, προσθῆκαι and σῶμα have been understood as two separate levels of value, one higher and the other lower. But as the nature of the medium of rhetoric, *logos*, suggests, a clearer view is obtained if we understand them as two sides of the same coin. This latter view is also preferable because it helps us understand the development of rhetoric in Greece in a way consistent with Aristotle's account;[36] once the beginning was made, rhetoric grew by the principle of augmentation; even so, its growth was κατὰ μέρος, one part at a time. And since the Sophists had already developed the area of *logos* as speech, it makes sense that Aristotle would concentrate on the underdeveloped part, *logos* as thought. If the above analysis is correct, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* does not oppose but grows out of the rhetoric of the Sophists.

In this essay, I have attempted to shed some light on the relation between the sophistical and Aristotelian versions of rhetoric. Basically, I have argued that Aristotle is indebted to the Sophists both historically and conceptually. His historical indebtedness is shown by his awareness of the rhetorical tradition preceding him, while his conceptual indebtedness is supported by the preservation of *to prepon* and *kairos* in the *Rhetoric*. Although Aristotle does oppose the Sophists on several issues, he also preserves and complements much of what they had to offer. Thus, his contribution may be seen not as an opposition to but as a natural outgrowth of the rhetoric of the Sophists.

NOTES

1. *Rhetoric*, A, 1.1. The Greek text of the *Rhetoric* is from E. M. Cope's *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*. The translations of the *Rhetoric* are Rhys Roberts'. Aristotle's other works (both the Greek and the translations)are from the Loeb series.
2. Throughout this essay, "Sophists" refers to the seven most familiar to rhetoricians: Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Antiphon. Thrasymachus, Hippias, and Critias.
3. For a collection of the Sophists' fragments, see Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, (Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1952). For a translation of their fragments, see Rosamond K. Sprague, *The Older Sophists*, (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1972).
4. George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 81.
5. E. M. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1877; *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, (Cambridge: Macmillan and Co., 1867).
6. Lane Cooper, "The *Rhetoric* of Aristotle," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 21, 1935, p. 15.
7. Friedrich Solmsen, from his introduction to *Aristotle: Rhetoric and Poetics*, (New York: The Modern Library, 1954), p. xxi.
8. *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 81.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
10. Regarding Aristotle's influence in rhetorical study, Cope notes: "The effect of this modification . . . is to withdraw the notion of the art in some degree from the exclusively practical application of it encouraged by the sophistical school, and to fix the attention rather upon its theory and method; in short it tends to a more scientific treatment of the subject." *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, p. 34.
11. See *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, pp. 88-90.
12. Also, on the subject of rhetoric there already existed much material enunciated in the past, whereas regarding reasoningwe had absolutely no earlier work to quote but were for a long time labouring at tentative researches.
13. For a discussion of these two notions, see John Poulakos, "Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 16, 1983, pp. 38-42.
14. See H. F. Cherniss,*Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935).
15. Cope, *Introduction*, p. 43.
16. It is only fair to be grateful not only to those whose views we can share but also to those who have expressed rather superficial opinions. They too have contributed something; by their preliminary work they have formed our mental experience.
17. This has happened, too, with rhetorical composition, and also practically with all other arts. Those who discovered the beginnings of rhetoric carried them forward quite a

little way, whereas the famous modern professors of the art, entering into the heritage, so to speak, of a long series of predecessors who had gradually advanced it, have brought it to its present perfection--Tisias following the first inventors, Thrasymachus following Tisias, Theodorus following Thrasymachus, while numerous others have made numerous contributions; hence it is no wonder that the art possesses a certain amplitude.

18. Carl Classen, "Aristotle's Picture of the Sophists," in G. B. Kerferd, ed., *The Sophists and their Legacy*, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1981), p. 11.

19. Consider for example *Rhetoric*, 1397b 24-25, 1406b 14-19, 1419b 2-6, 1418a 34-37, 1415b 10-15.

20. Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development*, trans. Richard Robinson (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1934), pp. 4-5 and 321-322.

21. For examples of the Sophists' work in argumentation, see Friedrich Solmsen, *Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 10-46.

22. For an account on this matter, see George Kennedy, "The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks," *American Journal of Philology*, 80, 1959, 169-178.

23. For a discussion of these two points, see Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, vol. 1, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 286-331.

24. For a study of the use of *to prepon* by the poets, see Max Phlenz, "Tò Πρέπον: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des griechisches Geistes," *Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft zu Göttingen: Philologische-Historische Klass*, LXIV, 1933, pp. 53-92. For a discussion of the place of *kairos* in the poetical tradition, see Robert T. Otten, *Metron, Mesos, and Kairos: A Semasiological Study*, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1956.

25. This is carried by Isocrates who writes in *Against the Sophists* 293 (13): "τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λόγους οὐχ οἱόντε καλῶς ἔχειν, ἣν μὴ τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τοῦ πρεπόντως καὶ τοῦ καινῶς ἔχειν μετάσχωσιν" (for it is not possible for speeches to be good if they do not partake of the opportune moments, and the appropriate, and the novel).

26. For the importance of *to prepon* in Greek culture, see Jaeger's *Paideia*, vol. I, p. 165.

27. G. B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 45 and 82.

28. Nancy S. Struever, *The Language of History in the Renaissance*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 12.

29. For a discussion on the relationship of delight (*terpsis*) and persuasion (*pistis*), see Charles Segal, "Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 66, 1962, pp. 119ff.

30. For a persuasive discussion of this point see Jaeger's *Aristotle*, pp. 11-38.

31. Consider for example *Rhetoric* 1355b 10-12, 1356a 34-35.

32. For an extensive discussion on this point, see Richard McKeon, "Aristotle's Conception of Language and the Arts of Language," *Classical Philology*, 41, 1946, pp. 193-206

33. E.M. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, vol. II, pp. 11-12.

34. *Ibid*., p. 250.

35. It may be instructive here to recall that for Gorgias the most basic element of rhetoric is *logos*; *Gorgias*, 449D.

36. See note 17 above.

ETHICAL PROOF: A REEXAMINATION OF ARISTOTELIAN THEORY

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At the core of Aristotle's rhetorical theory is his analysis of three modes of persuasion, commonly called *logos*, *pathos*, and *ethos*. This paper focusses on the last to attempt a reconceptualization of ethical appeal from a contemporary viewpoint. In a speculative spirit, I want to pursue the hypothesis that reexamining Aristotle's theory of ethical proof from the perspective of a speech act theory will yield useful insights about *ethos* itself, and about rhetorical argument in general. The essay will develop as follows: I will (1) briefly recapitulate Aristotle's theoretical description of *ethos* as a means of persuasion, noting along the way some perplexities that arise for modern readers from his treatment; (2) suggest how the descriptive dimensions and normative foundation of ethical appeal can be elaborated with reference to Habermas' theories of communication and discourse; and (3) draw out some implications of that treatment for rhetorical theory and criticism.

Ethos as Artistic Rhetorical Proof[1]

Aristotle's analysis of the means of persuasion begins with the distinction between inartistic (*atechnoi*) and artistic (*entechnoi*) proofs. By the former he means "such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset—witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on." Artistic proofs, on the other hand, are those that the rhetor may construct "by means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other has to be invented."[2] Aristotle succinctly characterizes the modes of artistic proof as follows:

> Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker [*ethos*]; the second on putting the audience in a certain frame of mind [*pathos*]; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself [*logos*].[3]

Commenting on the coordinate status of the three modes of proof, Grimaldi argues that rhetoric for Aristotle was essentially "the art of the *logos*," but that *logos* must be construed more broadly than the usual interpretations that treat it as the "logical" part of proof, somehow superior to *ethos* and *pathos*. He writes ". . . for Aristotle the very essence of the rhetorical art is constituted by an intimate fusion of the intellectual and appetitive elements in man. *Pathos* and ethos are by no means expedient additions or a feeble retreat from a purely intellectual position. On the contrary, they form with the intellect (*nous*) the integrated act which is the exercise of the art of rhetoric. *Ethos* and *pathos* are not accidental nor epiphenomenal, they are substantial components of the art."[4] Grimaldi maintains further that "Aristotle's text conveys the strong impression of a theory of discourse which asserts that discourse in all areas, but particularly in the area of the probable and contingent, is never purely logical and notional. . . . The causes of persuasion and conviction reside not only in the rational explanation of the subject (the *pisteis pragmatikai*) [Grimaldi's preferred substitute for the term *logos* in the context of three modes of proof], but also in the character of the audience and speaker and in their emotional resonance with the subject (the *pisteis ethikai* and *pathetikai*)."[5] Grimaldi is, of course, responding to some of the perplexities that arise for readers who interpret *ethos* and *pathos* as mere ancillaries to the supposedly more important business of logical proof. I will make some of those problems more explicit presently, and the question of the best way to understand the interrelations of the three modes of proof will be a theme of the concluding section.

Returning to Roberts' translation of Aristotle's text, we find the definition of *ethos*, itself: "Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible."[6] Another translator, however, renders that sentence with a more definitely normative emphasis: "The orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him *worthy of confidence*."[7] (Emphasis mine.) We should not, I think understand Aristotle's treatment of *ethos* as merely a description based on his observations and intuitions. Rather, he seems to be clearly indicating some standards by which the rhetor should be judged. Because "rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions,"[8] the role of the auditor as judge is a theme that runs throughout the *Rhetoric*. It is assumed that the listeners, or at least some of them, will be in possession of appropriate standards by which to evaluate all aspects of the rhetorical act. Moreover, these standards will be determined, in part, by the occasion. Hence, "particularly in political oratory . . . it adds much to an orator's influence that his own character should look right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings toward his hearers."[9] Whether or not one agrees with my attribution of a normative interest to Aristotle in respect to *ethos*, I intend to show that a reinterpretation of the concept, in light of contemporary insights, leads inexorably to a normative stance.

We come, finally, to Aristotle's specification of the elements of ethical proof: "There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character—the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it" good sense, good moral character, and goodwill. . . . It follows that any one who is thought to have all three of these good qualities will inspire trust in his audience."[10] In the same passage, Aristotle explains these elements on the grounds that speakers give bad advice from three causes only: defective intellect, dishonesty, or disregard for the interests of the audience. The rhetor is directed to other sections of the *Rhetoric* to find *topoi* by which to build up a favorable impression of his character, and is warned, implicitly, that these are the norms by which his hearers (or at least the intelligent ones) will judge him.

Modern readers of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* have sometimes been perplexed by certain of his remarks on ethical proof. Generally, these are resolved by some convenient rationalization/explanation (more often than not, one that suits our modern mind-set more than it fits Aristotle's), and then we pass on to what we take to be truly significant in the theory of ethical proof. But the perplexities remain as discomforts in the background. I will briefly sketch three of those problems here, and in subsequent sections try to show how they may be resolved by a reinterpretation of *ethos*.

One perplexity for the modern reader arises from Aristotle's observation that ethical proof is a concept relating to what the speaker does during the speech itself, without regard to previous reputation: "This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak."[11] Perhaps the most common response is to suppose that we moderns know better what constitutes source credibility, and to note that, after all, Aristotle had a rather rigid conception of artistic proof. This seems reasonable, on the face of it, but perhaps there is more to be said about the exact relationship between what the speaker says in the speech and what s/he says or does apart from it.

A more serious perplexity arises from Aristotle's statement that the speaker's "character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses."[12] This is a remark more difficult to deal with, for an implicit explanation does not suggest itself at once, and the whole notion of *ethos* as the most effective means of persuasion seems to run counter to Aristotle's general rationalistic bias. Some interpreters are tempted here to make too much of Aristotle's comment on "the defects of our hearers."[13] Are we to take this merely as a cynical observation on gullibility or on the power of charisma? Are we to believe that Aristotle simply thought that audiences were so defective that they could easily be taken in by the clever speaker who portrays character in the right way? Or is there possibly a deeper explanation, one consistent with Aristotle's belief in the power of reason? The following sections suggests there is.

A third problem, akin to the second, arises from the ambiguity of Aristotle's diverse statements concerning the relations of *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. He says, on the one hand, that "rhetorical persuasion is effected not only by demonstrative but by ethical argument; it helps a speaker to convince us, if we believe that he has certain qualities himself, namely, goodness, or goodwill towards us, or both together."[14] Yet, in Book III we find the rather plaintive remark, "we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore, should matter except the proof of those facts."[15] Clearly, there is ambivalence here. If we attribute to Aristotle, as some do, a version of naive realism, then we take the second statement very seriously and, in consequence, assign to *ethos* and *pathos* the status of merely ancillary techniques for making the "truth" palatable. On the other hand, if we accept Grimaldi's argument for the organic unity of the three modes of proof in Aristotle's theory, we must search for a different explanation. Grimaldi builds his explanation around the "enthymeme as the major structural idea" for integrating the elements in the rhetorical situation: speaker, audience, and subject-matter. These he takes to be the sources of artistic proof (*pisteis entechnoi*). His summary deserves quotation:

> It is more than clear that rhetoric, viewed as Aristotle views it, must be an integrated act in which person speaks to person for this is both the beginning and the end of the whole operation. Furthermore, the very grounds for initiating such discourse, as outlined by Aristotle, necessarily implicate, if the action is to be successful, the three critical areas which he calls the *pisteis entechnoi*. For in discourse on any problems these *pisteis* are the substantial elements which enable a person to lead an other toward belief or conviction. These *pisteis* are *pragma*, the logical and factual presentation of the subject-matter, those rational probabilities, opinions, truths about the subject which translate it to the mind as reasonable; *ethos*, the element of the personal, the person of the speaker and the auditor, his style, so to speak, as it is affected by and flows into the subject-matter; and finally *pathos*, the interplay of feeling, sensibility, emotions in relation to the subject of discourse.[16]

Grimaldi is here summarizing his impressive analysis of the organic unity of Aristotle's theory on Aristotle's own terms. In a way, his remarks point in the direction of my more modest project. For while I will now move away from Aristotle to consider the viewpoint of a contemporary theorist, the central concern remains the same: to give a theoretical account of what is required for successful rhetorical action, successful not in the narrow technical sense of effecting persuasion, but in the larger sense of rationally grounding our knowledge and values.

Ethos and Speech Act Theory

Jürgen Habermas is a contemporary philosopher who, like Aristotle, has sought to uncover the rational foundations of the communication processes in and through which social life is created and maintained.[17] Just as Aristotle, for example, sought to analyse the role of apodeixis, dialectic and rhetoric in the production of different sorts of knowledge, so Habermas has sought to analyze the discursive foundations of understanding for technical, practical and emancipatory interests—and so on—the parallels abound. The specific parallel explored here arises from their common interest in responsible communicative action. In Aristotle's terms this is responsible rhetoric; in Habermas' terms it is communicative competence. Aristotle's rhetoric may be read as a prescription for effective and responsible rhetorical action in the forums of a democratic city-state. Habermas' theory of communication, similarly, offers an analysis of the understandings and practices required for effective and responsible participation in communication and discourse aiming at a life of freedom.

In his theory of communicative competence, Habermas "seeks to articulate not only the constitutive conditions of rational discourse, but also the very grounds of the sociocultural mode of existence."[18] His theory of speech acts is embedded in the study of what he calls "universal pragmatics" undertaken "to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding."[19] He concentrates his analysis on communicative action because, he writes, "I take the type of action aimed at reaching understanding to be fundamental. Thus I start from the assumption . . . that other forms of social action—for example, conflict, competition, strategic action in general—are derivatives of action oriented to reaching understanding."[20]

The elements of his theory that I will focus on here are the universal validity claims that are embedded in all speech acts. In any normally functioning, communicative act, Habermas maintains, a speaker necessarily raises four claims: (1) the claim that the utterance is intelligible; (2) the claim to be speaking the truth; (3) the claim that his communication is in accord with appropriate norms; and (4) the claim to be speaking sincerely or truthfully.[21] These implicit claims situate the speaker's utterance in relation to domains of reality, i.e., to the linguistic medium, to the referents of utterance, to the normative context, and to the speaker's internal subjectivity. With each utterance, the speaker proffers an immanent obligation to offer grounds for the implicit claim and, if necessary, each claim can be thematised in a particular type of speech act. Thus, *communicative* speech acts thematize the claim to intelligibility, *constatives* thematize the claim to truth of propositional content, *regulatives* the claim to normative appropriateness, and *representatives* the claim to sincerity. In other words, should any element in the background consensus become problematic, it can be abstracted, as it were, from the context of communication for critical examination.[22]

Now what has all this to do with *ethos*? I want to argue, first, that there is a strong parallel between Aristotle's analysis of the dimensions of *ethos* and Habermas' analysis of the validity bases of speech and, second, that some interesting insights develop when we contemplate the parallel. I do not claim there is a perfect match between the two, but that there is an intuitively reasonable similarity. So, as Aristotle characterized the conditions that a speaker must satisfy to earn the trust of an audience, Habermas characterizes the validity claims that must (somehow) be made good in speech. Consider the intimations of good character, good sense, and good will in this statement by Habermas:

> The bond into which the speaker is willing to enter with the performance of an illocutionary act means a guarantee that, in consequence of his utterance, he will fulfill certain conditions—for example, regard a question as settled when a satisfactory answer is given; drop an assertion when it proves to be false; follow his own advice when he finds himself in the same situation as the hearer; stress a request when it is not complied with; act in accordance with an intention disclosed by avowal, and so on. *Thus the illocutionary force of an acceptable speech act consists in the fact that it can move a hearer to rely on the speech-act-typical commitments of the speaker.*[23]

The parallel elements of the two theories are as follows:

Dimensions of ethos:	Validity claims of speech acts:
Good sense	Truth
Good character	Normative appropriatness
Good will	Sincerity

Good sense for Aristotle would appear to depend upon the intellectual abilities required to give good advice with respect to any subject under deliberation, in other words, practical wisdom. The speaker would need appropriate knowledge and mastery of the forms and materials of rhetorical proof: "It follows plainly, therefore, that he who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced will also be best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respect it differs from the syllogism of strict logic."[24]

For Habermas, likewise, the establishment of truth claims is a matter of argumentation, for a problematic truth claim would have to be redeemed in discourse. Given the speaker's immanent obligation to provide grounds for validity claims, when presented with a challenge, the speaker faces the alternatives of "breaking off communication altogether, switching over to strategic forms of interaction (such as conflict or competition), or raising communication to the level of argumentative discourse for the purpose of examining the problematic (hypothetical) claims."[25] Now, when Habermas speaks of "discourse," he has in mind his Ideal Speech Situation, a model of unconstrained discussion, marked by perfect equality and freedom among the participants, which "guarantees" that a problematic claim will be resolved by the "force of the better argument," and by no other compulsion.[26] Thus, the speaker's claims to utter truth—and claims to good sense—rest not alone on what s/he says, but on the willingness to test the propositional contents of utterance in free and unconstrained discussion. I submit that this is largely consistent with Aristotle who understood the forensic and deliberative arenas of rhetorical action as quasi-dialectical, that is, as settings for relatively free and open debate. Moreover, Aristotle, too, has recourse to an ideal conception of argumentation as the foundation of truth when he characerizes dialectic as "a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries."[27] As a critical standard, therefore, "good sense" may be understood, not only as the rhetor's obligation to give good reasons, but also as the willingness to defend them in critical discourse. It is for these reasons that a refusal to debate or a "rose-garden strategy" give us the strongest grounds for withdrawing trust from a speaker.

A similar analysis can be given for the parallel between Aristotle's concept of good character as a constituent part of ethos and Habermas' notion of the validity claim of normative appropriateness. Both theorists have in mind the speaker's conforming to appropriate values in the construction of appeals and in behavior. Thus, Aristotle directs the rhetor to *topoi* concerning the noble and the base, and advises the study of the moral character associated with each form of government in preparation for political oratory.[28] Habermas adds the additional stipulation that normative claims, like truth claims, can be redeemed in discourse. Thus, the critical apparatus is extended a step here, too, as the speaker is seen to be accountable, not only for the portrayal of proper character, but for the willingness to test values in a critical discussion.

The notions of good will and the claim to sincerity do not match up quite so neatly as the preceding pairs. Nevertheless, there seems to be a common core of understanding in the two theories. Goodwill, for Aristotle, entails a regard for the audience's interests, a willingness to give the sort of advice we would want ourselves in a similar situation. This does not seem too far from Habermas' notion of making oneself transparent before a listener by revealing ones' true beliefs, feelings and intentions.

The more serious problem in applying Habermas' notion of sincerity as a validity claim to the analysis of *ethos* arises from limits on his present theory. In focusing on communication oriented to achieving understanding, he sets aside for further analysis the category of strategic action wherein the sincerity claim is "suspended."[29] How he will apply his analysis of implicit speech acts to strategic (and symbolic) communication remains to be seen in future elaborations of the theory. So far, he has merely hinted at a resolution when he remarks that other forms of action are "derivatives of action oriented to reaching understanding," and that the latter is somehow "embedded" in the former.[30] At least this much seems reasonable, the claim to sincerity—or good will—remains a sensible critical standard to which speakers can be held accountable.

Thus, it seems to me, Habermas' account of the validity bases of speech echoes Aristotle's account of the dimensions of *ethos*, and the former theory can be used to elaborate and extend the latter. There are important differences in the two theories, to be sure. Aristotle's rhetorical theory is grounded in a broad philosophical system, but his analysis of ethical appeal seems to rest mainly on observation and intuition. Habermas theory goes beyond such mundane observation in an effort to uncover the rational bases of speech in the very nature of communication. Early in his work, he wrote,

> . . . in every speech act the *telos* of reaching an understanding is already inherent. . . . We can only say in a self-explicative sense that language communication "serves" this reaching of an understanding. Every understanding reached is confirmed in a reasonable consensus, as we say; otherwise it does not represent a "real" understanding. Competent orators know that every consensus attained can in fact be deceptive; but they must always have been in possession of the prior concept of the rational consensus underlying the concept of a deceptive (or merely compulsory) consensus. . . . we can attempt to clarify the normative implications that lie in the concept of possible understanding, with which every speaker (and hearer) is naively familiar.[31]

Habermas' program of theory and research in pursuit of those objectives can help us to understand in a deeper way what it means to speak with good character, good sense, and good will.

Implications and Further Speculations

The first set of implications to be derived from this discussion refers back to the perplexities mentioned earlier. Examining *ethos* from Habermas' perspective suggests reasonable and interesting answers to some of the questions that trouble readers of Aristotle. First shall we agree with Aristotle that *ethos* is a concept to be applied exclusively to the speech itself? Obviously, on Habermas view, the answer is no. For the validity claims raised in a given speech cannot, in any ultimate sense, be redeemed in the speech itself. They remain always open to the challenge of a subsequent discourse. And, so, an inherent element of the speaker's *ethos* is bound up with the willingness to enter into discourse for the sake of resolving problematic validity claims. This notion may be applied as a critical principle in at least two ways. First, to the extent that a speaker attempts to shield implicit claims from the possibility of recognition and critique, the speaker is properly open to censure. Second, and perhaps more important, the critic's field of vision must necessarily widen to encompass the speaker's communicative action with respect to a subject matter over time. That is to say, it will often not be sufficient for the critic to ask, did this rhetor display good sense or good character in this specific instance; rather the critic will often be enjoined to inquire whether the speaker has held herself/himself open to discourse in appropriate critical forums.

The second and third perplexities noted above are related, and may be answered in the same way. First, persons schooled in the conventional Aristotelian rationalism that dominated our view of rhetoric until very recently have been uncomfortable with the master's statement that *ethos* may be the most powerful of the modes of persuasion. We resist this statement because we want to hold that it is substantive proof that should count most in deliberation, not mere charisma or authority. Second, our resistance is fueled by Aristotle's own apparent ambivalence. We perceive him wavering between the desire to "let the facts speak for themselves," and the recognition that hearers are inevitably influenced by personality and emotion. How, then, can the power of *ethos* be reconciled with the desire for "reason" to prevail?

The answer I want to suggest is the most speculative point of all in this essay. It is this: one consequence of applying Habermas' perspective on communicative action to the analysis of *ethos* is to effect a radical re-ordering of the relationships among the Aristotelian modes of persuasion. *Logos* is displaced from its traditional pre-eminent position. Even a claim to coordinate status for *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* is thrown into doubt. And, *ethos* becomes the superordinate construct under which we arrange our conceptions of *logos* and *pathos*. *Ethos* is the most powerful mode of persuasion because it embraces the others. The evaluation of good character, good sense and good will entails the evaluation of *logos* and *pathos* as the speaker's creations.

Let us return to the parallels explored earlier and extend them a step further. The concept of good sense refers us to the implied validity claims concerning the truth of utterance (and, perhaps, certain normative claims as well when they feature as premises in argument). What is thematized here (or potentially thematized) is the propositional content of the speech. And what is this but *logos*? In Aristotle's terms, this is simply the subject matter of the topic at hand; but in Habermas' terms—and the difference is important—it is the speaker's personal treatment of the subject matter, an interpretation for which the speaker remains responsible. The facts never do speak for themselves. As much of the current literature on rhetoric-as-epistemic tells us, rhetors speak for facts. Thus, *logos* may be construed as a subsidiary category of *ethos*. One exhibits good sense by speaking "truth."

Next, I have suggested that the concept of good character can be analyzed and extended by reference to the normative claims implicit in speech acts and the speaker's willingness to examine values in a critical discourse. The pathetic quality of a speech, the arousing of sentiment and emotion, comes about through the application of appropriate values or norms to the subject and situation. So, *pathos*, too, may be subsumed under the analysis of *ethos*. Finally, the dimension of good will may be assimilated to the sincerity claim. But this element itself, is, a value orientation and a dimension of character. Certainly, the person found lacking in sincerity (when not intending irony or the like) is thought to be defective in character or to be in violation of appropriate norms. Thus, sincerity may, in the context of either theory, be taken as a sub-set of normative appropriateness.

Having thus turned traditional categories topsy-turvy. perhaps this is as far as one should go without lapsing into conceptual gamesmanship. I hope to have done something more that merely "look at the elephant from another angle," for I believe that Habermas' critical theory can be applied to rhetoric with important results. *Ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* may be taken, on some readings of Aristotle at least, as mere techniques for the management of persuasive appeal. But if we take Habermas' view, we must regard them as inherently normative concepts that direct our attention to the rhetor as the creator of truths and values. All rhetorical action is, in a fundamental sense, ethical action; and all rhetorical criticism must ultimately be concerned with *ethos*.

NOTES

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are from the translation by Rhys Roberts in *Rhetoric and Poetics of Aristotle*, with an introduction and notes by Friedrich Solmsen; Modern Library (N.Y.: Random House, 1954).

[2] *Rhetoric*, 1355^{b}37-40

[3] *Ibid*., 1356^{a}1-5.

[4] William M. A. Grimaldi, S. J., *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Hermes, no. 25 (1972), p. 24 See also chapter 2.

[5] *Ibid*., p. 58. Grimaldi prefers to use the term *pragma* in the place of the more conventional *logos* in order to emphasize the subject-matter as a source of proof. See pp. 45-46 and chapter 2.

[6] *Rhetoric*, 1356^{a}5.

[7] Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, trans. John Henry Freese; Loeb Library (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1926), 1356^{a}5.

[8] *Rhetoric*, 1377^{b}22.

[9] *Ibid*., 1377^{b}25.

[10] *Ibid*., 1378^{a}6-15.

[11] *Ibid*., 1356^{a}9.

[12] *Ibid*., 1356^{a}13. Freese is even more definite in his translation: ". . . moral character, so to say, constitutes the most effective means of proof."

[13] *Ibid*., 1404^{a}7.

[14] *Ibid*., 1366^{a}10-12.

[15] *Ibid*., 1404^{a}5.

[16] Grimaldi, p. 136.

[17] For a concise introduction see Brant R. Burleson and Susan L. Kline, "Habermas' Theory of Communication: A Critical Explication," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 65 (December 1979), 412-428. The best full-length study of Habermas' work is Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1978).

[18] Burleson and Kline, p. 412.

[19] Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), p. 1. Hereafter abbreviated as *CES*.

[20] *Ibid*. A possible objection should be noted here, although it is not possible to deal with it directly within the scope of this paper. Some writers have questioned the applicability of Habermas' theory to rhetoric because he has not so far applied it to "symbolic" and "strategic" communication. For a discussion of those ommisions, see, James Aune, "The Contributions of Habermas to Rhetorical Validity," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 16 (Fall 1979), 109; and Thomas B. Farrell, "The Ideality of Meaning of Argument: A Revision of Habermas," in *Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation*, eds. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 905-926.

[21] Habermas, *CES*, pp. 2-3, 58.

[22] I will omit the claim to intelligibility from subsequent discussion, as Habermas has done in some of his recent work. It may be assumed, I think, that a parallel could be found in Aristotle's recommendations for clarity and correctness of style.

[23] Habermas, *CES*, p. 62.

[24] *Rhetoric*, 1355^{a}10-14

[25] McCarthy, p. 290.

[26] The fullest account of the Ideal Speech Situation, so far as I know, is an essay not yet published in English: Jürgen Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," in *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Festschrift für Walter Schulz* (Pfullingen, 1973). I rely on a draft translation by Richard Grabau.

[27] Aristotle, *Topics*, 101^{b}3.

[28] *Rhetoric*, 1365^{b}25-1368^{a}35.

[29] Habermas, *CES*, p. 41.

[30] *Ibid*., pp. 1, 41.

[31] Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 17.

THE END OF REASON: THE CRITIQUE OF RATIONALITY AS ARGUMENTATIVE STRATEGY IN HORKHEIMER

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Reason is, at best, a slippery creature. Every effort to pin reason down and analyze it within a synchronic philosophy has been humiliated by its laughing diachrony. Over time, reason has been the friend of the progressive, the penetrating light of reality in a musty society (as in "The Age of Reason") and the last refuge of the dying regime, the rebuke to the forces that unthinkingly rend the social fabric (as in "sweet reason," the consolation of philosophy). But reason quickly takes leave of its companions when their time has passed.

Of late, reason has not fared well at the hands of critics of argumentation. In their eyes, reason for too long has been associated with the demons of logic, the qualification of truth to that which can be derived analytically. That every meaningful statement must contain its own means of verification seems a nightmare of reason, for it denies the need for argument. It is much easier to preserve argument if reason is reduced to belief-value. Thus Willard insists: "But rationality has been more a piety than an accomplishment. The main uses of the word make it in every case redundant to some other term except, as a loose adjective, when it names the value placed upon the results of the other concept. If 'Reason is thought to be a faculty to be contrasted with, say, Passion and Will, 'rationality' merely gives value to someone's relying on Reason. If reason is a process (as in the usual senses of 'reasoning,' 'ratiocination,' or thought), 'rationality' specifies those procedures of which a particular theorist approves."[1] Reason has no significance outside of the ways in which people use reason when they argue. If we scrutinize those uses, we will understand all we need to know about "reason," as well as argument.

But will we lose something in thus narrowing our sights? Willard believes that skepticism has made a mockery of universal reason and comparative rationality. Argumentation must jettison reason if it is to rid itself of the parasite skepticism and its peculiar virus "tu quoque." Max Horkheimer believed as well that skepticism destroyed universal reason. But from a social and historical perspective, he saw the "cure" as no better than the disease. Reason defined within a "field" of discourse, whether through encounters, relations, schools of thought, or membership in social groups, may manifest abject surrender to socially-enforced fears for self-preservation. If we can afford the energy to appreciate his argument more fully, we may wish to reconsider our critical stance toward argumentation to preserve the possibility of another form of reason.

Horkheimer had good reason to worry about the state of man. At the time his work "The End of Reason"[2] was published (1941), fascist government held sway over several European societies and was mobilizing human resources to wage a war of conflict. The members of Horkheimer's Institute for Social Research were exiles in America from National Socialist rule in Germany. But Horkheimer did not find fascism to be an aberration; rather, it was the working out of the implications of a conception of reason that absorbed the individual into a social totality.

The rationalistic notion of reason as a universal metaphysical principle (what Willard calls Reason as a faculty) was particularly compatible with structures of social relations that promoted harmony between the productive activities of individuals and the functioning of society as a whole. Whether that harmony was imposed by favored groups upon those at the base of the social pyramid by force or by religious principles of sacrifice or self-abnegation, the doctrine of universal reason assured that all knew the order of relationships among men and what kind of performances would be expected of them.[3] "Reason, in humanism, aimed at the proper balance between what is good for the individual and what is good for the totality."[4] As long as it was possible to maintain the substance of individuality in social relations (where property was secure and individuals competed economically), reflective thought and theory could have meaning and skillful public argumentation could be an instrument of progress.[5] But "[W]hen the social mechanisms which made for this unity are weakened as they are today, the individual's concern for his self-preservation changes its meaning. What previously served to promote man's development, the joy in knowledge, living through memory and foresight, pleasure in oneself and others, narcissism as well as love, are losing their content."[6] There was no longer room for an individual ego in societies that required teamwork for the preservation of the whole.[7]

The weakness of reason as rationalistic dogmatism was its false appeal to universality when it served only to defuse the underlying tensions of competing social interests. "Reason has to master rebellious feelings and instincts, the inhibition of which is supposed to make human cooperation possible."[8] But the principle of reason did not eliminate the claims of such interests, which grew in strength as industrialization proceeded. "The difficulties of rationalistic philosophy originate from the fact that the universality of reason cannot be anything else than the accord among the interests of all individuals alike, whereas in reality society has been split up into groups with conflicting interests."[9] Philosophical methods reflected these changes. Reason, in the guise of skeptical critique, turned upon itself, revealing the growing disparity between the image of the harmonious relationship and the actual state of affairs. "Skepticism purged the idea of reason of so much of its content that today scarcely anything is left of it."[10] In earlier times, rationalists and empiricists fought over whether the potential solidarity of mankind was worthy of philosophical consideration than the existing reality of violence needed to enforce such solidarity. "At the close of the liberal era, however, thinking in terms of mere existence, of sober self-preservation, has spread over the whole of society. All men have become empiricists."[11]

Perhaps this view puts a gloss on Willard's statements about the role of skepticism in defeating formal justificationist theories about argument evaluation and the ability of his field notion to avoid it. Willard employs the method of skepticism and the defense of empiricism to show (1) that the epistemic views of formal theories are defeated by their own logic and (2) that formal theories succeed only by closure. "With respect to (1) we would use the tu quoque and case-specific skeptical challenges appropriate to the claims we are considering. The power of our skepticism would be fueled by the breadth and power of the formal claims to knowledge which have been made. With respect to (2) we would point to the obvious: 'If you in principle rule empirical claims out of discourse, no empirical field in principle owes you its attention; since epistemics is an irretrievably empirical field, it owes no debts to purely formal arguments.'"[12] Willard's program, then, is to destroy reason (defined as faculty) through skepticism and empiricism. This same empiricism allows his field studies to escape skeptical objections through limited relativism. We are dealing with the "fact of relativity" here: "Rather, man often doubts that he knows but must act (as if he knows). Our aim is to understand how people express and ameliorate their doubts; the empirical focus which serves this aim is upon argument interactions and the things said in them."[13]

Horkheimer's perspective on empiricism, however, sees it as the embodiment of a new set of social relations which further enslave individuals in an argument from the "fact" of totality. If his view is plausible, Willard's insistence upon a retreat to empiricism threatens to subject the possibility of invention in argument to the tyranny of the field.

How does empiricism reflect a new notion of reason that allows the individual to be overwhelmed by social totality? Horkheimer finds in the philosophy of the empiricist Locke a kind of technical reason (which Willard might call reasoning as a process) that promotes patterns of rationalistic behavior. "He appended four degrees of reason: discovering truths, regularly and methodically ordering them, perceiving their connections, and drawing the right conclusion. Apart from the final cause, these functions today still are held to be rational."[14] Reason and efficiency come together as discussion of ends is replaced by discovery of the superior means.[15] "Reason in this sense is as indispensable in the modern technique of war as it has always been in the conduct of business. Its features can be summarized as the optimum adaptation of means to ends, thinking as an energy-conserving operation. It is a pragmatic instrument oriented to expediency, cold and sober."[16]

The channeling of human interests into means-ends calculation fulfills the requirements of technically-organized large-scale production and facilitates other social relations that reinforced the domination of nature. Mass production made explicit force uneconomical and skepticism made religious beliefs untenable in the age of industrialization; technical reason gave people a new purpose for labor. "Where formerly they worked for the sake of salvation, they were now induced to work for work's sake, profit for profit's sake, power for power's sake. The whole world was transformed into a mere 'material.'"[17] Technical reason also prepares the individual for the expanded time horizon of planned production. To be part of a production team, the person must suppress his own long-term plans. "The individual constricts himself. Without dream or history, he is always watchful and ready, always aiming at some immediate practical goal. His life falls into a sequence of data which fit in advance the questionnaires he has to answer. He takes the spoken word only as a medium of information, orientation, and command."[18] The idolizing of bodily suppleness and quick thinking represents another product of technocratic reason, for these qualities yield the "ready response." Technical reason reaches into education, child-rearing and sexual freedom to destroy the legitimacy of pure theory, childhood and love.

Fascism differentiates itself from other forms of modern society only in the ferocity and efficiency with which it subjugates and absorbs the individual ego within the social totality. It recognizes that production can be made even more secure by the harnessing of government power in support of monopolized technology. Delegation of authority, for example, can be more reliable. "Under totalitarian conditions of society, reliability decides upon the allocation of all positions of trust, whether a manager of a provincial factory is to be appointed or the head of a puppet government. Side by side with efficiency, human qualities of a kind win respect, particularly a resolution to go along with the powerful at any cost."[19] Fascism also enforces conformity by replacing the fear of ultimate death with something more immediate and devastating--the seemingly irrational imposition of pain and torture. "Fascism has reinstated pain on its throne. . . . The contradiction between what is requested of man and what can be offered to him has become so striking, the ideology so thin, the discontents in civilization so great that they must be compensated through annihilation of those who do not conform, political enemies, Jews, asocial persons, the insane. The new order of fascism is reason revealing itself as unreason."[20] The oppressors take on the mannerisms of the oppressed to distance themselves further from the truth that must be suppressed.

In the face of this barbarism, abstract thought has been rendered helpless. Technical reason claims that a pluralism of ends makes reasoning about such matters foolish. "As a result, the value judgment has nothing to do with reason and science. It is regarded as a matter of subjective preference whether one decides for liberty or obedience, democracy or fascism, enlightenment or authority, mass culture or truth."[21] The legitimacy of contemplation has been undercut by the fetish for ready response. "Without otium philosophical thought is impossible, cannot be conceived or understood. In such a state of affairs, the argumentative procedure of traditional philosophy appears as helpless and idle talk."[22] Instead of searching for meanings, philosophers in the modern age investigate functions. Finally, the sheer brutality of fascist torture contradicts traditional reason so fundamentally that consciousness of the source of oppression fades in the shock. "Its tortures transcend the power to perceive or imagine; when thought attempts to comprehend the deed, it stiffens with horror and is rendered helpless."[23]

Under these conditions, what can happen to "ordinary argumentative interaction"? Scrutinizing individual exchanges without sensitivity to the ways in which they are historically constituted may cause the argument critic to objectify the interaction, to add to the veils that already hide their meaning. If individuals often treat the spoken word as a medium of information, orientation, and command, what seems to be dissensus actually may be a more subtle technical coorientation or a mutual recognition of one side's powerlessness. Knowledge gained through such interactions may be incidental to action toward the domination of nature. Moreover, the emphasis of the critic upon determining the functions or purposes of the interactants may miss what possibilities the arguer loses when discourses in a field are viewed as exemplars of goal-directed behavior. Perhaps the most disturbing prospect may be the unwitting role of the empirical investigation in apologizing for the current state of affairs. Like linguistic analysis, argument field study takes "things as they are." "Field studies, we have said, are not ends in themselves but (rather) the preconditions of successful critical enterprises. These studies aim not at critique but at an understanding of the presuppositions which affect the premises and procedures of arguments."[24] But as Horkheimer remarked in another context, an insane society could hold certain presuppositions as "facts," and its empirical sciences would have nothing more to say about them.[25] In the same spirit, one would be foolish to claim that Willard's empiricist view is "wrong," but one can ask whether it is all that criticism can be.

Does Horkheimer inspire us to consider an alternative, a critical theory of argument? He gives us guidance on this question at the conclusion of his essay. It seems clear, first, that the intention of the critic must be more than justification or description. A critical theory must stem from an interest in liberation.[26] Horkheimer finds in traditional philosophy a respect for the possibilities of freedom through the realization of things as they actually are. "The propositions of idealistic philosophy that distinguish man from the animal. . . contain the truth that through reason man freed himself of the fetters of nature. This liberation, however, does not entitle man to dominate nature (as the philosophers held) but to comprehend it. . . . Reason could recognize and denounce the forms of injustice and thus emancipate itself from them. As the faculty of calling things by their name, reason is more than the alienated life that preserves itself in the destruction of others and of itself."[27] The more onerous and efficient the sources of terror in a society, the closer the critic will come to a recognition that she and other arguers within ordinary spheres of social relations can dispense with the interests of self-preservation that enforce domination in those arguments.

To reach the critical moment, however, the critic must perceive that all reason, including her own concepts, is historically constituted. That claims to false objectivity and ontological certainty cannot be made for such studies is not a disgrace, for it is the process of historical change itself that makes critique possible. "To be sure, reason cannot hope to keep aloof from history and to intuit the true order of things, as ontological ideologies contend. In the inferno to which triumphant reason has reduced the world it loses its illusions, but in doing so it becomes capable of facing this inferno and recognizing it for what it is."[28] Those methods which claim scientific validity do so at the cost of drawing the curtain between objects they study and the social relations that give these objects true significance. The critic must look beyond specific forms of interaction and the modern culture that engenders them for insights from the precultural world. Often this insight takes the form of remembering what has been forgotten in the processes of reification and social change.

Finally, argument criticism must be dialectical. Critics must have the ability to discover the truth in arguments that have been lost in history and not assume that current notions have succeeded because they are ontologically correct and the sole respositories of truth. As Horkheimer observed in another work, ". . . by doing justice to those images and ideas that at given times dominated reality in the role of absolutes--e.g. the idea of the individual as it dominated the bourgeois era--and that have been relegated in the course of history, philosophy can function as a corrective of history, so to speak. Thus ideological stages of the past would not be equated simply with stupidity and fraud--the verdict brought against medieval thought by the philosophy of the French Enlightenment. . . . Though divested of the power they had in their contemporary setting, they would serve to cast light upon the current course of humanity. In this function, philosophy would be mankind's memory and conscience, and thereby help to keep the course of humanity from resembling the meaningless round of the asylum inmate's recreation hour."[29]

At the same time, the critic must take care to preserve the negation within the critical discourse. The truths uncovered by critique of argument practice cannot be verified or falsified simply by reference to current philosophies or the existing state of affairs, for the critique raises possibilities not yet realized. The critic must point to the "negative" characteristics within the current order and keep open the sense of possibilities that have been neglected or lost in the choices we have made.

For an example of how dialectical sensitivity can be applied usefully to argument criticism, consider for a moment Willard's principle of nonclosure as a determining factor in separating out argument fields that are worthy of attention. "'Closure' occurs when one insists that one can be refuted only on one's own grounds."[30] Willard alleges that there are some fields that "rely" upon closure for success and some that do not, and that closed fields are unworthy of attention, or at least deserving of a wrist slap. But from a historical and dialectical view, we might find that closure possesses an important truth that must be remembered. For some societies, closure in its social philosophy may be what allows that philosophy to be identified with socially progressive forces. Empiricism, for example, refuses to be refuted by any argument that is not based upon empirical evidence. Its refusal to consider rationalistic and metaphysical challenges made it useful in the development of the technical means of production and the rise of social totality in the twentieth century. A similar claim might be made about arguments from Social Darwinism in the late nineteenth century. By examining the role of argumentative closure in its mediations with on-going processes of social change, the critic can achieve a better understanding of the emergence of closure within argumentative interactions.

If the critic performs these tasks well, she may come to appreciate the dialectical interrelationships between the two notions of reason described earlier in this essay. The real objective of Critical Theory in argument study, as in its other endeavors, is to attempt some reconciliation between them in the cause of human freedom. As Horkheimer argues elsewhere, "[t]he two concepts of reason do not represent two separate and independent ways of the mind, although their opposition expresses a real antimony. The task of philosophy is not stubbornly to play the one against the other, but to foster a mutual critique and thus, if possible, to prepare in the intellectual realm the reconciliation of the two in reality."[31] The end of reason is the end of reason destroying itself; it maintains the possibility of critique and of liberation.

NOTES

[1] Charles A. Willard, *Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1983), p. 14.

[2] Max Horkheimer, "The End of Reason," *Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences* 9 (1941), 366-388, reprinted in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, eds., *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* (New York: Urizen Books, 1978), pp. 26-47. Hereinafter referred to as "End of Reason." Page citations will be made to the reprinted edition.

[3] For a more detailed description of this position, see Chapter IV, "The Rise and Decline of the Individual," in Max Horkheimer, *The Eclipse of Reason* (New York: The Seabury Press, reprint ed., 1974 [1947]), pp. 128-161. Hereinafter referred to as *The Eclipse of Reason*.

[4] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 29.

[5] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 38.

[6] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 36.

[7] In the later work of Theodor Adorno, this philosophy developed to the level of a complete negation of the concept of the totality, a position which led Adorno to cut his ties with orthodox Marxism. "'In the face of totalitarian unity,' Adorno wrote, 'which cries out for the elimination of differences directly as meaning . . . something of the liberating social forces may even have converged in the sphere of the individual. Critical Theory lingers there without a bad conscience." Translated excerpt from Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1951), p. 10, contained in Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 277.

[8] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 30.

[9] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 30.

[10] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 27.

[11] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 30.

[12] Willard, p. 276.

[13] Willard, p. 235.

[14] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 28.

[15] Horkheimer offers a more thorough discussion of this development in "Means and Ends," Chapter 1 of *The Eclipse of Reason*, pp. 3-57.

[16] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 28.

[17] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 34.

[18] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 37.

[19] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 35.

[20] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 46.

[21] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 31.

[22] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 39.

[23] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 44.

[24] Willard, p. 277.

[25] See Max Horkheimer, "The Latest Attack on Metaphysics," in *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell and others (New York: Continuum, 1982), pp. 160-161.

[26] Tom Farrell has made a similar observation with respect to the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy: "My position is that the study of rhetoric might 'learn' from philosophy, insofar as philosophic inquiry (as content and method) remains affiliated with the liberating prospects for human reason. But to the extent that 'schools' of philosophy abandon reasoned reflection in search of mythic, poetic, or technical visions of discovery, then reason--as Kuhn anticipated for the sciences--must become a study in the capacity of conviction to maintain itself through practical means. Reason, in short, finds itself studying the failed persuasion of philosophy. This legacy has no territorial ambitions, other than recovery. It is an investigation that is inherited, found rather than willed. And it is rhetorical." Thomas B. Farrell, "Rhetoric, Practical Reason, and the Counter-Enlightenment," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Summer Conference on the Philosophy of Communication, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, June 1982, pp. 1-2.

[27] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 47.

[28] Horkheimer, "End of Reason," p. 47.

[29] Horkheimer, *The Eclipse of Reason*, p. 186.

[30] Willard, p. 271.

[31] Horkheimer, *The Eclipse of Reason*, p. 174.

ARGUMENT-AS-EPISTEMIC AND THE MATTER OF UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS

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Introduction

In this essay, I explore the question: If there are unsolvable problems, does this fact invalidate the role of argument in the generation, acquisition, defense, and change of knowledge?[1] I take it that this is an important question for argumentation scholars for several reasons. First, unsolvable problems are interesting problems in and of themselves, as can be seen from the attention devoted to them, whether as the technical concept of "unsolvability" in mathematical logic, or as found in conversational argument. Second, unsolvable problems appear to be related to other significant issues, including the notion of "progress." Third, unsolvable problems may define the limits of argument as a method and, therefore, could serve as a guide to research. Fourth, unsolvable problems appear to occupy the intersection between argument and action, a locus that I submit is of considerable theoretical and practical significance.

Lest one will be tempted to answer this question too quickly, let me chart some of the dangers inherent to it. If we grant that there are unsolvable problems, it is possible that, if argument has not failed us altogether as an epistemic process, it has failed us in at least some interesting and important cases. If, on the other hand, we deny that there are well-founded but unsolvable problems, we may seem to fly in the face of history, and we bear, therefore, the responsibility of specifying how and where solutions are to be found. Finally, if we claim that argument is effective in creating knowledge in some cases but ineffective in other cases, then we assume the burden of explaining the criteria or processes by which these distinctions are made.

I will assume, for the sake of discussion, that argument is "epistemic" in a strong sense of the word. From this point of view, which I will touch upon below, argument is instrumental in the creation of knowledge. I want to argue, then, that there are well-formed but unsolvable problems but that this fact does not in any way invalidate claims that argument is an epistemic process. I shall thus challenge the notion that argument must have a clear resolution in order to function epistemically. Nevertheless, I will try to avoid gravitating to the opposite extreme—the view that argument is merely an invigorating form of intellectual jousting, wherein the process is more important than the creation of knowledge.

Argument-as-Epistemic

Scott's seminal essay was an early attempt to construe the epistemic

function of rhetoric.[2] Willard restates the case from the point of view of argumentation theory: "Hence, the study of arguments (construed primarily as a special kind of interaction among naive social actors) may be an important starting place for epistemological inquiry."[3] Brinton portrays two schools of thought among those who hold that rhetoric/argument is epistemic: (1) those who hold that only certain types of truths are created rhetorically and (2) those who hold the more radical view that truth is grounded in nothing more than intersubjective agreement.[4] Croasmun and Cherwitz apparently oppose this latter position, what they call "rhetorical relativism,"[5] but surely it is possible to insist that argument is epistemic without denying that there is an external, "objective" reality, and without falling into a thoroughgoing relativity.[6]

On the assumption that argument is epistemic in the strong sense, I offer a starting point, developed elsewhere,[7] for describing the epistemic function of argument. Briefly stated, I contend that Rescher's methodological pragmatism offers a framework for describing argument methods as instrumentalities for creating knowledge. Theses are justified by the application of a method, and methods are justified by reference to practical criteria. This approach has the advantage of helping argumentation scholars to define the connection between argument and action.

Unsolvable Problems

Having said this much about the role of argument in the creation of knowledge, let us move to the issue of unsolvable problems. Gallie distinguishes between empirical or formal concepts and philosophical concepts. He states that an essential feature of the latter is that "their criteria must always be in dispute."

> Further, I shall try to show that there are disputes, centred on the concepts which I have just mentioned, which are perfectly genuine: which, although not resolvable by argument of any kind, are nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence. This is what I mean by saying that these are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.[8]

As examples of essentially contested concepts, Gallie offers a range of hypothetical and actual examples, including several allusions to the language of religion, art, science, democracy, and social justice.

Rapaport, from whom I have borrowed the phrase "unsolvable problems," examines unsolvable problems as they relate to the issue of progress in philosophy. He maintains that "the apparent unsolvability of philosophical problems is illusory." Rapaport's stance is that "there are solutions, but they are all theory-laden, hence theory-relative...." For Rapaport, then, a prime, underlying issue in addressing unsolvable problems is his belief that "...we must commit ourselves to some theory."

Kuhn's notion of "incommensurability" between paradigms[10] and Willard's discussion of disagreements as interfield disputes[11] are other ways of speaking about unsolvable problems. According to Kuhn, movement from one paradigm to another is a revolutionary accomplishment and not an evolutionary process. He asserts that this movement is akin to religious conversion.

Willard concludes that justificationism is a dead-end: "...our organizing question should concern which fields merit our attention as we study knowledge and knowing. This question opens the door to seeing interfield disputes in a more productive way."[12] Willard presents what he calls a "modified hermeneutic posture," or what I would term, in his language, a way of doing *evaluation* of unsolvable problems. Some of the principles that can be brought to bear on the adequacy of field theory in explaining and resolving interfield disputes include: (1) fields are not hierarchically arranged; (2) the "invariant-field dependent" dichotomy is unproductive; (3) one incurs obligations when one borrows from another argument field; (4) argumentation principles are deontological; and (5) stability and change are thus explained in the same terms.[13]

I have, of course, greatly simplified the positions of these scholars and have transformed their concepts into forms that are compatible with the purposes of the present essay. Nevertheless, we may envision a kind of continuum on the matter of unsolvable problems. At one end, Gallie argues that essentially contested concepts are not resolvable by arguments of any kind. At the other end, Rapaport argues that the apparent unsolvablity of philosphical problems is illusory. In the middle range of the continuum, Kuhn and Willard suggest that unsolvable problems are a function of incommensurable judgmental and veridical standards, and they go on to describe some of the responses to unsolvable problems.

I submit that the positions of Gallie and Rapaport are weakened substantially by overstatement. I object to Gallie's claim that the criteria of philosophical concepts *must always* be in dispute, that "it is quite impossible to find a *generic principle* for deciding which of two contestant uses of an essentially contested concept really 'uses it best'...."[14] This viewpoint is open to two criticisms. First, Gallie may have set up a restrictive definition and then ruled out all alternatives, by definition, as failing to meet his standard. Second, Gallie fails to appreciate the fact that language is a shared phenomenon; language is community property. Let us employ Gallie's example of the essentially contested concept "a Christian life" to frame a counterargument that criteria for the use of concepts may be agreed upon.

While it is difficult to find *universal* agreement on the usage of the concept "a Christian life," it is obvious that there is *substantial* agreement. For example, the National and the World Council of Churches have developed criteria for membership which define what it means to be a "Christian" denomination or church. Recently, there has been some dispute over whether a church that contains a large percentage of avowed homosexuals can be admitted as a Christian denomination. Notice,

however, that the disagreement is limited to the issue of whether homosexuality can be *added* to the base definition of "a Christian life."

The basic parameters of "a Christian life" apparently are rather well understood. The ecumenical movement after Vatican II led to substantial theological agreement on such seemingly insurmountable Roman Catholic-Protestant differences as celebration of the Eucharist or the place of Mary in piety and worship. Consequently, the concept "a Christian life" is employed with some facility by church leaders and by millions of ordinary persons. Gallie's position, then, is rather extreme. He fails to count *substantial* agreement on the use of concepts as resolving disputes in some cases.

Rapaport's position also is undermined by overstatement. A sympathetic reading of Rapaport could take him to mean that there are no non-theory laden solutions to hard problems, or that there are no solutions without commitments. If this is the case, then his views are similar to those of Kuhn and Willard. Yet, Rapaport goes too far when he asserts that the apparent unsolvability of philosophical problems is *illusory*. We can see the weakness in Rapaport's stance by probing his dependence upon the concept "commitment."

Can there be a lack of commitment on some philosophical problems? In principle, it clearly is conceivable that an individual can withhold judgment on an issue. All problems, even within the same paradigm, do not impinge upon one with equal force. There may be no compelling reason to resolve a problem; thus, there is no necessity to act. In addition, it is conceivable that an individual may have compelling reasons to act, but is able to postpone, perhaps indefinitely, making a judgment due to insufficient evidence or some psychological factor (such as fear). In these cases, there is no commitment. Therefore, Rapaport's implicit logic that commitment resolves unsolvable problems is confounded.

Individuals may live with *unsolved* problems, such as whether or not to make a career change. (No doubt the study of how individuals are able to "bracket" unsolved problems would be an interesting piece of research.) However, I now am concerned with demonstrating that *unsolvable* problems are not illusory. I wish to address arguments of the variety: "Abortion is murder." I take it that Rapaport quite correctly maintains that such problems can be resolved within the framework of a particular methodological orientation. But he overlooks the most common instance in which such a problem is debated, namely, during an argument between two individuals operating from two, distinct, incompatible frameworks--(1) Abortion is murder! versus (2) Abortion is not murder! I suggest that these individuals likely will not resolve the problem, precisely because they will not (and, perhaps, cannot) choose a particular methodological orientation. Again, I charge that Rapaport's perspective on the potential resolution of all unsolvable problems is too optimistic.

Argument and "Outcomes"

At this juncture, I propose that we look at the related question: Is it necessary for arguments to be resolved, to have "outcomes," to be cast in terms of "winners" or "losers" in order to be effective as epistemic processes? This is a natural question to pose as preparation for the defense of my thesis that unsolvable problems do not present a threat to the notion of argument-as-epistemic. Intuitively, it would appear that only one of two opposing statements, position A or position B, can be true and, thus, stand as knowledge-producing. Yet, I submit that this intuitive point of view may represent an uncritical assumption and not a datum upon which to build a theory.

The winner-loser model may fit our caricatures of the pursuit of truth in a debate or in a courtroom (although this view also is being challenged by Willard and others), but what are the grounds for the thesis that one side or the other must "win" an argument in order to create knowledge? Let me suggest and then defend the opposite position—the pursuit of knowledge can be construed as a matter of elaborative choice, which may have little to do with "winning" or "losing" an argument. This perspective, built on Kelly's theory,[15] deserves to stand next to the winner-loser model until the merits of each viewpoint can be evaluated or, shall I say, elaborated.

Willard, following Kelly's principle that elaborative choice is the essence of decision-making, promotes the view that "Elaboration is perspectival; a system suggests the ways that it can be elaborated...."[16] In a basic sense, then, an individual creates knowledge anew by incorporating what is accepted as knowledge into his or her (personal construct) system. Willard develops this position in the following way:

> 7. *Naive actors also may be served epistemically by argument*. The actor who draws no distinction between his point of view and the facts or who refuses to introduce threatening elements into a system may come to understand his own view more clearly. More than any other form of interaction (except, perhaps, clinical encounters), argument may force an unreflective arguer to weigh carefully his claims and to speculate about the links between evidence and claims. He will impose a rigor upon, if nothing else, his manner of communicating constructs that ultimately may affect how he sees things. Doubts about a system's usefulness (its range and focus of convenience) are brought into the open. Although the actor might defend the system at all costs, he may come to understand the opposing point of view more clearly, even if he does not see it as a point of view.[17]

I agree with Willard, but I am saying even more than this. I claim that the loci of the epistemic functioning of argument are in the elaboration of the individual's system and in the evolution of a public system. Because it is possible to reduce Willard's position to the trivial assertion that an individual "learns" something from engaging in an argument, I wish to change the focus from the process of learning to the product of learning.

The thrust of this section of my essay is to underscore the fact

that an individual learns *something* from and through the process of argumentation. It does not matter at present if we call this something "knowledge" or "justified true belief" or whatever. What is important is that, in principle, it is possible for each of two opposing parties in an argument to elaborate their construct system, to learn something, to create a truth. Argument has been effective as an epistemic process even in the face of pluralistic outcomes. Thus, argument is epistemic in the face of unsolvable problems.

Argument and Action

If argument can be epistemic even in the face of an unsolvable problem, then it behooves us to take a closer look at other examples of the epistemic processes at work in situations where arguments do not have an opportunity to be resolved in the traditional sense. Let us imagine situations in which the need for prompt action makes the traditional resolution of an argument a luxury. For example, when a pilot and a co-pilot face the imminent crash of their aircraft, automatic, trained responses are what we expect. Or, in the case of an argument over whether a firearm is loaded or not, prudence and past experience seem to demand that the arguers *act as if* the firearm were loaded. In these kinds of situations, we are close to Willard's observation: "I prefer Aristotle's approach to the practical syllogism which held that its conclusion was never a statement, always an action."[18]

Can we apply these insights to the argument over abortion which we have been using as an example? One could say that a pregnant teenager must cut short the debate about abortion at some point and act—either to have an abortion or to follow some other course of action. Does action *solve* the problem? In one sense, action does solve the problem; in another sense it does not.

Action may end the argument, as in the remark: "I don't want to talk about it anymore; I'm going to the clinic today." Or, action may make the argument irrelevant for the present actors, as in the situation where a woman tells her lover: "Darling, I meant to tell you. I had an abortion last week." On the other hand, the choice to have an abortion may not stop either the (internal) debate of conscience or the (external) debate with others. The individual may conclude that the decision to have an abortion is the best possible decision under the circumstances. Later, she may regret the decision as a profound mistake. Truth claims in the case of arguments over abortion are not open to the same kinds of factual or visual verification that may be possible in other argument fields. For example, two skydivers may argue over whether a parachute will open, but this argument is open to visual verification.

I wish to draw one major conclusion from this entire discussion. There is an epistemic component to action. First, action "resolves" arguments of the sort: Will the parachute open? or Is the gun loaded? Second, action may or may not "resolve" the question: Should I have an abortion?, but the individual's construct system has or will be elaborated no matter what the outcome. Knowledge has been generated, acquired, defended, or changed by and through action. Therefore, the thesis that argument may be epistemic even in cases where traditional resolutions do not occur is supported.

As another bit of evidence for my thesis that unsolvable problems do not threaten the epistemic function of argument, I present the interesting puzzle of so-called "counterfactuals." Consider the claim: "If I were to play chess with Bobby Fisher, I would lose."[19] This statement is likely to lead to endless debate because it would be difficult to arrange a chess match with Bobby Fisher to resolve the argument. Yet, for most novice chess players, this statement is "true." This is a complex area, but we may draw the preliminary conclusion that argument is epistemic in generating a "true" conclusion, even though it is unlikely that the claim ever will be open to empirical testing.

One final digression before I move on. Willard has suggested that power may be a key element in any analysis of argument as a social process.[20] Certainly, we recognize situations in which "truth" is a word that is defined by those who hold power in a group or in a society. While I am not prepared to transform argumentation theory or epistemology into an analysis of power alone, I am prepared to allow that any comprehensive study of argument and action, or argument and unsolvable problems, must include the topic of "power." Problems may be "solved" by the introduction of force, power, or coercion. Nevertheless, my first reaction is to suggest that the product of this kind of interaction is not the same as the elaboration of the powerless individual's construct system discussed above. I am open, however, to research findings on the social grounds of knowledge in coercive settings.

Orientational Pluralism

Rescher offers some guidance to argumentation scholars on the matter of unsolvable problems in noncoercive settings. He suggests that orientational pluralism offers an answer to the dilemmas usually associated with philosophical disagreement. He postulates a dualistic, two-tiered approach:

> Level 1: A one sidedly dogmatic commitment, "from where one sits" *at the basic doctrinal level*—that from one's own perspective (the only one that one has) there is one optimally adequate position.
>
> Level 2: A pluralistically relativistic recognition *at the meta-doctrinal level* that other perspectives "are available" (but only to others).[21]

Thus, we may have profound disagreement--an unsolvable problem--at the doctrinal level over the statement "Abortion is murder." Nonetheless, the problem may be "solved" at the meta-doctrinal level with the recognition that other points of view are available to others. This stance is more realistic than Rapaport's, because it enables Rescher to circumvent the fact that arguers may never agree on or commit themselves to a particular methodological orientation. Yet, they may agree to disagree!

It is important to note that Rescher places limits on his relativism. It is not accurate to conclude that an individual can believe whatever he or she wishes to believe. Rescher maintains that there are structures of validation. However, these validation mechanisms are cyclic rather than linear. In other words, one can only retrovalidate, that is, retrospectively revalidate one's methodological orientation.[22] In the case of the debate over abortion, an appeal to the teachings of a religious group (a methodological orientation), for instance, only can be retrovalidated. As with methodological pragmatism, the thesis is justified by the application of a method, and a method is justified by reference to how well it performs practically over time.

I grant that a cyclic or retrospective structure of validation opens the door to some problems. One crucial problem is the matter of decision making in the face of an urgent need for action. How can one act as if his or her doctrine were true, when the validation will be a retrovalidation? The answer, according to Rescher, is that we cannot "attain monolithic solutions in orientation-independent ways."[23] I would add this postscript to this formulation: arguers would be wise to remember that the solutions to their arguments are merely the plausibly best case. Solutions always stand in an *ad interim* posture. These conditions point to the need for an element of openness and humility in addressing serious disagreements, including unsolvable problems.

Conclusion

I have developed the position that there are well-founded problems that are unsolvable and have suggested, further, that this fact does not invalidate argument as an epistemic process. In the course of this essay, I have indicated that argument can play an epistemic role when there are no outcomes or when there are multiple outcomes. Finally, I have suggested that Rescher's "orientational pluralism" offers a framework for argumentation scholars in addressing hard cases of philosophical disagreement. Throughout, I have pointed to the many connections between argument and action, a link that I take to be one of the most important areas of research for argumentation scholars.

At many places in the essay, I have used the debate over abortion as an example of the various dimensions of the argumentation issues at hand. The reader may wish to substitute another doctrinal debate. I have held that argument is more than an empty intellectual exercise. Even in the face of unsolvable problems, argument may produce "knowledge," for want of a better term, through the operation of the principle of elaborative choice. In conclusion, I invite serious discussion on this subject from other perspectives, including, but not limited to, the fields of communication, epistemology, and ethics, and I encourage research on unsolvable problems to test the preliminary theoretical positions that I have outlined in this essay.

Footnotes

[1] I am indebted to Charles Arthur Willard for helpful comments

and criticisms on an earlier draft of this essay.

[2] Robert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," *Central States Speech Journal*, 18(1967), pp. 9-17.

[3] Charles Arthur Willard, "The Epistemic Functions of Argument: Reasoning and Decision-Making from a Constructivist/Interactionist Point of View," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 15(1979), pp.169-191.

[4] Alan Brinton, "William James and the Epistemic View of Rhetoric," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 68(1982), pp. 158-169.

[5] Earl Croasmun and Richard A. Cherwitz, "Beyond Rhetorical Relativism," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 68(1982), pp. 1-16.

[6] See Michael S. Bruner, "Beyond the Fear of Relativism," paper to be presented at the Speech Communication Association, Washington, D.C., November, 1983.

[7] See Michael S. Bruner, "Argument From a Pragmatic Perspective," *Journal of the American Forensic Association* (in press).

[8] W. B. Gallie, *Philosophy and the Historical Understanding*, Second Edition (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), see Chapter 8, pp. 157-191; see esp. p. 158.

[9] William J. Rapaport, "Unsolvable Problems and Philosophical Progress," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 19(1982), pp. 289-297; see esp. pp. 294 and 296.

[10] See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

[11] See Charles Arthur Willard, "Argument Fields," J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, eds., *Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), pp. 24-77; and *Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1983).

[12] Willard, "Argument Fields," p. 77.

[13] Willard, "Argument Fields," see esp. pp. 67-75.

[14] Gallie, p. 184.

[15] See George A. Kelly, *A Theory of Personality* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963) for background material on the principle of elaborative choice.

[16] Willard, "The Epistemic Functions of Argument," p. 183.

[17] Willard, "The Epistemic Functions of Argument," pp. 189-190.

[18] Willard, "The Epistemic Functions of Argument," pp. 180-181.

[19] See R. Lance Factor, "A Counterexample to Lehrer's Definition of Knowledge," *Critical Analysis*, 2(1978) pp. 37-41.

[20] Charles Arthur Willard, Lectures, University of Pittsburgh, Fall Term, 1982.

[21] Nicholas Rescher, "Philosophical Disagreement: An Essay Towards Orientational Pluralism in Metaphilosophy," *The Review of Metaphysics*, XXXII(1978), pp. 217-251; see esp. p. 239.

[22] Rescher, p. 231.

[23] Rescher, p. 238.

INTERROGATION AND UNDERSTANDING: THE ARGUMENTATIVE BASIS OF EXPERIENCE

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Although argument, argumentation, and rhetoric have occupied a central position in human communication studies since antiquity, only recently have they been opened to systematic ontological investigation as problematic issues in themselves. As such, this paper represents an effort to investigate argument in an attempt to bridge phenomenological communication theory with critical theory. In this sense, it is neither a phenomenology nor a critical theory per se. Moreover, it would be fair to say that the diversification of phenomenology in recent years to include aspects of empirical research as well as idealist philosophy would make such an undertaking next to impossible, if not unproductive. As well, critical theory describes the same sort of inconsistency or ambiguity, ranging from the radical positivism of Louis Althusser to the orthodox Marxian dialectics of the Frankfurt School. It would thus be nothing short of a massive project to unite these trends in Continental thought on matters of general philosophic principle, and this paper is by no means that ambitious. Nevertheless, the relevance of critical reflection symbolic of the work in existential phenomenology and critical theory ought not be understated, and this work is clearly at its best when it is applied to problems of meaning and understanding that arise when traditional epistemologies are at a crossroads. One instance of how traditional thinking has arrived at a critical juncture is the matter of language and the problem of understanding.

In a technological society the competence of social man is indistinguishable from his ethics, and vice versa. That which survives becomes a rule for success, and it is from within this framework that matters of aesthetic, moral, and analytical judgement have emerged under the guise of contemporary theories of efficacy and functionalism. And it is from within this framework that an individual must, in the spirit of William James, assert the "cash value" of his ideas in order to experience some aspect of formalized identity with orthodox rationality. In this respect, a good idea or a good argument is one that is not overwhelmed by the ideas or arguments that oppose it.

Many ideas have no apparent cash value. Many ideas, it may be said, can be rejected out of hand because they assert an inconsonance or disharmony with the continuity of our social well-being. Some of these ideas suggest but marginal social utility, some challenge the existence of known facts, some are foreign to our current understanding of world operations, some are revolutionary. Thus, the distinction one ordinarily makes about the quality of an idea is, more than anything else, a distinction about the world in general rather than the idea in specific. More to the point, ideas are not separate from the world; they originate from the world of our realities, they represent this world. Yet at the same time, an idea can compel us to consider the possibility of more than one reality within the world. But first they must be recognized as ideas and not as illusions or misapprehensions.[1] Ideas, once spoken or asserted, cannot in another moment be rendered "unspeakable," or at least not completely so. For instance, there are many types of ideas that, because of their implications, occur to us as "unspeakable." Genocide, nuclear holocaust, murder, rape, are instances of ideas unsituated in a rational world. Alien, hence disembodied, they become stripped of their evidence (or evident-ness) and are denied any possibility of reason; without reason and evidence, of course, no idea can be adequately judged and understood. In the absence of understanding, the "unspeakable," although spoken, is nevertheless spoken without sense. Yet, while it is logically incompatible to conceive of the unspeakable on the one hand, and provide a meaningful example on the other, it is not impossible to think of past examples or future scenarios of genocide, nuclear holocaust, and so on. What this implies is that the appearance of ideas draws reference to the sense of the world; however, if the idea is unspeakable the reference has no sense and we cannot understand.

When we are unable to understand something, it is not uncommon to respond with the statement, "I cannot say." Although there are numerous other responses (e.g., "I don't know," "Beats me," "Who knows?" "I don't grasp," "Don't ask me!") the ones which highlight an ability to speak are of the most use to us here. As Joachim Israel elaborates, "*Understanding* (in the Hegelian sense of 'Verstand') means being able to give explanations of the use of an expression. *Grasping* (in the Hegelian sense of 'Vernunft) means being able to present *explanations* as well as the *rationale* for the explanation. To present the rationale means being able to *justify the rational use* of the expression."[2] What Israel stresses is that problem of understanding is, in a sense, nothing more than a problem of language acquisition. Yet, the continual development of modes of understanding through the acquisition of capable speech is a uniquely human phenomenon: one cannot understand everything in its totality in precisely the same fashion as one cannot attend to, objectify, and speak the entirety of the world all-at-once. Moreover, if argumentation theory is to have relevance for social science and social philosophy, it should adapt to this position. And this is perhaps what Wittgenstein suggests when he argues that "one person alone cannot follow a rule."[3]

A Phenomenology of Experience as an Ontology of Argument

To recapitulate, when we judge and, hence, lay a claim to the constitution and the reality of things, we have simultaneously engaged an incomplete process of language acquisition. In other words, we "say," but we do not "completely say"--or, rather, we have not fully understood. Yet this bespeaks a problem. While it may be possible to speak phenomenologically about the contingency and situatedness of our knowledge of things as practical knowledge, the very idea of "having a language" implies that one is able to make certain statements which are true, such that their denial would make our speech contradictory or meaningless. As Israel writes: "The point is, as Wittgenstein underlines, not to prove that one knows. . . , but the fact that we could not _understand a person_ saying that he possibly could be mistaken. What kind of mistake would that be, and what kind of language is he using?"[4] So, according to this line of reasoning incomplete understanding is sufficient for the generation of practical truth. But if this is so, what is to become of the enterprise of philosophy?

In many ways, this question describes the fundamental paradox to which existential phenomenology is addressed, _viz_., the ambiguity of experience and being.[5] Phrased another way, what both unites and separates us is the individuality of our experience. Inasmuch as we do not take the time to philosophically justify every little thing we do with our bodies in our waking activity, our consciousness necessarily evolves a private, subjective realm of experience which is familiar to us as a storehouse of practical knowledge, but which nevertheless does not satisfy the conditions of intersubjectively valid knowledge. On the other hand, it is only though an interrogation of experience, or an interrogation into the nature of having experience at all, that philosophical reflection is at all possible. Thus, a person's being in the world is a unique embodiment and objectification of both reflected and unreflected experience.

So, an understanding of the world is ultimately an understanding of the lived-world. Moreover, when an historically conscious understanding of experience (in other words, an initial grasping of the limits of experience) strives to overcome existential alienation through a creative recognition of the unique relationship of experience and freedom, the life of the thinker's known world comes into full view. To move away from an historical situation through such an interrogation of experience is to engage in a curious inquiry. It is to move critically and creatively against the tide of tradition, social forces, and technological certainty toward the _grounding_ of reason and experience. As Heidegger argues, "Reasons, which have their origin in transcendence, fall back on freedom which, _as origin_, itself becomes a 'reason.' _Freedom is the reason for reasons_. . . Freedom is not a reason in any one of the ways of grounding, as we are always inclined to think, but it is the grounding unity of the transcendental dispersion of grounding."[6]

A movement from alienation toward the "grounding of reason" is at the same time a movement from self-destruction. It is the critical thinker's flight from anonymity, a war which the thinker wages against becoming an historical and economic objectification as opposed to a free consciousness with the political and sexual potency of being capable of objectifying a world outside himself, a world he can confront with dignity and respect. For a person's speech and experience to become further and further alienated, abstracted and estranged, from an emancipated consciousness is to sediment that person's ego as an objectification of a world further and further beyond his comprehension and understanding. It is to nurture an illusion, an illusion in which the possibility of discourse with the unfamiliar--about ideas which are foreign or incompatible--is negated because of an insistence on the part of the unreflective thinker that the presently existing socio-cultural state of affairs is a naturally occuring phenomenon. To the extent the engendering of illusion occurs as a consequence of a claim to "true" knowledge (i.e., the natural way of things), its overcoming must, then, cautiously avoid the same form of determinism. If intersubjectivity may be posited as the transcendent ethic of phenomenological thinking, its realization in an interrogation of experience cannot be achieved in the same manner that technological rationality has emerged as the dominant ethic of science. The idea of intersubjectivity is not iconic and it is not a dogma; as such, it is not completely there "for us" as an extrinsic ideal.[7] One solipsism transplanted for anotherproduces not emancipation but a confounding of illusions.

The idea of freedom as the essence of reasons, hence, progresses in the absence of any formal system of ethics and analytical uniformity. In this respect, critical understanding of the lived world must rely on the free and unencumbered play of imagination and creativity. More to the point, our "having" of experience is a subjective activity in which meaning is subjectively ascribed to subjective experience, or at least this is the originary point where critical reflection begins. Werner Marx, in a comment on Hegel's concept of experience, describes originary reflective activity as a chain, such that "in each case the new object. . . is nothing else but the 'experience joined' from the preceding object. . . [which] is to say in fact that these experiences together form a chain. By means of it, every new experience lines up to the one before it, and by this again to the one before that, and so on back to the beginning of experience"[8] As such, the story one has of the meaning of experience is a coherent and individual unification of the process of perception and expression within a subjectively real system of appearances and things. Or, at least, this is what exists for us prior to any recognition of our consciousness as alienated from the intersubjective grounding of reason. In short, the critical thinker's expressed consciousness of the historical limitations of experience must therefore _begin from within alienation_. The acts of suspending belief and negating prior knowledge which are so often equated with the concept of critical thinking are, in this sense, nothing more than first-order responses to our own subjectivity--or the alienated prose of the world.

If the creative speech of a person has its origin in a three-fold historical, social, and subjective alienation from emancipated consciousness,[9] then speech between persons becomes a multiplication of estrangement from intersubjectivity. With something a little bit different in mind, Jürgen Habermas constructs a theory of rational motivation which contextualizes a concept of an ideal speech situation along with a consideration of systematically distorted communication as a social phenomenon.[10] In the occurance of systematically distorted communication, the subject commits himself to the experiential fallacy of confusing nature with the appearance of the social world. As such, the meaning of the subject's expression is constrained by a private association of his structures of experience with a solipsistic organization of subjectively "validated" beliefs, or ideologies. Hence, a distressed "culture of narcissism," for example, implies that reality statements eminating from a social system have in some way obviated those of its people; this in turn effects the formation of social character--driving human aspiration inward toward the *interiority* of the ego rather than outward toward the other and the social world. "An important consequence," according to critical sociologist Charles Lemert, "is that the members of a society become depoliticized insofar as they prefer the success that comes from a smoothly running social system to the criticism and dispute normal to an open society."[11]

However, the rationalism which serves as the foundation of Habermas's project gives rise to a particular problem: how is one sure that he or she can recognize systematically distorted communication when he sees it? As a distinct pathology, such a recognition is clearly non-problematic, much like taking note of the proverbial elephant in the dining room. But on a broader scale, other difficulties are bound to arise, particularly the problem of identifying problems of a technological society with a linguistic system in large part evolved through hundreds of years of technological rationality and its influence on human consciousness. It is one thing to speak of the concealed chain of experiential meaning carrying on, as it were, behind the back of consciousness, but it is yet another to speak of systematic displacement (or unreflective consciousness) in terms of systematic distortion.

The multiplication of estrangement is in many ways a description of human encounter. Phrased another way, inasmuch as we cannot completely grasp the world we constitute with our own consciousness--the many shapes of experience which constitute our being, it is likewise impossible to make statements about the world of the other as anything but estranged and alienated expression. Nevertheless, the moment of understanding is speakable. What we speak is not the whole of the event of understanding, but merely our experience of it. As Heidegger has pointed out, the word experience has its origin in the Latin *expiriri* which means to try out, to examine, to inquire.[12] This adds needed insight to an earlier discussion of the critical relationship of speaking and understanding. When we reply to a question or problem with "I cannot say," what we imply is not that we no longer have a language, but that we cannot as yet speak "examingly" or "inquiringly." So, to express an understanding is to intentionally embody a question in intentional speech. To speak questioningly is, in every sense of the word, to argue. The word "argue" comes from the Latin *arguere*, meaning "to make clear." What is made clear, in this case, is the experience of understanding. Based on what has been pointed out before with respect to experience, the experience of understanding is in many ways the experience of the limits of subjective speech and language. So, it can be said, in summary, that the experience of understanding is an understanding of the experience of not understanding--and what makes understanding possible is our capacity to speak questioningly, or argue.

Dimensions of Questioning and Argument: Overcoming Ideology

Although interpersonal interaction is the *existential* modality of speech, our interest here is not centered on the effective consensual relationship of two persons attempting to resolve a difference, but in the nature of the difference itself which, as has been pointed out, is the *theoretical* modality of the experience of understanding. What argument, thus, seeks as its end is a particular expression of this difference from the standpoint of grounded judgement. Husserl indicates that there is a significant connection between judgement and questioning such that the judgement, present to us as an act of objectification, is coextensive with questioning, absent to us as a presupposed seeking of judgement.[13] Conversely, every question (present) presupposes a judgement (absent). Husserl writes, "questioning is the striving, arising. . . from the cleavage and obstruction, to come to a firm judicative decision."[14] Husserl further considers that "every possible content of a judgement is thinkable as the content of a question. In the question, it is actually not yet an actual content; rather it is in the question only as a contemplated, a merely represented (neutralized[15]) judgement."[16]

Accordingly, Husserl distinguishes two kinds of questions: simple questions and questions involving justification. Simple questions arise from a situation of original doubt, aim at a decision, and obtain it in the answer. Questions involving justification aim toward a conclusive, assured judgement--in effect, "toward a judgement which the ego can ground and justify, one which correlatively, is directed toward actual, true being."[17] Husserl designates these latter questions as *questions of truth*. Moreover, questions of justification are not directed toward judicative certainty per se, but toward a grounded certainty--precisely the kind of grounded certaintly that Heidegger makes reference to earlier in this essay. So if--according to Heidegger--freedom is to be the response to the question of truth, what is and should be the quality of this freedom?

One possibility of answering this question is to consider the relationship of ethics to the concept of argumentation. If the hermeneutic play of critical reflection gives rise to consciousness of experience, and the understanding of conscious experience is made possible by argument, then the understanding which argument signifies can be opened up further to reveal a system of arguments (or epistemology) capable of supporting a rhetoric or ethic of being. However, the value of any rhetoric, which can be only equal to its theme or purpose, depends on the articulated nature of understanding as symbolized in argument. In the description of experience, argument is concerned not with the special, individual makeup of the experience itself--as this becomes the function of hermeneutic dialectic--but is concerned, instead, with the ontology of experiential meaning. As such, argument must sidestep the subjective modalities of negation, authority, punctuation, framing, and so on, and "speak" instead on the oppositions of intersubjective experience: the humanly conceived relations of identity and difference which are the essence of experience. To argue these relations of the human world, one cannot merely entertain the judgement of a "simple question," for if this were the case argument would barely penetrate the superficial appearance of relations in human experience, those chainlike qualities that grant us the first glimpse of the meaning of things in the world. To this end, argument must transcend the situation of negotiated consensus as a criterion for validity; it must instead seek its grounding in intersubjective (hence, axiological) conditions for validity--that is, as opposed to the simple conclusions persons may draw from comparing private, subjective realities.

To the extent that this perspective of argument posits intersubjective rationality as the basis for ethical validity, the future of study in argument should transcend the the notion of the "merely inauthentic" and confront the ethical relativism of contemporary (i.e., capitalist and technological) rationality. In a scientific age where the dominant mode of production and the orthodoxy of its attendent scientific rationality proceed without conscious articulation of the limits of their own logical necessity, the elemental oppositions of human experience bespeak fundamental contradictions. It is contradictory inasmuch asscience fails to posit the concept of intersubjectivity as the basis for rational understanding, positing instead some extrinsic ideal as a yardstick for measuring the extent to which an expression is or is not valid judgement. If philosophy and science are to maintain humanist status, then the intersubjective grounding of questions of truth must, as a result, become the principal focus of future critical reflection.

The critique of ideology, which has been the major thrust of critical theory and philosophy since Marx,[18] is thus of greater significance to philosophy under the auspices of modern communication theory than as a study of modes and ownership of production. As such, the form of alienation that is most critical to the problem of understanding in the human sciences is located in the tension of rhetoric and ideology rather than in the modern superstructure.

More specifically, the problem of ideology formation stems more from the way in which individuals think and express thoughts, and less from the particular content of the ideology itself. As such, a critical phenomenological perspective on argument is an effort to interrogate the process of ideology formation with respect to language and experience, instead of setting out on yet another crusade against capitalism and logical positivism. Moreover, such a critical theory could just as easily fault the application of classical Marxist principles as it could the orthodox rationality of technological reason. Again, this project is concerned with the nature of contradiction irrespective of the tradition which might support it. Emil Fackenheim argues that "when men truly suffer from contradiction, they may seek escape in the most ominous form of modern spiritual life: ideological fanaticism.[19] Fackenheim continues, "unlike faith, ideology must by its very nature become fanatical. When challenged by a conflicting faith, faith may withdraw on its certainty of *being* true. Because it knows itself to be but one product of history, ideology can achieve certainty only by *making* itself true; and this it can do absolutely only by recreating all history in its own image. When challenged, therefore, ideology cannot withdraw on itself; it must seek to destroy the challenger."[20]

The critical theory of Karl-Otto Apel provides a possible solution to the problem of ideology as distorted "anti-argument." Apel views the tension between the technical rationality of normative science and the existentially-based humanism of the Geisteswissenschaften as the emerging "Western system of complementarity." As he articulates, "it hardly needs to be mentioned that both the so-called existentialist situationalist ethics (e.g., of the young Sartre) and political decisionism (e.g., of Carl Schmitt) follow the same logic. It is the *logic of the alternative between objective science and subjective value decision* which even today largely determines the ideological structure of the mediation of theory and practice in the West.[21] It is in this respect that Apel advocates the juxtaposition of hermeneutics (or interpretive dialectic) and scientific analysis along with their combination for purposes of critical social inquiry. To the extent that different schools of thought continue to practice in different worlds, as it were, the continuation of philosophic inquiry as a type of rationality and as a "transcendental-pragmatic reflection" will occur in the absence of ethical grounding.[22] Thus, the project of overcoming relativist ethics--which occur not because of the subject-object dualism in the thinking of *an individual* but because of subjectivism and objectivism persisting in the *scientific communication community*--shows itself to be the major focus of future critical-interpretive research.

Apel's critical theory is modelled on a dialectical materialist system which he terms "hypothetical, experimental Marxism or--more correctly--neo-Marxism."[23] His concern is for the preservation of intersubjectivity as the basis for understanding human behavior and the norms of scientific reason. To this end, he relies upon Peirce's and Royce's conception of an ideal communication community in which grounded argument serves as the primary form of discourse and the fundamental praxis of philosophical reflection. Accordingly, philosophical reflection should be conducted in such a way as to ensure the survival of the human species as a *real* communication community. "The entire strategy of survival only acquires its meaning through the strategy--required by argumentation--of the social realization of the ideal communication community in which truth can be attained. In other words, the *strategy for survival* acquires its meaning through a long-term *strategy for emancipation*."[26]

For Apel, the task of realizing the ideal communication community must necessarily entail the transcendence of social class toward the elimination of all socially situated "assymetries" of the genuine interpersonal encounter. The task is, in a sense, to redirect previous understanding of rhetoric and communication such that "being logical" has a renewed ontological status. Moreover, if argumentation is only able to gain rhetorical persuasive effectiveness within the confines of limited socio-cultural frameworks (e.g., the university, the family, the church) and not in any larger sphere, then the rules for reasoning, as they have been taught for over two thousand years, will themselves suffer as contradictions.

NOTES

[1] For a fuller description of what is here implied by illusion, see Joachim Israel, *The Language of Dialectics and the Dialectics of Language* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, The Humanities Press, 1979), p. 67.

[2] Israel, p. 201.

[3] Israel, pp. 26, 187. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), sect. 199.

[4] Israel, p. 25.

[5] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 174.

[6] Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons*, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 127.

[7] Remy Kwant, *Phenomenological Philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 92-93.

[8] Werner Marx, *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Peter Heath (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 81.

[9] What is implied here is quite compatible with the discussion of estrangement and displacement in Elmar Holenstein, *Roman Jakobson's Approach to Language*, trans. Catherine and Tarcisius Schelbert (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 39, 45. See also Juri Lotman, "Two Models of Communication," in Daniel P. Lucid (ed. and trans.), *Soviet Semiotics: An Anthology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 99.

[10] See Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), and Habermas, "On Systematically Distorted Communication," *Inquiry* 13 (1970), 205-218. A very helpful general introduction to Habermas's basic themes can be found in Brant R. Burleson and Susan L. Kline, "Habermas' Theory of Communication: A Critical Explication," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 65 (1979), 412-428.

[11] Charles C. Lemert, *Sociology and the Twilight of Man* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979), p.214.

[12] Heidegger, *Hegel's Concept of Experience*, trans. Harper and Row Publishers (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 124-25.

[13] Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgement, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 62, 308, 309.

[14] Husserl, p. 308.

[15] See Husserl, Ideas, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1931), sect. 31-34.

[16] Husserl, Experience and Judgement, p. 309.

[17] Husserl, pp. 310-11.

[18] See Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankurt School and the Institute for Social Research, 1923-50 (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1973).

[19] Emil L. Fackenheim, Metaphysics and Historicity: The Acquinas Lecture, 1961 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), p. 6.

[20] Fackenheim, pp. 6-7.

[21] Karl-Otto Apel, Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 247.

[22] Apel, "Types of Rationality Today: The Continuum of Reason between Science and Ethics," Rationality Today (1980), 317-18. See also Apel, "The A Priori of Communication and the Foundation of the Humanities," Man and World 5 (1972), 3, and Apel, Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften, trans. Harold Hostelilie (New York: The Humanities Press, 1967).

[23] Apel, Transformation of Philosophy, p. 283

[24] Apel, Transformation of Philosophy, p. 282

PROBLEMS, PUZZLES, AND PROGRESS: A MICROSKETCH TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE

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> Democracy is that system of government under which the people, having 35,717,342 native born adult[s] . . .to choose from . . .pick out a Coolidge to be head of state. It is as if a hungry man, set before a banquet prepared by master cooks and covering a table an acre in area, should turn his back upon the feast and stay his stomach by catching and eating flies (Mencken, 1958, p. 213).

Mencken's "public sphere" was a place of pieties jostled by cynicism. A "clown dynasty," he called it. It was an unclean place, peopled by fools and scoundrels, fueled by prejudice, greed, and vanity, and protected by a thorough, invincible disdain for ideas. Its only redeeming feature, if it had one, was its contentiousness. The silliness of professors, the "anthropoid rages" of the Great Unwashed, and the rhetoric of fear and hate of the Southern Baptist Mullahs might all be held in check by the simple fact that all grabs at power are countered by opposing forces. For every action, he might have said, there is an equal and opposite buncombe.

Cynicism was Mencken's rhetorical strategy, not his personal philosophy. If anything, he was an unreformed Tory. However poorly they pay their servants, Tories cannot afford cynicism. Mencken's piety took two forms—both resembling the views of Dewey (1927) and Lippmann (1963). He believed first and foremost in the deliberative powers of the intellect when unencumbered by the emotional blindnesses: prejudice, hate, fear, and ignorance. He became America's Prince of Wails by puncturing the balloons of the self-righteous, ignorant, and stupid. How he would have loved our age of Falwells, Schlaflys , and Reagans! He believed second, as a consequence of his faith in the potential of human intellect, that rational conflict--the contentiousness of daily political life—might remedy the worst excesses to which political actors are prone.

Like surly subway passengers, pieties jostled by cynicism have a way of shoving back. Mencken's lust for the fight wened, rather as if he had been worn down by the continual, pervasive contentiousness he prized. Toward the end of his career, his faith in controversy had eroded: "Any man engaged habitually in controversy . . .must enter upon his declining days with a melancholy sense of its hollowness and futility. Especially in this great Republic, where all ideas are suspect, it tends almost inevitably to degenerate into a mere exchange of nonsense" (1958, p. 233).

This is more a weary moan than an argument, but anyone interested in the nature and functions of the public sphere must nonetheless take it seriously. Virtually everybody believes in the free marketplace of ideas and in the importance and value of debate in sustaining it. Despite disagreements about most components of public philosophy, there seems to be a consensus about the essentially dialectical nature of political processes. The thrust of claim and counterclaim, the give and take of formal debate, the competing burdens of advocates, and the existence of hostile alignments of blocs and interest groups contribute to continual states of tension, unceasing trench warfare broken by dramatic clashes, in the public sphere. And it is a standard operating piety among argumentation theorists, social philosophers, and political scientists that this contentious miasma is on the whole beneficial. We all believe that the lion's share of a public philosophy will consist of argumentation principles—argumentation being the field devoted to the study of "the force of the better argument."

So, our piety runs, ideas which weather the stresses and strains of debate emerge the better for it. Ideas tested in open and free disputation are better than intuitive guesses and subjective opinions. I do not know whether Lippmann coined the phrase "marketplace of ideas," but he certainly popularized it—to the extent that it comprises the core of what now passes as public philosophy.

Public philosophies ought to begin in skepticism or not at all. The problems they pose are too complex and the arguments they require are too tricky to permit pieties to sneak in unobserved. And there are very good reasons for a healthy dose of skepticism about the marketplace of ideas. For one thing, politics is the art of compromise, not consensus, in which competing parties sacrifice pieces of their positions, change their public stances, and dilute outside commitments and policies in order to secure majority votes for particular policies: "one point is conceded to save another. Statements are reworded, reorganized, or placed in new contexts. Conflicting opinions are whittled, hacked, or remolded to make them fit together" (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p. 5). As Mencken gloomily concluded: "no controversy to my knowledge has ever ended on the ground where it began" (1958, p. 236). The tests which ideas must weather are thus not strictly speaking forensic tests. It is a mistake, I think, to think of the methods of compromise in epistemic terms at all. Or, at least, it is a doubtful proposition deserving a skeptical second look. Ideas do compete in the public sphere, but it is an open question whether they are epistemically tested.

For another thing, the "force of the better argument" is a more complex matter than is sometimes supposed. At least some of an argument's force consists of the number of its adherents and the breadth of the power of the groups to which they belong. Perhaps this is unremarkable in democratic societies, but it is surely an epistemic monkey wrench. If we take science as an epistemic exemplar, we shall equate knowledge with the rational consensus among experts of a community. The temptation to translate that move to the public sphere becomes powerful if we think that decision-making should ape science. Perhaps it is inevitable that the "force of the better argument" be sociologically broadened in discussions of the public sphere. Perhaps there is nothing especially loathsome about this move. Nonetheless, it muddles our sense of the place of argument procedures in a public philosophy.

Thus, even if we think we shall end up applauding the continual tension and contentiousness of the public sphere, even if we think argumentation principles will survive scrutiny, it would be a mistake to start out by taking them for granted. The public sphere is a disaster area, not an accomplished epistemic community; its history is filled with incrementalism and the traces of past compromises. We have "muddled through," rather than triumphed. We count ourselves lucky to get through a year without megadeath. We congratulate ourselves on pious holidays that the planet has not yet been destroyed. Whatever else the public sphere may be, it is full of objects to be handled with rubber gloves. We wipe our feet before leaving.

In this essay, I want to grapple with a small piece of the larger critique a philosophy of the public sphere will require. By itself, my argument may seem unremarkable, even uncontroversial. But it is a necessary component of a definition of the problem of the public sphere and a small but necessary step toward a philosophy of the public sphere.

My argument is that a philosophy of the public sphere should not be derived from (or seen as a species of) any usual variants of the idea of "progress." This is not to say that "progress" is an untenable idea. Nor is an acceptance of this claim tantamount to taking a position in the distinctively philosophical disputes about epistemic progress. Progress may be a perfectly sound description of the cumulative effects of ordinary practices in scientific research traditions (Laudan, 1977). But it is not easily transported into discussions of public policy-formation and decision-making. Policy-makers do consult research traditions, but this does not permit the inference that their activities are equivalent to scientific ones. Policy-making differs in kind from science just as the search for compromise differs from science's search for a rationally founded consensus and as the pragmatic, utilitarian character of politics differs from science's distinctively epistemic nature. Progress may be well-suited to discussions of scientific consensus and knowledge, but it is ill-suited—indeed inimical—to clear thinking about public decision-making.

This thesis—that a philosophy of the public sphere should not use the progress notion—is a narrow claim. It does not mean that other aspects of scientific method are inappropriate to decision-making. Policy-makers as well as scientists benefit from intersubjectively validated evidence. I do not want to go against the grain of attempts to make policy-making more rigorous and critical. My sole claim is that intellectual progress is a poor exemplar for policy-makers to try to live up to.

Nor in any sense do I want to trade on a science v. policy-making contrast that depends on a dichotomy of exactness v. inexactness. Such contrasts are entirely suspect since the natural sciences have their share of inexactness (witness meteorology, aerodynamics, and the physics of extreme temperatures). "What matters is not whether or to what extent inexactitudes in procedures and predictive capability can eventually be removed; . . .rather it is objectivity—that is, the intersubjectivity of findings independent of any one person's intuitive judgment—that distinguishes science from intuitive guesswork" (Helmer and Rescher, 1960, p. 3). "Progress" is inappropriate to the public sphere not because public matters are less exact than scientific ones, though they sometimes are, but because policy-creation is not remotely analogous to knowledge-creation.

This thesis arises from a consideration of the epistemic pluralism of field theory and its consequences for the public sphere. If we see the public sphere as the arena in which interest groups, organizations, movements, research traditions, and disciplines compete for public power, we ex hypothesi equate the "problem of the public sphere" with interfield relativity (Goodnight, 1982a; Willard, 1982, 1983, in preparation; Cox, 1981). We notice the degeneration of the public sphere into a rule by experts (Beard and Beard, 1930), the public's lack of epistemic sovereignty over specialized fields (Wenzel, 1982; Goodnight, 1982b), and the specialists' consequent cooption of public prerogatives--the most piquent of these being the specialists' hedgemony over decisions about what counts as fact.

The public, we are prone to think, should have an organizing philosophy of its own--one capable of yielding knockdown arguments against the more specialized fields' claims of epistemic precedence. It should put the experts in their places--literally--in the theoretic framework of the public philosophy. It should be capable of arbitrating interfield disputes, of deciding which field is right, or at least which field merits attention (see Willard, 1983).

This essay's thesis is a way of pointing to an obstacle to this ambition. The fact that the public sphere cannot "progress" is a hefty part of the proof that it is not a conceptual ecology, or at least not an ecology analogous to the most common epistemic exemplars. Argumentation--the discipline as well as the practices it studies--may be understood ecologically. But unless we are prepared to say that a theory of argumentation comprises the totality of a public philosophy, we cannot say that the public sphere is a conceptual ecology.

I

"Progress" was once a god-term (Weaver, 1953). It had a Reformation infancy, thanks to Bacon, Descartes, and Pascal, an Enlightenment adolescence, thanks to the Encyclopedists, especially Diderot and d'Alembert, and a Nineteenth Century prime as the unifying theme among such otherwise disparate thinkers as Mill, Huxley, Spencer, and Fichte (Mandelbaum, 1971). It was once thought to have spent its declining years in the early Twentieth Century and to have died violently--the suspects being the social theorists, who finally noticed that progress always has a price, and Kuhn and the Weltanschauungen philosophers, who saw progress as a remnant of an outmoded positivism. But we know it did not die. Among Popperians, "progress" remains an entirely respectable inference one may draw from the fact that certain ideas survive repeated efforts at falsification. And Laudan (1977) has persuasively tied "progress" to the notion of research traditions--making it a microcosmic shadow of its former self, to be sure, but ensuring that the concept would be alive and kicking by the end of this decade (Aron, 1968; Babcock, 1929; Baillie, 1950; Beard, 1932).

At first, "progress" was a way of eschewing veneration of the ancients. Age equals wisdom, Pascal thought, so the ancients must have been children compared to contemporary humanity. Because every age can stand on the shoulders of its ancestors, each new age becomes the epistemological superior of its predecessors (see Frankel, 1967, p. 483). Appeals to the wisdom and authority of the ancients were thus seen as analogous to seeking the counsel of children (Brome, 1963; Bury, 1932; Sklair, 1970).

"Progress" eventually became the keystone of the new philosophy of science. It was a rejection of the Scholastics' notion that history repeats itself and, correspondingly, a proclamation that received authority cannot

set the boundaries of inquiry. Fallibilism and verificationism were to supplant piety and faith. Knowledge, it was thought, would accumulate as the rational processes of scientific method did their work.

This scientific/epistemological sense of "progress" is usually called "conceptual progress." It has endured in this guise, albeit in more modest terms, and only after a successive narrowing and winnowing process that has left "progress" appropriate only to particular fields. Research traditions (Laudan, 1977) thus yield cumulative results. Sometimes these accumulations yield breakthroughs and advancements for still larger domains. Problems do get solved. Puzzles do get figured out. People satisfy themselves that present conundra either are solved or can justifiably be set aside to permit a movement on to new problems.

Conceptual progress also survives in Toulmin's (1967, 1972) view of rational enterprises and their conceptual ecologies. Drawing upon a full-blown Darwinian metaphor, Toulmin attributes the survival of ideas to their success in passing communally validated tests, these tests being themselves survivors of a field's history. "Survival of the fittest, Spencer's catchphrase, is thus seeable as a principle of conceptual stability and change. While this scheme is not an uncontested success (see Willard, 1983), it has been extremely influential--so much so that explaining the rational grounds of conceptual evolution is now widely thought to be a central aim of the argumentation discipline.

Hitched to this wagon, the more recent work in the theory of argument fields has perpetuated Toulmin's emphasis on conceptual schemes and progress. Despite a diversity of theories (Zarefsky, 1982) and heated squabbles among them (Gronbeck, 1981; Willard, 1981; Klumpp, 1981; Rowland, 1981, 1982; Kneupper, 1981; Campbell,1981; Fisher, 1981), these theories share the assumption that, whatever else they are, fields are substantive domains (Sillars, 1981; Rieke, 1981; Wenzel, 1982a). The narrowest definitions make fields exclusively substantive, e.g., "A field of argument is an integrated complex of concepts, propositions, and arguments, persisting over time,, directed to shared explanatory goals, embodying shared judgmental standards, held consensually by initiates of a discipline" (Wenzel, 1982b, p. 211).

Broader views, which emphasize the rhetorical, social, psychological, developmental, historical, and warlike nature of fields (e.g., Willard, 1983), share the "substantive domain" view of the narrower theories. On this account, "progress" becomes a pivotal component of some field descriptions. Disciplines, e.g., seek progress in ways that resemble the Seventeenth Century sense of the term. They aim to expand and elaborate conceptual ecologies. Their field histories thus become conceptual/develeopmental histories--"progress" being a well-suited term for describing such development.

It was fashionable in the Enlightenment to apply scientific method to other domains. "Progress" nearly always came along for the ride. Thus, the Encyclopedists attempted to apply progressivism to domains hitherto thought to be nonscientific, e.g., social structure, psychology, politics, and even morals and ethics. When such thinking ran amuck, it became Social Darwinism and the Whig view of history (Butterfield, 1957; Sorel, 1970; Ginsberg, 1973).

And every day, in every way, it got better and better. Whigishness became a political religion in the Nineteenth Century, and remained vigorous until the more squeamish Twentieth Century came to regard it as a family embarrassment and allowed its more virulent strains to quietly die. More modest nonscientific progressivism has persisted till today.

One form the survivor concept took was that of a folk bromide--a piece of historical ethnocentrism sometimes mistaken for a serious argument—which says that no one living today would change places with any but the most privileged people in former epochs. In general, we live better than our predecessors did, benefiting from the fruits of indoor plumbing, Pac Man, and frozen food. This bromide has many deficiencies, among them the cost-benefit arguments about the price of progress have been thought to be decisive. And it is by no means a clearcut matter to say that the world's population lives, on the average, better than its ancestors. Spencer did not direct his arguments to readers in Bangladesh or Chad. The bromide is arguably nothing but a kind of smugness—too inspecific to warrant clear arguments (Aron, 1968; Baillie, 1950; Bury, 1932; Frankel, 1967).

Another form the survivor concept took is more respectable. If we peruse the proposals of Habermas or Toulmin, their felicity conditions of discourse and impartial standpoints of rationality, we cannot help but notice a modest progressivism:

> [Progress] . . .is itself a regulative moral idea, not simply a belief about history. It represents a directing principle of intellectual and social action, instructing men to regard all social arrangements with a critical eye and to reject any claim that any human problem has been finally solved or must be left finally unsolved. To the extent that this idea of progress is embodied in moral codes and social systems, these codes and systems will contain deliberate provision for self-reform. The idea of progress thus represents the social application of the principle that inquiry should be kept open and that no bounds can legitimately be set to the authority of such free inquiry. As such, it would appear to be an indispensable belief for a fully liberal civilization (Frankel, 1967, p. 487).

There is no trace here of history perfecting itself or of a steady march toward completion. Present conditions, on this account, are as likely to be imperfect, even bad, as they are to be anything else. The assumption is only that well founded institutions do not close their books on anything. They remain open to innovation and change and thus adaptive to new conditions. And they do not genuflect to their procedures; they only provisionally trust them. As Toulmin (1972) says, we show our rationality by how we change our minds.

Certainly this sense of progress is indispensable to argumentation theory. Arguments are a field's open doors. The willingness of field actors to submit their beliefs to communally vouched for tests comprises any field's "deliberate provision for self-reform." And the outcomes of arguments are supposed to be better than the outcomes of violence, coercion, authoritarianism, intuition, and hoping for the best.

So we have three senses of "progress" working today: (i) conceptual progress, the intellectual progress exemplified by disciplinary fields, of which scientific knowledge is often taken as a paradigm case; (ii) the folk bromide, the progress vaguely sensed in the world which leads us to expect that no one living today would trade places with any but his most privileged ancestors; and (iii) institutional progress, the idea of keeping institutions open to self-reform and of keeping inquiry free and open. Of the first two senses, I want to say that they are entirely inappropriate to discussions of the public sphere, and of the third I want to say that it is not a principle of progress at all, though its applicability to the public sphere can go without question.

II

There are many variations on the theme of (i) conceptual progress, most of them pinned to particular views of epistemic advancement in science (see Suppe, 1977; Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970). One can characterize knowledge as inhering in rigid conceptual systems, their stability stemming from their logical structure and their innovative capacities inhering in their calculi. Thus, covering law explanations see progress as new events are subsumed under systematically related laws. One can equate progress with the successive solution of problems, the problems themselves being rationally located in an intellectual system. One can, following Kuhn and Feyerabend, equate progress with a succession of replacement schemes, the new ones solving the anomalies of the old ones, and—sociologically at least—destroying the old ones. One can see progress as a narrow accumulation of satisfying results in a community of like-minded scholars, a research tradition. Toulmin (1972) focuses upon a community's geneology of problems, procedural traditions, including the community's conventions for expressing the meaning of its concepts, and, following Darwin's populational theory of variation and natural selection, the community's conceptual ecology and the reasons and causes through which conceptual variations are legitimized. Shapere (1965, 1977) sees progress inhering in problem solutions and, more important, in a domain's successive elaboration of methods of reasoning; as domains increase their sophistication, they produce increasingly subtle and adapted argumentative and expositive forms.

This is a brief sideways glance, not a summary. There are far more mutations of the progress notion than can be listed here. And the disputes between their adherents are spirited enough, the divisions between them important enough, that glib generalizations about unifying themes among them are not warranted.

But it is not too facile to say that, no matter which theory we adopt, we end up saying that a successor idea (or procedure, or yield, or tradition) is, by some accepted logic, better than the one it replaces. There exists some criterion for deciding the superiority of the successor, and this criterion is possible at all because the successor bears some family resemblance to whatever it supplants. We might debate the nature of the resemblance or the merits of the criteria for knowing and judging it, but we will nonetheless commit ourselves to having criteria and a theory explaining the connections among concepts if we want to speak of progress at all.

And this is why the notion of conceptual progress is ill-suited to discussions of the public sphere. By its nature and by the nature of the problems it confronts, the public sphere cannot generate criteria for judging the comparative worth of solutions, procedures, and traditions, and it cannot yield grounds for noticing the family resemblances of its problems.

The history of the public sphere is one of *decisions*, not accomplishments. A decision is the fruit of a momentary working coalition. It takes its form from the tradeoffs and compromises sufficient to secure majority votes. It takes its urgency from time pressure, real or imagined. And it takes its effectiveness from the power of the decision-makers to enforce it.

Rational decision-makers want their policies to fit the facts, but the facts do not consistently mesh. Different interest groups, coalitions, and institutions take different things as facts. The compromises among them which make decisions possible require winnowing, narrowing, picking and choosing, and even changing the facts to accomodate to the working coalition. In a bizarre reversal of *weltanschauungen* accounts, we might say that decision-makers select the decision they can get, the one they have the votes for, and then select the world view to rationalize their decision.

Some decisions do display connections, but these relationships stem from the coalitions which make them possible, not from a conceptual ecology. We can thus trace blue laws, or immigration decisions, or trade quotas to the social movements which produced them. We can see them successively, but not progressively—especially if we disagree with them.

At best, we might be able to notice that a succession of decisions added to the power and influence of a coalition. From that group's perspective, succession equals progression. But if we debate the merits of that group's facts, values, and theories, we inevitably appeal to bodies of concepts far outside the realm of the immediate decisions. We bash our own value systems up against theirs, and weigh our facts against their illusions. This result, which typifies political processes, has the effect of muddling arguments about progress beyond remedy.

Moreover, groups and coalitions change. Their ideas are not always set in concrete. One moment's progress becomes the next moment's debacle. If one saw the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as "progress," which more than a few people did, retrospective judgment became painful as the years went by. Revisionism is always fatal to Pollyannas.

So we have no uncontestable—or even mildly satisfactory—criterion for judging successive decisions, and we lack a conceptual ecology for identifying the relationships among decisions except as sociological clusters. These deficiencies, I think, permit the inference that progress cannot be coherently described in the public sphere.

It might be objected that this thinking misses the point. Successive decisions per se *are* different in kind from epistemological developments, but it is not the decisions themselves which are important, it is their *effects* which yield or fail to yield progress. This objection will not go very far. It displays the weaknesses of the folk bromide discussed below. It suffers from the irremediable defect of assuming that agreement might be found concerning effects. If the public sphere is filled with a pluralism of sovereign epistemic domains competing for power, agreement about decision outcomes is unlikely. And those decisions about which agreement is possible are likely to be innocuous.

So let us modify the objection. Perhaps most decisions do not fit any progress models, but perhaps a few do. Perhaps progress is merely piecemeal and cumbersome. Lincoln did free the slaves. Child labor got outlawed. Human sacrifices are no longer permitted. The Spanish Inquisition is unlikely to happen again. Granted, other ills have arisen and that these good effects did not solve all problems, they are still improvements over the past. Paying lip service to equity, justice, and personal rights is an improvement over the ages in which these things were ruled out.

Two things about this objection are worth noticing. First, we have moved completely away from the first sense of "progress" toward the grounds of the second, the folk bromide. So proceeding, we have substituted vague hunches about a society's global progress for the more precise, ecology-specific logics necessary to determining conceptual progress. There may be nothing wrong with this, since there is usually a grain of truth in folk bromides, but we have moved rather far from the goal of trying to define the public sphere as a field *sui generis*, having its own special concepts and epistemic claims, and being capable of intellectual progress.

Second, and perhaps more important, we have gotten society-specific in maintaining this objection. No one would claim that the world has gotten beyond slavery, child labor, human sacrifices, or inquisitions, only that particular societies have achieved these advances. But this reasoning creates an "other variables" problem of horrendous proportions insofar as events in an achieving society are thought to have consequences in non-achieving societies. If the American industrial experience made it convenient as well as morally imperative to abolish child labor, it had the price of raping the developing world to fuel its engines. I do not know whether in principle such cost-benefit calculations can be noodled through to final conclusions. Surely such calculations would entail tradeoffs of immense complexity: if Americans eat beef at the expense of the world's grain supply, or enjoy their freedom at the expense of the nuclear threat, or wallow in plenty at the expense of even minimal living standards in developing countries, the arguments justifying such policies would surely branch infinitely outward, taking in a bewildering array of considerations. While I cannot claim to have worked even one of these calculations out and know of no one who has, the analyses of our impact on Third World economies, limited though they are, suggest that all talk of "progress" is at best premature. And inevitably ethnocentric: the very grounds of argument that permit our weighing our surpluses against their reverberations elsewhere smack of utilitarianism gone wild. Do not such arguments end up saying that so many ergs of happiness in one society can balance so many ergs of misery in the places which must be looted and plundered to fuel the happiness?

III

Before turning to a discussion of the folk bromide, an incidental but important point needs to be made about the fit of the arguments here with constructivism's more general commitment to the "man-as-scientist" metaphor (see Willard, 1979). The metaphor emphasizes man's scientist-like aspects and practices, his forward-looking, knowledge-creative, hypothesis-testing nature. It says that behavior is experimental and that the cognitive processes which produce behavior also endow it with meaning by determining the fit of specific elements into general intellectual frameworks. Transported into field theory, the metaphor emphasizes an analogy between cognitive processes and *weltanschauungen* and (hence) a unity of individual and group. It encourages us to notice people's implicit theories of causation, personality, and knowledge and to study decision-makers in terms of their implicit theories of science and knowledge. Consistent with this, constructivists are perfectly comfortable with regulative accounts saying that decision-makers ought to employ this or that epistemic model.

But all this is not to make decision-making a subset of science or to equate the activities of decision-makers with those of scientists. The man-as-scientist *is* a metaphor. While we are content to say that man, while making love, is forward looking, calculative, and experimental, this does not make us prone to equate love-making with science and erotic memories with scientific knowledge.

I am not saying that there cannot be a social science of decision-making, i.e., a research program concerned with how decisions are in fact made. A value of the present distinction is that it reminds researchers to avoid equating their own philosophies of science with those of their subjects—or worse with their subjects' background awarenesses (Denzin, 1970; Olson, 1976; Cicourel, 1964; Mehan and Wood, 1974; Psathas, 1973; Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979). Nor am I ruling out viewing scientific activity as a kind of decision-making. For instance, one difference between decision-makers and scientists is that decision-makers operate in a more political atmosphere than scientists do; but this does not mean that science is free of politics or that such influences are unworthy of study. To take another case, one difference between decision-makers and scientists is that the public sphere contains more rhetorical elements than scientific spheres do; but this does not mean that science has no rhetorical dimensions or that these dimensions do not have important effects within science (Delia, 1981). It seems, in sum, prudent to keep the distinction in mind between speculations about the rhetorical/political aspects of science and scientific studies of the rhetorical/political/scientific character of decision-making.

The literature on social research is too vast to survey here. I shall be content with asserting the modest conclusion that, because decision-makers sometimes act like scientists, we sometimes confuse their activities with science. Because this thinking produces ambiguous, equivocal, and contradictory findings, the other variables problem becomes a raging beast.

Perhaps the main reason for avoiding an equation of decision-making with science, aside from the conceptual difficulties already discussed, is the *breadth* of concerns decision-makers typically have. In considering abortion policy, e.g., one considers moral, theological, ethical, medical, sociological, and political arguments as well as psychological matters and elements of police science. Safety issues in many fields display similar breadth. While they do turn in part upon engineering and technical matters, they turn as well upon fiscal, political, social, moral, and even theological concerns. Thus, nuclear power safety is inextricably bound to the social, political, and moral constraints that affect siting decisions, design specifications, and disposal policies.

This breadth, coupled with the exceedingly complex interminglings of politics and epistemology, would be a disastrous defect in science. But it is not only the rule in the public sphere, it *should* be the rule owing to the breadth and complexity of public problems. There is no reason to suppose that, as decision-making gets better and better, its resemblance to science will become clearer and clearer. To argue, as many do, that decision-making's fuzzy thinking and imprecision stem from its falling short of particular scientific models (see, e.g., Willard's [1982] discussion of cost-benefit analysis), is to profoundly miss the point. The public sphere will always have this breadth and complexity. Decision-making will always be a balancing process in which data and beliefs from competing domains are weighted and compared.

IV

Of the three senses of "progress," (ii) *the folk bromide*, the progress vaguely sensed in the world which makes us think no one living today would trade places with any but the most privileged people in previous epochs, is the most misleading and potentially dangerous. We have already taken account of how dubious the bromide is—our inability to achieve consensus on most things, the innocuousness of many of the things we do agree on, and the cost-benefit objections to society-specific progress claims. We have touched as well upon the moral defects of society-specific claims. On the assumption that contemporary field theorists want something better than manifest destiny or white man's burden, we concluded that the folk bromide is often little more than a dangerous piece of ethnocentrism.

As an empirical matter, we surely want to retain the folk bromide to label the traditional faiths, social pieties, and procedural niceties groups come to honor. In some quarters, the bromide would be "false consciousness," "nationalism," or ideology. In this regard, we might even say that such "progress" is a valuable totem for keeping field actors or members of the public enthusiastic. A sense of progress would thus be seeable as a rhetorical strategem in the arsenal of statecraft.

A powerful objection to using progress as one of the nationalist's *topoi* is that, the stronger it gets, the more it contradicts the third sense of progress—keeping an open mind to self-reform. Whigism, social Darwinism, and some darker possibilities such as rankings of civilizations, groups, or races may issue from taking the folk bromide as anything more than a vague hunch. Self-congratulative frenzies seldom yield citizens open to reforms.

Whately's theory of presumption is a case in point. The more seriously one takes it, the more resistant to change *in principle* one becomes. Since the theory makes no sense unless one believes that one's institutions have either resulted from some historical perfective process or, more modestly, represent historical wisdom. This endows existing states of affairs with an inertial weight corresponding to how seriously the bromide is taken. It lends a society's pieties epistemic authority and legitimate power. A properly ensconced piety can outshout a plea for change, all things being unequal, because it speaks with far more voices.

Notice that Goodnight's (1981) formulation of the "liberal presumption" turns the bromide upside down. Prevailing institutions like as not reflect the compromises and expediencies of episodes, the inertial weight of uninspired leadership, the sloppy traces of incompetent and dishonest planning, and the mistakes and miscalculations even the best decision-makers make. Obviously, the more seriously we take the liberal presumption, the more open to change we become *in principle*.

My point is not that the liberal presumption gibes with the third sense of progress but that, as Goodnight says, presumption is an arguer's construct bearing certain risks regardless of which presumption is chosen. A choice of presumption lays the foundation for the atmosphere of values in which an argument will occur. Goodnight correctly notices that the argumentation theorists who insist that presumption is value-neutral do not have good arguments to support their view. It is hard to imagine the content of an argument justifying the presumption notion if presumption is said to be value-neutral. For Whately, Bradley, Burke, and the British Idealists, the trust in prevailing institutions was a way of sanctifying traditions and of acknowledging the perfective outcomes of history:

> Throughout history [the doctrine ran], there is a progression toward greater and greater self-consciousness, an accretion of wisdom, until the process itself is finally understood. In the course of this process, society moves toward absolute truth, in its outlines at least, about the university, society, and man.
> . . . .
> The British Idealists were justifying the established social order; they were sanctifying tradition by making it reasonable; in a way they were justifying all traditions by making them right for their time and place, and then adding a fillip to their self-righteousness by making theirs the best because it was the latest (Ross, 1951, xii).

Hence the irony of conservative presumptions: one might think that the doctrine of historical progressivism would make its believers open to change, even eager for it. Logically, at least, one might think that change would be better in principle than any *status quo* if history moves toward perfection. Two things, I think, precluded such moves. First, one's present society is an end-state—possibly the perfection history seeks. Since one's horizons determine not only one's answers but also the questions one asks, the shape and structure of present society become blinders for the imagination. There must be "good and sufficient reason" for change, we say—meaning that the arguments for change must outweigh our prejudices, a possibility so unlikely that we can smugly regard ourselves as being open minded about change all the while utterly foreclosing it.

Second, the presumption is a grand and global idea which makes us feel free to crush very specific arguments and nonetheless retain our confidence that gradual, perfective change is occurring. Presumption is thus a way of describing the psychological horizon of arguers. It is a valuing in practice of their conventions, traditions, pieties, prejudices, and fears.

It might be objected that the present critique applies to extreme idealism, not the more modest forms of presumption that have come down from Whately's time. Yet a good working definition of a weak idea is that it is one

that does no harm as long as it is not taken seriously. To dilute the conservative presumption, to deprive it of its Whigishness, is to make it an empty procedural artifice, an arbitrary rule that cannot be justified.

V

Ideas are known by the company they keep, but (iii) *institutional progress* is virtually indistinguishable from its kindred concepts. It cannot stand alone. It depends upon a bewildering, ceaselessly expanding circle of concepts necessary to making sense of the general doctrine. The idea, remember, is that progress is a regulative moral idea, not just a belief about history; it is found in moral codes and social systems which have provisions for self-reform (Frankel, 1967). Inquiry must be kept free and open, uncontaminated by power plays and authoritarianism. This, Frankel says, is a belief indispensable to a fully liberal civilization.

One can argue *toward* this freedom and open-mindedness or take them for granted and argue *from* them. Some conventional public philosophies have historically opted for the former, proceeding on the assumption that societies are collectivities founded on values, their procedures and institutions being instrumentalities tward attain shared values and goals. One then debates the merits of competing values, defending one's favored candidate against all comers, and attacking competing values. One then turns to arguments about how a society can achieve the defended value.

(iii) can be so treated, but it is not a principle of progress given the arguments we use to work toward it. Freedom and open-mindedness become ends in themselves, better than their alternatives, no worse than their equals. The sheer difficulty of arguing our way toward freedom demands that we bracket issues arising from considerations of what free citizens would do, what choices they would make. *In principle*, (iii) does not direct us either to the liberal or conservative presumptions; such choices depend upon outside arguments irrelevant to the arguments establishing freedom and open-mindedness as values. So it is not a principle of progress at all. It becomes a principle of progress only by virtue of arguments about other things we tack onto (iii).

In tacking arguments onto (iii), we are proceeding *from* it, using it as our starting point and assumptive framework, toward other conclusions—some of these being principles of progress. But as a starting point, (iii) is vague enough to permit virtually any continuation depending on the utilitarism calculi we use to assess the effects of free and open deliberation. Thus arises an other variables problem of Kafkaesque trickiness and heroic proportions.

For instance, debate presupposes freedom but does not inevitably yield it. As the standard ironist argument has it, a citizenry free to make up its own mind may succumb to illiberalism and intolerance, undermining or abolishing the values which gave it power in the first place. Thus, Lippmann argues that the principle of majority rule is alien, not central to liberal democracy. Mannheim's free floating intellectuals were one solution. Habermas' restrictions on the basis of education and training are another. Thus, if free debate can yield outcomes inimical to freedom, we must defend still other principles to ensure the right outcomes.

We have already noticed the ironic twist to conservative presumptions, that given their doctrinal assumptions, proponents of conservative presumptions ought to be eager for change, not resistent to it. The sociological and psychological effects of conservatism are such that things can go either way depending on a host of other factors. One's theory of progress thus enters a spiral of other variables.

The liberal presumption displays the flip side of this ironic coin. If their doctrine is sound, if incompetence, greed, etc. have ruled past episodes, proponents of liberal presumptions should fear change. They should prefer incrementalism and glacial movement since there is no reason to suppose that the human frailties which have ruled past institutional development can be ruled out of present decision-making. It will not do to reply that the liberal presumption proves that such frailties and foibles are institutionalized and entrenched in positions of power. If the frailties rise to the top institutionally, how can we suppose that they become more shy and retiring in revolutionary movements?

Respecting both presumptions, we might insist that principles of argumentation, correctly followed and equally applied, can offset human weaknesses. Notice that, so saying, we have already moved two steps beyond the freedom principle—off in happy quest of other variables. And it is an unpaved road. Argumentation principles no more stand alone, needing no further principles, than the principle of freedom does. Most argumentation principles depend decisively upon the good will and civic-mindedness of arguers for success. Our theories of evidence are not handcuffs capable of staying the hands of scoundrels; our principles describing the burdens of advocates are not safety nets capable of protecting the ignorant and incompetent from their own prejudices and narrow mindedness; and our theories of idea clash do not overcome the value atmospheres in which arguments occur. In each case, I think, we inevitably suppose that argumentation principles are correctly followed by men of good will.

So we move willy-nilly to the moral and ethical principles in which an argumentation theory must be couched. Since more often than not argumentation theorists see moral codes and ethical principles as construct[illegible] symbolic structures we fashion from the materials provided by our assumptions, they are prone to think that moral constructs stem from the argument processes by which people invent them, recognize their jurisdiction, or consider their applications to particular events. So viewed, moral and ethical principles do not silence our doubts about argument principles, they broaden them.

Only confident people defend free speech. If we doubt our ideas and think them unlikely to withstand critical scrutiny, we are prone to protect them in the usual ways of avoiding debate. Most of us, however, think that a free and open dispute, both sides equally situated, the evidence equally available, no arms being twisted behind the scenes, will yield the outcomes we prefer. Since we have gotten our ideas rationally and critically (we say), rational and critical disputation will only reinforce them. Of course we know in our hearts this is not true. We know that rational and critical disputation may meet all preferred veridical and procedural tests and nonetheless yield outcomes we refuse to accept.

So the justificational circle widens. While it is surely not infinite, it is broad enough to be unmanageable. It generates a morass of arguments, connected serendipitously and haphazardly as well as logically. It leaves us where we started, with a weariness akin to Mencken's and a skepticism about our chances of ever saying anything definite about the marketplace of ideas. And the weariness will linger as long as we insist on defining freedom and openness to self-reform in terms of institutional progress. "Progress" is a valuing of methods and an expectation about their outcomes. It thus leads us to think of the marketplace as if it were a conceptual ecology.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing, to be sure, has not proved that the public sphere is *not* a conceptual ecology, only that our standard vocabulary for describing *such* disciplinary conceptual matrixes is ill-suited to clear thinking about the public sphere. "Progress" has been our case in point, though other distinctively epistemological concepts might have served as well. The three senses of the term, though often interconnected, are distinguishable in terms of the substantive arguments they raise. Conceptual progress is ill-suited to discussions of the public sphere because the public sphere cannot produce judgmental criteria and family resemblances for making coherent claims that progress has occurred. This is not a failing or a lamentable foible. It reflects the chaotic and alternatively construable nature of public events. The folk bromide is a smugness, not an argument. As a vague feeling about the state of the world, it may do no harm as long as it is not taken very seriously. And the idea of institutional progress is too vague and abstract to be useful. Looked at one way, it is not a principle of progress at all since it does not say which presumption one should adopt (or for that matter, which of *any* of the expanding circle of arguments one should accept). Like its conceptual cousin, the institutional progress notion pushes us along the roads established by conceptual analysts. It is to say nothing against these analytic traditions that their concepts and procedures do not mesh with the needs of a philosophy of the public sphere.

Like all arguments culled out of larger book length expositions, my analysis here has doubtless been more vague than one might like and more argumentative than one might think necessary for so narrow an argument. I hope only to have planted the seeds of a skepticism whose flowering must await the publication of the bigger work. I am convinced it is a necessary skepticism because it will force us to think through as if for the first time our reasons for trusting the principles of argumentation and for insisting on their place in a larger philosophy of the public sphere.

To borrow from Janet Flanner, present accounts of the marketplace of ideas are insufficiently skeptical about the value of conflict. We can comfortably think of our present theories as paradigmatic of the real marketplace in something of the sense that we comfortably think of the *Petit Trianon* as a typical farm or of Marie-Antoinette as a typical farm girl. For now, at least, if we trust the clash of ideas, it is not because we can prove that it yields conceptual progress.

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AN ESSAY ON THE FLIP SIDE OF PRIVACY

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My discourse today is an essay in the original sense of that term -- which is to say that it is an epideictic oration in the form of **basilikos logos**, an encomium to a King presuming to offer advice on matters gravely important to the business of the state. The subject of my advice is the concept "public," particularly its relationship to its opposite, "private," and to the ideographs "property" and "equality." Of course I live in a state presumably governed by rule of popular sovereignty. As representatives of the people, you may be considered Kings here. But for me to play the role and claim the privilege of an Imperial Professor of Rhetoric must surely put me on the flippant side of the rhetorical tradition and of my topic. Further, I mean to argue that the terms "public" and "private" are in dialectical opposition. Thus, in a second sense, I am on the flip side of privacy whenever I discuss what "public" may mean. But there is a third pun intended by my title which I mean to control my thought today. It comes from my brief career as a disc jockey. I mean to argue that the "public/private" pair are not only in dialectical opposition, but also that they are in such necessary opposition that it is as useless to try separating them as it would be to try splitting a sound recording in half to hold a "hit single" in each hand.

Success, prosperity, security, -- these are relatively positive words for the Anglo-American people in general. Neither are they objectionable to most leftists, providing that one carefully tiptoe around the relationship of such terms with the ideology of advanced capitalism. Hiding out in these terms, you see, is an evil spirit ready to jump out of ordinary life to keep good leftists out of grace. The demon is called "Property." We all know at least one of the House Marxists kept around for show in the liberal fraternity of so-called "major research universities." Each such scholar I have known is filled with a curious kind of angst that derives from the self-knowledge that nearly all Marxists in Anglo-America are comfortably bourgeois academics, well-paid Dons who cannot hide their success, prosperity, and security in blue jeans, t-shirts, and an aggressively articulated and overworked social consciousness. Marxists hate the idea of property, but if they are permitted to work for more than seven years in an American university, they cannot avoid acquiring it in relative abundance. The amusing dimension of the contradiction, however, is that it does not derive solely from Marxist politics freely chosen as an act of reason and preference. Desire to own property -- and hence to be successful, prosperous, and secure -- is mixed in the culture at large with a measure of guilt about having property and being privileged. Even the ultra-wealthy among us, those who are seen to "flaunt" their wealth with the purchase of fancy cars and houses, take great pains to project the image of being "just an ordinary person" in public. From NICPAC conservative to bourgeois Bolshevik, everyone exhibits angst at the contradiction between owning property and living in a political economy based on the ideology of the "democratic commonwealth."

Though it would be otherwise if the torpedoed Equal Rights Amendment had been approved, we live in a society where "All men are created equal." To own property when others have less or none at all seems to mark one as the enemy of equality. So we play games with the concept "equality," adding such qualifiers as "before the law" or "of opportunity" to make it clear that nothing in the rhetoric of our political economy abridges the right of the privileged elite to remain wealthy in the face of others' poverty. We do this, I think, because equality is a French idea, alien to original concepts of Anglo-American liberty and grafted onto our political ideology as a result of the rhetoric of the French Revolution. Before 1790, democracy in Anglo-America was as dirty a word as socialism or communism would be now. It was associated with "levelling," the elimination of all social distinctions based on property. Anglos wanted political and economic freedom, not abstract "freedom" based on one's alleged birthright and conceived as a categorical imperative. The object of being free was precisely to have the ability to acquire property -- and hence happiness -- without interference from a government at that time dominated by an aristocracy of birth. The important concept in understanding freedom was not equality, but rather the idea of a "commonwealth."

Like every other European feudal system, the English political economy was based on an aristocratic elite's possession of property and power by divine right. Kings were Kings and the nobility was noble because God had decreed that these particular people and their descendents be privileged. When it happened that commoners, through their mastery of the trades and of commerce, came to acquire the power of gold and property, pressure developed for the creation of a political system that recognized the rights of others than the nobility to the "common wealth" of the nation. The rising middle class, in other words, wanted to acquire and secure their piece of the pie that the economy in general was able to produce. Their first task was to redefine God's place in the temporal world. With some help from the force of arms, they argued successfully that "England" existed apart from the person of the King and the institution of government -- which is to say that the feudal aristocracy did not "own" England and its people by virtue of being in charge of the government. God decreed that sovereignty (ownership) resided in all of the people who lived in the state. The King in London, the Duke down the block, "owned" a part of England as private persons. What they had not paid for out-of-pocket, or inherited from a rich forebear who bought it out-of-pocket, they managed in public trust. That is, "ownership" adhered to no particular person in the political nation, but resided in the community collectively -- held "in common" -- and merely managed by personages with the power to govern in the state. Freedom was thus two dimensional:

1. It was the power to participate in decisions about the disposition of the "common wealth."

2. It was the opportunity to acquire "ownership" over parts of the "common wealth" theretofore unclaimed.

Once a person, whether King or commoner, established "ownership" through the sweat of labor or the grace of inheritance, dominance over the acquired property was absolute. That is, no one, King or commoner, could legitimately interfere with one's "property right" to dispose of what was "owned" in any way the "owner" saw fit. Ownership established a "private" world. And, by the same logic, no one, King or commoner, could exercise rights of property over things held in trust for the commonwealth. Such things were "public," and disposition of them required the consent of everyone who participated in the collective ownership of commonwealth properties.

Let me be clear about my meaning of "property" by commenting on what could be "owned." We are inclined to think of "property" today in legal terms, as "real property" and "personal property." That is, we think of things such as land, buildings, cars, and television sets. In the time when the institutions of our political economy were being developed, however, anything associated with a person's Being could be thought of as "property," everything from one's wife and children to the land to the right to hold office, or go to a particular church. "Property," in other words, was understood in something like the terms of scholastic logic as anything adhering to an individual that was unconnected with "essence." My "essence," in this Thomistic/Aristotelian account of Being, is my body, soul, and mind, my physical "existence," my spiritual "Being," and my capacity to reason and to communicate. Anything else one might say to characterize me -- McGee is bald, blue-eyed, fat, obnoxious, whatever -- constitutes a "property" of mine. In this view of "property," my possession of a house and a car is as much a part of my Being as my possession of blue eyes. And, in the realm of political activity, my possession of the "right to vote," for example, is no different from my possession of a job earning so much money per year or my ownership of two cats.

History might justify my going further, claiming that the Anglo struggle for liberty consists of asserting that body, soul, and mind cannot be "owned" by anyone other than the person whose essence they are. Englishmen were proud that they were "freeborn," "freemen" unbound to land they worked for the feudal aristocracy. Though "blackbirds" profited greatly from the slave trade in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, slavery was all but unknown in England proper, and the English were the first to move decisively toward the world-wide abolition of slavery. The Protestant Reformation and the Puritan Revolution can be understood as an assertion of the principle that neither the state nor the state church "owned" a person's soul. Religious freedom consists of locating "ownership" of Being in the individual, and more specifically, in the individual's right to worship in a church and according to a doctrine of his or her choice. The struggle for freedom of speech, first in parliament and then generally through adult society, and the attempt to guarantee freedom of publication can be understood as an assertion of the principle that individuals have inalienable "ownership" over their thoughts and expressions. Faustus could sell his own soul to the devil, but it could not be purchased from anyone else. Workers could indenture themselves or sell their labor in exchange for bare subsistence, but no one else could force such a transaction. People could give up their right to think for themselves by choosing to embrace state or church or group orthodoxies, but no King or Pope or demagogue could force people to think only as they were told to think, read only what they were told to read.

Equality, of course, is a very good idea. It is the cornerstone of modern conceptions of liberty, and arguments using it as a prime value have been productive of the greatest measure of social justice humanity has ever known. Think, however, of the potential for contradiction its introduction into the Anglo-American ideology has produced. Equality, you see, cannot be construed as a property right. Older 17th-century ideographs clustered about "religion," "liberty," and "property" are presumptively definitive of individual human beings -- that is, being more-and-less Catholic, more-and-less independent of others' demands, and having a greater-or-lesser earned share of the commonwealth are things I would say of individuals with a name to mark them out from a group of similar human beings. "John Doe is a self-employed Unitarian with a disposable income of $5,000 per year." Only with a sense of Orwellian irony, however, would one say that "all animals are created equal, but some are more equal than others." Equality is a relational concept. It can never be true of an individual alone that she or he is "equal." One can "be equal" only as part of a group. Equality, in other words, is definitive of the state or condition of a human group and not descriptive of the essence or the properties of a human being. One cannot "own" equality, for at least one other person must participate in the "ownership" of any relational state or condition. One can argue for religion, liberty, and property with "property" as the title term, considering every freedom to be a figurative extension of what is "owned" by individuals. But one must argue for equality on different grounds altogether.

Equality is claimed as a "human right," and almost from the beginning "human rights" were set in opposition to "property rights." Expressed in terms of Thomistic/Aristotelian logic, human rights are essences and property rights are, as the name implies, properties. If my right to vote is my property, I can trade it as I would my car, for a piece of "pork barrel" legislation, a job with the municipal government, or a bottle of whiskey. My vote is quite literally mine. But if my right to vote is a "human right," and hence a part of my essence, I cannot give it up in any way without forfeiting my claim to being human. Selling my vote for any kind of favor would be a "crime against [my] humanity." When prisoners lodged in the penitentiary are prohibited from voting, it is because they have behaved as beasts and not as human beings. In at least one construction of the ideology, they have "proven" that they are not human in their essence by committing crimes of violence, so it is quite reasonable for the state to deny them other rights until such time as they reform themselves, reclaiming their humanity in all of its essence, including the right to vote.

The state, of course, insists upon equality, passing legislation that levies sometimes severe penalties for those who behave as if they were superior in essence to other people in the community. But note the negativity of equality in comparison with older rights of property: Freedoms of religion, property acquisition, speech, and publication are limitations on the activity of government. By negation, each increases the number of alternative actions an individual might choose by decreasing what officials of the government may require of individuals. The principle of equality requires that government officials conceive the polity as a group of undifferentiated human beings, but otherwise, it in no way inhibits the activity of government. Rather, when the state insists upon equality outside its own institutions, it is decreasing the number of alternative actions available to individuals. The negation is upon each individual member of the polity. The old southern sophism with regard to the principle of equality being applied to relationships among the races was that "you can't legislate morality." The tiny grain of truth in this proposition is that equality is ultimately a matter of personal morality because it must be read against the background of other rights conceived as properties rather than essences. The state is limited by older notions of freedom-as-property in what it may do in the interest of equality. Here the distinction between "public" and "private" becomes important, for the state can insist upon absolute equality in matters concerning the commonwealth, but it cannot interfere with the theoretical autonomy of the individual without contradicting the property-centered freedoms. Because the line between public and private is at best fuzzy, it follows that the capacity of "equality" to limit many personal actions depends on individual "morality," which is to say on the commitment of individuals to honor the principle of equality in their day-to-day interactions. No law, for example, keeps me from referring to my friend Celeste Railsbach as "one of the smartest girls in the field," thus gratuitously and patronizingly calling attention to the sex of a formidable intellect. My refusal to make such references is the product of personal moral choice, of the angst which a climate of opinion opposed to such references generates, or of my fear of her strong right arm.

Suppose, now, that I wanted to construct a political argument on either side of the opposition between property and equality -- to oppose a constitutional amendment against abortions on the ground that women are sole "owners" of their bodies, for example, or to oppose gratuitous references to the sex of professional women on the ground that people should be treated "equally" with regard to the jobs they perform. Any potentially effective argument I could conjure up, I suggest, would necessarily require a specific determination of the relationship between two second-order ideographs, "public" and "private." To assert freedom-as-property, I must argue that the state is attempting to make a person's essence -- her very body -- into a matter of public concern. I must amplify the principle that one's sovereignty over one's body is clearly absolute and inviolable, a God-given right of property. Whatever else may be public, my body is my own. My opposition must assert that the principle of equality applies, on the ground that the right of another to his or her body is at stake -- pregnancy is a relationship between mother and fetus, and as a relationship, it must be governed by rule of the commonwealth, public law, public interest, public morality. Note further that the polarity remains constant when the issue shifts, forcing advocates to embrace an ideological contradiction to support the consistency of their overall political position. My politics are consistent when I chide colleagues for gratuitous references to the sex of professional women, but my arguments in support of that position portray a contradictory relationship between public and private. I must say that a reference to another human being establishes a public relationship which thus entitles the other to "commonwealth" privileges -- the comment is not your "own" if it offends another, depriving him or her of the right to participate in the public on equal terms. In this argument, equality pushes property, public pushes private, to the point that we cannot be said to "own" even our thoughts and words if such thoughts and words offend someone else. My opponent, of course, pushes back with the same rhetoric I used against him or her on the question of abortion: Body, soul, and mind are essential to human beings, absolute property rights which cannot be claimed for the commonwealth. Women are entitled to be offended, but not to put pressure on another's words and thoughts, for such pressure is, on its face, a denial of God-given freedom. The opposition of property and equality, in other words, forces a specific determination of the relationship between private and public in practically all political arguments -- and such determination varies with the interest of advocates in particular political issues. The tension is so great that I think it all but impossible -- at the present time -- to hold a political position in the context of Whig/Liberalism which is both ideologically and politically consistent.

I have called the dialectical pair "private/public" second-order ideographs because they both cue and color the tension generated by our simultaneous commitment to property and equality. To argue on any subject that "this is none of your business" invokes four enthymematically suppressed claims:

1. There is in our society "private" space.
2. Relational rules governing "public" space do not apply in "private" space.
3. "Private" space is privileged by rights of property.
4. You have no property rights in this "private" space, so
5. This is none of your business.

"Property" is the prime value, the ultimate backing beyond which the user of the ideology is in all likelihood incapable of proceeding. "Private" is the intermediate value which cues "property" and colors understanding of "property" by calling attention to what the concept excludes rather than what it might include. A similar series of five enthymematically suppressed claims are contained in the argument on any subject that "this is an unfair or unjust practice":

1. There is in our society "public" space.
2. Rights of property (sovereignty or "ownership") do not apply in "public" space.
3. "Public" space is governed by relational rules, particularly the imperative "equality."
4. This practice exists in "public" space.
5. This practice is inconsistent with variants of the imperative "equality" (i. e., "fairness" and/or "justice"), hence
6. This is an unfair or unjust practice.

"Equality" is the prime value. "Public" is an intermediate value which cues it and colors our understanding of "equality" by calling attention to the limited application of the ideograph. That is, "equality" is not to be understood as an arithmetic abstraction characterizing all human interactions, but rather as an ideological abstraction governing human interactions which occur in "public" space. The value of "property" is recognized by the negation of "private" provided in the modifier "public." "Equality" can be applied only in arguably "public" space.

It is difficult to think of a political argument which is not grounded in the value represented by one or another ideograph -- indeed, it may be conceptually impossible to imagine such an argument.[3] Because of the omnipresence of ideological value commitments at the inventional base of political argumentation, one option always open to advocates of special causes is a direct appeal to ideological abstractions.

One of my favorite examples of this strategy is the contemporary southern politician's heavily coded claim not to be a racist. "My opponent will represent special interests," the argument goes, "but I intend to represent ALL the people." Every southern voter knows to translate this pitch into the following more concrete language: "My opponent is a racist who will represent his rich and lily-white constitutency while ignoring everyone else. I intend to get the black vote, and as much of the poor-white vote as I can manage, and if that is to happen, everyone must believe that I'm not a racist and will listen as closely to average voters as I will to those who have financed my campaign." Race is always an issue in the south, but it would be indelicate and dangerous to speak of it openly, directly. So politicians abstract the issue, couching it in the ideographs which have been used to combat racism. A discussion of "special interests," "people," and "equality" (between the lines) serves to address the issue without indecorously accusing one's opponent of being the racist he or she probably is.

I think of direct appeals to ideological abstractions as "consensus argument," for as a rule, the strategy is to avoid the sticky entanglements of concrete problems and issues by seeking out the level of abstraction at which the most hostile audience member might agree. Because there is a dominant ideology in Anglo-America, it is a safe bet that the most hostile competing factions will agree on the meaningfulness of such ideographs as "property," "equality," "private," and "public." There will of course be great disagreement over which "property rights," for example, are imperative in the community at this particular moment. But very few indeed would suggest that there are no "property rights" of any sort. When an advocate appeals to the value of property rights, he or she expects to argue over the definition of a term that is accepted consensually by all competing factions in the polity. In the process of arguing over definition, the specifics of the case which inspired disputation simply get lost -- deciding whether 300 n'er-do-wells should be permitted to prance about Skokie in clown suits seems much less significant than deciding whether the "right of assembly" can be abridged in the case of Nazis "demonstrating" in front of Holocaust survivors and their children who "own" most of Skokie. No amount of detail about the trivial episode will weigh at all in a decision that must be made on "constitutional principle." Arguments will be over a series of definitions.

When ideographs are organized into a hierarchy of representation -- as I have suggested that "property/private" and "equality/public" are organized -- the "middle term" is especially significant for ideological argumentation. (The terms "private/public" are "middle terms" because they stand between concrete problems and the ideographs which are to be primary imperatives in coming to a decision about them.) A two-way consensus argument can be constructed:

1. An appeal to "private/public" abstracts argument from its concrete context.

This is the "usual case" of consensus argument, a strategy to avoid difficult entanglements in specifics. Members of exclusive "Men Only" boy's clubs, for example, have little use for women as equals, preferring "the gentle sex" to stay quietly in bedrooms and servant's quarters. They want to keep women as a class away from club privileges. Not wanting to insult particular people, or defend sometimes outrageous claims in particular terms, arguments are generated about "some members who would feel uncomfortable" if women were allowed to join. Since it is a "private" club, those feelings must be respected, despite the "quite reasonable" claim of a woman applicant to a principle of fairness. It is easier by far to let the question be decided on the definition of "private" and its applicability to boy's clubs than to argue about offending a particular woman or depriving her of her rights as a member of the commonwealth.

2. An appeal to "private/public" conceals a "property/equality" opposition which is overbalanced in the direction of an unfavorable ideograph.

In the case cited above, rights of property have been used to create a "private" space expressly to deny a class of people their ordinary and usual commonwealth rights. The very existence of private clubs advertizes inequality among members of the community. Its purpose is to differentiate society into "them" and "us." Particularly in a climate where "equality" is generally taken to be the title term of the ideology, it is hard to defend an assertion of property held by a group against the "equality" rights of other individuals who belong to the commonwealth. If nothing else, it would be embarrassing to try holding onto property rights as the prime imperative in such situations -- it would be "bad press" to match the big-bad-rich boy's-club against the solitary, deprived woman who wants nothing but her share of the commonwealth. It is far easier in such situations to keep the "property/equality" opposition as much under wraps as possible. Hence, advocates try to contest nothing but the definition of space, leaving the association of property/private and equality/public enthymatically suppressed. If opponents can be seduced into responding to the question "Is this a private club or not?" defenders of the "Men Only" boy's club can thus avoid two evils at once, both the undesirable position of offending specific women, and the hard-to-defend position of holding property superior to equality on a question involving group membership.

I have thus far made reference to the use of the ideographs "property," "equality," "private," and "public" as those terms might be used in everyday arguments in the political economy. You will observe, I think, both in other papers presented at this conference and in recent books and articles on the subject of understanding meaning in the idea "public," that reference to the historically-material usage of the term is rare. Many writers, I think, are following the lead of John Dewey and Walter Lippmann in conceiving the public as an ideal group or an ideal state of mind rather than as an ideological usage essential to the constitution and self-conception of the English-speaking peoples. As an ideal construct, "public" can be -- and usually is -- considered in isolation, a term stripped of its intertextual association with other ideological abstractions. The result is academic discourse which functions argumentatively in ways strikingly similar to the consensus argument I have just described. Presumably, academics have no interest in avoiding the specifics of concrete problems or in concealing the ideological contradictions that bother ordinary advocates. Yet many arguments about "the public" are purely definitional, centering on what it "is", "knows," "does," or ought to "be/know/do" in the best of all possible worlds. Lost in this move are the specifics in which "public" is problematic for people who must make important and consequential decisions in dangerous situations. Also lost are all higher-order values which, in the world of everyday argument, are cued and colored by the concept "public." Though it would be difficult to warrant such a claim with the evidence of carefully-weasled academic words, I get the feeling that many writers on the subject of "the public" think of themselves as operating outside the ideology of their culture, arguing as if they were unaffected by the normative commitments of their society, or as if what they said on the subject of "the public" could have no force outside the halls of an academy accustomed to dealing with carefully-bracketed idealizations of ideographs.

I am, of course, clearly on record as believing that "value-free" thought is impossible -- or, more accurately, that the illusion of ideology-free thought is as romantically fanciful and false as a fairy tale. One can manufacture an idealized account of "the public" as Grimm manufactured the story of Hansel and Gretl -- but to what purpose? Scholars are not usually in the business of lulling children to sleep, despite our predisposition to dense and dull prose. Everything I've said today has been intended to contribute to our conversation about and understanding of the concept "public." But to keep it clear in my mind that this concept must be understood materially, as it is intertextualized with all other normative commitments of our culture, I have understood it by negation. In the political economy, in those arguments outside the academy which establish the conditions of our life-world, "public" is the flip-side of "private." The two terms function together to guarantee, at least in our social reality, the existence of two distinct "spaces" in the life-world, arenas of Being governed by quite different rules of conduct and judgement. "Public" implies the space of a "commonwealth" now governed by the French notion of "equality." "Private" implies the space of an individual's "property" governed by rules of sovereignty ("ownership") which inhibit and constrain the action even of the most powerful officers of state.

It is especially important now to understand the place and power of "public" as an ideograph, as the flip-side of "privacy" and the space of "equality." The tension between freedom-as-property and freedom-as-equality has been a potential in our ideology since the Age of Revolutions -- Richard Sennett argues that it even antedates the French Revolution in English practice, pointing to the 1760-1770 "Wilkes affair" as evidence of the conflicting interpretations of English liberty.[3] In the past quarter century, however, the tension has exploded into a dominating consideration of American politics. We have experienced, are now experiencing, an ideological revolution that will alter the fabric of the political consciousness of subsequent generations. Ours has always been a property-centered ideology. That is, the institutions of the political economy and the cultural traditions we have inherited were established out of an understanding about what individuals could "own" while living in society subject to the police powers of a government. "Equality" came into the ideology easily, almost unnoticed, slipping effortlessly into the space of the "commonwealth," that part of the political economy not "owned" by any particular person or officer of state. For nearly two centuries, the American Republic existed with only occasional need to address the potential conflict between property and equality. No one had to apologize for having property, for being successful in acquiring it, for choosing to protect "one's own" while ignoring the abjectly poor. The American political economy was not only differentiated, but structured into a hierarchy based predominantly on wealth and status. Advocates building arguments based on property values had only to be sure that they were not asserting property rights where none existed, thrusting ideas of elite "ownership" into the space of the commonwealth. Now, however, as a result of a series of reform movements since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, property rights

and values have lost their former force. Public space is expanding so rapidly that skilled users of the English language have difficulty keeping up-to-date on what expressions are offensive to this or that person allegedly denied "equal" treatment by something so small as an impersonal pronoun! Formerly confidential meetings are now defined as "public." Everything from letters of recommendation to your neighbor's sexual orientation to Aunt Henrietta's abortion to Jimmy Smith's prayer in school is considered "public" business. In short, I believe that in my own lifetime "equality" has replaced "property" as the title-term, the ultimate imperative, of the Whig/Liberal ideology.

I think everyone here understands that I am not opposed to the new direction of the ideology -- indeed, I intend to promote the principle of equality on every appropriate occasion. I worry, however, about the fate of old notions of "privacy." So much of what people in advanced industrial states do and think is textualized in the history and structure of social practices that it is difficult in the best of times to realize one's individuality. This is less of a problem in Anglo-America than in Eastern-bloc nations and most European democracies because we have insisted upon -- and thus created -- a private space for human beings to exist as individuals rather than as cells in a social organism. The vehicle of this insistence, the ideological rhetoric which creates the social reality of privacy, is rooted in the ideograph "property." As public pushes private, as equality pushes property, the ground upon which one's self-hood is most easily recognized erodes. I do not know how to stop it. In my own mind, I can but make a beginning by insisting that "public" must be conceived as the flip-side of privacy, as inseparable from individually-"owned" space as the sides of my latest Willie Nelson record.

Notes

1. I think immediately of the old dichotomy between "arguments of principle" and "arguments of expedience," the former presumably connected with the values of the dominant ideology (the source of "principles"), and the latter connected with needs of the moment. Assuming that we are dealing with advocates properly socialized to the values of Anglo-American democracy, however, the decision to frame arguments as "expedient" recognizes the existence and force of ideology by negation: If I recognize an argument as "expedient," I must also understand that it is not an argument from "principle," that it is to be considered with the presumably imperative ideographs of the society bracketed momentarily. To make argument or decision on the basis of no value, I must recognize the null condition, that in other circumstances similar to these, a value would apply as a matter of course.

   Further, should I think of inclusion-by-negation as a logic-chopping way to demonstrate the omnipresence of ideological values, it occurs to me that the very idea of an "expedient" argument may be conceptually impossible. In any contemporary state, the material history of social and political practices has established a structured ideology, a set of rules by which individuals govern their activity so as to promote and perpetuate the community. "Principles," in other words, are intrinsic to all social-political situations and arguments. If "arguments from expedience" have ideological currency -- that is, if they are established as a common practice in the political economy -- it would follow that expedience itself is an ideological principle that "fits" into the ideographic structure in its own space. There are times to be "expedient," in other words, times when all other ideological values are to be bracketed, held in abeyance with regard to a specified subject or for a specified periud of time.

2. Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man New York: Vintage Books, 1978, pp. 99-106.

THEORISTS UNDERSTANDING 'THE PUBLIC': AN INFORMAL STUDY IN TECHNICAL ARGUMENT

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> Definition is an instrument of quasi-logical argumentation. It is also an instrument of the dissociation of concepts, more especially whenever it claims to furnish the real, true meaning of the concept as opposed to its customary or apparent usage.[1]

This essay is a preliminary study of a species of "technical argument."[2] Specifically, it is an exploration and evaluation of the relationship between arguments over questions of the form "What is X?" and the strategy of dissociation. Recent articles concerned with the question "What is the Public?" will provide the text for analysis, though the arguments made hopefully will have applicability for other disputes as well. Specifically, the following claims will be defended:

1) Arguments over questions of the form "What is X?" typically involve the strategy of dissociation.

2) Recent arguments over "What is the Public?" involve the strategy of dissociation.

3) Certain dissociations in technical argument rely on philosophical pairs that are now suspect.

4) The limits to technical arguments over questions of the form "What is X?" may be discoverable through study of the dispute over "What is the Public?"

Wittgenstein has noted that questions of the form "What is X?" produce 'mental cramps': "We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for the thing that corresponds to it."[3] When we are asked "What is X?" our inclination is to provide an example; either by definition or by visual demonstration.

When an argument in a technical setting takes place over what "power" is, or what "communication apprehension" is, or what an "argument field" looks like, etc., the first recourse of an advocate is to point to a phenomenon and claim "*That* is what I have in mind: *this* is how "X" ought to be defined, and here is an example of it."

Such a process of ostension can be a relatively simple matter. Teaching the answer to the question "What is X?" is often reducible to demonstrating how the word "X" is used. Thus, if a child is able to successfully *use* terms such as color-words, then we assume that the child has adequate knowledge of what the various colors *are*.

As we climb higher on the ladder of abstraction, however, the situation grows much more complex. The process brings to mind many of the early Platonic dialogues, where Socrates' interlocutors would suggest simple definitions or examples when confronted with questions such as "What is Courage?" "What is Knowledge?" and the like. No doubt Wittgenstein had the fate of many of Socrates' hapless foes in mind as an original instance of philosophical bewilderment.

What happens, then, when an advocate's explanation is challenged? What happens when a challenger responds "No, *that* is not X, *this* is"? Typically, a strategy of dissociation follows. The term dissociation is used here in Perelman's sense of a strategy whereby an advocate attempts to break up a previously unified idea into two concepts: one which will be positively valued by the audience, and one which will be negatively valued.[4] An advocate accomplishes this task through the employment of "philosophical pairs," one of which is usually considered ontologically, epistemologically, or ethically superior to the other. The prototypical philosophical pair, according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, is the appearance/reality pair. An advocate would use this pair by claiming that his or her definition represents the *real* instance of "X", whereas his or her opponent is claimed to be pointing to an illusory appearance.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have explicated a number of philosophical pairs frequently used in the strategy of dissociation.[5] Some of them

include: relative/ absolute, subjective/objective, particular/general, practice/theory, accident/essence. In most uses, the term listed first is considered less valuable than the latter term, though there are notable exceptions.

Sociologist of science Barry Barnes has argued that the strategy of dissociation (which he describes as the use of "the language of essentialism") plays an extremely important role in technical settings.[6] Utilizing the accident/essence pair, scientists often argue that they have identified the *essential* characteristics of X, while their opponents are reporting merely accidental features of X. Such a tactic is powerful because it allows the scientist to protect a generalization without requiring changes anywhere else in the terminological system under discussion. Thus the "conceptual fabric" of a technical community can remain intact, and the opponent's counter-example or definition can be explained away.

It is noteworthy that Barnes occasionally refers to the language of essentialism as the "language of Platonism." The point of Socrates' refutations was to demonstrate that his opponents lacked true knowledge of reality. They knew only appearances--the shadows on the cave wall. The language of essentialism in technical settings follows a similar logic. For example: when Dalton first introduced his atomic theory, it "appeared" to be incompatible with most of the existing observations and experimental results in chemistry. Like much of scientific change, Dalton's theory was eventually defined as progress towards a representation of underlying reality, while the challenging datawere classified as a result of faulty "appearances."[7]

2) Arguments over "What is the Public?" involve the strategy of dissociation.

While Perelman's notion of dissociation has been utilized as a critical tool in the analysis of public argument, it has received little application by rhetorical theorists in the study of technical argument. Nevertheless, such dissociations are available for study.

Consider the current dispute over the appropriate conceptualization of "the Public." Lloyd Bitzer's seminal essay, "Rhetoric and Public Knowledge," set forth a theory concerning the relationship between rhetoric, knowledge, and the Public.[8] In his answer to the question "What is the Public?" Bitzer suggests that 1) "A public is a community of persons who share conceptions, principles, interests, and values, and who are significantly interdependent."[9] 2) Such a public shares an "inherited knowledge" that functions as a source of legitimacy for would-be public spokespersons. 3) Without such public knowledge, "there is no competence, no authorization, and no public."[10]

Bitzer's theory of the Public has been challenged by means of the strategy of dissociation by several scholars. In Hyde's attempt to provide a phenomenologically derived definition of the public, for example, it is argued that if we are to grasp what a public "actually is," then we must recognize that the "essential feature" of a public is its "common sense."[11] The dissociative philosophical pairs involved here include the actual/potential pair and the essence/accident pair. In each instance, the former term is more highly valued and is aligned with Hyde's position, while the latter term is less highly valued and is associated with Bitzer's theory.

A second critique of Bitzer's position has been advanced by McGee and Martin.[12] Bitzer's theory of the public is described by McGee and Martin as "ideology" based on content-free speculation. McGee and Martin's own theory replaces many of Bitzer's terms with terms of their own: Bitzer's "theory" is replaced with "praxis," "the Public" is replaced with "the social-political collective," "Ideology" with "critical theory," and "content-free speculation" with "concrete" and "empirically relevant" descriptions.[13]

In some instances, such as the use of the theory/practice or abstract/concrete pairs, the dissociation in mind is obvious. In other cases, such as the replacement of the phrase "the Public", the dissociation is less clear. One might infer that in these instances McGee and Martin wish to retain the referential function of the original term used by Bitzer without having to unload and repack the theoretical baggage that normally accompanies the terms. Thus the overall "conceptual fabric" of historical rhetorical study can remain the same despite the potential change in the terms of order.

Admittedly, a great deal of violence is being done to the preceding positions by so cursory a summary. Omitted from discussion is a great wealth of evidence, theory, and reasoning that each scholar brings to bear for his or her position. Yet, when worldviews collide, advocates can and must make simple and direct comparisons between competing theories. The strategy of dissociation is a very powerful tool for such use, for philosophical pairs entice us to select this theory because it is based on philosophically firmer ground than that theory.

3) Certain dissociations in technical argument rely on philosophical pairs that are now suspect.

What problem is there, if any, with the use of dissociation in technical argument? Consider the fate of a philosophical pair considered central to the philosophy of science: the observation/theory pair. During the 1930s and 1940s it was suggested that scientists should be able to construct theories based on sense-data described in a neutral observation language independent of any particular theory. The ontological assumption was that sense-data are "concrete," "fixed and stable," or "invariant."[14]

Positivists consequently envisioned two levels of scientific activity that differed in kind both ontologically and epistemologically: "an unproblematic lower level of unchanging, objective data, describable in a pure observation language on which all observers can agree; and a separate upper level of theoretical constructs, acknowledged as products of man's creative imagination."[15]

The distinction between observational and theoretical language has been rejected by many contemporary philosophers. It has proven quite difficult to establish that there is a clear basis by which to distinguish between observable and unobservable objects—a necessity if the distinction between languages is to be based on ontological grounds. As R.E. Grandy noted:

> (I)f observability is merely a matter of degree, then there seems to be no plausible way of drawing a sharp line on this basis between objects which do and objects which do not exist. Under the influence of these considerations, most philosophers have given up the attempt to distinguish observables from unobservables on this basis and focus instead on the terminological distinction.[16]

Philosophers fared no better with terminological distinctions. As sociologist Michael Mulkay reported: "it was in practice extremely difficult to distinguish observational terms, whose meanings were 'derived from experience,' from speculative theoretical terms."[17] At best the distinction between terms can be made only intratheoretically. When conflicting theories are juxtaposed, it becomes apparent that what for one theory is an essential observation may become a wrong-headed theoretical speculation from another.[18]

One result of the breakdown of the observation/theory pair has been the declaration that "all observation is theory-bound." The interesting upshot of which is that the relative value of each term in the pair has actually been reversed.

The philosophical significance of the breakdown between observational and theoretical languages is difficult to overstate. The primary significance is found in the shift from "absolutist" or positivistic ontologies to relativistic ones. As Kenneth Burke once put it: "stimuli do not possess an absolute meaning."[19] Rather, "different frameworks of interpretation will lead to different conclusions as to what reality is."[20] A similar point emphasised by analytic philosophers is that terms do not derive their meaning as isolated units, but as "elements" within wider linguistic networks.[21] A number of philosophers of science, including Braithwaite, Hempel, Hesse, and Kuhn, argue that the minimum unit of meaning is not the single term, or even sentences, but whole theories.[22] Just as predications about speed and position become possible only relative to a given frame of reference, so our technical concepts become meaningful only relative to

a given theory. "Phlogiston" is meaningful and "real" only relative to a particular theory, just as "electrons" are meaningful and "real" only relative to another. As Braithwaite puts it, "to say that theoretical concepts *exist* is to assert the truth of the theory in which they occur.[23]

Of course, the observation/theory pair is not the only philosophical pair that has fallen prey to contemporary criticism. The rise of relativistic philosophies have cast doubt on other pairs as well, including the objective/subjective, concrete/abstract, literal/figurative pairs. Though these terms may be used persuasively intratheoretically, it is difficult to see how they may be defended intertheoretically without engaging in circular arguments.[24] "Concrete" and "factual" data supporting a theory areoften defensible only *in terms of* that theory. The facts that supported the theory of phlogiston, for example, cannot be separated from the theory itself. From the perspective of another theory, those "facts" would not be facts at all, but accidentals, illusions, or faulty appearances.

4) The limits to technical argument over questions of the form "What is X?" may be discoverable in the dispute over "What is the Public?"

The question becomes one of how to resolve conflicting theoretical answers to questions of the form "What is X?" Thomas Kuhn has provided an anecdote that highlights the problem. Two scientists were asked whether a single atom of helium was or was not a molecule: "Both answered without hesitation, but their answers were not the same. For the chemist the atom of helium was a molecule because it behaved like one with respect to the kinetic theory of gases. For the physicist, on the other hand, the helium atom was not a molecule because it displayed no molecular spectrum."[25] In this instance the dispute involves two conflicting answers to the question "What is a molecule?" While a molecule and a public are not the same thing, the anecdote does suggest several limits to questions of similar form.

It is senseless, for example, to ask which answer is "really" correct. To try to demonstrate to either scientist that their opponent's definition is "really" correct would be to engage in circular argument, as noted previously. In Kuhn's terminolgy, the two scientists are speaking from incommensurable positions which are not logically reducible from one to the other.

It is also unlikely that the conflict could be resolved by resorting to some kind of "neutral" set of terms. Past efforts to create a neutral scientific language have failed despite repeated attempts.[26] It is not difficult to understand why they have failed. It might be possible, for example, to invent new words for the terms in conflict between, say, Bitzer and McGee. But once these new words are used, some kind of attitude towards them, some kind of evaluation, will begin to emerge. If I believe that a helium atom is a molecule, I will conduct my laboratory operations accordingly. Once I begin to act, the "neutrality" of my invented terms will vanish quickly; whether their subject matter be "molecules" of "publics."

How, then, does one choose between incommensurable theories? Kuhn's description of the process of paradigm choice is basically pragmatic. He argues that theories or paradigms must be "better" or "more successful" than competitors. Paradigm choice reflects the values of the particular scientific audience involved, which could include predictive ability, consistency, aesthetic considerations, etc. The "objective" character of these values stem from their shared nature, rather than from a match with what is "really out there."[27] Paradigm choice is not accomplished through official vote. Rather, a consensus of action emerges as more and more practitioners adopt a paradigm for its superior ability to solve the "puzzles" that confront them.

The current dispute over theoretical approaches to "What is the Public?" seems to be an analogous situation. There are several "exemplars" currently "on the market." Each exemplar demonstrates a particular way of looking at, and talking about, the world of political rhetoric. While one cannot offer a "neutral" study and evaluation of each position, one can wait and see which perspective effectively persuades a larger portion of the discipline. A clear victor, if one emerges, would tell us a great deal about what our discipline considers to be the important puzzles to be solved, what philosophical traditions seem to be most helpful in solving them, and the like. Such a "marketplace" analysis may seem crude, but a superior alternative appears to be lacking.

One might object that success may be difficult to assess. A term may be appropriated without necessarily obligating its user to the theoretical origins of that term. The term "ideograph" has been the subject of sufficient use and abuse that it is now used by some to negatively describe almost any concept we decide not to like. No doubt the term's author finds this trend distressing. Yet this may be the price we pay outside of the natural sciences. Our terms do not come to be associated with consistent physical laboratory procedures. The "stretching" of theoretical concepts in the humanities can be slowed only by "gatekeepers" such as journal editors and the like. With or without such gatekeeping, the appropriation and use of theoretical terms is the only way we have to monitor the march of progress of theoretical disputes,

I would not be surprised if the "wait, see, and study" attitude advanced in this essay leaves the reader uncomfortable. Yet I am genuinely perplexed. I am perplexed by the fact that Hyde, McGee, and Martin are "genetically linked" to traditions that have rejected conventional dualisms, yet the dissociations found in their articles imply those very dualisms. I am perplexed because I do not know how they could argue their case without such dissociations. I am perplexed about the relative lack of research into technical argument in general, and the lack of research into philosophical/theoretical argument in particular. But I am genuinely eager to continue study of the rhetoric of rhetorical theory. There is a "self" to discover here, and it is to that task that this preliminary study is directed.

NOTES

[1] Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 444.

[2] Goodnight has argued that a distinction should be drawn between the private, public, and technical spheres of argument. Argument in the private sphere is relatively unsophisticated. Technical argument brings with it the formal expectations of a scholarly community bent on advancing a "special kind of knowledge." Public debate ensues when an argument reaches beyond the boundaries of a specialized community or group of private individuals and engages a larger group of people known as "the public." G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A Speculative Inquiry into the Art of Public Deliberation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (1982), 214-27.

[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, trans. Rush Rhees (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 1.

[4] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, pp. 411-459.

[5] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, pp. 420-426.

[6] Barry Barnes, T.S. Kuhn and Social Science (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 79-83.

[7] Barnes, p. 81.

[8] Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Rhetoric and Public Knowledge," in Rhetoric, Philosophy and Literature: An Exploration, ed. Don M. Burks (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 67-93.

[9] Bitzer, p. 68.

[10] Bitzer, p. 90.

[11] Michael J. Hyde, "Rethinking the 'Public': Deconstructing an Ideograph," Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Speech Communication Association, Anaheim, California, November, 1981.

[12] Michael Calvin McGee and Martha Anne Martin, "Public Knowledge and Ideological Argumentation," Communication Monographs, 50 (1983), 47-65.

[13] McGee and Martin, esp. pp. 47-53.

[14] Ian Barbour, Myths Models and Paradigms (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 94; and Michael Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), pp. 29-30.

[15] Barbour, p. 94.

[16] R.E. Grandy, Theories and Observation in Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973), p. 3.

[17] Mulkay, p. 32.

[18] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970).

[19] Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954), p. 35.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Mulkay, p. 32.

[22] Richard Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1953), pp. 79-82; Carl Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 112-113; and Mary Hesse, The Structure of Scientific Inference (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1974), pp. 9-16.

[23] Braithwaite, p. 80.

[24] Kuhn, esp. the "Postscript."

[25] Kuhn, p. 50.

[26] Hesse, pp. 9-16.

[27] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension (Chicago: Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 320-339.

KNOWLEDGE AND ARGUMENT: AN EXAMPLE FROM ENGLISH STUDIES

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The relationship between knowledge and rhetoric is problematic, particularly in the academic disciplines. It is not satisfactory to judge the value of an academic argument in such easily-generalizable terms as reasonable tone, logical structure, adequate evidence, standard English usage, and so on. We know that an argument may meet all these criteria and still fail to convince an academic audience, and, alternatively, that an argument may fail to meet some of them and still carry the day. More important to the persuasiveness of academic arguments is the knowledge maintained, extended, and disseminated by the discipline in which the argument is being made, difficult though it is to specify the ways in which academic knowledge constrains what counts as arguments in a discipline.

The difficulty of specifying these constraints on argument is, at least in part, caused by the invisibility of such constraints within a discipline. For the issue is not what arguments are *about*, but how the subjects of arguments came to be regarded as objects of inquiry. It must always seem that the objects of a discipline's knowledge are simply phenomena in the world. What do you study? Why, organic molecules. How did your discipline come to choose organic molecules as objects of knowledge? Why, what else should organic chemistry concern itself with?

One way to discover how the knowledge of a discipline--and thus the discipline itself--is arranged is to look at a juncture in its development during which its central procedures and objects of knowledge are redefined. Thomas Kuhn, a student of such junctures, calls these moments "paradigm shifts." As Kuhn and others have shown, paradigm shifts are accomplished by rhetorical argumentation, not simple demonstration. A juncture is a good place to look, then, for the ways in which knowledge and rhetoric interact in the academic disciplines.

Just such a juncture occurred in English studies during the 1920's and 30's. The development of what is now called the New Criticism dramatically changed the focus of literary criticism, changed the criteria for determining which works of literature are worth disciplinary study, and changed pedagogy in literature. Because English teachers teach argumentation in composition courses, which are required of almost all college freshmen, the development of the New Criticism also significantly affected how argument is defined and taught as a general academic practice.

The success of the New Criticism is due in large part to the work of I. A. Richards. During the 1920's, Richards published a series of books--*The Meaning of Meaning* (1923), *Principles of Literary Criticism* (1925), *Science and Poetry* (1926), and *Practical Criticism* (1929)--that laid out the new theory and argued for its adoption as an interpretive procedure and pedagogical guide. Richards objected to the sterility of English studies, the legacy of a skittishly romantic and self-indulgent view of aesthetics. English studies through the last half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth treated art and artists as eccentric, even abnormal and unnatural. English pedagogy consequently fostered a distant regard for highly technical matters of the art of poetry, the development of a refined taste, and an excruciatingly romantic image of the sensitive academic that expressed itself in the erection of barricades of historical and biographical information about literature and the other arts.

But Richards has nothing to say, directly at least, about this sterile mode of criticism. He confines himself to the examination of what he calls the psychology of meaning. *Practical Criticism* is an excellent example of his procedure.

In *Practical Criticism*, Richards reports on "an experiment in literary judgment."[1] As a feature of his poetry course at Cambridge, he asked students--most of them English majors--to write responses to poems that he distributed printed on sheets without title, author, or date of composition. The responses, which Richards calls "protocols," were submitted anonymously. Richards's professed aims in carrying out this experiment are three: to provide empirical documentation of a cultural phenomenon not usually so studied; to outline a new technique for the study of poetry, a technique which, not incidentally, will be applicable to disputes in other areas of cultural concern, such as ethics and religion; and to recommend pedagogical practices that will promote his new technique.

Richards proceeds by giving us the poems, just as his students saw them, each followed by a selection from the protocols, organized by what Richards considers their salient features. The features, according to Richards, indicate the ten chief difficulties in understanding poetry: 1) the "plain sense" of the poem; 2) the sound of poetry; 3) imagery; 4) the influence of "mnemonic irrelevances," or memories recalled by, but not germane to, the poem; 5) "stock responses"; 6) sentimentality; 7) inhibition; 8) "doctrinal adhesions," usually matters of religious belief; 9) "technical presuppositions" about how poems are supposed to be made; and 10) "general critical preconceptions" concerning appropriate form or content in poetry.

Each of the poems seems to engender particular difficulties in a few of these categories. Richards indicates where the difficulties lie in each set of excerpts from the protocols, frequently noting the writer's errors, more rarely praising an excerpt for its perspicacity. Following the presentations of the poems and protocols, Richards analyzes the ten features, summarizing the difficulties they presented and offering techniques to remove them. Richards concludes with pedagogical suggestions for inculcating these techniques and a discussion of the general state of culture indicated by his experiment.

When Richards reads the protocols, he does not treat them as equally valid judgments of the poems. Indeed, he does not treat the protocols themselves as arguments and he finds very few of the judgments in the protocols valid. He does not comment on the protocols' persuasive power (except negatively, by implication), on their form, or on the evidence they marshal to support their evaluations. He reads them only to find out where, and if possible why, they go wrong in their understanding of the poems. In only one or two cases does he regard a reading that does not correspond to his own as a possible alternative reading, though he does comment favorably on readings he agrees with. The assumption about poetry which underlies this treatment of the protocols is that the correct interpretation of a poem is readily apparent; it is there, in the words on the page. If the readers fail to "take in" this meaning, it must be because some obstacle is preventing them from seeing it. The ten "features" that Richards has identified are the sources of error--the stock responses, doctrinal adhesions, and assorted presuppositions that get in the way of clear sight and correct understanding.

Richards says that he is inquiring here into the psychology of reading, attempting to find the intentions and mental operations that affect our judgments in matters, like poetry, that require interpretation and disputation. Because Richards regards the "true interpretation" of a poem to be virtually self-evident, then false interpretations are aberrant or partial views of reality. Here, for example, is how Richards introduces the third poem and its protocols:

> Between the bare apprehension of the literal sense of a passage and the full comprehension of all its meanings in every kind, a number of half-way houses intervene. To ascertain, even roughly, where failure has occurred is, in many cases, beyond our power. . . .Inability to construe may have countless causes. Distractions, preconceptions, inhibitions of all kinds have their part, and putting our finger on the obstructing item is always largely guesswork. The assumption, however, that stupidity is not a simple quantity, such as weight or impenetrability were once thought to be, but an effect of complex inhibitions is a long stride in a hopeful direction. The most leaden-witted blockhead thereby becomes an object of interest (40-41).

Now this is witty, and the wit--and teacher's-lounge honesty--soften the metaphors: the half-way house (presumably for mental rather than criminal cases), the failures, obstructions, the weight and opacity of the blockhead reader. If we remove mental obstacles and cure deviant behavior, the simple, clear meaning shines through.

Richards does not blame the blockhead reader for his or her failures, however. It is quite natural, he says, for readers to be bewildered by poetry, to fall back on stock responses or mnemonic irrelevances when asked to respond to a poem. If there is a fault here, it is in the reader's lack of education in the techniques of interpretation. But if one needs to learn techniques in order to interpret, we might ask, is it true that "true interpretation" is self-evident? Richards must answer both yes and no to this question. Yes, one does need positive instruction in interpretation--in, say, the "four kinds of meaning" that Richards distinguishes--but the effect of such ✓ instruction is to remove obstructions that would otherwise spring up in one's mental processes. This kind of argument on behalf of his pedagogy persuasively obscures the fact that many of the "obstacles" Richards would clear away are the products of instruction under the set of theoretical assumptions with which he takes issue. The dominant critical method against which he and the

other New Critics reacted valued the technical knowledge Richards calls "technical presuppositions," the touchstones of taste that he calls "critical presuppositions," and the biographical and historical data that he demolishes by handing out poems stripped of author, title, and date.

If we examine some of the protocols on Poem 3, along with Richards's comments, we see how Richards redefines the criteria for making a literary argument. Here is part of a protocol:

> The sudden change from the fine tang of the first lines to the simplicity of the last is effective, but the long strings of monosyllables are ugly, and the fifth line is inexcusable while the sense is not altogether clear. It is difficult to share the poet's attitude, because although he is evidently sincere, his technique is bad. The lines do, however, in spite of this express the simple faith of a very simple man (43).

Those of us who know the wonderful poem that this refers to--Donne's sonnet beginning, "At the round earth's imagined corners"--will no doubt agree with Richards that the protocol shows "easy patronage" and the defensive reaction of contempt.[2] (As we agree, however, we should also remind ourselves that we have been trained in the method advocated by Richards.)

Here is another protocol on the same poem:

> A poem of this kind needs perfection. If not, enumerations as "war, dearth, age . . ." cannot but bore. Gloomy poems must express deep thoughts or give a harmonious feeling of melancholy not only a feeling of fear and discomfort else they are a failure (43).

This shows, Richards points out, both a doctrinal objection and the interference of preconceptions about what poems ought to do. In other similar protocols, Richards notes that "technical presuppositions, by destroying the movement of the verse and so precluding the emotional links from developing, certainly cooperated in producing miscomprehension and negative judgments" (44). And again, "the sharp and jerky way in which [the protocol writer] read these lines probably prevented him from taking in their sense" (45).

What Richards objects to here as prejudice, blindness, and incomprehension might well be read as attempts to imitate a well-accepted form of literary analysis. Compare the protocols just quoted with this passage by a respected critic:

> Our author will not keep his eye steady upon the thing before him; he goes off, and distracts us, and breaks the impression he had begun to succeed in giving, by bidding us look now at something else. Some simpler epithets . . . and some plainer language . . . would have done the work better. We are quite prepared to believe

> that these faults and these *disagreeables* have personally been necessities to the writer, are awkwardnesses of growth, of which the full stature may show no trace.[3]

This is the kind of criticism that Richards's students have long heard, a kind of argument that has long been not only acceptable as literary criticism, but a dominant form of criticism. The only recognition that Richards gives to this critical school is to refer to it as an unfortunate result of a "fashionable" and "confused" doctrine of "pure art." It is to his credit that Richards wishes to reduce the distance between poems and readers, to make poetry more accessible by cutting through ideas about the foreignness of poetry. He does not say, in so many words, that the then-current critical doctrines are the causes of our difficulties, but the implication is clear in the metaphors of blockage, deviancy from the natural, and mental illness that run through his argument.

Because Richards won the battle fought here, the New Criticism defines, for those of us educated in English departments since 1930, the new kind of knowledge we must have in order to work within the discipline. We must know, for example, that all poems are fictions, that the author's intention cannot be discovered anywhere but in the poem itself (the poet is usually the least qualified to tell you the meaning of the poem), that ambiguity is a positive aesthetic quality, and so on. New Criticism has tended to value some poems over others (those with more suggestive ambiguities, for example). Students must also know what kinds of comment are acceptable, how much evidence is expected (a great deal of quotation is essential to New Criticism), which critical assumptions and methods have been discarded, and which are avant garde.

When we look at the protocols again, then, we realize that, not too surprisingly, the writers are not familiar with all of this new knowledge. It seems a bit unfair of Richards to deny the status of arguments to the protocols when he is defining the criteria for arguments, but this procedure reveals for us the place and effect of knowledge itself--the knowledge that constitutes a discipline--in determining the status of statements that purport to be arguments. And it is doubly instructive to see how this constitutive knowledge works in a field that would like to be the site of education in what Richards calls "the middle subjects"--those that lie between "science" and the administrative arts: aesthetics, religion, philosophy, and "culture" generally. Richards wishes to equate poetry and culture, and then to equate culture and life. "There is no such gulf," he says, "between poetry and life as over-literary persons sometimes suppose. There is no gap between our everyday emotional life and the material of poetry" (300). If this is so, then it is a great pity that we are not all adepts at this art.

The form of education that will remedy this lack, however, is one that simply enables us to use our natural powers, according to Richards. "Doubtless," he says, "to some degree poetry, like the other arts, is a secret discipline to which some initiation is needed. Some readers are excluded because they have never discovered, and have never been taught, how to enter" (300). It is essential that Richards equate "discovered" and "taught" --for teaching means removing the impediments to discovery. More important is the word "secret" in "secret discipline." Richards seeks to remove the qualification "secret" in two ways: by instituting universal education in the discipline, and by revealing, through this education, that it is not really a discipline at all, but a self-evident element of human life.

Let us oblige Richards and remove the appellation "secret." For it is not a secret--is it?--that interpreting poetry is a particular discipline. And let us adopt his metaphor of initiation. For it is apparent, from Richards's own argumentative techniques, that it is knowledge--of objects, procedures, questions, theory, history--that determines the borders of discipline and establishes the criteria for what counts as argument within it. Within a discipline, discourse is transparent to the discipline's knowledge so long as it conforms to the proper criteria. Initiation into the discipline is the process of assimilating these criteria.

We will give a distorted picture of English studies unless we add that the New Criticism is not the only active theory in the discipline. For a time, it was so nearly alone, though, that most of the literary criticism produced in the last fifty years is dependent on it even when moving away from it. The effect of so powerful a theory is evident in the teaching of literature and composition. The chief activity in most literature classrooms and the desideratum of most student essays is close examination of the literal and figurative sense of the text, the relationship of its formal parts, the demands it makes upon the reader, and so on. The guiding doctrine is that "no poem can be judged by standards outside itself" (230). As for content, or the knowledge that underlies the comprehension of "plain sense," the rule is that "lack of acquaintance with the sense of unfamiliar words, the absence of the necessary intellectual contexts, defective scholarship, in short" (184) is simply not an issue, for "dictionaries and encyclopedias stand ready to fill up most gaps in our knowledge" (185).

Applied to argumentation in general, the theory has led to a devaluation of scholarship and an emphasis on form. When writing teachers talk about argument, they generally mean the form of an argument, which is identical to the form of a good paper: state the thesis, then provide evidence to support the thesis, along with reasons for not agreeing with other views, and and with conclusions that follow from accepting the thesis. Close analysis of written material on the subject at issue should be sufficient to generate arguments. When they advise students to consider the audience in framing arguments, teachers tend to mean that the writing should be correct, clear, and if possible attractive, and that organization should be "rational." Generalized in this way, these criteria for argument are not very objectionable, though it has not escaped the notice of teachers in many fields that the essay form taught in Freshman Composition seems more appropriate to literary criticism than to other forms of argument. In other words, while presumably teaching a form of argument that can be used in any sort of rational discourse, English teachers have betrayed the influence of their own disciplinary knowledge on what counts as a rational argument.

But what *is* an appropriate form of argument to teach if it is true that the organization of knowledge in a discipline determines what counts as an argument? The answer to this question is not to redesign the argument forms we teach so that they will have a more universal application, to "purify" our argument forms from the taint of disciplinary knowledge. Such purification is impossible. Therefore, a more appropriate pedagogical goal would be to take seriously the idea of initiation as a metaphor for education. Then in teaching argument, we would teach students how to recognize the discourse conventions that organize the interaction between knowledge and argument in a discipline. Rather than teaching one set of conventions, that is, we would be teaching that there are such things as argument conventions in disciplines, where to look for them, and how to use them. We would then be guiding the students' initiation into the academic discourse community.

Lying behind these pedagogical issues is the theoretical question with which we began, namely, what is the relationship between rhetoric and knowledge? The example of Richards and the New Criticism demonstrates that initiation into a discipline is not simply a matter of learning the community's secret handshakes, but of assimilating its way of viewing the world. For standards of what counts as rational argument are set by community consensus, not by some objectively determined match with universal human thought processes or the structure of external reality. Argument standards tend to become established as conventions in community discursive practices, so that one persuades by meeting community expectations in one's argument. The community sees the arguments that are most persuasive to it as "rational," so that the definition of rationality varies from one community to another. The community tends to see its own rational arguments as transparent to reality, and therefore to reject statements framed according to other argument standards not simply as weak arguments but as false views of reality.

It follows that learning to argue in any community is not a matter of mastering a neutral technique or "tool" that can be used to operate on reality in any way the arguer desires. Rather, learning to argue means learning the knowledge of the community, what the community has agreed upon as a way of understanding the world. Mastery of argument, then, means using this communal knowledge, which in turn creates more communal knowledge. Furthermore, arguments can only be judged valid within the community whose conventions they observe. It does not necessarily follow, however, that there can be no inter-community dialogue. What is required for that is that each community suspend temporarily its working conviction that its own argument standards mirror reality.

Rhetoric, to be sure, affects knowledge: argument standards in a discipline shape knowledge in the discipline. Argument can thus be seen as a social process that establishes knowledge. But the knowledge in a discipline also shapes argument standards in that discipline. In other words, if rhetoric affects knowledge, knowledge reciprocally affects rhetoric. Argument is not only a social process of reaching consensus but also an epistemic process of creating the nature of reality. In an academic discipline, the knowledge of the discipline is maintained, extended, and disseminated by rhetorical argumentation, and so too that knowledge may be changed by rhetorical argumentation. But no statements that claim the status of arguments in the discipline will affect the knowledge unless they are informed by what the discipline regards as the objects of knowledge: empirical data, persons, events, and relationships among them; hierarchies of importance among them; appropriate questions to ask about them; a general sense of what has been known in the discipline, what retained and rejected; tacit knowledge of procedures and premises; and so on. It is only within the interplay of rhetoric and knowledge that we will find the constraints upon and the powers of arguments.

Notes:

[1] I. A. Richards, *Practical Criticism* (1929; New York: Harcourt, Brace & World). All page references are given in parentheses in the text.

[2] John Donne, *Holy Sonnets VII* (ca. 1618):

At the round earth's imagined corners blow
Your trumpets, angels, and arise, arise
From death, you numberless infinities
Of souls, and to your scattered bodies go;
All whom the flood did, and fire shall o'erthrow,
All whom war, dearth, age, agues, tyrranies,
Despair, law, chance hath slain, and you, whose eyes
Shall behold God, and never taste death's woe.
But let them sleep, Lord, and me mourn a space;
For, if above all these my sins abound,
'Tis late to ask abundance of thy grace,
When we are there. Here on this lowly ground,
Teach me how to repent, for that's as good
As if Thou hadst seal'd my pardon with Thy blood.

[3] Arthur Hugh Clough, "Recent English Poetry," *North American Review* (July 1853), excerpted in Walter E. Houghton and G. Robert Stange, eds., *Victorian Poetry and Poetics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 403.

GROUNDS FOR ARGUMENT:
STASIS THEORY AND THE TOPOI

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The first three of the five divisions of ancient rhetoric, invention, arrangement, and style, are the substance of the rhetoric taught by writing instructors. The first of these three, invention, thinking up or creating something to say or write, is at once the most difficult and challenging of the arts of rhetoric to teach. In fact, according to James Berlin's recent classification of approaches to teaching composition, most writing texts either bypass invention or surround it by techniques (such as free-writing) that simply set the stage for invention and get the juices flowing.[1] Actually, most writing texts take a scatter-shot approach to invention, presenting a number of techniques in the hope that writers will find some congenial or inspiring. The techniques most commonly advocated include adaptations of the Aristotelian common topoi, the tagmemic grid, a simplified version of Burke's pentad, lists of questions that writers might ask about their subject, and various brainstorming and free-writing methods. As presented in textbooks, all these techniques are arhetorical, that is, divorced from the immediate sense of exigence, purpose, and context that precipitate writing.

We propose here a somewhat different approach to invention, more structured, more systematic, and closer to that of classical rhetoric. There, invention was certainly not bypassed, but it was regarded less as the act of creating content in general than as the art of generating arguments to serve general or special theses in particular rhetorical situations. Although some theorists regard invention as the wholesale fabrication of material or information regardless of purpose or context, we want to emphasize here this limited definition of invention.

The invention of arguments is a specific task, and it certainly was considered one of the teachable arts in antiquity. When Cicero wrote his treatise on the topics for his friend Trebatius who could not understand Aristotle's work on the same subject, he defined invention as a way of discovering arguments "by a rational system without wandering about."[2] Such a rational system is inherently teachable; furthermore, classical invention was to some extent teachable by itself, outside the particular subject matter of an argument, though this separation from content is a constant problem in rhetoric. For any art of invention teachable outside a particular subject matter must be somewhat abstract in order to fit different circumstances. In current terms, we ask whether there is an art of invention that is *field independent*, applicable to any discipline, as opposed to an art that is *field dependent*, tied to a particular subject matter.

Field independent invention systems have often been based on analytical models of argument on the plausible assumption that if you take something apart you might identify the components to help put it back together. The parts of the syllogism have often been presented as the analytic pieces of an argument; thus writing textbooks that deal with argument frequently have a mandatory section on syllogistic reasoning, based on the less plausible assumption that the ability to manipulate a syllogism is the same as the ability to invent an argument. Most recently, these sections have been replaced by descriptions of the Toulmin model, the syllogism turned on its side and expanded. Major premise, minor premise, and conclusion have become warrant, grounds and claim, with the addition of backing for the warrant, consideration of modality and the possibility of rebuttal. This sort of expanded syllogism, by the way, was not unknown in classical rhetoric. In fact, rhetorical versions of the syllogism were understood to vary from the two part enthymeme to the four or five part epicheireme.[3]

The Toulmin model is a flexible and powerful analytic device, especially good at the paragraph level, and it can also function as an invention device.[4] But it sits far above the specific content of an argument, as far in its schematic presentation as an expression in symbolic logic sits above a set of propositions in natural language. Thus we might ask if any other model can span the distance between the abstract representation of an argument and its embodiment in natural language--and between schematizing arguments and the somewhat different task of inventing them. In other words, we want to know not just what slots to fill, but something more about how to fill them.

For an answer we can look again at how invention was taught in classical rhetoric. Books I and II of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* provide our usual impression of what classical invention entailed: a listing of implied premises on which enthymemes can be based in forensic, deliberative, and epideictic situations, a commonsense catalogue of the sources of emotion from which pathetic appeals can be made, a discussion of appeals from ethos, the very general common topics, and a list of twenty-eight lines of argument. But actually one of the major constituents of the classical art of invention is not explicitly in the *Rhetoric* at all, though about two hundred years later, by the time of *De Oratore* and *The Orator*, Cicero referred to it off-handedly as something everyone in his audience knew about.[5] This common property of the ancients, largely lost today, was the practical art of the stases.

As we might expect, exactly what stasis theory entailed has proved somewhat difficult to reconstruct, so it is open to varying interpretations--not because there was one body of theory to be pieced together from fragmentary evidence (though fragmentary evidence is part of the problem), but because there were many conflicting versions of the stases, changing over the centuries. Stasis theory was, in short, a lively idea continually remolded and modified by its users. Presumably the second-century B.C. Greek rhetorician Hermagoras wrote the first systematic treatise on the subject. According to George Kennedy, this work was more influential on the practice of rhetoric than even Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.[6] But Hermagoras's treatise has been lost, though some of it can be reconstructed from commentaries in succeeding centuries, particularly from the expansions and variations of Cicero and Quintilian.

Although there are significant differences among the ancient descriptions, basically the stases are a taxonomy, a system of classifying the kinds of questions that can be at issue in a controversy. No matter what the particular proposition maintained in an argument, that proposition, according to stasis theory, must be classifiable as an answer to one of a set of fundamental questions: (1) Does or did a thing exist or occur? (2) How can it be defined? (3) What is its quality? and sometimes (4) Whether or where it makes sense to answer or even argue one of these questions. These questions represent, respectively, the stases of fact or conjecture, definition, quality, and jurisdiction or objection. As a system of classification to aid invention, the stases originated in forensic practice, in the collision of charge and countercharge between legal adversaries. For when two conflicting parties make contradictory claims, the only formulation of the controversy between them which is not a step in either direction is a question. This question pinpoints the matter at issue, the point for the judge's decision. To use the ancient example carried through all the textbooks with wonderful conservation, the plaintiff claims, "You stole the urn" (kataphasis), the defendant answers, "I did not steal the urn" (apophasis), and the judge decides the question between them, "Did he steal the urn?" The question here involves whether a particular event occurred, and Hermagoras, Cicero, the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Quintilian, and a host of other rhetoricians would all have called this a question in the first stasis, the stasis of fact or conjecture.[7]

The congruence of stasis theory with Aristotelian logic and dialectic is obvious. First of all, Aristotle offers two similar series of questions in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics* and another in the first book of the *Topics*. The series of questions in the stases correspond to these: the first question establishes existence, the second question essential qualities, the third non-essential qualities, and the fourth accidents. (According to Quintilian, the first four of the ten predicables correspond to the stases and the last six to the topics--substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, affection.)[8] We can also understand the first four questions as a progression that situates a subject ever more firmly in its exact rhetorical context, in the immediate circumstances of people, time, and place. The fourth question in particular, which is the least schematic or theoretical and thus unattractive to many theorizers, can in fact be considered the most rhetorical, placing an abstract issue in a particular context and in a sense bringing it to life.

In its various versions, stasis theory is a maze of divisions, subdivisions, and further subdivisions of issues that can be called into controversy. Hermagoras, to begin with, distinguished general issues, called theses, from particular issues, called hypotheses. His four-fold classification may have concerned general questions only, while for Cicero, the stases fit particular cases at law. Hermagoras and Cicero made another kind of distinction between ordinary and legal stases. (There are four of the former and five of the latter in *De Inventione*, four in *On Stases*). The five legal stases have to do only with controversies over written documents when, says Cicero, some doubt "arises . . . from ambiguity, from the letter versus the intent, from conflict of laws, from reasoning by analogy, and from definition," where the ordinary stases concern the more intrinsic questions at stake in cases.[9]

Although Cicero maintained Hermagoras's original four stases in *De Inventione*, he abandoned the fourth, the question of jurisdiction, by the time of *De Oratore* and the *Orator*. A controversy is in the fourth stasis when, to quote Cicero, "it appears that the right person does not bring the suit, or that he brings it against the wrong person, or before the wrong tribunal, or at the wrong time, under the wrong statute, or the wrong charge, or with the wrong penalty"[10]. In later works, however, he abandoned the fourth and most technical stasis because formal legal procedures in his day made the question unnecessary. In democratic Greece where plaintiff and defendant spoke before large juries of fellow citizens, there was much practical value in objecting to the procedures or trying to nullify them, but in Rome in the first century B.C., the question asked by the fourth stasis was usually answered before a case came to court at all. Therefore, in Cicero's later rhetorical treatises the fourth stasis disappears entirely. Similarly, Quintilian, after examining rival theories of the stases in his *Institutes of Oratory*, concludes with Cicero that nature imposes only three fundamental questions, the famous *an sit*, *quid sit*, and *quale sit*.[11]

Despite the authority of Cicero and Quintilian, debate over the number, nature, and subdivisions of the stases continued. But their fundamental importance, their primacy in invention, was never challenged; indeed, in the second century A.D. they were elaborated anew in a treatise by the Greek rhetorician Hermogenes written especially for students preparing controversiae. In one of five rhetorical works whose influence extended through the Renaissance, Hermogenes not only restored the fourth stasis, but he also emphasized two important features of stasis theory. First, he pointed out something no doubt practically known by those who employed the stases: their compelling hierarchical order. Questions of fact or conjecture in the first stasis are prior to those of definition in the second; definitions in turn must be established before quality is debated; and finally all three must be answered or assumed before an action can be recommended or taken in a specific case. Second, although he was not the only thinker to do so, Hermogenes extended the application of the stases to deliberative as well as forensic discourse, advising students to apply them in the invention of suasoriae, practice speeches before legislative bodies. He even claimed, tentatively, that they were of value in the generation of knowledge. From Hermagoras to Hermogenes then, we have roughly four hundred years, 200 B.C. to 200 A.D. (no mean era in the history of rhetoric) in which stasis theory is a major component of the art of invention. And its links to the Renaissance are certainly traceable, though there are subtle shifts.

How were the stases actually used? Traditionally, there were the earliest stage of invention in legal argument. When confronted with a mass of testimony or data, the rhetor had first to determine the stasis or question at issue.[12] He did not sort out his material and then apply the stases; he sorted it out by applying the stases, knowing ahead of time the kinds of issues possible. Was it a question of fact or definition or value or jurisdiction? Or several in succession? In other words, was the case simple or complex, involving alternatives or staying in one stasis or moving from issue to issue?[13] Once identified, the stasis led the rhetor in the next step to the appropriate topoi for making a convincing argument answering that kind of question on one side or the other. The stases were, in other words, a system for organizing the topoi and generating commonplaces for embellishment.[14] Questions in the first stasis sent the legal orator to topics of circumstance in the person or the deed or of sign, (or the possible and impossible or past fact)[15] those in the second to definition or sameness and difference, and those in the third to topics of the more or less, and so on. Questions in the stasis of quality required further subdivision before the actual topoi were reached: in this stasis, the defendant has already gone beyond the first two stases, admitting the act and conceding its definition. He can then turn to various justifications (I didn't mean to do it) or countercharges or attempts to shift blame, or pleas for leniency. Choosing one of these gave him a courtroom strategy.

Stasis theory as developed from Hermagoras to Hermogenes also taught that certain cases or issues were incapable of stasis, or *asystatic*; systatic issues could be brought to judgment before an impartial body, but asystatic issues could not because the available evidence, for a variety of reasons, did not support two contradictory theses. The testimony might be one-sided, or too balanced, reversible, inconclusive, incredible, impossible, despicable, or simply deficient. Other cases were close to being asystatic if the evidence preponderated on one side, if the case was useless (e.g., the defendant dead), or the matter prejudged. Under any of these conditions, with asymmetrical arguments and no audience undecided and nprejudiced, there could be no stasis in its purest legal sense.

Though stasis theory may seem archaic, the product of the overly optimistic and analytic habit of mind of some ancient thinkers, it is very much alive, practically if not theoretically, in modern legal practice. Let us illustrate with the Abscam case of recent memory in which the prosecutors and the defendants chased each other up and down the stases. The first collision of charge and denial occurred at the stasis of fact: "You took the money"/"I did not take the money." Here the preponderance of evidence in the form of video tapes moved the issue to the stasis of definition: "You took a bribe"/"I took evidence for my investigation." As the bargaining proceeded, the defendants lost this issue, so ground was shifted to the third stasis of quality where we can characterize the prosecution as maintaining: "You deserve censure for an act particularly reprehensible in a public official," and the defense mitigating this evaluation of the crime by answering: "I do not deserve such severe censure because I did not do what those who bribed me asked me to do." The final plea in the fourth stasis turns to the nature of the legal case itself and the jurisdiction of the court, the prosecution maintaining the propriety of the investigation and indictment, the defense claiming entrapment and appealing judgment to a higher court. Whether or not the investigation constituted entrapment is, of course, a question that takes us down to the stasis of definition again, and the two sides will continue to chase one another up and down the stases and in and out of the courts until the appeal process is exhausted. Although stasis theory is not a formal part of legal education in the United States, where case law predominates, it operates in the procedures of the courtroom. The stases have in fact become ritualized in the formalities of the courts and plea bargaining procedures. And of course debaters will recognize the stases in the standard practices of debate.

Now that we have defined, identified, and traced the early development of the stases, the important question that remains to be asked is whether the stases are of purely historical interest, whether they have value for the modern teacher of rhetoric. The answer, of course, depends on what we make of them. In other words, we must shift the stasis of this question from that of value to that of definition in trying to answer it. Clearly any attempt to adapt the stases as a modern invention technique must abandon the procedural formality of its forensic version and come up with some adaptation more sensitive to the diverse situations in which arguments are made and received, and more helpful in inventing arguments. For we are still in need of invention techniques that are field independent but closer to actual content than the Toulmin model.

The important feature of stasis theory to save is the notion of a set of questions that divides the vast domain of possible arguments, but we may want to alter the sequence of questions slightly, especially if we want to make the stases correspond to features of the Toulmin model. The distinction between the first two stases, those of existence and definition, collapses somewhat when we consider practical matters of putting arguments together rather than philosophical categories. Although the questions "Is it?" and "What is it?" certainly look like questions in different categories, there is little structural difference between arguments claiming that something exists and those claiming that something ought to be labeled in a certain way. Here is an illustration. When the Viking spaceprobes landed on Mars, they came equipped with instrument packages for trying to answer a question in the stasis of fact or conjecture: Is there life here? A robot arm scooped up samples of soil and submitted them to three tests: mixing with a nutrient medium to see if gases were evolved, gas chromatography and mass spectrometry to detect organic compounds, and pyrolysis. These tests for the existence of life depended entirely on the definition of life on earth as a set of biochemical processes for carbon-based oxidation and reduction. We know nothing, perceive nothing, test for nothing without such definitions. When they are tentative we call them theories and, as Einstein said, it is theory that decides what we can observe. Admittedly these definitions are always refined by experience, but they are always prior. Assumed or argued definition is the necessary warrant in arguments in either of the first two stases. Definition and matching evidence are the structural requirements for any existence or definition argument. If we ask whether something happened, existed, or exists or not, then we already have a definition of it. If we argue for a different definition, then we also have one already. Thus the first two stases can be regarded as one question reversibly answered by existence or definition arguments, both of which require definition warrants. The distinction, however, remains useful because it reminds us that we need to be careful in arguing that something occurred or did not occur, is or is not a fact, to defend definitions or sometimes to back up to a more readily acceptable term before applying a label to an event. But even if the two questions are maintained separately, we should recognize that they do not require structurally different arguments.

We also propose adding a stasis question that classical rhetoricians did not ignore, though they did not single it out for the overwhelming importance it has acquired since the age of Newton: the question "What caused it?" In the courtroom, questions in the first or second stasis are often answered by labels suggesting cause or motivation. Take the favorite example "You stole the urn"/"I did not." This can be interpreted as a question about the cause of an effect. The simplor question in the stasis of fact would be "Is the urn missing?" and then "You stole it" answers why. The distinction between fact and cause collapses in the first stasis because where a person is on trial for a deed, act and cause are often one, the idea of cause assumed in the intentions of human actors. But outside the courtroom, in matters not limited to the actions of individuals, or even to human agents at all, causality is a different queston requiring a different kind of warrant and a different structure of argument. We cannot always support a causal proposition by demonstrating the compatibility or set-relatedness of a subject and predicate as we can in a definition argument. Instead we have to assume or demonstrate a relationship of agency between them. Warrants of agency resemble definitions in the sense that they are likely to be shared by a homogeneous audience. People in the same culture naturally share the same assumptions about what can cause what the way they share the meanings of words. Thus if we argue that a child's drug addiction was caused in part by a parent's alcoholism, most audiences will tacitly acknowledge the power of imitation as a motivating factor in human behavior. Similarly, if we say that extreme cold caused a metal structure to fracture, an audience with some commonsense physics will understand that temperature is an agent of the expansion and contraction of materials. If we cannot assume that our audience will recognize the agency we want to appeal to, we have to argue it into place, and to do that we resort to a number of tactics codified in the sixteenth century by Francis Bacon and, more rigorously, in the nineteenth century by John Stuart Mill: the arguments from common factor, single difference, elimination, and concomitant variation. But even with these methods (or a number of other rhetorical devices such as chains of causality or analogies) it is difficult to establish a new causal agency. A new agency the magnitude of Darwin's natural selection, Freud's repression and abreaction, or Stanley Fish's role of the reader always causes something of an intellectual revolution.

After redefining the first stasis and inserting a new second question we can leave the third stasis, the question of quality or value, as it is. It is answered by an evaluation argument that requires an appropriate warrant of value ranging from the practical criteria we use to judge a word processor or a clock radio to the ethical warrants we use to evaluate values themselves. But although the warrant or warrants may be unique in an evaluation argument, its structural requirements do not differ from those of our two earlier types of quesions. Instead they start to repeat themselves. Arguments in the third stasis subsume or incorporate arguments in the first and second, so to argue for the value of anything we must resort to ideal definitions and/or consequences, to definitions (categorical) or causal propositions. For example, if we want to argue that the practice of giving placebos is a poor one, we can appeal to an ethical standard of honesty between doctor and patient, or we can trace the bad consequences of allowing patients with idiopathic symptoms to assume some drug will cure them. If we want to maintain the contrary proposition, that the giving of placebos is a good treatment strategy, we will appeal to an ideal definition of the physician as someone who uses every available resource to cure the patient and to the good consequences that some placebos are known to have. Different audiences will, of course, lead us to construct slightly different premises to fill the structural categories demanded by arguments for questions in the third stasis.

The fourth stasis described in *De Inventione* and *On Stases*, having to do with procedures and objections in the law courts, seems the least salvagable for a modern field independent theory of invention based on stases, unsalvagable that is, until we remember the exact context in which it was used and that it corresponds to a common form of argument, the proposal, the call for action. The fourth stasis, that of objection or jurisdiction, looks to the immediate situation in which action can be taken; in the courtroom that action is of course reaching a verdict and passing sentence, but we can think of action taking any form. In fact, we can say that any argument calling for action from its audience depends a unique kind of warrant, which we will call a warrant of jurisdiction, an assumption that the audience addressed is indeed the appropriate, effectual audience to take action--that they have the right to take it, the time and occasion to take it, the means to take it, in short the power to take it. An injudicious assumption of a warrant of jurisdiction means an ineffectual proposal argument, just as an unwarranted assumption of agency can mean a failed causal argument. For this reason part of a proposal argument, a large part often called the feasibility section, may be spent convincing an audience that they indeed have efficacy. This is, in fact, the distinctive feature of the proposal argument, which, in every other part, incorporates the definition and causal arguments that together constitute a positive and negative evaluation.

So far we have been describing stasis theory somewhat arhetorically, as a taxonomical grid that fits between an abstract representation like the Toulmin model and the dense pack of assumptions and assertions that make up an actual argument.[16] Where does audience come in? We can see its place when we remember a minor controversy among classical rhetoricians over whether rhetoric had six or five parts. The phantom sixth part was judgment, the part that takes the materials generated by invention and decides on their appropriateness. And what is the measure of appropriateness? It is audience. Representing the consensus, Quintilian maintained that judgment was an inextricable part of invention, but whether integral or separated, the arguments generated in the various stases will only be used if they can be judged effective for the actual audience addressed.

Arguer, audience, and occasion can also combine to move the stasis of a dispute. An argument wholly conducted in the stasis of fact or definition can actually affect its audience in the stasis of quality or even jurisdiction. If, for example, a well-known environmentalist convinces members of the Sierra Club that grizzly bears are endangered, he will probably have a full-fledged movement on his hands because that audience supplies an answer in the stasis of quality ("This is reprehensible") and considers itself, even defines itself, as efficacious.

Obviously stasis theory with its dynamic of moving argument is valuable in situations of what has been called triadic argument, where a third party listens as two parties contend and then passes judgment on the competing arguments. But what about the situation of dyadic argument, where two parties disagree and there is no third party to judge or to prevent them from perhaps moving on to what we might call the fifth stasis (an "antistasis" really), that of violence or war? Twentieth-century rhetoric has been particularly interested in the transactional model of dyadic argument and with how two parties can each make changes until they unite in resolution. The triadic model requires an external source of power and therefore an arena of contention acknowledged by both disputants. With its emphasis on winning or losing the judgment, it seems less humane than, say, the model of Rogerian argument, where the two sides presumably spend considerable time getting to know one another's point of view with an intent to agree, at least on one side, prior to the first argumentative sally.

This is not the place for a wholesale critique of the dyadic model of argument as a pattern of manipulation--or who can seem to want to agree the most while giving in the least. The question rather is whether invention based on stasis theory can help when the aim is agreement instead of victory. The answer is yes. Stasis theory is a general heuristic for argument. It aids the exploration of conflict between two parties alone, between two parties before a third party, and even in the invention of arguments apart from a compelling context. First, conflicts tend to form in the higher stases of value and action or jurisdiction: What should be done with the budget deficit? Which is more important, national defense or social programs? What action should be taken about the teenage pregnancy epidemic? About science instruction in the schools? One way for deadlocked parties to resolve such conflicts is to move down to the anterior stases of fact and cause. Such a movement will have two possible effects: first, it can show two parties where they are in fundamental and permanent disagreement about facts, definitions, causes--no small achievement. To know exactly where we disagree can provide at least a "metastasis" of calm and clarity if not a solution to an impasse. But, second, it is possible that recourse to the lower stases will find the common ground, the areas of agreement from which dyadic argument can proceed. Two parties deadlocked over a course of action can perhaps back up and agree about an assessment of the problem. Of course, disagreement in the lower stases can mean permanent disagreement: there is no anterior place to go, for example, in the case of the pro-choice versus pro-life controversy. There disagreement is deadlocked in the stasis of definition, so each party is left to attempt to capture political power--jurisdiction--in order to overrule the other.

The stases are useful in invention in quite another way when we remember the notion of the asystatic issues, those that cannot be brought to trial because of imperfect arguments on opposed sides. Here the courtroom model is too limited and rigid; such issues may and in fact should be debated in other less formal contexts. In fact, whenever an issue exists in the public mind as a morass of conflicting, half-formed beliefs and attitudes, unverified assertions and wild notions of impending consequence, the order of the stases can help any parties who will systematically apply them by creating test propositions and subjecting them to refutation. We argue about many issues that cannot be resolved well enough for action to follow, but that can be clarified to the extent that we come to know what we do not know.

What else is needed besides the stases to model the invention process behind an argument in any particular discipline for any discipline-constituted audience? First, we need a taxonomy of intentions for addressing that audience in the first place. The following series based on suggestions from Joseph Williams is a possible one: 1. to distract, 2. to add to an existing body of knowledge, 3. to replace without disturbing the existing body of knowledge, 4. to add and disturb, 5. to replace and disturb, 6. to restructure the body of knowledge, 7. to replace the body.[17] By invoking one of these

intentions, the author creates a context, or exigence, for arguing. He can, of course, fictionalise that context to some extent. These intentions constitute a special topoi for introductions in most fields.

Second, we need another set of special topoi which constitute what we can call the current enabling assumptions of value in a discipline. These are field dependent and very hard to identify because they change subtly over time and are so ubiquitous as to be invisible. But we might characterise them as a set of evaluative criteria that can be invoked by any argument within a field. They are not necessarily school-bound assumptions, but they may be co-extensive with a discipline. In molecular biology, for instance, the following assumptions can currently be invoked as support in an argument: that information travels from the genetic material to the organism but never the reverse, that all morphological and behavioral characteristics have molecular explanations, that selective fitness operates, and that nature tends to obey the principle of parsimony. In literary criticism, at a very abstract level, some of these assumptive values might include a favoring of complexity, of paradox, of congruence, and of paradigms (both small to large and large to small). Stanley Fish's graduate student was on to these when she identified the repertoire of interpretive moves she could use in any paper: "She could view the assigned text as an instance of the tenson between nature and culture; she could look in the text for evidence of large mythological oppositions; she could argue that the true subject of the text was its own composition, or that, in the guise of fashioning a narrative, the speaker was fragmenting and displacing his own anxieties and fears."[10] These can be called four current special topoi in literary argument.

The third element in a full model of invention would be the canons of evidence or rigor in a field, i.e., the standards for the amount and kind of evidence accepted as support, a notion that is of course tied to what is at stake in a proposition and therefore to the original intention of an argument and the disposition of the audience. The more contentious the proposition, the greater the degree of support required.

The arguer who fulfills these three aspects of invention--who invokes an adequate intention, appeals to the appropriate topoi, and verifies according to the standards of the field--has, in addition to generating an argument, created a persuasive ethos. These elements contribute to an intrinsic ethos, as opposed to an extrinsic one, what the audience already knows about the arguer. All of these activities would have to be added to stasis theory in order to account fully for the acts of invention that produce an argument in a given field. We need not claim too much for stasis theory--it is one part of, not the whole of invention--but we would like to propose that it be restored to its rightful place as a first organizing principle of invention.

[1] James Berlin, "Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories," College English, 44 (Dec. 1982), 771.

[2] Topica, I, 2, trans. H. M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 383.

[3] Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, trans. H. E. Butler, V, xiv, 5-14, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977),p. 351; *De Inventione*, I, xxxvii, 67.

[4] Stephen Toulmin, Richard Reik, and Allan Janik, *Introduction to Reasoning* (New York: Macmillan, 1979), 108-111, 121-123.

[5] Wayne N. Thompson, "Stasis in Aristotle's Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 58 (1972), 134-141. Cicero seems to assume knowledge of the stases in *De Oratore* (II, 26 & 27) and *Orator* (xiv).

[6] George Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 88.

[7] Dieter argues convincingly that the term "stasis" or stand was applied to this midpoint between contradictory claims as a metaphoric extension of the term "stasis" from Aristotelian physics, where it designates a resting or standing still, a cessation of motion between opposed forces ("Stasis," *Speech Monographs*, 17, 1950, 345-69). Because this stasis point can only be verbalized as a question, it is not surprising that one of the many other terms for "stasis" was "quaestio." In fact, this is just a sample of the terminological quagmire awaiting anyone who steps into this area: Greek *stasis* is in Latin *status* or *constitutio*, or *quaestio*, and is translated sometimes as issue, sometimes as position, sometimes as basis, and sometimes, most erroneously, as commonplace. Given the absence of a good English equivalent, it is best to revive the word "stasis" itself, now used comfortably by historians of rhetoric.

[8] *Institutio Oratoria*, III, vi, 23-24, p. 421.

[9] *De Inventione*, II, xxxix, 116, p. 285.

[10] *De Inventione*, I, vii, 10, p. 23.

[11] *Institutio Oratoria*, III, vi, 80, p. 450.

[12] Ray Nadeau, "Hermogenes' *On Stases*: A Translation with an Introduction and Notes," *Speech Monographs*, 31 (1964), p. 392.

[13] *De Inventione*, I, xiii, 18, pp. 37-39.

[14] For an illustration, see Cicero's example in *De Inventione*, II, xxxii-xxxiii, 99-103, pp. 265-69.

[15] *Rhetoric*, II, 18 & 19, trans J. H. Freese, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 263-73.

[16] We refer here to the substance of an argument as generated by the topics. Since Aristotle does not define Topic at all in the *Topica* and only as "an element of an enthymeme" in the *Rhetoric* (1396b23), we draw here on the definition offered by Theophrastus and preserved in the commentary of Alexander: "A Topic is a principle (*arche*) and element (*stoicheon*) from which

we draw propositions that serve as a basis for reasonings on a proposed question; it is determinate as to circumscription (*perigraphe* . . . *horismenos*) and undetermined as to particular applications (*kath' hekasta aoristos*)." Otto Bird, "The Tradition of the Logical Topics: Aristotle to Ockham," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 23 (July-Sept. 1962), 311-312.

[17] Joseph Williams, "From Style to Form," paper presented at Penn State Conference on Rhetoric and Composition, 1982. The first intention, to distract, Williams sees less as a purpose for argument than as a perlocutionary effect of the intent to amuse.

[18] Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 343.

FIELDS OF ARGUMENT AND SPECIAL TOPOI

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Judging by the table of contents of the Proceedings of the 1981 Summer Conference on Argumentation and by the pages of the *Journal of the American Forensics Association* in the past few years, fields of argument are a hot property. But like many intuitively appealing notions, this one has turned out to be hard to pin down: there is more agreement about the fruitfulness of fields for the study of argumentation than there is about what a field is or how to find one. The general idea introduced by Toulmin in *The Uses of Argument* was that some things about the "form and merits" of arguments are field-invariant and some things are field-dependent [1], that is, that arguments of different sorts cannot all be assessed by the same standards. To assess a claim about the probable composition of the U.S. Davis Cup team one must know more than the meanings of the terms used in making the claim, Toulmin says, one must know tennis. To judge a claim that a certain theory in physics is impossible, one must know a lot of physics. Toulmin infers the existence of *fields* to explain the failure of any universal standards to account for the variety that successful arguments may exhibit. His failure to provide an adequate definition of *field* has proved both provocative and frustrating. His illustrations are all vaguely sociological (tennis, physics, aesthetics, the law) but his definition invokes the notion of "logical types," one that seems vaguely at odds with his general purpose, to explain the failure of logic to account for rational argumentation [2].

Other recent definitions by argumentation scholars have focused on the centrality of purpose [3], on the underlying assumptions that determine reasonableness [4], on the propositional content of an epistemic enterprise [5], on sociological entities that exist in group practices and provide psychological perspectives [6], on the audience addressed [7]. These are not necessarily incompatible definitions; as David Zarefsky points out in a review of persistent problems in field theory, sometimes a given feature of fields may be taken as essential and sometimes as a resultant or incidental feature [8]. I don't have a new and better definition, or a way of miraculously integrating this previous work. I do want to suggest the benefits of returning to a somewhat earlier definition. the one Toulmin uses in *Human Understanding*, even as he abandons the term *field* [9]. That conception has particular implications for the field as the locus of argumentation. I believe it also has implications for the shape of rhetorical theory.

Fields of Argument

In *Human Understanding*, Toulmin's project is to account for the development and evolution of concepts, given the absence of universal standards of reasoning. The loose sociological notion of *field* is replaced by the term "rational enterprise," which has both intellectual and sociological aspects. The rational enterprise is both a discipline, "a communal tradition of procedures and techniques for dealing with theoretical or practical problems," and also a profession, "the organized set of institutions, roles, and [people] whose business it is to apply or improve those procedures and techniques" (p. 142). Seen thus, a field is a community united by concept-use, by the creation, use, testing, modification, and abandonment of concepts, which are both the tools and the products of human understanding. A field can be a well-established, or "compact" discipline, like most academic sciences; a diffuse discipline, which lacks either well defined goals and problems or a suitable professional forum, such as many social sciences; and even, in a less rigorous sense, a "non-disciplinable" activity, which has goals that are not purely intellectual but personal (art), social (politics), or practical (technology). In its most general sense, a field is any instance of "collective concept-use" (p. 361). I want to emphasize that even though Toulmin begins with science as the paradigm case of "human understanding," his discussion of fields as rational enterprises is not limited to disciplines with explanatory goals; the crafts and technologies, for example, have their own characteristic practical ideals; the "concepts" that evolve through disciplined activity are not laws and theories but recipes, techniques, manufacturing processes, and the like (p. 365).

Even though a field may not have epistemic goals, it inevitably has epistemic effects, that is, it still influences human understanding. This is so because the field consists of concepts, which are the "skills or traditions, the activities, procedures, or instruments of [our] intellectual life and imagination . . . through which . . . human understanding is achieved and expressed" (p. 11). Concepts are both the media through which we know and the substance of our knowledge. It is crucial to Toulmin's argument that the products of human understanding are concepts and not propositions; for the products of our reasoning do not form an orderly system of propositions with formal relationships but a network of concepts or, in the evolutionary language that Toulmin uses, a population of concepts, which form a "segmented semantic domain" (p. 128) [10]. As the population of concepts adapts and evolves in our continuing efforts to achieve our goals, the substance of our knowledge changes.

It seems obvious but must be said that rational enterprises as Toulmin describes them are fields of discourse: concepts have effect and are affected through communication. (It is interesting, however, that the index to *Human Understanding* has no entries for argumentation, communication, discourse, or rhetoric.) The procedures he recommends as definitive of rationality--criticism and conceptual change--require intellectual exchange, which requires communication, which requires the representation of concepts in language. It is not satisfactory to conceive of language as referring to or transmitting intellectual experience; rather, language recreates and organizes experience because it carries also the intentionality of the expresser, the intersubjective context in which it is used, and its own origins and history [11]. Thus, in use, the linguistic representation of a concept carries with it a field-dependent network of conditions and perspectives without which it would not mean what it does. This network represents the "sedimentation" [12] of collective experience over time, experience that differs from field to field (thus, the "same" concept expressed in the "same" terms is not really the same to two different fields).

Others besides Toulmin have made similar observations about the power of concepts in science. Thus, Jacob Bronowski: "science takes its coherence, its intellectual and imaginative strength together, from the conecpts at which its laws cross, like knots in a mesh. Gravitation, mass and energy, evolution, enzymes, the gene and the unconscious--these are the bold creations of science, the strong invisible skeleton on which it articulates the movements of the world" [13]. And Thomas Kuhn refers to "the legislative function of scientific concepts": concepts like element, species, mass, force, space, energy, he says, "are invariably encountered within a matrix of law, theory, and expectation from which they cannot be altogether extricated for the sake of definition. . . . Their use is one index of . . . [a] commitment to a larger body of law and theory. Conversely, the legislative content of that larger body of belief is in part carried by the concepts themselves" [14].

The simplest case of the linguistic representation of a concept is the technical term. Understood in the way I am suggesting, as representing the conceptual substance of a field, technical terminology--jargon--serves not so much as a shorthand convenience or exclusionary device but as an essential intellectual tool. The importance of its terminology to science has been much commented upon. Norwood Hanson, for example, notes that technical terms are "theory-laden," freighted with conceptual patterns that serve as explanations. Of such terms as "pressure," "conductor," "charge," and "wave-length," he says, "To understand one of these ideas thoroughly is to understand

the concept pattern of the discipline in which it figures" [15]. James Paradis' examination of the efforts of Linneaus and Lavoisier to create nomenclatures and systems of terminology shows the way in which scientific innovation is tied to linguistic innovation [16]. Stanley Gerr also suggests that "the development of a branch of science or technology is . . . intimately connected with the development of a suitable vocabulary" [17]. In the early years of research on electricity, he notes, "the word 'conductivity' was never employed in discussing the behavior of electrical conductors. Rather, the complex though equivalent concept 'reciprocal of the resistance' (1/R) was used instead. The result was almost complete neglect of the concept of conductivity" (p. 155). My point is that concepts and their discursive expression are entangled in a field and, moreover, that what such concepts help us understand more than anything else, is that field and the other concepts that populate it.

But I do not want to restrict my discussion to the sciences, or even to the disciplines. Organizations and institutions can also be seen as arenas of collective concept-use by which goals are pursued. Some work in organization theory is suggestive in this respect. Of particular interest is March and Simon's analysis of the technical language of an organization. An organization's vocabulary, according to March and Simon, provides a classification of events and issues such that communicating about them and responding to them is economical of the organization's resources. Further, owing to this economy, members of the organization perceive the world "in terms of the particular concepts that are reflected in the organization's vocabulary" [18]. The concepts become "reified"; they come to seem aspects of reality. For the organization as a whole, reification is a process of "uncertainty absorption"; it changes a problematic situation into an instance of a known class for which responses are known or can be planned. Similarly, Katz and Kahn suggest that every organization has a "coding system" that reflects its norms and values [19]. Koch and Deetz claim for organizational discourse an epistemic function because it "involves an enactment of the consensual reality which allows the information [being presented] to be understood in one way or another" [20].

Special *Topoi*

Organizations, institutions, and disciplines are not just fields of discourse, however, but fields of argument, with important consequences for the concepts that populate them. They are fields of argument because the seeking of goals by means of concept-use requires the making and justifying of claims. We have become accustomed, through Kuhn's work, to thinking of science as operating through argument (his term "disciplinary matrix" is cognate to "field"). Latour and Woolgar go even further, saying that scientific reality is "the *consequence* of the settlement of a dispute, rather than its *cause*" [21]. They use the term "agonistic field" to describe the intellectual arena in which statements turn activities into facts. Some organization theorists talk about organizations in analogous ways. March and Olsen call an organization a "set of procedures for argumentation and interpretation" that enables members to negotiate "choice opportunities" [22]. Since the discourse of a field—an organization, institution, or discipline--is given substance by concepts specific to the field and since these concepts are used in making arguments, we can ask what role they play in the process of argumentation.

What I want to suggest here is a connection that has been implied by several scholars in argumentation [23]. In general, it is a connection between field theory and classical rhetoric; more specifically, it is a connection between fields and Aristotle's notion of special topics or arguments, "those derived from the propositions relative to a particular species or class of things" [24]. The topics are generally recognized to be central to Aristotle's conception of how an argument is made, although there are apparently some difficulties of interpretation. A *topos* is a conceptual region that may afford that which is needed for persuasion [25]. Aristotle's division of *topoi* into the common (*koinoi*) or universal topics and the special or particular topics (*eide*) is often taken as a distinction between topics of argumentative form and those of substance, the topics of form being universally applicable and those of substance being restricted to a particular class of things, or field. Actually, Aristotle seems to make a threefold division of these sources of arguments: the *koinoi topoi*, the *eide*, and the *archai*, or first principles of specific sciences or disciplines. George Kennedy points out that Aristotle was, in fact, trying to distinguish rhetoric from the substantive arts and disciplines because the sophists had treated rhetoric as the art of political discourse and not, as Aristotle wanted to show, a counterpart to dialectic that was universally applicable to argumentation on all matters of opinion.

Aristotle realizes that the universal topics are not, in fact, very useful: they "will not give a man intelligence in any one science," and not many arguments are actually formed from them. He also warns that it is easy to slip from *eide* to *archai*: "As for the particular *topoi*, the better our choice of propositions, the more we imperceptibly glide into some discipline other than Dialectic and Rhetoric: for if we light upon true scientific principles, the art is no longer Dialectic or Rhetoric but is the discipline based upon those principles" (1358a). There is an instability in this system: because it tilts away from

the universal topics and towards disciplinary principles, it weakens the very conception of rhetoric that Aristotle is at pains to develop. Although the special topics have typically been taken as only those *eide* Aristotle described for political and civic discourse (the bulk of Books I and II of the *Rhetoric*), I believe the distinction between the *eide* and the *archai* is no longer supportable, especially since we have apparently jettisoned Aristotle's corollary distinction between argumentation and demonstration. So we have these rough equivalences: the *koinoi topoi* are formal features of arguments that are field-invariant; the *eide* are material features that are field-dependent [27].

A special or field-dependent *topos*, then, serves argument by providing a material or substantive basis for inference, by serving as a warrant, in Toulmin's words, as a "good reason" for assenting to a claim (in Karl Wallace's words). Wallace's work on both good reasons and *topoi* [28] underscores the importance of substance to rhetoric, the ways in which substance serves argumentative functions, and the accompanying poverty of a formalist analysis of argument. "Good reasons," which Wallace calls the substance of rhetoric, are of necessity field-dependent. These special *topoi* can be identified with crucial concepts in the network that is a field. Because concepts constitute social realities, they serve as the materials of argument about those realities, in the further development and evolution of concepts. For the participants in a field of argument, as we have seen, the concepts of the field serve the epistemic function of enabling them to define situations, comprehend issues, classify procedures, evaluate methods, etc.; inevitably, these concepts will help participants to construct arguments about those situations, issues, procedures, methods. Their function in the construction and interpretation of arguments helps to explain the ubiquity and tenacity of technical terminology in the discourse of disciplines and organizations: such "jargon" cannot be uprooted without crumbling an entire implicit argumentative structure.

I believe that detailed analysis of technical argumentation of various sorts would show that the effectiveness, and even the shape, of the argument would rest on key technical concepts. Without some fairly detailed knowledge of the field itself and the ways the concepts fit into the field, most such argument is obscure. But perhaps some brief examples will help to make my point clear, if not to prove it. They will also show that the entire conception of "special *topoi*" is still a quite fuzzy one.

In a study of the writing done by legislative analysts for a state legislature, Lee Odell and his colleagues found that there are certain points that the analysts believed a "good" "bill memo" should cover in its assessment of the weaknesses of pending legislation: the consequences of the legislation, its relationship to existing laws or procedures, the likelihood of its achieving the sponsor's intent, whether it stipulated the procedures to be followed, and what people would be affected by the legislation [29]. These points can be seen as *topoi*, as places where arguments about the quality of the proposed legislation can be found. And because they have more to do with the institutional purposes, methods, interests, and attitudes of those who have to write and defend legislation than they do with logical form or even common sense, I would call them *special* topics.

In my own study of Environmental Impact Statements, I found that certain terms in the National Environmental Policy Act had become, through judicial interpretation, *topoi* for the preparation of legally adequate impact statements [30]. Each of the key terms has accrued a sediment of specialized significance based in Congressional intent, case law, and official interpretation by the Council on Environmental Quality. Some of the *topoi* on which the argumentation in impact statements depends are *major*, *significant*, and *human environment* in the phrase "major Federal actions significantly affecting the human environment" in Section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA. Other such terms in the law are *impact*, *adverse*, *alternative*, and *the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity*. The significance of these terms as *topoi* cannot be construed from any assumption of "plain meaning": understanding them requires immersion in the field of environmental decision making.

In a study of social accounting in experimental papers in biochemistry, Gilbert and Mulkay point out that specific actions of researchers in laboratories are expressed in methods sections by means of general formulae and methodological rules formulated by other scientists, thus: "Polarographic measurements of P/O ratios were performed as described by *X*, by using the experimental conditions of *Y*" [31]. Clearly, statements like this fall short of the ideal that any scientist should be able to replicate the experiment by reading the "methods" section. The terms condense many actions and much reasoning into a few words. Again, it requires immersion in a particular research community to appreciate the role that these terms play in the overall argument of the published paper.

In the brief communication to *Nature* in which James Watson and Francis Crick suggested a structure for DNA, there are several kinds of arguments [32]. Michael Halloran has explained the extent to which the argument is based on the presentation of a particular form of scientific *ethos*, as well as on *topoi* common to most scientific work, those of elegance and explanatory power [33]. I think it is also the case that the argument rests on several more special *topoi*. For instance, Watson and Crick reject the Pauling-Corey model for DNA for two reasons: (1) the balance of charged groups required to hold a molecule together, and (2) the van der Waals distances acceptable between types of atoms. Without an understanding of interatomic charges and distances, one simply cannot follow their reasoning competently, much less evaluate the stength of their refutation. Their own proposal, they say, rests mainly on stereochemical arguments and published experimental data. Some of these data (the Chargaff ratios between adenine and thymine and between guanine and cytosine, for instance) are not difficult for the outsider to understand, but the stereochemical arguments (the spacing of the residues on the chain, the angles between adjacent residues, the locations of the hydrogen bonds) are more obscure. Yet they are material aspects of the argument, probably the most important ones to the scientific audience, and they rest on material *topoi*, unstated concepts basic to organic chemistry.

A final example comes from the *IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management*, an article entitled "Decision Analysis of Capacity Expansion Strategies for Electrical Utilities" [34]. The authors suggest the use of a decision tree for determining the type of power generation to be added to a system (coal, nuclear, etc.), the size, and the timing of the addition. In effect, what they do is to systematize sources of argument for these decisions, such as availability of fuel contracts, satisfaction of siting requirements, effectiveness of energy conservation measures. Each of these considerations is a *topos* in deliberation about these decisions. The authors seem to hope that by systematizing the *topoi* they can turn rhetorical argumentation into algorithmic decision making.

Implications

If we define fields of argument as Toulmin seems to in *Human Understanding*, I believe we gain some interesting insight into how a field functions *as argument*. To see a field as "collective concept-use" does not prevent our understanding its sociological or psychological dimensions but to focus too closely on those may distract us from rhetoric. A field as a population of concepts is held (known and used) in common (more or less) by a community which is thereby competent to evaluate arguments concerning the application or modification of those concepts. It may be possible to define fields empirically, by examining argumentation for clusters or concentrations of concepts. Toulmin, of course, suggests that we find these most easily in explanatory disciplines; we may also find such clusters in organizations, institutions, social movements, and interpersonal relationships. I have argued that such concepts are likely to be serving as material keys to the potency of arguments, as *warrants* for claims, in other words, as special *topoi*.

Topical theory is problematic. The universal topics, as both Aristotle and Toulmin observe, aren't worth much; they can't account for much of what happens in arguments. They seem to recede into cognitive psychology or logic (which may be the same). The special topics, on the other hand, proliferate and become unmanageable, unsystematizable, and hence not handy for invention. But if they are at all useful to understanding argumentation, the importance of knowledge to rhetoric is underscored and the unification of wisdom and eloquence is required.

To see argumentation occurring in fields and these fields as loosely defined by clusters of concepts is also to highlight the relationship between rhetoric and knowing. Aristotle's attempt to separate rhetoric from the substantive disciplines was mistaken: it is not that rhetoric has no subject matter but that the subject matter of rhetoric is *everything* we believe we know. The segregation of rhetoric from dialectic and of both from substantive knowledge cannot be supported by field theory. The aim of Toulmin's work, both in *The Uses of Argument* and in *Human Understanding*, has been to contravene the results of this segregation, particularly to detach our idea of rationality from logic and fasten it to the process of argumentation and the substance of our knowledge. The unification of rhetoric and dialectic has become an agenda item in rhetorical scholarship [35]. I think field theory might help achieve that unification.

Notes

[1] Stephen Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958), p. 15.

[2] Charles Arthur Willard has examined the implications of Toulmin's definition in some detail in "Argument Fields and Theories of Logical Types," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 17 (Winter 1981), 129-145.

[3] Robert C. Rowland, "The Influence of Purpose on Fields of Argument," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 18 (Spring 1982), 228-245.

[4] David Zarefsky, "'Reasonableness' in Public Policy Argument: Fields as Institutions," in *Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation*, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 101-113.

[5] Joseph W. Wenzel, "On Fields of Argument as Propositional Systems," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 18 (Spring 1982), 204-213,

[6] Charles Arthur Willard, *Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge* (University, AL: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1983).

[7] Ray E. McKerrow, "Argument Communities: A Quest for Distinctions," in *Proceedings of the [First] Summer Conference on Argumentation*, ed. Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1980), pp. 214-227.

[8] David Zarefsky, "Persistent Questions in the Theory of Argument Fields," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 18 (Spring 1982), 191-203.

[9] Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1972).

[10] This is a major difference between Toulmin's work and Wenzel's interpretation of fields.

[11] This summary of the phenomenology of language is that of James M. Edie in *Speaking and Meaning* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 152-158.

[12] Helmut R. Wagner's gloss of Alfred Schutz's use of the term "sedimentation" is as follows: "The process by which elements of knowledge, their interpretations and implications are integrated into the layers of previously acquired knowledge." *Alfred Schutz on Phenomenology and Social Relations*, ed. Wagner (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 322.

[13] J. Bronowski, *Science and Human Values*, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 52.

[14] Thomas S. Kuhn, "A Function for Thought Experiments," in *The Essential Tension* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 259-260.

[15] Norwood Russell Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1058), p. 62.

[16] James Paradis, "Bacon, Linnaeus, and Lavoisier: Early Language Reform in the Sciences," in *New Essays in Technical and Scientific Communication*, ed. Paul V. Anderson, R. John Brockmann, and Carolyn R. Miller (Farmingdale, NY: Baywood, 1983), pp. 200-224.

[17] Stanley Gerr, "Language and Science: The Rational, Functional Language of Science and Technology," *Philosophy of Science*, 9 (1942), 146-161.

[18] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 165.

[19] Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 227-228.

[20] Susan Koch and Stanley Deetz, "Metaphor Analysis of Social Reality in Organizations," *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, 9 (Spring 1981), 1-15.

[21] Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, *Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979), p. 236.

[22] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations* (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), p. 25.

[23] The importance of special *topoi* to the rhetoric of science and technology is noted by James A. Kelso, "Science and the Rhetoric of Reality," *Central States Speech Journal*, 31 (Spring 1980), 17-29; and Charles W. Kneupper and Floyd D. Anderson, "Uniting Wisdom and Eloquence: The Need for Rhetorical Invention," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 66 (October 1980), 313-326; J. Robert Cox approaches the problem of *topoi* for the field of policy argument but reaches a different conclusion than I have, in "Investigating Policy Argument as a Field," in *Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation*, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 126-142.

[24] *Rhetoric*, I.2, 1358a; I am using Lane Cooper's translation (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1932).

[25] A *topos* has been interpreted both as an element of argumentation and as a complete, connective proposition. Compare Donovan J. Ochs, "Aristotle's Concept of Formal Topics," *Speech Monographs*, 36 (November 1969), 419-425, and Michael C. Leff and Dean E. Hewes, "Topical Invention and Group Communication: Toward a Sociology of Inference," in *Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation*, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 770-789.

[26] George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 66.

[27] Otto Bird has pointed out that Toulmin's inference-warrants closely resemble the system of topics in medieval logic in "The Rediscovery of the Topics," *Mind*, 70 (July 1961), 534-539.

[28] Karl R. Wallace, "*Topoi* and the Problem of Invention," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 58 (1972), 387-395; and "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 49 (1963), 239-249.

[29] Lee Odell, Dixie Goswami, Anne Herrington, and Doris Quick, "Studying Writing in Non-Academic Settings," in *New Essays in Technical and Scientific Communication*, ed. Paul V. Anderson, R. John Brockmann, and Carolyn R. Miller (Farmingdale, NY: Baywood, 1983), pp.17-40.

[30] Carolyn R. Miller, "Environmental Impact Statements and Rhetorical Genres: An Application of Rhetorical Theory to Technical Communication," diss. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1980, pp. 136-151.

[31] Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, "Contexts of Scientific Discourse: Social Accounting in Experimental Papers," in *The Social Process of Scientific Investigation*, ed. Karin D. Knorr, Roger Krohn, and Richard Whitley (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981), pp. 269-294.

[32] The paper is reprinted in James D. Watson, *The Double Helix*, ed. Gunther S. Stent (New York: Norton, 1980), pp. 237-241.

[33] S. Michael Halloran, "The Birth of Molecular Biology: An Essay in the Rhetorical Criticism of Scientific Discourse," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, forthcoming.

[34] William G. Sullivan and Wayne Claycombe, "Decision Analysis of Capacity Expansion Strategies for Electrical Utilities," *IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management*, EM-24 (November 1977), 139-144.

[35] This is especially true of Chaim Perelman's work; see his *The Realm of Rhetoric* (Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1982).

THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION:
A NOTE ON IDEOLOGY, CRITICISM, AND REALITY

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> But when by the balance of experience it was found that the astronomer looking to the stars might fall into a ditch, that the inquiring philosopher might be blind in himself, and the mathematician might draw forth a straight line with a crooked heart, then, lo, did proof, the overruler of opinions, make manifest that all these are but serving sciences, which, as they have each a private end in themselves, so yet are they all directed to the highest end of the mistress knowledge, by the Greeks called *architectonike*, which stands, as I think, in the knowledge of man's self, in the ethic and politic consideration, with the end of well doing and not of well knowing only...
>
> Sir Philip Sidney
> *The Defense of Poesie*
> (1583)[1]

In a situation where a miserable reality can be changed only through radical political activity, writes Herbert Marcuse in his last book, *The Aesthetic Dimension*, the concern with aesthetics demands justification:

> It would be senseless to deny the element of despair inherent in this concern: the retreat into a world of fiction where existing conditions are changed and overcome only in the realm of the imagination.[2]

Marcuse is not gearing up for another claim about the mechanical relationship between base and superstructure, between productive forces and spiritual formulations. For him the existence of autonomous art--objects set aside in specially marked spaces for privileged moments--is symptomatic of an unfree people. Our lives are not works of art. In our leisure time, we visit museums, peruse books, go to concerts. During the rest of the week, we are enveloped by billboards, commercial messages, and piped-in music designed to stimulate behavior appropriate to shopping and work.

Of course we make distinctions between art and non-art, though they may not follow the self-congratulatory line between high-culture, mid-cult and pop-art drawn during the cultural disputes of the late 1950s, and which now constitutes common sense for the newly educated or a source of irritation for those making a case for the study of mass media or "popular culture" in the academies. Marcuse does not define "art" through intent, or origins, or in relationship to an *avant guarde*. His aim is to preserve subjectivity in the face of alienating and dehumanizing social structure. Art is experienced. Art, he writes,

> breaks open a dimension inaccessible to other experience, a dimension in which human beings, nature and things no longer stand under the law of the established reality principle.

But what is the nature of this experience; what is its relationship to truth; how do we know when we have entered into the aesthetic dimension? The encounter with art reveals itself in the "estranging language and images which make perceptible, visible, and audible that which is no longer or not yet, perceived, said, and heard in everyday life."[3]

All this is fearfully abstract, and I do not wish to bog down in questions about the nature of subjectivity, whether or not it can be said to exist. It is enough to hope that it may be summoned and that art is that which in fact summons us to experience something beyond the hum-drum of day to day living. And yet this may be to say too much. The experience after all must speak for itself. What I propose therefore is to issue an invitation to experience art in John Keats' poem, "The Eve of St. Agnes." More than its beauty in a literary sense, though this too is important, I wish to examine its generative potential in a rhetorical sense, to get at the "estranging language and images" this poem provides which go unnoticed in everyday life.

I first read the "Eve of St. Agnes" when I was a boy. A young man Porphyro is led by a servant ("old" Angela), willing to risk her life, to the castle bedroom of his beloved Madeline. The poem was based on a folkmyth having to do with the ability of a virgin, on the eve of St. Agnes, to obtain knowledge of her future husband. If she lies on her back, hands under her head, he is supposed to appear before her in a dream, salute her with a kiss, and feast with her. Porphyro has hidden in Madeline's chamber and watches her enter:

Out went the taper as she hurried in;
Its little smoke, in pallid moonshine, died:
She clos'd the door, she panted, all akin
To spirits of the air, and visions wide:
No uttered syllable, or woe betide!
But to her heart, her heart was voluble,
Painting with eloquence her balmy side.

Porphyro looks out into the chamber, what he sees takes on the color and texture of a painting:

A casement high and triple-arched there was,
All garlanded with craven imag'ries
Of fruits, and flowers, and bunches of knot-grass,
And diamonded with panes of quaint device,
Innumerable of stains of splendid dyes,
As are the tiger-moths deep-damasked wings;
And in the midst, 'mid thousand heraldries,
And twilight saints, and dim emblazonings,
A shielded scutcheon blus'd with blood of
queens and kings.

Full on this casement shone the wintry moon,
And threw warm gules on Madeline's fair breast,
As down she knelt for heaven's grace and boon;
Rose-bloom fell on her hands, together prest,
And on her silver cross soft amethyst,
And on her hair a glory, like a saint;
She seem'd a splendid angel, newly drest,
Save wings, for heaven:--Porphyro grew faint:
She knelt, so pure a thing, so free from mortal
taint.

Porphyro revives and the sensuousness of the language continues to build:

Anon his heart revives: her vespers done,
Of all its wreathed pearls her hair she frees;
Unclasps her warmed jewels one by one;
Loosens her fragrant bodice; by degrees
Her rich attire creeps rustling to her knees:
Soon, trembling in her soft and chilly nest,
In sort of wakeful swoon, perplex'd she lay,
Until the poppied warmth of sleep oppress'd
Her soothed limbs, and soul fatigued away.

I was not daunted by the archaic language, strange rhythms and rhyme, or by the ancient world of castles and jewels in which the action took place. While I had never seen a triple-arched casement or a stained glass window in a bedroom, I could imagine, nay smell the foods Porphyro prepared after Madeline fell asleep--"candied apple, quince, and plum, and gourd; with jellies soother than the creamy curd, and lucent

syrups, tinct with cinnamon." I could see the light in that room, especially the shaft of moonlight that threw warm colors on Madeline's fair breast. I saw her warm jewels removed along with her fragrant bodice, saw her rich attire creep rustling to her knees. I knew why Porphyro grew faint, as well as why his heart revived.

There was no analysis, no attempt to respond to the lines in the way that people of the day might have responded, nothing stayed me from participating, from encountering the poem as speech, as something wholly present being uttered by a friend. In the midst of an American Graffiti world of the 1950s, of cruising, necking, and wondering who wrote the book of love, I was seized by this poem in a way that was infinitely more sensual, satisfying and memorable than the fold-out pictures of air-brushed young women embedded in *Playboy Magazine*. I did not read the "Eve of St. Agnes" for class, and I did not remember it because it was great art. It was great art for me, because I found the reading of it wholly involving and completely unforgettable.

As a teenager I did not interpose a dramatistic model between me and the text. The act implied was wonderfully obvious. It was consecrated by fragrance, color, motive and religious and secular symbolism. Having played a lute by her bedside and laid out his danties, Porphyro watches Madeline awaken. "She panted quick and suddenly her blue affrayed eyes wide open shone." She starts at the discovery of the pallid reality that was her dream, but pleads with Porphyro not to go.

Beyond a mortal man impassion'd far
At these voluptuous accents, he arose,
Ethereal, flush'd, and like a throbbing star
Seen mid the sapphire heaven's deep repose;
Into her dream he melted, as the rose
Blendeth its oder with the violet,--
Solution sweet...

All was delicious and mysterious, and yet as titillating as it was and is, I grew dissatisfied with my immediate and unmediated response. However authentic and self satisfying, however liberating it might be, it struck me as uninformed.

Years later, after much reflection, more experience and repeated readings and with the rise of the feminist movement, I began to see in Keats' vision the elements of romance, the sort of rapture valued by the publishers of Harliquin books: Innocent, blue-eyed heroines wanting to remove their jewels, let down their hair, and run off with a lover to live in a castle of love. Madeline was Snow White, Cinderella, Sleeping Beauty,[4] a passive young girl hoping to be awakened by a kiss and carried off by a young doctor or lawyer, someone able to fulfill her every desire.

Even then I was not prepared for a cynical view of Porphyro. In a powerful and witty essay on the "Eve of St. Agnes," entitled the "Hoodwinking of Madeline," Jack Stillinger intimates that in our times sneaking into a closet, watching a girl undress and then, while she sleeps "sinking a warm, unnerved arm into her pillow" might result in a jail sentence. He calls Porphyro a "peeping tom" and a "villainous seducer." Madeline however is not wholly innocent. She victimized herself through mindless yearning and superstition:

> Her condition is pitiful, yet at the same time reprehensible. Her conjuring (perhaps like Merlin's) has backfired upon her, and as hoodwinked dreamer she now gets her reward in coming to face reality a little too late.[5] The rose cannot shut, and be a bud again.

Stillinger executes another reversal in the epilogue to his book. He addresses the life-mask of Keats in his study:

> 'So it's true,' I says,
> picking up where I left off,
> 'that Madeline was only
> faking her dream, knowing
> all the while that Porphyro
> was hiding in the closet?'[6]

Stillinger's reading is playful, provocative and acknowledged a pivotal effort in an ongoing dialog over the poem. It is an ideologically informed reading revealing as it does, in the midst of the feminist revolt, not only the duplicity and brutality residing deep within the male psyche mascarading as "love" but also the corresponding dream within the female psyche which not only fails to show that such love is in truth the ideology of oppression but, like the young woman carried out of the box factory in "Officer and a Gentleman," holds fast to it as an ideal.

There is however something to learn from considering the origins of this ideal, the historical context within which it became an emancipatory vision. Keats wrote the "Eve of St. Agnes" in 1819 within forty years to two great political, social and economic revolutions. The French revolution was within living memory. Let's look at the poem again. Two young people, inspired by love, break through the barriers of family, church and fear of death to create a life together. In the breakup of a feudal society based on land and kinship, the rising middle classes in the 18th century developed an ideology around the potential of the individual--free trade, free thought, free press, free assembly. In the 19th century the Romantic movement, faced with the collapse of traditional values and the rise of factories and the massing of workers in factory towns blackened, in Blake's words, by Satan's mills, lodged its notions of human progress not in science, technology or politics but in the human breast and in Nature. The swelling of great and pure emotions became living evidence not only of the potential of the individual but also of the hope for progress born of the struggle against the monarchy, the aristocracy and the Church. By giving the figures in Keats' poem terms designating their social class and treating the symbolism involved in the context of historical struggle, we discover the triumph of middle class values of personal merit and love transcendent breaking through the constraints imposed by a landed aristocracy whose code would have sanctioned the murder of young Porphyro, whose lineage was wrong, even though he was the beloved of Madeline.

Porphyro reached beyond the pale, but Madeline awakening accepted him. Together they formed an aristocracy of merit and, aided by the lower classes ("old" Angela), find love. Their rebellion is consecrated by Nature, Religion and the Feudal Order as their symbolic representations--the knotgrass, fruits, flowers and moonlight shining through heraldic images staining the glass and falling on the silver cross--become part of what makes the scene of the rebellion dazzling enough to transform a betrayal of old values into a triumph of love over the cold and drunken brutality of the status quo dominated by warriors who with "shade and form/Of witch, and demon, and large coffin-worn/Were long be-nightmar'd."

What is the correct interpretation of this poem? What a question, but it seems all but inevitable in an academic context where the need to rank order students through an average of graded classes so that employers and professional schools are better able to channel students into the work place requires a "master" interpretation. Without an unquestioned point of reference, rank ordering becomes not merely arbitrary but also irrational. Yet it is also true even for those who would situate the "text" in a socio-political context that there may be a "correct" interpretation. The point of reference here is the world-view of a particular movement or party.[7] Critical theory however is not attached to a movement or party. This is a source both of its viability, especially in an academic context, and its weakness in a socio-political context. The temptation with critical theory, because of its aloofness from everyday political activity, is to assume that praxis can be satisfied in ideology critique.[8] We will return to this theme.

For the moment we will confine ourselves to our interpretation of the "Eve of St. Agnes." Looking back at it, we discover three different responses, two of which are ideological in that they relate to actual social and political movements. The apparent apolitical reading offered by the ardent teenager may be characterized, if one allows philosophical terms in such cases, as a type of Hedonism. The reading focusing on the implications of the poem for male-female roles in modern society relates to the Feminist movement of the past quarter century. This interpretation, whatever its merits and however correct its formulation, reflects a Feminist world-view. Finally the reading which situates the poem in an historical context and discovers that, through a class analysis of the characters and ideologically grounded imagry, it recapitulates revolutionary struggle in the late 18th and 19th century bespeaks a Marxist interpretation.

Hedonism, Feminism, Marxism--but there is no need nor was it my intent to be doctrinaire about all this. I did not respond on the basis of some political schematic, though I do not fault such readings. While it is true that responses attached to or regulated by particular philosophies or ideologies, especially if they are bureaucratically mediated, tend to stilted thought and bad prose, the problem is not I think explained through epithets like "dogmatism" or "fanatacism" and the dangers of mixing in politics. If we grant that socio-political interpretations may have some validity, and I do not see how this can be denied in good faith, then we may approach the problem at a theoretical level. The assumption that such a critique must necessarily be dogmatic imputes to the critic a naive view of language and, in a political context, represents an unsophisticated notion of the political process.

Underlying democratic political theory is the belief that no one world-view, whether it be called "philosophy," "doctrine," or quite simply "Truth" or the "Facts" encompasses the Totality. And even if someone or some group could rise above history, peer into an inevitable future, or merge with pure Being, the attempt to communicate it through language must fail. "No intelligent person," wrote Plato in one of his letters, "will ever be so bold as to put into language those things which his [or her] reason has contemplated, especially not into a form that is unalterable, such as writing."[9] There is no reason to assume, unless it be part of the definition, that an ideology critique cannot operate in full recognition of the limits of language and the authoritarian dangers of writing.[10]

The nature of political struggle in other than completely dominated societies further operates against fears about political fanatacism. Historical struggle only in retrospect and made simple becomes some elementary drama wherein Right and Wrong identify themselves in such a way that one can take sides. However Right a given movement

or party may appear, as one gets nearer to it one will likely discover several competing factions within it. As one steps back, one is likely also to discover that there may exist several parties and/or movements which in order to enjoy a success must work out ways of cooperating. Critical theory therefore, if it be concerned with praxis beyond the production of words and even if the critic be sympathetic to one party or faction over another, must concern itself with ways of formulating a world view making possible effective coalitions. Doctrine or Dogma may be enforced. Ideology must be persuasive.

Critical theory has sought out a vantage point on political matters outside the established order, the state with its various means of correcting errant texts and interpretations. It is rooted in the emancipation of the individual, not the "individual" as an observable phenomenon, but in subjectivity--the potential each of us has for transcending the world that is handed over to us in the guise of Reality, the world that bills itself as all-there-is, all-that-can-be, all-that-should-be. The fact that its notion of subjectivity ranges not only through culture as a whole but also situates culture in an historical context raises above the dogmatism of the anti-controversialist sect in the academies. In doing so it embodies, reflects, and offers itself as a response to an historical context wherein political power was systematically employed to efface the individual and eliminate subjectivity.

The work of the early critical theorists--Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Fromm, Marcuse and others--occurred during, was a conscious response to, and continues to take as a pivotal historical event the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of fascism in Germany during the 1920s and 30s. It addresses a moment when revolutionary change is no longer possible, in concrete terms the dark night of fascism when those who refused to succumb to the reality principle, a time when realism made one an accomplice, could only map out potential points of resistance. The unions had collapsed, the government fell, private armies struggled in the streets, the National Socialists seized control of the state. Workers, students, faculty, the "liberals," radical debating societies could not contend with armed force and the resources of the state. In flight then, the Frankfurt intellectuals tried to leave some sign.

But what sort of subjectivity or what manifestation of subjectivity in the individual could be relied upon to resist a political system bent on absolute control, the crushing of dissent, and which could employ every established method for socializing the individual to enforce its view of Reality? This is where debates over human "nature" and the connection between psychology, personality (recall critical theory's part in identifying the "authoritarian personality") and the social order becomes crucial. All the more so because fascism also denies the reality principle, offers a critique of and an alternative to what is, and enjoins praxis. Thus Eric Fromm in his book *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* distinguishes between a response to crisis which is death-oriented, which seeks to order the world by crushing dissent, difference, opposition, and that which is life-oriented, which welcomes freedom, diversity and creativity.[11] These tendencies he sees in all of us--which one dominates our response, that is the question.

Critical theory does not offer "correct" interpretations. It was not connected with any particular party at its inception. It evolved in the face of the destruction of party politics. Instead it affirms the possibility for resistance ("negation") in the awakening of subjectivity in the individual and in a Totality beyond individual and collective visions on which and through which the potential for cooperative action may reveal itself. Critical theory seeks out moments in individual experience through which to negate the reality principle, moments capable also of orienting one's response and shaping its political expression. One of those experiences, a pivotal one in the life of every individual has to do with eros, the awakening of sexual desire and love in the individual.

This is the moment embraced by the Romantics and so evocatively expressed in Keats' poem. Not the moment of confusion and enthrallment, the repressive de-sublimation offered in romantic novels and soap operas, though this too hints at the emancipatory potential of eros. There is in the "Eve of St. Agnes" the utopian vision, the idealized lover, but there is also the awakening, the confrontation with what is. Porphyro and Madeline, writes Clifford Adelman, engage in the actions necessary to escape their worldly prison. They "locate the border between the waking and the dreaming worlds. They, the 'phantoms' who escape the hall, are truly awake, while the rest of the castle remains enthralled in a wholly sensory world,"[12] in a one-dimensional world of power, brutality and custom.

In the fullness and ripeness of experience we encounter the aesthetic dimension, a dimension that is thought of as a rare, isolated, and privileged moment in a society built on meaningless, drab and debilitating lives. The romantic moment, when truly experienced, is not an interlude. It cannot be confined. It dies in memory and lives in the here and now. It draws the veil back from the hidden beauty of the world. It makes familiar objects unfamiliar. It makes up part of a world to which the familiar world is a chaos. It reproduces what is common, and it purges from our inward sight the film of familiarity which obscures us from the

wonder of our being. It creates anew the universe, after it has been annihilated in our minds by the recurrence of the impressions blunted by endless reiteration in modern society. What we just heard was a paraphrase of Shelley's defense of poetry,[13] but it could just as well been uttered by Marcuse. On the responsibility of the poet and critic, their role in society, they are in close agreement. The poet and critic are the "mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present; the words which express what they understand not; the trumpets which sing to battle and feel not what they inspire; the influence which is moved not, but moves" (p. 751). They are not, despite the affinity of such views with Plato, philosopher kings, but in a democratically inspired phrase they are the "unacknowledged legislators of the world."

Critical theory resonates with the romance of democratic humanism while, at the same time, it obliges us to inquire into the conditions--social, political, economic--necessary for its realization. It reveals the dream, welcomes the stealthy lover, and relishes the embrace. But it knows that action, if it is to be meaningful, must be voluntary, clear and deliberate. On examining the results of two great revolutions, critical theory suggests that however pure the aim, historical struggle, even when successful on its own terms, does not automatically bring on the millennium. In the face of the bleakest pessimism, critical theory nurtures the dream of human liberation:

> Solution sweet: meantime the frostwind blows
> Like Love's alarum pattering the sharp sleet
> Against the window-panes...

With the survival of humanity in doubt, we awaken to the need for radical change and know that this is no dream.

[1] Sir Philip Sidney, "The Defense of Poesie," *Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden*, ed. Allan H. Gilbert (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), pp. 417-18.

[2] Herbert Marcuse, *The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), p. 1.

For a thorough discussion of the relationship between Marcuse and the rhetorical tradition, see James Arnt Aune, "Marxist Aesthetics and Political Action: On Marcuse's Contribution to Rhetorical Tradition," paper presented at SCA, Washington, D.C., 1983.

[3] Marcuse, p. 72.

[4] See Brother Baldwin Peter, "'The Eve of St. Agnes' and the Sleeping-Beauty Motif," *The Keats-Shelley Memorial Association Bulletin*, 21 (1970), pp. 1-6.

[5] Jack Stillinger, *The Hoodwinking of Madeline and Other Essays on Keats' Poems*, (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1971), pp. 86-87.

[6] Stillinger, p.

[7] See Frederic Jameson, "Introduction," *Henri Arvon: Marxist Aesthetics*, trans. Helen Lane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. xi-xii.

[8] See Goran Therborn, "The Frankfurt School," *Western Marxism* (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 83-139.

[9] Plato, "Letter VII," *Plato: Collected Dialogues*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 1590.

[10] See Henri Lefebvre, *Everyday Life in the Modern World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 152-175.

[11] Eric Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).

[12] Clifford Adelman, "The Dangers of Enthrallment," *Twentieth Century Interpretations of the Eve of St. Agnes*, ed. Alan Danzig (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 115.

[13] Percy Bysshe Shelley, "A Defense of Poetry (1821)," *English Poetry and Prose of the Romantic Movement*, ed. George Benjamin Woods (New York: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1929), pp. 748-751.

NOTES ON THE CHARACTER OF ARGUMENT IN MODERN ECONOMICS

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I shall begin with an example in detail. In 1961 John F. Muth published a paper in *Econometrica*, the leading journal of statisical and mathematical economics, entitled "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements." For many years economists ignored it. Robert Lucas, who was chiefly responsible for its subsequent fame, wrote in 1981 that the paper had "a remarkably quiet first decade," which is no rash assessment (Lucas and Sargent, eds., p. xi). Though accorded the honor in 1968 of inclusion in Arnold Zellner's *Readings in Economic Statistics and Econometrics*, the paper was little read and less understood. The pattern of citations to the paper is unusal in a field that models itself so selfconsciously on the urgent bustle of physics:

Numbers of Citations to Muth's
"Rational Expectations" 1961-1982
in the Periodical Literature of Economics

1962		1966	5	1970	4	1974	10	1978	47
63		67	3	71	2	75	20	79	44
64		68	2	72	9	76	33	1980	71
65		69	2	73	10	77	41	81	56
								82	74

Source: *Social Science Citation Index*

It was a flash of lightning and long afterwards a sustained, rumbling boom. The tardy recognition of the importance of the paper is attributable to the obscure way in which it was expressed. The case illustrates by an argument from contraries the importance of successful writing in successful science. Galileo of course was a master of Italian prose; Poincare, Einstein, and Keynes influenced science and society as much with their pen as with their mathematics. But even by the undemanding standards of American academic life Muth's prose was not masterful or influential. It was badly organized, with ill-motivated digressions and leaps from large claims to lame examples. Little distinction was made between minor points of form and world-shaking hypotheses. Though no reader of *Economietrica* would have been troubled by the inelegant mathematics involved, he probably did wonder what exactly it was supposed to prove. The paper had some of the marks of professional excellence, such as an easy familiarity with mathematical statistics at a time when not many economists could claim it, and a broadranging bibliography. But even a serious reader of the journal could easily have dismissed it as obscure muttering to no purpose. Apparently most did. While richer in invention even than it appeared on the surface, it was too obviously clumsy in arrangement and style.

Yet the paper is important.* The reasons are complicated, but begin with the simple point that what people think the future will bring is an important reason why they act as they do. Any explanation of economic action requires some explanation of how economic actors think about the future. Before Muth's theory the prevailing explanation was that people muddle through, that they get a more or less correct idea of what the future will bring and gradually adjust to it. The trouble with the explanation is that it implies that economic actors are less perceptive than economics professors. The professors claim to know how the actors act, and how they will act as they adjust. The audience claims to know the lines better than the players. What is troubling about the claim is that it makes the unnatural assertion that a professor of economics knows more about the future of sales and costs in steelmaking, publishing, or insurance than do the steelmakers, publishers, or insurance companies. If she did she would be--or could be--rich. The claim to know how actors predict is a claim to superior foreknowledge of the predicted outcome. It runs up against the American Question, which is always a serious objection to claims of prediction: If you're so smart why aren't you rich?

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*Perhaps I should emphasize at the outset, further, that I believe the paper is true. But I am a Chicago economist and am not to be trusted in such things.

Muth's notion was the professor, even if correct, could do no better in predicting then could the steelmaker or publisher or insurance company. Or, to put the same point the other way, the actors, even if inspired, could do no better than the correct economic model. The notion was one of intellectual modesty. Under Muth's constraint the professors would admit that they were experts only in the social science of economics, not in the markets for high carbon steel or hail insurance. The professors would then have an answer to the American Question: they are not so smart, which explains why they are not so rich. They declare themselves willing to attribute to the economic actors at least as much common sense--or "rationality"--as is embodied in the professorial theories. No longer are the actors viewed as automata cut off from knowledge of the playwright's intent. They are fully to be taken as fully human, on a par with professors and playwrights. They have rational expectations.

The idea of rational expectations is an extension of an older and broader principle of economic reasoning, the principle of entry. Economists have long asserted that businesspeople will follow the call of profit. In this they differ from most other observers of society. Wherever there is profit, the economists say, there will be entry: into French restaurants in Iowa City if there really is a market there for good food; into oil production if there really is a large gap between price and cost. And the entry is its own cure. As more enter the industry the prevailing price will fall (or not rise so fast as it would have). The profit and the further incentive to enter will be eroded. The same holds for the industry of producing information about the future. If an economist equipped with a few courses in economic theory and statistics could actually produce information about the future of the housing industry that was valuable information, he being the only one who could produce it, then he could become fabulously wealthy. Other economists, though, would set up shop, too: the first economist on the scene is not, by assumption, the only one who can produce the information. The others can take the course. A widely dispersed skill in economic theory and statistics is what is supposed to make it possible to predict. In the long run (according to economic theory itself) widely dispersed skills do not earn much. So here: the entry of new economists continues until a fresh entrant--"at the margin," as economists say--makes no more than the usual reward to a quite usual education.

Muth's notion was not entirely unprecedented. Before Muth wrote, and well before he was read, the idea of entry had been applied even to the industry of predicting. The so-called "Austrian" economists had long emphasized that economists could not predict better than, or as well as, the entrepreneur [e.g., von Mises, Human Action, 1949, p. 867]. During the 1960s in the study of financial instruments some mathematically inclined students of the Austrian economists established the propositions that investment tip-sheets are useless, that a dartboard does as well as a stockbroker in choosing stocks to buy, that stock prices follow a random walk, and that in general the professors and pundits in Wall Street were paid for their tongues, not for their prescience.

What made Muth's version of the argument especially important was its application, at first by Stephen Turnovsky and Robert Lucas and later by many others, to the matter of macroeconomics--the matter of boom and bust, inflation and unemployment, dollars and deficits. Out of the idea came an important school of macroeconomics, known somewhat clumsily beside the tidy labels "monetarist" or "Keynesian" as "rational expectations." The message, elaborated in scores of difficult and penetrating papers during the 1970s [see Lucas and Sargent, eds. 1981], was that the human rationality of the economic actor was to be recognised. He was to be viewed, for a change, as nobody's fool.

To give one instance of the remarkable power of this apparently unremarkable proposition, he was no longer to be taken as a fool in his understanding of the policy of governments. He was to recognise, for instance, that the Federal government reduces taxes (eventually) when times are bad, in an attempt to make them good. Such a student of practical politics would not be surprised when the tax reduction did happen. He would have, rationally, come to expect it. As is said on Wall Street, he would long since have "discounted" the tax reduction, and would react not at all to its accomplishment. He would have spent the money months before.

In the Keynesian or monetarist models of the 1960s, by contrast, the economic actor was perpetually astonished, the perfect rube: "My word! The government has just reduced taxes in depression!" [Eyes bug out] "Holy cow! The government has trimmed the growth of money after a long period of inflation! Gosh!" [Faints]. It would be trivially easy to manipulate such a dunce, from which grew the conviction that it was trivially easy to manipulate the economy--to "fine tune" it, as the journalists said. The models of rational expectations in the 1970s went to the opposite extreme. They viewed the economic actor as a bored, cynical, man of the world: "Oh, yes, a tax cut." [Yawn, lights cigarette in long holder]. "Hmm: I see that inflation has been going on for some months. About time for the Fed to do its tight money act." [Falls asleep under newspaper].

The paper by Muth, then, was very influential. Why? Here are the crucial sentences in Muth's paper. In the interest of general intelligibility the selection does not include the many mathematical arguments. But these were for the most part mere instances of the verbal arguments, and sometimes strayed from the main point. They added weight to the paper in various ways: by exhibiting a relevent virtuosity; and by showing in a number of particular cases how rational expectations might look, how they would differ from other sorts of expectations, and, by methods of simulation common in applied mathematics, how much the difference matters.* Any selection from the text can be suspected of bias, but it would be easy to persuade economists that the selection here is the core.

Math	Translation
[1] The objective of this paper is to outline a theory of expectations and to show that the implications are—as a first approximation—consistent with the relevant data....	The paper asks how people make guesses about what the future will bring. The answer is tested against some of the facts in agricultural markets.
[2] I should like to suggest that expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory. At the risk of confusing this purely descriptive hypothesis with a pronouncement as to what firms ought to do, we call such expectations "rational." It is sometimes argued that the assumption of rationality in economics leads to theories inconsistent with, or inadequate to explain, observed phenomena, especially changes over time (e.g., Simon 1959). Our hypothesis is based on exactly the opposite point of view: that dynamic economic models do not assume enough rationality....	The guesses people make are probably no better or worse than the guesses economists would make. I'll call such guesses "rational," to distinguish them from the irrational guesses that present theories posit. Hostility to "rationality" is common among the critics of economics. I wish to go in the other direction: to see how far one can get by supposing that people are as rational in guessing about the future as in buying bread in the present.
[3] The hypothesis asserts three things: (1) Information is scarce, and the economic system generally does not waste it. (2) The way expectations are formed depends specifically on the structure of the relevant system describing the economy. (3) A "public prediction," in the sense of Grunberg and Modigliani (1954), will have no substantial effect on the operation of the economic system (unless it is based on inside information). This is not quite the same thing as stating that the marginal revenue product of economics is zero, because expectations of a single firm may still be subject to greater error than the theory.	In other words, people take appropriate care with their guesses, and economists should credit them with such caretaking. If people take care in guessing, talk about the future will be pointless: people will have allowed for the effects talked about. For instance, declarations that prosperity is just around the corner will have no impact, unless the declarer really does know something we all don't know. Economists do know something though not as much as their present notions about guessing imply: they know that a bunch of guesses by individuals average out to less quirky guesses by the group.
[4] It does not assert that the scratch work of entrepreneurs resembles the system of equations in any way; nor does it state that predictions of entrepreneurs are perfect or that their expectations are all the same....	Businesspeople do not have to be trained in mathematical economics to do about as well as economists can in guessing the future. Nor do they have to guess perfectly or all in the same way.
[5] If the prediction of the theory were substantially better than the expectations of the firms, then there would be opportunities for the "insider" to profit from the knowledge—by inventory speculation if possible, by operating a firm, or by selling a price forecasting service to the firms. The profit opportunities would no longer exist if the aggregate expectation of the firms is the same as the prediction of the theory:....The expected price equals the equilibrium price....	The notion of rational guessing makes a lot of sense. If economists could do better than businessmen, the economists would be rich. They are not. A farmer guessing about the price of hogs will arrive on average at the price the market does—he'd better.
[6] It is rather surprising that expectations have not previously been regarded as rational dynamic models, since rationality is assumed in all other aspects of entrepreneurial behavior. From a purely theoretical standpoint, there are good reasons for assuming rationality. First, it is a principle applicable to all dynamic problems (if true). Expectations in different markets and systems would not have to be treated in completely different ways. Second, if expectations were not moderately rational there would be opportunities for economists to make profits in commodity speculation, running a firm, or selling the information to present owners. Third, rationality is an assumption	It is asymmetric for economists to treat people as rational economic men in buying bread or building ships but not in their guesswork about the future. On aesthetic grounds it would be better to use one principle of rationality. As I said, if economists were so smart as to know how businessmen were failing to be rational, the economists would be rich. Furthermore, rationality is always a good place to start thinking about human affairs, especially economic affairs. You can add in later whatever allowance for ignorance or foolishness seems justified in each case.

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*Simulation, trying out several rough guesses to test the importance of an alleged influence, is among the commonest of economic arguments, but as a method, unlike the fitting of curves to scatters of points or the derivation of theorems from axioms, it is little remarked and rarely studied [though see Zeckhauserand Stokey, A Primer for Policy Analysis, 1978].

that can be modified. Systematic biases, incomplete or incorrect information, poor memory, etc., can be examined with analytical methods based on rationality.	
[7] The only real test, however, is whether theories involving rationality explain observed phenomena any better than alternative theories. In this section we shall therefore compare some of the empirical implications of the rational expectations hypothesis with those of the cobweb "theorem." The effects of rational expectations are particularly important because the cobweb theorem has often been regarded as one of the most successful attempts at dynamic economic theories (e.g., Goodwin 1947). Few students of agricultural problems or business cycles seem to take the cobweb theorem very seriously, however, but its implications do occasionally appear. For example, a major cause of price fluctuations in cattle and hog markets is sometimes believed to be the expectations of farmers themselves....As a result, the prediction of the cobweb theory would ordinarily have the sign opposite to that of the firms....	But these arguments I've made so far are just frosting, and are not good scientific method. The cake is the ability of my notion to make better sense of the world than some competing notion. In agricultural markets especially (though also in the study of general booms and busts) the competing notion is called the "cobweb theorem." Actually, no one takes it very seriously, perhaps because they recognise without thinking about it that it's not rational. In any event, it says that each single farmer thinks prices will stay high when they are high, growing lots of hogs to take advantage of the high price. By the time the little hogs become big hogs, however, every other farmer has also grown lots, the price is in fact low. The farmer never learns.
[8] There is some direct evidence concerning the quality of expectations of firms. Heady and Kaldor (1954) have shown that for the period studied, average expectations were considerably more accurate than simple extrapolation....	Heady and Kaldor showed that they do learn, or at least that they learn better than this.
[9] It often appears that reported expectations underestimate the extent of changes that actually take place....Such findings are clearly inconsistent with the cobweb theory, which ordinarily requires a negative coefficient.	Other writers have found that farmers do not expect prices to move as much as they do, but at least predict the right direction: the cobweb theorem says they would predict the wrong direction.
[10] The evidence for the cobweb model lies in the quasi-periodic and fluctuations in prices of a number of commodities. The hog cycle is perhaps the best known, but cattle and potatoes have sometimes been cited as others which obey the "theorem."....That the observed hog cycles were too long for the cobweb theorem was first observed in 1935 by Coase and Fowler (1935, 1937). The graph of cattle prices given by Ezekiel (1938) as evidence for the cobweb theorem implies an extraordinarily long period of production (5-7 years). The interval between successive peaks for other commodities tends to be longer than three production periods.	The whole notion of the cobweb is based on the ups and downs of, say, hog prices. But hog prices take much longer to go up and down than it takes to raise hogs. Something is guessing that is part of the story is wrong.

The question is how the argument achieves credence. Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent, the most prominent users of the argument, are clear that it is

> one of the most carefully and compactly written papers of recent vintage: every sentence in the introduction [not reproduced here] counts, and many have since been expanded into entire articles. Muth introduces the hypothesis at a general, verbal level, motivating it as a corollary of the general principles of economic equilibrium, and then turns to specific, certainty-equivalent examples. (Lucas and Sargent, 1981, p. xvii; the words are Lucas's)

The language of "introducing the hypothesis at a general verbal level, motivating it as a corollary of...general principles" is taken from the positivism of an earlier age. By the hypothetico-deductive model of science prevalent in the 1930s among such philosophers as Carnap and Hempel—and prevalent down to the present in a simpler form among practicing scientists-turned-philosophers such as Paul Samuelson and Milton Friedman—one deduces lower level hypotheses from general principles, the test of the lower hypothesis being therefore an indirect test of the principles. The talk of "corollaries" is part of the story (and so too, incidentally, is the special virtue attributed to "care" and "compactness," the virtues of mathematics). For the rest, the positivists alleged, hypotheses come out of the context of discovery, a non-rigorous realm which must be entered to get untested ideas or to make the ideas clear to outsiders but which is off bounds to the scientist when doing his genuine work in the context of justification. One "motivates" a proof in mathematics by stepping for a little while outside the rigorous mode of proof-making, showing the groundlings what is afoot.

Muth himself makes similar remarks about what should warrant belief. In the first sentence he implicitly declares that most of his arguments to follow in the paper are epistemologically lame. Showing that "the implications are...consistent with the relevant data" [para 1] is the positivist criterion of truth in science, but practically none of the paper does it. He shows that if he is careful his notion does not lead to manifest absurdity, such as a condition that speculators in, say, wheat entered the business to lose rather than to gain money. These are the quality of "data" he shows "consistent" with his argument. Towards the end, after much argument that would find no place in the epistemology of positivism, he turns impatiently on himself with a positivist *ukase*: "The only real test, however, is whether theories involving rationality explain observed phenomena any better than alternative theories" [para 7]. The words are redolent of the philosophy of science before the 1950s. The richness of scientific persuasion is to be reduced to a crucial experiment, a "real test" (*pace* Duhem and his dilemma that no test is crucial). Since the alternative views are "theories," the job of science is to upend or uphold them (*pace* Kuhn and his tale of normal science fitting fact to invariant theory). The relevent test depends on "observed phenomena," the hard, objective data so much to be desired (*pace* Polanyi with his scientist's conviction that scientific knowledge is personal).

But it is mainly bluff. The official, modernist methodology of economics fits exceptionally poorly to Muth's paper. The paper does not achieve credence by axiomatic proof or statistical curve fitting, the canonical Methods in official economic argument, and obviously is written in some other genre entirely than the one recommended by positivism. So too is most of modern economics, or modern physical sciences for that matter.

In the older history of science produced under positivist auspices in the early 20th century the urge to view modern science as the triumph of a Method of Observation was strong. The Method was said to be epistemologically narrow--or, as they would have put it, pure, clean, and rigorous. Bacon, Galileo, and especially Descartes were said to have presented Europe with a Method, demarcating mere opinion, superstition, emotion, and foolish gullibility from objective fact, science, rationality, and proper scepticism. Medieval science was said to have used Aristotle to determine the number of teeth in a horse's mouth; modern, 17th-century science was said to use observation. From such beginnings the Cuisinart food processor, the Sony Walkman, and all our modern glories followed of necessity.

It has only gradually been discovered that the story is false, though a falsehood powerful enough to have dominated three centuries of Western intellectual life. The method of modernist scepticism came from Descartes' brain, although as Amelie Oskenberg Rorty points out "despite his austere recommendations about the methods of discovery and demonstration, he hardly ever followed those methods, hardly ever wrote in the same genre twice" [in *Critical Inquiry* March 1983, p. 548]. His attacks on the common topics of argument, such as authority or the appeal to common knowledge, have she notes an ironic air, for he "found himself using the very modes he intended to attack" (*loc. cit.*). Descartes' method, borrowed from the excoriating doubt preceding faith of stoic and Christian mystics, was to doubt anything that cannot be proven, to doubt even one's own existence until noticing that *cogito* (or *dubito*) *ergo sum*. From this and similar axioms impossible to doubt one is to rebuild knowledge. It was the project of late 19th century mathematics, of analytical philosophy before the later Wittgenstein and Quine, of behaviorist psychology, and, in a loose and inconsistently applied form, of much economics. It is the project to "found" belief, "basing" it on some privileged form of knowing [see Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*].

The privileged form of knowing is knowing by the lone person himself, *solus ipse*, that is, solipsistic not social knowing. The tests of logical veracity and direct apprehension that allegedly distinguish scientific from other matters are individual. No one needs to talk to you to persuade you of the ancient proof of the irrationality of the square root of 2. There is nothing, or very little, social about your assent to it. So too the metaphor of facing fact. To be sure, we are not called on daily to face the facts or examine the mathematics of planetary motion or the synthesis of protein. We accept astronomers and chemists when they claim to have done so. Yet, says the modernist wedded to a solipsistic theory of truth, the important thing is that we *could* do so ourselves if we wished. That's truth: what we could come to believe after long and lonely study. Though not much developing the point, in his brilliant book on *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent* Wayne Booth comes close to saying that the crux of modernism is its solipsistic theory of truth. He quotes Tom Paine, that archetype of man in modernism's late adolescence, declaring stoutly: "I do not believe in the creed professed by...any church I know of. My own mind is my own church" (p. 86). On the same page he quotes Kenneth Burke, the John the Baptist of a newer dispensation, as though in answer to Paine's solipsism: "A man is necessarily talking error unless his words can claim membership in a collective body of thought." The joke is on the man who tries to organise a discussion group for solipsists. When they strain to use modernist methods the discussions of economists take on this character of silent wrestling. The result, says Booth, is a division of propositions into articles of faith held for no reason and reasons held without solid faith. The breakdown of conversation must be the result of a solipsistic epistemology consistently applied:

> All the many allies who might work together to discover what can be legitimately believed are thus encouraged simply to affirm *at* each other.... Passionate commitment has lost its connection with the provision of good reasons. And reason has been reduced to logical calculation and proof about whatever does not matter enough to encourage commitment [*Modern Dogma*, pp. x-xi].

Knowledge is social. It is a social event that Muth's arguments came to be credible. Certain of them were persuasive to certain people. The arguments were not written in the heavens, or, as Descartes imagined, in the soul of the self-regarding man. Nor were they written for all ages and audiences in Nature's book, like atomic weights. As Aristotle said, with his dismaying common sense, "a statement is persuasive and credible... because there is someone whom it persuades" (*Rhetoric*, Bk. I, Chp. 2, 1356^b 27), a truism but like 2+2 = 4 no trivial truth.

The evidence in the present case is that not everyone has been persuaded by Muth. It is apparently a particular society of economists, not the ages, that was to be persuaded. His arguments, in other words, were not altogether compelling--the standard euphemism in academic life for "utterly foolish and mistaken," but here to be taken literally. They did not compel assent the way some (but not all) mathematical arguments do, or the way some (but not all) of the simplest and most dramatic controlled experiments do, as may be seen by the refusal of such careful and intelligent scholars as Robert Gordon, James Tobin, and Benjamin Friedman to give their assent to them. The official rhetoric of Muth's paper would make this impossible, as a certified piece of positivism "consistent with the facts." On the contrary, however, a lack of unanimous assent among people competent to judge may be used as a test of noncompulsion in scientific argument. When honest and well-informed biologists disagree about the strength of a tendency to inherited altruism among human blood relatives they must be using arguments that do not demand assent. It happens frequently in all sciences, and is therefore no cause for shame. The official method of science alleges nonetheless that science involves only—or at best very largely—compelling arguments, deductive proofs, crucial experiments, falsifying instances.

None of these are present in Muth's paper. The main argument, very far from compelling in some circles, is that rational expectations is merely a wider application of a principle used daily by economists elsewhere. The usual models "do not assume enough rationality" [2]; "rationality is assumed in all other aspects of entrepreneurial behavior" [6] so why not here? Muth was simply pointing to an oversight in the applications. It would be as though for some reason astronomers in possession of Newton's theory had not noticed that the motions of the earth's moon could be brought under it. A paper pointing out that this, too, could be fitted to a theory that explained the motions of the earth, Jupiter, and Mars, and even of Ganymede and Phobus, would be instantly plausible to many. So here. A large part of Muth's audience were convinced as soon as they understood the argument, that is to say, if they were among the tiny group who saw through its "compactness," by about the second page of a long article.

There is nothing unscientific about such ready assent. Thomas Kuhn meant this by speaking of "paradigms" in science. It is no break with the traditions of science to go on as Muth does to little simulations exhibiting special cases that seem to behave well—not that "predict well" but that compute and fit and lie still beside the existing theory without exploding. In explaining "The Function of Measurement in Modern Physical Science," Kuhn writes: "the scientist often seems rather to be struggling with facts, trying to force them into conformity with a theory he does not doubt" [*The Essential Tension*, p. 193]. And in contrasting his views on the "Logic of Discovery of Psychology of Research" with those of Karl Popper, who believed that scientists were engaged commonly in testing current theory, he argued that for the most part a scientist is concerned rather with evaluating his "best guesses about the proper way to connect his own research problem with the corpus of accepted scientific knowledge....[T]he scientist must *premise* current theory as the rules of the game" [*ibid.*, p. 270]. Science is commonly a series of puzzles the scientist poses which are "like crossword puzzles, challenges only to his ingenuity. *He* is in difficulty, not current theory" [p. 271n, his italics].

Having shown that his instance computes, Muth is ready to make more direct arguments for it. Early on he remarks that "information is scarce, and the economic system generally does not waste it" [3, compare the remark on the "marginal revenue product of economics," which makes the same point]. Cryptic remarks like this are common in economics: economists delight in posing examination questions for their colleagues, recalling fondly the elements of the craft, as classicists delight in apt but difficult quotations from the Greek Anthology. In both cases the correct reaction is a show of effortless understanding; in Muth's case, the understanding that he is comparing information about the future of hog prices with any other good that can be bought and sold. If the analogy persuades, then one will believe that

businesspeople buy information to the optimal extent—or at any rate to the extent of optimality they exhibit in their other and more ordinary purchases. Their purchases of trucking services or space in feedlots do not leave any gaps between the cost of the last units of such things and their value in use. There is no waste, no misallocation. So too information about the future, which implies that there is no gap for mere economists to exploit. When businesspeople have done their jobs the future will in fact bring what on average they had expected it would bring. The argument does not "state that the predictions of entrepreneurs are perfect" [3]. They do not hit the bull's-eye every time. But at least their hits are distributed evenly around the bull's-eye in such a way that no mere economist could profitably advise them to aim higher in shooting [5, 6 near middle].

His three further arguments "from a purely theoretical standpoint" [6] are revealing. They are purely aesthetic, which is what economists mean when they call an argument "theoretical." When economists are asked why almost all of them believe in free trade, they will say that it is a "theoretical" argument that convinces them. Evidence that would convince a consistent positivist is wholly absent. So here, which probably explains why Muth immediately turns on himself with the stern injunction to seek positive virtue and "explain observed phenomena." In any event, the arguments here are arguments from symmetry and suitability and personal character, very distant from the rules of positivisism. Rational expectations would be a unified theory of expectations, Muth argues, symmetrical in all its applications. The appeal is to a uniformity in social nature—or more accurately to a desire to understand social nature uniformly. He argues that economists would be rich if they were so smart as alternative theories posit [5 again]. The argument is practically *ad hominem*, and has the reflexive character that the Frankfurt School associates with critical as against scientific theories. He argues that rational expectations can be conveniently modified to fit the imperfections of the social world. Flexibility is frequently applauded in scientific theories. But flexibility is simply a promise that the theory will be able to evade crucial tests, surviving unscathed from any conceivable positivist torture. These are, as Muth says, "good reasons"; but they do not fit with the narrowing epistemology that most scientists still believe they wear.

Even when he has jerked himself back to "real tests," Muth cannot follow the positivist line. His "observations" [8, 9, 10] are all reports of other peoples' work, once removed from the virtue of primary experiment. They are in fact mainly attacks on the plausibility of one among the infinite number of possible alternatives to rationality, not the full horse race among alternatives imagined in positivist folklore. The paper by Heady and Kaldor used self-reporting of their expectations by the farmers themselves, which is forbidden in the economist's version of positivist method [*JFE* 1954, p. 34: "a sample of two hundred farmers...was questioned concerning their price expectations at six-month intervals between December, 1947, and June, 1949. The farmers were asked to estimate the most probably price...[and] the extremes of the range."] The regression coefficients discussed in [9] are open to numerous objections. The observation [10] that cycles in hog prices are in fact much longer than the gestation period of hogs (which is important to the other theories of expectation) is, as Muth remarks, hardly decisive: "positive serial correlation of the exogenous disturbances" means that farmers may have a series of several bad years in a row, lengthening the apparent cycle beyond the period it takes to grow a hog.

To say that Muth's "observations" would not persuade consistent positivists is not to say that they do not persuade economists. Economists, like other scientists, can not be consistent positivists. As Michael Polanyi put it, the methodology of positivism sets up "quixotic standards of valid meaning which, if rigorously practiced, would reduce us all to voluntary imbecility" [Personal Knowledge, 1962, p. 88]. The persuasiveness of Muth's paper comes from the richness and catholicity of its unofficial arguments, overcoming official narrowness. Among economists an argument from axiomatic demonstration, statistical test (regression in particular), or appeal to the competitive model all have prestige. None is logically compelling. One can object to each that garbage in implies garbage out, and that the axiom, the statistic, or the competitive model is garbage. Yet the most hostile economist, if properly socialized, will want to yield to the form of such arguments [cf. Kenneth Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, p. 58]. She will be pleased by their success at a form level--"Oh, how very cute! What a nice proof/statistical test/appeal to the intellectual traditions of economics"--even if she wants to disbelieve their substance.

The very style of Muth's article makes an ethical and emotional appeal, an appeal to his character as a scientist and to the self-image of his audience as scientists, too. The positivists methodological baggage of the paper is part of the effect. The word "I" occurs twice only (once in the selection), in keeping with the dignified convention that kings, editors, people with tapeworms, and honest to goodness scientists are permitted to use "we" instead. More sophisticated writers play off these conventions, charming the audience.

The style is often indirect, as suits a scientist (one can make insecure scientists more insecure by violating such stylistic conventions).[*] Ten of the thirty sentences in the selection have their main clauses in the passive voice. Amidst much that is self-confident and even cocky there are many soothing words of modesty: "as a first approximation" [1] the theory works; "I would like to suggest" [2], not assert; "it is rather surprising" [6] that the theory has been overlooked; "it often appears" [9] that behavior is inconsistent with the alternative theories. And throughout the essay the reader is treated to dollops of scientific vocabulary from the classical languages: "purely descriptive hypotheses," "observed phenomena," "objective probability distributions of outcomes," "analytical methods," and the like. The form and substance of Muth's article seeks to persuade. Not to fool: persuade. Put flatfootedly it would not have been a success as a scientific paper, without drawing on a range of rhetorical invention, indeed, it would have been wrong. In a word, the article, like any other piece of scientific work, is rhetorical.

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[*] More sophisticated stylists in economics (I have in mind that inseparable pair, George Stigler and Robert Solow) play off the conventions of scientific writing, making disquieting little jokes about this or that article of the creed. Naive readers do not get the jokes, or are even aware of them, and sophisticated readers are correspondingly charmed.

To claim that Muth persuades by rhetorical means is not of course a put down. Outside of a rather small group of specialists in speech, communication, theatre arts, and related fields the close study of the rhetoric of a text is usually a preface to debunking it. There is a rhetoric of the analysis of rhetoric. An outside reader of "Sweet Talk: The Moral Rhetoric Against Sugar" by Elizabeth Walker Mechling and Jay Mechling, published in 1983 in the Central State Speech Journal [vol. 83, Spring, 19-32] aches for the demonstration that the diatribes against sugar are in fact misled. But the demonstration does not come, and the expectation that it will is naive. There is no reason why one cannot analyze the rhetoric of a position one believes perfectly correct (although a rhetorical attitude does make it harder to believe in such perfection), just as a mathematician might check his algebra. Critical thinking is not necessarily destructive.[*]

Muth's article is typical of the literature of economics, which has a rich and unexplored rhetoric. The richness is not astonishing, of course. That economists persuade the way lawyers and other professional rhetors do is no more astonishing than that rhetors now use much the same common topics as were current in Cicero's time [Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, p. 56]. To be sure, one might be equally astonished by both facts, and study them with wondering respect. An anthropologist, for instance, would do well to study rhetoric among the Sherpa or the Ilongot, to see if the same enthymemes carry conviction there as with us. A study of rhetoric among the Econ need not encourage bad rhetoric, any more (or less) than the study of econometrics encourages bad econometrics [cf. Axel Leijonhufvud, "Life Among the Econ," Western Economic Journal, Sept. 1973, 327-37]. It is odd, though anciently respectable, to argue that rhetoric is peculiarly subject to misuse, and must be therefore left inexplicit, or at best made the subject of gentle kidding in The Journal of Irreproducible Results. Though worried as all the ancients were by the potential for misuse, Aristotle made the essential points in reply:

> And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful....[I]t is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic [that is, deductive, "compelling" reasoning] to discern the real and the apparent syllogism [Rhetoric Bk. 1, Chp. 1, 1355^b 3,14].

That rhetoric can be misused is more not less reason for exposing it to view.

Once it is exposed to view in economics, and compared with the results of similar excavations in other fields, an important point becomes clear. The point will be banal to students of communication, although a banality perhaps more commonly uttered by them in the direction of workers in the field than the other way around. It is that arguments are similar among fields, strikingly so. The point is an extension of the earlier one that the modern claim to possession of a Method of achieving certainty is mistaken. And by small further extension it becomes the main point here: in its rhetoric the study of economics is indistinguishable from the study of literature or of nature or of number and quantity. And these are indistinguishable from each other. It is subject matter that distinguishes subjects, not epistemology. Science is a class of objects, not a way of knowing.

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[*] It may be relevant here to remind the reader that I believe in Muth's argument.

The project of toppling the wall between syllogism and enthymeme is a large one. The wall was first raised in 4th-century Athens, acquiring cannon (and some canons) in the 17th century and rockets and radar in the 20th. It is enough to remark that the border between rhetoric and (Aristotle's, not Hegel's) dialectic does not match the border between subjects. Literature does not fall wholly on the rhetorical side of the wall and mathematics on the dialectical side. If the wall has any use, and there can be very great doubt that it does, it is surely not to be used to distinguish subjects by epistemology.

The task is to show that fields believed to be very different in their ways of knowing are in fact very similar, since argument is how they know and their arguments are indeed very similar. Three fields of study that among them must surround economics, whatever (cartesian) coordinates one uses to describe the intellectual space, are paleontology, pure mathematics, and Latin literature. If the modernist fixation on epistemology is valid, these surely will be realms of plain fact, indubitable proof, and mere opinion, respectively.

In paleontology, the case in point is described by Stephen Jay Gould.

> The sudden proliferation of species at the beginning of the Cambrian period, one of the great puzzles in evolution, was explained by Steven Stanley in 1973 by positing the sudden arrival of forms of life that fed on other forms of life, single-celled herbivores, as it were, in a grassy sea. Their grazing on the dominant forms allowed new forms to survive the competition from the previously dominant ones, which in turn resulted in new grazers.

Gould remarks:

> Stanley did not develop his theory from empirical studies of Precambrian communities. It is a deductive argument based on an established principle of ecology that does not contradict any fact of the Precambrian world and seems particularly consistent with a few observations. In a frank concluding paragraph, Stanley presents four reasons for accepting his theory: (1) "It seems to account for what facts we have about Precambrian life"; (2) "It is simple, rather than complex or contrived"; (3) "It is purely biological, avoiding *ad hoc* invocation of external controls"; and (4) "It is largely the product of direct deduction from an established ecological principle.
>
> Such justifications do not correspond to the simplistic notions about scientific progress that are taught in most high schools and advanced by most media. Stanley does not invoke proof by new information obtained from rigorous experiment. His second criterion is a methodological presumption, the third a philosophical preference, the fourth an application of prior theory. Only Stanley's first reason makes any reference to Precambrian facts, and it merely makes the weak point that his theory "accounts" for what is known (many other theories do the same).
>
> But creative thought in science is exactly this—not a mechanical collection of facts and induction of theories, but a complex process involving intuition, bias, and insight from other fields. Science, at its best, interposes human judgment and ingenuity upon all its proceedings. [*Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History* NY: Norton, 1977]

I apologize for quoting at such tiresome length, but the passage is too strikingly similar to the analysis of Muth's work above to be abbreviated. "Accounting for what [few] facts we have" is Muth's claim, too, buttressed immediately—lest we pause too long over their paucity and become depressed—by appeals to the traditions of economic reasoning and the aesthetic pleasure of the simpler argument. It is not altogether strange to find evolution and economics using identical rhetorical devices. They are identical twins, raised separately.

In pure mathematics, the case is one described by Mark Steiner in 1975, taken in turn from George Polya's remarkable book on the rhetoric of number and quantity, *Induction and Analogy in Mathematics* (1954). The great Swiss mathematician, Leonhard Euler, wished to find a simple result, supposing one existed, for the infinite sum: 1 + 1/4 + 1/9 + 1/16 + and so forth forever. It is an I.Q. test to see what the next term is....Time's up. It is 1/25; that is, the sum is the sum of the reciprocals of successive squares of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on. There is no obvious reason why the sum should even exist, although a little calculation makes it plausible that it probably does and is somewhere around 1.64. What Euler showed is typical of the rabbits that 18th century mathematics was always pulling out of hats, to the surprise usually of the magicians themselves: *that the sum is exactly $\pi^2/6$,* where π is the familiar constant in πr^2, 3.14159.... The Indiana legislature is said to have considered once a bill to make π equal to 3.0, to simplify calculations, but π is in fact no round number, or even a repeating decimal. It is astonishing that it turns up so often in expressions apparently unrelated to circles.

The argument that Euler developed depended on many things, among them, as Steiner puts it, precisely that "he knew that a constant like π, on the basis of past experience, was likely to show up in such a context" [*Mathematical Knowledge* Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1975, p. 105]. Likewise, Muth knew on the basis of past experience that rational models were easy to manipulate, and likely to give especially simple results. Euler felt his result to be "simple and esthetic" [Steiner's words, p. 105], as Muth did. Euler could see no alternative, as Muth could see no merit and many demerits in the cobweb theorem. Euler, a famous calculator, showed the formula to be empirically correct to as far as 20 decimal places. Muth had less precise material, but made an identical argument, dressed up for purposes of modernist epistemology as "the only real test."

The most important strand in Euler's web of persuasion was an algebraic derivation of the fact of equality between the infinite sum and $\pi^2/6$. But the derivation depends on a crucial "inductive 'leap'...unjustified by anything so far presented" [Steiner, p. 103]. The leap was an analogy between finite equations like $y = 3 + 4x - 10x^2$, which are said to be of the second degree (look at the largest exponent in the equation: 2) and infinite equations like $x/1 - x^3/3 \cdot 2 + x^5/5 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 - x^7/7 \cdot 6 \cdot 5 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 + \ldots$ and so forth forever $= 0$. Euler imagined that these should be called equations of the "infinite" degree (look at the largest exponent: you can't, but if you could it would be infinite). Steiner notes that "No axiomatization, or even formalization, of 'infinite addition' existed at the time" [106]. It was "Euler's genius and his painstaking verifications" that made fruitful his notion of "exploiting the analogy between finite and infinite." Even by the standards of 18th century mathematics "Euler had not proved his results." But, and this is the crucial point, "we must admit that Euler had a right to be confident in his discovery, beyond any doubt" [*loc. cit.*].

So too Muth. His discovery, though clearly less indubitable than Euler's, also rested on an analogy, that between ordinary goods and information about the future. Both, he said with approximately as much prior warrant as Euler, were objects of production, allocation, and lucid plan. The analogy, like Euler's, carried much of the weight of persuasion. Like Euler he had the warrant for using the analogy that in other applications a similar analogy "yields other results that are also verified to many decimal places," that it is "an analogy that brings forth previously proved theorems" [Steiner, p. 107; incidentally, Steiner is here attempting to break down the epistemological wall between mathematics and physics]. This is the burden of Muth's use of the word "rationality." He is pointing out that other applications of the analogy of human action to methodical calculation have proven fruitful in understanding. And of course they have.

In Latin literature, the case is a striking new understanding of the arrangement of poetry books in the late Republic and early Empire, due largely to Helena R. Dettmer. Dettmer has discovered that the poets arranged their books with elaborate care, going so far as to impose numerical patterns of sums of lines on corresponding sections [Dettmer, Horace: *A Study in Structure* Hildescheim, BD, forthcoming]. In Catullus' little book, for instance, the polymetric poems (numbered 1 through 60) are shown to obey a series of numerical theorems no less astonishing than Euler's. Divide the 60 poems on the basis of theme and plain verbal echoes into successive cycles labeled A (which is poems 1 through 14), B (poems 15-24), C (25-33), B' (34-44), and A' (45-60). Note a lemma (which like Euler's algebra, Stanley's cropping theory, and Muth's rationality "yields other results that are also verified"): the few poems that do not fit into the elaborate rings of relations among the poems--"non-corresponding" poems--are not included in the sums, as can be shown to be true in Propertius and other poets. Make two minor adjustments to the usual corpus, themselves suggested by the hypothesis that Catullus was obsessed by echoes and patterns in his arrangement. *Theorem*: A + A' - (B + B') = C [Dettmer, Chp. 7, "Epilogue"].

It takes the breath away, for we can believe anything about π, but had

always thought that poets were different (unless, indeed, we were familiar with the reinvention of similar devices in the poetry of 16th-century France and England; cf. D. Fenoaltea). This and hundreds of other instances detailed by Dettmer within individual poems and whole books change our conception of Latin Poets, increasing our admiration at least for their artfulness if not for their art. One can imagine that the embedding of the poetry in verified structure resolves textual and interpretive doubts, from the level of the validity of the conjecture "o patrona virgo" in line 9 of "Cui dono lepidum novum libellum" up to our understanding of how the Romans thought.

What is important here is the character of the argument. It is wholly "scientific" if the word means "precise, numerical, crushingly persuasive" (though one can see by now that it cannot mean this). And Dettmer is no outlier among classicists. Steele Commager in "Notes on Some Poems of Catullus" [*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, LXX (1965), 83-110] or Ronald Syme on "Piso and Veranius in Catullus" [*Classica and Mediaevalia* 17 (1856), 129-34], argue in a similarly exact way--to be sure, about the impression that a certain line of poetry makes in view of the linguistic evidence on usage in Republican Rome or the identity of a certain governor of Macedonia in 60/59 B.C. in view of the political evidence rather than about the usages of hog farming in 1950 A.D. or the identify of a certain herbivore in 600,000,000 B.C. But subjects, as I have said, do not entail epistemologies. If "scientific" means "indubitable," then there is no science in science. If it means "very persuasive" then we are all scientists.

I wish to make one more point, by way of a tentative moral to the tale. What distinguishes good from bad in learned discourse is not, as we have seen, the adoption of a Method, but the earnest attempt to contribute to a conversation. The notion is emphasized by Richard Rorty in the introduction to his *Consequences of Pragmatism*, but is of course the oldest and most honorable of philosophical doctrines. Plato was, as Cicero said, the best orator when making merry of orators, and his Socrates was the first and best conversationalist from the pen of a man trying to end conversation.

In this is the answer to the insistent demand for *standards* from philosophers and their victims. We recognize when a conversation in our own field is working well and progressing. The conversations overlap enough for us to make almost as sure a judgment about neighboring fields--that is what editors, referees, and research panel members do. And the overlap of the overlap, as Polanyi once noted, keeps all honest if each tries to be. There is no need, I am pleased to be able to point out, for philosophical lawmaking or methodological regulation to keep the economy of intellect running just fine.

It is best to quote philosophers against Philosophizing. Habermas, with his usual sensitivity for the graces of language (perhaps the German is better), put it so: "The expectation of discursive redemption of normative-validity claims is already contained in the structure of intersubjectivity and makes specially introduced maxims of universalization superfluous" [*Legitimation Crisis*, p. 110]. That is, we don't need philosophers to tell us about ethics, because the ethics of conversing [*Sprachethik*] will suffice. Another philosopher put the matter better, in answering how serious philosophers are themselves to be distinguished from system-making lunatics. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty said:

> It is "our ability to engage in continuous conversation, testing one another, discovering our hidden presuppositions, changing our minds because we have listened to the voices of our fellows. Lunatics also change their minds, but their minds change with the tides of the moon and not because they have listened, really listened, to their friends' questions and objections" [Crit. Inquiry, March 1983, p. 562].

This should be the character of argument, in economics as elsewhere. Perhaps when we are disburdened of our Philosophical impediments it will become so.

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*Unfortunately he and the rest of the Frankfurt School distinguish sharply between ethical or aesthetic conversations and empirical or analytical conversations.

SOME TENTATIVE REFLECTIONS ON ETHOS, ARGUMENT, AND METHODOLOGY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

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The general theoretical issue that interests me in this paper is that of the relationship between the ethos (or, perhaps more accurately, the ethe) of a discipline and the sorts of arguments that get accepted as legitimate in it. As a subsidiary issue, I am also interested in what might be called the "methodological temptation" - by which I mean the temptation to convert what is really an approach to or attitude toward a field into a set of methodological prescriptions. Characteristically, the limitations of the approach are forgotten in the articulation of the methodology, which comes to be presented as the proper mode of investigation in the field. Secondarily, then, this paper is a comment on the dangers of methodologism.

In considering these issues, I focus on an attempt to articulate a methodology for my own field, the history of ideas. Specifically, I focus on the "new history of political theory" championed by, among others, Quentin Skinner, John Dunn, and J. G. A. Pocock. Even more specifically, I look at one article by Quentin Skinner: "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," published in History and Theory in 1969.<1> This is, however, a very substantial and influential article. Historians of ideas - at any rate, historians of ideas of a certain type - cite it again and again as providing the standard of methodological rigor in the history of ideas.

I don't propose to deal here with Skinner's article in general. Instead, I deal with only one of its arguments - its argument against what Skinner calls the "mythology of prolepsis." I concentrate on this argument for two reasons. Firstly, I find it almost transparently weak. Its weakness leads me to look for unacknowledged assumptions - assumptions that enable Skinner to articulate the argument despite its weakness, and induce other historians to accept it without question. The argument is a bad one, but bad arguments can be sharply illuminating. Those places where the logic of the apparently logical person breaks down are often extremely revealing, for they force us to examine what we might otherwise accept without question. Secondly, I concentrate on this argument because, as articulated by Skinner, it applies not only to the history of ideas but also to history in general. It thus has a wider interest than would otherwise be the case.

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I.

Skinner argues in "Meaning and Understanding" that "prolepsis" is a bad thing. It is a violation of proper method in the history of ideas and in history generally. But just what is prolepsis?

Somewhat opaquely, Skinner declares that "the characteristic...of the mythology of prolepsis is the conflation of the necessary asymmetry between the significance an observer may justifiably claim to find in a given statement or other action, and the meaning of that action itself" (p. 23). Fortunately, he gives us a lucid example of such a prolepsis: the assertion, put forward by an older generation of scholars, that Petrarch's ascent of Mount Ventoux marked the beginning of the Renaissance. Skinner is willing to concede that this assertion could indeed constitute a true account of the **significance** of Petrarch's action. But it cannot constitute "a true account of any action Petrarch intended," since Petrarch himself could not have intended to "open the Renaissance." He could not have intended to open the Renaissance because the notion of "the Renaissance" was simply not available to him in the fourteenth century. It was only in a much later period that this notion was articulated, and applied to a set of actions of which Petrarch's ascent of Mount Ventoux was an apparent harbinger (pp. 22-23).

Interestingly, it turns out that there is a confusion in Skinner's account of the alleged fallacy that both conceals (from Skinner) and reveals (to us) an unjustified logical leap. Attend carefully to Skinner's wording as he makes the claim that the statement, "In climbing Mount Ventoux Petrarch opened the Renaissance," cannot constitute "a true account of any action Petrarch intended." It is true that the statement that in climbing Mount Ventoux Petrarch opened the Renaissance cannot constitute a true account of Petrarch's **intention** in climbing Mount Ventoux. If the historian who claims that in climbing Mount Ventoux Petrarch opened the Renaissance also claims that in climbing Mount Ventoux Petrarch intended to open the Renaissance, he is clearly asserting an impossibility. But the claim that in climbing Mount Ventoux Petrarch opened the Renaissance in no way entails the claim that in climbing Mount Ventoux Petrarch intended to open the Renaissance.

Strangely, Skinner shows no sign of grasping what seems, after all, to be an elementary point. There is an irony here, for Skinner himself turns out to be guilty of an unjustified "conflation." Specifically, he is guilty of conflating Petrarch's action - clearly intentional - of climbing Mount Ventoux with Petrarch's intentions in carrying out that action. More briefly, he conflates Petrarch's intended action with his intentions in acting. He seems to think that Petrarch's intended action, and his intentions in carrying out that action, are identical. This is why he asserts that the statement, "In climbing Mount Ventoux Petrarch opened the Renaissance," cannot constitute "a true account of any action Petrarch intended." Admittedly, this statement cannot constitute a true account of Petrarch's intentions in climbing Mount Ventoux. But the statement is not logically disqualified from constituting a true account of Petrarch's action itself, namely, his climbing of Mount Ventoux.

Skinner rightly points out that intellectual histories exist in which the historian leaves no place for "the analysis of what the author himself meant to say," and yet "may still believe himself to be engaged on such an analysis" (p. 22). Nor does one encounter this defect only in the historiography of ideas. Most readers will be familiar with historical accounts of past actions in which the effects of these actions are equated with the intentions of their agents. Such an equation is an important aspect of conspiracy theories of history, which customarily attribute, usually without adequate evidence, the alleged historical effects of an action or set of actions to the intentional machinations of the alleged agents.

Yet if some historians conflate texts (or events) with the deliberate intentions of authors (or agents) Skinner, for his part, conflates the deliberate intentions of author-agents with the historical reality of text-events. (The neologisms text-event and author-agent seem to me justified here.) On the one hand, Skinner legitimately distinguishes the significance ("for us") of a text-event from the author-agent's intentions in bringing that text-event into being (p. 22). On the other hand, however, he illegitimately ends up identifying a text-event's "meaning" with the meaning that the author-agent intended for it. I agree with Skinner insofar as he means to say that accounts of "significance" ought not to be confused with accounts of the intentions of authors or agents. This is why the statement that Petrarch's climbing of Mount Ventoux opened the Renaissance ought not to be seen as a statement about Petrarch's **intentions** in climbing Mount Ventoux. But, Skinner to the contrary, that statement could very well constitute a justifiable account of Petrarch's **action** of climbing Mount Ventoux. That is to say, there is no reason to reduce what Petrarch actually did in climbing Mount Ventoux to what he intended to do. Petrarch's intentions in climbing Mount Ventoux are distinct from his climbing of Mount Ventoux. The action Petrarch intended, and Petrarch's intentions in acting, are two quite distinct historical constructs.

Petrarch's climbing of Mount Ventoux is an action rather than a text, with Petrarch functioning in this case as an agent rather than as an author. Nonetheless, I see no essential difference here between the history of actions and the history of ideas. Obviously, Skinner himself believes that the cases are parallel, for he uses as an example a historical action rather than a historical text, and contends that what is true of the former is also true of the latter. He argues that just as it is an error to apply to Petrarch's action a description that Petrarch himself could not have intended, so it is an error to apply to historical texts descriptions that their authors could not have intended.

For example, Skinner is willing to concede that it might be true to say that John Locke was "one of the founders of the modern empirical and liberal school of political philosophy." But he objects to this being "elided" - as he says - into the claim that "Locke was himself a liberal political theorist." According to Skinner, such an elision "turns a remark about Locke's significance which might be true into a remark about the content of his works which could not be true." And this latter remark could not be true because "Locke can scarcely have intended to contribute to a school of political philosophy which, so this fashionable but muddled interpretation suggests, it was his great achievement to make possible" (p. 24).

But it is Skinner who is muddled, and muddling, here. For it is entirely possible to hold that Locke did not intend to be a liberal political theorist, while holding that he was a liberal political theorist after all. Of course, I am not concerned here with the question of whether Locke actually was a liberal political theorist; I am simply making the logical point that, so long as one concedes that intentions are distinct from texts or actions, it is possible to hold both views consistently. This is a logic, however, that Skinner denies. The unstated claim underlying Skinner's denial that the statement "Locke did not intend to be a liberal political theorist" and the statement "Locke was a liberal political theorist" can both be true is the assumption that the text-event can be nothing other than what its author-agent intended it to be. As Skinner puts it, "the relevant logical consideration is that no agent can eventually be said to have meant or done something which he could never be brought to accept as a correct description of what he had meant or done" (p. 28).<2>

Yet why could Locke not have been a liberal political theorist **inadvertently**? And why could Machiavelli, to take another example, not have been "the founder of the modern political orientation" (p. 23) without this having been his intention? Skinner never lets us know. His only argument against such "prolepses" is that they are open to "the crudest type of criticism that can be levelled against any teleological form of explanation: the action has to await the future to await its meaning" (p. 24). Skinner seems to think that this is such a devastating criticism that its mere assertion is sufficient to bring all discussion to an end. He wants us to believe that prolepsis is "teleological." Undoubtedly it is also metaphysical, and in every way in shocking contrast to his own level-headed and methodologically-sound empiricism.

Alas, Skinner attempts to make his arguments go further than they can manage. True, prolepses may indeed be teleological. They may indeed require us to view history in terms of an over-arching process of development culminating in a future **telos**. But this is not necessarily the case.

Granted that some historical prolepses have been misconceived, what is wrong with prolepsis as such? Why is it so devastating to say of a given action or text that it "has to await the future to await its meaning?" To be sure, it would be an error for us to treat the "meaning" that these text-events have for us as if they were meanings intended by their author-agents. But there is no need for us to fall into such an error. All we need do to guard against it is to remember that our perspective as historians is different from the perspective of past author-agents.

Why, then, are historical accounts that look at texts or actions

from the vantage point of their subsequently accrued meanings not legitimate? Let's consider a concrete example. Why can't one legitimately say that the gassing of six million Jews lent new meaning to certain passages of **Mein Kampf**, and to the **Machtergreifung** of 1933? Surely the historical meanings of the text, **Mein Kampf**, and of the action, the Nazi seizure of power, are in fact radically dependent on subsequent text-events that we now see as related to them. Suppose that Hitler had died in an airplane crash on the way to the Nuremburg party rally in 1934 and that the Nazis subsequently fell from power. Would it be wrong for us to say that in such a case the "meanings" of **Mein Kampf** and of the **Machtergreifung** would be markedly different from what is now the case? Would not historians legitimately approach them in a quite different way than they do so now? Skinner's answer - at any rate, the answer that follows from his attack on prolepsis - is "no."

Skinner's attack on the supposed mythology of prolepsis becomes all the more puzzling when one looks at the very intelligent discussion of historical narrative to be found in the book from which he draws his Petrarch example, Danto's **Analytical Philosophy of History**.<3> Skinner quotes Danto to the effect that, given the nonavailability to him of the concept "Renaissance," Petrarch could not have intended to "open the Renaissance" in climbing Mount Ventoux (p. 23).<4> Yet there is something very strange in Skinner's use of Danto's Petrarch example, for whereas Skinner goes on to assert that "opening the Renaissance" is a logically untenable description not only of Petrarch's intention but also of his action, Danto argues a radically different point. Skinner does not so much as acknowledge Danto's argument, let alone attempt to respond to it.

Specifically, Danto argues that "prolepsis" is not only **legitimate** in the writing of history but is absolutely indispensable. Danto contends that without prolepsis (though he does not himself use this term) history could not be written. There is no point in my reconstructing here in all its details Danto's argument, since it is easily accessible through a reading of his book.<5> In any case, the basic point can be made fairly easily, for Danto merely confirms - albeit with considerable technical skill - what we can easily grasp on our own.

Note again Skinner's contention that the only descriptions of text-events that are historiographically legitimate are those that would have been accessible to the author-agents in question at the time that those text-events were written or performed. Indeed, as we have seen, Skinner goes so far as to hold that the only historiographically legitimate descriptions are those that would have been not only **accessible** to these author-agents, but also **acceptable** to them. But as Danto points out, historians time and again apply descriptions to past events that could not have been applied at the time that the events in question took place. Consider, for example, the following statement: "The author of **Rameau's Nephew** was born in 1715."<6> Clearly, such a statement could not have been made in 1715, since **Rameau's Nephew** had not yet been written. Here is an example of an event - to wit, the birth of Denis Diderot - that had to await the future to acquire its meaning. More accurately, this event had to await the future to acquire its

meanings, since these seem obviously to be multiple, even infinite.

Skinner's rejection of "noncontemporaneous" descriptions also excludes such a statement as the following, which likewise comes from Danto: "Aristarchus anticipated in 270 B.C. the theory which Copernicus published in A.D. 1543."<7> Skinner makes clear, in numerous examples in "Meaning and Understanding," his opposition to such "anticipatory" statements (see, e.g., pp. 11-12, 29). Admittedly, it may as a matter of fact be the case that many of the instances of anticipation that historians in general - and historians of ideas in particular - have claimed to find do not stand up to close examination. But the mistaken description of certain text-events as anticipations of other text-events does not provide sufficient grounds for attacking "anticipatory" statements in general. Skinner slips from a justified exposure of particular historiographical errors to an unjustified articulation of a general methodological principle.

Perhaps historians could learn to live without such statements as "The author of **Rameau's Nephew** was born in 1715" or "Aristarchus anticipated Copernicus." But could they live without "The Thirty Years War began in 1618" or "The First World War began in 1914"? Or consider the fact that, compelled to give strictly contemporaneous descriptions, historians would no longer be able to make causal statements. For we have known since Hume that we cannot witness causes as causes; rather, the description of event A as being a cause of Event B can only be made after the occurrence of event B.<8> Similarly, such locutions as "correctly predicted," "instigated," "began," "preceded," and "gave rise to" would be excluded from historians' vocabularies.<9> In short, as I think Danto demonstrates, the writing of history would be impossible without the "retroactive re-alignment of the Past" in which historians, as a matter of fact, are always engaging.<10> In throwing out prolepsis, Skinner unwittingly throws out historiography itself.

II.

I turn now to the unacknowledged assumptions forming the background to Skinner's argument against prolepsis. These assumptions seem to me to be unequivocally part of that argument, but because Skinner does not articulate them they require some ferretting out. Having identified the assumptions, I shall then point out their origins in a historiographical ethos. Finally, I shall comment on the harsh limitations which, once converted into "methodology," they impose on the scope of historical understanding.

In the first place, one finds hidden in the background to the argument against prolepsis an assumption that I designate as "objectivism." That is to say, Skinner seems to view the historian as dealing in his work with something - namely, the past - that is determinate and changeless. The historian's task, on the "objectivist" view, is to convey this determinate and changeless entity to his readers. It is revealing when Skinner tells us that "the surest symptom" of the mythology of prolepsis "is that the discussions which it governs are open to the crudest type of criticism that can be levelled against any teleological form of explanation: the action has to await the future to await its meaning" (p. 24). Why does Skinner think it so terribly wrong that a past action should have "to await the future to await its meaning"? I wish to suggest that he does so because, without acknowledging it, he adheres to the assumption that the historian deals with something that does not change. Yet it is by no means obvious that this is the case. Consider again the Nazi seizure of power, or any event whose consequences are still being worked out historically. It is surely axiomatic that the changing significance of such events is part of what the historian is interested in. On the objectivist view, however, the historian is excluded from considering such matters.

In the second place, I see allied to Skinner's objectivism something that we can perhaps best call "descriptivism." By descriptivism, I mean the view that the task of the historian is essentially to describe. Implicitly, anything that cannot be fitted under the rubric of description is not history. Evidence of Skinner's descriptivist assumption can be found scattered throughout "Meaning and Understanding." For example, he states his concern that historians of ideas preserve "the proper emphasis and tone" of the works with which they deal (p. 16). He notes how difficult it is to articulate "the correct description...of the contents and arguments" of classic texts (p. 24). He suggests that historians of ideas ought to address themselves "solely to the description of a text," avoiding those mistakes that would lead them to "misdescribe" the theories of past writers (p. 28). In all of this there is a conviction that the historian can arrive at a final, "correct" description - a conviction that follows, of course, from the initial assumption that the historian's object is fixed and determinate. Skinner is able to adhere to such a view because he implicitly defines as unhistorical a concern with the significance, as seen from a later perspective, of Petrarch's climbing of Mount Ventoux or Locke's **Two Treatises of Government** or Hitler's **Mein Kampf**.

A third assumption to which Skinner appears to be more or less unconsciously committed is that of "autonomism." By autonomism I mean the view that historiography ought to be an autonomous enterprise, separate from the enterprises of theory and criticism. The function of history is to give us correct descriptions of history's object, the past. This function excludes any theoretical aim for history. To be sure, the historian may be able to use theoretical formulations in his descriptions, but he would hardly be able, as a historian, to contribute to the articulation of theory. It also excludes any critical or evaluative function for history. The historian's task is to describe; it is not to criticize, unless this criticism be of the faulty descriptions offered by other historians.

All three assumptions are at the very least questionable, yet no defense of them is given. I would suggest that Skinner fails to defend these assumptions - or even to see that they are assumptions - because he accepts, as the self-evidently proper way of doing history, the approach of a particular historiographical tradition. It is J. G. A. Pocock, Skinner's fellow practitioner of the "new history" of political theory, who is most explicit about this linkage. Pocock characterizes the position of Skinner and himself as "Rankean," in the sense that its aim is to "depict" political theory "as it actually happened."<11> Rather more specific and illuminating, however, is the connection Pocock makes between this "new history" and what he calls "the Cambridge historiens historisants." These historians, "committed first of all to the writing of history," are, he declares, "products of a British intellectual world in which that activity occasions no problems and never needs to be defended."<12>

Some sense of the attitude of these "historising historians" toward history writing may be gleaned from another Cambridge historian, G. R. Elton, who in **The Practice of History** gives us a historian's confession of faith. As Elton asserts in his preface, his book "embodies an assumption that the study and writing of history are justified in themselves...."<13> The purpose of the undergraduate teaching of history is decidedly not to "teach the young student to understand his own time" but rather to equip him "with the special intellectual training embodied in the study of history...."<14> The purpose of graduate teaching, for its part, is to produce teachers formed in the same mold. The intrusion of present concerns into historical study is illegitimate, for it violates "the first principle of historical understanding, namely that the past must be studied in its own right, for its own sake, and on its own terms."<15> Or as Elton puts it in another passage, "the task of history is to understand the past, and if the past is to be understood it must be given full respect in its own right."<16> Perhaps needless to say, this past has a fixed, unchanging character; precisely because historical matter is in the past, "its objective reality is guaranteed; it is beyond being altered for any purpose whatsoever."<17> It is, I contend, out of the intellectual world marked out so clearly by Elton that Skinner's methodological recommendations come.

It is not my intention to reject such an approach to history. My intention is only to point out its limitations. Skinner assumes that this approach - to which we may give the name historicism - marks out the only legitimate approach to historical investigation.<18> It is from the historicist ethos that he derives those assumptions of objectivism, descriptivism, and autonomism that are the unacknowledged background to his argument against prolepsis. It is the historicist commitment to studying the past "in its own right, for its own sake, and on its own terms" that leads him to the view that the only legitimate description of Petrarch's action of climbing Mount Ventoux is the description that Petrarch himself would have articulated as he was carrying out the action.

On the basis of his historicist assumptions, Skinner articulates a methodology for the history of ideas. He characterizes this method as "the appropriate methodology for the history of ideas" (p. 49; also pp. 44 and 48). It is certainly an appropriate methodology if one's desire is to articulate a historicist history of ideas. But Skinner by no means establishes that we ought to desire such a history. On the contrary, he systematically conceals the question of justification, hiding it behind a veil of philosophical argument based on the writings of J. L. Austin, Wittgenstein, and other figures.

Skinner complains in the preface to his major substantive work, **Foundations of Modern Political Thought**, that previous writers who have claimed to be writing the history of political theory "have rarely supplied us with genuine histories," and holds out the promise that his own approach will "begin to give us a history of political theory with a genuinely historical character."<19> By this he means a history of political theory that is historicist. It is, however, illegitimate to identify "genuine" history with historicist history. Pocock can find it "paradoxical" that an account of the past should be written "for reasons themselves not historical."<20> If this is a paradox, it is one that a large number of historians, not excluding Thucydides, have exemplified.

Certainly, history can be written for professedly historicist reasons: as an attempt to uncover the past "for its own sake" and "in its own terms." Such, classically, was Ranke's justification for the writing of history. (Note, however, that Ranke had theological, and therefore nonhistorical, support for this enterprise, since he saw himself as uncovering God's handiwork in past ages, each of which he believed to be "immediate to God."<21> This is not a support that Skinner or Pocock has ever adduced.) But it can also be written - legitimately, I would argue - out of a "committed" concern with influencing the present or out of a "reflective" concern with gaining a broader perspective on its problems. In short, history can be written with the primary purpose not of describing past text-events, or ideologies, or languages but rather of moving or reflecting upon the present. To reject such histories as "unhistorical" is arrogant. The crucial question is not whether works of history conform to supposedly universal norms of methodological purity, but whether they carry out responsibly the tasks that they set for themselves.

The limitations of Skinner's proposed methodology are underscored by a peculiar fact about its application. For the practitioners of the "new history" have notoriously shied away from any attempt to apply their methodology to modern political thought. In this regard, Skinner's **Foundations of Modern Political Thought** is misleadingly titled. In present-day English and American usage, the term **modern** is almost always used to refer to the period after, roughly, 1789. Skinner's book, on the other hand, terminates with the Reformation. It does not give us the "foundations of modern political thought" at all; what it gives us, rather, is a historical run-up to the political thought of Hobbes and Locke. Pocock's work similarly terminates in the early modern period. In his most impressive book, **The Machiavellian Moment**, he tantalizingly suggests the possibility of continuities between the Machiavellian impulse in early modern political thought and modern American political ideology. But he does nothing with these suggestions, and one senses both that he is not interested in doing anything with them and that he wouldn't know how to do anything with them if he were.<22> Finally, John Dunn's **Political Thought of John Locke** is in the same vein. Indeed, one of Dunn's major concerns in this book is to demonstrate the irrelevance of Locke to present-day concerns.<23>

So that we may see more clearly what is being lost here, let us entertain a distinction between "meaning" and "significance." Let us take "meaning" to denote the importance that a past text had for its contemporaries, and "significance" to denote its importance for us. What is striking about Skinner's conceptualization of the history of ideas - and of history in general - is that it eliminates the category of significance. Instead, it concentrates entirely on "meaning." Indeed, it concentrates on only a limited part of "meaning" as I have here defined it, for it deals not with meaning for contemporaries in general but only with meaning for author-agents. True, Skinner does postulate a distinction between "meaning" and "understanding." But "meaning," for Skinner, is author's intended meaning, and to "understand" a text is to understand what it meant for its author (pp. 46-47). Thus Skinner ties "understanding" entirely to "meaning" in his own very narrow sense, leaving "significance" out of the picture entirely.

This move has certain very clear advantages. Most importantly, it turns "understanding" into something unproblematical. To understand a text is to grasp the original intended meaning of the words, which for Skinner simply is the meaning of the words. The problem with the category of significance, from Skinner's point of view, is that it is shifty. It is not fixed, but is dependent on our own changing concerns. By tying "understanding" to something that by definition is no longer subject to change - namely, the intentions of past, dead authors - Skinner eliminates this shiftiness. At the same time, he excludes from historical investigation vast areas of human experience.

Finally, let me suggest that there is a strong element of bad faith in Skinner's proposed methodology. We can now see, I think, that his rejection of prolepsis is the product of his historicist preoccupation with occluding or effacing the position of the historian. Ideally, the historian silences himself before the past, which speaks through him. And yet, despite himself, the historian too speaks. This is particularly evident in the conclusion to "Meaning and Understanding," where Skinner claims that, properly approached, the "classic texts" of political thought help reveal to us "not the essential sameness, but rather the essential variety of viable moral assumptions and political commitments." Thus we learn that "there are in fact no...timeless concepts, but only the various different concepts which have gone with various different societies." This, Skinner maintains, is "a general truth not merely about the past but about ourselves as well" (pp. 52-53).

Skinner would have us believe that the study of history generates this insight. But it does no such thing. Despite his insistence on having derived this "general truth" from history itself, what Skinner is really doing is imposing on the past, on historiography, and on us an urbane, complacent, and decommitted world view. Note how Skinner's insight contradicts itself. He claims that the history of thought shows us that there are no timeless concepts. But he has at least found one such concept, namely, that there are no timeless concepts - and he has found it through a methodology that relies on "general criteria" that "necessarily apply" to the making and understanding of statements (p. 28). Though he contends that his approach to the past is "logical" and "empirical" rather than "mythological," this contradiction underscores

the peculiarly illogical and unempirical character of his insight. This insight has its own ideological function. Specifically, by declaring illegitimate the judgment of past concepts in terms of historian's concepts, it makes impossible a critical engagement with history. It also makes impossible a critical engagement with the historian. Presumably, the only texts susceptible to critical treatment, on Skinner's principles, would be those written in our own time by authors sharing our own values. And yet it is precisely these texts, which for us are still highly significant and therefore changing objects, that are least amenable to Skinner's proposed methodology.

I am not sure that we want to remain within the strait-jacket that Skinner has sewn for us. Various political theorists have attacked the "new history" of political theory for being utterly divorced from political theory as a present-day enterprise.<24> Additionally, the political theorist John Gunnell has accused Skinner and Pocock of providing an inadequate account of their own interpretive standpoint.<25> To my mind, however, the really decisive objection to the methodological project advanced by Skinner and his allies lies not in its failings as political theory or as hermeneutics but in its failings as history. Most importantly, it engages in an unargued (indeed, unconscious) exclusion of concerns that have every reason to be reflected upon historically. I shall not offer, against Skinner, another methodology, for history appears to have more mansions than any methodologist is able to project. I shall only suggest that caveat lector remains a useful maxim, if not a timeless truth.<26>

NOTES

[1] Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," **History and Theory** 8 (1969): 3-53. I shall place all subsequent references to this article in parentheses in the text.

[2] Skinner makes the same point on p. 6: "The perpetual danger, in our attempts to enlarge our historical understanding, is thus that our expectations about what someone must be saying or doing will themselves determine that we understand the agent to be doing something which he would not - or even could not - himself have accepted as an account of what he was doing."

[3] Arthur C. Danto, **Analytical Philosophy of History** (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965). Danto discusses Petrarch's climbing of Mount Ventoux on pp. 13, 61, 157, and 169. Incidentally, recent Petrarch scholars are skeptical whether Petrarch actually did climb Mount Ventoux. He may only have written about it. But this does not affect my argument here. It only teaches us to be suspicious of received texts.

[4] Ibid., p. 169.

[5] See especially Danto's chapter VIII, "Narrative Sentences," pp. 143-181.

[6] Ibid., p. 12.

[7] Ibid., p. 156.

[8] Ibid., p. 157.

[9] Ibid., pp. 157-158.

[10] See, in general, Danto's chapter VIII, "Narrative Sentences," pp. 143-181; citation from p. 168.

[11] J. G. A. Pocock, "Political Theory, History, and Myth: A Salute to John Gunnell," **Annals of Scholarship** 1, 4 (Fall 1980), 7.

[12] Ibid., p. 8.

[13] G. R. Elton, **The Practice of History** (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1967), p. vii.

[14] Ibid., pp. 148-49.

[15] Ibid., p. 65.

[16] Ibid., p. 47.

[17] Ibid., pp. 53-54.

[18] The term historicism has other senses as well. These include commitment to the notion of historical evolution or development, and commitment to the notion of the absolute relativity of values. Though in some ways connected with these other senses of historicism, historicism understood as the project of studying the past "for its own sake" should not be confused with them.

[19] Quentin Skinner, **The Foundations of Modern Political Thought**, vol. I: **The Renaissance**, and vol. II: **The Age of Reformation** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), I, xi.

[20] Pocock, "Political Theory, History, and Myth," p. 9.

[21] Leopold von Ranke, **The Theory and Practice of History**, ed. Georg G. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke, new translations by Wilma A. Iggers and Konrad A. Moltke (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), pp. xxii-xxiii, xliv, 53, and passim.

[22] J. G. A. Pocock, **The Machiavellian Moment** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[23] John Dunn, **The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the "Two Treatises of Government"** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), especially pp. ix-xii and 266-67.

[24] See, e.g., M. Leslie, "In Defense of Anachronism," **Political Studies** 18 (1970): 433-47; Bhikhi Parekh and R. N. Berki, "The History of Political Ideas: A Critique of Q. Skinner's Methodology," **Journal of the History of Ideas** 34 (1973): 163-84; and C. D. Tarlton, "Historicity, Meaning, and Revisionism in the Study of Political Thought," **History and Theory** 12 (1973): 307-28.

[25] John G. Gunnell, **Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation**, chapter IV, "The Problem of Interpretation," pp. 95-129, especially pp. 102-03. See also Gunnell, "Method, Methodology, and the Search for Traditions in the History of Political Theory: A Reply to Pocock's Salute," **Annals of Scholarship** I, 4 (Fall 1980): 26-62.

[26] In another paper, which I hope to publish in a history journal, I propose to deal with these issues in more detail.

MORAL ARGUMENT IN POLITICAL HISTORY:
THE CASE OF THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES

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In American politics, it is not uncommon for controversial issues to be discussed in moral terms. Such questions as the tariff, foreign military commitments, and aid to education have been examined with language and argument befitting a moral crusade. In contrast, the slavery question -- probably the most intense and divisive moral issue to have confronted our nation -- saw the moral argument clearly subordinated. A small but vocal minority, the abolitionists denouced slavery as immoral and incompatible with the Bible. But their program did not become politically respectable until well after the outbreak of hostilities in 1861. For the most part, advocates prior to the Civil War addressed the topic of slavery as a political or economic concern.

During these years, the moral argument about slavery gradually evolved, and a microcosm of that evolution can be found in the texts of the seven debates between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas in their 1858 contest for the U.S. Senate seat from Illinois. The debates, beginning at Ottawa in mid-August and concluding in Alton in mid-October, focused mainly on the question of slavery in the territories. This issue was of little immediate relevance to the people of Illinois but was of great import to the incumbent Senator Douglas. Not only was he Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories, but his name had become linked with the principle of popular sovereignty, which held that the issue of slavery ought to be decided directly by the inhabitants of the affected territory. Popular sovereignty had been incorporated into the Compromise of 1850 as an expedient way to settle the status of slavery in Utah and New Mexico Territories. Douglas transformed it into a principle in 1854 when he introduced the Kansas-Nebraska Act, providing that the status of those territories -- heretofore closed to slavery by the Missouri Compromise -- would be determined by popular vote. The principle had been enshrined in the Democratic platform of 1856 but had since suffered two possibly fatal blows: the submission of the Lecompton Constitution for the organization of Kansas, which, while legal, was fraudulent in its claim to represent public opinion; and the Supreme Court decision in the Dred Scott case, which held that Congress lacked the power to prohibit slavery in the territories -- regardless, presumably, of the will of the people. Douglas' opposition to the Lecompton Constitution had damaged his standing with the South; now he and his great principle seemed on the defensive in the North as well. That fact explains why the Lincoln-Douglas debates would center on a seemingly tangential issue, and suggests how the challenger would use the moral argument to counter the stance of the incumbent.

To speak of moral argument in the Lincoln-Douglas debates is to concentrate almost entirely on the argumentation of Abraham Lincoln. Douglas' whole strategy was to remove any moral dimension to the issue; his stance was that he "don't care" whether slavery is voted down or voted up. As he stated at Alton, "If the people of any other territory desire slavery let them have it. If they do not want it let them prohibit it. It is their business not mine."[1] It does not follow that Douglas was personally indifferent on the question, but he did not view the issue as very important. He denigrated it partly because he was sure that the territories would not become slave states in any case. In Jaffa's characterization, "It was in large measure because Douglas did not believe in the possible victory of slavery over freedom in the nation at large that he chose a policy which would put out of sight, as far as possible, the harsh moral contrast."[2]

To Douglas, then, slavery was like any other domestic economic interest and hence could be regulated by each state individually. As Douglas put it at Ottawa, "the laws and regulations which would suit the granite hills of New Hampshire would be unsuited to the rice plantations of South Carolina."[3] That the founding fathers must have seen slavery in this light is evidenced by the fact that they neither nationalized nor abolished it in the Constitution, while leaving each state free to regulate its own internal affairs. The public forum, therefore, should be neutral. Douglas' statements mixed the prevalent anti-Negro sentiment of the time with solicitous concern for the well-being of the slave. In the opening debate at Ottawa, he proclaimed, "I am opposed to negro citizenship in any and every form. I believe this government was made on the white basis. I believe it was made by white men, for the benefit of white men and their posterity for ever, . . ."[4] But, immediately after acknowledging the inherent inferiority of the Negro, he added, "I do not hold that because the negro is our inferior that therefore he ought to be a slave. . . . On the contrary, I hold that humanity and Christianity both require that the negro shall have and enjoy every right, every privilege, and every immunity consistent with the safety of the society in which he lives."[5] The question was what rights, privileges, and immunities were compatible with the public good, and that question could best be answered by the white inhabitants of each territory. Some might make the Negro a slave; some might make him a citizen; and some, like the state of Illinois, might follow a middle course. For Douglas, then, the issue was jurisdictional rather than moral.

Lincoln, on the other hand, argued that any ultimate resolution of the slavery controversy depended on its being viewed as a moral question. In one of the most oft-quoted passages from the debates, Lincoln's final speech at Alton, he drew the issue squarely. "The real issue in this controversy -- the one pressing upon every mind -- is the sentiment on the part of one class that looks upon the institution of slavery as a wrong, and of another class that does not look upon it as a wrong."[6]

Whereas Douglas maintained that slavery was like any other economic interest, Lincoln denied the analogy. The difference between slaves and other commodities was that slaves were human and hence entitled to the protections of the Declaration of Independence. If one began making exceptions to the clause, "all men are created equal," where would one stop?[7] Moreover, if slavery were like any other commodity, then why would it alone produce such public uproar? Lincoln answered the question in his Chicago speech, with a reference to the power of public opinion. Vast numbers of people, he said, do not see slavery as being "only equal to the question of the cranberry laws of Indiana,"[8] devoid of moral significance.

Referring to Douglas' "don't care" position, Lincoln suggested that it was not truly neutral. He observed, "Any man can say that who does not see anything wrong in slavery, but no man can logically say it who does see a wrong in it; because no man can logically say he don't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down. He may say he don't care whether an indifferent thing is voted up or down, but he must logically have a choice between a right thing and a wrong thing."[9] Then he began his peroration: "That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in this country when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles -- right and wrong -- throughout the world."[10] In what follows I shall try to explain the nature and development of this moral argument and then see what this extended case study implies for the rhetoric of the human sciences.

Perhaps the first thing to note about Lincoln's moral argument is how late in the game it unfolds. The passages I have quoted come from Lincoln's rejoinder in the seventh and final debate. One searches in vain through the text of the first six debates for an equally forthright and extended expression of Lincoln's view. In only two places does the challenger foreshadow the strong moral note on which he will conclude. In the fifth debate, at Galesburg, he referred to Douglas, stating, "every sentiment he utters discards the idea that there is any wrong in slavery" and previewed the claim that the "don't care" posture required an attitude of moral indifference.[11] Near the close of his speech at Quincy, in the sixth debate, Lincoln charged that "in all the arguments sustaining the Democratic policy, and in that policy itself, there is a careful, studied exclusion of the idea that there is anything wrong in slavery."[12] In the first four debates the moral argument is not even mentioned; these clashes are dominated by conspiracy charges (Lincoln was conspiring to abolitionize the Old Line Whigs, Douglas said; Douglas was part of a plot to make slavery legal everywhere, Lincoln replied), an elaborate discussion of the origins of the 1856 Toombs bill, and the "Freeport interrogatories."

The question naturally arises: Why did Lincoln wait so late in the debates to bring up the moral issue, and why did he do it so gradually? The answer is not that this appeal came to Lincoln suddenly. He had been developing it since 1854. In his Peoria speech decrying the Kansas-Nebraska Act, he said, "This declared indifference, but as I must think, covert real zeal for the spread of slavery, I can not but hate. I hate it because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself."[13] Moreover, Lincoln had included the moral argument in the "House Divided" speech. He also referred to it in his Chicago speech of July, 1858, when he concluded, "I leave you, hoping that the lamp of liberty will burn in your bosoms until there shall no longer be a doubt that all men are created free and equal."[14] Why, then, did the issue not figure in the early debates?

Lincoln knew his audience. However much Illinoisians might disagree about slavery, they disdained the Negro. As Foner notes, a large part of the population was of Southern origin and brought with them a Southern outlook and values.[15] Moreover, many whites opposed slavery because they opposed the Negro and wanted him kept out of Illinois, free or slave. Potter noted that the slavery issue was not simply "a choice of alternatives -- antislavery or proslavery -- but a ranking of values."[16] Consequently, it would be difficult to summon up moral outrage over the slavery issue; a careful, subtle, and gradual progression of the argument would be needed. Moreover, Lincoln considered himself bound by public opinion. "In this and like communities," he declared at Ottawa, "public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment, goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions."[17] Although Lincoln was referring to Douglas in this passage, the ideas applied to him as well. Even as he was attempting to influence public opinion he was molded and constrained by it -- even if it led to such paradoxes as men exercising their right to self-government by denying that all men are created equal. Had he introduced the moral issue at the outset, Lincoln would have faced certain rejection; he was beyond the pale of public sentiment. As Sigelschiffer has noted, "For a politician to be known as an abolitionist was an almost certain guarantee of defeat."[18]

For these reasons, Lincoln must prepare public opinion for what was to come later. That task was accomplished by distinguishing between slavery and Negro equality, insisting on a middle ground between the two. After denying that he favored political and social equality for the Negro, he added, as at Charleston, "I do not understand that because I do not want a Negro woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for a wife."[19] It was this middle ground, once established, for which Lincoln later could stake out a moral claim.

A second noteworthy aspect of Lincoln's moral argument is that -- although an absolute position -- it leads to non-absolute acts. If slavery is a wrong, then the appropriate course of action would seem to be to eliminate it at once -- the position represented by the most vocal abolitionists. Lincoln did not agree with them, but how could he have sustained his condemnation of the institution without joining in the call for its immediate repeal?

The answer is that other values occupied a pre-eminent position in Lincoln's hierarchy, particularly the sanctity of the Constitution and the preservation of the Union. As Lincoln saw it, the actual presence of slavery limited the options of the reformer. When he began at Galesburg to preview his moral argument, he was careful to note his "due regard for its actual existence amongst us and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way, and to all the constitutional obligations which have been thrown about it."[20] In Alton he drew the analogy between the Union afflicted with slavery and a person suffering from cancer: "You may have a wen or a cancer upon your person and not be able to cut it out lest you bleed to death; but surely it is no way to cure it, to engraft it and spread it over your whole body."[21]

Rather than espousing abolition, Lincoln championed the containment of slavery and opposed its extension into the territories. How could Lincoln reconcile a limited action with an absolute principle? By appeal to the value of public sentiment -- if slavery were confined to the states in which it currently existed, then the public mind would rest confident in the belief that it was on the course of ultimate extinction. That would be an appropriate remedy for a moral evil which also recognized the legitimacy which it had been given by history and in law. Conversely, as Jaffa describes Lincoln's view, "Without a moral decision against slavery, no guarantee for the future was possible,"[22] presumably because one could not be sure of the direction of the public mind. It was the notion of public sentiment, then, which enabled Lincoln to stake out a middle ground between proslavery and abolition, to defend such a ground with an absolute value position, and to maintain his own hierarchy of values.

Third, it is noteworthy that Lincoln did not select slavery itself or the slaveholder as the villain in his moral drama. That role was reserved for the politicians who kept the slavery issue unsettled by trying to rid the question of its fundamental moral dimension. For those concerned that an antislavery platform would invite social unrest and agitation, Lincoln turned the tables. It was not putting slavery on the road to extinction which led to social unrest; rather, it was Douglas upsetting the traditional stance of moral condemnation with his deceptive popular sovereignty position. It was deceptive because it did not put an end to the agitation, as the Lecompton imbroglio demonstrated; because it did not represent the principles of the Founding Fathers or Henry Clay, as Douglas had asserted; and because while pretending to be neutral it inevitably treated slavery as a right.

As evidence, Lincoln cited the calm resulting from the Compromise of 1850 by contrast with the agitation stirred up by Douglas' effort in 1854 to repeal the Missouri Compromise. In the Jonesboro debate, Lincoln plaintively asked "why he could not have left that Compromise alone."[23]

But it was not simply that Douglas was reopening the issue; he was doing so in a manner which had as its object the removal of the moral condemnation previously attached to the peculiar institution. By treating the issue as purely a question of procedure and by arguing that laws regarding slavery were essentially no different from those regulating liquor and cranberries, Douglas offered no reason to believe that slavery could not go on indefinitely. Lincoln was quick to seize upon this implication. At both Quincy and Alton he drew as one of the key distinctions between himself and Douglas the fact that the incumbent "looks to no end of the institution of slavery."[24]

Focusing on Douglas in this manner has two benefits for Lincoln. First, it enables him to redefine the moral issue in order to occupy the middle ground. It is not that he is on one extreme favoring abolition; rather, it is that Douglas is on the other extreme opposing any end to the institution, ever. Portraying one's opponent as a dangerous radical would make one appear moderate by comparison. Borrowing the term from Richard Hofstadter, David Brion Davis viewed the paranoid style as "a psychological device for projecting various symbols of evil on an opponent and for building emotional unity through a common sense of alarm and peril."[25] If Lincoln could establish that Douglas was really a radical who was looking to the spread of slavery, then by residues he could claim the support of the vast middle of the spectrum, the uncommitted. So, contrary to the position of the two candidates at the onset of the debates, Lincoln is able to make a claim on the support of all who believe slavery to be evil, even if at present it is a necessary evil. Lincoln was willing to see it end a hundred years or more in the future; but unlike Douglas he favored a course of action which began with the commitment that slavery ought to end.

The persuasiveness of this position was further enhanced by Lincoln's historical argument, prefiguring his 1860 Cooper Union address, in which he suggested that the founding fathers implicitly regarded slavery as an evil and looked to its eventual termination, while acknowledging that they were constrained by the actual presence of the institution. So not only was Douglas the extremist but he was a renegade, abandoning the wisdom of the founders. "Judge Douglas," Lincoln said at Alton, "has been the most prominent instrument in changing the position of the institution of slavery which the fathers of the government expected to come to an end ere this -- and putting it upon Brooks' cotton gin basis, -- placing it where he openly confesses he has no desire there shall ever be an end of it."[26] Lincoln was frank in acknowledging that his purpose in putting the issue in this fashion was to realign the audience by winning over to his own side certain elements who now supported Douglas. As Lincoln viewed it, each man currently numbered among his supporters some who thought slavery to be at root an evil. But "whenever we can get rid of the fog which obscures the real question,"[27] this element can be brought to the Republican side. That movement, Lincoln thought, would be sufficient to set slavery on the course of ultimate extinction, and to do so peaceably too.

The other benefit to Lincoln from focusing his moral argument on Douglas rather than on slavery was that it made Lincoln's earlier conspiracy arguments more credible. These arguments dominated the first four debates. Chief among them was the contention that Douglas drafted the Kansas-Nebraska Act in anticipation of the Dred Scott decision, and that the language of that decision anticipated a second decision which would hold slavery to be lawful everywhere, "in all the states, old as well as new -- North as well as South."[28] Although Lincoln could ask leading questions and draw from circumstantial evidence, the assertion that Douglas was an active participant in such a cabal was so preposterous on its face as not to warrant serious consideration.

But far more plausible was Lincoln's later argument that Douglas was the unwitting dupe -- the "instrument" -- of this conspiratorial design, who was behaving as effectively as if he were in on the plot. Douglas' role was to anesthetize the public mind as to the moral dimension of the issue. Jaffa, for example, maintains that Lincoln did not believe that the Supreme Court could have attempted the *Dred Scott* decision in 1854. Public opinion had to be prepared for it *first*, by the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the 1856 election campaign. "Only when the old idea of the moral objectionableness of slavery . . . had been replaced by the idea of the moral indifference of slavery could the Court have attempted what it did attempt," Jaffa concludes.[29]

By repeating that, as a matter of public policy, he "don't care" whether the territories were free or slave, he would induce his listeners not to care as a matter of individual moral judgment. Since "public sentiment is everything," the dulling of the public conscience was a vital prerequisite to the subsequent extension of slavery. Then, and only then, could a future Supreme Court consider such a travesty as the hypothetical "Dred Scott II," holding that no *state* had the power to outlaw slavery -- a decision which Lincoln "*deduced*" from the principles of the Dred Scott case itself.[30] At Galesburg, Lincoln put the argument this way: "I do not charge that he means it so; but I call upon your minds to inquire, if you were going to get the best instrument you could, and then set it to work in the most ingenious way, to prepare the public mind for this movement, operating in the free states, where there is now an abhorrence of the institution of slavery, could you find an instrument so capable of doing it as Judge Douglas? or one employed in so apt a way to do it?"[31] In short, not only was Douglas' attempt to neutralize the moral issue extreme, and not only was it a departure from the spirit of the founding fathers, but it was pernicious in its consequences. The only alternative to preparing the public mind to acquiesce in a future "Dred Scott II" was to abandon Douglas' "don't care" position and enlist under the Republican banner.

We have seen that the moral argument in the Lincoln-Douglas debates was one-sided, since Lincoln wished to emphasize this dimension while Douglas worked to deny it. We've seen that the moral argument was introduced by an indirect route, being alluded to in the fifth and sixth debates and developed fully only in the last. We've seen how Lincoln managed to defend a seemingly absolute moral position while linking it to a course of action hedged with qualifiers and reservations. And we've seen how Lincoln carefully chose his villain, focusing on Douglas rather than on the slaveholder. The question remains, however: Why did Lincoln find it necessary or desirable to introduce the moral issue at all? Why shift focus from the emphasis which had dominated the first four debates?

Of course, it is not clear that Lincoln *did* shift his focus. The earlier conspiracy arguments may well have been used in anticipation of the later moral position. One could set up the other: if there were any evidence, however circumstantial, to implicate Douglas as an active conspirator, then there was all the more reason to suspect him of being the unwitting "instrument" of the Slave

Power. Perhaps he really had not had *Dred Scott* in mind when drafting the Kansas-Nebraska Act; but the very existence of that charge made it more plausible to envision him "blowing out the moral lights"[32] on the slavery issue. Michael Leff recently has explored the tension between the second and third sections of the "House Divided" speech, contending that the two parts function together as an argument by hyperbole -- the second makes the third seem credible.[33] Just so, in the debates the conspiracy claims may have been advanced less in the belief that they can be won than in an attempt to condition the audience's response to the moral argument. The development of this theme across two months of discourse illustrates Farrell's thesis that arguments have both a synchronic and diachronic dimension, developing in time as well as within the confines of a particular context.[34]

But whether or not Lincoln "changed" his strategy, why introduce the moral argument? The answer involves an assessment of his political situation. Since Douglas had broken with the Buchanan Administration over the Lecompton Constitution, he had become attractive to Northern antislavery elements who believed that the practical effect of popular sovereignty would be to make all territories free. Some prominent Republicans, such as Horace Greeley, were encouraging *their* party to nominate the "Little Giant" as a fusion candidate. Fehrenbacher describes the possibility that all or part of the Republican Party "might become a tail fastened to the Douglas kite" as "a real and imminent danger in the spring of 1858," because the Lecompton dispute had softened the hostility of many antislavery leaders to the popular-sovereignty principle.[35] Lincoln thought such a course disastrous for his party, for his own personal fortunes, and for the antislavery cause. His objective, therefore, must be to drive a wedge between the Republicans and Douglas, preventing a rapprochement. Yet he could not do so by supporting radical abolition doctrine himself, so he must try to push Douglas to the other extreme. He could not do so on the territorial question alone, for -- in the aftermath of Lecompton -- the differences between the two on that matter were slight. Fehrenbacher argues that this issue "did not present enough contrast between Douglas and the Republicans." As the debates proceeded, Lincoln recognized that "a much sharper distinction could be drawn if the discussion were shifted to the more expansive domain of moral principles."[36] In a sense, then, the moral argument functioned as a tactic for Lincoln, enabling him to maintain the needed distance from Douglas. But it also was a necessary ingredient in his moderate position. He reconciled the tension between opposing slavery and opposing abolition by advocating that slavery be placed "where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in course of ultimate extinction."[37] Yet how could the public conclude that slavery was on the way out? The answer, for Lincoln, lay in the fact that the institution stood condemned on moral grounds. Remove that condemnation, and there was no reason slavery could not be expected to last forever; there was no middle ground left between acquiescence and abolition. The moral argument, then, was not an appendage or a flourish to Lincoln's position but an essential element of it.

For much the same reason, of course, Douglas found it necessary to blunt the moral appeal. Failing to engage his rival on this argument, Lincoln made Douglas' avoidance of a position itself an issue. He ridiculed the incumbent for making "the ignoring of principled differences itself a principle,"[38] and taunted him for "false statesmanship that undertakes to build up a system of policy upon the basis of caring nothing about *the very thing that every body does care the most about*?"[39] If Douglas would not engage the moral argument, then his failure to do so would be an argument against him.

From this case study, what conclusions can be extracted about argumentation in the human sciences? It must be acknowledged that this paper is unlike the others on this program, in that its concern is not with an academic discipline but with practical ethics -- views of morality as they are shaped in the public forum.

Perhaps the most obvious implication is that right and wrong are given at least part of their meaning in the context of specific rhetorical situations. There are transcendent values, to be sure, such as Lincoln's belief in the humanity of the Negro or Douglas' commitment to majority rule. But these values were animated and given force only in context. The value of majority rule was an effective means to transcend divisive conflict over slavery; the humanity of the Negro provided Lincoln with a moral judgment that could maintain a wedge between Republicans and Democrats. The appeal of moral propositions, then, may not lie as much in their abstract character as principled statements, as it does in the fact that they are rhetorical weapons, useful in moving the rhetor closer to his or her objective.

A second implication is that moral positions are established by the complex and subtle interplay of arguments. A moral argument is not simply a movement from premise to conclusion. One claim sets up another, and the completion of one becomes a component of another. Several years ago Samuel Becker characterized communication not as a linear process but a mosaic,[40] and that analogy seems especially apt when considering the role of communication in the study of moral issues.

Third, this study suggests the difficulty of defending absolute value positions in the public forum. They make compelling claims on the attention and belief of a listener, but in order to be taken seriously they must be linked to a program of action which is *not* absolute. Otherwise the effort may be stigmatized as extreme. And yet the link between absolute value and limited action must seem natural and appropriate or it will undermine the credibility of both. The line of reasoning which condemns abortion as immoral and hence opposes any abortion no matter what the circumstances, has the virtue of consistency but is likely to be dismissed as extreme. The President who proposes to wage "unconditional war on poverty" with a $750 million program is not extreme but is not credible either. In contrast, the genius of Lincoln's moral position emerges. By paying homage to the role of public sentiment (which, after all, the majoritarian Douglas hardly could oppose), Lincoln was able to suggest that a public judgment that slavery was on the way out would have the same *ultimate* effect as would its immediate abolition. He thus was

permitted the luxury of defending an absolute value position to be achieved in the world of prudential conduct by no absolute means.

Fourth, the moral argument may function best if an evil can be named and a villain identified. But the villain is probably not the party who *introduced* the evil into society. That is a matter of history, and to search for the original villain may be to impugn innocent people who have grown up with the evil in their midst. Rather, the villain is the party who perpetuates the evil, whose actions cause presumably good people to tolerate it. The process of finding a villain in public moral argument, then, greatly resembles the inherency analysis of academic debate, guided as it is by the search for a motive which permits an acknowledged problem to continue.[41]

Finally, this study should make clear that moral arguments develop in time. Sociologists and anthropologists often observe sweeping changes in the values of a culture over time, but their accounting for these shifts often trivializes them as nothing more than fads or fashions. The study of public argument may enable us to understand better *how* values and morals change. This essay implies that they change through the slow accretion of claims, evidence, and warrants, interacting with and affecting one another until eventually one can recognize the emergence of a new moral position. Arguments develop in time, as Farrell has proposed, and the study of individual texts and discourses may help to make clear how. Certainly such study should confirm the role rhetoric has to play in establishing, validating, and testing moral principles, and thereby defining one of the least exact of all the human sciences.

Notes

[1] Quoted in Paul M. Angle, ed., Created Equal? The Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 367.

[2] Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 109.

[3] Quoted in Angle, p. 110.

[4] Quoted in Angle, p. 111.

[5] Quoted in Angle, p. 112.

[6] Quoted in Angle, p. 390.

[7] Lincoln developed this position in his July, 1858 speech in Chicago. See Angle, p. 41.

[8] Quoted in Angle, p. 35.

[9] Quoted in Angle, p. 392.

[10] Quoted in Angle, p. 393.

[11] Quoted in Angle, pp. 303-304.

[12] Quoted in Angle, p. 335.

[13] Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1953), II, p. 255.

[14] Quoted in Angle, p. 42.

[15] Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), p. 262.

[16] David Potter, The Impending Crisis (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 45.

[17] Quoted in Angle, p. 128.

[18] Saul Sigelschiffer, The American Conscience: The Drama of the Lincoln-Douglas Debates (New York: Horizon Press, 1973), p. 25.

[19] Quoted in Angle, p. 235.

[20] Quoted in Angle, p. 304.

[21] Quoted in Angle, p. 391.

[22] Jaffa, p. 393.

[23] Quoted in Angle, p. 207.

[24] Quoted in Angle, p. 393.

[25] David Brion Davis, The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1969), p. 4.

[26] Quoted in Angle, p. 394.

[27] Quoted in Angle, p. 393.

[28] This line is from Lincoln's "House Divided" speech; it was repeated during the debates. See Angle, p. 2.

[29] Jaffa, p. 287. Lincoln made this claim during the Galesburg debate. See Angle, p. 309.

[30] Lincoln made this deduction in the Galesburg debate. See Angle, p. 308.

[31] Quoted in Angle, p. 311.

[32] Lincoln used this phrase in the Ottawa debate. See Angle, p. 130.

[33] Michael C. Leff, "Rhetorical Timing in Lincoln's 'House Divided' Speech," The Van Zelst Lecture in Communication (Evanston: Northwestern University, forthcoming).

[34] See Thomas B. Farrell, "Knowledge in Time: Toward an Extension of Rhetorical Form," Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, eds. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 123-153.

[35] Don E. Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850's (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1962), p. 78. See also Jaffa, p. 276.

[36] Fehrenbacher, p. 108.

[37] The quotation is from the "House Divided" speech. See Angle, p. 2.

[38] Jaffa, p. 151.

[39] Quoted in Angle, p. 389.

[40] Samuel L. Becker, "Rhetorical Studies for the Contemporary World," The Prospect of Rhetoric, eds. Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 21-43.

[41] For a recent discussion of inherency analysis, see J. W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, Contemporary Debate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), pp. 130-137.

MODELS, STATISTICS, AND OTHER TROPES OF POLITICS: OR, WHATEVER HAPPENED TO ARGUMENT IN POLITICAL SCIENCE?

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> A story is what remains when you leave out most of the action.
> -- Russell Hoban<1>

This story is about the discipline of political science since the Second World War. It is about that discipline's substitution of models, statistics, exemplars, and principles for adequate argumentation. So far, it is a sad story of missed opportunities, squandered resources, and resulting punishments. It tells of a turn away from actual politics toward academic discourse, of a slide into strange assumptions and stupid procedures, of a fall into numerous anomalies and prominent paradoxes. In short, it tells of a slow but steady decline in the discipline's overall quality of inquiry.

But brevity can bedevil stories as easily as beget them. Told thus, the tale would be fairly familiar from previous accounts by critics of political science. Their villains have different names -- behavioralism, deductivism, empiricism, historicism, methodism, positivism, scientism, and so on -- but fit the same mold and foment the same perversions of political inquiry.<2> Their plots are almost relentlessly grim and unremittingly hostile to recent attempts at political science. They tell less of tragedies befalling a flawed field of inquiry than of travesties perpetrated by a benighted tribe of idolaters. They are satires in the old style: savage depictions designed to destroy the legitimacy and morale of opponents.<3> The new devices of rule are regarded as utter disasters, and their masters are castigated in terms unqualified and uncompromising. Yet they generate scant chances of success. For their main notes of hope are clarion calls to heroes or virtues apparently past, and their main images of action are simple pleas to purge the realm of its misguided rulers and all their tools.<4>

My version, however, is not so one-sided.<5> It recounts the recent career of models, statistics, exemplars, and principles not as mere enemies but as potential tropes of intelligent inquiry into politics. More specifically and properly, they are tropes of argument about politics. Like all tropes, though, they can be misconceived and misused. In political science, they have become tokens more than tropes of argument, replacements rather than resources for substantive studies of politics. Here I tell how these tropes of political inquiry have come to be abused so widely and unawares. Hence my story tells how recent political science is what remains of political inquiry when you leave out most of the argument. But my story also relates how these tropes, understood and used well, are valuable and virtually necessary figures for political inquiry.

Accordingly, my tale portrays models, statistics, and other tropes of politics as more the victims than the villains of recent political science. At worst, it is truly a tragedy, with the seeds of self-destruction planted in the protagonist by those very virtues which lead us to lament the final fall. At best, it is potentially a comedy, with the seeds of self-awareness brought to bloom by those very devices which help us to produce the present trouble. In its latter aspect, my tale points toward reconciliation of conflicting methods and contending factions of political inquiry, by revealing their common grounds of political argument. It implies that what often function now to befuddle inference and bemuse understanding can serve as true tropes of improved political inquiry to come. Thus it projects ways to turn recent losses into future gains, by transforming debilitating perplexities into potent problems for fruitful solution by a redirected discipline. In conclusion, it hints of a real if erratic increase in the discipline's overall capacity for inquiry.

HOW POLITICAL SCIENCE LOST ITS ARGUMENTS

Whatever happened to argument in political science? In a word, it was lost. In a phrase, it was gradually but largely misplaced -- and therefore displaced -- in the aftermath of the behavioral revolution. This does not put the proposition as precisely as required for many purposes, but it will suffice for those at hand. For my aim is to tell in general terms how the loss has occurred, how it has been little detected or lamented, how it has nonetheless crippled political inquiry, and how it has to be overcome.

But you may doubt from the outset that such a crime -- either of commission or omission -- could have been perpetrated against any political science worthy of the name. Controversy and (therefore) argument seem to be the life's blood (if not the true calling) of academic disciplines. How could any field of inquiry lose its capacity, sensibility, or even proclivity for argumentation? Actually, I do not believe my home discipline to be the only one to suffer such a loss of late. It certainly has company in the other social sciences and perhaps even in some of the humanities. But that is a tale for another time. For now, read on, my colleagues; and you shall see how political science has diminished itself radically -- yet not irrevocably -- in all of these respects.

The self-declared behavioral revolution was a sort of social movement within the academic discipline of political science. It was meant to liberate the discipline from liabilities of older inquiries into politics. It rejected traditional analysis of laws and institutions as trivial description, evaluative prescription, or unjustified speculation. Many stories are still told of its ambitions, achievements, failures, and followers.<6> But here I tell of its tragic aspiration to render political argument at once rigorous, vigorous, and ample. Along the way, as in many another Faust tale, political science seems to have sold its soul for success, only to find that synonymous with failure. Increasingly, it has sacrificed significance to rigor, only to become sloppy as well as insignificant.<7> Similarly, it has formalized and mechanized argument, only to conflate explanations with correlations, assumptions with findings, tests with specifications, and arguments with methods.

Just so, many intertwined tales make up the story of how political science lost its arguments. Drawing on accounts of protagonists in each, let me reconstruct three episodes from the many already detailed elsewhere. For the most part, my contribution is simply to see them all as parts of the same story of recent political science.

Significantly, each episode embodies much the same structural irony. Seeking short, straight, swift routes from their wilderness to the great city of science and theory, political scientists pursue rigorously restricted means. These are thought to promise many quick and safe trips to the metropolis. But actually, none reaches more than part-way to the original destination. Some travelers understand this at the outset; some do not. But while a few rediscover it along the way, far more gradually forget the first goal in favor of the frequent rewards and satisfying simplicity of retracing familiar routes. With more traffic, the paths take on the appearance of transporting travelers all the way to the city; with so many way-stations and talking-places, they may seem to be streets of the city itself; and with personal experience in erecting edifices or paving paths, some travelers even settle into dreams of working on the city's main street. All around their bustle, of course, lies the wilderness: more walled off from the city than before and easily seen by lifted eyes.

THE BEHAVIOR VANISHES

Behavioralism began as a commitment to the scientific study of politics. Through logical positivism and empiricism, it conceived this as behavioral science. That is, it would be the theoretical, quantitative, and empirical study of the directly observable behavior of persons in politics. Previous studies were pervaded by hyperfactualism, barefoot empiricism, normative manipulation, and pontificating about governmental or other institutions. In their place, behavioralism would create and test truly scientific theories about the actual units of politics: behaviors by individuals. The theories would be nomothetical- or hypothetical-deductive instruments for discovering new facts and explaining old ones. As such, they would stay strictly separable from any models of behavior used to operationalize, test, or express the results of research. To execute this program, behavioralism turned political science toward kinds of data, models, statistics, exemplars, and principles already purporting to suit the study of individual behaviors. They came primarily from psychology, with assists from sociology and economics.

Of course, psychology was more interested in "attitudes" and other "mental" phenomena than "behaviors" in some "directly observable" sense. To make matters worse, behavioral requirements of "direct observation" were both scientifically mistaken and philosophically incoherent.<8> Perhaps worst of all, the behavioralist conception of theory was equally confused and incorrect.<9> The result was considerable incompatibility between the principles or assumptions of behavioralism and its other tropes of argument or technologies of research. Soon behavioralism was burying not only its principles but also its argumentative sensibility beneath an avalanche of election and other studies. These were fostered at first by borrowed data and statistics, but soon they were sustained by new data and different statistics -- largely refinements of regression analysis. Thus behaviors became opinions or (at best) decisions; theories became regressions or (at best) models; and the new tropes, technologies, findings, and examples of research created further applications for themselves. But who wants to argue with success?

Evidently, the answer is: the early succeeder, fiercest defender of the original principles, for whom success without them seems hollow and dissonant. Thus in political science, there is a virtual tradition of presidents of the professional association declaring the dream betrayed and recalling colleagues to first principles in yet another reorientation of the discipline. One founding father of behavioralism has urged a return to America's Enlightenment norms in studying politics and a recovery of the ontological base lost by behavioralism.<10> Another has heralded an era of postbehavioralism.<11> While still other cases could be cited, the most pertinent is John Wahlke's discovery that the behavioral revolution has been betrayed.<12>

Wahlke notices that political science is dominated by "attitudinal" and "mentalistic" concepts. He complains that the related variables cannot be directly observed or empirically established. Nor is inquiry in these terms "theoretical," in behavioral or any other legitimate terms. Indeed, he shows that the survey research which dominates political science cannot begin to meet behavioral standards of science. What, then, is political science to do? It must recognize that it has only been pre-behavioral and that it needs a truly behavioral matrix of inquiry. This can come from applying sociobiology and psychophysiology to politics. The resulting "biopolitics" would use ethological principles as working hypotheses to inform research and psychophysiological techniques to conduct it.

The first point is that Wahlke is right about recent political science: the behavior vanishes from a self-professed behavioral science. As the next section emphasizes, this happens mostly when behavioral tropes supplant rather than support argument. Sadly, the second point is that Wahlke and company are well on the way to repeating this debacle. To date, ethology in particular and sociobiology in general have proceeded mostly by using previous principles of human action to describe or explain animal behavior and then circling back to describe or explain human behavior in allegedly "biological" categories supposedly derived from animal studies. Hence it is hard to portray these inquiries as rigorously -- let alone justifiably -- behavioral.<13>

Moreover, the biopolitics performed thus far has unfortunately followed Wahlke's call to use the principles rather than the (purported) methods of ethology. Yet ethology would be "behavioral" less for its principles than its methods, especially the "direct observation" of individuals. In fact, biopolitics mostly ignores individual behaviors in favor of speculative adaptations of sociobiology and general commentaries on human nature: again the behavior vanishes. Thus Wahlke himself claims that political scientists should attend to ethology because it reveals: (1) the normality of war; (2) the dependence of war on cooperation, groups, and acceptance of authority; (3) the subsistence of polities as pseudosocieties or pseudospecies in a biological sense; (4) the universality of political bonding; and (5) the dependence of government on cooperation, groups, and acceptance of authority. These are hardly insights unique or even original to ethology. For example, virtually all can be found in the writings of Karl Marx, Saint Augustine, or Aristotle.

In sum, biopolitics seems to include (but not be exhausted by) one more behavioralist attempt to rescue dubious principles of scientific method under the guise of detailed studies of politics. Repeating the pattern of behavioralism, it can convince itself of success as a substantive paradigm or field mostly because it pursues what should be tropes of argument as though they simply were argument: complete, persuasive, and progressive. For the insular audience of those sympathetic to biopolitics, of course, the favored principles, exemplars, models, and statistics indeed are the argument: basically adequate, if not unassailable. This same moral emerges from fables of other latter-day legacies of behavioralism, as the next story suggests.

REGRESSION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Most political inquiries after the behavioral revolution have proceeded as though they were the epitome (or perhaps the parody?) of Thomas Kuhn's "normal science." If not by full-fledged disciplinary matrices, most studies are conducted within and according to what could be called "research literatures." These include exemplary cases of research, on which other studies are modeled -- albeit loosely. Such exemplars usually inspire far more by innovations of method than by inventions of argument, expansions of subject, or alterations of theory. Conversely, each research literature is usually conceded a distinctive domain of (potential) subjects. Similarly, each is typically if tacitly characterized by a set of principles which comprise the special perspective of the literature. Such perspectives are more diffuse and far less directly at issue in concrete research than are any specific theories in the literature.

Within a research literature, political scientists sometimes seek to ape or articulate exemplars, in the manner described by Kuhn. They sometimes try to solve puzzles as well. Most often, however, they work at recognizing and filling "holes" in the literature. By far the most common justification offered for individual projects of research in political science is simply: nobody has studied that political phenomenon in this way before, and here are the findings. Indeed, many of the purported solutions to such puzzles as apparently contradictory findings

actually attempt little more than to fill some hole in the neighborhood of the seeming clash. Another frequent justification of research is the chance to try out some refinement of method, in hopes that it may be applied more substantively in later research -- presumably by others. This sounds somewhat like research organized around exemplars, except that Kuhn's exemplars provide substantive as well as methodological inspiration for inquiry modeled after them.

Research oriented to filling holes in a literature of inquiry is the most prominent part of political science because it is practiced as though it were the least problematical part of political science. This is because it seldom seems more challenging than routine application of standard forms of multivariate regression to conveniently collectable sets of data not already so analyzed. In this role, regression has become the single most important trope of recent political science. But it has also become the single most common substitute for genuine argument in political science. As such, it is the main heritage of behavioralism in political science.

Regression began as a figure of argument sometimes suited to eliciting patterns from large sets of data which meet fairly exacting requirements, a few of which tend to make it pertinent to behavioralism's emphasis on the study of individuals. Thereafter, regression quickly became something akin to an all-purpose medium of inquiry. This much is widely agreed upon in political science, where it is sometimes the occasion of good-humored jokes about the discipline. As the use of regression has grown, however, so have the pretensions of its users -- sometimes self-consciously, sometimes not.

The proliferation of regression has greatly reduced the ability of some of its users to distinguish between correlations and explanations or between evidence and theories. Practitioners of regression talk unfortunately of "explaining the variance" in their data when they are merely measuring the correlation between their dependent and independent variables. Abstractly, they know that skilled argument is needed to move from correlation to causation or other modalities of explanation. But in research, they short-circuit the complications of argument, reporting the result a regression analysis as though it were the best argument for their substantive conclusions -- rather than some evidence available for weaving into an argumentative evaluation of such contentions. Thus they make a useful trope of argument into a pernicious token of argument: here are the sheer facts as found through regression analysis; take them or leave them, but neither ask nor give arguments about them; instead, go out and regress your own results (about another hole in the literature).

Theories are networks of arguments.<14> If individual arguments are replaced by regressions, can the conflation of theories with regressions be far behind? Expressing the practice of many political scientists, one sophisticated exponent of multivariate regression asserts that "A political theory ... is a multivariate hypothesis about a political event." He speaks further for the mainstream of the discipline in declaring that such a hypothesis is best addressed scientifically as a regression equation. And this, too, he terms "a political theory."<15> In such a political science, what room remains for rigorous, vigorous, ample argument? With the reduction of theories to regression, the highest and most complicated levels of inference are laid low, if not made easy.

The cult of regression can also overwhelm the nature and function of models in political research. On the one hand, modeling has long been methodologically precarious in political science, partly because of its shaky philosophical status in the logical positivisms and empiricisms behind many principles of behavioralism.<16> On the other hand, it has been developed as one of the main steps away from sheer correlating and toward substantive theorizing. Formalized and mathematicized, some models have even become alternate tropes of argument in political science. At best, however, over-reliance on regression tends to assimilate modeling to the hoary trope of conceptual frameworks in political science: decently complicated sets of concepts which profess from the outset their own insufficiency of articulation and justification.<17> At worst, the substitution of regression for argument in political inquiry tends to pull modeling all the way down to the level of grab-bag correlation, generating diagrams in which a profusion of factors somehow produce largely but little differentiated effects.<18> Again, not just the precision but the very disposition of argumentation is virtually eliminated.

There are enough tricks important in regression to make graduate education necessary, but they are not so many or difficult as to restrict its practice further than that. The real troubles with regression are to know what it can accomplish (which is often less and otherwise than political scientists think) and to recognize when it should not be used (which is basically more than political scientists think). Another sophisticated teacher of regression has recently reconsidered its proper conditions and conclusions in use. He demonstrates that many of its common applications by political scientists are statistically -- which is to say inferentially and argumentatively -- unwarranted. In effect, he suggests that most of the behavioral inquiries conducted in political science are so fundamentally defective as to be worthless or even pernicious in their pretensions to coherence, let alone defensibility. Their argumentative inadequacy is so great that he insists on a need for new (and unprecedented) theories of specifically political data. In the face of the cult of regression, he shies away from the clear implications of his own case against it. But in the end, his is a brief on behalf of recovering regression and other statistics as parts of political argument rather than replacements for it.<19> Otherwise, political science will continue to regress.

HOW RATIONAL-CHOICE THEORY GOT ITS PARADOXES

Modeling has already been mentioned as one of the main modes of resistance to the regression of political science. A prominent contributor to this alternate trope has been what is usually known as "rational-choice theory." (Some advocates call it "positive political theory" or simply "political theory" -- not for short but for emphasis on their deductivist view of theory.<20>) Rational-choice theory itself is best conceived as only one branch of formal theories of politics. It is distinguished from other branches by its substantive presuppositions about politics. As has been argued repeatedly by others, these assumptions are highly unrealistic in regard to politics. But that has not kept rational-choice theory from becoming the prime mover of formal analysis in political science to date.

For a capsule presentation of formal analysis generally, let me borrow an excellent summary from a colleague who practices it. "Formal analysis is distinguished as a mode of inquiry by the kind of theory to which it aspires and by the means it employs in developing it." There are three standard steps. "First, the observed entities and their relations are translated into an appropriate representation." This is called "mapping." "Second, accepted principles are used to draw implications concerning the representation." Mathematical representations are thought to facilitate this. "Third, these implications are translated back into statements about the original phenomena, a process called 'inverse mapping.'" Similarly, there are three main goals. "The first is the discovery of principles that account for our empirical generalizations." "The second is the use of such principles to generate new hypotheses." And the third is "to lend coherence to what we know."<21>

In these terms, rational-choice theory is distinguished from other formal theories by its representations or maps of politics. It suits behavioralism not only in its deductivist view of theory but also in its individualist view of behavior. It represents politics as the result of individuals' rational choices. "It represents individuals as preference orderings (or real-valued utility functions) with respect to alternate actions available. And it states that individual choose the actions that rank highest in their preference orderings (or for which their utility functions are maximized)." Although avowedly directed at (strategic) actions or (purposeful) decisions rather than (caused) behaviors, inattention to the source and substance of preferences leads most rational-choice theory to repeat the behavioralist principle of staying on the observable surface of human events. Yet it requires some specification of preferences in order to operate; so in practice, rational-choice theory usually accepts "the principle of self-interest, which ascribes a particular content to individuals' preference orderings."<22> Finally, it typically assumes conditions of (virtually) complete knowledge or negligible information costs.

Given what ordinary people, let alone political scientists, think that they know about politics, all of these assumptions would seem to be either generally wrong or at least severely limited in potential application.<23> But the deductivist view of theory rescues rational-choice theory from this shaky start by declaring that false premises are fine as long as they produce predictions which prove true. Hence rational-choice theory defends its assumptions as instruments for exploring politics. Its predictions must meet the test of reality or experience: keep those that do, discard those that do not. Of course, the assumptions themselves are prized partly for their formal elegance but also for their tacit ties to certain views and values of liberal democracy.<24> Still, the basic doubtfulness of the the principles of rational-choice theory make it especially important to discipline their every use by details of actual, careful argument -- that is, to remember that such principles are never more than tropes of political argument.

To say this is to suggest how much it is a stricture forgotten in recent political science. The result has been a series of paradoxes within and about rational-choice theory. Directly or indirectly, these paradoxes are acknowledged by practitioners. Some -- such as the particular paradox of voting or the more general paradox of Arrow -- are intrinsic to the axioms of the theory. Of course, these are produced by the substantive principles assumed by the theory. But others are produced by comparison of its predictions to evidence about politics. Thus the (fortunate) infrequency with which the paradox of voting occurs in actual voting calls into question whether rational-choice theory can claim to be a theory of politics. Similarly, the insistent demonstration by rational-choice modelers that voting in large elections must be irrational for individual voters is (happily) at apparent odds with actual turnout of voters. The theory and its predictions seem sound, but the contradictory facts seem valid. Arguably, there are many such anomalies in rational-choice research.

If the principles and models of rational-choice theory were tropes of argument, then these results would encourage their reconsideration and modification. For many proponents, however, this means taking both sets of paradoxes as puzzles for further research, which in turn means tinkering with details of particular models and refusing to reassess their premises. To be sure, many opponents make the mirror mistake of taking at least the second class of paradoxes as decisive refutations of the entire domain of theory. Neither side engages in the detailed, argumentative analysis needed to discover more adequately what to make of the results thus far.

If that were the choice, then the critics would deserve to prevail, since the practitioners of rational-choice theory often (but far from always) fail their own standard of successful prediction. In fact, the critics do deserve to be taken seriously, for they have lodged at least five significant complaints against rational-choice theory. (1) It fails to recognize the actual uncertainty under which human decisions are made. (2) It fails to study the actual content of preferences or values informing human actions. (3) It fails to account for the sources of preferences. (4) It fails to address how human interaction makes individual choices contingent on the actions of others. (5) And it fails to detail the actual processes of decision by individuals or groups.<25> Sometimes, these criticisms are expressed as a failure to consider the contexts of human affairs. Other times, they are advanced as a failure to take history or time itself into account.<26> In this sense, rational-choice theory has defined an action as what remains when you leave out most of the story. Hence it does tend to slip back toward a study of mere behavior.

But there is little reason to recommend a choice between uncritical pursuit of rational-choice theory and supercritical rejection of it. The heroes of the story of how rational-choice theory got its paradoxes are those who have turned to address deficiencies of the kinds just listed with new ideas articulated in careful and sometimes complicated arguments. They have begun to explore such amendments or complements to rational-choice theory as the costs of information and the effects of uncertainty, the contents and sources of preferences, the effects of interaction, and the processes of social decision.<27> In so doing, they have returned to treating models of rational-choice as true tropes of argument: as figures of analysis and evidence rather than as fudges for them.

TROPES, TRAPS, TOKENS, AND DETOURS

How could any academic discipline long lose its disposition to argument? At least three stories later, my answer should be even more evident than before: disciplines can turn desirable tropes of argument into detrimental substitutes for argument. Elaborated, this is to say that disciplinary tropes of argument can become traps, tokens, or detours of argument. To explain what this means, how it can happen, and how to prevent or redress it, let me turn finally but briefly to the idea of tropes or figures of argument.

I say briefly, because no initial presentation of this idea can do more than evoke its implications and justifications. For one thing, it projects theories of argument radically different from those implicit in the usual discussions of deduction and induction. For another, it partakes of a complicated and unconventional network of ideas about language, inquiry, and even politics. Here neither set of connections can be adequately developed, let alone defended. Nonetheless, the basic idea can be broached so that further discussion can contribute to its development and defense.

The basic idea is this: just as there are figures of speech, so there are figures of argument; just as tropes of speech are unavoidable, so are tropes of argument; and just as the former may be turned to abuse or advantage, so may the latter. Of late, there are several massive, intersecting literatures which argue the necessity of figuration in language. Contrary to naive or programmatic proclamations of literalism, figures of speech are neither mere ornaments inessential to meaning nor perverse tools of manipulation hostile to reason. Instead, such tropes are necessary for linguistic expression and creativity.<28> Indeed, they are specifically necessary for scientific expression and creativity.<29> Just as the linguistic turn of philosophy has rediscovered the indispensability of figures to speech, so the rhetorical turn of philosophy is ready to recognize the the necessity of figures in argument.

This idea is dependent on realizing that, to some extent in argument as elsewhere, the medium is or at least shapes the message. Rationalists conceive good arguments to order all the relevant or available evidence so as to reach a sound conclusion. They believe in a single, general, and -- ideally -- formal discipline of logic for discerning or constructing sound arguments. Grudgingly, they concede the need for compromises such as ellipsis, since life is short and resources are limited. What they fail to appreciate, however, is the sense in which an argument is what remains when you leave out most of the evidence. In other words, the art of argument is to discover, endow, and deploy logics in a world of limits: to our knowledge, time, intelligence, imaginations, emotions, and the like. In our world, the art of argument is to order and convey information by presenting it in terms of positions, particularly relevant evidence, and pertinent criticisms. Whether the aim is persuasion, inquiry, or otherwise, argument therefore proceeds by tropes.

To date, there has been some study of argumentative tropes, both in academic affairs and everyday life.<30> The kinds or levels of tropes identified thus far are largely different from the ones at issue in my stories of how political science lost its arguments. Epistemically, Stephen Pepper's "world hypotheses" and Haydan White's "prefigurations of the phenomenal field" are more fundamental but also more diffuse than the sorts of tropes in my stories: models, statistics, exemplars, and principles. By contrast, the "metaphors we live by," as elaborated in the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, are sometimes more precise but still more ambiguous in their implications. Yet this may be to say only that different tropes need to be distinguished in addressing different issues and domains of argument. Were the arguments and stories at hand elaborated, they would surely find room for talk about these other types of tropes, not to mention a more extensive presentation of the tropes identified in preceding pages.

Perhaps the signal advantage of recognizing these particular tropes of argment -- in political science and elsewhere -- is that they suggest more directly than the others how academic arguments often go wrong or even away. Plainly, this is where tokens, detours, and traps enter the picture.

The three preceding stories emphasized that tropes can come to replace argument rather than mediate it. The presentation of a principle, the emulation of an exemplar, the citation of a statistic, or the mention of a model can short-circuit or otherwise substitute for arguments. Then the trope is a mere token of argument: a way of avoiding evidence and reasons rather than potentially helpful selection and communication of them. There are many motivations for transforming figures of argument into flights from argument: inadequacies of understanding, desires to win rather than learn, disputes too deep and personal to be addressed for a while, differences in perspective too gaping to be transcended at the time, and so on. But the key point is that tropes of argument are not primarily, normally, or properly (mere) tokens of argument. I do not mean to suggest that every instance of the substitution of tokens for tropes is bad, even in academia. In some cases, we may even concede that tokenism in argument serves urgent personal, academic, or even intellectual needs better than articulation and a seemingly inevitable confrontation to follow. (This is one way in which any argumentation, no matter how scholarly, must remain rhetorical and political.) But I do mean to say that the difference between tropes and tokens can help to explain such trends as the decline of argumentation in political science.

The other two travesties of argumentative tropes are less prominent in my stories but perhaps no less evident in the events which they portray. When tropes are twisted to perverse advantage in argument, we may say that they have been transformed into detours of argument. Then the intent or effect is manipulation -- more than outright suppression -- of argument. Since the literalist would say that all tropes of argument are -- at best -- detours, their distinction from tropes is especially important to sustain. But since the logic books are full of examples of perverse -- and not merely mistaken -- reasoning,<31> and since that subject is another essay in itself, here I shall simply assert the difference. No less than tokens, of course, detours are motivated by diverse considerations and may sometimes be justified in rhetorical or political terms. But no more than tokens are detours to be identified with tropes, which form the very fabric of all argumentation, even though they may differ dramatically across domains.

By insisting that tropes of argument are not reducible to tokens or detours of argument, I am simply articulating the point that argument cannot avoid figures and should derive real advantages from them. In other words, figures of argument are as vulnerable or even prone to abuse as figures of speech. By contrast, I introduce the notion of argumentative traps to emphasize that tropes of argument are never without limits and costs. Even apt figures of speech are able to serve us well precisely because they shape our thinking, speaking, and acting. Any such shaping, however, is also a constraining and a directing away from thoughts, words, and deed which are pertinent and perhaps even appropriate in the circumstances. Moreover, as circumstances change, the shapes (i.e., the constraints and directions) seldom change precisely apace. The lesson is not just that perfection is impossible in argumentative tropes but that even the best tropes are in some respect mistropes.<32>

Perhaps the main manifestation of this effect is in the tendency of tropes to become traps of argument.<33> Many theorists of rational choice might be described as trapped by their tropes. The models, principles, exemplars, and even statistics of rational-choice theory serve their students well in many ways. Yet they still restrict abilities to shift to other figures of argument more favorable for addressing aspects of politics poorly appreciated by rational-choice theory. As summarized above, the figures of argument favored by rational-choice theory slight or distort aspects of politics important for its own concerns about politics. The point before was about how this can and should be avoided. The point here is about how it cannot.

More generally, the ways in which argumentative tropes also can and almost must be traps is related to those troubles in communicating across paradigms which figure so prominently in the writings of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.<34> As suggested by the latter's injunction to pluralize paradigms, a good response to the tendency of tropes to become traps is to produce more (diverse) tropes. To cultivate illusions of avoiding all figures of argument is only to increase the rigidity, credulity, and dishonesty which are inclined to creep into any body of argument after a while. The real -- if uncertain -- protection against argumentative traps is to proliferate argumentative tropes. For they afford different ways to make and break those spells of order which we call arguments. And in the end, that is what this essay is about.

NOTES

1. Russell Hoban, **Pilgermann**, quoted by David Lehman in "Pilgrim's Progress," **Newsweek** 101 (May 30, 1983): pp. 92-93, on p. 92.

2. See: Bernard Crick, **In Defense of Politics** (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1962); Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, eds., **Apolitical Politics** (New York: Crowell, 1967); Sheldon S. Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation," **American Political Science Review** 63 (December 1969): pp. 1062-1082; John G. Gunnell, "Deduction, Explanation, and Social Scientific Inquiry," **American Political Science Review** 63 (December 1969): pp. 1233-1246; Gunnell, **Philosophy, Science, and Political Inquiry** (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1975); Eugene F. Miller, "Positivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry," **American Political Science Review** 66 (September 1972): pp. 796-817; Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., **The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory** (New York: Dunellen, 1973); Alasdair MacIntyre, **After Virtue** (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.

3. See: Robert C. Elliott, **The Power of Satire** (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).

4. Thus even the best of these critics have so far offered only anemic or implausible alternatives. Typically, they aspire to a grand resurrection of the very kinds of inquiry demonstrated in their accounts to be irrevivably past, or they incline toward a covert acquiescence in the same modes of inquiry decried in their criticisms of current political science. For example, the former malady is suffuses the work of Aledair MacIntyre, Eugene Miller, and Sheldon Wolin. On MacIntyre, see: John S. Nelson, "Political Theory as Political Rhetoric," **What Should Political Theory Be Now?**, ed. by Nelson (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983), pp. 169-240, on pp. 189-190. On Miller, see: Miller, "The Primary Questions of Political Inquiry," **Review of Politics** 39 (July 1977): pp. 298-331; Miller, "Metaphor and Political Knowledge," **American Political Science Review** 73 (March 1979): pp. 155-170; Miller, "What Does 'Political' Mean?," **Review of Politics** 42 (January 1980): pp. 56-72; Miller, "Epistemology and Political Inquiry," **Journal of Politics** 42 (November 1980): pp. 1160-1167; Nelson and Ira L. Strauber, "For Epistemology: Its Importance in Political Theory," unpublished manuscript. On Wolin, see: Gunnell, **Political Theory** (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1979); Nelson and Strauber, "For Epistemology." The latter trouble is evident in the work of John Gunnell. See: Gunnell, "Political Science and the Theory of Action: Prolegomena," **Political Theory** 7 (February 1979): pp. 75-100; Gunnell, "Political Theory and the Theory of Action," **Western Political Quarterly** 34 (September 1981): pp. 341-358; Gunnell, "Encounters of a Third Kind: The Alienation of Theory in American Political Science," **American Journal of Political Science** 25 (August 1981): pp. 440-461; Gunnell, "In Search of the Political Object: Beyond Methodology and Transcendentalism," **What Should Political Theory Be Now?**, pp. 25-52; Nelson, ed., **From Epistemology to Action**, forthcoming, especially the chapters by Hanson, Moon, Nelson, Strauber, and Wolin.

5. In this general regard, it resembles accounts by Richard J. Bernstein: **Praxis and Action**, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971; **The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory**, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976.

6. See: John S. Nelson, "Natures and Futures for Political Theory," **What Should Political Theory Be Now?**, pp. 3-24, on pp. 8-15.

7. See: Philip L. Beardsley, "Substantive Significance vs. Quantitative Rigor in Political Inquiry: Are the Two Compatible?," **International Interactions** 1 (1974): pp. 27-40; Beardsley, **Redefining Rigor** (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980). Also see: John S. Nelson, "Education for Politics: Rethinking Research on Political Socialization," **What Should Political Theory Be Now?**, pp. 413-478.

8. See: J. L. Austin, **Sense and Sensibilia** (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 19, 31, 50; Richard Rorty, **Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature** (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), especially pp. 17-69.

9. See: Gunnell, **Philosophy, Science, and Political Inquiry**; John S. Nelson, "Accidents, Laws, and Philosophic Flaws: Behavioral Explanation in Dahl and Dahrendorf," **Comparative Politics** 7 (April 1975): pp. 435-457.

10. Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science," **American Political Science Review** 60 (December 1966): pp. 869-879; Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," **World Politics** 29 (July 1977): pp. 489-522.

11. David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," **American Political Science Review** 63 (December 1969): pp. 1051-1061.

12. John C. Wahkle, "Pre-Behavioralism in Political Science," **American Political Science Review** 73 (March 1979): pp. 9-31.

13. See: Nelson, "Education for Politics," pp. 460-462.

14. See: John S. Nelson, "The Ideological Connection, Parts I-II," **Theory and Society** 4 (Fall-Winter 1977): pp. 421-448 and 573-590.

15. Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "What Political Theory Is," draft, September, 1980, 2, 3. See: Lewis-Beck, **Applied Regression** (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980).

16. See: Marshall Spector, "Models and Theories," **British Journal for the Philosophy of Science** 16 (August 1965): pp. 121-142; Paul F. Kress, "On Validating Simulation, with Special Attention to Simulation of International Politics," **International Interactions** 1 (1974): pp. 41-50.; Philip C. Wall, "How Scientific Are Political Science Models?," **Political Methodology** 1 (Summer 1974): pp. 83-118.

17. See: John G. Gunnell, "The Idea of the Conceptual Framework: A Philosophical Critique," **Journal of Comparative Administration** 1 (August 1969): pp. 140-176.

18. Another example of this phenomenon just crossed my desk, no doubt on its way to publication: Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom W. Rice, "Government Growth in the United States," draft, June, 1983, especially figure 2.

19. Christopher H. Achen, "Toward Theories of Political Data," paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, September 2-5, 1982. Also see: Achen, **Interpreting and Using Regression**, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1981. sk 1

20. William H. Riker, "Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics," paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, September 2-5, 1982, p. 1.

21. William H. Panning, "Formal Models of Legislative Processes," **Legislative Studies Quarterly**, forthcoming.

22. William H. Panning, "What Does It Take to Have a Theory? Principles in Political Science," **What Should Political Theory Be Now?**, pp. 479-511, on p. 490.

23. See: Panning, "Formal Models of Legislative Processes," the section on "The Premise Problem." Also see: Panning, "What Does It Take to Have a Theory?," pp. 489-507; Nelson, "Political Theory as Political Rhetoric," pp. 193-204.

24. See: Ellen Meiksins Wood, **Mind and Politics** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, **Knowledge and Politics** (New York: Free Press, 1975); Charles E. Lindblom, **Politics and Markets** (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

25. See: Panning, "What Does It Take to Have a Theory?," pp. 491-493; Riker, "Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics," pp. 1-15.

26. See: John S. Nelson, "Meaning and Measurement Across Paradigms: Metaphor and Irony in Political Inquiry," paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., September 1-4, 1977, pp. 15-22.

27. See: Riker, "Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics," pp. 15-32; Panning, "What Does It Take to Have a Theory?," pp. 501-507; Panning, "Formal Models of Legislative Processes," pp. 28-30. Riker proposes a discipline of "heresthetics" to study the strategy of decision; more specifically, it is to explore the origin and manipulation of preferences and alternatives. Perhaps I should add that, notwithstanding Riker's argument to the contrary, this may be regarded as an important part of the discipline of rhetoric. Relatedly, Panning's proposals, too, are closely linked to inquiry into processes of persuasion and other modes of influence.

28. See: Paul Ricoeur, **The Rule of Metaphor**, trans. by Robert Czerny (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977); Andrew Ortony, ed., **Metaphor and Thought** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Mark Johnson, ed., **Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor** (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).

29. See: Earl R. MacCormac, **Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion** (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1976); Nelson, "Meaning and Measurement Across Paradigms," passim.

30. See: Stephen C. Pepper, **World Hypotheses** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942); Hayden White, **Metahistory** (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); John S. Nelson, "Review Essay [on **Metahistory**]," **History and Theory** 14 (1975): pp. 74-91; Nelson, "Tropal History and the Social Sciences," **History and Theory** 19 (1980): pp. 80-101; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, **Metaphors We Live By** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

31. My favorite such text for teaching undergraduates is full of such examples: Howard Kahane, **Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric** (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1980).

32. See: Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Falsity in Their Extramoral Sense," **Essays on Metaphor**, ed. by Warren Shibles (Whitewater, WI: The Language Press, 1972); Paul de Man, "Nietzsche's Theory of Rhetoric," **Symposium** 28 (Spring 1974): pp. 33-51; de Man, **Allegories of Reading** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

33. These traps of argument may call to mind the traps of gumption, value, and truth surveyed by Robert M. Pirsig in: **Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance** (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), pp. 298-318. Although not exactly the same, they are importantly related to many aspects of this essay.

34. See: Thomas S. Kuhn, **The Structure of Scientific Revolutions** (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970); Paul K. Feyerabend, **Against Method** (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1975); Nelson, "Meaning and Measurement Across Paradigms," pp. 66-81.

RHETORIC IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES:

A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS MEGILL, ZAREFSKY, MCCLOSKEY, AND NELSON

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Megill's essay argues for pluralism in historical methodologies, and attacks one prominent purist position which would oppose such toleration. Megill contends that Quentin Skinner reduces and narrows the role of history by insiting that proper history restrict itself to recording the intentions of author-agents in terms that might have been recognizable in the times in which they wrote, acted, and spoke. Skinner denies what he calls "immanence" in history, and rejects the possibility that ideas may slowly come to consciousness across many generations and through many spokespersons and actors. Megill rightly attacks this proscription as both arbitrary and severe: Skinner seems to deny the possibility that visionary minds can see or would even wish to see beyond their own times to speak or write to a future. He denies what surely must be an overwhelming presumption: that thought can detect its own trajectory. Perhaps he may even deny the validity of cultural evolution itself, that over the past 10,000 years humans have gradually created their own environment by manipulating symbols. Or, if people were not conscious of the changes within which they were participating, Skinner would ban any historian from speculating about the significance of their actions within any trans-generational frame of reference.

If Skinner's dicta were taken seriously, essays such as Douglas Ehninger's "On Systems of Rhetoric" would be read only as examples of folly. How could George Campbell have realized that he was participating in an emerging consciousness that would reach from the logical/grammatical formulations of the classical rhetoricians through psychological speculations of the Eighteenth Century and into the contemporary sociological era of rhetorical theory? But there is indeed a crucial distinction between what an agent _means_ and the meaning of his action. Campbell at least saw that he was grounding the theory of rhetoric in a theory of mind, and if he did not fully intend to participate in this coming-to-consciousness in rhetorical theory, this by no means diminishes his achievement. His participation, Ehninger argues, had that meaning, and this added value only affirms our appreciation of Campbell's work: his reach did exceed his grasp.

The value of work such as Skinner's, of course, is that it keeps us on our toes: it makes us insist on rigor in the use of historical evidence. But that would be Skinner's significance, not his intention, and such bouquets would be banned in Cambridge!

Megill points out that the ethos implied in Skinner's position is the historian as objective observer/recorder of events whose meaning is "fixed and unchanging" (and, I would add, "entire in themselves"). Telos is the devil term here, so there is no role for the historian as interpreter. But where Megill is content with observing the unproved assumption which supports this persona, I am disturbed at least as much by its deep inconsistency with a powerful contemporary argument concerning the use of language. This argument holds that the very symbols we must use in describing any reality--past or present--are less reflectors than interpreters of that reality, and that (in the most severe form of the argument) they may actually constitute the reality which they pose. The problem here is that whether we take the argument in its strong or weak form, the historian, assuming he or she could somehow be transposed into the past independent of the symbols in which the past must be embalmed, would still have to report in communication which presupposes, not the observer, but the interpreter. But of course the past is presented to us in symbols, and is continued by us in the symbols we use.

The mythology Skinner is so concerned with then may lurk in his own unquestioned assumptions. As an outsider to the arguments that agitate historians in their own specialty, let me hazard what may seem a naive suggestion: what if we should simply transcend the problem I have outlined by accepting and exploiting it? Why not consider another resource opened by application of the rhetorical model, and think of history as a specialized and especially responsible branch of forensic rhetoric? As forensics rhetorician with a special mission, the historian's task would be the representation of the past so that we could both see where we have come from, could fix our present position in the drift of time, and could determine the possible futures available to us (thus predisposing deliberative rhet-futures available to us (thus predisposing deliberative rhetoric). As much as possible, we should like to know the motives and intentions of those who acted significantly in the past, and we should like to know the full measure of that significance, both as consciously and unconsciously realized, both as immediately and remotely consummated. The historian as forensic rhetorician would ask us for a judgment upon the actions and persons presented, and always in those judgments would reside the possibility of object/lessons for the present and future. As audience members to such rhetoric, we would be close observers of the proofs employed, searching for enthymematic structures that might originate either in the historian's presuppositions or in ourselves, identifying appeals to pathos perhaps buried within those structures or in their presentation.

Skinner's assessment of the proper role for historians may suggest ironically a complementary dimension for this new ethos. Skinner observes: ". . .The appropriate methodology for the history of ideas must be concerned, first of all, to delineate the whole range of communications which could have been conventionally performed on the given occasion by the utterance of the given utterance, and, next, to trace the relations between the given utterance and this wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer." As I read this statement, Skinner is saying that the historian must define the range of inventional resources open to an author-agent in a given situation, and must assess his or her choice of a specific strategy in light of this wider context of options. The historian, in short, must also become a meta-rhetorician, who identifies intentions and illuminates tactics. But in rising above the rhetoric of that time, historians do not abandon their roles in the rhetoric of their own time. The two roles are really quite compatible. The historian may both argue for a certain perspective of the past and may simultaneously reveal how others--from his or her vantage--have contended both by words and deeds within their own times.

A problem different from that identified by Megill in the intentionalist emphasis may be exemplified unfortunately by Zarefsky's able paper. Historians and rhetorical critics who are preoccupied by intention may come to see complex human interactions as dominated by strategies, when they could well be the products of chance or error or even of stubborn integrity that insists upon intruding in human symbolic actions. For Zarefsky, Lincoln's use of the moral argument made good rhetorical sense on a number of strategic levels; therefore, the implication emerges, Lincoln formulated a somewhat compromised position on black people in order to enhance his own Presidential hopes and to embarrass those of Douglas. When Lincoln said, "I do not understand that because I do not want a negro woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for a wife," we are directed to see, not a possible expression of conviction, but rather an ingenious appeal to a broad constituency of voters, including those who despised slavery but would deny social and political equality. But the fact that the appeal made good rhetorical sense does not mean that it was formulated on rhetorical grounds. It could just as easily have been incidentally effective as rhetoric, serving a primary function of expressing a real conviction. Or it could have been simultaneously effective both as rhetoric and as personal expression.

The problem here arises from another of those unexamined roles we scholars assign for each other, the ethos assumed by the rhetorical critic. Here we see the world of human communication as one of tactical maneuvers, orchestrated by master wills who oppose each other in various situational games that arise. As we play the meta-rhetorical game, we may allow intention to again reduce--in quite another sense than that described by Megill--the rich field of phenomena that opens itself to potential observation. An assumption of the telos of situations can constrict our views in the microscopic sense, as well as tempt us on the more grand scale of developments across time.

Thus when Lincoln offers some truly preposterous accusations in the early debates, we are reassured that he may have been establishing by contrast the plausibility of later accusations. But it seems more likely that such early rhetorical grotesqueries might have compromised Lincoln's credibility, making his later argumentation less effective--or at least more difficult. And so the earlier arguments, rather than establishing a favorable platform for the later, could perhaps be better classified simply as blunder. Lincoln, after all, may have been human.

My purpose, however, is not to attack Zarefsky's paper, which is a thorough piece of scholarship. I simply wish to caution that as we practice meta-rhetoric with history, and assume simultaneously the specialized role of forensic rhetorician passing judgment on the past, we also remember that rhetoric is selective and to that extent distortive. What we omit may be vital. That is exactly why the cases argue in such rhetoric remain open: such argumentation can never resolve the past beyond doubt or beyond the possibility of new interpretations.

McCloskey's position, at least as outlined in his impressive and broadly cultured "The Rhetoric of Economics," continues themes that are introduced in the Megill paper. Skinner might find another synthesis here especially suspicious, but it is certainly interesting that McCloskey, like Megill, finds his enemy in an obdurate position that proclaims the superiority of a form of knowledge claiming empirical justification. And there is an interesting counterpart in the two papers as well: while Megill's position points, as I have argued, to a realization of the historian's ethos as forensic rhetorician, so McCloskey would point to the economist as deliberative rhetor. His published essay is a critique of the rhetoric of modernism in economics, especially of its god-terms and its unexamined orthodoxy. He suggests that examination of this orthodoxy would imperil its mystery, or even worse, reveal to its adherents their rather unscientific devotion to a mystery. "Economists," McCloskey argues in one of his memorable epigrams, "appear to believe that economics is too important to be left to the open-minded. . ." As his attack intensified, McCloskey parallels Megill's assault upon the Skinnerites: like that confused tribe, modernist economists believe there may be a fixed, unchanging, entire essence "outside" perception but waiting to be discovered by it. Quite perceptively, McCloskey connects the trans-disciplinary battle signalled by this assumption to the ancient dispute between the sophistis and Plato over invented vs. discovered knowledge. And like many of us, McCloskey wonders if there were not some important gleams of recognition, some deeper intuitions of the fate of humans made suddenly responsible for creating their own worlds of being and action, contained within the sophistic rhetoric, only to be buried under the massive flow of Plato's attack.

If we view the economist not as pseudo-scientist but as especially responsible deliberative rhetor, offering considered advice on future policy, then we must develop what Aristotle would have called the *special topoi* of economic argumentation, so that we know both how to generate and how to evaluate the rhetoric peculiar to that field. This vital task of theory-building now awaits McCloskey and those who will be persuaded by his meta-rhetorical critique.

One cautionary note, however: in his enthusiasm over the discovery of the role of rhetoric in his own field, McCloskey is struck initially (and understandably) by the *similarily* of arguments among fields. But this similarity may or may not prove to be the most important feature of the argumentation in economics. It may require further research and activity in theory-building, of the sort I have urged above, to identify the similar and special features of such argument, and the importance of each in the relationship. I would suspect that the similar feature--perhaps the *universal topoi* Aristotle identified--will serve to provide economic argumentation in the general field of archetypol forms of arguemntation. The special topoi should individuate argumentation in economics, and make room for its vital and evolving character.

Finally, I shall comment briefly on the paper presented by Nelson. At first glance, he seems to have discovered the same kind of villain operating in the field of political science: an imperial behavioralism that monompolizes research and that supplants adequate argumentation and that prevents engagement with "actual politics." But Nelson's argument is not with the scientific presuppositions as such, but rather with their abuse in the research of political science. He would transform scientific procedures into tropes that would generate the basis for argument. His approach is that of the reformer rather than the revolutionary.

The thing I do not find in his paper, however, is a probing after first principles, the identity of the field he envisions. Is the very title, "Political Science," an oxymoron that obcures a proper focus upon that field? If so, what *ethos* is imperiled here? If present research is so often sterile and pointless and even thoughtless, what ends and what concepts would Nelson have it pursue through a revived argumentation?

As Nelson himself observes, the very concept, "tropes of argument," needs considerable elaboration beyond what we find here. He may have to consider the relationship between such tropes and the *topoi*, so that we don't risk duplication nor construct unnecessary semantic and conceptual barriers that could prevent the ready application of research across these many new fields that are awakening to the importance of rhetoric in their own research.

It is this general, trans-disciplinary awakening--in the final analysis--that excites me about these papers. Perhaps I am overly optimistic, but we may well be entering a new golden era of development in rhetorical theory. The next several decades should be quite exciting, as fine minds in many disciplines grapple with the problems posed by rhetorical inquiry.

CATEGORIES OF REASONING IN LEGAL ARGUMENT

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Almost twenty-five years after Stephen Toulmin (1958) advanced the idea of fields of argument, scholars in argumentation have generally concluded that the idea has merit. Moreover, we have tentatively suggested what some of those fields might be: law, religion, science, art, ethics, politics, and business. Of these, law has received the most attention and the most confident designation as a field. If argumentative fields are defined as "collections of communicative rules which specify what may be disputed by whom, when, how, where, and to what end," (Gronbeck, 1981, p.15), then law seems clearly to qualify. It is, perhaps, the most highly rule-oriented of human endeavors, and a great many of those rules concern communication. Legal procedures clearly specify what may be disputed, to the extent that the first question asked is whether the issues presented are ones properly within the realm of legal attention. The who, when, how, and where are also closely regulated. The function or purpose of legal argumentation--the resolution of disputes within the context of a system of justice--is also easily identified.

Having reached this point of consensus, however, does not put an end to the research task. In fact, it marks only a beginning. What now remains is the job of identifying the characteristics of argument within the field of law. Rieke (1981-a) suggested that once scholars have done their homework of surveying legal literature and guides to legal practice and judicial behavior, interviewing legal professionals, and generally coming to understand what law is about, they should obtain specimens of legal discourse, devise a descriptive system and apply it to the data.

The purpose of this paper is to report on an examination of a specimen of legal discourse, and report on a descriptive system emerging from an examination of the data. In the discussion that follows, no claim is made that one study of one bit of legal discourse is sufficient to characterize argument in the field of law. We do claim, however, that what follows constitutes a serious first step in such a characterization.

The focal point of this study is the final communication from attorneys to judge or jury in the trial at law. This is the communicative act labeled "argument" by the law. It must be distinguished from other lawyer communications also called argument such as memoranda, briefs, and oral argument before courts of appeal and appellate decisions. The attention in this study is the trial nisi prius--the first judgment on a civil action.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Toulmin's examination of argumentative fields provided the initial basis and justification for recent explorations concerned with establishing criteria and definitions for fields. Toulmin (1958) claimed that disciplines need to reject old systems of explanation and choose new ones based specifically upon the criteria drawn from the shared goals of the scholars of that discipline. Toulmin suggested that although all arguments contain certain universal characteristics, field specific arguments are also composed of particular characteristics unique to the pertinent field. Rieke and Sillars (1975) and Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1979) elaborated upon the notion of fields, providing numerous illustrations of field specific arguments in a variety of argumentative domains.

Rowland (1981) suggested that although Toulmin's explanation of argument fields has utility, it is limited only to a substantive analysis of field dependent arguments. He contended that argument fields can be better understood by identifying the shared purpose(s) of a particular field. Rieke (1981-a) explained that there are numerous theoretical perspectives from which to study argument fields. However, even more importantly, Rieke (1982) emphasized the significance of dispelling any pre-conceived notions congruent with traditional argumentation, in order to generate precise categories of field dependent argument.

Dismissing the problems of defining argument fields, many scholars have proceeded to the study of specific fields. Legal arguments are already considered by some to constitute a specific field, although research in this area has been minimal, and no definitive criteria for legal argument have been established. Dunbar and Cooper recently examined argumentative forms in the trial setting. They suggested that, "[i]mposition of traditional theories of argumentation run the risk of ignoring characteristics of legal argument which are unique to that field and of confirming the theory rather than advancing understanding of the legal controversy under study." (1981, p. 213) Dunbar and Cooper's research not only supports the premise that arguments in the legal setting should be examined in order to validate legal argumentation as a field, it also attempted to generate criteria for the examination of legal argument at the appellate level.

Although there is little research concerned with the discovery of category systems for legal argument, numerous scholars have made contributions toward the development of alternative category systems for general argumentation theory. Marwell and Schmitt (1967) examined sixteen compliance-gaining techniques and discussed their likelihood of usage. Rieke's (1981-b) examination of general adult reasoning offered a preliminary category system which describes the various types of reasoning used in adult discourse. Similarly, Willbrand's (1980) examination of children's discourse generated a category system of argumentative reasoning. Both of these investigations were similar in theoretical perspective, opting for an inductive methodology.

The concept of grounded theory, based on a logic opposite to the traditional hypothetico-deductive approach, has become a useful alternative for generating categories from the data. Glaser and Strauss (1967), principal proponents of this approach, explained that grounded theory functions inductively, with no initial assertion of expected results, other than perhaps vague and general potential expectations. Grounded theory is concerned with formulating categories of data, determining properties of the categories, and inferring hypotheses from those categories and properties. Glaser and Strauss' inductive methodological approach offers a suitable tool for the discovery of categories of legal argument.

Rieke (1981-a) argued the validity of viewing arguments as speech acts, as an alternative method for identifying the rules of argumentation that seem characteristic of law. Speech act theory, developed by Searle (1969), consists of three parts: (1) the proposition, (2) the illocutionary force and (3) the perlocutionary force. Willbrand (1981) explained that the proposition consists of the predicate and the argument, and the illocutionary force of the speech act consists of the speaker's intent. Speech act analysis provides an opportunity to understand the functions of legal reasoning that are found in this specific piece of planned discourse.

METHOD

In order to explore objectively and assess whether any unique characteristics of argument exist within the legal setting, the concept of grounded theory was employed to serve as the theoretical posture which guided this study. A grounded methodological perspective was necessary in order to determine a potentially different category system for argumentation in the law.
The process of a grounded theory methodology allowed the flexibility needed to examine the data free of any pre-conceived category system. Additionally, in order to discern the function of legal argument, the speech act was chosen for the unit of analysis. An examination of the illocutionary forces evident in the discourse sample provided the basis for generating categories of argumentative functions. Because the part of the trial from which our sample came is called "argument," and because lawyers say that they are making an argument, we believe it is fair to conclude that the illocutionary force (intent of the speakers) in the discourse is to argue.

Discourse sample. The selection of the data was based upon two criteria: (1) a typical trial situation, in terms of cause of action, and (2) an ordinary case in terms of content and notoriety.

Thus, we chose a simple product liability tort, *Pasillas v. Frederick Engineering*[1]. Because the trial's major arguments appeared in their most concrete form in the closing statements, only this section of the transcript was analyzed.

Procedure. Eighty-four speech acts were randomly selected from the discourse sample, and initially examined for propositional and illocutionary characteristics. A second examination of the data added further clarity to the initial observations, and provided grounds to formulate a coding manual. The coding manual was designed to offer general definitions and examples of potential categories found in the data, and to provide criteria to guide the third re-coding of the data.

RESULTS

Exploring the potential similarities and differences among the speech acts resulted in the generating of ten categories of legal reasoning, which are offered in the following coding manual. The format of this coding manual presents the labeling of each category, a brief definition of each category, and then offers a few examples of speech acts that are representative of the category. The examples consist of two parts; first, the specific speech act is offered and secondly, a larger sample of the discourse in which the speech act was found is offered.

Legal Reasoning Coding Manual

1. *The Law*.

This category included all lines of reasoning that pertained to the definitive structure of the law and the legal system.

1-1. *Letter of the Law*:

Letter of the law reasoning consisted of the exact wording of the law; describing precisely what is the law and the intended meaning of (the wording of) the law.

Examples:

a) just and adequate compensation for that pain and suffering

Most of all, the law that we are dealing with, the law for the protection of injured people demands and requires that you give him fair, and *just and adequate compensation for that pain and suffering*.

b) and to obtain compensation when they have been injurud as a failure of a defendant

It's a set of consumer laws that have been developed for the protection of the people that come into contact with devices, articles, machines, controls, and it's a set of laws that has been developed over a period of years for the protection of these. . .people, to give them rights in court, to give them a way to redress their grievance, if you will, and to obtain compensation when they have been injured as a failure of a defendant, a person, an entity, a company, to comply with the consumer law that we have established.

1-2. Procedures under the law.

The law explicates specific procedures that apply to any given law or legal situation. Reasoning in this category consisted of propositions addressing the procedures inherent in the law.

Examples:

a) the lawyers are permitted to cross-examine witnesses

Our system of justice has determined that the best way of ascertaining the truth in a controversy is to have an adversary proceeding where in opposing viewpoints are expressed in evidence and in the argument of lawyers with a view of ascertaining the truth because the lawyers are permitted to cross-examine witnesses who take the stand on the other side of the fence, and this is a way of getting at the truth.

b) I am going to outline for you now my burden of proof

I have that responsibility and I am going to outline for you now my burden of proof, go over it with you, discuss the facts, the evidence as it came in, and the law as it applies, so that you can weigh the evidence and evaluate it.

2. Obligation/responsibility to the law.

Obligation/responsibility to the law reasoning included propositions that addressed any given individual's

obligation to be accountable to and fulfill the requirements of the law. This definition also applies to the following subcategories.

2-1. Responsibility under the law.

Reasoning in this category included arguments aimed at establishing what legal requirements apply in what way to the situation under discussion.

Examples:

a) defendant was negligent

That's my burden on strict liability, and if I may, on negligence, it's simply defendant was negligent; the defendant's negligence contributed as a legal cause to a sign -- plaintiff -- injuries in damages.

b) Frederick was not hired in '73 and '74 to install any point of operation guards

And he also testified that of the eleven punch presses in the plant, Frederick was not hired in '73 and '74 to install any point of operation guards and that his state of mind as to such guards and based on his knowledge of O. S. H. A. standards, that was the duty of the employer to install such guards on the machine.

2-2. Obligation to adhere to the law.

Arguments in this category focused on exhortations to individuals or entities to follow the law as it is established.

Examples:

a) you have taken the oath to follow the law

. . . that the failure was a substantial factor, then you have got to give consideration to all the damages that the law allows, and you have taken the oath to follow the law, and the question is what is the nature and extent of the injuries. . .

b) for the purpose of ascertaining and declaring the truth

. . .so that we are here today and have been for this long period of time, ladies and gentlemen, for the purpose of ascertaining and declaring the truth, aren't we?

3. Moral obligation to vigilant information processing.

A juror not only has the obligation to enforce the law, but has a moral obligation to make the proper and just decision about the trial. Reasoning in this category consisted of propositions dealing with the enactment of a moral and just decision. How does the juror process information properly, in order to arrive at a fair decision?

Examples:

a) you are completely impartial

"You are completely impartial, you don't care which side wins the case or which side loses?" and I got a responsive answer to the effect that you did, all of you, have that open mind, that impartiality that we lawyers want in our jurors who decide these cases.

b) ask yourselves whether or not my client exercised reasonable or ordinary care

And so you ask yourselves whether or not the client exercised reasonable or ordinary care, and I submit, in justice, the answer has to be yes for the simple reason. . .

4. Equity.

This category consisted of reasoning concerned with the determination of what is fair and just compensation. Compensation should be appropriate to the given situation.

Examples:

a) I don't think there has been any real impairment of earning capacity in this case

I submit, I don't think there has been any real impairment of earning capacity in this case, as they would have you believe, he voluntarily chose to and apparently at the expense of the state. . .

b) what are you willing to pay Mr. Pasillas for pain?

You are willing to pay all this money for pleasure. What are you willing to pay Mr. Pasillas for pain?

5. Credibility of the evidence.

Reasoning in this category consisted of propositions addressing the evidence offered in the trial.

5-1. Availability of Evidence.

This category included reasoning concerned with the availability and quantity of evidence offered in the opposition's arguments.

Examples:

a) there has been no evidence on either side

At first blush you'd say, "Wait a minute, there has been no evidence on either side. We can't bring in a verdict."

b) who do we have in the way of evidentiary testimony that concerns that?

But what do we know about the dangerous propensity, that concept? First of all, who do we have in the way of evidentiary testimony that concerns that?

5-2. Credibility of the Evidence.

Reasoning in this category consisted of propositions establishing the credibility (or lack of credibility) of the evidence offered in the trial.

Examples:

a) we believe that one person because of the quality of evidence

Yet, one person could come up against those one thousand and give you a 180 degree opinion, view, statement, and you could all agree in unison, "We believe that one person because of the quality of the evidence." That's what you are to weigh, not disregard numbers totally, but to evaluate the quality in those numbers.

b) he tends to stretch the credulity of his testimony

I think I would like to comment for a minute and a half on Professor Schwalje's credibility -- credulity, and that he is professor, he is a licensed engineer; he works for the National Safety Council and he tends to stretch the credulity of his testimony by suggesting that people in the National Safety Council. . .

6. Existence of events.

This category consisted of reasoning by factual claims. Propositions consisted of factually establishing what occured; offering of the facts relevant to the trial.

Examples:

a) we saw that the tips of three fingers are missing

We looked at the hand and we saw that the tips of three fingers are missing in varying degrees. We know he was injured.

b) He used the foot switch operation and used the same die

He used the foot switch operation and used the same die, and the punch press at that time was not equipped with any point of operation guard or guarding device.

7. Obligatory behavior.

This category consisted of propositions addressing a person's obligation to adhere to social values. Societal values are reasoned as pre-empting any written law.

Example:

a) isn't it unjust to saddle somebody with a duty to do something that they can't do anything about?

And if they haven't the power -- if they don't have the power to control something, isn't it unjust to saddle somebody with a duty to do something that they can't do anything about?

b) where does common sense come into this thing?

Well, ask yourself this: really, where does common sense come into this thing?

8. Similarity of Present Instances to Believed Instances.

This category consisted of reasoning that involved analogous instances to add clarity to the audience's comprehension of some other line of reasoning.

Examples:

a) that car has no controls

Now, that car has no controls and of course, that car, as such, is useless as a car. And now can one say that--so now we put on those controls--can one now say that somebody gets drunk and makes use of those cars, to make that car roll at an excessive speed and run into a telephone pole. . .

b) I am reminded of the story of the country lawyer

In that connection I am reminded of the story of the country lawyer who was trying a case in front of a jury and he said. . .

9. Cause.

This category consisted of propositions that addressed a potential causal relationship between some variable and the incidences under discussion.

Examples:

a) this sign or one like it or one similar in import would have prevented this accident

So what they are trying to make you believe is that this sign or one like it or one similar in import would have prevented this accident.

b) that a sign such as this hung on a machine would have been of no value

. . .judging in the light of after events and what Mr. Pasillas did when he went back there and operated the machine, that a sign such as this hung on the machine would have been of no value. . .

10. Non-reasoning.

This category consisted of a compilation of all utterances which are not an attempt at reasoning. Therefore, these speech acts were of no use in determing legal reasoning, and were dismissed into this category of non-reasoning utterances.

Examples:

a) Let's review.

b) Thank you.

Upon the completion of the third coding of the data in accordance with the legal reasoning coding manual, the speech acts were analyzed in order to determine the frequency of the ten proposed categories. This examination unfolded the extensive use of "Obligation to adhere to the law" and "Existence of events". These two types of reasoning were employed more frequently than any of the other eight categories that emerged from the data.

Table 1

Frequency of Legal Reasoning Categories

Categories:		Frequency:
1-1.	Letter of the Law	8
1-2.	Procedures under the law	6
2-1.	Responsibility under the law	7
2-2.	Obligation to adhere to the law	12
3.	Moral obligation to vigilant information processing	6
4.	Equity	5
5-1.	Availability of evidence	3
5-2.	Credibility of evidence	4
6.	Existence of events	18
7.	Obligatory behavior	5
8.	Similarity of present instances to believed instances	2
9.	Cause	3
10.	Non-reasoning	4

Additionally, the data was re-examined to establish the frequency with which each individual attorney used the different categories in his closing arguments. The predominance of usage of the "Obligation to adhere to the law" and "Existence of events" categories were found in the arguments of the defendant's attorney. The plaintiff's attorney relied more heavily upon "The letter of the law" reasoning than did his opponent, and never used "Similarity between present instances and believed instances". With this one exception, both attorneys employed all of the categories of legal reasoning in the oral presentations of their closing arguments.

Table 2

Frequency Differences Between Attorneys

Categories		Plaintiff's Attorneys	Defendant's Attorneys
1-1.	Letter of the law	6	2
1-2.	Procedures under the law	3	3
2-1.	Responsibility under the law	2	5
2-2.	Obligation to adhere to the law	4	8
3.	Moral obligation to vigilant information processing	4	2
4.	Equity	4	1
5-1.	Availability of evidence	1	2
5-2.	Credibility of evidence	2	2
6.	Existence of events	6	12
7.	Obligatory behavior	3	2
8.	Similarity of present instances to believed instances	0	2
9.	Cause	1	2
10.	Non-reasoning	2	2

DISCUSSION

To what extent do the categories of arguments found in the samples examined characterize law as a field of argumentation? We can suggest answers to that question in two ways: first, we can discuss the categories as they characterize the field on their face; and second, we can contrast this array of categories with those found in studies of unplanned reasoned discourse generally.

On its face, the set of categories generated by the data seems to characterize argument in law. The heavy concentration upon categories 1 and 2 illustrates the point. Letter and procedures of the law, and responsibility under the law and obligation to adhere to the law constitute a significant proportion of the reasons advanced.

The third category in which heavy use was observed--#6, existence of events--does not seem to characterize legal argument *per se* as it is likely to be found in other fields such as politics and scholarship. However, the emphasis in law on questions of fact and questions of law would make this finding consistent with expectations. Other categories used, while as we will see are not necessarily exclusive to legal argument, also reveal the legal perspective. The stress upon a moral obligation to vigilant information processing is more or less peculiar to jury behavior. The arguments on equity tend toward points of just and fair compensation, peculiar to civil suits. The remaining categories are less clearly legal on their face, and may show points of similarity with general argumentation.

In contrast with categories of reasoning found in ordinary, unplanned discourse, the legal categories again reveal points of distinction. In the Marwell and Schmitt (1967) study of compliance-gaining techniques, the first factor defined from the list of sixteen techniques--rewarding activity including pre-giving, liking, and promise--does not appear in the behavior of lawyers making closing arguments. The second factor emerging from their study--negative manipulation including threat and aversive stimulation--also does not appear in lawyers' behavior. The third factor--expertise both positive and negative--does have an equivalent behavior in lawyers' argument in our category of credibility of the evidence, but the actual discourse associated with the categories is quite different. Marwell and Schmitt use expertise to refer to arguments addressed to people on the basis of, "If you do or do not comply, you will be rewarded or punished because of 'the nature of things'." (p.357) In contrast, our category of credibility characterizes arguments dealing with the extent to which the person addressed should believe someone else who is giving testimony. Thus, there is a characteristic difference between general and legal argumentation within this factor.

Marwell and Schmitt's fourth and fifth categories, including such techniques as positive and negative self-feelings, altercasting, and esteem, moral appeals, altruism and debt, have equivalence with our category of obligatory behavior. It should be noted, however, that in neither the Marwell and Schmitt study nor in ours do these lines of reasoning constitute a significant portion of the argumentation.

In the Rieke (1981-b) study of unplanned reasoned discourse among adults in supplication, the two most frequently used categories--burden switching and social pressure--do not appear in the behavior of lawyers. Rieke's categories of moral obligation were highly related to the situation he studied, and thus do not reveal points in common with the lawyers with one exception--equity. Rieke found bribes used frequently in unplanned reasoning, and our study does not reveal lawyers using them. The remaining category in the Rieke study with frequent usage--power authority including threats, desire, and law--shows a comparison with the lawyers in only one element: law. There law was invoked with very much the same form as that used by the lawyers in our study.

In conclusion, we can tentatively advance some defining characteristics of legal argumentation. As expected, lawyers argue from the basis of the law with significantly more frequency and intensity than do people in unplanned reasoning. Lawyers typically address arguments to their decision makers involving exhortation to follow prescribed patterns of decision making where those in unplanned discourse are unlikely to do so. Lawyers argue the credibility of evidence in a way rather different from those in unplanned situations.

Lawyers argue about equity and obligatory behavior in a way similar to that used in unplanned reasoning. Their use of category 8, similarity of present instances to believed instances, shows about the same form and frequency as others' use of analogy. More detailed research will be necessary to determine if there are characteristic differences to be found in these categories. Also, further data must be examined to see if the categories themselves remain valid across a variety of legal arguments.

This study has reported on the examination of a specimen of discourse occurring in a civil trial during the closing arguments. Samples of what the lawyers said have been transcribed into speech acts and then categorized on the basis of naturally occurring groups. Comparisons between these categories and those found in unplanned argumentation reveal some distinctive argumentative practices in this aspect of the law. To that extent, they offer a first step in defining law as a field of argument.

Footnotes

[1] *Pasillas v. Frederick Engineering* was selected for this analysis because it satisfied the criteria for a representative sample of courtroom argument. This particular product liability tort involved injuries sustained by a worker while operating a punch press machine. Pasillas lost three fingers in the accident and sued Frederick Engineering, a company that had been contracted to provide safety inspections and maintenance services at the factory where Pasillas was employed.

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RHETORICAL ARGUMENT IN SCIENCE: THE FUNCTION OF PRESUMPTION

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In an impressive essay, relating theory to practice, Thomas Farrell and Thomas Goodnight have recently drawn attention to a study of "the rhetorical crisis." In this case, the particular crisis under investigation was Three Mile Island. However, their definition of rhetorical crisis seems valuable generally: "A rhetorical crisis occurs when discourse fails to fulfill ordinary epistemological or axiological expectations."[1] At another level of discourse, we have a "rhetorical crisis" of our own. One would suspect that, for theories of argument to be of value or to advance knowledge, those theories should fulfill certain expectations. That, for example, theorists of argument should exhibit coherence about the answers to these types of questions:

What is the objective of research?
What methods are appropriate to seek that objective?
What is meant to be explained?
What material is to be examined?
For whom is the theory meant to be an explanation?

Yet such coherence has hardly been the case. Looking at the subject matter of argumentation in 1980, a smorgasbord of inconsistent insights were available. Consider the wide range of approaches represented then with respect to even two of the related philosophical questions: What is meant to be explained by a theory of argument? and What material is to be examined as conducive to pursuing such explanation? For instance, Chaim Perelman deliberately restricted his approach to the methods of proof used in the human sciences, law, and philosophy. Henry Johnstone, Jr., however, examined philosophical argument almost exclusively. Another, Stephen Toulmin, claimed his insights pertained to argument in science, ethics, and law--and he examined the arenas in that order. Then, exploring the problem of rhetorical argument and science, Phillip Wander and Herb Simons focused on social science for the data for their conclusions, while Michael Overington and J. Michael Sproule were just as interested in psychology and sociology for theirs. Finally, still others composed theories of argument based on contemporary American or British public speeches/documents, interpersonal adult speech acts, and small group communication.[2] Of course, none of this is to mention, in our past behavior as theorists of argument, the marked lack of ambidexterity when it comes to coordinating our goals for the philosophy of argument with our interest in debate; harnessing our theoretical speculation with actual practices of argument; and balancing our purpose to describe the types of arguments people use with the purpose to focus on exemplary cases in order to appreciate "good arguments."

And now, in 1983, the "rhetorical argument situation" is hardly different with respect to the problem of incoherence and theory-building.

Lately, (and ironically) this incoherence has largely been produced, rather than resolved, by the question: What is a "field" of argument? Charles Willard has arrived at one perspective on "field" by looking first at the speaker, Ray McKerrow and Thomas Cuodnight each by starting with the audience, Robert Rowland by focusing on purpose, with David Zarefsky doing the comparing, the contrasting, and trying to advise us all.[3] Actually, theorists of argument seem divided in their reactions to the *asking* of the very question about fields: divided, that is, according to those who think the term should be clarified because then it will be so useful; and those who believe they have been using the term for some time, thank you, because its meaning was already clear. Stephen Toulmin knew what he meant by a field of argument: bodies of knowledge as rational enterprises--science, ethics, and law for example. Then arguably, the controversiality of the question about fields--controversial in the asking and in the answering--is but a symptom of deeper conflicts surrounding theory-building in argumentation, such as What is the objective for research? and Where do we start? So, let me suggest a third kind of incoherence in argumentation research, related to the apprehension of "field" as a problem, then propose a remedy and a programme of research along traditional lines of thought familiar to our subject matter--the "rhetoric is epistemic" and the "science is rhetorical" projects.

Suppose that a researcher were to say to you that he/she was interested in pursuing the problem of rhetorical argument and epistemology. And suppose further, that in discussing how this person was to go about their task, you learned that the researcher planned to begin the study by examining arguments in public, political, and personal discourse as well as in practices of knowledge. In such a situation, one might feel obliged to point out to the person that the combination of the objective and the examination was theoretically incoherent. In other words, that in order to construct the desired theory, the person was not looking at the appropriate practices. If one were to amend this little scenario by: (1)striking "the individual person" and inserting "a group of researchers", and (2)substituting "it is the case that. . ." for each "suppose that. . ." the result would be the same as in the first situation--theoretical incoherence. The same result would occur, but at the group level. For example, although Joseph Wenzel, Ray McKerrow, Thomas Goodnight, Stephen Toulmin, (and myself) base their work on the premise that there is an important *difference in kind* between ordinary public argument and epistemics, recent essays by J. Robert Cox, Charles Willard, and James Klumpp indicate that they do not always do so.[4] While, in a category of their own, Thomas Farrell and Thomas Goodnight together seem to be working on a kind of boundary between what Farrell has defined previously as "the technical" and "the social" knowledge spheres.[5] And the result of incoherence is related to the taking of "field" as a primary problem.

By letting go of the "fields are bodies of knowledge" maxim, we have created a situation in which we have trouble holding something constant for research because "virtually anything can be taken as a 'field.'" Charles Willard writes: "It is arguably the case that its diffuse and open-ended nature has been (the field notion's) most attractive feature and that its widespread employment is owed to the fact that it can be made to say virtually anything."[6] Running with that very notion, in his most recent work, Willard does seem to take this view that almost any school of thought--disciplinary or not--*can* be a field: perhaps, one imagines, that would include foundationalism, coherentism, historicism, and realism as well as protectionism, strict constructionism, rhetorical criticism, and pluralism.[7]

The consequence, however, of working on fields in this way, is to blur the distinction between public discourse and the epistemic. On the other hand, by taking bodies of knowledge as normative frameworks for doing a study of comparative applied epistemics--for comparing different strategies of argument in the production of knowledge--the consequence is to distinguish between that which is public and political from that which is epistemic. Such a distinction respects that the problem of rhetorical argument and epistemology is *one* major problem in the theory of argument, while "the public" presents another important, and overlapping, but in some senses separate problem. Relationships between the two problems will surely emerge, but to put them in the same bag of discourse, without distinction, from the start will not help us understand those relationships.[8] Clearly, there must be theories of argument to explain both "the public" and "the epistemic", but probably not one epistemic theory which explains both well. In other words, I am saying that if rhetorical argument is to have something to do with the new epistemology (which is replacing, or beginning to replace, in many circles, the standard *philosophical* accounts), it cannot also solve the problem of the public with the same blow. Given the objective to influence contemporary epistemology, the appropriate practices to examine for theory-building are bodies of knowledge that can be reliably coded as knowledges.

Based on the foregoing considerations, I would suggest the following "modest proposal" to help direct future inquiry in argumentation. First, we should distinguish the argument practices which serve as the material for theories of argument according to practices which are accountable to their own body of knowledge, those which are accountable to other bodies of knowledge, and those which are primarily accountable to the public. The set of distinctions directly corresponds to three sites for doing the research of argumentation, and offers a guiding interest which precedes decision-making about what is, or is not, a field. It may be taken for granted that theorists and critics of argument are in agreement that a study of rationality presupposes that the researcher study argument at a time when the assumptions of discourse have been contested and are therefore accessible for analysis. Thus, the three research sites are: during the "revolution" of a body of knowledge (what I would call intra-field crisis), in the dispute among bodies of knowledge (what I would call inter-field crisis), or during a "rhetorical crisis."[9] In proposing the above distinctions and research sites, I am supporting the claim that our primary interest as argument scholars should be to study argument practices during a legitimation crisis, and let the senses of "fields" fall where they may. To put the "fieldwork"--the cultivation--before the speculation, if there were more actual studies of change in legitimation crises, we might find that the pooling of the results squared more with each other than with our individual speculations.

This July marks four years since Bruce Gronbeck's synthesis of some of the available research in argument, "From Argument to Argumentation: Fifteen Years of Identity Crisis."[10] Yet, surprisingly, even to this day, no one has written the obvious in the theory of argument: Why is argumentation a subject unto itself? In large part, the lamentable theoretical situation is due to a lack of attention toward specifying the philosophical and methodological grounds for argument as a study separate from other rhetorical studies. We have assumed that "argument" is within, yet different from, "rhetoric" but have not always acted as if we know why.

In the essay to follow, I plan to show the advances in argument that can be made when one attempts to put together two research programmes--the "rhetorical argument is epistemic" and the "scientific argument is rhetorical"--and pursue the consequences. By stating the problem guiding my purpose, the fundamental aim, the stance, and the definitions of my key terms, I hope to be an advocate of one particular approach advancing research in argument. My approach differs from previous others, though, by the *way* in which it makes *rhetoric* central--not sociology, not psychology, and not even communication research; and by the way in which it subsumes "argument" under "rhetoric." To unpack the semiotic of my essay's title is to interpret the pivotal joints of the essay which follows. By the end of the evolution of the essay, it ought to be clear where I stand on the meaning of the terms "rhetoric," "argument," "the rhetoric of science," "function," and the relationship of "presumption" to all of these. I will contend that anyone who takes up a programme such as I outline will indeed help theorists of argument discover what is rhetorical, yet special, about argument.

"Rhetoric is Epistemic"

Is presumption unique to rhetorical argument? Yes, and no. The answer is "no," since a study of presumption in *both* the disciplines of rhetoric and philosophy (especially the philosophy of science) indicates that one's view about the location of presumption is an index to one's epistemology. Roderick Chisholm, for example, a famous philosopher of epistemology, distinguishes several different epistemic levels that propositions which bear the property "epistemically justified" may occupy, and places "presumption" at the lowest possible epistemic level of all.[11] Thus, the rankings for the attribute "epistemically justified" descend in this order: being certain, being evident, being beyond reasonable doubt, acceptability, and having some presumption in its favor. In Chisholm's view, to say that a claim to knowledge "has some presumption in its favor" just means that it is *more reasonable* to attribute the property "epistemically justified" to a proposition than to its negation. But to understand Chisholm's epistemology is to understand that, for him, "having some presumption in its favor" is such a weak description of a belief (notice how he ranks presumption below acceptability) that the person who holds the belief would be better off, epistemically, to withhold belief in the proposition *or* its negation until further evidence.

Another philosopher, Richard Foley, in a recent attack on the school of thought in contemporary epistemology, "epistemic conservatism," revealed his views about presumption at the same time that he defended his approach to the relationship of rationality and knowledge.[12]

According to Foley, if "epistemic conservatism" means that anything we find ourselves believing may be said to have some presumption in its favor, then "epistemic liberalism" means that every proposition which a person believes, whatever it is, is such that its negation has a presumption of rationality for the person. Further, argues Foley, epistemically, a "middle-of-the-roader" is neither conservative nor liberal: he/she finds it as rational to prefer the hypothesis which requires the least change in his/her beliefs as it is to prefer the hypothesis that requires the most change. To summarize, hardly anyone has ever held the view of "epistemic liberalism"; W.V.O. Quine and Gilber Harmon think it best to be "lazy", epistemically, with respect to altering one's beliefs; but actually, concludes Richard Foley, "epistemic conservatism" and "epistemic liberalism" both are equally arbitrary.

Given this brief introduction to the location of presumption within a philosophical epistemology, one already can compare the perspective of Chisholm, Foley, and arguably many other philosophers trained to be worth their salt, to the perspective on presumption within a rhetorical epistemology by someone trained to be a rhetorician. A major issue distinguishing the perspectives on presumption amounts to the following. A standard, philosophical epistemology is likely to dismiss presumption from epistemic status because, while presumption *appears* to have a rational *function*, no one can identify its rational *source* (or foundation). Foley's comment that, ". . .every proposition which a person believes, *whatever it is*, is such that (it) has a presumption of rationality for the person," highlights the difference to which I have pointed. Due to the "principle of inferential justification" adhered to in philosophical discourse, for philosophical reasons, a philosopher generally cannot accept a belief as justified, "whatever it is." The principle reads:

> To be justified in believing a proposition p on the basis of a proposition e; one first must be justified in belief e, and second, justified in believing their connection--i.e. believing e means that p is likely to be true.

According to this principle, unless one supposes there are some foundational beliefs, then one has no reason to believe anything. Philosophers, throughout history, have disputed the question whether particular sense perceptions (or some form of analytic proposition), can be taken as certain, and thus the basis of reasoning.

From a rhetorical perspective, however, the principle of inferential justification is read not as a statement about the source of presumption, but about its function. Seen in the principle is the formulation of a way to assume some belief as a starting point, allow it to lead one to believe further beliefs, and to let these further beliefs be judged by the test arguments receive in practice, through time. Unless one assumes some beliefs, one has no reason to believe anything--this would amount to complete doubt--but, we have to start somewhere.[13] Bracketing the quest for certainty, a rhetorical epistemology leads to an analysis of how knowledge rationally grows. Rather than neglecting its function because he/she cannot explain its source, the rhetorician is free to study how presumption operates in a given period of history, in one practice as compared to others. Chaim Perelman best expresses our attention to function, our inattention to source:

> The existence of the connection between presumptions and what is normal is itself a general presumption. Until there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the normal can safely be taken as a foundation in reasoning.[14]

Distinctly rhetorical is the perspective that adequacy of argument is relative to audience. And so with knowledge. Knowledge does not begin on the foundation of nearly certain beliefs, but as we move forward in the progress of a practice, our sources of agreement become stable and *act as* foundations for belief. Thus, the rhetorical conception of presumption is an index to an epistemology--call it rhetorical foundationalism.

Obviously, then, to speak of presumption from the standpoint of a theorist of knowledge is not unique to the rhetorical tradition. However, that rhetoricians can speak highly of presumption, and use the concept to understand the relationship of rationality to the acquisition of knowledge, is unique. My particular concern in this paper is to investigate whether presumption ("epistemic conservatism"), while dismissed in major philosophical *theories* of knowledge and rationality, serves an actual, central function in the *practice* of scientific argument. In the competition of two or more scientific theories/hypotheses--sometimes other things being equal, or equally indeterminate--if one theory/hypothesis is chosen on the ground that it conserves the present beliefs of a scientific audience better, then the ground for decision-making is presumption. An examination of the literature on science from diverse angles led me to focus on this particular concern described above as worthy of investigation.

So given the views which I have developed in the argument so far, these are the research questions which seem interesting for the study of rhetorical argument in science:

> (1)What is the relationship of presumption and change to invention and judgment in a particular body of knowledge (in this case a science)? Is a theory of persistence in belief required to explain motives for acceptable judgment, but not to explain plausible invention?
>
> (2)How does presumption (in the sense of an epistemic value for "conservatism") interact with other grounds for decision-making, i.e. with "simplicity," "fruitfulness," "fittingness," "extensibility," "empirical confirmation," and the like?
>
> (3)If presumption is discovered to be fundamental to scientific theory construction, then doesn't science, as a body of knowledge, make "judgments" rather than "justifications" or "conclusions"?

I take a justification or a conclusion to be a premise which is accepted, subject to future rejection by contrary evidence and argument. But a judgment is more inclusive: a judgment can have an expressive and injunctive function and link acceptance of a belief with future consequences. Scientists who are epistemically conservative would encourage the maintenance of present judgments by implicitly arguing: "We cannot agree to believe in theory X; X conflicts with some other theory(ies) which we already have agreed upon in order to acquire knowledge." In *saying* so, the scientists would perform an *action*: they would *express* respect for the established foundations for doing science and *command* conclusions to conform to them. Because, after all, to entertain theory X is to accept the possibility that they might have to redo the accumulated body of knowledge. As for invention, I take it to bear a dialectical relationship with judgment. The individual scientist who invents an hypothesis which competes, in a relevant way, with the current foundations for belief reacts against the group judgment with a kind of presumptuousness: "We must believe in the worthiness of my hypothesis X; even though I cannot prove the hypothesis entirely, the world just *has* to be this way." Implicitly, as with a judgment, a competitive claim invented by the scientist links acceptance of a belief with future consequences. As a consequence of accepting his/her proposal, the person suggests that knowledge will be gained. Can this tension of the implicit dialogue between inventors who believe themselves to be expanding knowledge, and judges who believe themselves to be maintaining knowledge and avoiding error, explain the growth of scientific knowledge? My theory of presumption is designed to accommodate these questions.

So far, I have argued that, given the state of contemporary epistemology, research in argumentation must start with *the* study of knowledge, *then* see what follows about argument; and *not* start with an examination of any and all practices of argument to see what follows about the study of knowledge. Now, I am also endorsing a related point, which shall be framed, for a time, as a question: If we begin research in argumentation with *a* kind of knowledge to investigate, what follows about argument? In other words, considering the epistemic objective for research in argumentation, what material should be examined? If the theory of argumentation is not to be self-contained, but is to influence some body of theory or some practice outside itself--including contemporary philosophy--then scientific argument is an important material to be examined.

"Science is Rhetorical"

My fundamental aim, within the context of the larger problem of a rhetorical theory of the acquisition of knowledge, is to consider how far, and in what way, we can say that a science sustains itself through rhetorical argument. In addition to the reason that a scientific practice represents a clear case of a body of knowledge, there are several other advantages to examining its material worth considering. First, it has been widely presumed by the academic and the popular audience, that sciences in general, and natural sciences in particular, have "better epistemic credentials" than most other bodies of knowledge.[15] As a consequence, there is no question but that a rhetorical theory of scientific argument which succeeds could, by implication, say something useful about knowledge. And the matter of *to whom* we could be saying this is potentially a very rewarding one. By now, hopefully it is clear that I perceive the three questions--What is the objective of research? What material is to be examined? and For whom is the theory meant to be an explanation?--as twining one with another. So secondly, let us consider the advantages of focusing on science with an eye to the minds we might be capable of influencing to adopt or appreciate a rhetorical perspective.

"Rhetoric is epistemic" may surely be a cliché in the summer of 1983, in the safe company of fellow rhetoricians. But in the vast and growing corpus of works about science, one is much more likely to encounter the views that: "Rhetoric is figures of speech and amplification;" "Rhetoric is flourish and trickery;" and "Rhetoric is one thing, substance another." In the broader company of fellow students of science, one could state, in short (and less painfully) that "Rhetoric is extra-scientific."[16] Of course, by defining "rhetoric" as "manipulation" or "extravagant speech," other students of science can routinely rule rhetoric out of its substantive claims. Yet to us, this state of affairs should offer a challenge: to show that like the philosophy of science, history of science, sociology of science, and psychology of science there exists a legitimate rhetoric of science. And this rhetoric of science is a species of the genus meta-science like the others, but differing in perspective and circumference. Choosing science as an arena for continued research in argumentation has the advantage of influencing something outside argumentation, because the focus is on a thoroughly investigated practice, not speculation as an end in itself. And yet indirectly, (as it should be) one of the perceived meanings we may influence could be our own--the meaning of "rhetoric." By the year 1990, there may be as many people writing about science as there are now writing about metaphor. The opportunity to create genuine dialogue about rhetorical argument seems too good to pass up in this and other ways.

A third advantage of attending to scientific argument as the material for rhetorical investigation is the opportunity to examine intrafield "revolutions" in thought, interfield dispuces (amongst the philosophy, history, sociology, psychology, rhetoric, and science of science), and "rhetorical crises" from within the same domain. Choosing science as an arena for study is also conducive to the making of claims about science and ideology, as well as about the scientific argument for scientists/public scientific argument distinction. Any of these studies would ground speculation in practice and allow students of argumentation to collect results then reason collectively, by induction, about how people can and do argue.

Based on a survey of articles on the subject of science over a three year period--articles natural and social scientific, philosophical, historical, sociological, and rhetorical--I arrived at the following three justifiable propositions about scientific argument:

1.According to both the academic and the popular audience, for *some* methodological reasons, natural science is epistemically outstanding compared to other arenas of knowledge.

2.Theories constructed and judged acceptable in natural science are *underdetermined* by relevant facts. The physical world exerts constraint upon, but does not uniquely determine, the conclusions of either scientific invention or judgment. To invent or accept hypotheses/theories, scientists rely on empirical facts, analytic statements, and also propositions which can neither be

> reduced to, nor derived from, empirical facts or analytic statements. . . .It is the growth of knowledge and the procedure by which growth takes place which contributes to the rationality of natural science, not knowledge of itself (as a property).[17]

One undoubtedly can get the best vision of my rhetorical perspective on scientific argument through grasping the linkage of the three propositions. Initially, the whole--the relationships of all three propositions--is best viewed by looking first at the second part: Theories and hypotheses are underdetermined by relevant, empirical facts. While it is rather noncontroversial, for a number of audiences, to say simply that theories/hypotheses *are* underdetermined by their relevant facts; it would be controversial, or "news" to use that principle, in conjunction with the other two principles, as a springboard to the rhetorical theory of presumption to follow here.

In an abbreviated way, let us consider some of the scholarship which led me to believe that "theories/hypotheses are underdetermined by the facts" is a widely agreed upon principle, but that there exists much disagreement about the meaning of this for scientific argument. In a clear explanation of both the problem and their solution, John Woods and Douglas Walton link the exercise of expertise to the underdetermination principle:

> Appeals to authority focus squarely upon the expertise of the authority; they require an exercise of that expertise. As good as an example as any of how this expertise may be exercised is this: any scientific theory worth its salt is underdetermined by the relevant data. . . .How then, should conflicts among rival analytical hypotheses be adjudicated? Not, certainly, by appeal to direct evidence, by appeal to the data. One aspect of the adjudication procedure no doubt involves considerations of simplicity, coherence with neighboring theories, and the like. . . .there is always a kind of "leap of faith," for which we do, and are right to, turn to the theorist's mere sense of what is fitting and fruitful.[18]

Woods and Walton express well what many others agree to: the strength of a preferred scientific theory is not completely dependent upon the strength of its observations. According to the framework that I have established for the study of scientific argument, "leaps of faith for which we have a right to turn" in "theory adjudication" such as "simplicity," "coherence with neighboring theories," "fittingness," and "fruitfulness" are presumptions. Consider first, however, the views of Carl Kordig and Helen Longino on the same subject of "plausibility criteria" in reasoning as an avenue for understanding how my approach is different from others.

From my reading, Carl Kordig seems to take one of the more unique positions on the role of "plausibility criteria" in reasoning when he argues that there are rational criteria, "regulative aims," for deciding the plausibility of competing theories and that these are "good reasons" *independent* of the specific theories that scientists hold or the particular beliefs that they have:

> Good reasons are relevant to both plausibility and acceptability. They support acceptability. Prior to experimental test, they also support plausibility. Margenau and myself have discussed the following good reasons: empirical confirmation, logical fertility, extensibility, multiple connection, simplicity, and causality. Other good reasons need not, and usually do not, change when scientific theories change. They define regulative standards of excellence. . . .Successful scientific theories further the regulative aims of science.[19]

Thus, for Kordig, if one theory furthers "the regulative aims of science" better than its competitor, the first theory would be more acceptable (also, during the invention phase, the first theory would be more plausible).

But Carl Kordig is mistaken, I think, when he argues that "empirical confirmation," "logical fertility," "extensibility," "multiple connection," "causality," and "simplicity," are regulative aims in scientific argument--"good reasons" for judgment--*independent* of any particular scientific theory. The regulative aims he cites are methodological criteria for what must operate as good reasons, but these criteria sometimes emerge from particular beliefs about the world which cause them to count differently according to the subtance and strength of the particular theory under investigation in a problem-situation. Some methodological criteria are just more relevant to a situation than others. And debates over the *relevance* of criteria suggest one important sense in which different theories can be said to compete. Indeed, on an even larger scale, some methodological criteria are more relevant to one practice of knowledge than to another.

Compare Carl Kordig's position on "good reasons" to that of Helen Longino. In "Evidence and Hypotheses: An Analysis of Evidential Relations," Helen Longino defends the thesis that there is a "basing relation" between hypotheses and evidence such that what constitutes "evidence" for a researcher depends upon his/her "background beliefs" or assumptions.[20] In other words, given appropriately differing "background beliefs" (i.e. the "backgrounds" differ in a relevant way), the same state of affairs can be taken as evidence for different and conflicting hypotheses. If the foregoing statement is correct, then changes in "background beliefs" will result in changes in the status of evidence: a context of beliefs determines what counts as evidence. Consequently, in Longino's view, (a view with which I am sympathetic), parties to a dispute may infer conflicting hypotheses from a set of facts and yet be equally "rational." "It is rational to take some state of affairs as evidence for an hypothesis in light of background assumptions one accepts," argues Longino.

Reflections upon the implications of Longino's perspective raise at least two pertinent questions: What legitimates the acceptance of some "background beliefs" instead of others for an inventing scientist? and What sort of *criteria* are *relevant* for judging between different or competing sets of "background beliefs" in any given case? I agree that beyond scientific observation is some set of "background beliefs" in light of which some state of affairs counts as "evidence"; but to me, Helen Longino and Carl Kordig each has explained only half of the story. The rest of the story must make sense out of the following conjunction: Theories are not merely inferred from an objective set of data, but there must be some appellate standards in a situation for deciding the plausibility of competing theories. Longino recognizes the same epistemological stance as I do, but lacks a set of good reasons which applies across situations of theory-choice. Arguably, it is from such reasons that criteria of *relevance* to a particular situation are picked.

It should be obvious, at this point, that what I have observed others to discuss as "plausibility criteria," "regulative aims," or "background beliefs," not to mention "auxiliary statements," "themata," or "methodological criteria" in science, shall, from my perspective, benefit from being synthesized into a rhetorical concept--presumption. I submit that the key problem to explain--and an especially rhetorical one--on the intersection of argument and science, is this: *What basic beliefs serve as the grounds for judging the acceptance of other beliefs in science?* And a theory of presumption provides the solution. Still, two tasks remain before the method of presumption can be unraveled. One prior task is to show the connections among the three propositions describing scientific argument. A second preface is to connect the emphasis on presumption with my epistemology. Fortunately, the sets of connections are themselves connected and can be explained in this way.

If one grants the premise of underdetermination (as many scholars of science tend to do); yet rejects philosophical standards for knowledge (as the rhetorician does)--for instance, having the properties "epistemically justified" and "true"; then it is plausible to consider that it is the *growth* of knowledge, and the *process* by which growth takes place, that developes the rationality of natural science's[20] knowledge of itself. Hermeneutically speaking, the rationality of science is possibly realized in the very process of acquiring it. Upon reflection, after a journey in the scientific literature, I have returned to a single sentence of Stephen Toulmin's which clearly influenced me some time ago: "A man demonstrates his rationality, not by a commitment to fixed ideas, stereotyped procedures, or immutable concepts, but by the manner in which, and the occasions on which, he changes those ideas, procedures, or concepts."[21] In other words, I am studying the changing preference for procedures of "doing science" within a body of knowledge as a process of argument and judgment. Of course, it goes without saying that the particular focus of my study is the so-called scientific "revolution." For during these periods, the very authority of the underlying beliefs and commitments of a community are called into question. At such times, the question, "What is good science?" is not strictly an empirically answerable question.

The underdetermination of theory by evidence necessitates the reliance in theory-building and adjudication upon "background knowledge" as well as accumulated observations (so propositions two and three are closely related). Since what counts as "evidence" for a researcher depends on his/her "background beliefs" or assumptions, when the "backgrounds" of several researchers conflict in relevant ways, the competition is over opposing conceptions of what it means to "do science," "to procede," or really "to know." "Background knowledge," what I would classify as "acceptable foundations", control the theories built and the progress allowed in a scientific practice. Furthermore, the so-called "safe" progress of growth in knowledge through building upon past acceptable foundations apparently is manifested to a greater degree in natural science than in any other body of knowledge, distinguishing it, in part, from the humanities.

In stating the preceding views, I am committed to the statement, also, that it is appropriate to label accepted beliefs as knowledge if the claims actually function as a constraint on the subsequent development of ideas in an arena. Although, rhetorically, constraints function to control opportunities for thought as well.

Given the intersection of the two positions "rhetoric is epistemic" and "science is rhetorical", it seems promising to investigate the function of presumption in scientific argument. Or, in other words, given the objective for research, the material to be examined, and the people I want to be talking to, now what method is appropriate?

The Function of Presumption

In the recent past, several rhetoricians have tried to invoke such things as ethical standards, "presence," metaphor, and variations on the stasis doctrine to account for the relationship between "social reality" and knowledge. In this section of the essay, I show the importance of a renewed understanding of presumption. To move toward a rhetorical theory of the acquisition of knowledge in science, then, I have located two, competing senses of presumption--one inventional, one justificatory, the two dialectical--and defined them accordingly with respect to position in the community of arguers and type of inference.

The first, "social" sense of presumption shall be called grounded presumption, and can be defined in the following way:

> Grounded presumption is the position that an operative inference occupies in a community when the inference is generally accepted as justified.

The definition of a grounded presumption refers to an *inference* that has acquired a *position* of legitimacy in a community. Grounded wires are intentionally connected to a reference point, which may be earth (hence the term "ground") to protect users from shock, the equipment from spurious, unwanted impulses, and to produce accurate information signals. The position of grounded presumption might protect the community from shocking, spurious, and unwanted impulses, too.

In contrast, the "individual" sense of presumption shall be called live presumption, and is defined in this way:

> Live presumption is the position of an invented inference, provisionally treated as though it were justified, which inference is reasonable to an advocate even though it remains an open question whether generally accepted judgment is forthcoming.

A live presumption refers to an *inference* which an advocate *supposes* to be justified. In fact, his/her invention would be incomplete without some such supposition taken on probation. The position of the inference, though, is such that it lacks authority: it has not acquired legitimacy for the community. Just as a live wire is relative to a grounded wire in its system, so too, a live presumption is relative to the grounded presumption--a live presumption *could*, ultimately, be grounded.

Space will not permit the complete analysis here of my case study of the so-called Darwinian "revolution", together with its necessary context, with an eye to exemplifying the two concepts, grounded presumption and live presumption, and their dialectical competition. This analysis is provided in a longer work.[22] Instead, I hope the present, abbreviated treatment will make the concepts more meaningful for our purposes here. Suppose that during any given episode of scientific progress, a person could attend to particular grounded presumptions which constrained the judgment of knowledge and the opportunity for acquiring further knowledge. From my study of scientific argument, I would argue that when the body of knowledge is natural science, these may be featured as grounded presumptions when they are relevant to inference-making in a problem-situation: simplicity, elegance, symmetry, unity, harmony, order, coherence with neighboring theories, intelligibility, beauty, fruitfulness, extensibility, and range of problem-solving. Perhaps there may be a few other important grounded presumptions in natural science, but even the ones listed above can appear in various indirect forms.

Grounded presumptions are not directly values of nature, but are values of natural knowledge.[23] Each can function to make an inference that carries the praise of a claim to knowledge. Acceptable judgment for a particular time means that one scientist rationally persuades his/her group on the basis of these types of methodological virtues for the doing of science. So that, for methodological reasons, for a period it is "unscientific" or "poor science" not to let certain ones rule. A scientific audience can maintain the status of "knowledge" for what they already claim to know by judging acceptable only those theories with virtues of, e.g. harmony, simplicity, and order. Recall the consequence to which such audiences implicitly appeal: "We can't believe in new hypothesis X; accepting X would alter what we have already agreed upon in order to acquire knowledge." So, for example, a new hypothesis could be rejected for a time on the basis that it did not maintain the present science, as it was constituted to be an underlying search for harmony, simplicity, and order in the universe. Recall, too, that I earlier noted how Chaim Perelman associated presumption with "the normal" or "the likely": "The existence of the connection between presumption and what is normal is itself a general presumption. Until there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the normal can safely be taken as a foundation in reasoning."[24] Instead of the association with the normal, although retaining the notion of foundation, I am suggesting that a better place to locate presumption--especially when grounded presumptions are compared to live presumptions--is in the category of norms which are *virtues* for acquiring knowledge within a practice. Grounded presumptions are foundational positions which receive *epistemic praise* in their community. *What impels the behavior of those persons to whom a grounded presumption is addressed in scientific argument is the assumption that any competent scientist would adhere to them*. Grounded presumptions receive epistemic praise, then, in large part because they offer needed but *trusted* algorithms--recurring foundational beliefs for solving problems of knowledge in a practice.

If grounded presumptions receive epistemic praise in scientific reasoning, live presumptions absorb epistemic blame. In the case of the "individual" use of presumption, an arguer makes an *a priori* commitment to a premise in order to reach a conclusion he/she thinks deserves attention. Several studies of science document that Isaac Newton, Johannes Kepler, Niels Bohr, Albert Einstein, and Noam Chompsky made such *a priori* commitments, and that later acceptance of their suppositions became unavoidable for scientific thought.[25] And for every student of science who comments that, "wanton speculation" is seriously discouraged in science, another student of science is sure to remind us that the history of science shows that "wanton speculation" frequently has "paid off."[26]

The function of a live presumption can be seen in an inference of this form:

The surprising fact, c, is observed;

But if a were true, c would be a matter of course,

Hence, there is reason to suspect that a is true.

The premise which makes this inference inventive is the second premise. When a scientist assumes for the sake of his/her argument that he/she is justified in provisionally treating the connection between a and c AS IF it were a worthy belief in order to explain c, this is a live presumption. Live presumption makes the "abductive" inference above work.

According to Charles Peirce, "abduction" is a case of synthetic inference in which we find some very curious circumstance , which would be explained by the supposition that it was the case of a certain general rule, and thereupon adopt that supposition.[27] In my view, it is more productive to specifically classify the "supposition" in abductive reasoning as live presumption in order to show the tension between individual invention and group judgment through the function of presumption.

To conclude this part of the discussion on the two senses of presumption, from my viewpoint, the "social" sense of presumption has primary influence in scientific argument, while the "individual" sense of presumption is secondary to it. A live presumption will only receive *epistemic praise* if it becomes grounded, that is, if it becomes a grounded presumption. In a fascinating article, "Genius in Science," Joseph Agassi has expressed a viewpoint similar to mine: one's stance on the study of scientific argument must start with the society, not the individual member of it. A "rebel" to the consensus, he implies, can only transcend the foundation if he enhances it:

> There are two strong reasons why the young rebel must be so outstanding. First, his excellence resolves the conflict between the conservative and the progressive within the romantic philosophy: the rebel is a progressive force (but) there will be no widespread attempt to emulate him. . . .the greatest majority are followers and only a few can be leaders. Second, only the most excellent can trans-

> cend the tradition, yet thereby enrich it rather than destoy it.[28]

By the criterion of the "new tradition", says Agassi, the "rebel" who has founded the tradition is a "hero." My conclusion is similar: that the rebel inventor is considered a hero only by the criterion of the "new" tradition indicates the priority of the community's standards for the acquisition of knowledge. In contrast to the grounded presumptions are the live presumptions which compete with them--the "antinomials" which bear epistemic blame until such time as a "revolution" occurs.

I have considered the two senses of presumption separately, and in order of priority. To end this final section of the paper, I will comment on their dialectical tension. For the tension between grounded presumption and live presumption explains their function in scientific argument better than could the simple dominance of grounded presumption alone. Both Richard Whately and Charles Peirce sometimes spoke of presumption as possessing a "weight" that could not be resisted in argument without difficulty. Though the metaphor makes sense, and is vivid, I have discovered another way to express the advantage presumption often holds which makes sense, is vivid, and which illuminates the kind of tension that I perceive to exist between the two types of presumptions.

Recently, J.F.M. Hunter, discussing "rational persuasion" for the purpose of understanding "good arguments to moral questions," used the concept of "traction" to express what is meant by the rationality of a strategy of persuasion. Independent of his particular concern for moral, rational argument, Hunter's notion of "traction" is appropriate to describe the tension between the two senses of presumption and the rationality of that competition. He writes:

> When an argument has "traction" it does not normally establish something. It might be likened to a magnetic force: it exerts a real tug, but whether anything actually yields depends on whether contervailing forces exist or can be set up. To pursue that analogy further, some such contervailing forces, while they may prevent a shift occurring in a given direction, may not result in there being no shift at all; and sometimes the forces needed to resist a given thrust themselves affect the complexion of things to produce a result less acceptable than what would have prevailed had the initial force been allowed its natural sway.[29]

Two points that Hunter makes about rationality and "traction" apply not only to moral argument but also to rational scientific argument. First, by describing "traction" in the manner that he does, Hunter does not mean anything like "for every argument there is an equal and weighty counter-argument." Rather, I take it that he means something more akin to "there is no such thing as an argument in isolation." The key phrase in the passage is, to paraphrase: whether anything yields from argument depends on whether countervailing forces exist or can be set up. In comparison, I am suggesting that, although the social sense of presumption has priority over the individual sense, the rhetorical concept of presumption is most fruitful for study when we recognize the tension created between presumption and its counter-presumption

as a kind of traction.

For a second point Hunter raises which is applicable to my stance on presumption, rationality, and epistemology, notice how he distinguishes "traction" from both the philosopher's logic and the psychologist's interest in mind. He writes:

> Not many of the arguments that are ever acutally deployed, either in philosophy or elsewhere, are presented in anything like any of the forms dear to logicians; but their informality does not prevent the arguments we mostly use from having what we might call 'traction': from being such that their introduction into our deliberations materially alters the complexion of a problem, independently of the tastes, idiosyncrasies, or other attributes of the particular persons involved.[30]

Clearly, from this passage together with the rest of the essay, one can see that Hunter finds the philosopher's standards of "logic" too restrictive for the study of rational argument as it is used. Clear, also, is his view that rationality has to do with how arguments affect a problem, not how arguments work in someone's m[illegible]. Though the author does not expressly say so, arguably, he seems to implicitly support the notion that the framework for rational argument--as it is used and as it should be studied--is the language game.

I have drawn attention to the passages by J.F.M. Hunter because they emphasize conclusions similar to the ones I have desired to present. In a non-philosophical, non-psychological way, rationality seems to involve the changing preference for concepts and procedures for the doing of science. And presumption is an important notion related to rationality because conceptual attention, traditional beliefs, and presuppositions adhered to in arguments affect the possibility for change or the understanding of different communities, positions, and arguers. Presumptions affect how arguers interpret and investigate the conditions for the possibility of thinking "otherwise" than an audience already believes. In sum, rhetorical presumption has to do with substance and procedure in argument, audience attitude toward change in belief, and can help us explain rationality itself as a changing process. Further, although the point cannot be developed in the present essay, I have discovered the underlying principles of language change which are presupposed by my method of presumption. It can be shown that language use changes according to two complementary principles of semiotics. Once that were done, a theory of language could explain the resistance to change, or change yielded, when presumptions compete. For now, I wish to say only that within the unique grasp of the rhetorician lies the ability to illuminate the relationship between knowledge claims about the external world, the reasoning process, and the semiotic mediating systems of scientists as participants in a language game.

Conclusion

Just as it has taken the length of this essay to create understanding for the semiotic of my title, so, too, it would take the length of another essay to fully unpack my method of presumption as semiotic. What this essay has sought to establish about my stance, however, should already serve to distinguish my method of presumption from any other. My objective has been to say something about the relationship of argument to the study of knowledge; the material I have meant to draw continued attention to for examination is scientific knowledge; and I have intended to explain the function of presumption, and the unique perspectives of "argument" and "rhetoric" for potentially three different audiences: contemporary epistemologists who seek researchers not committed to the justificationism of traditional philosophy, the various students of scientific argument in disciplines other than rhetoric, and students of rhetorical argument. In addition, since any theory of argument presupposes a theory of language, the semiotic underlying the dialectically related senses of presumption would cohere with the previous claims by emphasizing the social sense of presumption (grounded presumption) over the individual sense as primary is to secondary; by showing the dialectical relationship between convention and intention in the production of argument; and by including a place in the theory for invention. Finally, to take a semiotic perspective is to depsychologize the study of argument.

Given this stance, then, on the subjects of rhetoric, argument, epistemics, and science, perhaps the thing theorists of argument might agree on is to take "first things first." Of course, one does not have to take my first things first. At the least, I ask that we would do one of these things first: study an argument practice when assumptions of argument are pressed--either within a body of knowledge, between bodies of knowledge, or in rhetorical crises. Then perhaps together we can make inductive conclusions, uniting theory and practice, from the results that we find in practice. In other words, as argument theorists, critics, and practitioners, we should worry more about the "practice" in "theory and practice." For ultimately, that is what makes us special when we pursue the problem of argument, language, and knowledge.

Footnotes

[1] Thomas B. Farrell and G. Thomas Goodnight, "Accidental Rhetoric: The Root Metaphors of Three Mile Island," *Communication Monographs* 48 (December 1981): 272.

[2] Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969). Stephen Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958); Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). Philip C. Wander, "The Rhetoric of Science," *Western Speech Communication* (Fall 1976): 226-235. Herbert W. Simons, "Are Scientists Rhetors in Disguise? An Analysis of Discursive Practices within Scientific Communities," ed. Eugene E. White, *Rhetoric in Transition* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980): 115-130. Michael Overington, "The Scientific Community as Audience: Toward a Rhetorical Analysis of Science," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 3 (Summer 1977). J. Michael Sproule, *Argument: Language and its Influence* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980). For more information, see Michael C. Leff, "In Search of Ariadne's Thread: A Review of the Recent Literature on Rhetorical Theory," *Central States Speech Journal* 29 (Summer 1978): 273-291.

[3] Charles Arthur Willard, *Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge* (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1983). Ray McKerrow, "Argument Communities: A Quest for Distinctions," *Proceedings of the (First) Summer Conference on Argumentation* (1979), eds. Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell (Washington, D.C.: Speech Communication Association, 1980), pp. 214-227. Although, it should be noted, David Zarefsky has rightly pointed out that, "McKerrow admits to skepticism regarding the value of 'field theory' as a rationale for the explication of arguments." McKerrow's essay described "communities" of arguers, not "fields." David Zarefsky, "Persistent Questions in the Theory of Argument Fields," *Journal of the American Forensic Association* 18 (Spring 1982): 191-203. G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A Speculative Inquiry Into the Art of Public Deliberation," *Journal of the American Forensic Association* 18 (Spring 1982): 214-227. Robert Rowland, "The Influence of Purpose on Fields of Argument," *Journal of the American Forensic Association* 18 (Spring 1982): 228-245.

[4] Joseph Wenzel, "On Fields of Argument as Propositional Systems," *Journal of the American Forensic Association* 18 (Spring 1982): 204-213. Ray McKerrow, "Argument Communities: A Quest for Distinctions." G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument." Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding*. J. Robert Cox, "Investigating Policy Argument as a Field," *Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation*, eds. George Ziegelmeuller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1981). Charles Willard, *Argumentation and the Social*

Grounds of Knowledge. James F. Klumpp, "A Dramatistic Approach to Fields," *Dimensions*. In his essay, Joseph Wenzel considers the different approaches to the subject of "epistemics" taken by J. Robert Cox and James F. Klumpp, among others.

[5] Thomas B. Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 62 (February 1976): 1-14. Farrell's original contribution to distinguish "social knowledge" from "technical knowledge" by type of inference cuts across the question of fields rather than asking it.

[6] Charles Arthur Willard, "Field Theory: A Cartesian Meditation," *Dimensions*, p. 21.

[7] Charles Arthur Willard, *Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge*, pp. 146-233.

[8] It seems reasonable to acknowledge that there are significant differences in kind between public/political discourse and discourse which aims to have primarily an epistemic function. In the sociology of knowledge literature, this distinction is usually expressed as the "internal" (or "cognitive") sociology of knowledge which focuses on rational argument, as opposed to the "external" sociology of knowledge which studies resistance, change, and persuasion for ideological or political reasons. In his Ph.D. dissertation, Michael Altimore demonstrates that scientists may have different "rhetorics" for solving the *same* scientific problem: when delivering testimony in a public, Congressional hearing, scientists were found to come to one conclusion; when talking to their colleagues in science back at the university, Altimore noticed that the scientists reversed their decisions. Michael Altimore (Sociology), "The Rhetoric of Scientific Controversy: Recombinant DNA," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa). My point is that all epistemic communication may be dissensual, but not all dissensual communication is epistemic. At the least, arguments must be constructed reflectively to purport to be epistemic in some way. When public discourse or political discourse primarily seeks power, not reflection, it is difficult to see their arguments as examples of an epistemic function. Even though there are "public" and "political" dimensions to the epistemic, these are frequently "ground" and not "figure."

[9] See footnote 1.

[10] Bruce E. Gronbeck, "From Argument to Argumentation: Fifteen Years of Identity Crisis," *Proceedings of the (First) Summer Conference on Argumentation* (1979), pp. 8-19.

[11] Roderick Chisholm, "A Version of Foundationalism," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 5 (1980): 543-564.

[12] Richard Foley, "Epistemic Conservatism," (forthcoming) *Philosophical Studies*. From this point on in my essay, the reader can note that I am committed to the view that a version of "epistemic conservatism" (presumption) plays an important role in natural scientific argument. But

I am in agreement with Foley that "epistemic liberalism" does not apply to rational, epistemic enterprises. In contrast, and for the purpose of analysing public political philosophies, G. Thomas Goodnight has posited the "conservative" and "liberal" presumptions in the public sphere. See G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Liberal and Conservative Presumptions: on Political Philosophy and the Foundation of Public Argument," *Proceedings of the (First) Summer Conference on Argumentation*.

[13] The original source of this idea is my interpretation, but with some amendment, of the reading of Charles Peirce on "abductive reasoning" and "evolutionary epistemology." See Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss eds., *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965-1967).

[14] Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, p. 71.

[15] There is widespread agreement that, as a body of knowledge, science is epistemically outstanding. Yet, any one of at least twelve different lines of argument could lead one to this conclusion. Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus on which of the twelve available lines of argument is most plausible.

[16] Sometimes rhetoricians begin with a proposition such as "rhetoric is epistemic" and extend its meaning to an extreme, such as "rhetoric is everything." When Walter Carlton argues, in effect, that epistemology is rhetorical; and when Barry Brummet argues, in effect, that reality is rhetorical; I have to disagree. But it seems equally an injustice to the meaning of "rhetoric" that scholars in other disciplines sometimes classify rhetoric simply as "extra-scientific" or "lacking substance." Some middle ground is required between these two extremes. For the purpose of studying the process by which knowledge is produced in scientific argument, one particular statement on the function of rhetoric seems appropriate. To quote Michael McGuire: "Rhetorical theories collectively provide advice in the form of rules for generating discourse. Rules are social norms, of course, and have as their purpose, not the scientific description of phenomenon, but the perpetuation of preferred ways of doing." Michael McGuire, "The Structure of Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 15 (Summer 1982): 149-169.

[17] The complete grounds for my framework for rhetoric and scientific argument are provided in a longer work: Anne Holmquest, "Rhetorical Argument in Science: the Function of Presumption in the Origin of Species 'Revolution,'" (Ph.D. dissertation, in progress, University of Iowa). Here, I wish to add only one particular definition important to the framework--a definition of "rational belief." I credit Larry Laudan with the expression of this predicate for "rational belief" which, we both admit, is not extremely sophisticated, but is sufficient for our purposes. To adopt a belief rationally, a person must be able to specify reasons, relative to his/her proposals and background knowledge, for adopting that belief rather than its negation (or, rather than withholding on the belief altogether). I am suggesting that we can give arguments because there are general prin-

ciples restricting belief, principles that are widely subscribed to in our argument community, and in giving arguments we are trying to show that, supposing our audience has certain beliefs, they must in view of these principles have other belifs, those we are proposing to establish. If there were no acceptable principles restricting belief, there would be no common ground for argument; but, on the other hand, if all conclusions were foregone by admitted principles, the situation would not be characterized as "argument" at all. See Larry Laudan, "The Pseudo-Science of Science?" *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 11 (1981): 173-198.

[18] John Woods and Douglas Walton, *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*, *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 3 (Summer 1974): 136.

[19] Carl Kordig, "Discovery and Justification," *Philosophy of Science* 45 (1978): 115-116.

[20] Helen Longino, "Evidence and Hypotheses: An Analysis of Evidential Relations," *Philosophy of Science* 45 (1979): 40.

[21] Stephen Toulmin, preface to *Human Understanding*.

[22] See footnote 17.

[23] For an outstanding explanation of this distinction, read Nicholas Maxwell, "The Rationality of Scientific Discovery Part I: The Traditional Rationality Problem," *Philosophy of Science* (June 1974): 123-153.

[24] Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, p. 71.

[25] See especially Gerald Holton, *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973).

[26] Joseph Agassi, "Genius in Science," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 5 (1975): 145-161.

[27] Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss eds., *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, book 2.642.

[28] Joseph Agassi, "Genius in Science," p. 151.

[29] J.F.M. Hunter, "The Possibility of a Rational Strategy of Moral Persuasion," *Ethics* 84 (April 1974): 186.

[30] Ibid., p. 185.

TECHNICAL WRITING AS ARGUMENTATION

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What I say today will be new to no one here, in its parts. But in the whole it might be new, simply because you may not have had occasion to put the parts together. Permit me an attempt to do so for you.

The two parts to be interrelated are *argumentation* and *technical writing*. I have no thesis to propound; just an explanation of how I see argumentation fitting into technical writing, and of the relationship between the two as we teach them at California Polytechnic.

At Cal Poly we have had to address this specific relationship because of the confluence of two factors. The first is that we teach a lot of technical writing to people of very varied backgrounds. Of some eighty major undergraduate fields of study at Poly, about seventy are in technical disciplines. Here's a small sample: agricultural, architectural, electronic, environmental, and metallurgical engineering, city and regional planning, construction, dietetics, graphic communications, natural resources management, ornamental horticulture, poultry science, computer science, food science, dairy science, fruit science, swine science and soil science. The list is long enough that, although not very likely, an instructor could teach three sections of technical writing during one term and not have two students with the same major.

Most students in the technical disciplines take the basic technical writing course as their second and last college writing course. Consequently, after freshman composition, the English Department teaches more basic technical writing than anything else—as many as fifteen sections a term. (This number does not include sections in advanced technical writing, or in business writing, or in scientific writing, all of which add up to another fifteen sections.)

The second factor that has caused us to think about the relationship between technical writing and argumentation is a new set of General Education guidelines imposed on all the campuses of the California State University, including Cal Poly, by the University's Chancellor. Included in the guidelines is a specific reference to argumentation: "the ability to analyze, criticize, and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or belief." Courses that teach these skills, the guidelines say, "view communication as the process of human symbolic interaction focusing on the communicative process from the rhetorical perspective: reasoning and advocacy, accuracy; the discovery, critical evaluation and reporting of information." (1)

In response to the high demand at Poly for a very general interdisciplinary technical writing course, and to the Chancellor's requirement that argumentation be specifically included in every undergraduate's education, the English Department has restructured the basic course to make the role of argumentation in technical writing explicit, and has given the course a new name: "Argumentation and Reports." This paper explores my own understanding of the newly restructured course's theoretical underpinnings.

Technical Writing Defined, Broadly and Loosely

"Technology," Professor Henry McGuckin has said, "is the art of doing whatever we want done in the most rational and efficient manner available." (2) In other words, the goal to be achieved does not define an activity as technical so much as the way it is achieved; not the end, but the application of technique toward an end. Any human activity becomes technical when the way in which it is done is controlled so as to better accomplish the purpose for doing it. The more control, the "higher" the technology. Aeronautics is a higher technology than chicken farming, but chicken farming is a higher technology today than it was fifty years ago.

In contrast, an activity is not technical when the means for doing it is not determined by its purpose. Ritual, for example, is a "stereotyped sequence of activities . . . designed to influence preternatural entities," but its success in doing so is indeterminable and irrelevant to its continued practice. (3) Ritual, religion, superstition, magic, instinct, and habit are not technology.

As a corollary, technology is *out of control* when the technical possibility of doing something becomes the reason for doing it, or when technique determines purpose. The idea that technology can and should determine its own use Rose and Rose call "the myth . . . of the technological imperative. This states that whatever is possible to conceive of being done by science and technology must be and will be done." (4) Technology was out of control when the hydrogen bomb was built. "It was technically sweet, so we had to go ahead and do it," N. P. Davies reports J. Robert Oppenheimer as saying. (5) Norbert Wiener expressed much the same thing when he wrote that the first atomic bomb was built at least partly because of "the desires of the gadgeteer to see the wheels go round." (6)

In this sense of *technical*, good writing has always been technical, at least since Aristotle described rhetoric as *techne*, the purpose of which is to affect an audience. Writing is not technical, however, and usually not good, when it springs from a writer's keyboard without regard for its effect, purposeless, the spontaneous product of an autistic muse, artlessness disguised as artistic license, sound and fury signifying nothing but self indulgence. And writing is technology out of control when it is the "empty" rhetoric of which politicians continually accuse one another, bombast for the sake of bombast, mere demonstrations of verbal agility dangerous to all who prize their time and guard their attentions, the fulminations of rhetorical gadgeteers who want to see the wheels go round; or when the techniques of writing seduce the writer into saying something other than what he intends, the ready phrase or familiar format or prescriptive dogma obscuring or even determining meaning.

Nevertheless, *technical writing* is not completely synonymous with *good writing*, nor with *rhetoric*. However much all good writing is technical, we generally reserve the term *technical writing* for writing that is about a technology; that is, about techniques for accomplishing something we want (or someone else wants) to accomplish. That the writing itself be technical is a *sine qua non*: it would be self-defeating to write irrationally and inefficiently about reaching a goal rationally and efficiently. Yet it is a *sine qua non* which perpetually admits of *mutatis mutandis*: as Charles Bazerman has pointed out, the efficiency of writing published in technical journals has greatly improved over the past hundred years, as our ideas about the nature and importance of efficiency have changed. (7) Aristotle's *techne* was not the last word, although it was a good word.

Conventionally, of course, the term *technical writing* has been circumscribed by its provenance: it originally meant writing by and for engineers, in the service of the great corporations: General Electric, Westinghouse, IBM, Ford. It was in the corporate crucible that the principles of technical writing were forged. With an economic motivation for communicating more rationally and efficiently—recording their procedures, documenting their activities, making their needs and services known, and perhaps most importantly, understanding their own work in the rigorous way that formal discourse encourages—corporations began looking at writing as an instrument, rather than, as in the *belles artes* tradition, an end in itself, and began insisting that universities look at it that way too. Even today, as Carolyn Miller has written, "much of what we call technical writing occurs in the context of government and industry and embodies tacit commitments to bureaucratic hierarchies, corporate capitalism, and high technology." (8)

But to the extent that technical writing does imply tacit commitments, commitments not intended or understood by the writer, it is a technology out of control. It need not be so. The history of a term need not define its meaning, nor the use of a tool be constrained by the ideology of its maker. In fact, technical writing is not so constrained. Formal discourse can be useful to anyone involved in technology—which is to say everone in our society—from the artist potter to the ceramic porcelain manufacturer, from the homemaker to the industrial food scientist.

For example, recently a former Cal Poly student, a dairy science major, testified on behalf of a citizens' political action group before a committee of Congress, against the licensing of the nuclear power plant at Diablo Canyon. Her testimony had little to do with her profession--she was acting simply as a concerned citizen--but it was lucid and concise, well reasoned and well supported with evidence. Unlike the power company's expert witnesses she did not lapse into jargon unintelligible to the committee members and the radio audience, although her detailed knowledge about the nuclear industry was obvious; unlike the representative from a pro-nuclear citizen's group she did not lapse into a blatantly self-serving polemic. Her testimony implied no tacit commitment to corporate values--just the opposite--but it was technical discourse, technical writing in the strictest sense, tightly controlled, information-rich, audience directed, written for a purpose. The committee members were clearly impressed, and grateful--and clearly annoyed with the other witnesses for having been less articulate. Whatever the eventual outcome of the war over Diablo Canyon, she won that day's battle.

To cite another example, the famous *Foxfire* series employs technical writing in the service of traditional values, and embodies a commitment to folk technology, most of it not very "high." Similarly, Stuart Brand's publications, the *CoEvolution Quarterly* and the *Whole Earth* catalogs, employ technical writing in the service of an ecology-oriented lifestyle and "appropriate" technology. For that matter, the world's largest publisher of technical writing, the Government Printing Office, puts out documents that serve values as various as the hundreds of authors and dozens of government agencies responsible for writing them. You can learn about nuclear technology from a GPO pamphlet, but you can also learn how to grow organic tomatoes, and why the whale should be saved.

The point is that the stereotype of technical writing as exclusively a corporate/capitalist tool no longer fits, if it ever did, nor need one be a high technology chauvinist to be a technical writer. David Dobrin's definition gets the relationship between technology and technical writing right: "Technical writing is writing that accomodates technology to the user." (9) *Accomodates* is an hospitable verb: the user's interest may be professional or personal; the technology may be high or low, corporate, communal, or individualistic, capitalist or altruistic. Whatever it is, the writing *accomodates* it to the user of the technology; that is, makes it more amenable to the user's purpose, whatever that might be. It enables the user to accomplish his goal more rationally and efficiently than he could have had the writing not existed. It helps keep technology *in control* by making the relationship between purpose and technique explicit. Any writing that does this, in any form--memo, essay, report, list, lecture notes, comic strip--is *technical*.

The point is further that the principles of technical discourse, and the need for widespread knowledge of those principles in our society, far transcend the interests of isolated technological communities. We sometimes see technical writing as "a collection of Balkan states," in David Dobrin's phrase (10), the jargon of the chemical engineer being impenetrable to the architect, the jargon of the architect impenetrable to the crop scientist, all impenetrable to the English teacher. And of course this is true; specializations do exist,

with useful specialized vocabularies and conventions which the specialist must master to be successful within her technological community, and which have the unfortunate side effect of keeping specialties isolated. But in a larger sense all of American culture is one technological community. No one escapes computer banking, or environmental pollution, or confrontations with the medical establishment, or nutritional needs. No one escapes the responsibility of making technical decisions, in our participatory technocracy: Should we close the power plant? Should we pass the recycling bill? Should we build the new water pipeline? No one escapes the anxious pleasure of consumer decisions: Should we buy the Zenith or the Quasar? Everyone negotiates daily through a more and more highly technical world. Just coping requires technique. Sharing technique, criticizing technique, keeping the technology of daily life *in control* all can be done better by people who know principles of technical discourse.

One of those principles, for example--perhaps the foremost principle--is to always give an overview before giving details, always announce the purpose of a technique before describing or criticizing it, always announce the purpose of a piece of discourse at its beginning. Always, before anything else, answer the question "*What's this all about?*" If people had this principle in mind as they discussed the tasks of daily life, daily life would be easier.

Two weeks ago I was trout fishing in the high Sierra, just below the tree line, with a friend, a solar engineer. I had never camped in that part of the country, though my friend had often. He is a repository of wilderness technique, but has trouble sharing it. "Take this rope," he told me as we were making camp, "and throw it over a branch." He was busy unloading all the food from his pack and mine and stuffing it into two nylon sacks.

It had been a long day. We had carried fifty pound packs ten miles at nine thousand feet above sea level, and I was tired. I took the coil of rope and hurled it like a limp Frisbee over a nearby sapling.

"What's the matter, professor?" my friend said, not much longer on patience than I. "Didn't I say it right? Look, keep one end of the rope in your hand, okay?"

"Okay," I said tightly. I retrieved the coil of rope, grasped one end, and let the rest festoon itself over the same sapling.

"What the devil do you think you're doing?" my friend yelled.

"I haven't got the slightest idea," I yelled back.

My friend felt the responsibilities of his superior experience. *Noblesse oblige* emerged as he regained his composure. "Look," he said, "I'm only trying to help you get along out here. Now take that rope, and keep one end in your hand, and throw the rest over a branch at least twenty feet off the ground, and not more than two inches thick, fifteen feet out from the trunk, and then call me, and I'll bring over these food bags, and tie one to each end of the rope, and hoist them into the tree, okay?" He paused. I stood there, waiting. "What's the matter, didn't I say it right again?" he said.

"Why?" I asked him. "Why the rope over the branch, why the twenty feet, why the two inches thick, why the food in the tree?"

He looked surprised. "So the bears don't get it, of course," he said.

"Oh," I said. I began to see how my friend's technology could accomodate purposes of which I had not yet conceived. I also felt a definitely altered sense of place. "There are bears, huh?" I asked, as I went looking for a branch.

Argumentation Defined, Broadly, Loosely, and Quickly

At this spring's Institute on Writing and Higher Order Reasoning at the University of Chicago, my companion in hostelry was Talmadge Scriven, a philosophy professor at Cal Poly. Throughout the conference, over coffee and over drinks, we squabbled about what "higher order reasoning" really was. Tal, as an analytic philosopher in the Quinian tradition, wanted to reduce *reason* to *argument*, and *argument* to *logic*. In his dispensation, if I infer correctly, *argumentation* would be the set of techniques by which the rules of logic apply to discourse—a very narrow definition. I, on the other hand, as a rhetorician in the Aristotelian tradition (and inflamed by Wayne Booth's keynote speech), wanted to understand *reasoning* as including all the mental processes through which a person discovers, criticizes, and articulates *reasons* for particular behaviors or beliefs. Those processes include logic, of course, but also include emotion and culture and various sorts of psychological predisposition. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca write in *The New Rhetoric*,

> . . . when it is a question of arguing, of using discourse to influence the intensity of an audience's adherence to certain theses, it is no longer possible to neglect completely, as irrelevancies, the psychological and social conditions in the absence of which argumentation would be pointless and without result. (11)

Argumentation, in this view, is an unfortunately dysphonious synonym for *rhetoric*, the set of techniques (excluding chicanery, deception, or any technique motivated by ill will) for moving an audience to an action or securing their adherence to a belief—a definition that is broad, and loose, and from Tal's point of view, irredeemably sloppy.

The sort of reasoning that Tal would prefer is what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call *demonstration* rather than *argumentation*, *convincing* rather than *persuading*. An enthusiasm for it seems to me as contrary as the enthusiasm Mark Twain observed in his Christian acquaintances for a Heaven in which the angels did nothing all day but listen to harp music. How boring. Does a person lose all appreciation for the finer pleasures, like Kentucky sipping whiskey and romantic dalliance and hot country fiddles, when he passes to the Other Side? Not Tal, I'll bet. Do humans become less than human when they start to reason?

The squabble about the definition of *reason* matters, in an academic way, because if technology is the art of accomplishing a goal rationally and efficiently, and technical writing is the technology of composing discourse about technology, then how one conceives of rationality could make a difference in what one considers "good" technical writing. It could, but in practice it doesn't. A person who chooses the narrow definition of reason as logic merely pushes the sloppy leftovers onto efficiency's plate. There is no efficiency in producing a document which is logically compelling but fails to gain an audience's adherence because it fails to satisfy cultural or emotional criteria. In practice, a technical writer is as bound to be as attentive to *ethos* and *pathos*, as well as *logos*, as any other writer.

Argumentation in Technical Writing

By now you've probably come to believe what I told you earlier: I'm not going to tell you anything new. After all, rhetoric is mostly common sense. You can see that, if what I believe and teach at Cal Poly is any guide, technical writing is just rhetoric about technology, rhetoric that makes technology more usable, more "user-friendly." And if *rhetoric* and *argumentation* are roughly synonymous, both being names for the technology of moving an audience to action or securing their belief, then "argumentation in technical writing" is all there is to technical writing. Even when a technical document has no explicit thesis to argue—e. g., "The company should revise its purchasing procedures"—it has an implicit one: "This document is reliable and worth your time." The implicit promise in every technical document is that it *will* help accomodate technology to its user. The key to successful argumentation in technical writing is both to *seem* to fulfill that promise and to actually do so.

The part of rhetoric that is not common sense is common decency. Just as everyone knows that it's wrong to use automotive technology to run people down, everyone knows that it's wrong to use rhetorical technology to run people down. Manslaughter remains manslaughter. Technical rhetoric accomodates technology to its user; rhetoric in general accomodates the world in general to its inhabitants. Any discourse that does not help its audience get along in the world is an example of abused, or at best failed, technology. Technical discourse that seems to but does not actually render technology more usable is abused or failed argumentation.

Still, it's the *seeming* that engenders belief. This is the traditional province of rhetoric: to make things seem to others the way they seem to oneself, and to test the reliability of those things that seem true to oneself by trying to make them believable to others. The "principles" of technical writing to which I have been referring serve precisely these functions. I'll conclude this essay by reviewing three of the most important of those principles--one for each of the three classical modes of rhetoric.

Ethos. The general rule of ethos is that the writer should always conform to, even embrace, the socialized predispositions of the audience, insofar as they do not distort his intention. When writing for Ford, use Ford's style, and reinforce Ford's values; when teaching the bowline to Boy Scouts, use Scout style, and reinforce Scout values.

As Aristotle said, if you have a speaking engagement in Lacedaemon, wear your hair long, because Lacedaemonians consider long hair a mark of nobility. This is, of course, the reason that IBM's technical representatives always wear white shirts and ties, even in California. In a document the equivalent of a white shirt and tie is white space and careful typing. Particularly in technical writing, readers take a sloppy manuscript as a slight.

> If a set of instructions looks bad, if it's crammed on the page, if the specific steps are not separated and numbered, if it doesn't have good visual appeal, if it doesn't have illustrations, then you look at it and you think, "I'll put it together myself and I won't look at the instructions." So whether it has credibility depends on whether or not it has visual appeal. If it doesn't generate visual appeal, then you're not going to even read it. (12)

But ethos runs far deeper than mere appearance. A sloppy document is not just unappealing; it's hard to use. And although stylistic rules may vary from corporation to corporation, and from discipline to discipline, one ethical principle pervades all technical writing: *Always make the text as easy to understand and use as the subject allows*. Technical writing is instrumental, and an instrument that is not easy to use wastes time and effort, and often does not get used at all. Technical values demand efficiency. The rhetorical equivalent of a Rube Goldberg device may be entertaining, but if it is offered seriously most readers will reject it out of hand, and the argument will be lost.

The techniques that cluster under this principle include the various readibility and comprehensibility formulas, like Robert Gunning's and Rudolph Flesch's; various layout devices, like bulleting and underlining and extensive use of headings; formal organization patterns, like the format for the analytic report; and a host of admonitions: avoid ambiguity; keep the modifier near the modified; quantify in standard units whenever possible; define extensively; avoid sequential nominalizations; don't be afraid of useful redundancy.

As Halloran and Bradford have pointed out, however, some scholars of technical writing have gone too far in their search for simplicity: the admonition "Prefer the literal to the figurative," though useful in

reducing ambiguity, does not mean that technical writers can or should reject all figurative language. A metaphor can often clarify, or vivify, technical information. (13) Like most Boy Scouts, I learned to tie a bowline by memorizing a story about a rabbit that runs around a tree and then darts down a hole in the trunk.

Pathos. The general rule of pathos is to show in oneself, and educe from the audience, emotions that support the actions one would like the audience to take or the beliefs to which one would have them adhere. In technical writing, the principle of pathos is simple: *Play it cool*. Do not let emotion distort the empirical question of whether a technique will accomplish the purpose for which it is meant. This does not mean, of course, that emotion can or should be ignored. The question of whether a purpose is desirable (Should this forest be clearcut?) is often an emotional one, and for a technical writer to ignore the emotion aroused by a technical question would be for him to ignore what is often a critical ingredient in its successful solution--indeed, to ignore the very reason for its solution. Human purposes are emotional purposes: to help others, to achieve fame, to find happiness. Much if not most corporate technical writing, for example, appeals to a single emotion, often unstated but nevertheless pervasive: greed. A business report that did not at least indirectly invoke corporate cupidity would not be very likely to succeed.

Still, while the purpose of a technical process may be emotional, and the execution of that process must find its justification in emotion, the evaluation of that process' instrumentality toward achieving the purpose should not be emotional. It is in this aspect of technical writing--*negative pathos*, you might say--that the appearance of "objective" logic comes to the fore, convincing rather than persuading, and it is in the maintenance of this appearance that pathetic techniques have proliferated in technical writing. The chief technique is to, in Michael Halloran's phrase, "suppress human agency."

> There are a number of conventional devices by which scientific [and technical] prose is depersonalized. Simplest and most frequently noted by critical readers is the passive voice construction: "It was observed that . . . " rather than "I observed . . . ." Somewhat more subtle and rhetorically interesting is a device that one finds with increasing frequency in academic writing across the disciplines, a device that amounts to the manufacture of abstract rhetors: "*The data* show that . . . " or "*This paper* will argue that . . . ." The effect of the device is to suppress human agency, to imply that what are essentially rhetorical acts--arguing, showing, demonstrating, suggesting--can be accomplished without human volition. (14)

. . . And without the apparent distraction of human emotion. This "formal objectivity," as David Dobrin calls it--the appearance of objectivity--is of course no guarantee of "instrumental objectivity"--seeing and describing the world the way that others would see and describe it, had they the same vantage. (15) When overused, devices that a writer hopes will impart the appearance of objectivity instead conceal just what the vantage is, mystifying the technology and making the prose ugly and cumbersome. Used judiciously, however, they remind both writer and audience to play it cool.

Logos. The general rule of logos is to make a logical case for one's thesis. It is here, of course, that Professor Scriven, along with Quine and Kant, and most of Silicon Valley, sees all of argumentation dwelling--or at least all responsible argumentation. The "pincers movement" between induction and deduction, to use Gregory Bateson's phrase, is the technique most people in our technical society see as most reliable for capturing truth.

But there is a subtle difference between *logic*, an interior mental process, and *logos*, making logic public, and useful. Probably the most common failure in technical discourse is a failure of *logos*: the failure to specifically and explicitly--logically--tie a technology to its purpose, and explicate it and criticize it accordingly. This is the sort of failure that I was illustrating earlier, when I was speaking of the bears in the Sierra. This is the sort of failure that allows a technology to slip out of control. The effort to avoid failure of this sort is the reason for what I called above the foremost principle of technical writing: *Always, before anything else, answer the question, "What's this all about?"*

J. C. Mathes illustrates this principle by describing a memo that was written before the near-meltdown at the nuclear power plant on Three Mile Island, warning of the possibility of an incident.

> The memo actually did go to the important audiences, but it was so poorly designed that they didn't realize that it was meant for them and they had to act. It was not persuasively designed. The writer didn't think in terms of persuasion; he thought he was transferring information--and his primary, the manager who received it, testified that he glanced at it . . . and in his mind all it was was a request for further evaluation. He didn't even respond to the sentence in the memo that says, "The references suggest the possibility of uncovering the core if present high pressure injection policy is continued." . . . It's buried in the last paragraph. (16)

Mathes' point is not that the writer did not, in his own mind, make the connection between the disciplinary literature and the possibility of a meltdown, but that he didn't make that connection *seem* like the purpose of the memo. As a consequence, his argument was lost--and a lot more, besides.

Technical Writing for Everybody

At the start of this paper I said that I had no thesis to propound, but I was too hasty. A thesis has emerged, periphrastically, from the bombast. Sometimes my writing gets a little out of control.

At Cal Poly, we are teaching a course that we call "Argumentation and Reports," but we might with precision subtitle it "Everyday Rhetoric for a Technical World." It's not an easy course to teach, but I'm glad it exists. As the technology of our personal and civic as well as professional lives becomes more complex--"higher"--the need for rational and efficient discourse about technology becomes more pressing. We need to know what we're about. A general education that leaves students without the techniques for careful discussion about the world they live in undermines their ability to survive.

It undermines yours and mine as well. The Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant had been scheduled to receive its operating license two years ago, when at the last moment someone discovered a flaw in the documentation that had led workmen into building a portion of the plant upside down. The delay in licensing since then has been costing the power company, Pacific Gas and Electric, a half million dollars a day. Since the first discovery some two hundred and fifty more errors have been discovered, many of them in the plant's documentation. "NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] officials said the flaws resulted from PG and E's using informal conversations, rather than writing, to communicate information to design consultants." (17) Errors will always occur, of course, but fewer errors are made by people trained to prevent them. The techniques of technical discourse matter.

And they matter all the more because they are rhetorical techniques--techniques of argumentation--rather than simply techniques of "information transfer." People are not electronic communication devices: we don't just process information; we create it, and we judge it. We judge what others write; we judge what we write ourselves. College students who have studied technical writing as argumentation will be a bit more critical about the information that comes their way, whether or not it pertains to their specializations. They will be a bit more careful about seeming to say what they mean to say, so that they and others can judge rightly whether the technologies they're discussing meet human purposes.

In time we'll gain control over the world we have made.

NOTES

(1) Office of the Chancellor, California State University, Executive Order 338, "General Education-Breadth Requirements," November 1, 1980, p. 3.

(2) Henry McGuckin, Humanities Lecture Series, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, Fall, 1977. Mr. McGuckin is a professor of communication at San Francisco State University, and has written extensively on technology in daily life.

(3) Victor W. Turner, "Symbols in African Ritual," Science, March 16, 1972, vol. 179, p. 1100.

(4) Steven Rose and Hilary Rose, "Can Science be Neutral?" Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Summer, 1973, p. 607.

(5) As quoted in Rose and Rose, p. 607.

(6) Norbert Wiener, "Moral Problems of a Scientist," Writing about Science, edited by Mary Elizabeth Bowen and Joseph A. Mazzeo (New York: Oxford, 1979), p. 170.

(7) Charles Bazerman, "The Emergence of the Modern Physics Article," a manuscript prepared for the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Society for the Social Studies of Science, Philadelphia, October 28-31, 1982. Mr. Bazerman is a member of the English Department of Baruch College, New York City.

(8) Carolyn R. Miller, "A Humanistic Rationale for Technical Writing," College English, February 1979, vol. 40, no. 6, p. 616.

(9) David N. Dobrin, "What's Technical About Technical Writing?" New Essays in Technical and Scientific Communication: Research, Theory, Practice, edited by Paul V. Anderson, R. John Brockmann, Carolyn R. Miller (Farmingdale: Baywood, 1982), p. 242.

(10) Dobrin, p. 241.

(11) Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, translated by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: Notre Dame, 1971 [paper]), p. 14.

(12) Elizabeth Taboe, University of Houston, speaking on "College Writing," Part II, Options in Education, coproduced by National Public Radio and the Institute for Educational Leadership of the George Washington University, 1981.

(13) S. Michael Halloran and Annette N. Bradford, "Figures of Speech in the Rhetoric of Science and Technology," manuscript, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1982.

(14) S. Michael Halloran, "The Birth of Molecular Biology: An Essay in the Rhetorical Criticism of Scientific Discourse," manuscript, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1982. Halloran discusses the suppression of human agency in the context of ethos, while I lift his discussion into the context of pathos, thereby illustrating what Aristotle warned us of: that the modes of rhetoric overlap. One might say that the suppression of pathos is part of the ethos of science and technology.

(15) Dobrin, pp. 231-232, 245.

(16) J. C. Mathes, University of Michigan, speaking on "College Writing," Part II, Options in Education, coproduced by National Public Radio and the Institute for Educational Leadership of the George Washington University, 1981.

(17) Dave Brackney, "NRC May Revoke Diablo Test License, Mustang Daily, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, November 19, 1981, Volume 46, Number 32, p. 1.

SUBSTANTIVE AND REGULATIVE FUNCTIONS OF IDEOGRAPHS 'LIBERTY,' 'ORDER,' AND 'PUBLIC TRUST' IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ANGLO-WHIGGISM

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A central question confronting twentieth-century political and social theory has revolved about the problem of "mass" or "public" consciousness: How best can we discover, describe and control the public motives-to-action of particular socio-political communities.[1] Of course, the problem of public consciousness has been a practical concern of rhetoricians since at least the fifth century B.C., when Aristotle first recognized the necessity for systematically cataloging the common *topoi* of arguments acceptable to Athenian audiences. Nonetheless, despite this ancient tradition of audience analysis, the nature of the relationship between public argument or rhetoric and public consciousness was barely acknowledged as a primary concern for social and political theory until at least Marx and Engels' critique of ideology as "false consciousness" in the nineteenth century:

> The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, *the language of real life*. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to metal production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc. of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.-real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these , up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men in their actual life-process.[2]

Even granted this admonition, the central importance of the essential relationship between rhetoric and ideology was all but ignored by social and political theorists (not to mention rhetorical critics and theorists) until well into the present century.[3] In recent years, however, it has gradually become more generally accepted that *any* useful critique of public consciousness necessitates a clear understanding of the relationships between and among rhetorics and ideologies.[4]

In an increasingly elaborate effort to explore the relationship between rhetoric and ideology as a means of describing specifically political mass consciousness, McGee has argued for a theory of "ideographs."[5] An ideograph, as I understand that term, is an ordinary and culturally biased phrase, or single-term abstraction, which

represents in a condensed form the normative, collective commitments of a community. Conceived as the "building blocks" of an ideology, ideographs function in public social and political discourse either to justify otherwise unwarrantable beliefs and/or behaviors—including usages of power, or as prescriptive guides for future beliefs and/or behaviors. A survey of twentieth-century American public political discourse, then, is likely to uncover such ideographs as "liberty," "equality," "state's rights," "national security," "the right to work," "rule of law," "executive privilege," "the right to bear arms," and "law and order," as well as a multitude of others. When taken in their entirety, such ideographs would define the structures of the American ideology and would signify the range of acceptable (and in the instance of negative ideographs, the unacceptable) motive-to-action within that ideological system or community.[6]

One of the interesting features of the theory of ideographs is that it provides us with a means by which we can chart and probe the tensions and crises which emerge from within ideological systems and surface in ideological argumentation. While few of us would ordinarily see any significant incompatibility or tension between the commitments to "law and order," and "the right to bear arms," when placed in the context of a specific situation, when asked literally to do duty in propositional arguments as justifications for specific beliefs and/or behaviors—as say, for example, in a controversy over hand gun control legislation—this mutual compatibility can, and frequently is called into question. What is the cause of such incompatibilities? According to McGee, by tracing the diachronic and synchronic structures of the argumentative usages of particular ideographs we can approach a clearer sense of the *relationships* which exist between and among them, and we can thus better understand the tensions, potential and actual, which emerge in any particular controversy.[7]

My concern in this essay is to pursue the functional dimension of the relationships between and amongst competing ideographs in ideological argumentation. In particular, I will argue that individual ideographs function argumentatively as either substantive or regulative commitments of a community. Ideographs function substantively when they are asserted as intrinsic values for a particular ideological community. In the Anglo-American Whig tradition, "liberty," "property," "religion," and "law and order" come to mind as typically substantive ideographic commitments. Ideographs function regulatively when they exist in argumentation as a means of balancing or counter-balancing "sets" or "configurations" of potentially conflicting substantive ideographic commitments. In the Anglo-American Whig tradition, "public trust," "rule of law," and "executive privilege" come to mind as typically regulative ideographic commitments. Because my purpose is to demonstrate the sense in viewing ideographs in terms of their substantive and regulatory functions, I shall pursue my argument operationally, through the description of a brief case study of the origins and uses of "liberty," "order," and "public trust" in eighteenth-century Anglo-Whiggism.

"Liberty," "Order" and "Public Trust"

Throughout the eighteenth century, the dominant tensions in England between (and amongst) "parties," "factions," and "connections" were guided, *at least in the public discourse*, by a struggle to interpret and to apply the logic and principles of the Glorious "Whig" Revolution of 1688 which had resulted in the "rule of law" rejection of absolute monarchy, the establishment of parliamentary sovereignty, and the Protestant succession beginning with the accession of William and Mary to the throne in 1689.[8] Naturally enough, then, any discussion of the spirit of eighteenth-century Anglo-Whiggism must begin with a consideration of the characteristic responses to that event.

When James II fled England in 1688, it marked the second time in less than fifty years that the members of England's Houses of Parliament had taken it upon themselves to resist and to overthrow the generally acknowledged absolute and sovereign authority of the monarchy. Was such resistance justifiable, and did the ultimate sovereign authority of the nation truly reside with the members of the Houses of Lords and Commons as the representatives of the people? Or had these members of Parliament, led astray perhaps by some insidious and factitious conspiracy, managed to usurp the powers and prerogatives that justly belonged to the Crown? Or, for that matter, was it just possible that no resistance had occurred at all; that James II had in fact voluntarily abdicated and vacated the throne.?[9] The answers that one arrived at, of course, would be decisive in determing the legitimacy of the Revolutionary Settlement. Efforts to alleviate the pressure created by the posing of such questions came from various quarters, as all involved endeavored to explain and to justify the potentially seditious actions of the Glorious Revolution. Two dominant political creeds, one "tory" and the other "Whig" emerged from these explanations and justifications.

Tories, characteristically conceived as progeny of the Royalist Stuart Cavaliers of the English Civil Wars, advanced a conservative explanation and justification of the events and actions surrounding the Glorious Revolution. Originally and largely comprised of the members of the hierarchy of the Anglican Church and of the landed Aristocracy those evincing the Tory view of government were motivated typically and primarily by a concern for maintaining "order" in the realms of social, political and economic affairs.[10] The maintenance of such stability and order, they believed, necessitated a central and absolute authority. Hence, prior to 1688 they maintained that the sovereign power in the state was a divinely ordained hereditary monarch whose right to rule was virtually irrefutable. Corollarly to the theory of divine rights monarchy were the doctinres of "non-resistance" and "passive obedience." In order to sustain the stability and order promulgated by a ruler in possession of an absolute, sovereign, royal prerogative, it was believed to be necessary to assert and to emphasize the obligation that every citizen had to obey the monarch's dicta.[11] Of course, the Glorious Revolution--if understood as the resistance to and deposition of a monarch--posed serious problems for the Tory commitments to "order." In the end, however, they were capable of securing that commitment as well as the commitments to "passive obedience" and "non-resistance," by maintaining the fiction that James II had not been deposed--that he had in fact fled England voluntarily,[12] and by gradually conceding the fact that the supreme authority of the nation no longer rested solely with the monarch, but was reposed conjointly in the legislature of King + Lords + Commons.[13] This second move was to prove to be especially important: By conceding that sovereignty resided with the combined legislature, it was possible to view the Revolutionary Settlement more in terms of an attempt to balance the relationship between the monarch and the parliament viz. the "rule of law," than as an attempt to assert absolute parliamentary sovereignty. Additionally, nothing in the Tory argument demanded that they sacrifice their commitment to a divinely remanded authority, and it thus became possible for them to argue that the combined sovereign legislature ruled with God's blessing and sanction.[14] Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it functioned to sustain a central and absolute authority which could easily remand "prerogative" powers to the monarch and justify adherence to the doctrines of "passive obedience" and "non-resistance" to the supreme power of the nation, i.e., the King-in-Parliament.

Whigs responded initially to the occurrence of the Glorious Revolution with a more radical explanation than that of their Tory counterparts. While by 1688 the Tories had committed themselves to an ideology organized around the commitment to "order," the Whigs had committed themselves to a view of government based generally upon beliefs in a "Legislative sovereignty," "government by consent," and the "right to resistance." Central to each of these beliefs was a commitment to the guarantee of "liberty." In point of fact, Whig advocates were no less concerned than their Tory opposites with the conservative goal of maintaining natural stability and "order"; but, importantly, they were unwilling to do so at the expense of the civil liberties which they believed were guaranteed by an immemorial and Ancient Constitution.[15] Thus, when push came to shove, they steered a rather moderate course in defending the Glorious Revolution. They backed off on their claim to "government by consent," and avoided the volatile question of the "right of resistance" by accepting the Tory fiction that James II had voluntarily abdicated the throne. What they retained and emphasized was their sovereign allegiance to the immemorial Ancient Constitution, and the authority to interpret and to alter the laws inherent in that Ancient Constitution as it reposed in the combined legislature of King + Lords + Commons. Most importantly, however, these conservative adaptations of the principles of their ideology notwithstanding, the Whigs maintained a code of governance which emphasized the critical importance of achieving "liberty" for the nation as a whole.

The descriptions which I have offered here of the Whig and Tory creeds of government are sketchy and obviously oversimplify the issues involved. There is probably even some inaccuracy in describing them as entirely coherent and thoroughly consistent ideological creeds, for they were rarely expressed in public advocacy as fully developed commitments to community. In point of fact, both "liberty" and "order" were national virtues heralded by *all* Englishmen, and there was hardly enough opposition or tension between the two of them to warrant any kind of serious or prolonged confrontation. However, in the context of a particular crisis situation, as, for example, the need to explain and to justify the Revolutionary Settlement in 1689, the national commitments to "liberty" and "order" could come to stand in stark contrast and contradiction with one another: For those more strongly motivated by Tory virtues, the Whig praise of "liberty" came to represent the anarchy which would undoubtedly attend any society without some form of absolute and centralized governmental authority; For those more strongly motivated by Whig virtues, the Tory praise of "order" came to represent the potential tyranny and loss of "liberty" which would accompany the authority of any unbridled and absolute sovereign power. More often than not, however, Whig and Tory conceptions of government tended to exist simultaneously, functioning as competing impulses or guidelines for public behavior: The Tory impulse, calculated to sustain social, political and economic "order," emphasizing the importance of allegiance and loyalty to the sovereign authority of the nation; The Whig impulse, calculated to guarantee the "liberty" of every English citizen, emphasizing the importance of achieving the tacit, if not explicit, "consent of the governed."

Following the accession of George I to the throne in 1714, and until the accessionof George III in 1760, England's government was ruled by what has since been dubbed a "Whig Supremacy."[16] This is not to claim, however, that the Tory view of government had entered into a total remission during these years.[17] Even though the so-called "Tory Party" lost significant power and was forced into parliamentary opposition between 1714 and 1760, the praise of Tory virtues was very much in evidence in public discourse throughout the entire century.[18] And despite the fact that the management of government has been secured by Whig oriented ministers and members of parliament, England's predominant ideological community in the eighteenth century came to rest upon a more "ubiquitous form of Whiggism" than had been evident prior to, or immediately following, the Glorious Revolution: It was, in fact, more a spirit of Whiggism than anything else—a mode of public consciousness rooted in popular conceptions of England's Ancient Constitution, capable of accommodating substantive commitments to both. "liberty" and "order," and perhpas most important, kept vital by the oppositions created through the potential tensions inherent in the past usages of the two.[19] The succesful management of these tensions was dependent upon the abilities of ministers and government leaders to create the popular belief that the policies of a particular administration were in accordance with the dictates of the Ancient Constitution and perfectly balanced the national commitments to the abstract virtues of "liberty" and "order." To fail to create and to sustain such a belief was not only to risk the loss of the confidence of the parliament—a party whose co-operation was essential to the effective implementation of any legislation—but was also to abrogate the "public trust" in government itself. To properly understand the spirit of eighteenth century Whiggism then, one must consider the ideological commitment to "public trust."

The conception of "trust" as essential to successful governance first became evident in the Anglo experience during the reign of Queen Elizabeth.[20] By 1689 it was becoming painfully clear that monarchs who failed to sustain the "trust" of their constituents did so only at their own risk: The executions of Charles I in 1649, and his chief advisor, Thomas Wentworth, Lord Strafford, eight years earlier, as well as the "forced" abdication of James II, left little doubt that the "people" were capable of monitoring the monarch equally with the love and comfort of the carrot, or the fright and pain of the stick. The point was forcefully and deliberately made by Lord Somers in his vindication of the Glorious Revolution in 1692:

> No farther encroachments upon our rights and privileges are to be feared in time to come, since the bad success of all our late kings is an example to all their successors, wherein they may read their destiny, if they understood so little their own interest, as to act arbitrarily, as some of their predecessors did, to the great disturbance indeed of their subjects for a time: but at last, to the utter ruin of themselves and their adherents ... *Their sovereign's greatness in England depends chiefly and only upon the love of his subjects*.[21]

The equation "love of people" = "trust in government" = "liberty *and* order" was quickly and well learned, as evidenced by the introduction and conclusion to George I's maiden speech before his Parliament in 1715:

> My Lords, and Gentlemen; This being the first opportunity that I have had of meeting my people in parliament, since it pleased Almighty God, of his good Providence, to call me to the throne of my ancestors, I most gladly make use of it, *to thank my faithful and loving subjects* for that zeal and firmness that hath been shown in defence of the Protestant succession, against all, the open and secret practices that have been used to defeat it; and *I shall never forget the obligations I have to those who have distinguished themselves upon this occasion* ... Let no wicked insinuations disquiet the minds of my subjects. The established constitution, in church and state, shall be the rule of my government; *the happiness, ease and prosperity of my people shall be the chief care of my life. Those who assist me, in carrying out these measures, I shall always esteem my best friends; and I doubt not but that I shall be able, with your assistance, to disappoint the designs of those who would deprive me of that blessing which I most value, the affection of my people*.[22]

As an ideolgical principle, the normative commitment to "trust" as the regulative foundation of the relationship between the King/ruler and the People/ruled received its most influential and lasting treatment in John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*.[23] According to Locke, "civil society" was founded upon a "compact" drawn up by virtue of the "consent of the people" to abide by the "declard'd Laws" of the majority as determined by a legislative authority.[24] Of course, even when it iw determined and established by the "consent of the people," the "rule of law" is a double-edged sword. Just as it can be used to assure that all citizens are treated "equally" and "fairly" in the eyes of the community, so too it can be used excessively to limit the "liberties" of the "people" in the supposed interests of "security" and "peace," or it can be used equally to constrain the executive power of government in such a way as to render it impotent and ineffectual in dealing with the crises and problems which emerge from day-to-day requiring direct and decisive administrative attention.[25] Inasmuch as the security of "Liberty" depends upon a powerful government which is responsive to its citizenry, but which is also flexible enough to be able to confront and deal with unpredictable, day-to-day concerns, the substance of "civil society" relies upon some mechanism for controlling and balancing the liberal and conservative dimensions of the "rule of law." Locke describes such a mechanism (wittingly or not) in the *Second Treatise* when he discusses the formal relationship between the "people," and the executive and legislative offices of government in terms of the functional relationship between three regulatory normative commitments: "prerogative," the "right of resistance," and "public trust."

Although Locke located the sovereignty of a Commonwealth in the hands of the legislature as the supreme law-making body, he also acknowledged the practical necessity of maintaining a strong and capable "executive power."[26] When the legislature is out of session, for example, the Supreme power in the nation rests naturally with the executive. In order to be able to function effectively in this capacity the executive must possess the authority to act fully and without restraint in the interests of the "people."[27] The authority remanded to the executive to act "without the prescription of Law, and sometimes against it," was the power of "prerogative."[28] But, and this must be stressed, the executive "prerogative" was considered by Locke to be little more than a necessary evil, a bureaucratic encumbrance required by the complexity of the demands placed uon the government in a civil society. It was never to be considered an "Arbitrary Power" to be used at the executives' whim or fancy, or for his or her own private interests apart from the "people." It was to be used *only* and *always* in the interest of the "Publick Good."[29] And although Locke claimed that it was unnecessary to place "precise bounds" upon the "prerogative" of a "good and wise ruler," he was quite clear in extolling the authority of the "people" to "encroach" that power whenever it was abused by "weak Princes."[30]

That power of "encroachment" was the "right of resistance." According to Locke, the "right to resist" unjust force and authority--behaviors categorized as either "usurpations" or "tyrannies"--was the essential counterpoint to the power of the executive "prerogative." But more than that, it was an obligation that every citizen had to assure the just and proper adherence to the "rule of law" in the community. Just as the monarch required the power of "prerogative" to meet his or her obligation to deal adequately and in the interats of the "people" with the problems and crises which confronted the community from time to time, so the "people" required the capability to check and control "abuses" of the prerogative" if and when they occurred. The "right of resistance" was that check, but, and again this deserves stressing, it was not an absolute right in the sense that it could be used capriciously and serendipitously without deliberate and explicit provocation. As Locke notes, the "people" may not invoke such a right

merely because of minor "inconveniences," or wherever the "injured party may be relieved, and his damages repaired by Appeal to the Law."[31] The "right of resistance" may be used justly only where all legal appeals have been "obstructed," and only "if a long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices all tending the same way make the design /of slavery/ visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under, and see whether they are going."[32] To oppose force with resistance under any other cicrumstances is to provoke "a just condemnation both from God and Man."[33]

Although Locke delineates the broad outline of the relationship between executive "prerogative" and the "right of resistance," the precise standards for the just use of the powers attendant to these commitments remain rather vague and ill-defined. It is clear, for example, that each of these commitments is intended as a check upon the potential abuses of the other. What is much less clear, however, is precisely how a particular ruler can be certain that his or her actions conform with the requirements of a just use of "prerogative"? Or, what is in the same vein, how can the "people" have any surety that the Prince's behavior evidences a misuse of the power of "prerogative," or that a particular misuse reflects the Prince's "design" and not his error? The answer which Locke offers is highly equivocal: In either instance, the standard measure of conduct will be the "interest" or "welfare" of the "people": "*Salus Populi Suprema Lex*, is certainly so just and fundamental a Rule, that he, who sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err."[34] Of course, this still leaves the central question largely unanswered: What is the "public interest"? Or, put another way, how can one tell when the "public interest" is *not* being served? To answer this last question, Locke evokes the notion of "trust."

The commitment to "trust" as a political virtue represents the confidence which the members of a society have in their leaders to use the powers and authority of their offices to assist in the preservation of the "lives, liberties and estates" of all of the members of the community.[35] For Locke, "trust" was the *sine qua non* of the successful government in "civil society":

> Though in a Constituted Commonwealth, standing upon its own Basis, and acting according to its own Nature, that is, acting for the preservation of the Community, there can be but *one Supream Power*, which is the Legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends, there remains still *in the People a Supream Power* to remove or *alter* the *Legislative* act contrary to the trust reposed in them. For all *Power given* with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that *end* is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the *trust* must necessarily be *forfeited*, and the Power devolved into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security.[36]

In this passage, "trust" is treated as an object which is remanded along with power and authority, from the members of the community to their leaders. It represents a kind of contractual relationship between the officers of state and the governed regarding the preservation of civil society. In practice, however, Locke acknowledged a sense in which the public's "trust" in their leaders was as much an ancient spirit of mutual love and concern for the security of the community as it was a basic agreement on how to conduct government. In an earlier time, he noted, "without such nursing Fathers tender and carefull of the publick weale, all Government would have sunk under the Weakness and Infirmities of their infancy."[37] According to Locke it was the duty and responsibility of the leaders of a particular society to inspire and sustain this spirit of loving "trust." Whenever it was lost, he maintained, it was always because "the Governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally syspected by the People; the most dangerous state in which they can put themselves."[38] And when such suspicion and distrust becomes prominent, Locke concluded, more is the pity, for the public's "trust" can be retained so easily:

> It being impossible for a Governor, if he really means the good of his People, and the preservation of them and their Laws together, not to make them *see and feel it*; as it is for a Father of a Family, not to let his children see he loves, and takes care of them.[39]

The standard against which the implementation of the commitments to "prerogative" and the "right to resistance" were to be judged, then, was the presence or absence of the spirit of the public's "trust" in their leaders to perform faithfully the duties of their offices. Although this too is somewhat equivocal an answer to the question confronting Locke, it does offer a flexible mechanism for regulating usages of "prerogative" and the popular "right of resistance." Executives and legislators, once elected or appointed, are free to perform the duties of their offices as they see fit, virtually unbound—unbound, that is, up to the point at which the "people," in whose "trust" they serve, question the motives or effects of their actions in terms of the "public interest." When such popular "suspicions" are seriously aroused, leaders will be responsible for quelling them, but it is the "people" themselves who are the final judge as to whether or not their leader's actions have actually superseded and transgressed the just use of their authority and "prerogative":

> *Who shall be Judge* whether the Prince or Legislative act contrary to their *Trust*? ... If a controversie arise betwixt a Prince and some of the People, in a matter where the Law is silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great Consequence, I should think the proper Umpire, in such a Case, should be the Body of the *People*. For in cases when the Prince hath a Trust reposed in him, and is dispensed from the common ordinary Rules of the Law; there, if any, Men find themselves aggrieved, and think the Prince acts contrary to, or beyond Trust, who so proper to Judge as the Body of People (who at first lodg'd that Trust in him) how far they meant it should extend.[40]

Leaders, whose responsibility it is to retain the public's "trust," thus have a clear incentive to adapt their actions to those established

categories of behavior which readily and obviously evidence their love and care of the "people." When this spirit of "trust" is present, the "people" are typically very generous with their leaders, and will tolerate "*Great Mistakes* in the ruling part, /and/ many wrong and inconvenient Laws, and all the slips of humane frailty will be born *by the People*, without mutiny or murmur."[41] But when this spirit of "trust" is absent or only very slight, the "people" are more scrupulous of their leaders' behavior. Under these conditions, those leaders of the community who are so foolish as to utilize their authority despotically to engage activities which are not explicitly in the "public interest," or who fail to adapt their behaviors to the "public interest" immediately upon arousing the "suspicion" of the "people," face almost certain deposition, if not revolutionary resistance.[42]

The commitment to "trust," then, is the key principle in Locke's conception of civil government. While the formal and substantive commitments to "liberty" and "order" or "security" were certainly the primary ideal political virtues towards which the government in "civil society" was conducted—both in Locke's *Second Treatise* as well as the political discourse of the eighteenth century—it was the actual establishment of a spirit of "trust" between the governors and the governed which allowed the society to survive and prosper. Without "trust" there could be no "civil society," in which case the preservation of "liberty" and "order" would be endangered. Consequently, the ideological commitment to public "trust" functions as a regulating force between despotism and anarchy. In the presence of the spirit of "trust," leaders are relatively unencumbered by constraints upon their "prerogative" and can perform their duties freely, while the members of the community feel as if their "lives, liberties and estates" are being preserved as much as is humanly possible. Accordingly, the public's "trust" in leaders and government is at its highest when the "people perceive a serious threat to that balance, either because efforts to achieve the ideal commitment to "order" have somehow resulted in unnecessary (and harsh) constraints upon their rights and freedoms, or because an over-emphasis upon the commitment to particular "liberties" menaces the stability of the entire society, the public's "trust" in their leaders to successfully administer the government dissipates. And if the "people" perceive that threat to be strong enough, it becomes their supreme right and responsibility to reclaim the authority which they have remanded to their leaders, and if necessary, to reconstitute government as a means of better preserving their "liberty" and "order."

The central and decisive episode in establishing and defining the manifest regulatory significance of "trust" as an essential instrument of successful governance did not occur until the middle of the eighteenth century. The principal character involved was Sir Robert Walpole. From 1721 until his resignation in 1742, Walpole served as both the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, thus earning himself the somewhat tainted title as England's first "Prime Minister." For the vast majority of these years, Walpole was largely successful in managing England's foreign and domestic affairs by simultaneously securing the confidence of the Crown and the majority of the members of the House of Commons—this latter through a rather wide network of "bribery, corruption and wise management."[43] In 1739, prompted by public outcry, but against his own better judgement, Walpole declared war against Spain which had been somewhat overzealous in her searching of British ships and the imprisonment of British sailors reputedly engaged in illicit trade along the Spanish Main. When the war began to go badly for England in 1740, there was more public outcry, this time accusing Walpole of failing to support the war effort. The members of the "loyal opposition" used this public sentiment as an opportunity to call for Walpole's removal from the King's ministry:

> A weak man is certainly in any country very unfit for being in the king's counsels; and in a popular government a man who has increased the general odium of the people ought not to be continued in the kings' counsels, because the unpopularity of the minister may at last affect the throne itself and render the people disaffected to their sovereign.44

> I believe every Lord in this house is sensible that he has lost his character with a great majority of the people of this nation, and that he is generally and violently suspected, not only of great failing, but of heinous crimes ... If the suspicion be well grounded, he is in some degree guilty of high treason by the known laws and constitution of his kingdom, and ought to be removed. But the very suspicion is a sufficient cause for addressing the king to remove him, because the people can never be easy whilst a man is in power who, in their opinion, is a traitor against the laws and constitution of this country; for a man who is in danger of suffering the law will certainly endeavour to overturn the law. Therefore, to dissipate the fears and jealousies of the people, and to make them easy under the government of their sovereign, such a minister ought to be removed.45

Whether Walpole was guilty of treasonable offenses or not, then, the opposition asserted that the mere suspicion of guilt indicated the possibility of public disorder, and thus constituted a lack of the public'c "trust" in the minister's leadership.

Walpole managed to overcome this initial on-slaught by charging his accusers with the responsibility of producing positive evidence of his singular misconduct, a task which they could not fulfill.46 Unfortunately for Walpole, however, the damage had been done. Even though he had not been charged officially with having engaged in any activities which abused or constrained the "liberties" guaranteed by the Ancient Constitution, he had been publicly accused of being "suspect" of tyranny and usurpation--the two most heinous crimes in which a public official could engage. In the parliamentary elections of 1741 Walpole managed barely to hold onto a majority in the House of Commons, but in late January of the following year he lost a very close vote on a decisive election petition, and was thus forced by the perception of his inability to administer the government into tendering his resignation. Thus was established in practice the significance of a minister maintaining at least the illusion of "public trust" through a voting majority in the House of Commons.

But the episode did not end there. On February 9, George II named Walpole the first Earl of Orford and raised him to the House of Lords. William Pultney, the editor of the leading opposition newspaper The Craftsman and one of Walpole's chief adversaries, commandeered an assault upon the ministerial conduct of the newly created Earl, claiming the necessity of bringing Walpole to justice. In March a motion was entered in the House of Lords calling for a committee "to inquire into the conduct and affairs at home and abroad during the past twenty years."47 The leading spokesman for this motion was another one of Walpole's leading foes, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, who noted:

> I readily admit, sir, that we have very little to do with the character or reputation of a minister, but as it always does, and must affect our sovereign. But the people may become disaffected as well as discontented, when they find the King continues obstinately to employ a minister who, they think, oppresses them at home and betrays them abroad. We are, therefore, in duty to our sovereign, obliged to inquire into the conduct of a minister when it becomes generally suspected by the people, in order that we may vindicate his character if he be innocent of the charges brought against him, or, if he be guilty, that we may obtain his removal from the councils of our sovereign, and also condign punishment on his crimes.48

Again, the issue of "trust" was eminent, all the more so by virtue of Walpole's election to the peerage and the popular belief that he was "still minister behind the curtain."49 The motion failed to pass by a narrow margin, but was amended and reintroduced two weeks later when it passed by a majority of seven votes.

The committee of inquiry that was established was unable to discover any significant evidence of Walpole's misconduct as a minister that could justify his official reprobation. Nonetheless, the episode was constitutionally significant. The events leading to Walpole's resignation, compounded by the official parliamentary investigation into the popular "suspicions" of his infidelity to the "public interest," signaled to all future ministers the necessity of being able to evidence this "trust" in their policies. Following Walpole's experience, ministers had to satisfy two conditions in order to evidence this "trust": First, they had to be capable of securing a majority in the House of Commons on decisive votes. Any minister who could not control the House of Commons had lost the ability to administer government successfully, and had, by definition, lost the "trust" of the legislature. Second, they had to maintain at least the perception that "liberty" and "order" were in perfect balance throughout the realm, and that the "lives, liberties and estates" of the "people" were being preserved and protected. Anything which disrupted this perception, as, for example, widespread popular "suspicion" of the minister's fidelity to the "trust" which had been reposed in him, or mass disorder--including public outcry, riots and rebellions--was prima facie evidence of an imbalance between "liberty" and "order," and represented the failure of the minister to adequately accommodatethe "public interest." Never again, at least in the eighteenth century, would a minister retain his office in the presence of the perception that he had lost the "trust" of the "people."50

My purpose thus far has been to describe the spirit of Whiggism which dominated political consciousness in eighteenth-century England by focusing attention upon the language in which it was expressed in ideological argumentation. In particular, I have argued that the dominant spirit of eighteenth-century Whiggism emerged initially during the years following the Glorious Revolution as a sort of rapprochement between the ideological commitments of radical Whigs who praised "liberty" as the supreme virtue of civil society, and conservative Tories who praised social and political "order" as the supreme virtue of civil society. In the process of affecting this rapprochement the spirit of Whiggism emerged as a normative commitment to the simultaneous achievement of both "liberty" and "order." Of course, the natural tension between absolute "liberty" and perfect "order" made the attainment of such a state virtually impossible. Nevertheless, by constructing a government controlled by a "rule of law" which was grounded ultimately in a commitment to the "consent of the people," and by defining "liberty" and "order" as practical terms, rooted in historical precedent and human experience, it was possible to regulate the tension between them so as to maximize the achievement of both.

The mechanism of regulation acknowledged by the spirit of eighteenth-century Whiggism was a rhetorical/political process which consisted of three regulatory ideographic commitments: executive "prerogative," the popular "right of resistance," and, most important, "public trust." Even though the Revolutionary Settlement located the sovereignty of England in the Parliament as the supreme legislative body of the nation, in point of fact, the burden of administering government in the eighteenth century rested more with the executive monarch or, to be more specific still, his ministers, than anywhere else. In order to perform their duties adequately, these executives required a flexible authority, a power of "prerogative" that allowed them to ignore or to go beyond the written "rules of law" of the society if and when it was necessary to the preservation of the balance of "liberty" and "order." Of course, executives who misused this "prerogative" to the detriment of that balance—in fact or in popular perception—faced charges of usurpation and tyranny. In the event that the normal legal process was unable to control and eliminate such misuse, the "people," in whose interest and with whose consent the governors governed, possessed the ultimate "right of resisting" their leaders, just as they had done during the Glorious Revolution to restore the original principles of the Ancient Constitution which had been subverted by James II. Throughout the century, however, the "right of resistance" was remarkably seldom employed in England, the result of the presence of a third regulatory ideological principle which emerged in the political argument of the age, the commitment to "public trust."

The only way that executives could effectively maintain the balance between "liberty" and "order" was to use their "prerogative" to solve the crises and emergencies which would occasionally erupt, and which were not specifically accounted for in the "rules of law." While the primary fear of eighteenth-century Englishmen was that a monarch or his ministers would misuse their "prerogative" powers and thus enslave an entire community, the obverse condition was equally if not more problematic. An executive who failed to utilize the "prerogative" power when it was necessary, was derilect of duty, an incompetent who was only slightly more palatable--but certainly no more useful--than a tyrant or usurper. As long as executives were constantly looking over their shoulders, eyeing the popular temperament ever fearful of the possibility that any use of "prerogative" would be considered jealously by the "people" as a misuse of power, they would never be effective in administering government. In order to accommodate this potentially paralyzing situation, leaders learned to enlist the "trust" of their "people," to create the feeling and belief that whatever executive actions were taken, they were always motivated by the executive's "love and care" of his or her subjects, and the desire to secure and preserve a comfortable and prosperous balance between "liberty" and "order." Of course, those leaders who managed to maintain the perception that they had preserved the balance between "liberty" and "order," whatever their specific demeanor towards their "people," also frequently earned the public's confidence and "trust" as demonstrated in public elections, etc. Thus emerged, in the discourse of the eighteenth century, a normative commitment to the equation: "love of people" = "public trust" = "love and order." Leaders who could demonstrate either their competence as administrators in the public interest, or their love and care of their subjects, were assured of maintaining the image of the public trust and could therefore be relatively secure in their use of "prerogative" powers. To lose both, however, as did Walpole in 1742, was to sacrifice the public trust entirely, and to threaten the possibility of mass disruption of the society. And throughout the remainder of the eighteenth century, whenever such conditions became evident, monarchs were ever careful to demonstrate their love and care of their subjects by replacing wayward ministers with more acceptable individuals. Along side of the substantive commitments to "liberty" and "order," then, "public trust" became the dominant, organizing regulatory commitment of the spirit of Anglo-Whiggism.

CONCLUSION

I began with the assumption that one of the primary values of ideographic analysis is that it provides a means of examining directly the conflicts and contradictions which emerge naturally within ideological communities or systems, and which become embedded in ideological argumentation. By charting the origins and usages of "liberty," "order," and "public trust" as the first order, organizing principles of eighteenth-century Anglo-Whiggism, I have begun to describe the rhetorical process by which such conflicts emerge in political consciousness and are resolved. In particular, I have suggested that the key tensions of eighteenth-century Anglo-Whiggism were grounded, in rhetorical praxis, in a competition between "liberty" and "order," two contrary, substantive ideographic commitments. The resolution of this tension was achieved, not by establishing the priority of one over the other, but through the development, again in specific rhetorical praxis, of "public trust" as a regulatory ideographic commitment which afforded both leaders and people the opportunity to exploit and manage that tension through elicitations of loving care.

Of course, ideographs can function in relationship to one another in any number of ways which are by no means exhausted in the analysis of their substantive and regulatory qualities. I do believe that there is value in specifically emphasizing the substantive and regulatory functions of ideographs, however, because, as in the case study above, they help to direct our attention to the point(s) at which ideological dislocations occur which frequently result in socio-political crises of legitimacy. To even begin to explore this claim would take more time and space than is available in this forum, but I would leave you with a hypothesis that I am currently exploring. To wit: Crises of socio-political legitimacy occur most frequently when advocates attempt to convert essentially regulatory ideographic commitments into substantive ideographic commitments. So, for example, Edmund Burke read a potential crisis of legitimacy in the efforts of Dr. Richard Price to elevate "public trust" to the level of a substantive ideograph in the wake of the French Revolution. In more recent times, you might recall the havoc wreaked by Richard M. Nixon's efforts to give "executive privilege" a kind of independent existence as a substantive ideological commitment. In the end, of course, his efforts failed. And the reason, one might argue, is because "executive privilege" exists merely as a means of balancing the relationships between commitments to "liberty" and "law and order." In and of itself, "executive privilege" possesses no "intrinsic" worth.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), esp. pp. 1-48.

[2] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, ed. C.J. Arthur (New York: International Pub., 1970), p. 47.

[3] See Irving M. Zeitlin, Ideology and The Development of Sociological Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968); and George Lichtheim, "The Concept of Ideology," History and Theory, 4 (1964-1965), 164-95.

[4] See, for example, Edwin Black, "The Second Persona," QJS, 56 (April 1970), 109-119; and "The Sentimental Style As Escapism, Or The Devil with Dan'l Webster," in Form And Genre: Shaping Rhetorical Action, ed. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, (Falls Church, Virginia: SCA, 1976), pp. 75-86; Fredric Jameson, The Prison House of Language (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Niklaus Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society, trans. Stephen Holmes and Charles Larmore (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 90-121, 166-189, and 229-270; Terry Eagleton, Walter Benjamin: Towards A A Revolutionary Criticism (London: New Left Books, 1981), pp. 70-180; and Giddens, pp. 165-233.

[5] Michael Calvin McGee, "The 'Ideograph': A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology," QJS, 66 (February 1980), 1-16; "The Origins of 'Liberty': A Feminization of Power," CM, 47 (March 1980), 23-45; and (with Martha Anne Martin), "Public Knowledge and Ideological Argumentation," CM, 50 (March 1983), 47-65.

[6] My use of the phrase "ideological system," which I take to be wholly compatible with McGee's notion of the "ideograph," is intended to suggest the propositonal/linguistic statements of fact which categorize the ideal value structure of a culture, and which, by necessity, its members, by virtue of their inclusion in the community, must adhere to, strive for and defend. Thus, the claim "All men are created equal," would be an ideolgoical statement which contained the ideograph "equality." My own use of the term "ideology" borrows from and builds upon the work of the following: Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben Brewster (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 127-88; Clifford Geertz, "Ideology As A Culture System," in The Interpretation of Cultures (N.Y.: Basic Books, Inc., 1973), pp. 193-233; Jurgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics," in Communication and The Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press

1979), pp. 1-68; Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. Louis Wirth and Edwin Shils (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1936), pp. 55-108; Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 37-94; and Martin Seliger, Ideology and Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1976), pp. 97-9.

[7] McGee, "The Ideograph," 13.

[8] See J.H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England, 1675-1725 (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 133-66; H.T. Dickinson, "The Eighteenth-Century Debate on the 'Glorious Revolution'," History (1976), 28-45; Archibald S. Foord, His Majesty's Opposition, 1714-1830 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), esp. pp. 13-54; and Fredrich George Marcham, A Constitutional History of Modern England (N.Y.: Harper Brothers, 1960), pp. 171-281.

[9] John Hampden, "Some Short Considerations Concerning the State of The Nation, Presented About November, 1692," in Parliamentary History (Hereafter PH), Vol. 5, Appendix 7, pp. lxvi-lxxxi.

[10] Keith Feiling, A History of the Tory Party, 1640-1714 (Oxford: The University Press, 1924), pp. 484-493.

[11] See, for example, "The Corporation Act of 1661," in Statutes of the Realm, V, pp. 321.

[12] PH, Vol. V, pp. 35-50.

[14] See John Sharp, A Sermon Preached Before the House of Lords on 30 January 1700 (1700), pp. 20-21; Francis Atterbury, The Voice of The People, no Voice of God (1710), p. 6; and George Berkeley, The Revolution No Rebellion (1710). The divine nature of the combined legislature is put forth most forcefully in Offspring Blackall, The Lord Bishop of Exeter's Reply to Mr. Hoadly's Letter (1709), pp. 22-3.

[13] Mr. Simon Harcourt, State Trials, 9 Anne A.D. 1710, p. 196. See also Sir Keith Feiling, History of the Tory Party, pp. 417.

[15] Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthsman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 3-87 and 320-88.

[16] Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714-1760 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).

[17] See W.E.H. Lecky, England in the Eighteenth Century, Vol. I (N.Y.: Appleton and Company, 1888); and Geoffrey Holmes, "Harley, St. John and the Death of the Tory Party," in Britain After the Glorious Revolution 1689-1714, Ed. Geoffrey Holmes, (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1969), pp. 216-237.

[18] See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 4 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979, originally published in 1769), esp. pp. 400-436.

[19] John Brewer, Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 42.

[20] See McGee, "The Feminization of Power."

[21] John, Lord Somers, A Vindication of the Proceedings of the late Parliament of England, An. Dom. 1689, being the First in the Reign of Their Present Majesties King William and Queen Mary, 1692. Reprinted in PH, Vol. 5, Appendix IV, pp. xxiv.

[22] "The King's Speech on the Opening of the Session, 1715," PH, Vol. 8, pp. 42-44. Emphases added.

[23] John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, (New York: Cambridge U. Press, 1960), pp. 74-78.

[24] Locke, Second Treatise, VII:89, pp. 368-7. (Page numbers refer tothe Laslett edition which will be used throughout. The roman numeral refers to the chapter in the Treatise and is followed by the paragraph number ascribed by Locke.)

[25] Dickinson, Liberty and Property, p. 90.

[26] Locke, Second Treatise, XII: 144, pp. 410-11.

[27] Ibid., XIX: 159, p. 421.

[28] Ibid., XIV: 160, p. 422.

[29] Ibid., XIV: 166, pp. 424-5.

[30] Ibid., XIV: 162, pp. 422-3.

[31] Ibid., XVIII: 207, p. 451.

[32] Ibid., XIX:240, p. 476; and XVIII: 208, p. 452.

[33] Ibid., XVIII: 203, p. 449.

[34] Ibid., XIII: 157, p. 419.

[35] Ibid., IX: 123, p. 395.

[36] Ibid., XIII:149, pp. 412-13.

[37] Ibid., VIII: 110,111, pp. 387-7.

[38] Ibid., XVIII: 210, p. 453. Emphasis added.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., XIX: 240, 241, pp. 476-77.

[41] Ibid., XIX: 225, p. 463.

[42] Ibid., XIX: 214, p. 477.

[43] Goldwin Smith, *A History of England* (N.Y.: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1949), p. 428; and W.A. Speck, *Stability and Strife, England, 1714-1760*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 203-19.

[44] Lord Carteret, "Debate on the Removal of Walpole From Office," 1741, Before the House of Lords. Cobbett, *PH*, XI, pp. 1049-1388.

[45] Lord Argyle, "Debate on the Removal of Walpole from Office," 1741, Before the House of Lords. Reprinted in *Sources of English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents From A.D. 600 to The Present*, ed. Carl Stephenson and Fredrick George Marcham, (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1937), pp. 631-2.

[46] "A Speech of Sir Robert Walpole on A Motion for Addressing the King for His Removal, Delivered In the House of Commons, February, 1741," Reprinted in *Select British Eloquence*, ed., Chauncey A. Goodrich, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Co., 1963), pp. 35-42.

[47] Ibid., p. 82.

[48] "A Speech of Lord Chatham on a Motion For Inquiring Into The Conduct of Sir Robert Walpole, Delivered in the House of Commons, March 9, 1742. Reprinted in Goodrich, pp. 82-89.

[49] Horace Walpole, cited in Smith, *A History of England*, p. 433.

[50] See Sir LEwis Namier, *England In The Age of the American Revolution*, (London: Macmillan, 1961) pp. 45-108; and Michael C. McGee, "The Rhetorical Process in Eighteenth-Century England," in *Rhetoric: A Tradition in Transition*, ed. Walter R. Fisher (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1974), pp. 99-121.

BECOMING THE PAST:
THE RATIONALE OF RENEWAL AND THE ANNULMENT OF HISTORY

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Of all the rationales for action in rhetorical discourse, the idea of renewal, a rationale that posits the possibility of essentially "becoming the past," is one of the most specious ever conceived. Not only does such a rationale violate the idea of temporal linearity, the image of time most readily accessible to the consciousness of modern humanity,[1] it also promises in return for an auditor's action a reward that the rhetor cannot possibly deliver; i.e., an actual recreation of past conditions.

And yet, despite the validity of these criticisms, the rationale of renewal has remained a pervasive mode of thought in American social life from the Jeremiads of the Puritan era down to the present.[2] For this reason alone, we are justified in asking just what it is about this rationale that has ensured its enduring appeal throughout American history and its current widespread use in contemporary discourse.

In this paper, I will argue that the appeal of this rationale can only be explained in terms of its ability to relieve a form of temporal anxiety that results not so much from the fear of the uncertainties of the future, but rather from the guilt regarding the irreversibility of the consequences of past actions. The rationale seems to be able to combat this sense of guilt by convincing an auditor that the adoption of a particular course of action will bring about a symbolic annulment of history. With this in mind, let us first examine the arguments that make up this rationale, review some of the most important criticisms that have been leveled against the mode of thinking that it seems to entail, and identify the sociological and psychological conditions that seem to increase an auditor's susceptibility to such a rationale.

II

In public discourse, the idea of renewal usually assumes the form of three interrelated claims. The first is an evocation of an image of a quasi-mythical golden age, the chronological position in time of which is never specific. The second claim details and "fall" of humanity from this golden age (for whatever reason) and argues that this same humanity is now following a dangerous course that can only eventuate in some dreaded end. The final claim is an exhortation to the auditors that they can abandon this course and effect a return to the values and way of life of the golden era. These three claims form the rationale for the adoption of a particular course of action advocated by the rhetor. In other words, only by means of this course of action can the golden era be recreated. The success of this rationale, of course, presupposes that the auditor be in essential agreement with the rhetor that the golden era is indeed worth recapturing, that the auditor is somehow responsible for the passing of this era, and that it is truly within the power of the auditor to recreate this idyllic past.[3]

Despite its apparent simplicity, the rationale of renewal actually consists of the skillful juxtaposition of two distinct types of arguments; direction and unlimited development. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, "The argument of direction implies . . . the existence of a series of stages toward a certain--usually dreaded--end and, with it, the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of crying halt once one has started on the road leading to that end."[4] This argument comprises the second claim of the rationale that posits the movement of humanity along an undesirable course. On the other hand, this threat of direction is countered with the promise of unlimited development, an argument that asserts the "possibility of always going further in a certain direction without being able to foresee a limit to this direction, and this progress is accompanied by a continuous increase in value."[5] This argument, of course, comprises the third claim of the rationale. However, the employment of this type of argument does not strictly adhere to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's description in the sense that the development it promises does not seem to lie in the future but rather in the past. Hence, the argument appears more as one of retrogression rather than development.

Because of this implication, the consciousness of time entailed by this rationale has encountered severe criticism from process philosophers and sociologists of knowledge as being fallacious. Of the former, Henri Bergson is perhaps the most representative. For Bergson, the human conception of time is confusing and "unreal" in that this conception erroneously perceives time to be a homogeneous medium like that of space. Bergson argues, however, that while space is a homogeneous medium that is subject to quantifiable measurement, time is a heterogeneous medium that can be apprehended only as quality. Time, according to Bergson, is best understood as duration, "a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outline, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, without any affiliation with number: it/Is7 pure heterogeneity."[6] Because duration is heterogeneous rather than homogeneous, it is impossible for past states to recur or to be recreated. In the words of Bergson:

> Now, if duration is what we say, deep-seated psychic states are radically heterogeneous to each other, and it is impossible that any two of them should be quite alike, since they are different moments in a life story. While the external object does not bear the mark of time that has elapsed and thus, in spite of the difference of time, the physicist can again encounter identical elementary conditions, duration is something real for the consciousness which preserves the trace of it, and we cannot here speak of identical conditions, because the same moment does not occur twice. . . . /To entertain such a notion7 would be to forget that even the simplest psychic elements possess a personality and a life of their own, however superficial they may be; they are in a constant state of becoming, and the same feeling, by the mere fact of being repeated, is a new feeling.[7]

A similar idea is expressed in the following observation by sociologist Joseph Gabel: "Now, in common-sense terms, the essential characteristic of space is to allow movement in all directions and also backwards. One does not choose 'one's place' in time; in theory one can choose it in space. One cannot go back in time but one can move freely in space."[8] Gabel goes on to argue that time, unlike space, is a "dialectical dimension not only because, contrary to space, it is impossible to conceive of it in a state of rest, but also because its progression effects a dialectical synthesis constantly being reborn in its three dimensions: present, past, future."[9] Hence, for Gabel, the confusion of time with space is a symptomatic characteristic of the reification of the social world, of false consciousness.

It can be noted that both Bergson and Gabel employ a conception of time as irreversible linear motion, and it is this conception that enables both authors to label the idea of renewal fallacious. When viewed from this perspective, the claim of being able to return to or recapture the past must be viewed as nonsense. However, if one closely examines examples of the rationale as it appears in public discourse, one discovers that the rhetors employing it are not proposing a reversal of time in the literal sense, but rather a renewal of past conditions in the future. The rhetors are thus employing the same linear conception of time as Bergson and Gabel. Nevertheless, the criticism could still be made that

these rhetors have neglected to consider the heterogeneous nature of time. If, indeed, time is a heterogeneous line, then every point that makes up this line is qualitatively different from all the other points. Consequently, to argue that a point from the past can be repeated in the future is to commit the fallacy of conceiving time in terms of space.

As was stated above, the criticisms of the rationale of renewal are all too valid. And yet this rationale, the dubious nature of which should be revealed by common sense, continues to exert a powerful influence upon our consciousness of time. As might be expected, the rationale is most commonly found in examples of religious discourse. In such discourse, the rationale is somewhat more acceptable to the critical mind in that it is thought to refer primarily to sacred time, which by nature is infinitely repeatable, rather than the temporal structure of the everyday world. However, even a casual perusal of contemporary public discourse will reveal the abundant use of this rationale to advocate the most profane courses of action imaginable. When this is the case, the time frame employed by the rationale is not that of heaven, but rather that of the mundane world. In rhetorical contexts such as this, how can the rationale assume an aura of plausibility? One possible answer to this question, I would suggest, is that certain sociological and psychological conditions render auditors more susceptible to the appeal of this rationale. Let us now turn to an examination of some of these conditions.

Most commonly, the rationale of renewal appeals to individuals in times of rapid social change. In these situations, some individuals' normative expectations regarding the present are frustrated and their ideological frame of reference is unable to account for this discontinuity.[10] As the level of frustration intensifies, so does the tendency toward anomy or meaninglessness.[11] In other words, these individuals begin to question the meaning that the ideology has bestowed upon the society's history. More important, the course of this history now assumes the form of a temporal progression that these individuals can no longer understand. Devoid of all the transhistorical meaning that had previously been attributed to it, history now appears as nothing more than "the blind play of economic, social, or political forces, or, even worse, only the result of 'liberties' that a minority takes and exercises directly. . . ."[12] Consequently, many individuals cease to perceive themselves as free human agents capable of controlling their own destiny and making their own history. The future becomes a source of anxiety for them in that it promises to be but a further progression into the depths of anomy. Inevitably, in these particular instances, the natural human tendency toward nostalgia is intensified considerably. As Hans Kung has noted: "It is completely understandable in an epoch of radical upheavals in all spheres of life that very many /long7 for peace and security, for the apparently more stable conditions of former times."[13]

Now, if we examine this longing for the past closely, we find that it is a form of temporal anxiety that is in some ways similar to that described by Cox in his essay on the notion of the irreparable in argumentation. Here, Cox notes that humans are usually future-oriented in the sense that "we structure our existence in relation to certain ends--in relation to purposes which are realizable within time. . . . Within this structuring framework of time, we are able to establish our lives meaningfully; we can entertain hope, make plans, act, or organize projects."[14] However, Cox goes on to argue that this same future-orientation can become a source of extreme anxiety for humans in that "the symbolic capacity which allows us to 'stand beyone' ourselves also brings us face to face with our finitude."[15] The heightened realization of our finitude, Cox concludes, serves to "transform our experience of time. We experience the future as closed. When this happens, time becomes threatening; the future becomes a source of anxiety and dread. The human dilemma is inescapable: Whether in turning away or in resolving to face the future, we risk irreparable loss. In turning from the future as a way of reducing anxiety, we choose an 'inauthentic' existence. Yet, in forming projects, in opening ourselves to the future, we expose ourselves to the possibilities of suffering and loss, including our own death."[16]

This form of temporal anxiety is similar to that addressed by the rationale of renewal in that both result in the sufferer experiencing the future as a source of dread. But in the case of heightened nostalgia, however, the root cause is not the realization of loss, separation, and death. Instead, this form of anxiety seems to result more from the consciousness of what Hannah Arendt terms the "process character of action."[17] According to Arendt, such consciousness stems from the belief that "men never have been and never will be able to undo or even to control reliabily any of the processes they start through action. Not even oblivion and confusion, which can cover up so efficiently the origin and the responsibility for every single deed, are ever able to undo a deed or prevent its consequences. And this incapacity to undo what has been done is matched by an almost equally complete incapacity to foretell the consequences of any deed or even to have reliable knowledge of its motives."[18] The effect of such a belief in terms of the nature of the anxiety it produces is described by Arendt in the following manner:

> That deeds possess such an enormous capacity for endurance, superior to every other man-made product, could be a matter of pride if men were able to bear its burden, the burden of irreversibility and unpredictability, from which the action process draws its very strength. That this is impossible, men have always known. They have known that he who acts never quite knows what he is doing, that he always becomes "guilty" of consequences he never intended or even foresaw, that no matter how disastrous and unexpected the consequences of his deed he can never undo it, that the process he starts is never consummated unequivocally in one single deed or event, and that its very meaning never discloses itself to the actor but only to the backward glance of the historian who himself does not act.[19]

As can be seen, the kind of anxiety that Arendt describes here is produced by the belief that the processes initiated by past actions have come to possess a "life" of their own. By virtue of this fact and the fact of the presumed irreversibility of these processes, the individual comes to perceive himself/herself as a mute object whose fate is to be eventually determined by the consequences of past actions that now seem to be beyond his/her control. Of course, such a perception negates the very idea of human freedom. In the words of Arendt: "All this is reason enough to turn away with despair from the realm of human affairs and to hold in contempt the human capacity for freedom, which, by producing the web of human relationships, seems to entangle its producer to such an extent that he appears much more the victim and the sufferer than the author and doer of what he has done."[20] As one would naturally expect, those who suffer from this type of anxiety become desperate for the proverbial second chance; i.e., the re-creation of past times so that the mistakes then committed can somehow be annulled.

The rationale of renewal thus appeals to this type of anxiety in that it claims to provide the auditor with an opportunity for a second chance. In so doing, it functions in a way similar to the regenerative rituals of primitive societies. According to Mircea Eliade, primitive peoples are those "for whom time is recorded only biologically without being allowed to become 'history'--that is, without its corrosive action being able to exert itself upon consciousness by revealing the irreversibility of events."[21] By means of rituals that abolish past time and reactualize the cosmogony, the primitive is able to keep this corrosive action of history at bay. Because of this belief, Eliade argues that the individual of the archaic civilization was able to experience a type of freedom no longer available to modern humanity. This point is expressed in the following manner:

> He is free to be no longer what he was, free to annul his own history through periodic abolition of time and collective regeneration. This freedom in respect to his own history--which, for the modern, is not only irreversible but constitutes human existence--cannot be claimed by the man who wills to be historical. We know that the archaic and traditional societies granted freedom each year to begin anew a 'pure' existence, with virgin possibilities. . . . Indeed, whereas nature repeats itself, each new spring being the same eternal spring . . . archaic man's 'purity' after the periodic abolition of time and the recovery of his virtualities intact allows him, on the threshold of each 'new life', a continued existence in eternity and hence the definitive abolition, hic et nunc, of profane time.[22]

Like the primitive rituals described by Eliade, the rationale of renewal also seeks to abolish the past. However, this annulment differs from that performed by the archaic rituals of regeneration in that it is not intended to produce a "new" life for those who attend to it, but rather the reproduction of an old one. In order to accomplish this symbolic effect, the rhetor employing the rationale must first counter the debilitating effects of historical anomy and convince an auditor that the possibility exists for effective action. In other words, the rationale must not confer value upon history itself, but rather upon the ability of the human agent to alter history. This valuation of the human agent in history serves to negate the idea of historical processes irrevocably determining the course of human development. If the rhetor can successfully accomplish these tasks, then the rationale should produce two perceptual changes in an auditor. First, the future loses some measure of its terror in that it is revealed to be subject to human choice rather than historical contingencies. Second, and most important, the auditor now perceives himself/herself as possessing a plan of action that will bring about the annulment of the consequences of history similar to that described by Eliade above.

One of the clearest examples of the employment of the rationale of renewal in recent American discourse can be found in President Jimmy Carter's speech of July 15, 1979. Carter's use of this rationale in the speech is interesting for two reasons. First, the fact that this speech was not successful implies that the majority of his auditors did not accept all of the presuppositions necessary for the rationale to be effective. In this particular instance, the majority most likely did not accept the idea that they were somehow responsible for the energy crisis and the state of anomy described by Carter. Hence, the President as unable to instill in the audience the requisite burden of guilt over the consequences of past actions.[23] Aside from this, however, Carter's employment of the rationale is exemplary. Let us now turn to a brief examination of this rationale as it appears in this speech.

Ostensibly, the topic of the speech is the energy problem and what the government and people must do in order to solve this problem. However, Carter also takes this occasion to address what he perceived to be the real problem facing the United States, namely the "crisis of confidence" that had resulted in "growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and the loss of unity of purpose for our nation."[24]

Early in the speech, Carter evokes the image of the archtypal golden age, a past in which people "believed in something called progress" and had "faith that the days of our children would be better than our own." According to the President: "As a people we know our past and we are proud of it. Our progress has been part of the living history of America, even the world. We always believed that we were part of a great movement of humanity itself called democracy, involved in the search for freedom and that belief has always strengthened us in our purpose."

But this golden era was ended, Carter argues, by the turning away of the American people from their true being: "In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close-knit communities, and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. Human identity is no longer defined by what one does, but by what one owns." Following this rejection of what Carter considers to be "authentic" American being, a period of historical anomy was somehow ushered in:

> We were sure that ours was a nation of the ballot, not the bullet, until the murders of John Kennedy and Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. We were taught that our armies were always invincible and our causes were always just, only to suffer the agony of Vietnam. We respected the Presidency as a place of honor until the shock of Wagergate. We remember when the phrase "sound as a dollar" was an expression of absolute dependability, until 10 years of inflation began to shrink our dollar and our savings. We believed that our Nation's resources were limitless until 1973 when we had to face a growing dependence on foriegn oil. These wounds are still very deep. They have never been healed.

In the face of this terrifying historical progression, Carter asserts that the people have looked to Washington to change this direction and found a "system of government that seems incapable of action," a government that is "twisted and pulled in every direction by hundreds of well-financed and powerful special interests."

The inability of the American government to act decisively and positively to change this direction of events has produced a similar state of "paralysis and stagnation and drift" among the American people. In Carter's words: "For the first time in the history of our country a majority of our people believe that the next 5 years will be worse than the past 5 years. Two-thirds of our people do not even vote. The productivity of American workers is actually dropping, falling below that of all other people in the Western world. As you know, there is a growing disrespect for government and for churches and for schools, the news media, and other institutions."

Having thus defined the American people as a collectivity who experience their past as meaningless and their future as closed, Carter is ready to conclude his argument of direction. He states that his "is not a message of happiness or reassurance, but it is the truth and it is a warning." If the American people do not attempt to do something to change this course, they will continue down the "path that leads to fragmentation and self-interest. Down that road lies a mistaken idea of freedom, the right to grasp for ourselves some advantage over others. That path would be one of constant conflict between narrow interests ending in chaos and immobility. It is a certain route to failure."

But Carter argues that this course can be altered if the crucial problem of energy can be solved: "Energy will be the immediate test of our ability to unite this Nation, and it can also be the standard around which we rally. On the battlefield of energy we can win for our Nation a new confidence, and we can seize control again of our common destiny." Carter thus intimates that effective action in the face of time and the processes initiated by past action is indeed possible: "We know the strength of America. We are strong. We can regain our unity. We can regain our confidence. . . . Restoring that faith and that confidence to America is now the most important task we face." Only by means of this action, he argues, can Americans reinstitute in the future the golden era of the past: "All the traditions of our past, all the lessons of our heritage, all the promises of our future point to another path, the path of common purpose and the restoration of American values. That path leads to true freedom for our nation and ourselves. We can take the first steps down that path as we begin to solve our energy problem."

As can be seen, the rationale of renewal stands in stubborn defiance of the inexorable linearity of time and the processes initiated by past actions. In return for the adoption of and support for his course of action, Carter promises the American people the ability to abolish their past history. All the sins and nightmares of recent decades will be forgotten and Americans will be able to renew their lives in an idyllic era when human beings can once again control time rather than be subject to it.

In the final analysis, it is this idea of the human mastery of time and human development through time that constitutes the core appeal of the rationale of renewal. This rationale continues to exert a powerful hold on the minds of humanity in that it continues to reaffirm the possibility of a truly autonomous individual "freed" from the ravages of time.

But is this a promise a rhetor can truly keep? In other words, is the rationale worthy of praise in that it offers hope to individuals and collectivities where previously there was only the nightmare of anomy and inaction? Or should this rationale be condemned on the grounds that its promise is one that cannot humanly be fulfilled? Does the rationale ultimately prey upon and produce nothing more than a non-productive fixation with the "good old days?" In the final portion of this paper, I will propose a tentative answer to these questions.

III

That the rationale of renewal appeals to the auditor's nostalgia for the "good old days" is undeniable. That the idyllic past depicted by the rationale never existed or, at least, was not so idyllic as auditors seem to remember it, is also a claim that must be granted. Finally, that the level of temporal anxiety can actually increase as the result of a plan of action's inability to "liberate" auditors from the consequences of past actions is an occurence that happens more often than not.

However, in our zeal to dismiss the rationale as nothing more than pernicious reactionism, let us not overlook the properties that the rationale shares with those arguments we consider to be less specious. Indeed, if we reflect for a moment upon the function performed by the rationale, perhaps we might recognize in it (albeit in extreme form) the function performed by all deliberative rhetoric.

As noted above, the rationale of renewal is very careful not to confer value upon history itself, but rather upon the ability of the human agent to act freely in the face temporal progression. In a very broad sense, I would argue that this is the essential function of all deliberative discourse. Arendt, I think, states this position best in a passage that deserves to be quoted in some length:

> If without action and speech, without the articulation of natality, we would be doomed to swing forever in the ever-recurring cycle of becoming, then without the faculty to undo what we have done and to control at least partially the processes we have let loose, we would be the victims of an automatic necessity bearing all the marks of the inexorable laws which, according to the natural sciences before our time, were supposed to constitute the outstanding characteristic of natural processes. We have seen before that to mortal beings this natural fatality, though it swings in itself and may be eternal, can only spell doom. If it were true that fatality is the inalienable mark of historical processes, then it would indeed be equally true that everything done in history is doomed. And to a certain extent this is true. If left to themselves, human affairs can only follow the law of mortality, which is the most certain and the only reliable law of a life spent between birth and death. It is the faculty of action that interferes with this law because it interrupts the inexorable automatic course of daily life. . . . The life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order to live.[25]

It is this autonomy of human action in spite of the temporal process that the rationale, like all deliberative rhetoric, seeks to perform. The ultimate value of this rationale, then, lies not in the fact that it promises a return to a golden past, but rather in the fact that it de-values the idea that humans must always surrender themselves to the consequences of their past actions.

Footnotes

[1] The conception of time as a linear progression is usually attributed to the Christian influence on Western thought. According to Mircea Eliade in *The Myth of the Eternal Return or, Cosmos and History* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974), the "linear conception of time and history /was/ outlined in the second century by St. Irenaeus of Lyon. . . taken up again by St. Basil and St. Gregory and. . . finally elaborated by St. Augustine" (p. 143). See also *The Philosophy of History in Our Time*, ed. Hans Meyerhoff (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), esp. pp. 1-25. Reservations regarding the generality of this attribution, however, are outlined by Arnaldo Momigliano, "Time in Ancient Historiography," *History and Theory*, *Beiheft* 6 (1966), 1-23; and Chester G. Starr, "Historical and Philosophical Time," *History and Theory*, *Beiheft* 6 (1966), 24-35.

[2] That the idea of renewal or reversing the "evil" direction of collectivity's progress has been a stock element of both European and American Jeremiads is asserted by Sacvan Bercovitch in *The American Jeremiad* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1978), esp. pp. 3-30. For other discussions of the idea of renewal in American public discourse, see Ernest G. Bormann, "Fetching Good Out of Evil: A Rhetorical Use of Calamity," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 63 (1977), 130-139, and Kurt W. Ritter, "American Political Rhetoric and the Jeremiad Tradition: Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speeches, 1960-1976," *Central States Speech Journal* 31 (1980), 153-171.

[3] In *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries: The Encounter Between Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Realities* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), Mircea Eliade argues that such a belief in renewal is a survival of mythological thinking in the modern world. See esp. pp. 23-38 and 59-72.

[4] Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 284.

[5] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, p. 287.

[6] Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1910), p. 104.

[7] Bergon, pp. 199-200.

[8] Joseph Gabel, *False Consciousness: An Essay on Reification* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. 106.

[9] Gabel, p. 107.

[10] This idea of ideological discontinuity is perhaps best expressed by Walter Prescott Webb in The Great Frontier (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1951). Here, Webb argues that the ideology produced the American frontier has become obsolete in twentieth-century American life: "The dilemma of the modern man is due to the persistence of his psychology, the last piece of baggage to be discarded by the traveler faced with new conditions. The modern man cannot divest himself of his desire to act in the old way; but he cannot succeed by acting in the old way. The result is an offset between his desires and his possibilities. The cogs of his mind do not engage with reality, and therefore he is out of gear. Despite all his efforts, nothing happens, he does not get forward, for the reason that he is living in the realm of unreality, a land of remembered things. He is trying to harness the dreams of yesterday, of the frontier, to the machines of today and tomorrow" (p. 121). This sense of discontinuity, Webb notes, most usually manifests itself as nostalgia: "It is thus that many American people remember frontier life, its romance, its freedom, its opportunity. For this it has become a fixation, and many of them wish they could return to the 'good old days'" (p. 122).

[11] The concept of anomie was first developed by Emile Durkheim and is most fully explicated in his works entitled The Division of Labor in Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1964) and Suicide (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951). Durkheim is rather vague, however, in his application of the concept to society and subsequent social theorists have attempted to clarify the term and make it more applicable to contemporary twenthieth-century societies. Unfortunately, these attempts at clarification have only served to increase the conceptual confusion surrounding the term. Among the best explanations of anomie and its relevance for contemporary social theory are those by Anthony Giddens in Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971), esp. pp. 65-81, 91-94, and 224-232, and Steven Lukes, "Alienation and Anomie," in Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), pp. 134-156. The definition of anomie as employed in this paper is the most common now in use and is drawn from two sources. The first is that of Ruth Wallace and Alison Wolf in Contemporary Sociological Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1980). Here, these authors define the term as the "discontinuity between peoples' actual experiences and their normative expectations" (p. 58). A more explicit definition is that offered by Peter Berger in The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1969). For Berger, anomie is the "danger of meaninglessness. This danger is the nightmare par excellence, in which the individual is submerged in a world of disorder, senselessness, and madness. Reality and identity are malignantly transformed into meaningless figures of horror" (p. 22).

[12] Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, p. 151.

[13] Hans Kung, On Being A Christian (New York: Wallaby Books, 1978), p. 52.

[14] J. Robert Cox, "The Die is Cast: Topical and Ontological Dimensions of the Locus of the Irreparable," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 68 (1982), 227-239.

[15] Ibid., p. 233.

[16] Ibid., p. 233.

[17] Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 230-231.

[18] Ibid., pp. 232-233.

[19] Ibid., pp. 233.

[20] Ibid., pp. 233-234.

[21] Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp. 74-75.

[22] Ibid., pp. 157-158.

[23] According to the results of a Gallup Poll published in Newsweek, 30 July 1979, p. 28, Carter's overall approval rating following the speech was a dismal 32% as opposed to a disapproval rating of 51%.

[24] This and all following quotations from the speech are taken from the text in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Washington: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, July 20, 1979), 1235-1241.

[25] Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 246.

ON QUESTIONS OF EVACUATION AND SURVIVAL IN NUCLEAR CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY IN PUBLIC ARGUMENT AND RHETORICAL CRITICISM

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From time to time issues arise that occupy the public forums for a whole generation. For those Americans, North and South, of the 1840s and 50s, the issue of slavery left its stamp on many if not all of the important questions of national concern. To turn of the century citizens, a quarrel as intense if not as bitter pitted proponents of a rural and small-town America against the advocates of pyramiding economic power and unrestrained development. So, too, the generation of the Great Depression found a single issue, national recovery, coloring the controversies of the era. Our own times are not without public debate, as a proliferating complex of ideologies, movements, and interest groups seek economic, social and political liberation or retrenchment. While the contemporary rhythms of most public conflicts bring about power adjustments, realigning competing definitions of social value and adjusting interest group desires to the realities of resource distribution, a superordinate public debate persists. Upon its successful resolution depends not only how future generations will view the present but also whether there will be a future. It is this issue, the question of war and survival in a nuclear age, that I intend to address my remarks today.

To examine the nuclear debate in so short a space may seem to be a dubious venture. The Atomic Era has seen produced a veritable mountain of speeches, studies, manifestoes that might be examined; and, even while select aspects of previous arguments might be studied, the arguments continue to proliferate. Yet, if public controversy cannot be reduced to a single set of texts, engaging the fragmentary, theoretically diverse, changing concoction of statements issued in connection with what is called "public discussion and debate" may enable us to discover something of the character of the public sphere of discourse itself.

Even if the amount and variety of material itself were not so imposing, still one might eschew such a discussion because the issues themselves are still tcostarkly controversial. If a critic takes sides in the ongoing argument, he or she does not advance the understanding of the argument as such, but merely advances partisanship in another way. If the critic brings to the controversy an exogenous set of standards by which to measure the adequacy of arguments, then nothing is really established beyond the critics ability to verify a set of presuppositions. To these objections, I would posit a third alternative, one that hopefully might show the usefulness of rhetorical criticism. Although it may be true that a critic may never get beyond the attitudes, beliefs, and methods--the linguistic partisanship--of an age, it is not the case that the issues of the day must be taken on their own terms or ignored. Rather, examination of the discourse itself may reveal discursive systems that have formulated the issues in such a way that a resolution of the debate productive to the culture cannot be reached. Reformulating the terms of the debate, what some have called a "transvaluation of values" enables the critic to examine the broader implications of temporizing discourse, to uncover dead-end arguments, and to open up new possibilities for understanding.

The final objection to discussing the nuclear issue might be aesthetic. To contemplate the end of our days and ways is gloomy. In fact, it is so obviously depressing that studying the survival of humanity after an all-out nuclear strike seems to conjure up feelings that range from the bizarre to the burlesque. Milenialist discourse notwithstanding, the language of our age is somewhat strange. The arguments that invite us to contemplate the end phrase the most heinous human deed imaginable in garden variety metaphors--"ground zero," "surgical nuclear strike," "bonus kills"--and so the vocabulary continues, disjoining moral character and positivistically conceivedresult. So great is the gap, that common sense understanding of the issues of war and peace--what might be the grounds of public knowledge--gives way to repression of the issue itself. The Defense Budget is just one thing to be argued about among many. The repression of the issue of the times leads to a collapse of public argument in general. Confronted with the horrors of the plague, groups of the yet-to-be perished in 14th century Europe engaged in St. Vitus dancing, singing and gamboling from town to town, the revellers partied to the end. The burlesque of the atomic age takes the form of privitism the pursuit of private life in the meantime; in the absence of reasonable language the only vital choice to be made is how to outlandish the outlandish. "Let's drop the big one now," is the refrain of a modern day protest song, a refrain no doubt meant to satirize, but it also invokes the real possibility of the end of all things. Thus, does the burlesque continue.

Recognizing the disorienting nature of the subject, though, we should nevertheless strive to discover an avenue beyond the common associations, and thereby recover a way to reconstitute the confidence necessary for sober public appraisal and decision. The great issues that occupy a generation do so because at their root resides an indetermination, a darkness in the culture which for the time being does not permit even its greatest thinkers and advocates to discover a way beyond to different times. In reading history, these great disputes always seem to be resolved by forces unaccounted for by the disputants themselves. Fate or fortune intervenes to make the issue resolved in the Civil War by arbitrament of the sword, in the Progressive era by immigration and social organization, in the Great Depression by the wealth afforded in war. What separates these closed eras from the vital present is that another great issue is at stake. The arguments concerning nuclear war have not been settled by historical accident or force of authority. Fate hangs in the balance. Thus, in spite of the formidable array of material, in spite of the limitations of partisanship and objectivity, in spite of the moods occasioned by looking into the vortex of cultural uncertainty, a rhetorical critic's obligation remains to clarify the discursive systems at work and to advance understanding of discourse itself in order to enhance the ability of a public to knowledgably choose its own fate.

THE NUCLEAR EVACUATION CONTROVERSY

The particular criticism that I wish to undertake today concerns but one of the issues of the nuclear debate, but in many respects it is probably the most important: the issue of survivability in event of an "all-out nuclear exchange" between the Soviet Union and the United States. Since the dawn of the Atomic era there have been conflicted interpretations over the implications of atomic bombs and subsequent development. One camp argues, albeit in different ways, that atomic weaponry--especially thermonuclear bombs attached to intercontinental missiles--have revolutionized the character of war, making the next world war the last; hence, deterrence exists insofar as mutual destruction is assured. No war is possible for such would be suicidal to its participants. The other camp argues against the revolutionary character of atomic weapons, and, thinking the unthinkable, theystrive to convert the ever changing weaponry that science provides into moves of more traditional strategic threat and maneuver. Rather than sketching the variations of this dialectic, I wish to concentrate attention upon a single fragment of the debate.

In the Grand Old Party's political platform for 1980, what typically functions as a lick and a promise, appeared a pledge to "createa strategic Civil Defense which would protect the American people against nuclear war at least as well as the Soviet Union is protected." This pledge was to put into motion in late 1981 as President Raegan authorized the National Security Council in December to develop Civil Defense, a program that had been researched but shelved by Carter. In March of 1982 a request was put to Congress for $4.2 billion to prepare for the evacuation and relocation of United States citizens in event of crisis. In the winter months, between December and March, the administration followed rhetorical strategies known to many Presidents in this century: cultivating public opinion by releasing studies, preparing editorials, and sending out lower echelon spokespersons to argue the necessity and advantages of allocating resources toward preparation for conflict. Whereas President's rarely have had problems marshalling support in time of war, previous Civil Defense campaigns of the nuclear age had met only with public apathy. The Reagan strategy, however, was to spark controversy because

the issue of Civil Defense, indeed the very concept of surviving a nuclear war, ran at loggerheads with a new, and relatively unique rhetorical movements: proponents of a bilateral freeze on arms development and deployment.

Narrowing the focus a bit further, we come upon a direct and bitter clash between proponents of presidential viewpoints and the movement. By investigating this clash, it might be possible to illuminate a struggle for public confirmation, and in so doing discover the limits of public address given the current strategies of formulating public discussion and debate. The particular statements that instigated the controversy were initially made by one T. K. Jones, a proponent of fall-out shelters and evacuation measures. In a Los Angeles Times column of January 15, 1982, Robert Scheer reported that Mr. Jones had said that "the United States would recover fully from an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union in just two to four years, if it had a Soviet-style civil defense. 'Everybody's going to make it,' he observed during the interview, 'if there are enough shovels to go around.' The shovels are needed, he said, to build primitive shelters for evacuated urban population. Jones' idea is, 'Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then throw three feet of dirt on top. It's the dirt that does it.'" On January 16th Scheer again reports: "T.K. Jones, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Nuclear Forces told the Times that with proper civil defense, it would take only two to four years for the United States to fully recover from an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union." This time, Scheer added, following the purported testimony, that the Federal Emergency Management Agency, "which is in charge of the U.S. civil defense program that the Reagan administration plans to expand, has declared that 'the United States could survive nuclear attack and go on to recovery within a relatively few years.'"[1]

Scheer's articles on nuclear evacuation are examples of how the fifth estate sets the public agenda by stirring controversy among proponents and opponents of proposed public programs. Following administration estimates of success Scheer paraded testimony of qualified experts asserting to the contrary. While no technical information was provided in the article, the colorful phrase, the starkly conflicting choices, the drama of personalities in conflict, in short the very stuff of ritual political drama was evoked by Scheer. If Jones' statements of "complete recovery" were not bizarre enough to a public that should have remembered the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the advances in atomic weaponry since, Scheer finds a certain Mr. Chipman, head of FEMA. When he was asked if he thought democracy and other American institutions would survive in a nuclear war, Scheer reports that he said: "I think that they would eventually, yeah. As I say, ants will eventually build another anthill." While the newsreports were short on cognitive content, the controversy at least stung members of the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and the Environment, a group of public representatives attached to the prestigious Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. A public hearing was scheduled for March the 4th.

THE FIRST DAY OF HEARINGS

The text of the ensuing controversy between members of Congress and the Administration is a remarkable public document. Like so many disagreements that are aired before the public, it has neither a beginning nor an end. The hearing, whose aim according to its Chariman, Senator Pressler, is to answer the question, "[C]ould we survive a nuclear attack, and could the Soviet Union?", begins with the announcement that the Senators had met earlier in the morning in a closed-door sessions with experts from the Central Intelligence Agency the Defense Intelligence Agency. No summary is offered, except by a remark made by Senator Cranston: "I was not impressed by either the purported effectiveness or scale of the Soviet effort, and I do not think that any of my colleagues were impressed." [p. 4] Immediately, it is clear that a member of the public could not reach a considered judgment from the arguments represented in the text. The most vital information is withheld from the start. The text terminates in the midst of a heated exchange with the promise of technical questions to be asked. No resolution to the disagreement is reached. Thus, the text of the controversy underscores the fragmentariness of public discussion. It is just one more piece in a broader puzzle. Hence, it would be a mistake to examine this document for its informative or persuasive potential. Like much public discourse, it is ephemeral and fleeting, valuable only for what it suggests about the public discourse as a whole.

What is clear is that the text represents a skirmish in the struggle for power between legislative and executive branches of government. So long as power is mediated by the expression of public opinion, advocates strive for public confirmation through various argument tactics and strategies. In fact, the Hearings open with a frank invocationof public interest and public responsibility by Senator Pressler. "I think civil defense is very important The average citizen is aware of the nuclear threat and says, where would I go if a nuclear bomb landed or if there were nuclear ash floating around." [p. 1] The question set forth as the object of the hearings is deliberative in nature: "[W]hat level of planning and effort is appropriate for civil defense program? Does civil defense represent a priority expenditure of our scarce defense dollars?" [p. 1] Distinguishing the appropriate from the inappropriate and ordering the hierarchy of public goods in a time of scarcity is a matter for deliberative argument to perfect informed consensus. Ostensibly the hearing is to be conducted in an adversary manner so that each side can make the best case for and against the proposed plans for evacuation in times of war.

More than a debate over a policy question, however, the hearing also serves as an opportunity for confrontation with the administration, the source of propaganda supporting the civil defense program. In the latter portion of his opening statement, Pressler calls attention of the Committee to a "procedural matter." He remarks that while holding a previous hearing, he and Senator Cranston had become aquainted with Jones' statement in the Times. What follows is Pressler's rendition of efforts to get Mr. Jones before Congress to verify these views. Pressler asserts that the request went out in 1981; that the administration agreed to hearing to be held March 4, 1982; that a few days before the administration altered the hearing date due to a FEMA civil defense exercise; that the hearing was rescheduled for March 16, and again the administration canceled Jones appearance. While Jones' was presumably unavailable for public comment, the day before the hearings another article appeared in the Times defending the utility of Reagan's proposed civil defense measures, and its author was the ellusive Mr. Jones. The irony of this co-incidence was not lost on Senator Pressler:

> It would seem that Mr. Jones is permitted by the Pentagon to make public statements on civil defense before any audience in the United States execept this subcommittee, and I would like to know why. There are only two possible explanations. One is that the Defense Department does not support his rather extreme views on civil defense, that is, that it does not regard him as an informed or competent witness on the subject. If this is so, I would like to know why he is permitted to write articles, give interviews, and address public gatherings.
>
> The other possible explanation is that Defense Department is simply afraid to expose Mr. Jones' views to the wider public audience likely to be occasioned by this hearing, in short, that you are worried that your civil defense proposal cannot stand the light of day. [p. 6]

Senator Cranston makes a similar opening statement, but with a bit more sting. Recalling Jones' remark that "Everybody's going to make it...if there are enough shovels to go around," he reads the November 12,1981 study published in the New England Journal of Medicine on medical problems of survivors of nuclear war. Whereas Pressler's argument is a challenge for the honest disclosure of truth, Cranston's argument taunts the administration to dare defend bogus claims in front of prepared discussants.

What would become the basic level of conflict in the hearings, however, is best expressed by Senator Tsongas, himself a professed member of the nuclear freeze movement, who begins his testimony with a rather stange story recounting a visit to Griffith Air Force Base. He says:

> I asked them to show me the nuclear weapons. I had never seen one. So they took me to a hangar where they had about 15 or 16 nuclear

> weapons. They were just stacked there like air compressors. I went over and I tried to link the piece of metal I saw before me with what it means, that there are living and breathing human beings, children et cetera, who, if we don't do our job correctly, will be obliterated by that piece of machinery.
>
> What is interesting about the discussion that takes place in this city on these issues is that it is remarkably amoral. In fact, it is fashionable in the arms control community not to allow emotion or feelings to intervene in one's analytical process, and there is a premium put on having an amoral capacity, not immoral, just simply devoid of moral responsibility.
>
> That attitude, I would argue with you, Mr. Chairman, is limited to this city. If you go around this country and talk about these issues in that way, people will think you are crazy. [pp. 15-16]

To Tsongas, the argument yet-to-be waged represents more than a give and take on a public issue, rather the arguments are symptomatic of an ongoing struggle between the public which makes judgments on **intuitive** grounds that make moral sense and nuclear war analysts who, though perhaps better informed, have lost the capacity to make moral judgment. Indeed, in contemplating United States recovery from such a war, they make the unthinkable thinkable by giving optimistic estimates of what might not happen. "I want Mr. Jones. Let him come up here," Tsongas challenges. "I think by continuing this session we are in essence giving the administration an excuse to keep those 'thinkers' under wraps for the very simple reason that if the average American listens to Mr. Jones and reads these materials, they are going to be horrified,and the arms control constituencies will grow and grow and grow." [p. 16]

The opening remarks of the Senators were not lost on an empty chair, for **representing the Defense Department was the Hon.** Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense on International **Security Policy** Perle is permitted only a brief statement, however. Unimpressed with Perle's claim to exclusively represent the administration "policy" on civil defense, the Senator's are not mollified. Theyreassert the demand for Jones to testify. The remainder of the day is spent with three witnesses: Eugene P. Wigner, Sprgeon M. Keeny, Jr., and Adm. Noel Gayler. Each is qualified in expert areas. The first source supports the administration. The second two deny the value of evacuation plans. None of the arguments concerning the usefulness of civil defense are novel, nor do any contain information that has not appeared previously in the public realm.

While this tortuous opening may have barred the hearing from progressing directly toward answering the reputed central questions of civildefense viability, nevertheless, the procedural controversy offers an opportunity to reflect on the nature of contemporary public argument. Whereas in the ancient _polis_, one could engage in a dispute by calling out an opponent in front of the assembled body of citizens, the present demands of public argument in a mass society create a logistics of projection that afford opportunities to dodge direct controversy even while making arguments in support of a controversial public policy. In a sense, what is euphemistically called public discussion and debate is often nothing more nor less than propaganda campaigns disjointly conducted by opposing interest groups. So Mr. Jones could gad about the country making statements to the public; yet, when he was called upon to account for these statements in an official public hearing, he could be protected behind the screen of a corporate identity which regulated the time and place of his testimony. In this manner, the Defense Department sought to create public opinion requisite for supporting expenditure increases while at the same time protect the investment by protecting Jones' statement from the possible impeachment that close cross-questioning might bring. Apparently wise to this tactic, the Senators prepared a hearing, less to seek the truth through the bilaterality of Socratic dialogue than to prepare an _auto da fe_ in which the unorthodox style of thinking would be self-confessed and the credibility of the administration burned. Finally, there is a subtle interplay of questions concerning authority; indeed,the stage is set for a confrontation between technical and prudential reason.

THE SECOND DAY OF HEARINGS

The hearings of March 31st open with Mr. Jones in attendance, flanked by representatives ofthe Defense Department. The pretense of a wide-ranging investigation into civil defense has been dropped. No other witnesses are present. Pressler begins by nothing that since "Mr. Jones has made many public statements **and many** public appearances on civil defense" the Congress of the United States should be able to hear from him. A bill of indictment follows, establishing that the Scheer report was probably not a misquote or a slip of the tongue. Pressler cites the "NBC Nightly News Broadcast of March 4, 1982 where Jones says: "If the Russian people can survive, then I see no reason why we can't do it as well as they can. If they choose to do things to protect their industry, on the order of two-thirds of what would survive to the point where production levels after a period 2 to 4 years can go back to where they were before the war." [p. 48] Earlier but similar statements are read into the record. In 1976 Jones is found telling the Joint Committee on Defense Production that "'98 percent of (the Soviet) people would survive an attack' in which the United States would throw 'everything we had at the Soviet Union.'" In the same year, he tells a House Armed Services Panel that "we would tend to lose slightly more than they because we have only about one-third of the land area" • "however, the loss numbers would not be much different." [p. 49]

Jones' statements are not presented by themselves. Rather Pressler contrasts his positive opinions of civil defense with the choice of all presidential administrations to shelve the option. Pressler also freshens the argument by referring to the opinions elicited during the first day of testimony. Keeny is summarized as saying that the administration's notion that we could recover from an all out war "could encourage policies and action which could, in fact, result in the complete destruction of our society, if not civilization." [p. 49] Adm. Gayler is said to have "told this committeethat civil defense won't work...is bad policy...is wasteful...has no military utility...makes no economic sense ...(and) is (a) dangerous illusion.'" [p. 49] Finally, the secret CIA reports concerning Russian efforts characterize Soviet defense as "of little consequence." Pressler concludes with Gaylors terse summary of Reagan's proposal, calling civil defense "a turkey."

A perverse commitment to statements contradicted by the majority of experts might be enough to impeach the intelligence or integrity of a witness, but the Senators were after a more damning indictment of credibility. Tsongas opening statement follows: "Why do you [Jones] think there is a nuclear freeze constituency? Because finally there has been in this country a recognition that there are some people on both sides who really do contemplate nuclear war as an option. There are those who think we can survive, and who make these kinds of statements. This human species will survive only if there is a return to reason." [p. 51] The kind of reascn Tsongas desires is not the enlightened knowledge of a Barron Frankenstein, who, makes a monster and then lets it loose upon the village; rather, it is the quest for a moral sensibility in considering disarmament policy, a sense which he obviously believes Jones lacks altogether.

The well thus thoroughly poisoned, Mr. T. K. Jones (curiously enough in this portion of the hearing given a different title, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces) takes the stand. The confrontation that ensues takes shape in four somewhat separate moments, each illustrative of the ways in which argumentation develops differently among the public, private, and technical spheres of discourse, and illustrative of the struggle to establish grounding for arguments within one or the other of these domains.

1. The Dissociation of Technical Knowledge and Public Knowledge. In the first stanza of the confrontation, Jones makes an attempt to place his previous statements into an uncontroversial perspective. Jones says that he has testified that Soviet shelters are efficacious before; further, he claims that "I have not estimated the war recovery potential of the United States given a Soviet-type protection program. What I have done is to estimate the war recovery potential of the Soviet Union given Soviet plans and Soviet programs." [p. 52] Moreover, even within this

restricted area of expertise, he is not really responsible. "This work included a great number of people with different skills, because, in my judgment," Jones asserts, "no one person and no one organization has sufficient expertise to make a competent assessment of a program of the diversity and magnitude of Soviet civil defense." [p. 53] He does admit to having done another study some years ago that suggested that the United States might recover without civil defense in somewhat more than 12 years, but then qualifies this projection by saying that because the variables were too complex for the model a precise estimate could not be made.

On the direct question of whether or not the United States could survive if it had Soviet-style defense shelters Jones responds:

> I have not made an estimate of U.S. recovery, given Soviet-style civil defense. Such estimates are extremely complicated to make. My estimates of Soviet recovery involved the work of a group of economists who specialize in Soviet economy, along with a number of experts on industrial operations, people who understood how we might target the Soviet Union, and who, of course, do not have comparable understanding about how the Soviets might target the United States. Attempting to extrapolate an estimate of U.S. recovery from the complex, technically complicated modeling and analysis of Soviet recovery is not feasible. [p. 59]

If the subcommittee wishes to discover the value of a civil defense policy to the United States, then it must consult Mr. Perle, the administration spokesperson on policy matters. "[I]t is Mr. Perle who is responsible for civil defense policy. I am not." concludes Jones. [p. 52]

The opening statement is clearly an attempt to differentiate the authority and responsibility for statements between technical and public sphere. Although Jones never says so directly, clearly his position is that as an expert his comments should only be taken seriously if they are backed up by technical study. If one wishes to know the policy position of the administration concerning the worth of a policy and the degree to which it is supported, then the Senators would be better off consulting Mr. Perle, the official and authoritative spokesperson. The posture is a curious one, given that his publicly aired statement contain little technical reportage and many value judgments, such that fall-out shelters are humane because they save lives--humaneness a qualitative pronouncement. Jones wishes to be judged on the facts that his studies have established, however, and the rest of the statements so far as he is concerned is mere opinion which is less worthy of investigation than official opinion. Thus, do arguers themselves attempt to distinguish between the technical and public realms of argument.

2. The Dissociation of Public Argument and Technical Knowledge. Following Jones' initial statement and questioning, the patient Mr. Perle is given a chance to speak. One suspects that a deal was struck between the subcommittee and Defense Department permitting the star witness to testify if the administration could set forth its views as well. What follows is a "policy statement," the bureaucratic equivalent of a public address. Bereft of most recognized forms of proof, the statement of corporate beliefs and goals is accurately characterized as a dozen variations of the claim: "We intend to do everything right and nothing[1] wrong." Each variation itself is in search of a reason why.

Perle begins by affirming his own right to speak on policy matters. While not denying the corporate identity of Jones, he does say that Jones views are neither official nor "necessarily" those of the Defense Department. Indeed, as policy statements of the administration, Jones views hardly count at all. Referring to his 10 years of experience dealing with Congress, Perle downplays the matter as a small matter blown out of proportion "I [have] learned something of the rapidity with which the journalistic winds carry verbal fallout a great distance. Above all, I [have come] to understand how easily a colorful phrase can encourage a chain reaction that culminates in an explosion of misunderstanding." [p. 68] Perle's age-old rhetorical strategy is to destroy a person's anger with mildness, but the use of the terminology of ultimate doom to trivialize the hearing's subject seems somewhat in poor taste, even slightly bizarre. Predictably, the rhetorical balm did not sooth the Senators.

None of the Senators paid much attention to Perle's arguments, and it would probably misrepresent the spirit of the hearings to linger too long over what was, even at the moment of its utterance, forgettable statements. Yet, Perles plodding statements do deserve attention because they exemplify a common technique of contemporary public argument: namely, dissociating public policy argument from any kind of reasoning. One example should suffice. Perle says:

> We do not seek nor do we believe that it is possible to obtain levels of protection from the effects of all-out nuclear war that would reduce significantly the unspeakable horror of such an event. But neither do we believe in good conscience we can make a deliberate decision to refrain from even those minimal plans for expedient measures that might diminish the loss of life that would entail. [p. 69]

Assuring the Senators of the administration's faith in the god-terms of the nuclear age, "balance," "stability," and "deterrence," Perle defines civil defense as a type of prudent foresight. "The modest measures we are proposing for civil defense represent little more than insurance, insurance that, in circumstances short of a nuclear exchange, some lives might be saved that otherwise would be lost." Who would oppose such a "modest and measured" program with the sole goal of saving lives?

Zarefsky has noted the tendency in political argument for proponents to generate reasons that provide, if not a sound test of the merits of a policy, at[2] least a pretext that makes cooperation politically palatable. Perle's argument is the attempt to construct such a bridge. This technique harkens back to the Golden Mean of Aristotle, where virtue is the common sense choice between the extremes. But whereas in Aristotle's view virtue was the product of inculcated habit and reasoned choice, the middle position itself a difficult position to maintain, Perle's middle way is expected to be carried on the back of a metaphor: insurance. No reasons are presented, even where they might obviously add something to the gossamer-like argument. Why does $4.2 billion represent a modest commitment? How does this effort square with the wonder-predictions of Soviet recovery made by Jones? Why ought this expense compete with others for scarce resources? Even an insurance salesman would be prepared to give reasons for priority expenses. Perhaps Perles bridge would have been successful if he were arguing in front of an American Legion Outpost which needed only the slightest of pretexts to support anything carrying the banner of the military. To the Senators present, Perle's statement must have merely whetted the appetite. In any event, the bland, unsupported assertions of Perle exemplifies the shoddy state of argument when policy and proof are disjoined.

3. The Use of Technical Consensus to Establish and Refute the Proofs for Public Argument. The third movement in the discussions seems to involve an attempt on behalf of the Senators to solidify the technical grounds for rejecting Jones' statements. One of the characteristics of contemporary public argument is that the space in which debate is conducted is fragmented, divided up in such a way that public speakers can follow the time-honored practice of making one set of reasons for a policy before one audience and fish-tailing on those reasons before another. While the attention of the public media is typically fleeting and its products ephemeral, the reproduction and dissemination of statements has restricted the unfettered opportunism of arguers who use reasons to blandish the audience. When conflicting reasons are offered by "important" spokespersons on "current" topics, he or she may be asked for an accounting.

Perhaps aware of the new necessity for some consistency yet undaunted in the need to generate persuasive reasons that fit the prejudice of an audience, corporations send forth spokespersons to display a rangeof opinion which, while not really consistent, nonetheless conform to the potential range of public opinion that is desirable. If these opinions are brought together and shown to be conflicting, then the corporation denies as real or official whichever opinion offends the investigating group or is out of favor with the general opinion. During the Nixon administration this argument tactic was known to the members of the administration as deniability. The Senators, wise to this public dodge, were not buying Perle's attempt to deny Jones' public authority. Tsongas says: "[I]t insults my intelligence for us to be told that he goes out--he is an official of this Government, a high-ranking official. He goes out and makes these statements, and under questioning tries to pretend that those were personal judgments that would not reflect on the administration." [p. 71] Whatever the official organizational charts were reputed to be, Jones had made a statement to the public. Furthermore, his identity at the time was not qualified as a private opinion. Thus, since the statements were made to the public from the administration they could be tried as technical proof in the public debate. It is in the trial of the statements that the subcommittee is most forceful.

Let us turn to the confrontation between Percy and Jones. Percy has just read the two to four year recovery statements from Scheer's articles. He asks Jones to confirm or deny that he made the statement. Jones equivocates, not answering directly, but denying he has the technical expertise or authority to make such a statement. Percy continues:

> The Chairman: All I am saying is, if you deny it, then flatly deny it, but they [unnamed sources at the Los Angeles Times] say you did. The most important thing is to set the record straight.
> Mr. Jones. Sir, I have never analyzed that case and hence have no basis to believe it. My recollection is specifically that I did not make the statement.
> The Chairman. Well, then, that is all we need to know. Let us put it behind us for heaven's sake. You know I didn't believe my eyes when I say it, and not being able to question you here, as you know, I cabled everyone whom I could get a hold of quickly who was knowledgeable in this field. [p. 73]

Percy then reads into the record telegrams from T. J. Watson, General Seignious, Paul Warnke, Harold Brown, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith, a bi-partisan whos'-who of regarded experts and public figures on arms control. Asked to comment on the truth of the two to four year estimate, the experts respond in decidedly untechnical language. Jones' estimates are characterized as "utter nonsense," "outrageous transgression of logic and fact," "a sick joke" and "'Buncumbe' (pronounced 'bunkum'), (in other words, 'bunk!')'." The Chairman concludes: "Everyone of them says that the statement is preposterous and unbelievable, and they denounce it as an absolute inacurate representation of what would happen. So let us forget that now, and put it behind us." [p. 74]

Seeking to impeach Jones' estimate and purge it as a part of the proof that might be used in discussion of the public sphere, Percy confronts Jones with a consensus of peers; and, so confronted, Jones denies that he made the statement and denies that it is true. Indeed, the contrary--a long recovery period--is asserted by the many and the wise to be the case. Seeking the widest consensus possible, Percy confronts Perle. "[W]hat difference would it make if the civil defense program were fully implemented?' he asks. Perle counters: "Again, for a quantitative answer to that question, I would turn to the experts from the F deral Emergency Management Agency." Acknowledging that there are a number of complex considerations, Perle says that he would be "glad" to supply an answer for the record. The text reads: "Precise information on this matter is not available at this time, and, as noted earlier, must be obtained from...[FEMA]. To expedite things, we have asked FEMA to provide a direct reply to the Committee." [p. 76] Perle, an expert at public opinion, does not fall into the same trap that mangled Jones. By restricting estimates of survivability to the technical sphere, he does not give any useful information as to the administration's intentions. Furthermore, the denial of information on record denies public access to the reason why the program would be effective--in the eyes of the administration.

If the restriction and timed release of technical information is a means of establishing bureaucratic influence over public opinion, then the power of the public forum is to generate consensus in light of unknown or uncertain facts. Percy, no stranger to the power of his office, pressed this advantage to thefullest. To each administration representative he put the question: "How do you think life would be in the United States a month, a year, 5 years after an all-out nuclear exchange?" Perle responds oily: "I cannothope to portray very graphically how grim life would be, Senator. Let me say, however, that I know of no one in the administration responsible for these policies who thinks that even after 5 years we would not bear terrible scars from a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions. No one is under any illusion that the severity of nuclear war would be significantly diminished. Asked if he concurred, General Doyle makes his only statement in the hearing: "Yes, sir." Jones, too, says "the damage would be extraordinary." Not willing to divulge technical estimates and unwilling to appear as warmongers who believed in survivability in spite of no hard evidence, these advocates could not help but contribute to the public consensus of opinion abhorring nuclear war.

Percy's victory is complete, for the moment. No strong statements, or even weak ones supporting survivability remain. Yet, since the statements abhorring nuclear war were only opinions, nothing precludes new studies from suggesting that being atom bombed is not as bad as everyone thought that it was. And it is upon factual determination that the course of prudent policy must rest rather than opinion about the unknown. Thus, even though Percy exposes one technical study (or its representation) as fraudulent, the public sphere remains vulnerable and unstable.

4. The Insulation of Technical and Public Reasoning. If technical discourse reshapes the public sphere, it must do so through the process of interpretative argument. Facts do not speak for themselves, but somehow must be fitted in to the opportunities and constraints confronting the public Yet, the entry of what is reputed to be factual information into a context of public power may itself constitute an unspoken argument. Thus, to a public nervous about the possibilities of annihilation in the nuclear age, a study that discovers proof positive defense would mandate a dramatic alteration of policy. If the study is sanctioned as valid by experts, then any debate might merely be pro forma. While it is the case that technical studies may give rise to unspoken justifications for action, it is not always the case that public interpretation is admitted as a consequence of the study by the technician. In the following conflict, Jones demonstrates how the technical sphere provides argumentative presuppositions that may be employed to restrict statements to a public and of public importance from strict public accountability.

The exchange occurs bewteen Senator Tsongas and Mr. Jones. Tsongas begins by stating that he does not believe that Jones is telling the truth. He builds his case by establishing that Jones stands by his 1976 estimate that if the Russians built shelters 98% of them would survive a nuclear war. Jones equivocates at length, but then agrees. Tsongas then asks if he still stands by the estimate that the United States could recover in twelve years. Jones qualifies this statement, but essentially agrees. The stage is set, for it is clear that Jones believes recovery is possible, for the Russians with shelters and for the United States without--though the period of time has not been precisely estimated.

> Senator Tsongas. You say the Los Angeles Times violated the interview, that I am taking you out of context by quoting you. NBC Nightly News: 'If the Russian people can survive, I see no reason why we can't do as well as they.' Now, if they can survive and bring back the Gnp within 2 to 4 years, you believe that the United States can bring back its GNP to pre-war conditions in 2 to 4 years. Is that right?
>
> Mr. Jones. You are trying to construct a statement that I can't support and that I wouldn't believe. The inference is that you don't believe it either, so it seems to me that we agree.
>
> Senator Tsongas. If what you said before the committee we cannot rely upon, the Los Angeles Times obviously is a paper without credibility, and the 'NBC Nightly News' clearly made a serious mistake in quoting you, where are we? Anything that you say as outrageous was taken out of context. I am only using your words, Mr. Jones. I am only using your words.

> Mr. Jones. The commitee transcript is not out of context. On the other hand, one cannot expect to take specific results of very detailed technical analysis, and equate them to a general statement made 2 or 3 years later.
>
> Senator Tsongas. Tell me where the technical details are in this statement: 'If the Russian people can survive, then I see no reason why we can't do as well as they can.' What is technical about that? You were on 'NBC Nightly News.'
>
> Mr. Jones. I agree with that statement.
>
> Senator Tsongas. Oh, so you agree with it.
>
> Mr. Jones. Certainly I agree with that statement. That is a technically supportable fact---
>
> SEnator Tsongas. That we can do as well as the Russians?
>
> Mr. Jones. In terms of population survival, there is no technical reason why we couldn't. It would be somewhat more difficult for us than it is for them, Senator, because, as I am sure you know, the Soviets have a much larger nuclear arsenal than we do.
>
> Senator Tsongas. So if we can do as well as they can, that means that we can achieve 98% survival of our population.
>
> Mr. Jones. Equating a precise number with a general statement would be taking great liberty with what I said.
>
> SEnator Tsongas. But that is the position you took in the committee when you testified. You said, "Such protection would enable 98% of the Soviet population to survie.... Your intent at that meeting with the committee was to leave them the impression clearly stated that 98% of the population in Russia would survive given their strategies.
>
> You then said to NBC that if the Russian people can survive, then I see no rason why we can't do as well as they can. You just said that we can protect our people as well as they can protect theirs. If theirs is at 98%, then clearly ours must be at 98% as well. So you are postulating that 98% of the American people could survive an all-out nuclear attack by the Soviet Union were appropriate protective measures taken. Is that correct?
>
> Mr. Jones. Senator, what you are trying to do is to take one statement made in one place at one time and connect it with a different statement made at a different time. That is not a technically valid way to assemble the statements.
>
> SEnator Tsongas. ...OK, then, let's agree that it [the estimate on U.S. survival] was not intended to be precise. What did you mean?

> Mr. Jones. That the laws of physics apply equally well to both sides. If the Soviets can build shelters and they work, the shelters that they build could work as well for us as they would for them. It is the same physics book.
> Senator Tsongas. So we can do as well as they can.
> Mr. Jones. I know of no reason why we can't. You may think that your **constituency is less capable than the**Russians, but I don't see any reason to believe it.
> Senator Tsongas. OK. If we can do as well as they can, then by definition we can achieve 98% survival.
> Mr. Jones. I would not make that statement. If you want a number from somebody, I would suggest you get one from FEMA.
> Senator Tsongas. Well, tell me, if the laws of physics remain the same in both countries and you say we can do as well as they can and they can achieve a 98% survival, given that, that we can do as well as they can, if we did everything you wanted, what percent survival?
> Mr. Jones. Senator, if you want numbers from me, there is a process that I get them from, and that is known as analysis and estimating.
> Senator Tsongas. Have you done that?
> Mr. Jones. I can't give you numbers that I haven't run through an estimating process. I am just not going to do that.
> Senator Tsongas. But if you haven't done the analysis, how can you make the statement that we could do as well as they can?
> Mr. Jones. A general statement can always be made. However, one cannot correctly relate a general statement to a specific number. I have pointed out to you repeatedly that to do so is not technically valid. With all due respect, sir, it is just not supportable. [pp. 84-86]

Frustrated with Jones' replies, Tsongas addresses the Chair. Characterizing the interchange as a "damage control scenario" wrought by the Defense Department, he says: "Mr. Jones is going to go back and they are going to say 'Well how did you do?' and he will say, 'Well, I told them I didn't say it, I told them it was not a technically correct analysis and that whatever I did say, I said on a personal level and not as a representative of the United States government. That person is going to say, 'Did they believe it?' He is going to say, 'Yep, they took it hook, line, and sinker.'" Pressler also acknowledges that Tsongas questioning and his own has failed to penetrate Jones reasoning. Let us see why.

It is clear that Jones holds technical information as a different order of knowledge from common opinion. Yet, the truth of technical information, while of a higher order in terms of precision and reliability is more difficult to link to the present circumstances. Indeed, when asked to picture the entire consequences of his studies, Jones argues that one study cannot be compared to another. Presumably the variables are different and the times change. Given the presumed superiority of analysis as a means of knowledge, Jones is able to subordinate anything but a study to opinion. However, the knowledge provided by the studies does not form a basis for inference or opinion, since each is held as discrete. Thus, Jones own opinions are held as matters of little consequence, the studies independently discussible but not subject to wholistic inference.

Connected with the above tactics is the careful manipulation of what is considered to be known and what is considered to be unknown. When it favors him to equate the unknown with that which is not-yet-established he does so. Thus, Jones argues that it is not legitimate to extrapolate economic recovery rates between America and Russia because no study has proven the countries to be alike. When it is in his favor to equate the unknown with that which has yet to disconfirm a conclusion, he does so, saying that there is no reason proven why a comparison cannot be drawn. Thus, is Jones able to say that American and Soviet populations can recover, after allthe laws of physics are the same. This game of known and unknown, within the realm of technical discourse, might be played indefinitely, as no study takes into account all the hypothetically relevant variables under all conditions.

What permits the known-unknown game to take place is the denigration of anything outside of the formal process of reason sanctioned by his field to mere opinion. Thus, Jones is able to say that "a general statement can always be made" and these general statement, whether reasoned well or ill by some other process, have no claims upon his own rational view. A general statement is one unverified by the sanctioned epistemological process, and like all general statements, an unknown subject to confirmation. Thus, Jones acting in the role of technician says that the statement should not really count against him, for it is only an hypothesis, not an official pronouncement.

Tsongas cannot pehetrate the technical logic. As a public advocate he isimmersed in rhetorical arguments, those that concern accountability for statements, the personal allocation of responsibility, and the integration of information for expedient and prudent judgments. Jones technical training, however, permits him to make a series of arguments which do not permit synthesis, which attribute responsibility to method rather than to person, which dis-integrate synthetic understanding of opinion, and which clearly by its claim to facticity might influence the public realm flaunts its own accountability by remaining within its own limits of precision. Whereas Jones might have won the technical debate with the Senator, Tsongas does get in the last word. Getting Jones to reiterate confidence in his conclusion that the United States can recover from all-out nuclear war in something like 12 years, Tsongas concludes: "Well, Mr. Chairman, I am glad we didn't give up, because I would be intrigued if the committee were to bring people in--given the current economic policies, we may not get to current GNP in 12 years without a war." [p. 87] This parting shot notwithstanding it is clear that although the subcommittee was able to impeach Jones' purported statement through an assembly of expert testimony and rhetorical strategy, the subcommittee was not able to effectively penetrate the insulation provided the technical sphere of argument.

CONCLUSION

Taken as an example of the present debate on nuclear weapons, the hearings as a whole exhibit the fragmentary, elided, almost surreal quality of what is called today public discussion and debate. The hearings themselves products of ephemeral discourse, the Reagan campaign of 1982 to facilitate public acceptance of civil defense, are not significant for their place in the history of great persuasive moments nor do they contain stunning new arguments for or against civil defense, much less the question of surviving a nuclear war. While the arguments put forward in the hearing do not meet even minimal standards for enlightened argument, still they function as informative examples of the problems faced by contemporary advocates.

That which is clearest about the struggle for influence between part of Congress and the administration is that each agency seeks to establish its own grounds of argument. The grounds of argument are variously constructed as the personal, technical and public sphere. Moreover, the claim for appropriate grounding is not always made with complete candor, but it is more often the product of strategic placement. To the Department of Defense, an organization that sought the advantage of multiple representations of its position to gather support, the public sphere was directly reached through its speakers attempting to generate confidence in evacuation studies; yet, when confronted with the formal issue of public responsibility attempted to disclaim its propagandist. The Senators, too, claimed to be engaged in pursuing a pulic question, airing arguments so that the private citizen could decide. What came to represent the substance of the investigation seemed to be a private struggle for power, a trial of sorts convicting the administration of callousness, hypocrisy, or incompetence--or all three. Though such may have been accomplished, little was decided about the central question of nuclear war, nor was the information sought which would make the decision possible on a reasonable basis. In such a manner do representatives address the public, even while using public address to conduct arguments advancing the interests of the private and technical spheres.

Perhaps the most dramatic lesson of the confrontation was the inability of Tsongas, whose passionate and moral concerns for avoiding nuclear war were well-argued, to penetrate the technical defenses of a relatively incompetent technician. By differentiating personal and technical knowledge, by manipulating the known and the unknown to confirm or not disconfirm his position, by stipulating that all knowledge other than that which has been processed through his own methodology is imprecise and only opinion, Jones was able to run Tsongas around in circles. What makes the failure to impeach Jones testimony on its own grounds all the more disturbing is that from a technical point of view--as the adduced consensus said--Jones' views were patently absurd. The question that cannot be answered from this single case study is whether the defects of public reasoning are such that they are inherent. The Senators won the public trial, convicting Jones of an unorthodox statement, but they failed to impeach the kind of reasoning that poisons the public sphere at will.

Endnotes

[1] "United States and Soviet Civil Defense Programs," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, March 16 and 31, 1982 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1982). All page numbers quoted in the text are from this document.

[2] David Zarefsky, from comments at the 2d Summer Conference on Argumentation.

"DIRECT MAIL FUNDRAISING LETTERS: 'OBJECTIFYING' ARGUMENTS IN A PERSONAL MEDIUM"

J. Robert Cox
University of North Carolina

In late Spring 1983, millions of individuals across the country received one or the other of the following messages in a personally-addressed letter:

> At a time when teenage pregnancy is epidemic we must continue to offer our counseling and medical services despite outrageous governmental interference.
>
> (Faye Wattleton, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. letter, May 17, 1983)

> It is wrong for clinics supported by our tax dollars to give "free" contraceptives and abortion advice without parental permision!
>
> (Rev. Jerry Falwell, Moral Majority, Inc. letter, n.d. [1983])

The letters-- part of direct mail fundraising campaigns by the two groups-- illustrate what Alasdair MacIntyre has called "the most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance": *the expression of disagreement*. "And the most striking feature of the debates in which these disagreements are expressed is their *interminable* character." MacIntyre does not mean by this "that such debates go on and on-- although they do-- but also that they apparently find no terminus. *There seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture*."[1] (Emphasis added) This is so, MacIntyre observes, because the premises upon which rival claims depend often employ quite different normative or evaluative concepts. Yet despite this incommensurability, it is often a feature of such claims that their utterance "presupposes the existence of *impersonal* criteria-- the existence, independently of the preferences or attitudes of speaker and hearer of standards of justice or generosity or duty."[2]

I do not intend to pursue MacIntyre's line of argument further than this, but instead want to advance a related thesis. I intend to argue that the purported "impersonal" criteria-- the taken-for-granted references-- of disputants' claims contain not only rival conceptions of the Good but *fundamentally different conceptions of the relationship of personal moral action and the larger social-political collective*. Embedded in the counter-claims of groups such as Planned Parenthood, the Moral Majority, Common Cause, or the National Conservative Political Action Committee, for example, are differing assumptions of *publicness*-- the relation of moral action to law, rules, and civil rights and prerogatives as well as ritual, custom, or communal or societal traditions

Further, the "texts" relevant in such an inquiry are the direct mail fundraising letters which groups like the Moral Majority have increasingly come to rely upon in communicating with supporters thoughout the country.

Direct Mail as Medium

The use of direct mail as a medium of political influence and as a powerful tool for fundraising came ironically into its own in the wake of the 1974 Watergate campaign finance reforms. By limiting individual contributions to a candidate to $1,000, the regulations created a need for new sources of funds and direct mail's ability to tap small, grassroots contributions in great volume proved increasingly attractive. During the 1980 Presidential election, for example, the New Right's chief fundraiser Richard A. Viguerie mailed more than seventy million letters through one hundred different lists of names of potential donors, raising more than $20,000,000 for conservative candidates.[3]

This low cost (.21¢ per letter for an initial mailing)[4] high-volume medium of communication also proved useful to an increasing number of non-electoral, "single-issue" groups-- liberal and conservative. "Direct mail has allowed conservatives to by-pass the liberal media, and go directly into the homes of the conservatives in this country," Viguerie told the 1977 Conservative Political Action Conference. "There really is a silent majority in this country, and the New Right now has learned how to identify them and communicate with them and mobilize them."[5]

Although a financial boon to candidates and political action groups alike, direct mail fundraising letters are, at first glance, a perplexing medium for critics of argumentation. Direct mail consultants readily concede that the texts of most letters forego reason-giving discourse for *pathos*. Tom Matthews of Craver, Matthews, Smith and Company (a liberal direct mail firm that has handled accounts for the National Organization of Women and the National Abortion Rights Action League) believes there is little justification for appealing to reason because the letter's purpose is "*not to convince* [*the reader*] *of anything* [but to] motivate the person to send some money."[6] (Emphasis added) And Crawford found, in his study of New Right direct mail, that

> the key to all these appeals is anger and fear. As Terry Dolan of the National Conservative Political Action Committee told me, his organization's fundraising letters try to "make them angry" and "stir up hostilities." The "shriller you are," he said, the easier it is to raise funds. "That's the nature of our beast."[7]

Rather than a claim-warrant-data structure, direct mail typically employs a *narrative* form. Though the letters vary according to candidate and organization, stylistically they share many similarities. Crawford notes that fundraising letters of New Right groups

> depict a world gone haywire, with liberal villains poised to destroy the American Way of Life. After re-

> citing a list of horrors about to be perpetuated, the signatory— often a prominent right-wing activist or politician— asks for "help" from the recepient, frequently requesting his participation in a survey or poll; then he is asked to contribute and told how his $5 or $10 contribution will be used to further the counter-attack on the liberals.[8]

Further frustrating the critic who shares Goodnight's ideal of "deliberative arguments in the public sphere"[9] is *the pseudo-personal style of communication* which the medium of a "letter" suggests. The "writer" often employs an intimate, conversational tone: Jerry Falwell, in a letter using script type, writes plaintively "that is the way I feel tonight, as I sit at my desk here at home and write to you" (MM 10/15/81) while Katharine Hepburn, writing on behalf of Planned Parenthood on facsimile blue linen-finish stationery, remembers her mother's work with Margaret Sanger fifty years earlier in founding the American Birth Control League (PP n.d. /̲ 1983 /̲. Sabato observes, "The overriding principle of direct mail is intimacy." And every step away from a handwritten personal letter "weakens the letter a little."[10]

Contributing to the personalization of direct mail— along with the cozy style— are many nondiscursive features of the letter, additional enclosures, contribution card, return envelope, and the carrier or mailing envelope. These include facsimiles of personal stationery, handwritten notes on the text, first-class stamps (rather than metered-postage) on the carrier envelope, and ink underlining of key passages in the letter. And the signatures of both Jerry Falwell and Archibald Cox of Common Cause appeared recently at the end of letters typed on a regular-faced typewrit er on facsimile yellow-lined legal pads with hand-underlined phrases in the letter's text.

How, then, are we to give an accounting of a group's first premises —of purported "impersonal" criteria— in a medium characterized by *pathos*, narration, and a pseudo-intimate style of communication? Can direct mail fundraising letters be made to reveal the grounding for claims embedded in moral Agon rather than argument?

In addition to the signatory of a letter, a "second persona" —to borrow Black's phrase— may be identified in the discourse. And that persona is the implied auditor.[11] In discerning the sort of audience that is appropriate to the appeals of a direct mail letter, the critic possesses the means for understanding —not the persona's demographic traits or attitude— but *ideology*— "the network of interconnected convictions that functions in a man /̲sic /̲ epistemically and that shapes his identity by determining how he views the world."[12] Beyond the expressed concerns, the overt propositional sense of the discourse are cues which enable actual auditors to identify personal beliefs and values in terms of a broader Agon— the struggle for "right" or the-way-things-should-be. Though the best evidence for discerning the nature of this worldview is the substantive claims contained in a text, Black suggests that the most likely evidence will be in the form of stylistic tokens such as metaphor. One would be justified in suspecting, for example, that in using the term "bleeding hearts" to refer to proponents of welfare legislation, "a general attitude— more, a whole set of general attitudes were being summoned."[13]

Such a notion borrows also from Willard's concept of *objectification* as a process of social comparison; it implies that "actors seek points of reference, things taken to be true, and not-to-be-questioned assumptions against which they may check their private constructions."[14] In understanding the persona's relationship to a narrative world in which things-are-as-they-should-be, we have some understanding of the grounding of a groups' value claims; the attributed role of the persona in such a narrative *is* the mythopoesis of a group's selection of premises and, hence, its claims of moral right or wrong, virtue or treachery.

Finally, in searching for characterizations of the social-political collective in direct mail, the critic need make no *a priori* assumptions of a "'timeless public' possessed of a unique kind of knowledge."[15] Instead, it is the rhetors' defining of the relationship of the second persona and the larger social collective which will most interest the critic of argumentation.

In the analysis which follows, I initially surveyed several hundred direct mail fundraising letters from fifty-three organizations including groups as diverse as NARAL, Save-the-Redwoods-League, the Holy Christian Mission International, and former Vice-President Mondale's Committee for the Future of America. Letters were clustered by common traits of objectifying claims in terms of the social-political collective ("public," "people," etc.). Sixty-eight letters from four different groups were then selected for further analysis and comparison: Moral Majority, Inc., American Civil Liberties Union, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., and Common Cause.[16] Analysis focused only upon the text of the letters themselves; except in a small number of cases, other components of the direct mail "package" —additional enclosures and envelopes— were excluded.

The analysis reported below offers partial support for the proposition that *conservative and liberal direct mail fundraising letters differ fundamentally in the way each objectifies personal action in terms of the broader social-political collective*. Where groups such as Planned Parenthood and the ACLU see a civil system of guarantees of individual choice and the pursuit of private conceptions of the good, Rev. Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority envision a moral order informing the organismic "nation."

Because of page limitations on papers for this conference, I have chosen to focus principally upon direct mail letters of the Moral Majority, Inc. Although conceptions of a normative "public" and of the "public interest" may be more familiar to critics of argumentation, the choice of the Moral Majority has the advantage of inquiring how a rhetor —Jerry Falwell— who does *not* objectify ought-claims in terms of a "public good" nevertheless depicts the relationship of private belief and the larger public sphere.

"Publicans" and the Righteous Nation

> We have to put in place a mammoth organisation of Americans who believe in traditional moral and family values. We must rise up and effectively bring America back to the Judeo-Christian heritage upon which she was founded. (MM 11/1/82)

What is immediately apparent in the direct mail of Moral Majority, Inc., Lynchburg, Virginia, is the absence of any references to the "public interest" or "public good." In fifty-one letters from October 20, 1980 to March 18, 1983, the Rev. Jerry Falwell makes no use of either phrase or any other civil regulative concept. The word "public" itself occurs only as a modifier of certain social institutions, e.g., "public schools" or "public officials," and as a plural reference for individuals, e.g., "the public."

In the latter case, however, there is no suggestion of "the public" as an organic unity or empowering agent. The one exception to this occurs when "public" is modified by "American;" for example, Falwell writes to alert "the American public of the moral crisis facing us." (MM 10/1/81) More often, particularly when speaking of "persons" or "individuals" in the context of a telic order, Falwell will use the term "Americans": "And I believe that the majority of Americans agree on the basic moral values which this nation was founded upon over 200 years ago," (MM n.d. [1981]) or, "moral Americans-- honest, decent citizens, working to build America up... ." (MM 1/2/82)

Such *nation*-terms as "America" and "Americans" as well as the use of "the nation" rather than "public" or "people" are, in fact, the dominant referents for the social order and its participants. Furthermore, "nation" is conceived in organismic rather than structural terms. "America" possesses a past, can experience "rebirth," (MM 12/24/81) and suffers "cancers that are destroying [her] moral fibers... ." (MM n.d. [1981]). Within the *weltanschauung* of fundamentalist Christian and Jewish *personae* of Moral Majority direct mail, the term "nation" assumes special significance. The actions and fate of nations constitute an important dimension in the Biblical drama of God's chosen people: Nations sin (Isa. 30:1,2), are chastised by God (Jer. 5:29), suffer adversity (Judg. 21:2-4), are involved in the sins of rulers (Gen. 20:4,9) as well as of other individuals as Achan (Josh. 7:1,11-16), find peace (Psa. 33:12), are promised peace (Lev. 26:6), pray for peace (I Tim. 2:1,2) are given peace by God (I Chr. 22:18), and are exalted by righteousness (Prov. 13:34).

Of special importance in Moral Majority direct mail is the relationship that a nation sustains with God. Falwell writies: "3,500 years ago, Solomon said, 'Living by God's principles promotes a nation to greatness, violating God's principles brings a nation to shame.'" (MM 6/15/81)

Within this *weltanschauung*, the implied auditor is most responsive, not to discursive form, i.e., "argument" in its usual sense, but to narrative. America-- as an organismic conception-- has a history, a founding from which she has turned away; hence, moral Americans "must now rise up and effectively bring America back to the Judeo-Christian heritage upon which she was founded." (MM 11/1/82) It is in terms of this *quest* that Falwell objectifies the motives of individual auditors: "your desire to help us return our nation to ... basic Bible principles... ." (MM 10/20/80) At its "birth," Moral Majority rhetors note, America was not bifurcated into separate civil and "moral" realms. Writing in the *Moral Majority Report*, Harry Covert refers to writings of the "founding fathers" and to De Tocqueville's observation in arguing: "The spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom 'were intimately united and they reigned in common over the same country.'"[17]

Moral Majority mail, however, is careful to point out that it is "not around theological issues, but around *moral* issues" that the social collective must be organised. "Morality" is the chief objectifying term, the social bonding of the world that the implied auditor seeks. A brochure entitled "Moral Majority celebrates its second birthday," mailed to contributing members, narrates the origins of the organization: "Starting from scratch in June of 1979 with no more than the belief that millions of Americans held shared moral values ... ." (MM 6/1/81) Most letters use such phrases as "moral sanity," "traditional family and moral values," and condemn enemies of this tradition as "amoral" and "morally offensive."

Although, as a source of legitimation, "morality" is distinct from "rule" or "law," the Moral Majority believes that the moral order informs the public realm-- laws, ritual, and the traditions defining conduct in public places, e.g., schools. Thus, a "precarious merger of the spiritual and secular realms is maintained, Conrad concludes:

> Political institutions and spiritual organizations remain separate and structurally independent. However, the influence of spiritual *ideas* on every social and political decision is ensured by a kind of loose social contract. Agents of the good vow to support and maintain the legal separation of spiritual and secular *institutions* in exchange for guarantees of their rights to (1) have direct access to political decision-makers, (2) influence the character of social institutions, [and] (3) serve as guardians of persons who cannot protect themselves [i.e., children and the "unborn child"].[18]

The function of civil law, then, lies in its fulfillment of moral principle. There is no room for the liberal distinction between law and morality. Understood in this manner, the public sector more closely resembles Aristotle's view of the *polis*. Both are conceived as communities in which persons in common "pursue *the* human good and not merely as --what the modern liberal state takes to be-- providing the arena in which each individual seeks his or her own private good."[19]

The Moral Majority alleges, however, that public agents in practice now exclude or are about to exclude the voice and concerns of moral citizens: "millions of Americans [who] hold shared moral values [have] been denied a voice by their government leaders and the press."

(MM 6/1/81) And Falwell warns, if the "GAY CONSPIRACY" succeeds, "the traditional family as you and I know it and the right of citizens to take a public stand against perversion will be destroyed." (MM 2/15/82)

Against the ideal of a social collective infused with the spirit of "Bible-based principles," Moral Majority direct mail juxtaposes its claim that the public order has been corrupted by forces of evil. Falwell informs his supporters that "your hard-earned dollars are going to support pornography, abortion, gay rights, and the other cancers that abound in our land." (MM 9/7/82) Such forces are "corrupting the very foundations our nation was founded upon!" (MM n.d. [1981]) In a letter urging renewal of membership, Falwell pleads, "help us fight to save America from immoral laws and corruption that is destroying our great country." (MM 1/20/81)

Given the particular role in which agents of the public and their allies have been cast (as insidious conspirators), it may be useful to inquire as to what, if any, symbolic significance "public" has in the *weltanschauung* of religious fundamentalism. The Latin root *publicus* (from *populus*, the people) also serves as the root for *publicum* (public revenue) and *publicanus* (tax farmer). In the King James translation of the New Testament books of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, the term "publicans" (from *publicanus*) refers to Jewish tax collectors for the occupying Roman forces in Palestine. Serving in the prototypal civil role (tax collector) for an imperial power, publicans were social outcasts, despised by fellow Jews. In the narration of Jesus' life by New Testament authors, publicans are usually identified in the company of "sinners" (Mark 2:14, Matt. 9:11) and "harlots." (Matt. 21:31,32)

Yet, the publican is also an object of religious concern. When his disciples were asked "Why eateth your Master with publicans and sinners?" Matthew, the repentant tax collector of Capernaum, reports Jesus as saying "they that be whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." (9:11-12)

Thus, the publican is a somewhat ambiguous figure: one who-- in the service of an alien authority-- acts against the interests of his natural community. Still, it is with publicans that Jesus chooses to associate. The simultaneous revulsion and sympathy elicited by New Testament accounts of the publican provides, perhaps, a further clue in understanding Falwell's attitude toward the public and its relationship to civil authority.

In the depiction of America's betrayal and hope for a moral rebirth in Moral Majority's direct mail, the publican-- if not in actual name-- serves as a central character. His presence is felt in Falwells' references to a public that has been "sleeping" (MM 6/15/82), "deceived" (MM 10/12/82), "brainwashed into believing that homosexuality is not sinful behavior" (MM2/2/81), and "confused by the lies and the slander that the liberal press is writing about Moral Majority." (MM 7/15/81) The public is therefore an uncertain ally. "I cannot share this problem with the general public," Falwell writes in one letter. "I must look to you and a few close friends for the answer." (MM 10/30/81)

Clearly, Falwell intends his audience to understand his use of "public" --whether as plural "persons" or social institutions-- as a *secular*

reference, i.e., as that people or realm apart from the moral order. In the fundamentalist persona's world, such a view of "public" can never be neutral. It is "amoral," not empowered by an agent or principle beyond its own interests. Hence, Falwell argues, *secular humanism* must be the consequent *ethos* of a social-political collective that has broken from its spiritual moorings.

By his amoral identity, the publican/secular humanist/liberal character must inherently pose a threat to members of the nation-community. Falwell warns of "the liberal humanist tide that has been slowly corrupting America over the past twenty-five years" (MM 5/15/81), "the insidious efforts of secular humanists to destroy the moral convictions of our boys and girls in some public schools" (MM1/20/81), and "the way amoral liberals are trying to corrupt our nation from its commitment to freedom, democracy, traditional morality, and the free enterprise system." (MM n.d. [1981])

When the moral armour of the social-political body has been pierced, such forces can reach those most vulnerable, whom law was intended to protect:

> And what about the possibility of many practicing homosexuals who are militant recruiters being allowed to teach our children in our public schools?
>
> New "gay rights" laws will be an open invitation for them to subvert our young and impressionable children into their own lifestyles!
>
> What kind of defense do our children have against this kind of vulgar teaching *if they are not protected by laws* ... ? (MM 2/2/81) (Emphasis added)

When public institutions derive their authority from power that is not *of* a righteous community-- as publicans in the role of civil agents for the Romans-- they can never have "true" authority. It should not be a surprise to learn that Falwell promotes "*non*-public schools ... teaching traditional family and moral values" (MM 10/10/80) and that "The Moral Majority is pro-life, pro-family, pro-American, and *we don't receive aid from the government.*" (MM 9/7/82).

The part played by the publican-character "and other moral cancers in our Republic" (MM 4/2/82), I suggest, satisfies a demand by the second persona of Moral Majority direct mail letters for *culpability*. Consistent with Eric Hoffer's observation that "Mass movements can rise and spread without belief in a God, but never without belief in a devil,"[20] Falwell's narration requires that responsibility for America's betrayal be fixed. An auditor who is invited to conceive of the polity as "a living creature, susceptible to disease," Black insists, "would likely be just the sort of person who would seek culpability." This disposition, he suggests, lies in religious fundamentalism itself. "Surely it is possible that a lifetime of reverent attention to sermons that seek a purpose behind the universe can end by developing a telic cast of mind, can end by inducing people to seek purpose and plan behind everything, so that they must explain political misfortunes and illnesses alike by hypothesizing conspiracies."[21] Indeed, Falwells' list of "the evil forces in this country" (MM 10/12/82) is formidable: "liberal politicians, sex education advocates, pro-abortionists, and pornography kings" (MM 7/15/81), and "drug pushers, secular humanists, and other enemies of traditional American moral values ... ." (MM 12/24/81)

Although cast in the role of culpable agent, the publican-character serves a second, related purpose in Moral Majority direct mail. Even as "publicans and harlots" repented under the preaching of the prophet John the Baptist (Matt. 21:32), Falwell holds out the hope of a moral "rebirth" of the public. "I don't hate homosexuals," he proclaims in a May 3, 1982 letter. Nonetheless, he insists, their *practices* and the authority ("immoral laws") permitting these and other amoral acts must be eliminated from public institutions (schools) and positions of influence *on* the public. What is required is a "battle against immorality," Falwell announces. "War has been declared!" (MM n.d. [1981])

And as John the Baptist was "the voice of one crying in the wilderness" (Luke 3:4), Falwell is prepared to wage his battle in the *secular* (public) wilderness: "I have made the commitment to go right into the halls of Congress and fight for laws that will save America." (MM n.d. [1981]) And he calls upon Moral Majority members to "help me fight the evil forces in our country" (MM 10/12/82) and "to be a 'soldier' in a war we are fighting with ballots instead of bullets!" (MM n.d. [1981]) Moral citizens, Falwell insists, must "take a *public* stand against perversion" (MM 2/15/82); "We must go into the halls of Congress and fight for moral laws that will bring this nation back to God." (MM n.d. [1981])

In locating the agon squarely in the *public's* space, Moral Majority direct mail implies two things: First, the individuals who occupy this space-- "the public"-- must themselves be an object of a campaign to win allies. "We must launch a well organized campaign to inform and activate millions of Americans while there is still time." (MM 3/1/82) As part of this effort, Falwell has set up the tax-exempt Moral Majority Foundation "to educate and inform the public about the issues." (MM 12/10/80) Individual members of the public thus are ultimately identified with one or the other sides in this agon. Referring to his dispute with Planned Parenthood over the so-called "Squeal Rule" proposed by the Reagan Administration, Falwell writes, "We can win this mail war with the *liberals*, but only if we alert *Americans* everywhere about what is happening ... ." (MM n.d. [1983]) "The American people,"he insists in an earlier appeal, "are behind us." (MM 4/15/82)

For there to be redemption, there must be, as Burke tells us, purification. In the process of mobilising the American people, there must also be a purging of public places and institutions. Falwell calls upon his supporters to "Examine your public schools' libraries and textbooks for immoral, anti-family, and anti-American content," (MM 1/1/81) and, further, asks "the American public to boycott the products of the company or companies which are refusing to withdraw financial support of ... programs considered to be 'morally offensive' ... ." (MM 6/26/81)

Such campaigns have inevitably led to criticism from more liberal

groups. Norman Dorsen, President of the American Civil Liberties Union, charged that the Moral Majority and other New Right organisations "want their religious doctrines enacted into law and imposed on everyone." He continued, "Their agenda is clear and frightening they mean to capture the power of government and use it to establish a nightmare of religious and political orthodoxy." (ACLU n.d. [1981]) And in a much more provocative tone, Planned Parenthood warned, in large dark print emblazoned on the front of its carrier envelope: "THE NEW RIGHT DOESN'T LIKE WHAT YOU'RE DOING IN YOUR BEDROOM, SO THEY'RE GOING TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION TO MAKE IT ILLEGAL." (PP n.d. [1982])

In subsequent direct mailings, Falwell has attempted to respond to these and other such charges. Denying that "our ultimate aim is to impose our moral values on everyone else," he offers the *tu quoque* rebuttal: "we are simply trying to stop the secular humanists, pornographers, abortionists, and others who are trying to impose their immoral values on the rest of us!" (MM 1/15/82) Again, Falwell insists, "we aren't trying to 'censor' anything or anyone-- nor are *we* denying *the public their* First Amendment rights." (MM 10/1/81) (Emphasis added)

In a more problematic vein, Falwell's attempts to answer his critics reveals a surprising ambivalence toward the public realm. "Moral Majority is committed to *a pluralistic society* ... ." He continues, however, "we are not trying to 'control' America, *only to create a moral climate and conscience which makes it easier for government to do right than wrong*." (MM 10/10/80) (Emphasis added) Beyond these statements, Falwell does not clarify what he means by a "pluralistic" society. Does he really mean to imply that civil libertarianian and a common telic order can co-exist?

Ronald Dworkin has recently argued that "the central doctrine of modern liberalism is the thesis that questions about the good life for man [sic] or the ends of human life are to be regarded from the public standpoint as systematically unsettlable. On these individuals are free to agree or disagree."[22] Faye Wattleton of Planned Parenthood illustrates this view when she uses "right" meaning "freedom of choice, your right to plan your own family, your right to control your own destiny." (PP n.d. [1982]) Yet, this is clearly not what Falwell means. When writing of the "rights of parents and traditional American values" (MM n.d. [1983]) he is referring not to civil "rights" in the sense of rules guaranteeing the exercise of personal preference or conscience, but in the sense of "correct action."

Conclusions

Where has this venture into the "personal" correpsondence of Rev. Jerry Falwell and his followers led us? Critics of argumentation, I suspect, will be sorely disappointed if they expected to find clear utterances of propositions, data, and warrants, in short, "reason-giving" discourse in the usual sense of the word "argumentation." Instead, we have discovered *narrative*: a tale of society betrayed by demonic forces, a call for a moral crusade, and visions of return to an idyllic state.

In a recent essay, Conrad has argued that the matrix of spiritual and secular myths which forms the Moral Majority's societal vision constitutes a rhetoric of "romance." Using Frye's characterization of this genre, Conrad finds:

> Romance allows readers to participate in a universe of simplified moral constructs ...; a universe where ... people and institutions are either good or evil. Romantic form arouses a desire ... to become a potent soldier of the "right" who acts in ways which will bring the moral regeneration of society and the spiritual rebirth of its citizens.[23]

When others in society cannot or choose not to participate in this *mythos*, disagreement must inevitably occur; and when the conflicting moral claims are objectified in terms of incommensurable constructions of the social collective, the dispute becomes "interminable."

But there is a further consequence, I believe, that is equally disturbing for argumentation critics. *For when conveyed through the medium of direct mail fundraising letters, such narratives as Falwell offers further distances the "people" from the possibility of a truly public art of deliberation*. Not only cannot the recipients of such letters question, challenge, or *argue* with rhetors --frequently the signatory has not drafted the text or, in some cases, even read it beforehand-- but the nature of the medium itself shields its claims from effective *public* criticism. (Letters from Planned Parenthood, ACLU, Common Cause, and other organizations challenging Falwell's views *are not mailed to persons who are likely to receive Falwell's direct mail*!)

Such an arrangement poses, *inter alia*, two dangers: First, "public-ness" --our conceptions of communal values, procedures, institutions, and the "space" in which discussion and decision are situated-- is increasingly bifurcated, rendering the possibility of a moral terminus more remote. And, second, our sensibilities and, hence, our responsiveness to "public" language, i.e., *loci communes*, is dulled. Falwell undermines our sense of the irreparable in claiming --in repeated letters-- "We must act now, or it may be too late forever!" (MM 3/12/82) and our capacity for trust: "Believe me, I have never needed your help as much as now!"

Is the critic who holds forth the hope of an art of "public" deliberation himself guilty of what McGee and Martin term "ideological argumentation?" Does the judgment posed above undercut "the people's will to power by creating the fiction that people ought to have academically 'good reason' for what they do?"[24] Surely an argument can be put forth to this effect, but it is just this possibility of the efficacy of *argument* that direct mail fundraising letters, at least as practiced by Falwell, seems to deny.

NOTES

[1] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 6.

[2] Ibid., pp. 8, 9.

[3] Perry Deanne Young, "Richard A. Viguerie," in *God's Bullies* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1982).

[4] Larry J. Sabato, *The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 228.

[5] Quoted in Alan Crawford, *Thunder on the Right: The "New Right" and the Politics of Resentment* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 45-46.

[6] From a talk given at the American Association of Political Consultants Annual Meeting, Wash., D.C., Nov. 30, 1978; quoted in Sabato, p. 241.

[7] Crawford, pp. 50-51.

[8] Ibid., p. 51.

[9] G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A Speculative Inquiry into the Art of Public Deliberation," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 18 (1982), p. 214. Goodnight describes deliberative rhetoric as "a form of argumentation through which citizens test and create social knowledge in order to uncover, assess, and resolve shared problems." (p. 214)

[10] Sabato, p. 237.

[11] Edwin Black, "The Second Persona," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, LVI (1970), p. 111.

[12] Ibid., p. 112.

[13] Ibid., pp. 112-113.

[14] Charles Arthur Willard, "Argument Fields," in J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, eds., *Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), p. 39.

[15] Michael Calvin McGee and Martha Anne Martin, "Public Knowledge and Ideological Argumentation," *Communication Monographs*, 50 (1983), p. 47.

[16] Direct mail fundraising letters from these four organisations are referred to within the text by abbreviation of name and date, e.g., (PP 10/3/82)for Planned Parenthood letter, October 3, 1982.

[17] Harry Covert, *Moral Majority Report*, Oct. 19, 1981, p. 2.

[18] Charles Conrad, "The Rhetoric of the Moral Majority: An Analysis of Romantic Form," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 69 (1983), 162-3.

[19] MacIntyre, p. 160.

[20] Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Perennial Library [Harper and Row], 1951), p. 86.

[21] Black, p. 117. Although intentionality is not normally associated with disease, Black explains, a high percentage of persons believing they have cancer "are disposed to blame the cancer on a morally responsible agent." (p. 117)

[22] MacIntyre, p. 112.

[23] Conrad, p. 161.

[24] McGee and Martin, p. 55.

THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF PROGRESS IN LIBERAL ARGUMENT

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The seeds of modern American liberalism were planted in the Omaha Platform of 1892 when the People's Party (or the Populist Party) met to nominate a presidential candidate in defiance of the two party structure. Against the background of the gilded age when big business and especially the railroads largely controlled the nation, when political corruption was both widespread and blatant, when one weak and mediocre president was succeeded by another, and Darwinism was the dominant economic tenet, the populists started a movement whose impact is still with us today. Among other things, the party platform called for unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1, a federal commodity loan system, a graduated federal income tax, public ownership of railroads and telegraphs, an eight hour work day, direct election of senators, the initiative and referendum, and an end to the use of private armies against strikers.

Arthur Link refers to the Omaha Platform as "the advance guard of a new reform movement."[1] He explains this break from the past:

> The adoption of the Populist platform marked the end of an era when practically all Americans put their trust in the English Liberal idea of a free, competitive economy, operating automatically in the general interest without decisive and planned intervention by government. The adoption of this platform heralded the coming triumph of a new progressive faith--a faith in the ability of man working together to overcome economic adversity and rectify social injustice by legislative action.[2]

Their presidential candidate James B. Weaver, an old veteran of the Greenback movement, managed to garner a million of the twelve million popular votes cast that year, winning twenty-two electoral votes in the process. Of more importance, however, was the fusion of the People's Party with the Democratic Party four years later. After the free silver advocates managed to take control of the Democratic party from its eastern wing, resulting in the nomination of William Jennings Bryan whose endorsement of free silver made him the hero to millions and the enemy of the rest, the fusionists endorsed the Democratic candidate and exerted their considerable energies on his behalf.

After a brief flirtation with the silver question, the Republicans endorsed the gold standard and selected William McKinley as their candidate. Seldom have the battle lines been drawn so passionately as they were in the Bryan-McKinley campaign of 1896. The business interests provided all the money necessary to defeat Bryan and his forces, portraying Bryan through a massive propaganda campaign as an anarchist and seditionist, among other nonflattering things. Yet in an election decided along sectional lines, Bryan carrying the South and most of the West and McKinley the East and most of the Midwest, the reform Democrats made a respectable showing, losing the popular vote by five hundred thousand and the electoral vote 271-176.

It is easy for cultural historians to ridicule Bryan and the silver campaign. Indeed by 1900 when the two men faced each a second time, the silver issue was scarcely important. Yet in 1896, the Bryanites were able to capture the soul of the Democratic Party. As naive as the silver issue was and as simpleas Bryan might have been, the reformists realized that silver was the one issue that could unite the various reform movements and ideas and create a national movement whose successes would come on another day. Bryan himself said it in his famous speech: "If they ask us why we do not embody in our platform all the things we believe in, we reply that when we have restored the money of the Constitution all other necessary reforms will be possible; but until this is done there is no other reform that can be accomplished."[3] And even Richard Hofstadter, whose respect for Bryan is both partial and begrudging, is forced to conclude that Bryan, "always defeated, had, in the course of a sixteen-year quest for issues, effectively turned public attention upon one reform after another; and many of his proposals had had a core of value."[4] A "core of value" is an interesting phrase, for among his proposals were the federal income tax, popular election of U.S. Senators, publicity in campaign contributions, women's suffrage, a Department of Labor, more effective railroad regulation, currency reform, and state initiatives and referenda, almost the exact menu for the progressive movement that would soon hit the states and then the national government, led by many who had regarded Bryan as a dangerous radical including the future president Woodrow Wilson who thought Bryan "foolish and dangerous in his theoretical beliefs."[5]

It was left, then, to Theodore Roosevelt and an anarchist in Buffalo to bring progressivism into the national arena. This enigmatic vice-president who constantly talked of the manly and heroic virtues, who searched for lofty goals that would make politics less of a cheap affair, who despised the rich but feared the mob, who regarded himself as a stablizer of the present system, a controller of excesses, brought chills to the old-guard Republicans who had agreed with some reluctance to his serving as second on the National ticket in the election of 1900.

One needs to talk about two presidencies for Theodore Roosevelt, the one he held from 1901 to 1909 and the one he might have held had his 1912 return from political retirement been successful.

The first Roosevelt presidency was not without its political successes. He did succeed in passing a pure food and drug law, a not insignificant railroad regulation bill and programs for conservation of natural resources. Yet his presidency was largely a rhetorical one. Indeed, his domestic policies were the opposite of his foreign policies, electing in the home arena to speak loudly but carry a small stick. He relied on his personal charisma to expose business corruption, to demand voluntary actions at the risk of governmental actions and to argue against the dangers of accumulated wealth.

Yet there is merit to a rhetorical presidency, especially when foundations are laid for future action, where traditional arguments are rearranged, agendas decided upon, the popular mood stablized and reinforced. None of this is to suggest that Roosevelt selected such a strategy. Indeed he believed, at least then, that reform should only go so far, but the net effect of his rhetoric was to focus attention on more reform, to garner the forces of progressivism that were having their day on the state and local level and then turn the attention of the whole movement to problems that required a national solution. His presidency created expectations.

Content that he had met his public responsibility, Roosevelt elected not to run again in 1908. Satisfied that his hand-picked successor William Howard Taft would carry on his policies, Roosevelt stepped aside. When he returned two years later from his travels abroad, he found the national scene in a sorry state, regretting his abdication of the presidency. But it was not just Roosevelt who was disenchanted with the direction the Republican party was taking, it was also his progressive followers.

Their dream of an effective tariff bill was crushed with the passage of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff which, by the time all the crippling amendments were passed, was a bill bitterly opposed by progressives but praised by President Taft; and in the dispute between Secretary of the Interior Richard A. Ballinger and Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot where the latter accused the former of a sellout of natural resources to the forces of private exploitation, Taft settled the issue by firing Pinchot, raising the ire of those who supported conservation; and when Democrats and progressive Republicans revolted against the autocratic powers of Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon, whose obstructionist tactics kept progressive legislation bottled up in his self-appointed Rules Committee, the President refused to support the power challenge. Thus all around him, Taft found insurgency and Theodore Roosevelt arrived home in time to find himself as the logical alternature to Taft, the Progressive Republican Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin notwithstanding, for the 1912 Republican nomination.

In many ways the second Roosevelt presidency was the more interesting of the two, the presidency that never happened. If the American liberal tradition keeps track of important moments in its history, then trumpets should blare at the mention of Roosevelt's visit to Osawatomie, Kansas, August 31, 1910, when he proclaimed his "New Nationalism"[6] and then essentially endorsed the platform of the Omaha Convention of 1892.

The speech may be regarded as a passionate defense of centralized authority, an attempt to argue the importance of national interests over sectional interests and the endorsement of the federal government as the method of affecting a more humane society. "The national government," he said, "belongs to the whole American people, and where the whole American people are interested, that interest can be guarded effectively only by the national government."[7] And he defines what he takes New Nationalism to mean:

> The New Nationalism puts the national need before sectional or personal advantage. It is impatient of the utter confusion that results from local legislatures attempting to treat

> national issues as local issues. It is still more impatient of the impotence which springs from overdivision of governmental powers, the impotence which makes it possible for local selfishness or for legal cunning, hired by wealthy special interests, to bring national activities to a deadlock. This New Nationalism regards the executive power as the steward of the public welfare.[8]

And in the speech, he offers a list of problems that require national solutions: control of lobbies and special interests in congress, regulation of the railroads and whatever else is necessary to deal with other combinations that deal with the necessaries of life. He argued that directors of corporations should be held responsible when the corporation breaks the law. He urged an effective tariff commission, a graduated income tax, monetary reform, conservation, welfare programs for workers and direct primaries.

"An outburst of Marxian madness," the *New York World* called the speech. *Harper's Weekly* called him a "virtual traitor," and his critics compared him with Kaiser Wilhelm, Julius Caesar, Cataline and Porfirio Diaz.[9] Nonetheless, after a bitter Republican Convention whose party machinery was controlled by the Taft forces, they passed over the former president and renominated Taft on the first ballot. The Progressive Republic League, formed officially a year earlier, then met and nominated Roosevelt as its presidential candidate.

The split in the Republican ranks paved the way for the election of Woodrow Wilson, the reform Governor of New Jersey who had obtained the nomination of the Democratic Party after a lively session in Baltimore that took forty-six ballots to settle.

The election of 1912 was largely a campaign about means and not ends. The Progressive Movement had now occupied the national agenda and even Taft, while the most conservative of the three candidates, could claim some progressive credits, having in fact initiated twice as many trust suits during his presidency as had Roosevelt.

Nonetheless, the lively part of the campaign dealt with the choice between the New Nationalism and the New Freedom. Wilson, as accurately described by Link, "was still inbued with nineteenth century laissez-faire concepts and the Democratic state rights belief that the federal authority should be used only to destroy artificial barriers to the full development of individual energies, not to rearrange social and economic relationships or to give protection to special classes."[10] Thus the sole question that divided Roosevelt and Wilson was this one: Should the federal government destroy special privilege and allow the individual to flourish or should the federal government take positive action to allow participation in the national life?

Wilson not only won but brought with him a Democratic Congress and their ultimate legislative achievements more than anything merged New Nationalism with New Freedom, resulting in a graduated income tax, the Underwood Tariff, The Federal Reserve Act, the creation of the Federal

Trade Commission, women's suffrage and the Clayton Act which tried to define unfair methods of competition and generally fill the voids of the Sherman Act.

Thus it would appear that "progress" and "liberalism" had prevailed. Three conclusions seem appropriate about the manner in which Populism-Progressivism evolved and settled because that very much determined the manner and shape that liberalism would take during the New Deal era, establishing a legacy for American liberalism that we still cope with today.

First, one should note the departure from the traditional liberal fear of accumulated power. While one could debate the important distinctions between the New Nationalism and the New Freedom, any differences were lost in the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's job as president was much easier than any of his progressive or near-progressive predecessors. Progressivism in 1912 was a national idea whose time had come. Combined with the Democrats who were elected to Congress in 1912, in addition to the backing of the progressive Republicans, Wilson's legislative agenda in the domestic sphere was not seriously threatened. As Link puts it:

> All that was required of him was to act as the catalytic agent of his time--to rally and strengthen his forces, to synthesize ideas and proposals, and then to use his incomparable powers of articulation and leadership to translate these ideas into statutory realities.[11]

But the success of the progressives depended on strong executive leadership and with willingness to accumulate and use power. One could justify this use of power as long as he was convinced he was acting in the public good. But he who has such power also has the power to *define* the public good and the national welfare. This was the dilemma for these early twentieth century liberals, whether they knew it to be a dilemma or not. Thus it is no coincidence that the same administration that passed such progressive legislation would also lend its offices to the national hysteria of 1919-20 when over five thousand suspected radicals were arrested and almost six hundred were deported without the benefit of criminal charges which would have required elements of due process not necessary with deportation hearings.[12]

On the state level, the same Progressive Governor Hiram Johnson that attacked and conquered the Southern Pacific railroad in California and established a model agenda for progressives on the state level also supported the Alien Land Act of 1913 that attempted to keep foreigners, mostly orientals, from purchasing land in that state.[13]

Despite the disdain for organization, the progressives would find it necessary to take over the power of existing organizations or create new ones. That power was not always used with moderation.

Secondly, the populist-progressive notion of equal opportunity was a conservative and rather limited notion, excluding many who were indeed lacking such opportunity. Writing of the populist-progressive era, Richard

Hofstadter correctly observed that "the goal of revolt tended to be neither social democracy nor social equality, but greater opportunities."[14]

Their notion of equality of opportunity meant that if somehow men had greater access to the political process, changes serving the common good would follow. Thus one can readily understand their advocacy for open primaries, direct election of U.S. Senators, the initiative and the referendum. Their notion also assumed that, with increased political opportunities, laws would be made by men of good will who would return the nation to the day when individualism mattered, when initiative and hard work paid off. Thus laws could be written to control the excesses of big business, without tampering too much with big business itself. The notion of rearranging the economy was foreign to them and would partially account for their fear of bolshevism a few years later and plague liberalism until this day.

Always equality of opportunity would contain a caveat, an assumption, that if men did not use it, that was not the fault of the progressives. Thus even Theodore Roosevelt, accused of "Marxian madness" after his Kansas address, made clear his position:

> When I say I want a square deal for the poor man, I do not mean I want a square deal for the man who remains poor because he has not the energy for himself. If a man who has had a chance will not make good, then he has got to quit.[15]

The key for Roosevelt, like other progressives, was character and character of the traditional kind:

> In the last analysis, the most important elements in any man's career must be the sum of those qualities which, in the aggregate, we speak of as character. If he has not got it, then no law that the wit of man can devise, no administration of the law by the boldest and strongest executive, will avail to help him.[16]

One will find little difference in the notion of equal opportunity among the populists or progressives. Nor can one ignore the anti-semitic overtones to the silver campaign and the "international gold ring."[17] Additionally the same Omaha Platform that gave birth to the reform movement also called for prohibition of alien land ownership and immigration restriction.

While the progressives were more sophisticated and urbane than the agrarian populists, one also needs to mention their almost total alienation from the immigrants who by 1910 numbered 1/7th of the total population, largely centered in the east where the old rules of equal opportunity never quite matched the needs or realities of immigrant life. The immigrant and the progressive never quite understood each other. Nor could they. The progressive, with his emphasis on political access, had no message for the immigrant who, given old-world realities, viewed government as something to be feared, avoided and of no help in their economic problems. They sought economic opportunities, not political opportunities. The political boss was better able to meet their needs,

reinforcing the nativistic insticts of the progressives who obviously felt more comfortable in a world and with a myth that they better understood. Thus it is not difficult to figure out who the progressives were talking about when they spoke of those who ignored opportunities because of character defects.

A third conclusion that must be suggested about the reform movement was the fragile political structure they left behind. Making very few institutional changes in the political society they sought to reform and relying on their notion that good men would enforce good laws, the progressives made no allowances for the fact that they might not always be in power.

Perhaps Hiram Johnson was correct when he said of reform as it related to his California experience: "Communities will stand just so much reform legislation at one time, and wise is the man who intuitively has some conception of just how far he can go..."[18] In any case, for a variety of reasons, reform by 1920 was an idea gone out of fashion. Without the presidents who would use the various regulatory agencies, if only through the power of effective appointment, the agencies could do no good. Hofstadter writes the appropriate epitath for the end of the era:

> In their search for mechanical guarantees of continuted popular control the reformers were tying to do something altogether impossible-to institutionalize a mood. When the mood passed, some of the more concrete reforms remained; but the formal gains for popular government, while still on the books, lost meaning because the ability of the public to use them effectively lapsed with the political revival that brought them in, and the bosses and the interest promptly filtered back.[19]

Liberals would have to wait another twelve years before the mood returned and they would have another opportunity to repair the national structure. The collapse of the economy in 1929 made that possible.

In 1932, the Franklin D. Roosevelt campaign train stopped at a small town in Ohio. After a brief address by the candidate, the train began to pull away, to move on to still another small midwestern town. An anonymous rhetorical question was heard from the crowd: "Brother Roosevelt, you are a distant relation to old Teddy. Have you got one joint of his backbone?"[20] To what extent was the second Roosevelt a successor to the progressive tradition? Despite his well-documented ambiguities in the 1932 struggle for the Democratic Party nomination, several things are true. FDR was the candidate of the Southern and Western wings of the party and the enemy of the more conservative Eastern wing who would have preferred Newton Baker of Ohio and were using Alfred Smith as a stand-in until the FDR movement folded. Newton Baker was clearly the preferred candidate of the Eastern business interests.

Additionally, while the complexities of the Chicago proceedings that resulted in the nomination of Roosevelt still provoked controversy, we do know that when the steering committee of the California delegation decided to switch to FDR on the fourth ballot, one member gave the following post-campaign explanation:

> A deadlock in 1932 would undoubtedly have nominated Newton D. Baker, and his running mate would have been chosen from Ritchie of Maryland, Byrd of Virginia, or more probably Garner. All three of these men were conservatives. In any case, none of them was capable of fathering a "New Deal." The political philosophies of Roosevelt and Baker were worlds apart; so was their approach to domestic and world problems.[21]

And, more than any other person, it was the old populist-progressive William McAdoo of California, the former Wilson cabinet member, who released the California delegates and permitted the rush to FDR during the fourth ballot. As one historian of that convention wrote: "...there is ample evidence that McAdoo perceived in Roosevelt's candidacy and the election the best chance for a progressive resurgence in the midst of the agonies of a horrendous economic depression."[22] Finally, the leaders of the Republican Progressives, among them George Norris, Hiram Johnson and Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., deserted their own party's candidate and supported FDR.

Whatever ambiguities one finds in the New Deal, this does not mean that its defining characteristic was one of improvisation, as many, including Hofstadter, would charge. Nor does it mean that the New Deal was "ambiguous, contradictory, and soon to split into rival factions" as Jack Newfield and Jeff Greenfield, among others, suggest.[23]

The New Deal was an attempt to improve on a capitalist foundation with whatever was necessary and feasible in dealing with the inequities of that society. In that sense, the New Deal was hardly revolutionary, as others, including Hoover and Smith, would charge.[24] It differed from the progressive movement in several important regards: more than the progressive movement, it depended almost exclusively on one leader; it greatly expanded its political base; it was more daring with experimentation; it avoided many of the prejudices of the progressive era; and it had more real-life meaning for more segments of the national population.

Yet, like the progressive movement, it retained the belief that business regulated would serve the larger interests of the nation and that the individual still had great personal responsibilities. In his most thorough explication of his economic views, Roosevelt explained his position at the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, September 23, 1932. There he told his listeners and the press:

> Nor today should we abandon the principle of strong economic units called corporations, merely because their power is susceptible of easy abuse. In other times we dealt with the problem of an unduly ambitious central Government by modifying it gradually into a constitutional democratic Government. So today we are modifying and controlling our economic units.[25]

And he regarded himself as the person to complete the work of Woodrow Wilson:

> Had there been no World War-had Mr. Wilson been able to devote eight years to domestic instead of to international affairs-we might have had a wholly different situation at the present time.... The problem he saw so clearly is left with us as a legacy; and no one of us on either side of the political controversy can deny that it is a matter of grave concern to the Government.[26]

There were, of course, differing points of view within the New Deal administration and is easy to separate them into camps. Rexford Tugwell was different from Raymond Moley; Harold Ickes was far more to the left than Henry Morgenthau; Robert Wagner, Sr. was more of a social reformer than James Farley. But the genius of the New Deal was its ability to tolerate and accommodate some essentially different points of view, especially among those who saw the New Deal as the opportunity to institutionalize social reformism and those who viewed the New Deal as a specific response to a temporary economic condition in the national economy. And it was the special genius of Franklin D. Roosevelt that he could accommodate such differing points of view with a reasonable degree of open-mindedness and tolerance unusual in a chief executive. What the New Deal proved, as much as anything, was that liberalism came in many shapes and forms and that liberals could work together, albeit in a somewhat chaotic and occasionally bitter fashion.

Thus, those who look for an ideological strain to the New Deal will constantly be disappointed for, if it had a unifying theme, it was one of political strategy and not economic theory. In that sense, Elliot A. Rosen, more than most historians, defines correctly the meaning of the New Deal:

> Roosevelt as compromiser, oriented toward concrete goals, will never satisfy those with transcendent ideological commitment. The governing motif of the 1932 campaign reflected the longing of the mass of the American people for the attainment of economic recovery and some measure of security. In tandem, the Democratic candidate aspired to achievement or majority status for his party by forging a liberal coalition that would outlast the immediate crisis.[27]

If the circle of advisers that surrounded Roosevelt seemed an unlikely group with their differing social and economic theories, so did the success of Roosevelt in the public arena where he forged a coalition that would not have been possible with a more ideological commitment, a political party broad enough to include, and claim as enthusiastic supporters, a Southern Populist such as Estes Kefauver, an agrarian reformer such as Henry Wallace, an urbane and wealthy industrialist such as Henry Lehman, a Russian-born labor leader such as Sidney Hillman, a midwestern Farmer-Laborite such as Hubert Humphrey and a pragmatic and ambitious politician such as Lyndon B. Johnson. As William Leuchtenburg notes:

> Roosevelt presented himself not as the paladin of liberalism but as father to all the people, not as the representative of a single class but as the conductor of a concert of interests. A man above the political battle, the President aimed to serve as the unifier of interests and the harmonizer of divergent ideologies.[28]

It is indeed a tribute to his legacy that the coalition he created was strong enough to sustain itself, even when out of political power, through the sixties and the Great Society of Lyndon Johnson, the last gasp of new dealism, eventually pounded into oblivion by an ill-advised foreign adventure. It is further testimony to the legacy that the myth persists even today that the elements of that coalition still exist and can be returned to power, if only one could find the appropriate leader.

The word "progressive" is, of course, no longer fashionable in American political rhetoric. Whatever utility the term had was hurt by the disastrous coalition among liberals and socialists in the 1924 presidential election when the party of Robert M. LaFollette went down to disastrous defeat. And with its brief resurrection, in the 1948 presidential campaign when Henry Wallace was the candidate of the Progressive Citizens of America, the term came to mean association with communists or communist sympathizers. So the Americans for Democratic Action was formed so as to indicate that not all liberals accepted the views of Henry Wallace, that not all Democrats were Progressives.[29] Additionally, even the word "liberal" has lost a degree of fashion, many politicians now preferring "moderate" or "neoliberal."

But if the language is tired, so is the platform and so are the spokesmen and thus one cannot be entirely optimistic about the future of the liberal argument. Liberalism has lost favor with large numbers of the American electorate and not since 1964 have offers of "progress" made for a successful presidential campaign. And when Ronald Reagan asks the voters to decide whether they were really better off than they were four years ago, the American electorate responded with a resounding thump.

In 1896, at the climax of the American industrial push, new economic realities demanded fresh solutions. As conservative as the liberal responses might have been when the progressives assumed power, one could still claim for them advancements that improved the national scene. And as nonideological as the New Deal might have been, it clearly allowed a greater segment of the American population to enter the mainstream of American life. Indeed, it might have been too successful, giving a large share of the population a stake in the present system and an understandable desire to hold on to their gains.

The liberal argument needs a refresher course, so to speak. It needs to adjust itself to new national realities. It will not allow its spokesmen to win national elections when it uses the tired arguments of the past to persuade voters for change. Change needs to be defined. Affirmative government must be made relevent to the problems of the current era. The electorate needs to be educated.

One currently has on the political scene six Democratic Party candidates seeking the presidential nomination a year from now. In some form or another, all are attempting to utilize the liberal argument. But they are essentially six characters in search of an agenda, six mimics who depend on nuances to find separate ground. So they roam from national interest group convention to convention, displaying their candidacies, but all relying on the strategy of nonoffensiveness to seek the backing of the relevant interest group. None are willing to offend, and none seem to realize that relevant arguments must offend. Posturing becomes a substitute for argument.

A relevant issue facing the industrial complexities of today's society, for example, is the issue of seniority versus affirmative action in the workplace, given the employment difficulties of these times. How do these liberals respond to this issue? They equivocate, evade or simply rephrase the question.

Gary Hart says it is "an issue for collective bargaining." But, of course, collective bargaining agreements have already settled the issue in favor of seniority and at the expense of blacks, Hispanics and women.

Walter Mondale says: "Both are legitimate interests-seniority and the issue of affirmative action. I believe in both. I believe in both principles and I think we have to deal with those policies."

Alan Cranston says: "I basically favor a seniority system. But I think we need to find ways to deal with the special problems of women and blacks."

John Glenn's aide said: "Both sides have legitimate claims. He's always been a strong supporter of the principle of seniority, but at the same time past discrimination has made affirmative action a necessary thing."[30]

At least none of them will be accused of Marxian madness.

The liberal argument needs to profit from the past. Progress in America has consisted of cautious movements. So it must be in a pluralistic society, operating within the confines of a two-party system. But changes have nonetheless occurred in the twentieth-century that have justified a liberal argument. Each movement has built on the successes of the past, but has not been slave to it. While the America of 1948 might not have achieved all that liberals desired, it nonetheless provided more for its citizens than might have seemed possible to the liberal of 1896. Yet there is a difference between caution and timidity. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were cautious yet bold. Franklin D. Roosevelt had more than a joint of his cousin's backbone. The liberal argument today needs less timidity, a degree of boldness and a willingness to take a risk. It may also need the realization that the coalitions of the past may need some rearranging.

Thus the liberal argument needs to search out more solutions that deal with the realities of the present world, the post-industrial era. Jack Newfield and Jeff Greenfield correctly argue that "bigness, wealth, and power have replaced initiative and opportunity as the key factors in determining who succeeds and who fails in America's economy."[31] But the villains are not just the ones they identify, the businessmen who control critical segments of American industry. The problem is also the AFL-CIO, the National Education Association and those once liberal groups who, having succeeded, want to retain their power. If liberalism means anything, it means to resist power wherever it is used to limit the freedom and opportunity of others. The liberal argument today needs to confront the issue of power where it exists and wherever it inhibits social reform. Only then will progress occur and only then will the liberal argument have relevance for the realities of the present national situation.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Arthur Link, *American Epoch* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 11.

[2] Link, p. 11.

[3] William Jennings Bryan, "Cross of Gold," in *American Public Address*, ed. A. Craig Baird (New York: McGraw Hill, 1956), p. 198.

[4] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 257.

[5] Quoted in Hofstadter, p. 322.

[6] Theodore Roosevelt, "The New Nationalism," in *The New Nationalism*, ed. William E. Leuchtenburg (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1961), pp. 21-39.

[7] Roosevelt, p. 36.

[8] Roosevelt, p. 36.

[9] Quoted in Leuchtenburg, p. 8.

[10] Link, p. 124.

[11] Link, p. 126.

[12] Robert K. Murray, *Red Scare* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1955), p. 251.

[13] Spencer C. Olin, Jr., *California's Prodigal Sons* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 80-90.

[14] Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), p. 10.

[15] Roosevelt, p. 27.

[16] Roosevelt, p. 39.

[17] See Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, pp. 77-82.

[18] Quoted in Olin, p. 89.

[19] Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, pp. 266-267.

[20] Quoted in Eliot A. Rosen, *Hoover, Roosevelt And The Brains Trust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 334.

[21] Quoted in Rosen, p. 263.

[22] Rosen, p. 265.

[23] Jack Newfield and Jeff Greenfield, *A Populist Manifesto* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 20.

[24] See, for example, "Smith Threatens A Revolt On Roosevelt Leadership; Calls New Deal Socialism," *New York Times*, January 26, 1936, p. 36.

[25] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Commonwealth Club Address," in *Rendezvous With Destiny*, ed. J.B.S. Hardman (New York: Dryden Press, 1944), p. 35.

[26] Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 33.

[27] Rosen, p. 304.

[28] William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt And The New Deal* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1963), p. 84.

[29] See Allen Yarnell, *Democrats And Progressives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

[30] Quoted in Peter A. Brown, "Bias Vs. Seniority Issue Giving Democrats Fits," Scripps-Howard News Service, in *Pittsburgh Press*, July 16, 1983. p. B-3.

[31] Newfield and Greenfield, p. 35.

THE IMPASSE OF THE LIBERAL ARGUMENT:
SPECULATION ON AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE LATE 1960'S

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"In America in 1968," wrote Theodore H. White, "folk-wisdom not only ran out of solutions, it ran out of common standards of judgment. . . . It was as if a master hand had descended and confused the tongues of Americans, made a Babel of their words so that when one group spoke the other could not understand its language."[1] White was referring to a state of deadlock resulting from the loss of a common vision of national purpose or goals. Although some writers pick an earlier critical date,[2] it is clear that the liberal coalition built by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930's had come apart by the time Lyndon Johnson declined to run for re-election in 1968.

Simple economics explains part of the change. The great post-war prosperity had brought more and more of the ranks of labor and the previously disadvantaged into the middle class. With the shift in socioeconomic status came a shift in ideological moorings as well: Where you stand truly *did* depend on where you sit. The growing middle class was more concerned about protecting its own newly-won security than it was about opening the gates of opportunity to those who still were left behind. How else could one explain the popularity of George Wallace in predominantly liberal, urban, Northern states in 1964 or his threat to take traditionally Democratic votes as an independent Presidential candidate in 1968? How else to explain the pervasive appeal during the late 1960's of what came to be called the "social issue," on which liberals were particularly vulnerable?

But economics alone cannot explain the deadlock of American liberalism. Another part of the answer is that the traditional twentieth-century liberal argument also had reached an impasse. I wish to explore this contention, drawing primarily on two theoretical constructs. One is Farrell's explanation of the diachronic dimension of argument. As he explains in "Knowledge in Time," arguments not only relate premises and conclusions at a given moment, but they also are historically situated and evolve in context. Any argumentative utterance has what Farrell calls a "redoubling" character: responding to the exigence of the moment yet also anticipating how the argument will develop later so that the utterance might be viewed retrospectively as appropriate.[3]

The other theoretical position on which I wish to draw is Henry Johnstone's concept of the argument *ad hominem*.[4] Briefly,

Johnstone holds that this form, far from being a fallacious argument, is the only valid form of philosophical argument. Philosophical disputes cannot be settled through appeal to external evidence, because the disputants will view that evidence through the lenses of different presuppositions. Hence validity depends on an argument addressed to the person, showing that his or her premises would lead to a conclusion which he or she would find contradictory or otherwise unacceptable. It is not some external notion of validity, then, but the participants' individual judgment, which causes an argument to be set aside and another one tried in its place.

The thesis which I hope to develop is that over time, during the 1960's, the fundamental tenets of the liberal argument became *arguments ad hominem*. Gradually at first, then at an accelerating pace, liberals began to reject the conclusions to which their own premises seemed to lead. Moreover, the acceleration of this process during the late 1960's so stunned liberals that they lacked alternative arguments to those which were deposed. The result was to leave the liberal argument in an impasse from which it may yet await rescue.

I shall approach this thesis in four parts: an exposition of the major tenets of the twentieth-century liberal argument, a discussion of how these tenets had developed into *arguments ad hominem* by the late 1960's, a view of the resulting impasse, and some speculation about how the deadlock might be broken.

I.

Though there are some similarities, it is obvious that twentieth-century liberalism differs from its nineteenth-century predecessor in significant respects. Chief among these is the view of government. Unlike his forbears, the contemporary liberal does not view government and the individual as inherently at odds. Government is seen basically as a benign influence which can do two key things. It can counter the power of organized business and labor interests, responding to the "interdependence into which individuals and groups of individuals have been thrown in modern society."[5] And it can serve as guarantor of a wider range of individual rights than the eighteenth or nineteenth century recognized, including "the right to security from the economic hazards of illness, accident, old age; the right to employment of a kind commensurate with one's abilities and to a training which will prepare one for such employment."[6] Government was a benign force for change, but -- consistent with the liberal tradition -- change must occur through orderly processes and not by confrontation or revolution. The means were as important as the ends.

Second, modern liberalism assumed the importance of economic growth.[7] If growth were to cease, what would follow would be a war between groups and sections for distribution of a pie of fixed size. In contrast, growth allowed the pie to be enlarged. Then the incremental economic resources could be allocated in favor of the disadvantaged, gradually improving their station without worsening the conditions of those relatively well off. The poor could gain without strain to the rich. The sustained economic growth of the 1960's, therefore, made the times propitious for the liberal agenda. Conversely, as Girvets acknowledges, prior to that decade "any drastic increase of the resources allotted to public purposes [the liberal agenda] could not have been accomplished without either reducing the private comforts of the dominant middle and upper income groups or eroding the economic base of their power."[8] The clear implication here is that the liberal agenda is achieved only at the sufferance of those relatively well off. Their consent depended on a situation which was not zero-sum: gains to the public interest could not come at their own personal sacrifice.

Third, twentieth-century liberals sought to direct the dividends resulting from economic growth in order to meet the needs of the disadvantaged, to achieve greater equality in the distribution of income and wealth, and to provide needed public works and investments. They therefore called for a shift in investment from the private sector to the public.[9] This theme, of course, is encapsulated in the notion of a limited Welfare State, which began to take form during the 1930's and which was sustained or expanded by all subsequent Presidents regardless of party.

Fourth, liberals were fundamentally optimistic about American society and culture. The order was presumed to be good, and the great moral and ethical question was how to *include* in a good society those who were excluded from it. Nowhere was this position more clearly drawn than on the issue of civil rights. The liberal view was that racial segregation was inherently wrong and that blacks should have the same legal protections and opportunities as whites. That the integration of blacks into the presumably good American society would represent the final objective of the civil rights movement was simply assumed. Advocacy which suggested that the system itself was flawed -- such as James Baldwin's plaintive "who wants to be integrated into a burning house?" -- was not well received by liberals before the mid-1960's.

Last, liberals tended to view foreign policy from the same perspective as domestic affairs. The aim of government was to improve the lot of mankind, and that goal was valid both at home and abroad. So the 1950's and 1960's liberals, who today seem so conservative, saw a duty for the United States to use its influence to achieve a better world. They disdained *Realpolitik* or the notion that there were limits to what we could do. In this respect they carried forward a traditional American attitude: that our nation was uniquely blessed by Providence and destined to play a role in the world, that our moral superiority over other nations gave us the power to make things happen by saying that we wished it so, and that when liberal principles were at stake it was sinful not to exert our influence, evil not even to try.

These five principles -- benign government, economic growth, a limited Welfare State, an assumption of a morally good order into which people needed to be assimilated, and a readiness to exert ourselves in international affairs -- marked out the liberal argument from the early 1930's to the mid-1960's. What happened then to cause each of these arguments to spin out against itself? What led the liberal argument to an impasse?

II.

Civil rights offered perhaps the clearest case of the liberal argument gone sour. In an effort to open the good society to blacks who had been excluded from its benefits, black leaders and white liberals together mounted a moral crusade. Making allowances for the delays which are inevitable in politics, it appeared that the cause would prevail. Strong support for the civil rights demonstrations of the early 1960's and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 were encouraging signs. Then, as Parmet describes it, "Just as faith in the ability of a democratic society to respond to its obvious inequities seemed to be reaching its height, however, different sounds were coming from new black leadership, both North and South."[10]

In retrospect it is not hard to explain what happened. The strong moral appeal of the civil rights movement had aroused the hopes of the nation's blacks, raising expectations faster than they could be fulfilled. Against the promise of racial equality, present deprivation was judged by a new calculus of values. What previously had been endured as inevitable now was abhorred as unjust. Relative deprivation was heightened. Since moderate reform had failed to achieve what now were urgent goals, a more militant posture was called for. As blacks became more militant, they judged liberal reforms to be inherently inadequate. The Civil Rights Commission reported in 1967 that, at its hearings around the nation, blacks expressed their sense of disillusionment with all levels of government and with the white community in general, and that they questioned the sincerity of the nation's commitment to racial progress.[11] Very few whites escaped suspicion; in particular, the white liberal stood accused of hypocrisy. He advocated measures for the benefit of blacks, but exerted himself only so much as was necessary to gain black votes without antagonizing whites.[12] But only measures which redistributed power, and which thereby provoked opposition from whites, really could achieve racial justice. This belief also made blacks progressively less sensitive to pleas for gradualism, which was, of course, the only pace of social change to which most whites could be expected to accede and the pace encouraged by the liberal's respect for orderly procedure.

So the liberal stood in a tenuous position. He had become used to the opposition of racist and reactionary whites. But now he also witnessed antagonism from those he intended to benefit! Under such circumstances it was easy for the liberal to conclude that blacks were ungrateful for all that had been done for them,[13] and hence to withdraw from the struggle. Such a move, of course, only strengthened blacks' perception that liberals were hypocrites after all. Increasingly, blacks viewed the white liberal as threatening the realization of social justice while the white liberal saw blacks as threatening social stability.

It was a most unfortunate coincidence that the advent of black militancy occurred at the same time as the riots of the mid-1960's, for in the public mind the two became linked. Certainly the riots posed a clear threat to orderly processes of change; therefore, as Tomlinson suggests, the dominant white reaction -- shared by liberals -- was that "riots cannot be tolerated," reflecting the belief that no just cause could be advanced by such unjust means.[14] Yet the aftermath of the riots placed liberals in a real dilemma: how to sympathize with the basic grievances of the voters while making clear that riots had no place in America? The liberal was seriously constrained. When calling for the importance of order, he always could be outflanked by the conservative for whom "law and order" was almost an incantation. Meanwhile, calls for massive government aid to redress the problems of the ghetto rang hollow since it was thought that previous Federal efforts had met only with ingratitude. As House Appropriations Committee Chairman George Mahon said in 1967, "The more we have appropriated for these [urban] programs the more violence we have," suggesting instead that it might be more appropriate for the government to stress "discipline, self-respect, and law and order enforced at the local level."[15]

The liberal's discomfiture was epitomized by President Johnson's silence in the wake of the Report from the Kerner Commission in February of 1968. The report described American society as racist and called for massive increases in government aid to the urban ghettoes. But the riots had eroded support even among liberals for such a venture; Johnson clearly lacked the political support for the measures advocated in the Kerner report. Besides, he was distressed that the accomplishments of his own programs had not been given more credit. At the same time, though, he could not denounce the report or imply that his own appointees had not done good work. In the face of this dilemma, Johnson chose to make *no* public statement, but that response also was seen as defensive and therefore unacceptable.[16]

By the late 1960's, in short, there was no satisfactory avenue for the liberal argument -- not the moral appeals of earlier years, which blacks now found patronizing; not the emphasis on orderly change, which rang of hypocrisy; not the call for massive aid, which was taintedby the riots; not a reversal of position, which would have denied the liberal's original sympathies; and not the "benign neglect" urged by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, which would have implied unconcern. Over time, the liberal argument had worked itself into an *ad hominem*, in which it led to results unacceptable to its own advocates.

Much the same progression can be seen in the argument for the Welfare State. This position always was somewhat equivocal: the Welfare State received support so long as it was relatively painless and arguably successful in achieving its goals. It was financed not so much at the expense of the private sector as out of the "fiscal dividend" accompanying economic growth. Moreover, the Welfare State could not be adopted under its own name, for it smacked of socialism, which remained a powerful devil term. So the appeals for public spending typically were couched in terms of buttressing free enterprise by correcting for the problems it left behind -- a kind of "fine tuning" of the economy. And public spending often was described as an investment that would bring greater returns in the long run, whether through greater productivity, increased tax revenues, or lower costs for unemployment insurance. Finally, the scope of the welfare programs often was small, so that the nation was always behind in accomplishing the liberal's objectives.

In the mid-1960's, Johnson attempted to harness these traditional appeals, ranging from the moral imperative to prudent management, to obtain a firmer national commitment in support of these social programs. As with the case of civil rights, expectations were raised in the early, heady optimism of the Great Society. The story of the inability of the Johnson social programs to satisfy these expectations, and the subsequent retrenchment of the programs, has been told elsewhere.[17] What may be worth noting, however, is the manner in which the Welfare State and the civil rights issue became joined.

It began with the desire to prove that the social programs were successful, a necessary step if the Administration were to justify their retention or increased funding. Since Congressional appropriations were made on an annual basis, time was of the essence: it was important to be able to show results quickly. So a decision was made early on to target these programs in the areas where there was the greatest concentration of potential beneficiaries -- the ghettoes of the major cities. There, of course, most residents were black. Several of the Johnson social programs consequently came to be widely perceived as intended for blacks. Moynihan, for example, described the War on Poverty as a means by which the Federal Government could devise measures to aid urban blacks without having to specify that such was their intent.[18] But the perception that these were programs for blacks led to a decline in the support they received from whites -- including those whites who might be beneficiaries of the program. For example, in a supplemental study for the Kerner commission, the researchers found far smaller percentages of whites than of blacks who concluded that the antipoverty program was "doing a good job."[19]

When the riots occurred, it was easy to argue that the Johnson social programs had been the cause, since they had raised black expectations to an unrealistic level and then produced frustration when the goals could not be met. In 1966, House Minority Leader Gerald Ford found part of the blame for the riots in the Administration's promising more than it could deliver to ghetto blacks. In 1968, the Republican Coordinating Committee found little doubt "that the repetition of irresponsible promises and political slogans by the Administration" was a primary cause.[20] Allegations such as these put liberals on the defensive. It was hard to refute the claim that there was *some* connection between the programs and the riots, particularly since one of the earlier arguments in behalf of the programs was that they were the antidote to riots.[21] The linkage left liberals seriously vulnerable, not only because white America massively rejected the riots as unconscionable but also because they were incompatible with the liberal's own commitment to orderly social change. The argument had led to its own negation. Parmet finds it not surprising, then, that "the politics of the so-called white backlash began to enter the vocabulary, completely transcending partisan lines," and concludes, "A specific victim of the backlash was the poverty program itself."[22]

Interestingly, however, there is another side to the story. In an oft-quoted passage, Moynihan noted, "Ideologically the American public is conservative; in practice it is liberal."[23] Those public programs which were able to transcend argument and controversy flourished, notwithstanding the immobilization of the liberal argument. No better example can be found than Medicare, which -- although mired in controversy for decades -- quickly gained consensual support following its adoption in 1965. Its parent program, Social Security, likewise enjoyed widespread approval. Even the Nixon Administration, while proclaiming that "we are approaching the limits of what government alone can do,"[24] agreed to maintain and even expand these programs, including the probably mistaken indexing of Social Security benefits in 1972.

In retrospect, two major features distinguish Medicare and Social Security from the public programs which stymied the liberal argument. First, they did not require annual appropriations. Once in place, they drew on their own sources of funding. (Not until the 1980's did funding for these programs become controversial, and then the discussion was almost entirely on the level of how to find the funds rather than whether to keep the programs.) Second, they were potentially universal in their benefits. Not everyone lives in a ghetto, suffers from poor nutrition, or is in need of retraining, but old age is the great equalizer. So long as virtually everyone stood to benefit from a program, its support was likely to continue. The lesson was not lost on so staunch a supporter of the Welfare State as Hubert Humphrey. Although speaking about civil rights, his remarks had much broader application. When the civil-rights papers at the Johnson Library were opened to scholars in 1972, Humphrey remarked that no longer was legislation for the special benefit of one segment of the population politically viable. He warned against demanding "a special break" for blacks as opposed to across-the-board economic gains for all.[25] While the liberal argument always had championed economic gains for all, it had not previously viewed targeted programs as the antithesis of that objective.

Even the gains for all which supposedly resulted from economic growth came into question by the late 1960's. It was not so much that growth came to be viewed as an unqualified evil, but that it was seen less as an unqualified good. Two developments encouraged this shift. First, there was a growing self-consciousness among liberals that the Gross National Product was value-neutral. It added in the value of military weapons and the value of consumer goods without distinction. It neglected the unmeasurable side effects of growth. By the late 1960's, many liberals were taking up the traditionally conservative call for conservation -- rephrased as protection of the environment or maintenance of ecological balance. Not until the 1970's would we encounter the argument that "less is more"

nor the concern for toxic wastes which today dominates our attention. But we did encounter the beginnings of a "limits to growth" argument, and we often encountered them from liberals -- who previously had depended on economic growth as the vehicle for achievement of their agenda.

Second, an unqualified concern for growth fostered growth that was not "real" -- it was checked by inflation. Loath to impose a tax increase in 1966, for both economic and political reasons, the Johnson Administration permitted the onset of inflation from which we are only now -- perhaps -- recovering. Inflation not only limited the *real* rate of growth but, more importantly, eroded middle-class support for the array of liberal programs which economic growth was to have made possible. It was a convenient argument that public programs, though beneficial, simply could not be afforded at such a perilous time. It was equally convenient to argue, then as now, that it was government spending on domestic programs which *caused* the inflation by pushing the federal deficit beyond some presumably acceptable level. Summarizing the effect of several of the factors I've described, Parmet noted, "The coincidence of rising costs, disenchanting both business and labor, plus the white backlash all combined as a reaction against both the Great Society's assumptions and the president's leadership."[26]

Discussing the effects of inflation invites attention to one of its principal causes -- increased spending for the war in Vietnam. It is no news to state that Vietnam undermined the liberal consensus on foreign policy which had been sustained since the end of World War II. But it did so in two quite distinct ways which combined to seriously fragment the Democratic Party between 1968 and 1976.

First, many liberals hewed to the postwar consensus, according to which Vietnam truly was a "noble cause." Just as one had a responsibility to remake American society for the better, so this obligation extended around the world. It dictated an activist foreign policy dedicated to "pay any price, bear any burden" for the containment of communism, since communism posed such a serious threat to the freedom and dignity of the individual. Notwithstanding President Johnson's protestations, it was *not* politically possible to sustain both guns and butter. Liberals who continued to support the war had little choice but to accept a scaling back or postponement of their domestic objectives. They would be ensnared by the argument that greater domestic spending, while possibly desirable, was simply unaffordable in wartime. In order to sustain one element of the liberal position they had to deny another. The shifts in public opinion on the war left these liberals increasingly alienated from their own base, and their position was essentially repudiated by the Democratic Party in 1972.

On the other hand, liberals who began to oppose the war often did so on the basis that the war was inconsistent with liberal values. Contrary to Johnson's surmise, it was not just that they were frustrated by the length of the war or deluded by Communist propaganda.[27] Rather, they saw our policy riddled with contradictions. We opposed communism because of its threat to human freedom, yet supported a repressive government in South Vietnam. We aspired for a better life for the Vietnamese peasant, yet bombed civilians and military personnel indiscriminately. We claimed to support the principle of self-determination although we had violated it in 1956. We contended, in effect, that the conquest of North Vietnam was more important to American survival than the conquest of poverty at home. These contradictions became too great to bear and could be resolved only by repudiating the foreign-policy consensus. Once again, one element of the liberal tradition was set against another. But not only that: the liberal who opposed the war also opposed important Democratic constituencies, especially labor. Although he is referring specifically to protest on the campuses, Parmet's conclusion is pertinent here: "What perhaps was dawning very slowly among liberal intellectuals was the pronounced movement of the bulk of organized labor in America toward an establishment mentality, which not only supported the war but deeply resented, even hated, the privileged collegiate youth's criticism of American values."[28]

In either case, then, Vietnam exposed contradictions in the liberal argument and divided the liberal constituency against itself. The result was the evolution of an argument in which the conclusion was not compatible with all of the original premises.

It hardly need be added that this cluster of problems greatly underminded belief in the ability, if not the good intentions, of government. For some, it was a conviction that government was out of control. Murray Edelman has written that one of a leader's great symbolic resources is appearing able to cope with problems, almost regardless of the course of action he pursues. "The clue to what is politically effective," he writes, "is to be found not so much in verifiable good or bad effects flowing from political acts as in whether the incumbent can continue indefinitely to convey an impression of knowing what is to be done."[29] From this perspective, the worst situation is immobility, such that a leader is unable or unwilling to act. But, because of the dilemmas noted here, that was the situation confronting the United States in the late 1960's. It could be remedied, some thought, by changing leaders. This line of thought was not unlike that pursued by many liberals in 1980 who voted for Ronald Reagan out of the conviction that Jimmy Carter was ineffective or incompetent and hence that anything would be better.

For others, faith in government was eroded because the problems seemed so vast. One trend during the 1960's was the growing tendency to see problems as systemically related rather than isolated. Problems were not so much ills in their own right as symptoms of a deeper social malady. That view, however, required mind-boggling changes in society and culture in order to overcome what previously had been regarded as exclusively political problems. Against a backdrop of such magnitude, it was not surprising that liberals would lack confidence "that the problems plaguing the nation were within the competence of any single party or individual."[30] Having said that, however, what response was available to the liberal except numbness, reflecting almost a state of impending apocalypse?

III.

Liberals were not silent in the late 1960's, to be sure, but the evolving ad hominem nature of their traditional argument left them on the defensive and severely constrained in argumentative resources. Fragmentation was the paramount problem with which they had to deal, and two responses were predominant. One was to find unity in the past and to evoke those memories. The litany of Democratic Presidents was frequently recited, as were the claims that the Democrats were the "party with a heart," the "party of the people," or the "party that cared about the little guy."[31] In his 1968 acceptance address, Hubert Humphrey attempted to make a virtue of the dissension at the convention. He claimed, "that revolution is in the proud tradition of our party," and proceeded to recite names and quotations of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Adlai Stevenson, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson.[32] Campaigning that fall, Humphrey transformed the difference between himself and Richard Nixon into a historical difference between their respective parties: "Now, our Republican friends have fought every piece of social legislation that has benefited this country, . . . You just name it, and I'll guarantee you that you will have found a majority of them in Congress against it. . . . The Democrats have been responsible for every piece of constructive legislation that has passed in these last thirty-five years, . . ."[33] There is nothing unusual about this sort of electioneering, of course. But what is notable about 1968 is the degree to which Humphrey was forced to rely on it. As White notes, "Humphrey had no central theme that one could discern." Without one, "there remained only tactics -- of which the chief was to goad Nixon into anger or blunder, and force him to debate publicly." But, White maintains, this tactic was accompanied by "only the vaguest kind of strategy -- for the strategy of the Democrats, from beginning to end, was to recapture the Democrats."[34] Exactly -- and the way to surmount the present state of division was to select campaign appeals so as to take the audience back to another time, when the party had been united and clear in purpose.

The other response to the liberal's deadlock was to construct carefully balanced appeals, playing the values of one interest or segment against those of another. Richard Weaver probably would have regarded the balance as "artless,"[35] but it acknowledged that there was no contemporary basis for a unifying appeal. The difficulty is that the carefully contrived balance may not be sustained. Again, the 1968 Presidential campaign furnishes a good case study.

One of Humphrey's short-lived appeals was a call for "order and justice." The "order" side of that argument could not hope to compete with Nixon and Wallace, both of whom had made "law and order" a centerpiece of the political platform. Humphrey could always be outflanked on that score. But the use of the term "order" caused many others to perceive the Vice-President's commitment to "justice" as less than total and hence not worth taking seriously. In like manner, on Vietnam Humphrey combined support for Johnson's policy with the admonition that "the policies of tomorrow need not be limited by the policies of yesterday."[36] Once again, though, Humphrey evoked antagonism from both sides. Antiwar protesters could not stomach the Vice-President's defense of Lyndon Johnson, and the President's staunchest supporters were aghast to learn that the candidate was even contemplating a change from their man's policy. The "artless" balances, then, encountered difficulties; they did not serve as a rallying point for the public resolution of a great moral dilemma.

It is possible that using Humphrey as the example may be unfair. He was faithful to the liberal cause, but he also was faithful to his President, and the combination of these two loyalties eventually did him in. Perhaps, had the candidate not been tied to the Administration -- Robert Kennedy, for instance -- the albatross of defending Lyndon Johnson might have been much lighter and the candidate could be free to talk about his own programs and goals. Perhaps so, but any coalition Kennedy or someone else might have assembled would be likely at best to draw on his own personal appeal in order to reassemble the coalition. The analogy might have been to 1948, when liberals reconciled themselves to the Democratic Party as a better alternative than Thomas Dewey or Strom Thurmond. But the reconciliation, if any, probably would have been short-lived, since there *were* really significant differences among supporters of the liberal argument, and this expedient unity only postponed confronting them.

IV.

We are currently seeing what may be the first steps by liberals to extricate themselves from their own morass. I refer to such recent appeals as the call for a nuclear freeze and the jockeying for possession of the education issue. Interestingly, both of these examples recognize that the traditional liberal position had collapsed under the weight of its own paradoxes, yet draw on those paradoxes to define a new liberal tradition.[37]

For example, the nuclear freeze reconciles the liberal's activist foreign policy with the restraint implicit in a world in which there are limits to what we can do: America will take an active role, but will take it on behalf of a demilitarized foreign policy. Likewise, the education issue takes an interesting twist of the traditional argument in behalf of growth. How to reconcile that position with the growing recognition that growth is not a *prima facie* good? By viewing education as an investment enabling us to become more productive in the high-technology enterprises that are thought to be the "wave of the future." These are the enterprises that, supposedly, will provide intelligent and balanced growth in the economy in the years ahead.

It is too soon to tell whether either of these appeals will overcome the malaise which has affected American liberalism since the late 1960's. The President may well succeed in ridiculing the freeze issue and co-opting the education issue. Nevertheless, these two examples illustrate the general means by which an argumentative impasse may be overcome. It never is really resolved, but the argument is shifted to another level. Even if similar themes predominate, they do so with a difference in emphasis. Whoever is able to find a way around the *ad hominem* by shifting the argument to a new level is likely to be able to control the subsequent discussion. And, for the political culture as a whole, the "end run" which overcomes the impasse of the liberal argument bears out Farrell's position that arguments evolve and develop over time, and gain force as a rhetorical rather than logical form.

Notes

[1] Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1968 (New York: Pocket Books, 1970), p. 518.

[2] For example, Herbert S. Parmet maintains that the integrity of the Roosevelt coalition already had been eroded by 1945. See Parmet, The Democrats: The Years After FDR (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976) passim.

[3] Thomas B. Farrell, "Knowledge in Time: Toward an Extension of Rhetorical Form," Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, eds. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 123-153, esp. p. 128.

[4] Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., Philosophy and Argument (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1959), pp. 73-80.

[5] Harry K. Girvetz, The Evolution of Liberalism (New York: Collier Books, 1963), p. 253.

[6] Girvetz, p. 291.

[7] See, for example, Girvetz, p. 353.

[8] Girvetz, p. 369.

[9] The outstanding example of such a call is John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), which, perhaps because of its title, was widely misinterpreted as an encomium to American prosperity.

[10] Parmet, p. 232.

[11] U. S. Civil Rights Commission, A Time to Listen, A Time to Act: Voices from the Ghettos of the Nation's Cities (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 81.

[12] See, for example, William F. Soskin, "Riots, Ghettos, and the 'Negro Revolt,'" Unemployment, Race, and Poverty, eds. Arthur M. Ross and Herbert Hill (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1967), p. 208. For earlier statements of this theme, see Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 77-78; Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 211-212. These complaints, in turn, are strikingly similar to those of Saul Alinsky in Reveille for Radicals (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1946).

[13] For example, President Lyndon Johnson's first reaction upon learning of the riots was that the blacks were ungrateful for the efforts of his Administration. See Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: New American Library, 1976), p. 305. Upon reflection, Johnson quickly concluded that black grievances were justified.

[14] T. M. Tomlinson, "The Development of a Riot Ideology Among American Negroes," Racial Violence in the United States, ed. Allen D. Grimshaw (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 232.

[15] Quoted in "Riots Held Peril to Poverty Drive," New York Times, August 1, 1967, p. 17.

[16] On this subject see David Zarefsky, "Civil Rights and Civil Conflict: Presidential Communication in Crisis," Central States Speech Journal, 34 (Spring, 1983), 62, 65; Robert M. Fogelson, Violence as Protest: A Study of Riots and Ghettos (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971), Chap. 7.

[17] For example, David Zarefsky, "The Great Society as a Rhetorical Proposition," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 65 (December, 1979), 364-378; David Zarefsky, "President Johnson's War on Poverty: The Rhetoric of Three 'Establishment' Movements," Communication Monographs, 44 (November, 1977), 352-373.

[18] Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Professors and the Poor," Commentary, 46 (August, 1968), 23.

[19] Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman, "Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities," Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 41.

[20] "Humphrey's Stand Criticized by Ford," New York Times, July 23, 1966, p. 9; David R. Jones, "G.O.P. Links Riots to Johnson Policy," New York Times, June 3, 1968, pp. 1, 38.

[21] See Zarefsky, "Civil Rights and Civil Conflict," pp. 63-64.

[22] Parmet, p. 242.

[23] Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 316-317.

[24] This line is taken from Nixon's First Inaugural Address. See Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 2.

[25] Cited in "Come All Ye Faithful," Newsweek, 80 (December 25, 1972), 22.

[26] Parmet, p. 244.

[27] Kearns, p. 316, discusses this explanation of Johnson's.

[28] Parmet, p. 252.

[29] Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 76.

[30] Parmet, p. 310.

[31] Parmet, p. 2.

[32] "Acceptance Speech: Candidate for President," Vital Speeches of the Day, 34 (September 15, 1968), 707.

[33] White, p. 446.

[34] White, pp. 424-425.

[35] Cf. Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), p. 124.

[36] Humphrey, "Acceptance Speech," p. 707.

[37] For a discussion of the rhetorical uses of paradox, see Michael J. Hyde, "Paradox: The Evolution of a Figure of Rhetoric," Rhetoric 78: Proceedings of Theory of Rhetoric, An Interdisciplinary Conference, eds. Robert L. Brown, Jr., and Martin Steinmann, Jr. (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota, 1979), pp. 201-225. An extended treatment of the uses of paradox in the therapeutic setting can be found in Paul Watzlawick, John Weakland, and Richard Fisch, Change: Principles of Problem Formation and Problem Resolution (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974).

WHY THE NEW DEAL STILL NEEDS A HERO: ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.'S ARGUMENTS FOR LIBERALISM IN THE 1980's

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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. has generated significant controversy throughout his career as historian, liberal political commentator, and active democrat./1/ The historian's liberal political philosophy, captured in his vivid portrayals of Roosevelt's New Deal and Kennedy's New Frontier, prescribes an active role for the national government and leadership in dealing with America's domestic ills.

Schlesinger's brand of liberalism has come under severe attack in recent years by conservatives who oppose active government interference in the economic marketplace and by liberals who sense a need to turn to fundamentally different approaches to solve economic and social problems. In response to critics of "traditional" liberalism, Schlesinger has called upon "authentic" liberals to close ranks around established liberal policies of pragmatic experimentation and to rally around a new hero who will find ways to solve the problems of the 1980's without abandoning the legacy of Andrew Jackson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy.

It is argued in this paper that Schlesinger's current defense of liberalism highlights paradoxes in his political philosophy. These paradoxes have led Schlesinger and other traditional liberals to rely on exhortation and hero-worship instead of careful examination of contemporary issues in their continuing struggle to make their approach relevant to the present and future in American political argumentation.

This paper's thesis is developed in three sections. Section one briefly explicates the components of Schlesinger's political philosophy. Section two explains the rhetorical problems confronting Schlesinger in the early 1980's and examines the historian's argumentative responses. Section three discusses the paradoxes in Schlesinger's political philosophy which become apparent in his defense of traditional liberalism in the 1980's.

A. SCHLESINGER, JR.'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Each of us develops a frame of acceptance to symbolically answer the nagging questions in our lives. /2/ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. was faced early in his intellectual life with the nagging contradiction between the idealism of Progressive-era and New Deal reformers and the awful realities of world war spawned by the totalitarian cruelty of Hitler and Stalin which was too long unchecked by the naive Allies./3/ Schlesinger attempted to resolve his tangled disillusionment with human motives by following the precepts of his father, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. The elder Schlesinger taught his son to oppose rigid ideological doctrine and to support the empirical and pragmatic experimentation embodied in the policies and personality of Franklin D. Roosevelt./4/ The young Arthur was also influenced in his studies and writings by the works of Reinhold Neibuhr, who reintroduced original sin into political thought. Neibuhr believed that "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary." /5/

Schlesinger began to work out his vision of liberalism in post-war America in the Pullitzer Prize-winning *The Age of Jackson* (1945) and the political treatise *The Vital Center* (1949). Schlesinger's emerging political philosophy, which stressed resolute opposition to Communism while championing New Deal-style economic reform, seemed aptly suited for his generation. By the late 1950's, Schlesinger had begun work on a four-part history of the Roosevelt Administration, and his views were gaining wide notoriety. /6/ "Vital center" liberalism was paraded in popular periodicals like the *New York Times Magazine* and *Saturday Review*, and was debated in the pages of *Reporter* and *Twentieth Century*. /7/ Schlesinger's involvement in the Americans for Democratic Action, his activities in the campaigns of Stevenson and Robert Kennedy, and his role as adviser in the Presidential Administration of John Kennedy, all created continuing opportunities for the historian's opinions to influence an age of liberal thinkers./8/

The political philosophy of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has developed around three themes: a comparison between the liberal and the conservative, the ongoing rhythm of liberal and conservative epochs in American political history, and the need for strong leadership.

1. *The comparison between liberal and conservative*. Schlesinger's political arguments have invariably sprung from definition. /9/ The historian has continually asserted that fundamental differences in temperament and interest divide active American political participants into liberal and conservative camps. /10/ Schlesinger is fond of quoting Emerson's decree that "Mankind is divided between the Party of Conservatism and the Party of Innovation, between the Past and the Future, between Memory and Hope." /11/ Convinced that the American political tradition is (or should be) essentially a liberal tradition, Schlesinger has drawn his definitional distinctions so as to reduce the status of

conservative presumption in public discourse. /12/

A liberal may be distinguished from a conservative in Schlesinger's definitional scheme by attitudes held toward man, history, the desirability of change, the public good, and the state. The modern liberal, influenced by Neibuhr and hardened by the experience of totalitarian war, views man as inherently flawed but potentially improvable through empirical reason; the conservative, influenced by Andrew Carnegie and other robber barons, views man as an instrument to serve the ends of efficiency and profit. /13/ Schlesinger's liberal sees history as an unfinished, inscrutable continuum of human choice and responsibility; the conservative sees history as a finished work which serves as intractable precedent. /14/ Toward change, the liberal believes that society can and should be improved though application of pragmatic solutions to meet particular circumstances; the conservative "opposes efforts at purposeful change because he believes that things are about as good as they can be reasonably expected to be, and that any change . . . is . . . likely to be for the worse." /15/ To the liberal, the public good lies in protecting a diversity of interests among the "humble members of society"; to the conservative, the public good lies in protecting the enterprising interest of business and industry. /16/ Finally, the liberal conceives of the state as a positive means to promote ends of fair economic distribution and social justice; the conservative conceives of the state as an evil mechanism which intrudes without warrant into the free marketplace. /17/

As unfavorably as Schlesinger depicts his ideological rivals, he has noted a role for a responsible conservatism based on a "belief in the organic character of society" consisting of "common trust and obligation." /18/ Schlesinger sees the conflicts between conservatives and liberals taking place within a common framework of shared values, a "vital center based on faith in democratic processes and civil liberties and opposition to totalitarianism. /19/ Each camp serves a function in "preserving the health of the body politic" by checking the excesses of the other. /20/ So long as the American people maintain belief in a vital center of values, American politics will avoid the wild fluctuations from one absolute ideology to another. /21/

2. *The ongoing rhythm of liberal and conservative epochs*. Schlesinger has portrayed American history as a continuing conflict for power between liberals and conservatives within a consensual framework of values. While believing that the liberal position is superior, Schlesinger recognizes that conservatives have often gained the upper hand in the struggle for popular support and public office during America's lifetime. The liberal historian has attempted to empirically account for periodic conservative victories by referring to a cyclical theory of American politics developed by his father. /22/ In *The Age of Jackson*, the younger Schlesinger introduced the theory to explain the defeat of Jacksonian Democrats in 1840:

> American history has been marked by recurrent swings of conservatism and of liberalism. During the periods of inaction, unsolved social problems pile up till demand for reform becomes overwhelming. Then a liberal government comes to power, the dam breaks, and a flood of change sweeps away a great deal in a short time. After fifteen or twenty years the liberal impulse is exhausted, the day of "consolidation" and inaction arrives, and conservatism, once again, expresses the mood of the country, but generally on the terms of the liberalism it displaces. /23/

Three elements of the "cyclical" theory of American politics are important to an understanding of Schlesinger's political philosophy. First, the alternation between liberal and conservative eras is described in *physical* terms rather than in terms of reasoned electoral choice. In his 1939 essay "Tides of American Politics," Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. based the causal explanation of the American political rhythm on an "interplay of subjective influences . . . springing from something basic in human nature." The elder Schlesinger adopted as causal law Thomas Jefferson's observations that individuals act in political contexts "according to their constitutions," and that "human beings in the mass . . . respond to psychological impulses" of activity and rest. /24/

The younger Schlesinger has characterized the ebb and flow of liberal and conservative dominance in American public affairs as "a physiological process, like the systole and diastole of the heart." /25/ After "seasons of action, passion, idealism, reform" we naturally "long for respite." /26/ The Schlesingers have thus conceived of the American people more as an autonomic nervous system than as a thinking, critical public.

Second, the alternation between conservatism and liberalism is regular and can be predicted. Using "not preconceived theory but empiricism" as his "guiding star," Schlesinger, Sr. surveyed American history and discovered eleven liberal-conservative cycles averaging 16.55 years in duration. /27/ Based on that survey, the elder Schlesinger confidently predicted in a 1949 re-write of "Tides of American Politics" that the latest conservative epoch, which had begun during the 1946 Congressional elections, would end in 1962, at which time America would enter a new liberal era. /28/

Schlesinger, Jr. used the theory to forecast "The Shape of National Politics to Come" in a boldly optimistic memorandum distributed among liberals before the 1960 election. /29/ In 1962, the son proudly announced that his father had been right about the new liberal era, thanks to John Kennedy. By adjusting the end-points of the conservative eras, the theory could be stretched to rationalize yesterday's defeats or predict tomorrow's victories. /30/

Third, the alternation between liberalism and conservatism gradually moves American political thinking to the left with each completion of the cycle. Schlesinger, Sr. posited that as each new liberal generation of government activity becomes entrenched in established institutions, conservatives tend to begin defending the liberal reforms as part of the status quo. /31/ The liberalization of the American body politic has been confirmed, according to the Schlesingers, by the conservative support for some Progressive legislation during the 1920's and for New Deal programs during the 1950's. /32/ The progressive movement leftward has led the elder Schlesinger to joyously speak of a liberal "spiral" in American life, and the younger Schlesinger to occasionally assert the "inevitability" of liberalism. /33/

The political cycle has served two rhetorical functions in Schlesinger's liberal philosophy. When liberals have come to power, Schlesinger has used the cycle to legitimate sweeping reforms in the name of a generational, even physiological, mandate. /34/ When liberals have fallen out of power, Schlesinger has used the cycle to comfort battered liberal egos with the thought that the new liberal age will arrive as soon as people get tired of conservatives. /35/ Promise of a liberal epoch at hand or soon to come has bolstered liberal nerve and fortified the hope that liberalism will prevail. /36/

3. *The need for leadership*. The final major component of Schlesinger's philosophy has been the argument that heroes are necessary in a democratic society. The hero figure is the keystone in Schlesinger's political frame of acceptance. /37/ Strong leadership is needed in a democracy, Schlesinger has asserted, for *functional* and *moral* reasons.

The functional justification for heroes stems from a discrepancy between an ideal liberal electorate and the actual American public, which harbors strains of anti-intellectualism and is limited by the structural nature of representative government. /38/ Heroic leadership is needed to "offset the centrifugal effects of the dispersion of political power" to mass voting populations. /39/ Borrowing from the writings of Emerson, Carlyle, and William James, Schlesinger has argued that democratic publics have been able to "focus their aspirations only as strong individuals embodied and clarified the tendencies of the people." /40/ The diverse interests of the liberal coalition have been combined only by leaders who could innovate, teach, and persuade. /41/ And, whenever a crisis has arisen in American history, only liberal heroes like Jackson, Lindoln, and Roosevelt have been able to guide the entire American people toward their best interests. Only heroes can come up with answers and inspire action. /42/

The moral justification for heroes stems from the belief that the personal virtues of heroes serve as exemplars to restore faith in the potency of human choice. "The heroic leader," Schlesinger has written, "has a Promethean responsibility to affirm human freedom against the supposed inevitabilities of history. As he does this, he combats the infection of fatalism which otherwise paralyzes mass democracy." /43/ In response to the "increasing velocity of history" which threatens modern man with technological depersonalization, heroes serve as examples of human potentialities. /44/ Only heroic leadership can infuse the vital center of American values with a "fighting faith." /45/ Without the hero, Schlesinger has concluded, a democratic society would tend to acquiesce in the "drift of history," and succumb to totalitarian demagoguery. /46/

So the hero has been the centerpiece of Schlesinger's political philosophy. From Jackson to Roosevelt to the Kennedys, Schlesinger has revered the liberal hero as necessary to lead America toward her progressive destiny.

TOWARD THE 1980's: RHETORICAL PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES

As the 1980 elections approached and passed, Schlesinger's liberalism was threatened with obsolescence. Both Republicans and Democrats proclaimed that the big-talking free-spending New Deal liberal approach was no longer popular nor practical in an age of scarcity. /47/ Edward Kennedy's economic keynote address at the 1980 Democratic Presidential Convention, a speech Schlesinger undoubtably applauded, was quickly labelled an anachronism, a last hurrah for traditional liberalism. /48/ Democrats such as Senator Tsongas of Massachusetts began calling for a "new liberalism" based on fiscal restraint and the issue of fairness. /49/ Other writers and politicians hailed 1980 as the beginning of a new conservative era in American life. /50/

The reaction to Republican victories and liberal defeats in the 1980 elections presented two related rhetorical problems for Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. the liberal analyst and advocate. First, an interpretation of the 1980 election results was needed that would hearten traditional liberals and refute self-congratulatory conservative rhetoric. Second, a reaffirmation of liberal values was called for that would maintain the faith of members of the traditional liberal coalition and attract supporters from the ranks of the uncommitted American populace.

In order to fire up liberals for 1984, Schlesinger has written numerous editorials and popular magazine pieces publicizing his answer to liberal malaise. Schlesinger's answer has involved three strategies which correspond to the three main components of his political philosophy. The three strategies of Schlesinger's recent defense of traditional liberalism can be identified as definitional dissociation, casuistic stretching of the political cycle, and hero justification.

1. Definitional dissociation. Dissociation is the division of an apparently unitary concept into two parts by linking each part to a member of a philosophical pair of terms, the first of which has a negative connotation and the other a positive connotation (such as appearance/reality, letter/spirit). At the conclusion of the dissociation, a previously single term has been transformed into a favorable and an unfavorable term. /51/ Schlesinger has attempted to dissociate the term "liberal" in order to reassert traditional distinctions between liberalism and conservativism and to place the liberal presumption in current political debate back where it belongs—with the heritage of the New Deal.

Schlesinger has dissociated the term "liberal" into the unfavorable term "neo-liberal" and the favorable term "true liberal." "Neo-liberals" are not liberal in the traditional sense but are just a group of frightened rabbits who drew the wrong conclusion from the 1980 election that "people wanted a counterrevolution against the New Deal." /52/ The essence of neo-liberalism, asserts the historian, rests in the vociferous rejection "of the old Democratic commitment to national government as a means of attacking national problems." /53/ Neo-liberals are in fact conservatives!

The "spiritual father" of neo-liberalism, and the villain in Schlesinger's recent discourse, is President Jimmy Carter, who committed the heresy of admitting in his 1978 State of the Union message that "government cannot solve our problems." /54/ Carter sinned by catering to popular opinion, which consisted in the late 1970's of "cheap prejudice against government action." /55/ To adopt Carter's neo-liberal view of limited government, Schlesinger claimed in 1980, "is to deny the heritage of the modern Democratic Party." /56/ Months after Carter's defeat, Schlesinger cited the paucity of neo-liberal domestic proposals as proof that the political position "is remarkably void of fresh thoughts." /57/

The "true liberal," on the other hand, quickly discerned that the 1980 election was not the repudiation of liberalism but of an incompetent President. /58/ Schlesinger has asserted that America has not had a truly liberal national leader since 1966 when President Johnson "decided to sacrifice the Great Society on the altar of the Vietnam War." /59/ So the 1980 election was hardly an ideological referendum.

In addition, the true liberal realizes that liberalism will never successfully outflank conservatism on the right. /60/ Instead, what should be defended is the liberal tradition stretching back in time from Jackson to Kennedy. Liberals should continue to believe in the use of the federal government as a means of promoting the public welfare. /61/ While true liberals are realistic enough to acknowledge that the problems of the 1980's demand new remedies beyond retread New Deal programs, they should not abandon faith in affirmative government. To abandon the means of liberalism, Schlesinger has concluded, would be to abandon the ends of liberalism. /62/

2. *Casuistic stretching of the political cycle*. Casuistic stretching involves the shift in the positioning of dialectical terms in a frame of acceptance in order to accommodate a new situation. /63/ Schlesinger has used the strategy of casuistic stretching in his positioning of the endpoints of the historical liberal-conservative cycle in such a way as to explain recent liberal setbacks and to predict upcoming liberal victories in the ongoing struggle for political power in America.

The decline in the popularity of traditional liberal reforms in the 1970's, Schlesinger has reasoned, was a *natural* part of the cycle of action and recuperation in American politics. After a season of activism in the early 1960's (spearheaded by Kennedy's New Frontier and Johnson's Great Society) swung ominously out of control for a few violent years during the decade, the American people longed for rest and recuperation. They found respite in the "me-decade" of the 1970's. /64/ Even the victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980 could be interpreted as part of the most recent conservative swing (which began around 1966). The cycle is empirically bound to swing to the left soon.

So, liberals should not be overly upset about the prospects of Ronald Reagan in the White House. Schlesinger has remarked that it may be for the best that Reagan is President at the present, so that "[a]t least we can have a full and fair test, conducted without any easy alibis, of hallowed conservative propositions." /65/ When Reaganomics fails, which Schlesinger believes is a certainty, Americans will turn once again to the liberal path. /66/ The cyclical theory presumes that as "the problems neglected in the years of cynicism and apathy become acute and threaten to become unmanageable," the people will call for liberal relief. /67/ Sooner or later, a "detonating issue" will trigger a "new hunger for dynamism, innovation, crusading, new efforts to redeem the promise of American life." /68/ Reagan's failure promises a new liberal era, if liberals will only stay the course.

3. *Why the New Deal needs a hero in the 1980's*. The final strategy Schlesinger has employed to rejuvenate faith in traditional liberalism has been the call for strong liberal leadership to lead America into the next epoch of reform. Schlesinger has cited both a functional and moral imperative of the emergence of a liberal hero in the 1980's.

First, a functional imperative for a hero exists. Schlesinger has stated that a leader must emerge to boldly confront today's "detonating issue" of economic depression, and must devise convincing and workable solutions consistent with the liberal heritage. President Reagan's problem, the problem plaguing all Americans, is that "we do not know what to do" in these times of economic hardship. Policy makers have not been able to insure fairness and an equal chance for all to succeed./69/ Reaganomics has fed the "devil-take-the hindmost" tendencies of laissez-faire capitalism and has caused much suffering among the poor. /70/ New Deal Keynesian economics is inflationary and has become largely obsolete. /71/ America's present leadership has "failed to convince a durable majority that one or another course will do the job" to cure the nation's economic ills. /72/

What is needed is a return to the "bold, persistent experimentation" of liberal Presidents like Franklin Roosevelt. /73/ Only a strong leader with fresh ideas can dispel the current conviction that economic prosperity is a zero-sum game. /74/ Only a leader with "both a conviction about the direction in which the republic must move and a capacity to convey his vision to the people" can persuade the diverse groups in American society that "the public interest is something greater than an aggregate of private claims." /75/ "People will accept painful policies," Schlesinger has claimed, "so long as they perceive them as fair." /76/ Only someone who has "sailed against the wind" (to steal a 1980 campaign slogan) and has remained true to the liberal tradition can generate the popular trust to transfer the pent-up energies of a nation ready for change into effective, planned economic recovery. /77/

Second, a moral imperative for a hero exists. Schlesinger has recently cautioned that a liberal leader must emerge soon to save the "vital center" of American values from an impending "crisis of confidence" potentially more threatening than the violent crisis of the 1960's. The policies of Reaganomics are fostering class warfare and are disintegrating the social fabric, Schlesinger wrote in late 1982. Laissez-faire capitalism in the fragile economic environment of the 1980's is a "long-odds gamble" that has communicated to the poor that Reagan has engaged in a "withdrwal of public concern." As a result, the poor have begun to "lose faith in the justice of the social order." /78/ As the cruel policies of conservatism and the watered-down program of neo-liberalism successively fail to redress the problems of distribution of wealth and opportunity, the "pervading sense of frustration and impotence" may spread to all levels of society and invite "tough right-wing Populist authoritarianism." /79/

Not even the regularities of the political cycle are immune to disruption and even collapse, Schlesinger has warned. For example, 1932 was a "scary time" characterized by "a baffled and impotent national leadership, an apparently uncontrollable economic disintegration, /and/ an increasingly angry populace moving toward ever more drastic remedies." Americans did not revolt nor succumb to authoritarian demagoguery during the 1930's only because Franklin Roosevelt came to the fore as a leader resolute in purpose and determined to a course of pragmatic experimentation. /80/ Schlesinger has soberly quoted Thurman Arnold's warning that "Every dictatorship which we now know flowed into power like air into a vacuum because the central government, in the face of a real difficulty, declined to exercise authority." /81/

Schlesinger believes that in the 1980's, more than ever before, America needs a liberal hero to maintain popular faith in the vital center of American values in the face of the selfishness and mob hysteria caused by economic hard times. The historian has gone so far as to assert that traditional liberals may have "only one more chance" to demonstrate that social and economic problems can be abated through concerted human action. /82/ "If the Republicans fail today and the Democrats fail thereafter," Schlesinger speculated pessimistically in 1982, "what rough beast, its hour come round at last, may be slouching toward Washington to be born?" /83/

EVALUATION

Does Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s call for heroic leadership offer liberalism a secure foundation on which to build support and develop ideas in the 1980's? To answer this question, it is appropriate to consider two paradoxes in Schlesinger's political philosophy which have surfaced in the historian's most recent defense of traditional liberalism. Schlesinger has relied upon the hero figure to resolve the contradictions in his political thought; the dependence on the hero seriously weakens Schlesinger's case for traditional liberalism.

1. The paradox of reason. Schlesinger's recent call for a liberal hero reveals a paradox of reason lying in the historian's conception of the American public. While Schlesinger has defined the ideal liberal public as a body which adheres to "the proposition that complicated problems can be solved only by thoughtful analysis," the contemporary American public Schlesinger describes is more akin to an unthinking protoplasm. /84/ According to Schlesinger, Americans in the 1970's harbored "cheap prejudice" against government action; Americans in the 1980's are confused and acquisitive. Apparently, the historian does not trust the American people to know their best interests.

Schlesinger has developed the functional justification for the liberal hero to resolve the paradox of reason. A heroic catalyst is required to periodically snap the quiescent masses out of their doldrums. The public responds favorably if the remedies prescribed meet the needs of the moment. For Schlesinger, what counts in politics is what works. "Take a method and try it," F. D. R. used to say. "If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something." /85/ These are words that Schlesinger's brand of pragmatic hero lives by.

The functional justification for the liberal hero has led Schlesinger to confuse the means of liberalism with the ends. Because Schlesinger believes that the key to addressing America's problems is to elect a leader who can apply cool pragmatism to situations, the acquisition and concentration of political power through elective office has become as important as the distribution of goods among the "less humble members of society." /86/ And, because Schlesinger has considered affirmative government action as part of the definition of what a liberal should believe in, he has tended to characterize any criticism of traditional New Deal response and established liberal institutions as the abandonment of the goals of liberalism. /87/

2. The paradox of responsibility. Schlesinger's call for a liberal hero also reveals a paradox of responsibility lying in Schlesinger's conception of history. While Schlesinger insists that history is unfinished and influenced by human choices, the cyclical theory of politics tends to reduce human choice to glandular reactions. The logic of the physiological metaphor has supplanted historical contingency. /88/

In addition, Schlesinger seems afraid that the economic scarcities of the 1980's coupled with the "incessant and irreversible increase in social change" brought about by technological revolution may overwhelm the ability of liberals to construct pragmatic means to make change work for human benefit. /89/ Ironically, the process of change which has a privileged status in Schlesinger's definition of liberalism now apparently threatens the liberal tradition with a crisis of confidence which could upset the certainties of America's political rhythm and destroy faith in the power of man to act in a hostile environment. /90/

Schlesinger has developed the moral justification for the liberal hero to resolve the paradox of responsibility. But the hope that a liberal leader will emerge as an exemplar of the potency of human choice leaves Schlesinger's position vulnerable to the vagaries of circumstance, such as heroes losing elections (such as Stevenson and McGovern) and heroes deciding not to run for office (like Edward Kennedy).

The reliance upon a hero to disprove the "supposed inevitabilities of history" also encourages Schlesinger to abdicate responsibility for liberal failure. Casuistic stretching of the plitical cycle has allowed Schlesinger to assert, in a written response to a critique by Carroll Englehardt, that "[i]t is the cyclical rhythm, not the sins of liberal intellectuals, that, in my view, accounts for conservative swings in American politics." /91/ And it is hardly a responsible liberal position for Schlesinger to counsel a "wait-until-Reagan flops" strategy while also arguing that Reaganomics is tearing the country apart. /92/

In his examination of Schlesinger's liberal philosophy, Carroll Englehardt concludes, "[P]erhaps the fact that Schlesinger's brand of realistic liberalism dominated the postwar intellectual scene helps to account for the absence of serious social debate and the lack of meaningful social reform since 1945." /93/ While it may not be fair to place all of the blame for the weakness of contemporary liberal argument on one New Deal historian, it is the conclusion of this paper that the confusion of ends with means, the pursuit of power at the expense of concern for justice, and the flight from responsibility disqualify the soundness of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s political arguments for Heroic liberalism.

Notes

[1] Carroll Englehardt, "Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Postwar American Liberalism," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 80 (Spring, 1981), p. 119.

[2] Kenneth Burke defines frame of acceptance as "the more or less organized system of meanings by which a thinking man gauges the historical situation and adopts a role in relation to it." Kenneth Burke, *Attitudes Toward History* (Los Altos: Hermes, 1959, 2d ed.), p. 5.

[3] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1962, 2d. ed.), pp. 51-68.

[4] Englehardt, pp. 120-1. See also Marian J. Morton, "Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and the Search for the Vital Center," in *The Terrors of Ideological Politics: Liberal Historians in a Conservative Mood* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve Press, 1972), pp. 27-49. For an idea of the frame of acceptance of Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., see *Paths to the Present* (New York: Macmillan, 1949).

[5] Schlesinger, Jr., quotes Neibuhr in "Reply to Englehardt," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 80 (Spring, 1981), p. 140. See also Schlesinger, Jr., "Theology and Politics From the Social Gospel to the Cold War: The Impact of Reinhold Neibuhr," in Cushing Strout, ed., *Intellectual History In America: From Darwin to Neibuhr* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 158-81.

[6] The first three volumes on the Roosevelt era were completed by 1960. Schlesinger is still working on the final segment of the study.

[7] See the following four pieces by Schlesinger, Jr.: "Conservative vs. Liberal," *New York Times Magazine*, 4 March 1956, pp. 11, 58-62; "Liberalism," *Saturday Review*, 8 June 1957, pp. 37-8; "The Future of Liberalism: The Challenge of Abundance," *Reporter*, 3 May 1956, pp. 8-11; and

"Stevenson and the American Liberal Dilemma," 20th Century, 153 (January, 1953), pp. 24-9.

[8] Englehardt asserts (p. 119) that in the years after 1945, Arthur Schleinger, Jr. has "played an important role in shaping the new liberalism and defending political commitment as a proper role for intellectuals." In a 1978 review of Schlesinger, Jr.'s Robert F. Kennedy and His Times, Henry Fairlie, never a stauch Schlesinger ally, frankly admitted that Schlesinger is a "significant writer who ought to engage our interest" because he has "made himself count in the middle years of our century in a way that has no parallel in any other career. . . . He is perhaps the most representative figure in mid-twentieth century liberalism." Henry Fairlie, "Books Reconsidered (review)," New Republic, 4 September 1978, p. 30.

[9] Richard Weaver defines argument from definition as argument based on the nature of the thing. Weaver considers argument from definition as a characteristic of conservative discourse. Ironically, as we shall see, Schlesinger, Jr.'s philosophy also is vulnerable to Weaver's critique of the argument from circumstance. Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Argument (Chicago: Gateway, 1953), pp. 55-114.

[10] Schlesinger, Jr., "Is Liberalism Dead?" New York Times Magazine, 30 March 1980, reprinted in Current, 223 (June, 1980), p. 4.

[11] Emerson is quoted in "Is Liberalism Dead?" p. 4.

[12] Perelman writes, "Presumption is connected with what is normal or likely." Goodnight explains that advocates attempt to gain presumption for their positions by making their positions appear safer, less risky, less out of the ordinary. Presumption constitutes the "argumentative authority to determine a hierarchy of values for decision-making." G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Liberal and Conservative Presumption: On Political Philosophy and the Foundation of Public Argument," Proceedings of the First SCA Conference on Argumentation (Alta, Utah: SCA, 1979), pp. 304-37.

[13] "Conservative vs. Liberal," pp. 58-60.

[14] Schlesinger, Jr., "On the Inscrutability of History," Encounter, 27 (November, 1966), pp. 10-7.

[15] "Conservative vs. Liberal," pp. 58-60.

[16] Schlesinger, Jr., "One Last Chance for the Democrats," Playboy, November 1982, pp. 110, 112.

[17] "One Last Chance," p. 252.

[18] Schlesinger, Jr., "The New Conservatism: The Politics of Nostalgia," Reporter, 16 June 1955, pp. 9-12.

[19] Schlesinger, Jr., "Not Left, Not Right, But a Vital Center," New York Times Magazine, 4 April 1948, pp. 7, 45-7.

[20] "Is Liberalism Dead?" pp. 12-3.

[21] "Not Left," p. 47.

[22] Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., "Radicalism and Conservatism," New Viewpoints in American History (New York: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 103-25.

[23] Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1945), p. 391.

[24] Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., "Tides of American Politics," Yale Review, 29 (December, 1939), pp. 217-30.

[25] "Is Liberalism Dead?" p. 12.

[26] "Is Liberalism Dead?" p. 10.

[27] Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., "The Tides of National Politics," in Paths to the Present, pp. 91, 84.

[28] "The Tides of National Politics," p. 85.

[29] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Shape of National Politics to Come (Private circulation, 1959), pp. 22-3. Schlesinger concluded, "The crust is breaking up. The batteries are being recharged. New forces and values are straining for release in our society. The sixties await, and they promise to be one of the great decades in our history."

[30] Schlesinger, Jr., *The Politics of Hope*(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1962), p. xii. Schlesinger wrote the following in his acknowlegements: "[M]y father and I are both indebted to John F. Kennedy for vindicating the cyclical theory of American politics."

[31] "The Tides of National Politics," p. 86.

[32] Schlesinger, Sr., "The Tides of National Politics," p. 86, and Schlesinger, Jr., "Stevenson and the American Liberal Dilemma," pp. 24-9.

[33] Schlesinger, Sr., "The Tides of National Politics," p. 86, and Schlesinger, Jr., "Is Liberalism Dead?" p. 12.

[34] *The Politics of Hope*, pp. ix-xii.

[35] "Stevenson," pp. 24-9.

[36] *The Shape of National Politics to Come*, pp. 22-3, and "Is Liberalism Dead?" pp. 12-3.

[37] Schlesinger, Jr., "On Heroic Leadership and the Dilemma of Strong Men and Weak Peoples," *Encounter*, December 1960, in *The Politics of Hope*, p. 6.

[38] "On Heroic Leadership," pp. 4-8.

[39] "On Heroic Leadership," p. 6.

[40] "On Heroic Leadership," p. 6. The references to Emerson, Carlyle, and James are made in Schlesinger,Jr., "The Decline of Greatness," *Saturday Evening Post*, 1 November 1958, in *The Politics of Hope*, p. 32. "'The appearance of a great man,' Emerson wrote, 'draws a new circle outside our largest orbit and surprises and commands us'. . . . Carlyle /said/, "The great man, with his free force direct out of God's own hand, is the lightning. . . . The rest of men waited for him like fuel, and then they too would flame' . . . . 'In picking out from history our heroes,' said William James, 'each of us may best fortify and inspire what creative energy may be in his own soul.'"

[41] Schlesinger, Jr., "Who Needs Grover Cleveland?" *New Republic*, 7-14 July 1979, reprinted in *Current*, 215 (September, 1979), pp. 9-13.

[42] In *The Age of Jackson* (p. 521), Schlesinger asserted, "Every great crisis thus far in American history has produced a leader adequate to the occasion from the ranks of those who believe vigorously and seriously in liberty, democracy, and the common man. The sense of public responsibility, the ability to inspire national confidence, the capacity to face imperative issues, seem in this country to have been largely the proerty of the great democratic leaders. . . ."

[43] "On Heroic Leadership," p. 8.

[44] "The Velocity of History," *Newsweek*, 6 July 1970, pp. 32-4.

[45] *The Vital Center*, p. 256.

[46] "On Heroic Leadership," p. 8.

[47] "End of the Democratic Era?" Newsweek, 18 August 1980, pp. 21-5.

[48] For an analysis of the Kennedy speech, see Steve Depoe, "The Road Not Taken: Edward Kennedy and the Privileged Rhetorical Moment," Paper presented at the 1982 Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, Kentucky, November 4-7, 1982.

[49] Steven V. Roberts, "ADA Debates Role of Liberals in a Year of Losses and Budget Cuts," *New York Times*, 15 July 1980, p. 4.

[50] "End of the Democratic Era?" p. 25.

[51] The term "dissociation" is taken from Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1969), pp. 411-5.

52 "One Last Chance," p. 112.

53 Schlesinger, Jr., "American Politics on a Darkling Plain," *Wall Street Journal*, 16 March 1982, p. 28.

54 "Darkling Plain," p. 28.

55 "Who Needs Grover Cleveland?" p. 12.

56 Schlesinger, Jr., "The Great Carter Mystery," *New Republic*, 12 April 1980, p. 21.

57 "Darkling Plain," p. 28.

58 Schlesinger, Jr., "Requiem for Neo-liberalism (review of Gary Hart, *A New Democracy*)," *New Republic*, 6 June 1983, p. 28.

59 "One Last Chance," p. 246.

60 "One Last Chance," p. 252.

61 Schlesinger, Jr., "The End of an Era?" *Wall Street Journal*, 20 November 1980, p.26.

62 One Last Chance," pp. 252-3.

63 Burke, *Attitudes*, p. 25. See Also Barry Brummett, "Burkean Transcendence and Ultimate Terms in Rhetoric By and About James Watt," *Central States Speech Journal*, 33 (Winter, 1982), p. 550.

64 "Is Liberalism Dead?" p. 11.

65 "The End of an Era?" p. 26.

66 "The End of an Era?" p. 26.

67 "Who Needs Grover Cleveland " p. 13.

68 "Is Liberalism Dead?" p. 12.

69 Schlesinger, Jr., "Time For Constitutional Change?" *Wall Street Journal*, 24 December, 1982, p. 4.

70 Schlesinger, Jr., "Neo-Conservatism and the Class Struggle," *Wall Street Journal*, 2 June 1981, p. 30.

71 "Darkling Plain," p. 28.

72 "Time For Constitutional Change?" p.

73 "Who Needs Grover Cleveland?" p. 11.

74 "Is Liberalism Dead?" p. 7.

75 "One Last Chance," p. 254.

76 "One Last Chance," p. 254.

77 "One Last Chance," p. 252.

78 "Neo-Conservatism and the Class Struggle," p. 30.

79 "One Last Chance," p. 252.

80 Schlesinger, Jr., "The Revolution That Never Was," *Wall Street Journal*, 24 October 1979, p. 22.

81 "The Revolution," p. 22.

82 "One Last Chance," p. 254.

83 "One Last Chance," p. 254.

84 Schlesinger, Jr., "New Liberal Coalition," *Progressive*, April 1967, p. 19.

[85] Schlesinger, Jr., "The Decline-and-Fall Mood," *Wall Street Journal*, 5 June 1979, p. 22.

[86] Englehardt writes (p. 138), "In adopting centrist liberalism, it would appear that Schlesinger has valued realism more than idealism. By avoiding ideology and stressing the role of pragmatic intellectuals, he has made a fetish of empiricism, has blurred the distinction between *is* and *ought*, and has identified too closely with the existing power structure."

[87] Englehardt, pp. 133-4.

[88] Dennis Wrong has argued that Schlesinger's use of the political cycle "belabor/s/ the biological analogy to the point where metaphor does the work of explanation." Dennis Wrong, "How Critical is Our Condition?" *Dissent*, 28 (Fall, 1981), p. 419.

[89] "The Velocity of History," pp. 28-30.

[90] "One Last Chance," pp. 251-4. See also Schlesinger, Jr., *The Crisis of Confidence: Ideas, Power, and Violence in America* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1968).

[91] "Reply to Englehardt," p. 141.

[92] "The End of an Era?" p. 26 , and "Neo-Conservatism," p. 30.

[93] Englehardt, p. 138.

WAYS OF GOING PUBLIC: THE PROJECTION OF EXPERTISE IN THE SOCIOBIOLOGY CONTROVERSY

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In his study of the role of communicative practices in the sciences, William Garvey discusses how, under the protection of Stalin, T. D. Lysenko got control of all relevant media of scientific communication in the Soviet Union to propagandize on behalf of his particular theory of genetics. This "non-scientific" use of scientific media set Soviet genetics back a quarter of a century, according to Garvey, who concludes:

> The important point to be noted...is that scientific communication media are the life force of science, and consequently scientists [should?] insist that they be maintained and used only by scientists to exchange scientific information. Inherent in this consequence is the tenet that non-scientists (e.g. technologists, politicians, moralists) not use the media for their special purposes and that scientists not use the media for non-scientific communications (e.g. humanistic or political causes).

It would be convenient, perhaps, if these two different sets of purposes could easily be sorted out; but in practice, one person's science sometimes turns out to be another's ideology, cause, or pseudo-science. Inquiry does not proceed devoid of rhetoric and politics. Rather, it always occurs in some variable, not always clear, relationship to them. Nowhere is this more evident than in the controversy over the scientific merits of sociobiology. The participants in the debate do not sort themselves out as ideologues or true scientists, as partisan or objective inquirers. Persons of good faith and impeccable credentials line up to testify for and against sociobiology, often in strong terms, like witnesses for or against the accused (who may unwittingly cancel each other out in the eyes of a jury). Scientist is pitted against scientist, and colleague against colleague at places like Harvard. "On the one hand," Michael Ruse observes, "some absolutely first class biologists feel that it represents a basic breakthrough in a crucial area of evolutionary thought. On the other hand, some equally first class biologists feel that in important respects it represents an excrescence on evolutionary science: an excrescence of the most reactionary and malignant nature."[2]

Sociobiology is the sort of phenomenon that reveals the difficulties in drawing sharp lines between science and non-science, or between the discourses of knowledge and the discourses of propaganda. Still, if we accept the claim that the use of scientific media for non-scientific purposes can have serious implications for science as well as society, then there is reason to suppose that it is worthwhile to study the relationship between technical and other communicative purposes. The sociobiology controversy seems to invite such study because it offers a diverse mixture of interpretations and purposes, and because it occurs in both the technical and nontechnical contexts. Sociobiology carries the trappings of science, but its bold speculations about how scientific findings can henceforth inform and reform our social understanding require that its case be made before the specialist and non-specialist alike.

Although a brand of inquiry calling itself sociobiology dates from the 1940's, the new slant it has taken since 1975 has produced a newly active debate on scientific, political, and moral levels.[3] The chief figure in this is Edward O. Wilson, Harvard entomologist, whose books, The Insect Societies (1971), Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), the Pulitzer Prize winning On Human Nature (1978), and (both with Charles Lumsden) Genes, Mind, and Culture (1981) and Promethean Fire: Reflections on the Origins of Mind (1983), have moved from careful claims about social behavior among insects toward increasingly bold extrapolations about social behavior in humans.[4] A number of others have contributed to the development of sociobiology, but Wilson's Sociobiology: The New Synthesis is the manifesto of the movement, and he remains its chief prophet.

Any general characterization of what sociobiology claims should be accompanied by the caveat that there is considerable diversity in the work grouped under this rubric. Sociobiology might be identified as a method or perspective, perhaps with an implicit set of aspirations. Wilson characterizes sociobiology as "the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior."[5] Accordingly, human behavior would be but one sub-set of animal social behaviors. It is possible to be a sociobiologist and refrain from generalizing to human behaviors, although this tends to leave one in the less controversial reaches of what is usually called ethology, the study of animal behavior. The real source of the controversy, and that which makes it possible for sociobiology to bid so vigorously for general attention, is its approach to human social behavior. Wilson further specifies his objective: "The role of sociobiology with reference to human beings, then, is to place the social sciences within a biological framework, a framework constructed from a synthesis of evolutionary studies, genetics, population biology, ecology, animal behavior, psychology and anthropology."[6] The means of fitting social explanation into biological framework is to provide a reduction of social behaviors ("behavior" being already a reduction from "action") to biological generalizations. As physics after Newton became the accepted model for scientific reduction in nature, biology would provide the fundamental model for explaining the behaviors of all living things. "Biology is the key to human nature," Wilson explains, "and the social scientists cannot afford to ignore its rapidly tightening principles."[7] The sense of these rapidly tightening principles is the result of the significant recent advances in biology, or particularly, genetics. The framework for this investigation remains essentially Darwinian, but is transformed by modern genetic research. This means that the biological reduction will not necessarily explain the evolutionary fate of organisms as such, but will seek the more specific genes and gene pools that may be distributed within species and account for the behaviors in question.

Sociobiology finds a background and foundation in population genetics, which is concerned with the distribution and inheritance of genes within various populations. Population genetics calculates the ratios of different genotypes within a population, assuming that--apart from the influence of mutation and selection--the ratios would remain constant over successive generations. Since

mutation and selection are perpetual, however, the task of population genetics is to determine how these "disruptive" factors work, and how they are geographically and otherwise distributed. Not surprisingly, success in correlating gene pools with behaviors has come much more readily in connection with the more inflexible orders of life--Wilson's own work on insects, for instance--than with human populations. The special problem in the study of human sociobiology is in how to account for the mediating effects of culture in a condition where, according to Wilson, genes "hold culture on a leash." Wilson and Lumsden have risen to the task by positing "epigentic rules" and "culturgens" as mediating agents in gene-culture coevolution.[8]

When looking to human behaviors, sociobiologists have focused on behaviors of longstanding interest to ethologists and anthropologists, such as aggression, sexual behavior, kinship selection, and altruism. The last of these has been of particular interest because of the paradoxical place of altruistic behavior within a comprehensive Darwinian theory that holds (subject to some controversy) that nature selects what is helpful to individuals, and that whay may be helpful to entire groups or species can only be selected if it is first helpful to individuals. A solution to this problem advanced by William D. Hamilton and advocated in much of the literature, is the theory of inclusive genetic fitness, which holds that organisms recognize their genetic kin and behave in an altruistic way toward them in order to perpetuate the shared genes.[9] So central is this issue, in fact, that zoologist-sociobiologist Richard Dawkins makes it the purpose of his book, The Selfish Gene, "to examine the biology of selfishness and altruism."[10] The interest in sociobiology has spread through a great number of academic journals, books, and professional papers within a wide variety of host disciplines, and if we listen to the optimistic rhetoric of Wilson, the discipline is in its early stages. Critics such as Stephen Jay Gould, on the other hand, say (with equal optimism) that it is taking its last gasps from the crib.[11] It may be years before we can judge the viability of sociobiology as a science, but its discourse is all about us now.

How might a student of argument or a rhetorical critic get a foothold in this discourse without reducing it to "mere rhetoric?" We might attempt to answer this question by way of a general epistemological stance. At least three stances on the place of rhetoric in relation to science have some currency.[12]

EPISTEMOLOGICAL STANCES

The first holds that all genuine knowledge can be put on the firm foundations of a unified science. What we often call knowledge might come to us through other means--serendipitously or otherwise--but it does not become established as knowledge without benefit of something like the scientific method. There are non-scientific processes of interpretation, appropriate to the humanities, and these may have important roles in the imaginative and aesthetic elements of life, but they rely on such faculties as intuition. The scientific method, by contrast, is of most value precisely when it flies in the face of intuitions and forces us to the recognition, counterintuitively if need be, of what is true. This view is distinguished by an implied directionality in the quest for knowledge; that is, a one-way movement from description and interpretation toward genuine, scientific explanation. Whatsoever one could know, one could take the scientific route to get there--at least in principle. This view simultaneously limits rhetoric to an unimportant role and frees it from the constraints of epistemic responsibility within the scientific context, as rhetoric would hold no logical place there (its role being purely psychological). The danger here is that what goes under the name of science often subsumes a range of issues, not all technical in nature, and the rhetoric of scientism may be used to reduce normative questions to technical ones. This is the basis of W. R. Albury's criticism of sociobiology. He writes: "The possibility of a sociopolitical element in the judgements of scientific specialists--not as an isolated occurrence but as a matter of course--is one which the defenders of sociobiology and their philosophical allies are unable seriously to entertain. To do so would threaten to undo the whole reductive chain by which normative criticisms of sociobiology were converted into questions of technical expertise."[13] To give to science a monopoly on legitmate knowledge claims, it would seem, is to invite widespread smuggling in crates labelled "science."

A second position is to stake out two separate but equal domains of discourse, so that neither the interpretive nor the explanatory process (that is one way of dividng things) is subordinated to the other. The hermeneutic tradition following Dilthey attempts to distinguish between the study of human cultural activity, which can be understood "from inside," from the study of natural objects. Aristotle demarcated the domain of those things subject to demonstration and hence ascertainable with certainty, from those things that could be known only as probable; on this view rhetoric would get a toehold only in the camp of the latter. In practice, careful partitioning of either sort is a relative rarity, not only because rhetoric enters the sciences, but because of the presence of scientific methods within virtually every region of the humanities. Sometimes these methods enter with imperialistic zeal. In 1977, for instance, Robert Trivers forecast sociobiology's inevitable conquests. "Sooner or later," wrote Trivers, "political science, law, economics, psychology, psychiatry, and anthropology will become branches of sociobiology."[14] Such colonization is often welcomed by the colonized, of course. As evidence that this can be done with excessive zeal, I submit testimony by Losco and Baird on sociobiology in political science: "Fred Kort, in 1977, developed a sociobiological explanation of civil rights and civil liberties and their interpretation by the Supreme Court. Building upon Trivers' single-gene model for potential increase to fixation of a gene associated with altruism, Kort synthesized a genetically determined change in behavior of Supreme Court justices resulting in their increased support of civil liberties."[15]

A third view, more radical but increasingly popular, holds that science is only a certain mode of discourse, no more nor less "grounded" than any other. This view has been given impetus by arguments in the philosophy of science which purport to show the radical dependence of theories on the ways of scientific community choses to talk about data.[16] It often appears as part of the rhetoric-is-epistemic line, a view urging a reversal of the direction implicit in the first view, above, and making rhetoric the ultimate determinant of what would count as knowledge. In subsuming science under general interpretive processes, this view has tended to elide the distinction between blatant politics and technical issues, and between justifying practices used before an external audience and those internal to a scientific community. If we are to accept Richard Rorty's view that "conversation is the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood,"[17] we might at least wish to observe that conversation is not a single context, and that one must be most careful about how our various conversations are mixed.

Summing up, there is Stance One: All roads lead to science, which will found what we know. Stance Two: some roads lead to the explanatory methods of the positive sciences, but there are other, equally important destinations. Stance Three: We never really follow roads--we follow road maps. Each of these views would define a relationship between science and rhetoric or interpretation, and would make this relationship follow from the presumed epistemological status of science. But what if there should be a variety of science-discourse relationships, depending on how the relevant scientific claims were functioning? To sort through such relationships would be a useful inquiry for the rhetorical analyst--one not dependent on how, apriori, one sets the standards of the constitution of "knowledge," but on the ways that knowledge claims are presented, defended, or publicized.

BEYOND EPISTEMOLOGY: PUBLIC FRAMES OF EXPERTISE

This immediately shifts attention to the bearers of knowledge claims in the various disciplines, the "cognitive authorities," or experts--a matter that has received surprisingly little attention as an epistemolgoical issue. "The role of experts and authorities in our cognitive lives has been all but ignored by modern epistemologists," according to Stich and Nisbett, "Yet it is the hallmark of an educated and reflective person that he recognizes, consults, and defers to authority on a wide range of topics."[18] I would propose that we think of experts both epistemologically and rhetorically; not solely in their relation to a subject matter, but as participants in discourses that advance and propagate knowledge claims. My interest here is in how they enter those discourses, or how they "go public," and I am suggesting that expertise not be thought of as a qualification, simply, but as a way of entering the knowledge-seeking, knowledge promoting enterprises.

The question of the role played by the expert in the production and dissemination of knowledge is in part a question of the discourse frame one focuses on. It could be said that an expert is a kind of mediator, who assumes a persona and a purpose in relation to both the area of expertise and an audience. This activity might usefully be seen from three different interpretive frames, depending on the kind of mediating function to be served, or one could say, on how the expertise is to be projected. In the first case, the technical fields to which experts belong frame their discourses in a certain way. By "field," I mean something like a program of inquiry, or an area of study bound by some (variable) combination of common purpose, common method, and common subject matter. To be more precise here is notoriously difficult and probably unnecessary.[19] Within this first frame, the expert seeks to contribute to a research program by addressing other participants in that program. The "mode of projection" in this frame might be characterized as follows:

Frame: Intra-field discourses (technical-epistemological)

expert's purpose: to advance the research program
expert's persona: contributor to the research program
expert's relevant audience: members of the research field

This technical frame might also be called the "epistemological," as it thematizes the processes and procedures whereby knowledge originates, irrespective of broader public understanding or acceptance. Although it focuses on the justifying practices within a field, there is an essential act of "going public" at the heart of this process; enough so to perhaps justify Garvey's characterization of communication as "the essence of science."[20] This frame is not made distinctive by virtue of a lesser dependence on discourse, therefore, but by the way in which expertise functions here in its dual relationship to a subject matter and an audience. Sociologists have noticed, for instance, that there are sometimes substantial differences (e.g. not just differences in style or complexity) in the way scientific experts testify to their peers and the way they testify to other publics, such as in Congressional hearings.[21]

A second way of projecting expertise is to represent one field to other fields. This "interfield" activity is part of the more general process of legitimating knowledge claims: of giving them a place and a standing among different (often rival) voices in the community of specialists. This might be thought of as more dominantly hermeneutical dimension of specialized discourses, as it features the interaction of one research tradition with another and the translative and (externally) critical processes. The cross-fertilization of one field by another, at its best invigorating and even revolutionary in consequences, and at worst misguided and even dangerous, begins here. (Sociobiology, depending on who one sides with, could be either.) This second frame, then might show the expert going public as follows:

Frame: Interfield discourses (hermeneutical)

expert's purpose: to "negotiate" the place of methods and findings within the scientific community
expert's persona: representative of a field (as importer or exporter)
expert's relevant audience: expert's own or other fields

Just as one might respond to foreigners with anything from xenophobia to reverence, the posture taken toward another field might be an isolationist or a hostile one. But there are also the scientific Marco Polo's, who enthusiastically import ideas gathered in other fields. In her study of interdisciplinary research, Luski documents the phenomenon of scientists looking to other fields for methods, on the assumption that these may offer greater certitude than those generated on the home turf (where the grass is presumably less green).[22] Such an outlook has perhaps made the social sciences ripe for the sort of colonizing that R. C. Lewontin alleges to have occurred in the case of sociobiology. "By Darwinizing culture," he contends, "biologists both assert their intellectual hegemony and provide a cheap diet of easy explanation for the starving multitudes in the social sciences."[23] Lewontin is here taking a rather "territorial" view of the matter, but the interaction of different fields can be seen to serve cooperative purposes as well. For instance, Willard has characterized the importance of interfield dialogue in terms of what he calls the "nonclosure principle." This essentially is a rhetorical principle of cooperation which requires that fields take other fields seriously. Fields which borrow concepts have incurred this obligation *on their own terms* and are especially vulnerable to the nonclosure principle as an *objection*. Fields which do not borrow concepts are invulnerable to objections based on the nonclosure principle; but they cannot justifiably feel offended if we ignore them."[24] The moral of the story, as Willard sees it, is that "fields observing the nonclosure principle command our attention; fields which depend upon closure do not."[25] Had sociobiology remained a world unto itself, rather than speaking of its relations to other disciplines, it might never have aroused widespread interest.

A third frame features the expert's relationship to a broader, unspecialized public, whose exposure to the experts via textbooks, popularized writing, and mass media coverage of the sciences puts them in a "consumer's " role. Here the purpose and manner of addressing a broader public will differ in a variety of ways from the two frames described above. Success in this role is well exemplified by the "media stars" of science--Carl Sagan, the late Margaret Mead, Lewis Thomas, Lester Thurow, etc.--but also in textbooks. These disclose what is presumably knowledge to a readership who may be presumed to have a certain receptivity to this knowledge, but who are not addressed as specialists within any given field. Even when the audience is sophisticated, as college students or readers of certain general circulation magazines sometimes are, the expert who projects beyond specialized fields is acting in a way that serves more the propagation than the origination of knowledge, that is less dialogical and more monological, and is in that sense more "rhetorical" than either of the modes above. For this activity, we have:

Frame: Extra-field discourses (rhetorical)

expert's purpose: to reveal or propagate.
expert's persona: educator/advocate
expert's relevant audience: a general public

Gadamer speaks of the importance of rhetoric in giving efficacy to science: "The ubiquity of rhetoric," he writes, "...is unlimited. Only through it is science a sociological factor of life, for all the representations of science that are directed beyond the mere narrow circle of specialists (and perhaps one should say, insofar as they are not limited in their impact to a very small circle of initiates) owe their effectiveness to the rhetorical element they contain."[26]

With this claim of rhetorical ubiquity fresh in mind, there are two points that should be made about the status of the frames I am positing. The first is that the device of "framing" should not be thought to capture utterly distinct processes. There will be circumstances under which each of the respective frames will seem more obviously to fit: intellectual discourse found upon the pages of highly specialized scientific journals, for instance, seem to call for the intra-field frame. However, one might also think "factorially" rather than categorically in considering these ways of going public. Even the most intramural discourses among specialists could be taken up under the "hermeneutic" mode, since each writer must bridge to the otherness of colleagues in the field, and perhaps be the representative of an individual sub-speciality. Or, one could apply the "rhetorical" frame to track down the ways in which scientists act as propagators to their peers. Emending the above argument from Gadamer, we could say that even *within* "a small circle of initiates," rhetoric is ubiquitous. The second point is that writers or speakers will not necessarily be in control of what frames are used to interpret their discourse. For instance, when Edward O. Wilson spoke of sociobiology to a professional meeting of fellow academics, portions of his talk were excerpted and quoted by *Time* magazine, which radically recast both the context and audience for the remarks.[27] It follows from these two points that the same work (book, essay, speech) might be taken up according to any or all of the different frames: each foregrounds a different dimension of a complex rhetorical process.

SOCIOBIOLOGY: PROJECTING EXPERTISE

The theory of sociobiology is especially interesting for the manner in which it projects technical, scientific expertise into interfield and extra-field debate. This can be attributed in part to the way in which the dialogue has been pulled into socio-political direction by critics; but there is something intrinsic to the enterprise of sociobiology that seems to urge a "rhetorical" framing of its discourse. One is struck by the degree to which the theory is an *interpretive* enterprise, fitting "plausible stories" to the research findings of biology, anthropology, and related disciplines. Research in those disciplines cited by Wilson, Dawkins, Trivers, and others, is often standard fare, which left in its natural habitat would be unprovocative to other fields and to the general public. The rhetoric of these areas usually follows the conservative scientific style of backgrounding and explaining a study, and restricting any speculation to concluding remarks. The rules of the genre here are fixed and rhetorically unthreatening to established interests. "The general form of a scientific paper," John Ziman tells us, "has changed less, in nearly 300 years, than any other class of literature except the bedroom farce."[28] This stylistic conservatism changes as sociobiology moves out from established areas of expertise to represent itself to broader publics, however. Teleology seems to control its discourse as sociobiology announces itself as an "anti-discipline" with the goal of reconceiving the various traditions of the sciences and humanities in terms of its own purposes.

The first twenty-six chapters of Wilson's *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* had been a laborious study of lower animal behavior; its last chapter, advancing a vision of putting human social behavior on a biological basis, was what "violated the rules" of technical expertise by undertaking advocacy. At the same time, this made Wilson's theory a phenomenon. As Wilson further distanced himself from actual research, the voice of the expert *became* the voice of the advocate. *On Human Nature* begins, not with a scientific problem, but with word of a grand solution to all problems of the social sciences. This volume (Bantam Paperbacks) not only summarizes his evolving aspirations for sociobiology but recaps Wilson's movement from a technical to a rhetorical frame. In the preface to this book (deemed "startling--and disturbing" in a cover blurb from *Time* magazine) he provides a brief chronicle of "a trilogy that unfolded without [his] being consciously aware of any logical sequence until it was finished." The preface is a revealing distillation of Wilson's project. It is, on the one hand, a simple summary of the work to date, beginning with *The Insect Societies*, followed by the work that created "an unusual amount of interest and controversy"--*Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*--and progressing to *On Human Nature*. Yet its rhetoric reinforces the thesis celebrated by sociobiology, namely that we are all but poor players in a human drama shaped by the inexorable logic of our genes. Wilson describes himself almost as playing a role for which he was fated--groping unconsciously toward forging a link between social theory and natural sciences. And in the course of that groping his expertise evolved. In the final chapter of *The Insect Societies*, Wilson had speculated that "the same principles of population biology and comparative zoology that have worked so well in explaining the rigid systems of the social insects could be applied point by point to vertebrate animals." "Unable to resist the rhetoric of my own challenge," he professes, "I set out to learn the large and excellent literature on vertebrate social behavior and wrote *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*." Not content to stop there, he completed the trilogy with *On Human Nature*, a "speculative essay" on evolutionary theory, the social sciences, and the humanities, exploring the thesis that sociobiology is the appropriate instrument for closing the gap between the two cultures. This book goes far beyond the dry and plodding discussion of insect and animal societies to make a sweeping prognosis for virtually all aspects of human culture. It would seem guarded by comparison to the later work in collaboration with Lumsden.

The program on which Wilson thus reflects shows a pattern for which we have antecedents. Wilson the expert entomologist does carefully researched scientific work in his area of specialization, then moves to address a broader intellectual audience by projecting his expertise onto other disciplines. Drawing mixed reactions there and creating academic controversy, he next goes directly to the public in a rather dramatic presentation which, as the back cover informs us, "defines the next step in the evolution of human consciousness." Then, attaining the high public legitimation of the Pulitzer Prize, the author moves to collaborations with Canadian mathematician Charles Lumsden, in *Genes, Mind, and Culture* and in *The Promethean Fire: Reflections on the Origin of Mind*. These attempt to put sociobiology on a sound mathematical basis and to elaborate the theory of the "culturgen," the mechanism for the mediation between genes and culture. (*Genes, Mind, and Culture* actually offered a complex mathematical formula purporting to show how, according to genetic predisposition, women's fashions change over time.)

Mathematical mumbo jumbo can have potent rhetorical effect by creating an aura of expertise before a mystified readership, of course. However tempting it might be to attribute such a motive to Wilson and Lumsden as they reach for new constituencies, that kind of understanding of their discourse should be held in a tension with an understanding of the internal justifying practices of sociobiology. (*Genes, Mind, and Culture* is after all very much a technical book.) For example, sociobiologists share the assumption that genetic strategies operating over long periods of time will produce the selected behavior in large populations; and when they find certain behaviors that are nearly universal in human societies, such as incest taboos, they take this as strong evidence of such a genetic strategy. This means that a basic pattern of inference for the sociobiologist in such cases is the abductive inference--reasoning from cases to a hypothesis which would explain those cases. As gene strategies are something that could not be directly observed, this is perhaps necessarily an important mode of inference. Under this pattern, the strongest argument a sociobiologist can make against alternative hypothesis, e.g. those involving cultural determinants, is to contend (1) that the genetic hypothesis would explain the phenomena in question, and (2) that it would afford an advantage to survival.

This can be seen in Wilson's account of the incest taboo. The avoidance of sexual intercourse within the nuclear family, he acknowledges, is "achieved by cultural sanctions," although brother-sister relations are discouraged by a more basic and automatic sexual aversion. All this could be explained if the avoidance of inbreeding were a genetic strategy; but it would also be explained by the anthropological theory of Lévi-Strauss that incest taboos arise in order to facilitate the exchange of women between social groups. Wilson therefore cites evidence of a "heavy physiological penalty imposed by inbreeding," ranging from stunted growth to high infant mortality, and sums up as follows:

> The manifestations of inbreeding pathology constitute natural selection in an intense and unambiguous form. The elementary theory of population genetics predicts that any behavioral tendency to avoid incest, however slight or devious, would long ago have spread through human populations. So powerful is the advantage of outbreeding that it can be expected to have carried cultural evolution along with it. Family integrity and leverage during political bargaining may indeed be felicitous results of outbreeding, but they are more likely to be devices of convenience, secondary cultural adaptations that made use of the inevitability of outbreeding for direct biological reasons.[29]

Either theory, it might be observed, universalizes the taboo acording to some common principle, but sociobiology sees its chosen principle as revealing "a deeper, more urgent cause" of the behavior in question[30]--survival strategies are "deeper" than culture.

If one were to attempt a list of the "field-defining" practices of sociobiology, this sort of abductive approach would be one. So too would be the use of homologies, as it is presumed in justification of claims about human behaviors that human social behavior functions homologously to those of lower animals. (Critics charge that these arguments more often rely on mere analogies or metaphors.[31]) And the principle of reduction of the cultural to the biological would of course be crucial to defining competence to perform in the field. One problem in defining expertise in sociobiology, given its direct dependence on such fields as population genetics, ethology, anthropology, and so on, is that it is not altogether clear what claims *are* specifically sociobiological claims, or what the precise relationships are between data drawn from those fields and theoretical claims in sociobiology. It has been alleged, for instance, that sociobiology is no more than an arrangement of facts without new research of its own, and further, that this disguises Wilson's leap of faith in applying his expertise on insect behavior to the interpretation of vertebrate animal behavior. The novelty of sociobiology would appear to come more from its bold extension of biological notions into new areas of application than from methods that are essentially new, and this makes the interfield frame particularly applicable.

Attacks from other scientists have caused Wilson et. al. considerable difficulty in "negotiating" the place of sociobiology within the scientific community. Some critical reaction has been less than detached and even-handed, motivated more by ideological considerations, it would appear, than Wilson is sometimes suspected of being. Criticisms coming from the Cambridge-based (Mass.) group calling itself the Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People have tended to rhetorical excess, with comparisons to Nazi eugenics, etc.[32] This might be contrasted with the more sensitive and illuminating ideologically-oriented critique of anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, *The Use and Abuse of Biology*, or to the sympathetic philosophical critique of Michael Ruse, *Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?*[33]

Most sociobiologists have shown enough political sensitivity to distance themselves from right wing political ideology and to foresee some of the dangers of misinterpreting their work. Racism, sexism, and the like, are roundly condemned, and the work of such figures as Arthur Jensen and William Shockley on the relationship between race and IQ, which a lay reader might expect to have a place in the sociobiology literature, are scrupulously ignored. Still, this has not stopped persons with political motives, including the New Right in France and in England, from using sociobiology for their own purposes.[34] Again, scientists do not fully control how their expertise will be put to use.

MAKING KNOWLEDGE "COUNT"

All this is not to say that all the interesting sociobiological arguments are extra-field, or "rhetorical" ones. There are also technical controversies. Sociobiologists have been criticized, for instance, for speaking of genes as though they were discrete units acted upon singly by natural selection, and presumably corresponding directly to such behavioral traits as reciprocal altruism, selfishness, kinship recognition, and so on. This might be explained in part by matters of stylistic convenience--the need to provide a simplified, comprehensible account of what are really highly complex variables. But it is that variability itself that is misunderstood, according to James King, of the New York University Medical School, who takes Dawkins, Wilson, Trivers, and others to task for what he sees as outdated genetic theory. Their notion of Mendelian single genes, thinks King, is not in line with the "variabilist" hypothesis, which leads to "quite different" conclusions: "Instead of discrete, indestructible, aggressive units, constantly urging their carriers to hand them on at any cost, one must visualize fragile combinations of continuously varying, interacting complexes under constant threat of vanishing as a result of recombination."[35] This may or may not turn out to be a serious foundational weakness of sociobiology; but King has taken sides on a controversial issue, and it would thus seem unfair to accuse sociobiologists of naiveté on genetic theory so long as there remains a live battle among "uniformists" and "variabilists" in genetics. Other questions have been raised about the accuracy of the sociobiologists' portrayal of genetics--but it is not really the technical issues that are at the focus of the controversy. Rather, the dispute revolves more around questions of how any knowledge we may have about genes is to *count* within broader constellations of meaning and understanding, and this hinges on matters of interpretation, evaluation, and policy interest, and on the rhetoric that mediates among them and that makes various kinds of expertise relevant.

The issues in those dimensions are themselves so absorbing that the controversy over sociobiology has gone round and round without it yet being quite clear just what would verify or falsify the theory. Wilson explicitly denies that genes exercise exclusive control over human behavior, or that they control behavior directly. Instead, the argument goes, genes influence cultural development, which in turn influences genes. Thus the lines between nature and culture are thrown into a confusion, making it complicated even to talk about the relative influence of genes over culture. Wilson has avoided attributing overwhelming influence to genes, and under critical scrutiny has so hedged his position that he has been quoted as making the remark that genes may account for as little as 15% of the determination of behavior, although one would certainly get a rather different impression from his books.[36] Given the hedge that culture may "override" the influence of genes (and that in any case culture is itself held on a leash by genes), it becomes difficult to predict the specific points on which technical expertise will come directly to bear, especially since most opponents have long since acknowledged that behavior is partly determined by our genes. We have, in brief, a controversy in which both sides seem to be saying that genes partially determine behavior, and neither side is willing or able to say with any meaningful measure *how much* of behavior is so determined. It should come as no surprise therefore that the argument moves quickly away from technical questions to interpretive ones.

One wonders whether, if Wilson had been so forthright in hedging his claims all along--if he had said that genes exercise some influence, to a degree as yet undeterminable, over human behavior--there might have been no controversy at all. But that begs the question as to whether there would even be an aspiring science of sociobiology at all if its methods and assumptions had to be developed with such meticulous care as those of, say, entomology. Without conveying the impression that genes overwhelmingly determine our behavior, *On Human Nature* would never have been in demand in Bantam paperback. The most serious charges of genetic determinism levelled at Wilson can be shrugged off, given his position that the question of *how much* genes determine behavior is still an open one. Under the light of controversy, in fact, Wilson seems to concede to virtually every reasonable claim about the importance of culture, the dangers of reductivism, the folly of determinisms, and so on--and in so doing qualifies his position almost out of existence as a *noteworthy* one. Under a closeup, critical look at his claims, the specter of genes as Iron Masters evaporates--only to re-form the moment we relax our gaze. Phrases such as "our hidden masters" and "gene machine" pervade Wilson's, and especially Dawkins' prose; and these images say something to the reader that Wilson, at least, is not willing to take responsibility for saying directly. Likewise, exercises in "speculation" provide Wilson with a kind of insulation from strictly scientific objections, while at the same time his scientific cloak is used to gain immunity from critical evaluation by qualified philosophers and social scientists. The humanities as currently practiced, in fact, are practically dismissed as irrelevant to the modern scientific age. The tone of things is well set by Chapter One, page one, of *On Human Nature*, where Wilson confidently informs us that Deity had no role in shaping our species (an observation reminiscent of the Soviet cosmonaut whose scan of the empty heavens yielded evidence to shatter the myth of God). One senses that the debate will not be adjudicated on the criterion of Verifiability.

Beyond all the technical knowledge that might come into the argument, there is the question of how these data, whether actual or merely hypothesized, are to count--both in the sense of how they are valued (e.g. Is it bad news to learn our genes are in control?), and in the sense of how they are to be acted upon (e.g. Does this warrant changes in existing institutions?). Surely, the various particular supports of the sociobiological edifice--arguments about aggression, kinship, altruism, sex, etc.--might be modified or brought down under the weight of further scientific investigation. But knowing more, in the scientific sense, does not necessarily mean moving closer toward agreement on the oughts and should-be's. One need only look at the raging controversy over abortion to see that an enormous increase in biological information about fetuses in recent years has not settled its status as to "personhood"--and if anything has intensified the debate over abortion. On this there is some great divide in the body politic, which almost inexplicably yields judgments (often simplistically attributed to religious influences) that are almost totally at odds, despite a more or less common body of factual information on the subject. It seems unlikely that any imaginable scientific discovery will dictate a resolution to such differences of judgment. Sociobiology is not likely to be proved or laid to rest by increased information alone, anymore perhaps than is the debate over human nature centering on the abortion issue to be

Having no particular content of their own, nor even, taken in isolation, any particular ideological bearing, these strategies are pure rhetoric. Yet much of the heat in the sociobiology controversy is generated in the clash between these strategies as they are used in response to the purported role of genes in influencing behavior. Even those who reject the technical claims of the sociobiologists seem irresistibly drawn to the "even if" questions. For instance, even if it could be demonstrated that genes strongly influence human behavior, how should we react to such a possibility? In this connection the contrasting strategies make a dramatic appearance. Wilson, Dawkins, and others who find a logic of the genetic influence on culture seem committed to (somehow) aligning human values and institutions with the principles of biology. Presumably, our culture should more accurately "reflect" the tendencies and potentials latent in the genes. The contrasting response, given by Rom Harré for example, is to hold our biological natures, in those cases where they seem to militate against the values of culture, as obstacles to be overcome.[40] If humankind is by biological predisposition aggressive, selfish, territorial, or whatever, a culture regarding these as dangerous tendencies might structure its institutions to provide a constant countervailing force. The way that sociobiology establishes its credibility is very much wrapped up in such matters, and hence anyone's "qualifications" to speak to the issues it raises cannot be defined by technical competency alone.

Conclusion

I would suggest that there are various sorts of accountability that should be brought to bear on the expert, as expertise may "count" in various discursive contexts. The judgmental standards applicable to expert claims cannot easily be compartmentalized according to epistemological criteria, however, nor is it clear that this should be taken as an ideal. The special ethos built by the scientist, for instance, sometimes makes that person seem worth hearing on topics admittedly outside his or her area of technical expertise--possibly because we assume that intellectual competence is in some ways transferable. I submit that it is, after all, more illuminating to read Noam Chomsky's discourses on government and foreign affairs than it is to read an average political scientist's. But we need to be sensitive to how expertise is being projected and transformed by the different discourses it serves. The "framing" device, I believe, is a way to get a handle on this without reifying categories (such as "scientific" and "public" discourse) and thereby making them unaccountable to each other. The sociobiology controversy is in some ways an unusual case because of its unsettled status as science; but it also throws into bold relief the struggle to make expertise count before different relevant publics.

Notes

[1] William D. Garvey, *Communication: The Essence of Science* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 29.

[2] Michael Ruse, "Sociobiology: Sound Science or Muddled Metaphysics?," in *Proceedings of the 1976 Biennial Meeting of the Philsophy of Science Association*, II, ed. Frederick Suppe and Peter D. Asquith (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1977), p. 48.

[3] On the history of the term "sociobiology," see King's College Sociobiology Group, Cambridge, ed., *Current Problems in Sociobiology* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), p. x. For a good introduction to the controversy, see Arthur L. Caplan, ed., *The Sociobiology Debate* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978); and Ashley Mantagu, ed., *Sociobiology Examined* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1980).

[4] *The Insect Societies* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1971); *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1975); *On Human Nature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978); *Genes, Mind, and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1981); *Promethean Fire: Reflections on the Origins of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983).

[5] *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, p. 547.

[6] Montagu, Introduction, p. 5.

[7] Wilson, *On Human Nature*, p. 14.

[8] *Genes, Mind, and Culture*, passim.

[9] Richard D. Alexander, "Evolution, Human Behavior, and Determinism," in *Proceedings of the 1976 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science*, Association, ed. Suppe and Asquith, p. 7.

[10] Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976), p. 1.

[11] Stephen Jay Gould, "Genes on the Brain," *New York Review of Books*, June 30, 1983. p. 6.

[12] The first stance is widely represented in the more positivistic approaches to communication study; the second has been around for some time in the "humanistic" approaches to communication: and the thrid is enjoying current popularity in rhetorical theory.

[13] W. H. Albury, "Politics and Rhetoric in the Sociobiology Debate," *Social Studies of Science*, 10 (November, 1980), 519-36.

[14] Quoted by Joseph Losco and Donna Day Baird, "The Impact of Sociobiology on Political Science," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 25 (Jan./Feb., 1982), p. 336.

[15] Ibid., p. 339.

[16] Representative of this trend is the recent work of Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981), which seems much influenced in this respect by Thomas Kuhn.

[17] Rorty, p. 389.

[18] S. P. Stich and R. W. Nisbett, "Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning," *Philosophy of Science*, 47 (1980), 198-99.

[19] The most comprehensive approach ot the notion of "fields," and one which gives a good sense of the difficulties involved in characterizing them, is Charles Arthur Willard, *Argumentation and The Social Grounds of Knowledge* (University: The Univ. of Alabama Press, 1983).

[20] Garvey, *Communication: The Essence of Science*.

[21] Michael Altimore, "The Rhetoric of Scientific Controversy: Recombinant DNA," unpublished paper, 1982.

[22] Margaret Barron Luszki, *Interdisciplinary Team Research* (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1958), p. 53.

[23] "Sociobiology—A Caricature of Darwinism," in Suppe and Asquith, p. 23.

[24] Willard, p. 272.

[25] Ibid.

[26] H.G. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. and ed. David E. Ling (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1977), p. 24.

[27] "Genes Über Alles," *Time*, Dec. 13, 1976.

[28] John M. Ziman, *Public Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968), p. 105.

[29] *On Human Nature*, p. 39.

[30] Ibid., p. 38.

[31] This issue has been examined by Lawrance Bernabo, "Homology and Catachresis in the Sociobiology Debate: Metaphor in the Service of Argumentative Claims," paper presented to the Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, 1982.

[32] See, e.g., "Sociobiology--Another Biological Determinism," in Montagu, pp. 280-90.

[33] Marshall D. Sahlins, *The Use and Abuse of Biology* (Ann Arbor, MI: The Univ. of Michigan Press, 1976); Michael Ruse, *Sociobiology: Sense Or Nonsense*? (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1979).

[34] Montagu, p. 13.

[35] James C. King, "The Genetics of Sociobiology," in Montagu, p. 94.

[36] Wilson was so quoted in the *Time* article, "Genes Über Alles."

[37] Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Chapter 3.

[38] In this connection, see Kenneth Burke's discussion of the way teleological language creeps into the discourse of the biologist, in *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal. Press, 1969), pp. 157ff.

[39] That would be the case only for these particular uses of the strategies. I am assuming that they can be used in a variety of different ways.

[40] Rom Harré, *Social Being* (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1980), p. 18.

"CREATION-SCIENCE" IS NOT "SCIENCE"--ARGUMENT FIELDS AND PUBLIC ARGUMENT

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In March of 1981, the State of Arkansas adopted a statute requiring that "creation-science" be given "balanced treatment" with "evolution-science" in the state's public schools. The constitutionality of that statute was subsequently challenged and the trial of the case of *McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education* in December of 1981 drew national attention. The popular press drew parallels to the 1925 Scopes "monkey trial." *Time*, for example, captioned its December 21 report on the trial "Darwin vs. the Bible,"[1] and proclaimed "Darwin Wins"[2] when it reported the judge's decision three weeks later. I believe that one informative way to approach the statute and the court battle over its constitutionality is to view it as a controversy in the public sphere over the limits of an argument field.

The concept of argument fields is one of the most provocative notions to emerge from recent scholarship in argumentation. The proposition that all arguments are *not* equal, that arguments belong to different "fields," and that each field has agreed-upon standards for evaluating the worth of arguments is an attractive one. Yet in the twenty-five years since Stephen Toulmin first suggested the notion of argument fields, little headway has been made in pinpointing the concept. As Joseph Wenzel notes after surveying the papers presented at the 1981 Summer Conference on Argumentation:

> it is probably fair to say that everyone shares a global understanding of the term "field of argument" as referring to some sort of universe of discourse. What is lacking is agreement on the boundaries of such a universe, its constitutive conditions, or its defining features.[3]

Part of the attractiveness of the "fields" concept, obviously, is the assumption that fields exist "out there" in the "real world"--that they are *not* merely the collective fantasy of a group of argumentation scholars on holiday in the mountains. Much of the literature on fields has, therefore, been meta-theoretical, as scholars have searched for the right philosophical perspective from which to *identify* fields accurately. (Among the papers at the 1981 Summer Conference, for example, one finds "A Cartesian Meditation" on argument fields, "A Dramatistic Approach," "Some Social Constructivist Observations," "A Situational Perspective," and so on.)[4] The lack of agreement on the boundaries, constitutive conditions, and defining features of fields has severely restricted empirical and critical research in argument fields.

As I suggested a moment ago, I believe that the case of *McLean vs. Arkansas* invites scrutiny as a "real world" dispute over the *limits of* an argument field. Such a case study will serve a number of functions: (1) it should demonstrate that the concept of "fields" *is* a relevant one in *public* *argument*; (2) examination of the competing definitions of the field of science offered during the trial should provide an index of the gap between those "inside" and those "outside" of the field; (3) examination of how this particular dispute was adjudicated should provide insight that will be useful in understanding the value and the limits of the fields concept in public argument. The rest of this paper is in three parts. First I shall report the background and describe the provisions of Arkansas Act 590, the act mandating equal time for "creation-science;" next, I shall describe the competing definitions of "science" advanced during the trial and show how they focused the controversy on the pivotal issue of argument field boundaries; finally I will examine the judge's opinion in the case to indicate the standards by which he decided the definitional issue and will consider some of the implications of his decision for the future course of the creationism argument.

Background and Provisions of Act 590. In March, 1981, Freshman Senator James L. Holstad introduced into the Arkansas State Legislature a bill requiring that "Public schools within the State shall give balanced treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science."[5] The bill was passed by both houses of the legislature following about one hour's debate, and was signed into law on March 19 by Arkansas Governor Frank White.

On first reading, the most striking feature of Act 590 is its preoccupation with fairness.[6] The key provision of the act was in Section 1, which mandated that "Public schools within this State shall give balanced treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science." The requirement extended to "classroom lectures taken as a whole for each course . . . . library materials taken as a whole for the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other educational programs in public schools . . . [that] deal in any way with the subject of the origin of man, life, the earth, or the universe." Section 2 prohibited religious instruction, limiting discussion to scientific evidence for each model and precluding any religious instruction or references to religious writing. Section 5 made clear that no instruction in the subject of origins was *required*; however, if a public school chose to teach either approach, *it must teach both*. It is not difficult to imagine a legislator, facing an end-of-session flood of bills, thinking wearily, "That sounds like it ought to satisfy everybody."

Not only did Act 590 extend to creation and evolution the democratic guarantee of "balanced treatment" in the public schools, it accorded them both *equal status* by declaring both to be "science." Moreover, to ensure that *no one should* misunderstand the elements that were to be treated in a balanced fashion, Section 4 of the Act included very specific definitions of each"science:"

> (a) "Creation-science" means the scientific evidences for creation and inferences from those scientific evidences. Creation-science includes the scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate: [1] Sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life from nothing; [2] The insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of all living kinds from a single organism; [3] Changes only within fixed limits of originally created kinds of plants and animals; [4] Separate ancestry for man and apes; [5] Explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, including the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and [6] A relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds.
>
> (b) "Evolution-science" means the scientific evidences for evolution and inferences from those scientific evidences. Evolution-science includes the scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate [1] Emergence by naturalistic processes of the universe from disordered matter and emergence of life from nonlife; [2] The sufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of present living kinds from simple earlier kinds; [3] Emergence by mutation and natural selection of present living kinds from simple earlier kinds; [4] Emergence of man from a common ancestor with apes; [5] Explanation of the earth's geology and the evolutionary sequence by uniformitarianism; and [6] An inception several billion years ago of the earth and somewhat later of life.

Again, on first reading, the carefully structured parallelism appears to draw tidy boundaries and sharp distinctions between the two "sciences" in a way that would facilitate the teaching of both. Upon reflection, however, it becomes apparent that "creation-science" and "evolution-science" are defined in terms of the content of their conclusions ("the scientific evidences for . . . and inferences from those scientific evidences that indicate . . ."), and it becomes equally apparent that "evolution-science" is defined on the basis of a dialectical opposition to the propositions of "creation-science."

Competing Definitions of "Science" in the Trial. Act 590 was signed into law on March 19, 1981. On May 27, the Rev. Bill McLean, principal official of the Presbyterian Church in Arkansas and 22 other plaintiffs filed suit in U. S. District Court charging that Act 590 was unconstitutional. The case went to trial in December. Federal District Judge William Overton heard the case. There was no jury.

Act 590 declared "creation-science" and "evolution-science" to be "science." Not surprisingly, one of the major lines of argument advanced by the plaintiffs was the contention that "creation-science" is not "science." I will not attempt to review all of the arguments and evidence advanced at the trial. I will limit my report here to a distillation of the key features of the plaintiffs' contention, and the defendants' response to the contention, that "creation-science" is not "science."

The plaintiffs asserted that there are methodological differences between "creation-science" and scientific method as it is ordinarily understood. In their pre-trial brief, the plaintiffs drew the distinction this way:

> Creationists . . . start with divine revelation and only then address the facts. . . . Science concerns itself

> solely with natural phenomena and natural processes . . . whereas "creation-science" relies upon, espouses, and is dependent upon supernatural processes. A key feature of science is that it is always somewhat tentative and always subject to revision in the light of new knowledge.[7]

During the trial prosecution witnesses pointed out flaws in the arguments of many creation scientists and offered scientific evidence to contradict some of the claims made by creationists.

The defense argued in their pre-trial outline that Act 590 "advances both scientific inquiry and academic freedom." Specifically:

> Scientific inquiry is advanced by providing students with an alternative scientific theory to evolution-science. . . . much of the scientific evidence concerning origins supports the theory of creation science, and . . . other scientific evidence does not support evolution science. As such, creation-science is equally as scientific as evolution-science.[8]

During the trial defense witnesses testified to the existence of evidence which appeared to support the tenets of creation-science, and offered evidence that appeared to contradict the theory of evolution. Others testified that creationism was being suppressed by the scientific community.

The courtroom debate over Act 590 gave rise to two very different conceptions of "science." For supporters of Act 590, "science" represents a debate between scientists. The goal of "science" is to advocate hypotheses favored by the particular scientist. Evidence is used rhetorically, to support one's own position and to refute contradictory claims. Because of the adversarial nature of the enterprise, it may be necessary on occasion to appeal to some outside agency to adjudicate disputes and to assure fairness.

For opponents of Act 590, "science" represents a dialog between scientists and nature. The goal of "science" is to use hypotheses to study natural phenomena and natural processes. Evidence is used as the basis for drawing conclusions and conclusions must be revised if new evidence appears to contradict them. Because of the cooperative nature of the enterprise, the field is self-regulating. Other scientists will see that fairness is assured.

Judge's Ruling and Its Implications. At the conclusion of the final arguments, Judge Overton indicated "I will not undertake to try to verify the validity of biblical creation or the theory of evolution. . . . A lot of people perceive that to be the issue in this case, and, obviously, it is not."[9] In his memorandum opinion in the case, Overton made it clear that the deciding issue was the question of the boundaries of the field of "science." He declared the "'creation-science' as defined [in Act 590] is simply not science." Alluding to testimony given during the trial, he noted:

> Several witnesses suggested definitions of science. A descriptive definition was said to be that science is what is "accepted by the scientific community" and is "what scientists do." The obvious implication of this description is that, in a free society, knowledge does not require the imprimatur of legislation in order to become science.[10]

More specifically, Judge Overton went on to list the five defining characteristics of science advanced during the trial.

> (1) It is guided by natural law;
> (2) It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law;
> (3) It is testable against the empirical world;
> (4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e., are not necessarily the final word; and
> (5) It is falsifiable.[11]

He compared the six sections of the definition of "creation-science" ("Sudden creation of the universe . . . insufficiency of mutation and natural selection. . . changes only within fixed limits . . . ") with these five characteristics to show how the definition failed to satisfy any of the five. Moreover, he went on to observe that "creation-science" also failed to meet the more general descriptions of "what scientists think" and "what scientists do:"

> [1] There is . . . not one recognized scientific journal which has published an article espousing the creation-science theory described in Section 4(2). . . . no witness produced a scientific article for which publication had been refused. . . . [2] The creationists have difficulty maintaining among their ranks consistency in the claim that creationism is science. . . . [3] The methodology employed by creationists . . . is indicative of the fact that their work is not science. . . .[12]

In sum, then, Overton left no doubt that the deciding question guiding his decision was whether "creation-science" was within or outside of the boundaries of "science." And he unequivocally ruled that the definition of that field was the prerogative of the members of the scientific community. In the brief time I have left, I would like to suggest several implications of this ruling for the future course of the "creationism" argument.

First, I would note that Overton's ruling provided an "objective" basis on which to resolve the specific constitutional issue before the court. The demand for "balanced treatment" for creationist ideas was linked specifically to the assertion that "scientific evidence and related inferences" (in the language of Act 590) exist to support those ideas. Proponents of Act 590 ought to have anticipated that the legislation would by challenged in court, and that it would be challenged on the attempt to equate "creation-science" with "science." By looking to the scientific community for a definition of "science," the court avoided the necessity of dealing with the "validity" of the theory of creation or the theory of evolution. Significantly, the decision is not being appealed.

A second observation I would make is that the two disparate conceptions of "science" that were advanced during the trial offer evidence of a radical "gap" in habits of thought, as well as matters of belief, between adherents of the two definitions. I would contend that one of the values of this case for students of argumentation is the way that it brings into focus the key features that inhibit communication between the "science as inquiry" and "science as debate" proponents. A rigorous commitment to either one of these perspectives makes the statements of the other group literally non-sensical. From the "science as inquiry" point of view it is a "cop-out" to use super-natural explanations to account for unexplainable phenomena. From the "science as debate" point of view the requirement that hypotheses account for all of the available data is a strategy for getting around some very damaging evidence.

Finally I would suggest that McLean vs. Arkansas provides legal precedent for saying that one may not label as "science" the selective use of evidence to support favored hypotheses, but it does not preclude anyone from reasoning in that way. The public argument over creationism will undoubtedly persist. James L. Holstad, the Arkansas senator who introduced Act 590 into the legislature made that clear after the trial had ended. "It's just starting, all the hoopla and publicity. . . . That's what I wanted. I feel like we really won, because people are talking about it."[13]

Conclusion. In this paper I have tried to show that the sometimes abstract concept of argument fields is germane to controversy in the "real world" of public argument. Specifically, I have suggested that Arkansas Act 590 may be viewed as an attempt to legislate the boundaries of the argument field "science." Opponents of Act 590 objected to the proposed definition on the grounds that it included territory traditionally held to be outside of that field. The Federal District Court agreed, affirming the right of established scientists to define the limits of the field they practice.

The decision in McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education did more than simply resolve a specific dispute and set a precedent for future court cases. The recognition that creationists and evolutionists do not share the same argument field does much to explain why their controversy has persisted for over a century, and why its participants have almost always found each other to be unreasonable, if not incomprehensible.

ENDNOTES

[1] Time, December 21, 1981, p. 67.

[2] Time, January 18, 1982, p. 63.

[3] Joseph W. Wenzel, "On Fields of Argument as Propositional Systems," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (Spring, 1982), 204.

[4] Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, eds. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1981).

[5] The materials that provide the basis for this analysis are of two sorts: primary materials and a journalistic narrative of daily events during the hearing in Little Rock. I have not had access to a transcript of the the court proceedings. The best single compilation of primary materials is found in the Summer, 1982, issue of Science, Technology, & Human Values, which includes the complete text of Act 590; "heavily edited versions" of the plaintiffs' and defendants' "Preliminary Outlines of the Legal Issues and Proof," and of the "Pre-Trial Briefs" for each side; as well as the full text of Judge Overton's Memorandum Opinion in the case. An alternative source for the full text of the Memorandum Opinion is the February 19, 1982 issue of Science. The most complete journalistic narrative available to me was that published daily from December 7 through December 18, 1981 in the New Orleans Times-Picayune/The States-Item.

[6] "Act 590 of 1981, Acts of Arkansas," Science, Technology & Human Values, 7(Summer, 1982), 11.

[7] "Plaintiffs' Outline of Legal Issues and Proof," Science, Technology, & Human Values, 7(Summer, 1982), 17.

[8] Defendants' Outline of Legal Issues and Proof," Science, Technology, & Human Values, 7(Summer, 1982), 22.

[9] John Pope, "Judge lists creationism trial issues," The [New Orelans] Times-Picayune/The States-Item, December 18, 1981, section I, p. 17.

[10] "Opinion of William R. Overton U.S. District Judge [Dated 5 January 1982]," Science, Technology, & Human Values, 7(Summer, 1982), 36.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., p. 37.

[13] Time, January 18, 1982, p. 63.

CREATIONISM: THE ARGUMENT TIME FORGOT?

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All things die into that out of which they were born, they pay one another penalty for the injustice according to the ordinance of Time.

Anaximander

...symbolic universes are social products with a history. If one is to understand their meaning, one has to understand the history of their production. This is all the more important because these products of human consciousness, by their very nature, present themselves as full blown and inevitable totalities.

Berger & Luckman

In my previous Alta paper, I introduced the idea of "rhetorical epoch" which I characterized as "the eruption, development and demise of a strategic, stylized symbolism, so significant that it divides history into a before and after." "Rhetorical epochs," I observed, "are particular periods of organization and order in the life of humanity."[1] In the revised version of my essay I define "epochal symbols as verbal and nonverbal representations that constitute a rhetorical epoch."

In this presentation I build on my previous one by addressing an anomaly in the discourse of the modern epoch. In the last several years the creation science movement has been much in the public eye through its suits to have creationism taught in the public schools as an alternative to the theory of evolution.[2] Books have been written advocating creationism and rebutting it.[3] As creationism has established itself as a topic of national attention, many interested observers have gone from initial disbelief at its advent, to irritation at its persistence, to fear of its possible success.[4]

The controversy is interesting from the perspective of what I have termed "the rhetoric of history," as it appears to deny the experience of epoch. The Origin of Species does, after all, mark a before and after of meaning and is one of the constitutive symbols of modernity. Along with Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Marx, Freud and Einstein, Darwin wrote an indispensable chapter in the narrative of modern self-understanding. To disbelieve in The Origin, is to confront the received story of the modern epoch with an alternative and incompatible narrative. Why creationism should emerge as a serious topic of discussion nearly a century and a quarter after The Origin's publication invites rhetorical investigation. No less interesting, however, is the offense creationism gives to moderns who assumed the scientific world-view so altered the climate of opinion that creationism would naturally go the way of Dodo and the Woolly Mammoth. In what sense, then, is creationism the argument that time forgot? Why does it persist? To address these questions I propose the following lines of inquiry. First, to examine how the contemporary outrage at creationism reveals a rhetorical naïveté about modernity's supposedly privileged place as history's final narrative: second, to note the decisive importance of time bound social knowledge in The Origin's cultural success; third, to reintroduce a distinction between death and hibernation, and to point out that creationism obeys historical rhythms which antedate the modern epoch and which will probably survive it, if anything does; and fourth, to draw implications from this analysis for an understanding of our theme: argument and time.

I

In the nineteen twenties, E.A. Burtt observed "in the last analysis it is the ultimate picture which an age forms of the nature of its world that is its most fundamental possession. It is the final controlling factor in all thinking whatever."[5] Burtt's observation is easier to apply to the past and to others than to ourselves and now. We cannot easily step outside of our own assumptions to examine just what they are. In hermeneutic terms, the social forestructure of our knowing is the condition of our understanding and not an object of it. This is why the experience of epoch is so significant. When a genuinely epochal event occurs, the familiar is made problematic and what had been problematic, i.e. the origin of species, may seem familiar. The root of "epoch" is epoche, a moment when stasis is achieved, as in that instant before a sneeze. The shock of disbelief with which most of us confront creationism is a minor epoché, a momentary lifting of the forestructure of our knowing. It is worth dwelling on this moment of surprise, for it may afford us something more surprising still--a moment of self-understanding we are ordinarily denied. To widen and freeze this momentary breach in our taken-for-granted world, let me suggest an offensive parallel. Suppose for a moment our irritation at creationism were analogous to the offense Polish Catholicism gives an orthodox Communist. I choose this example partly to momentarily privilege religion and make modernity problematic, but also to indicate that the offense is not located on the level of propositional differences. Orthodox Communists are not troubled by what Catholics believe; they are troubled by the fact that they exist and are thriving in the last place where they ought to be found. However quick may be our comrades' dialectical explanation, still, in the early hours of the morning, the vigor of Polish Catholicism must terribly offend their sense of reality. When a person is confronted with something too massively real to deny, but whose occurrence had been theoretically ruled out, that person is in an excellent position to reconsider his or her view of the world. Provided, of course, the individual is open to real experience. Are we in a similar situation to the one I have described?

Consider the following observations from William North Rice's Presidential Address before the American Association of Naturalists. The address was published in 1891 in the prestigious Protestant quarterly, Bibliotheca Sacra.

> The younger generation of scientific students can hardly appreciate today the agonies of terror with which the doctrine of Evolution was regarded by many religious men twenty-five years ago, and the intense bitterness with which the theory and its advocates were denounced. An irenic era has supervened upon the period of conflict. Now and then, indeed, some theological Rip Van Winkle attempts the old Sinaitic thunders in denunciation of the essential atheism of Evolution; but his utterances are regarded by his brethren in the church, not with sympathy, but with amusement or mortification. The curriculum of an orthodox theological seminary is hardly regarded as complete today without a course of lectures on[7] the consistency of Evolution with theistic philosophy.

The revival of creationism in the nineteen-twenties and before, would evidently have surprised our great, great grandparents had they lived to see it, just as it surprised intellectuals at the time and just as its revival fifty years later has surprised many of us.[8] Our parallel then has some empirical support. For one hundred years, roughly since the mid-1880's to the present, reports of creationism's demise have been consistently exaggerated.[9] What is the basis for the persistent expectation that creationism is about to disappear? What explains the hardihood of an hypothesis whose repeated falsification has never led to its rejection, or even made it problematic for so many people?

We detect here the deep and solid foundations laid by the master architect, Auguste Comte. The issue is not what we may think about Comte's "laws" of historical progress, i.e. that humanity progresses from the age of "myth" to the age of "metaphysics" to the final "positive age" of science.[10] The apparent fact is that Comte's "laws" thematize our self-understanding. To be modern is not only to experience oneself as belonging to a distinct epoch but is to understand oneself as living near the apex of a lengthy historical process of emancipation.[11]

Two features are immediately discernible in the Comtean symbolism: eschatology and the denial of alterity, i.e. that the human person is related to others and to the whole and is not the ground of his or her own being.

The immunity of Comte's third law from empirical falsification should already indicate its extra-scientific character. We may make a specific test for eschatological content by borrowing a procedure from the honored tradition of village atheism. If one asks "And what comes after the 'age of science'?," one realizes one has rediscovered that rhetorically unbeatable rejoinder to popular arguments for final cause "And who created God?" The "age of science" is not a proposition about the world in the sense of Heraclitus' waking state where men share things in common. The "age of science," like "in the beginning God..." of popular theism, is a boundary symbol marking the point beyond which one is to ask no further questions. There is, however, at least one important difference in the two symbols which deserves our brief attention as it will be significant for our later analysis.

To see oneself as the end of a process, which had not prevision of the ends toward which it was working, is to see oneself alone and without peer in the cosmos. In Freudian terms, modernity describes the heaven of an unbounded narcissism.[12] The rhetorical significance of this fact lies in its implications for the management of motives and of the public symbols in which they are embodied. The symbols of modernity find their social ground in the demands of a consumerist economy for an endless proliferation of objects of desire.[13] The tendency of the narcissicist to see in things an endless reproduction of the self makes him or her not only an excellent customer, but the ideal modern who can at last look at the cosmos with a sense of relief knowing that aside from himself or herself and possibly some high tech friends across the milky way, there is nothing in it.[14] But what would be the consequence for a society accustomed to ever expanding horizons of plenty, if it should one day make an unwanted discovery: the limit. How would people adjust to the discomfiting new fact that if I have some gasoline, that means you will have less, or even that if I have one luxury item you will have to go without a necessity? It is hard to see how some symbols appropriate, indeed necessary, to an economy of desire could mediate the self-understanding of a culture whose very survival depended on breaking the auto-cathetic bond. Under the pressure of scarcity, a consumerist society might feel a terrible shock of ontological imbalance which would precipitate a crisis of personal and social order insoluble by any symbolism within the orbit of modernity.[15] As we shall subsequently examine, I believe our current economic and social situation may shed light on why, among other functionally analogous symbols, the anthropomorphic God of a pre-industrial age may find adherents in a post-industrial world.

Our analysis has completed its first goal. Our irritation at creationism is intelligible as the reflex of an outraged eschatology. That there should still be competitors contending for the same ground covered by the modern symbols invites our further attention to what exigence is bringing them forth. Why is Darwin's symbolism, a symbolism so phenomenally successful in the late nineteenth century, being popularly disputed now? The issue of rhetorical interest is not Darwin's scientific achievement, that is secure, and religious fundamentalism is powerless to reverse it. What I take to be of rhetorical interest in the current discussion is the evident widespread dissatisfaction with Darwinism as a set of public symbols adequate to emplot the drama of living. To understand the logic of the contemporary challenge we must first understand the conditions of the initial success. What is the "root metaphor" of The Origin of Species? What is the social knowledge it embodies and how did that knowledge initially facilitate Darwin's popular acceptance? Once we grasp The Origin's central image and the social knowledge it embodies, we should be able to read the date on the Darwinian epoch's historical lease.

II

The root metaphor of The Origin of Species is the domestic breeder. That the central image of the book is commonly thought to be the more picturesque "struggle for existence" only indicates how deeply the actual modification in social knowledge is concealed. The struggle for existence, while mentioned in Darwin's first chapter, does not receive center stage attention until the third. It is only when the breeder has faded into the nature which "daily and hourly scrutinizes" that the reader can forget his crucial function in preparing the way for the reader's recognition of the struggle for existence as the proximate cause of evolutionary change. Darwin's modification of social knowledge is simple in strategy but subtle in operation. It unfolds in three distinct stages in the first four chapters of *The Origin*, with the crucial turns centered in chapters one, three, and four. We will briefly examine each of these steps in sequence.

Chapter one turns on the question of where domestic flocks and herds originated. The question is disarming, because there never was any doubt about the answer. English flocks and herds were a source of national pride and everyone who knew anything about livestock respected the skill of the English breeder. Behind the explicit question Darwin develops, however, is an implicit question which unfolds enthymematically: if God makes animals the way man does, what is so mysterious about the origin of species? The center of rhetorical action in the first chapter of *The Origin* is Darwin's move to convince the reader that man himself has long exercised creative powers traditionally ascribed to God. Once the reader grants the almost unlimited power of the breeder to shape flocks and herds, the reader should be well prepared to follow Darwin in a small, but significant change in thought and language: "In this sense he may be said to make for himself useful breeds."[16] As the strategy of chapters three and four demonstrate, man's "making" provides the heuristic foundation for the reader's comprehension of nature's making.

The rhetorical task of chapter three is for the reader to project the breeder's power back into nature. Chapter three, "The Struggle for Existence" explains how population pressure, and the competition among and between life forms for limited means of subsistence, eventuate in some forms of life passing on their characteristics, and of other forms dwindling or actually becoming extinct. By the end of the chapter Darwin's reader should be in a position to do what at the beginning of the book he or she might have thought altogether beyond human power. The reader will have begun to internalize what Darwin has said about the breeder and to identify the breeder's activity with what he or she takes to be an analogous operation in nature.[17]

In Chapter four, we see the decisive restructuring of social knowledge brought about by *The Origin*. Here Darwin seeks to get the reader to affirm the essential identity between the operations of man on domestic animals and the operation of nature on wild ones. The covering symbol facilitating this central reorganization of social knowledge is "natural selection." As "natural selection" rests upon human selection as its heuristic base, the root metaphor of *The Origin of Species* is man. Darwin's rhetorical strategy at this historic juncture is strikingly similar to the procedure Ludwig Feuebanh claimed was distinctive of religious consciousness.[18] Indeed, on its face, if anyone ever projected a conception of himself onto some part of the cosmos and then read it back into himself in an alienated form, it was Darwin in Chapter four of *The Origin of Species*.

The crucial separation of powers from man and their projection onto a now anthropomorphized nature is accomplished in the lines just preceding Darwin's famous personification of nature as "scrutinizing." The lengthy paragraph begins with a simple rhetorical question, "As man can produce and certainly has produced a great result by his methodical and unconscious selection, what may not nature effect?" The paragraph may be superficially described as an unequal contest between the powers of man and the powers of nature.[19] The overawing of human powers by a power higher than man is reminiscent of the conclusion of job and of the stock-in-trade of pulpit oratory. The difference, though, is that in the paragraph there is no opposition between man and some process that is not like man. Darwin's "nature" as we have already seen is the breedur writ large. On straight Feuerbachian lines, one has to say that what looks like an act of obeisance is, in fact, an act of self-praise.

> How fleeting are the wishes and efforts of man! how short is time! and consequently how poor will his products be, compared with those accumulated by nature during whole geological periods. Can we wonder, then, that nature's productions should be far "truer" in character than man's productions: that they should be infinitely better adapted to the most complex conditions of life, and should plainly bear the stamp of far higher workmanship?[20]

The nature whose superiority is recognized here is exclusively defined by its ability to exercise on an unlimited scale the same selective procedures as those whose efficacy in the hands of the domestic breeder Darwin has already shown. The breeder's new status as quasi-deity is made explicit in the sentence which immediately follows.

> It may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout the world, every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good; silently and insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic being in relation to the organic conditions of life.[21]

The recurrent critique in the nineteenth-century religious press that Darwin deified nature is beside the point. The God in Darwin's "Nature" is no one other than man himself. Marx seems to have had no trouble grasping the point and neither did Andrew Carnegie.[22]

If Darwin's crucial change in conventional social knowledge consisted in a transfer of power from God to man via the mediation of the domestic breeder, what happened to the tradition of natural theology in the wake of Darwin's success? As will presently become clear, if it is not already, it is important for us to understand in what sense natural theology disappeared if we are to understand why creationism is re-emerging.

In his *The Return To Cosmology*, Toulmin captures the fate of natural theology after Darwin in a humorous illustration. Toulmin compares the fate of natural theology to the fate of a bureaucrat in a large industry who leaves his seemingly well established "department of coordination" for a two week vacation. On his return he discovers his department has been abolished and no one even remembers who he was.[23] Toulmin's illustration gives us a clear picture of the change in viewpoint which led to the demise of natural theology within professional science. But, as Toulmin's analysis of the myths of science indicate, natural theology did not cease to exist when it no longer had an accepted place within professional science. As Toulmin points out, the scientist, as human being, is unavoidably involved with the problems of meaning and of finding adequate symbols for the reaffirmation of meaning as is anyone else. The many examples of scientific myths which Toulmin so expertly dissects, suggest a sequel to his illustration. Apparently after losing his old job, our former bureaucrat opened a consulting firm across the street. Indeed, as so often happens in the odd twists and turns of the modern consulting business. his former employers became his steadiest clients.

Toulmin's analysis of the fate of natural theology after *The Origin* contributes directly to our goal of understanding the roots of contemporary creationism for it clarifies how startlingly superficial was the change in social knowledge which occurred in Darwin's wake. To be sure, there is no question about *The Origin's* epochal status within science since the lines of research it opened clearly distinguish the epochal after from the before. But from the standpoint of *The Origin's* impact on culture, the aspect of Darwin's achievement of greatest concern to rhetorical analysis, what was epochal about *The Origin*, is not at all clear. Professor Toulmin's analysis of the various post Darwinian myths seems nothing short of devastating to the conventional assumption that as a cultural event Darwinism marked a before and after of self-understanding comparable in depth to the Greek experience of the before and after of philosophy. Indeed, from the standpoint of its impact on culture, the advent of *The Origin* seems to have marked little more than a change in style from one form of anthropomorphic myth-making to another. Nor are we merely focusing on late nineteenth-century Social Darwinism, though to be sure Social Darwinism is a good example of how an advance in science can mark a derailment in a culture's self-understanding.[24] If anyone should have been able to distinguish what was epochal in Darwinism from what was merely popular misunderstanding, it was the late eminent biologist, Sir Julian Huxley. Yet in his critique of Julian Huxley's endeavor to found an ethics on evolution, Toulmin can find nothing more or nothing less profound than the motive which led the pre-philosophic Greeks to devise the myth of Atlas.

> The next time you feel the fear that morality may after all not prove a paying proposition, you can at least (on this view) comfort yourself with the thought that such an ancient institution as the cosmic process is not likely to default.
>
> An anxious fear that the Earth itself may be insecure: that is what gives the Atlas myth its strength. .... Again, the desire that morality should unquestionably be worthwhile, that the importance to us of our own affairs should find a reflection through all the history of the universe: is it fanciful to see this as the motive behind the Myths of Evolution?[25]

Toulmin's comments on Huxley are especially informative for our investigation of the reasons for creationism's popular revival. If even the guardians of a scientifically informed culture are capable of retelling ancient tales and for the original reasons, there is no reason why, with equal justice, ordinary people might not do the same. Indeed, there is no reason why they should not use Genesis as their basis. Considered from the standpoint of social knowledge, and in light of contemporary creationism's popular appeal, Darwinism's persuasive power appears to be at least partially tied to its late nineteenth-century milieu. Given a period in history such as our own, when man seems problematic as a symbol of the world's creative ground, all the old theological problems, for so long set aside from public concern, once again re-emerge. Whether we instance Tennyson's lucid doubt in the waning days of the old natural theology, "Are God and nature then at strife....," or contemporary creationism's insistence that there never was a conflict, or Julian Huxley's none too carefully examined faith in his *Religion Without Revelation*, we find ourselves returning to the same pre-Darwinian point: the classic theological and rhetorical problem of finding persuasive symbols adequate to connect the rim of private experience to the hub of being's wheel. The ambiguous and hopeful conclusion of Toulmin's book is that the core problems of the old natural theology may now be addressed in a "post-modern" epoch.[26]

III

But why, above the gentle bleep of our digital watches should the creationist cock herald the Post-Modern morning? In his review essay in a recent number of *New York Review of Books*, R.C. Lewontin explains creationism as a delayed reflex stimulated by Sputnik.

> The national Science Foundation supported scores of professors from eastern establishment universities to rewrite the biology textbooks to bring them up-to-date, and then saw to it that the school curricula were everywhere revised. Suddenly, the intellectual culture of the well-to-do had invaded the homes of ordinary folk in Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas, and of the descendants of Okies and Arkies in California. In response, the forces of Christian fundamentalism began to assemble, to prepare the campaign that has only reached full force in the last few years.[27]

On its face there is something important in what Lewontin says. Every symbolism will have some particular group which especially supports it. My own liberal eagerness to accept Lewontin's account as complete, however, affords a moment of hesitation. What view of argument and time is implied by this line of thought? Are we not allowing ourselves to entertain a normative expectation that once the sponsoring group has been integrated into society's mainstream that creationism will no longer disturb us? Just beneath the surface of Lewontin's observation is the expectation we noted at the outset of this essay that at some not far distant point culture will have reached the stage where "mythical" and "metaphysical" accounts will lose their appeal. I posed then and repeat now the question "Is this in fact a trustworthy assumption?"

In the earlier analysis we examined the empirical/disappointments that have dogged this dauntless assumption. In the present instance, then, let us take a different approach and look to the future. If, for instance, one took one's science fiction from Arthur Clarke rather than Auguste Comte, would it be reasonable to assume that under different sociological conditions there would be no more creationism to contest with scientism what symbols should emplot the drama of living? Clarke's Rendevous With Rama is placed in a future sufficiently removed from our present for the ripples of "southern and southwestern populism" to have ceased to trouble the surface of cultural memory. A space crew is dispatched to intercept an object, forty kilometers in width, which is hurtling toward the earth. The object, it turns out, is built by extraterrestrial intelligence. It also turns out that one of the highly skilled members of the elite crew is a member of a sect derisively called "Cosmos Christers." The crew member accepts as dogma that Jesus was a space visitor. His commander regards him as many of us regard the more articulate among the creationists. The commander "could never understand how men with advanced scientific and technical training could possibly believe some of the things he had heard Cosmo Christers state as incontrovertible fact."[28] What this illustration suggests is that creationism is compatible with a variety of different sociological, educational, and technological foundations. Indeed, without going into the future or into outer space, we can find support for this point here and now. To use a local example that is increasingly becoming less local, Mormons are dogmatically creationist, are generally more educated than the general population, and while southwestern, are not transplanted southerners, nor heirs to the political legacy of populism and they are rapidly becoming less rural. The difficulty with Lewontin's analysis is not that he points out that creationism draws heavily from a particular sociological base, but that he makes it too exclusively a function of that base. As his accompanying citation from Marx serves to confirm, his analysis is meant to reassure the reader that creationism is temporary, aberrant, and in the long run, must disappear. A more radical and potentially more adequate account would forswear sociological reductionism for insight into the deeper historical and social conditions which at one time favor a particular style of symbolism and at another presage its demise. If one were to assume the integrity of what Fisher calls "narrative rationality" potentially one might offer an account which at least did not prejudice history's outcome.[29]

The following analysis will attempt to build upon our preceding investigation into the cultural roots of Darwin's popular success by grounding itself in the following assumptions. First, since our preceding investigation has shown that there is no innate superiority in accepting a symbolism for the drama of living that is taken from science than one taken from traditional sources, i.e. the Atlas myth, we will assume that creationism is enjoying popular success for the same kinds of reason that made Darwin popularly successful in the late nineteenth century. In short, even if one grants there may be among creationists a disproportionate number of "Okies and Arkies," there must be some larger reason why they are not, in a highly mobile society, being assimilated into the mainstream and are resisting acculturation. Second, the social forces that are currently pressuring creationism are probably also pressuring other and seemingly unrelated contemporary symbols. By way of analogy one could say that the eruption of Mt. St. Helens in Southern Washington and the recurrent earthquakes in Southern California are regional events. This, while in one sense correct, is to ignore the San Andreas fault which connects them both.

Creationism, on its face, is such an unlikely symbolism for a post industrial society to produce on any wide scale that one is unsure of just where to begin to identify the root of its congruity with its larger historical and cultural scene. Since we are committed to a radical analysis we may as well begin by taking our analysis back as far as we can. Whether we look at Jewish, Christian, or Mohammedan models, monotheism is born nowhere but in deserts. It would be interesting to know what peculiar historical and social conditions favor the introduction and spread of this relentlessly exclusivist and other worldly symbolism. In the larger essay based on my previous paper I refer to Ethical Monotheism as a differentiation of consciousness and consider it as the first symbolism to break the mold of "the cosmological epoch." For our present purposes let us set aside Ethical Monotheism as a "leap in being" and confine our attention to the imminent social conditions of its occurence.[30] Without prejudice to these other claims, which belong properly to another level of analysis, could it also be true, considered strictly from an immanent standpoint, that Ethical Monotheism is a concrete response to a recurrent social problem?

A hint as to what this larger problem might be is provided by George Foster in his 1972 essay "The Anatomy of Envy"[31]. The editor of the journal in which it appears thought sufficiently highly of the essay to submit it to fifty scholars many of whose responses were published along with it.[32] Foster observed that neither anthropology nor any social science had a category for or a literature on the subject of "envy."[33] Foster's essay then, marks a pioneering attempt to define the basic terms for a literature on a topic, no less significant for modern as for ancient man, and no less common to urban, as to rural, cultures.

One of Foster's distinctions is particularly significant for our present theme. Foster noted that the management of envy was a problem for what he termed "economies of scarcity." It was not a problem for "economics of plenty." According to Foster, and here "common sense" would go along with science, as long as there is enough, or more than enough for subsistence and beyond, the management of envy is not pressing, for if one wants more, one can get more. Envy, understandably, becomes a problem in those economies in which life is presented as a "zero sum game."[34] That is, if you have some that means absolutely that I will have that much less. No small amount of the general interest of Foster's article lies in the various verbal strategies he found by which people who were well off tried to conceal the fact, or deflect attention from it.[35]

But what does Foster's analysis have to do with Ethical Monotheism, let alone creationism in a post-industrial world? Potentially it may illuminate a current and largely overlooked problem of a very troubled consumer-oriented economy, that is, the management of envy, and how this problem gives rise to the problem we have been examining throughout this essay, i.e. the problem of an adequate symbolism for the drama of living.

Let us expand our analysis for a moment by drawing a link between the problem of envy and the notorious Hebraic, what shall I say..."fear" of representation. Indeed, to expand our analysis even further, there is at least a curious symmetry between the Jewish fear of graven images (a fear continued by Islam) and Plato's resolve to banish the poets.[36] Why is it that the structurally analogous symbols of Monotheism and Greek metaphysics should be united in their hostility to all mimesis but that particular imitation by which man bodies forth in his living the divine will?[37] Indeed, isn't the symmetry curious between the way St. Paul continually harps on the significance of poverty of the spirit and contempt for worldly goods and the way Socrates continually astounds his commonsense opponents when he refuses to consider anyone happy until he knows the state of the individual's soul?[38] What is the connection between poverty, Monotheism, metaphysics, and hostility to representation?

A suggestive elucidation to the social logic behind the Jewish and even Platonistic antipathy to representation was brought to my attention by my colleague in the Department of Romance Languages, Professor Douglas Collins. In a brief note, Freud makes some remarks on a personality type whom he calls "the indifferent woman." Freud observed there was a type of woman who passes one by without acknowledging one's nod of greeting. The studied attractiveness of the woman belies her indifference, yet her refusal to acknowledge the attention she evokes says something else. She is, in effect, a self-contained object.[39] Freud's analysis in essence repeats in modern terms an ancient text of his ancestors: "They have mouths, but they speak not: eyes have they but they see not...They that make them are like unto them, so is everyone that trusteth in them."[40] In his paper "The Found Object" Professor Collins renames Freud's "indifferent woman" the "coquette" and supplies a related example from the contemporary French psychiatrist Jacques Lacan. In his college days Lacan was aboard a fishing boat for recreation and adventure. One of the crew was not entirely at ease in the presence of Lacan who, in comparison to himself, could anticipate a life of relative leisure. The fisherman pointed to a can bobbing on the water and said to his passenger, "You see that? It doesn't see you!" Lacan reported that the fisherman found the event immensely amusing, yet he himself found the incident vaguely disturbing.[41]

What kind of society could not only tolerate, but depend upon the production of coquettes and what kind of society would be prepared to practice on an unprecedentedly mammoth scale the ontological humiliation manifest in "the terrible tin can of Jacques Lacan?"[42] If the answer is in doubt, turn on your television. Open Time magazine. Look at a billboard. Touch the velvet, or wish you could.

What would be the consequences to the world we know, the world of suburban shopping malls, new automobiles incessantly hawked in ever slicker advertisements, video games and home computers, if long gasoline lines were once again a fact of life? I suspect we would then have more of what, with an unemployment rate absolutely higher than at the height of the Great Depression, we now have a great deal of. The symbols of possibility with which we had been raised, indeed, in which and through which we had come to self-understanding, would now be as ludicrously out of sync with our lives as was true of our ancient counterparts in Babylon, Egypt, and China who had performed all the appropriate cosmological rites and found their crops died of drought and their homes were ravaged by bandits all the same.[43] The

ancient realization just might dawn upon us that what we too had most taken for granted, was actually not the sure thing we had thought. We would find ourselves positioned on history's familiar fault line where another set of gigantic public certainties crumbled under the relentless shift of a million private refusals to believe in them. As I have attempted to show in my previous analysis, and without any eschatological program as to the necessity of such realizations (and in an economy of plenty all bets are off), I have noted it sometimes happens in such socio-economic circumstances that quite ordinary people undergo a change in self-understanding. Here then we find the shifting margin of social reality on which Moses' Yaweh and the philosopher's summum bonum must trade for credit. A radical response to the problem of envy is to find a source of group cathexis outside the system, an object which delivers its goods, i.e. which rewards its faithful with immunity from the endlessly centripetal lust of representation. Again to borrow from my colleague Professor Collins, the answer to the "richly corrupt pleasure of the phenomenologist" is the austere "horror of the metaphysician."[44] Indeed, one may discern behind Reagan's "Stay the course" an even deeper echo of the one correct route. How many iconically impoverished fundamentalist homes and churches are adorned with the single picture of the vigilant young man at the ship's helm guided by the shadowy figure of Jesus?

In addition to the problem of the management of envy in a troubled capitalist economy there is another historical circumstance pressuring the emergency of contemporary creationism. I mean the hourly threat of nuclear annihilation. One of the most attractive features of the Darwinian myth, indeed, the one which rang truest in its historical setting, was its cosmic guarantee of a happy ending. In the final two sentences of the second to the last paragraph of The Origin we read "Hence we may look with some confidence to a secure future of great length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress toward perfection."[45] When I first read Foucault's The Order of Things, I did not understand what he meant when he said "As the archaeology of our thought clearly shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end."[46] I now consider those two sentences may presage, if not provide, the decisive metaphor of our epoch. Whatever Foucault may have meant by them exactly, in light of our common legacy from Darwin, their public meaning is all too apparent. As a social monument, The Origin of Species is built on the foundation of Tennyson's doubt, and as many mid-century religious thinkers feared and Darwin celebrated, in the Victorian age it was God, not man who was problematic. As the humblest citizen of any country contemplates the various species of technological animals whose no longer hairy fingers are poised above the buttons which will ring the bell of the last annunciation, it is only too obvious that the line of meaning in history runs where it will and not where we had thought.

IV

Astride the great fissure stretching from W.W. I to our present and which widens, closes, and widens again and again, hang the suspended wrecks of many Victorian and indeed some modern mansions. The Idea of Progress, Marxism, Darwinism, and even the more recent Structuralism all seem to be having the same structural problem, the relentless erosion seems endless. It does not seem any stretch of interpretation to see in the contemporary environmental movement's insistence on the inviolability of nature anything but a different response to the same tensions which pressured Karl Barth, in the aftermath of W.W. I, to rediscover the Wholly Other of Calvin's God, or which pressure Professor Toulmin's call for a revised, chastened and "secular" natural theology.[47] The problem of our time is the problem of reference. Creationism may not have the theological merits of these other symbols, but there can be little doubt it belongs to the same historical set.

While the recent spate of self-help books for beleaguered Darwinians are well meant and within their own sphere useful, the reasons for creationism's emergence seem to lie deeper than misinformation, regionalism, or even mere prejudice. The root of the creationist symbolism is not an argument, but an eruption of the universal tension of life against death. It is proximally pressured, as I believe the preceding analysis provides grounds for affirming, by two specific and interrelated forces: 1) the social management of envy and 2) the eschatological urgency of life against the shadow of the bomb. At the risk of making too explicit the meanings of history's dark but ever playful oracle, this latter point appears to be Time's way of saying that considered either as an analysis of the ground of being or yet as a symbolism in which someone might play out the drama of living, Darwinism seems to have left something out of the account. Indeed, beneath the simplistic fundamentalist alternative "God or the Gorilla?," one can perhaps tease out what this something might be. "Man is a subject and not a substance." This proposition is not, in so many words, the proposition creationists would be prepared to debate. Still, it does seem to be the existential issue at the heart of their polemics.

To respond to the question I posed at the outset of this essay, Creationism is no exception to the experience of epoch or to the rhetorical dynamic which removes social assent from seemingly permanent symbols, pressures the eruption of new ones, and then erodes and destroys the new ones in turn. Once we finally retire our debts to Comte, there is nothing particularly remarkable about one generation seeing the demise of one style of symbolism and three or four generations later for another symbolism in some ways strikingly like the first to break the surface of consciousness. Indeed, if as Professor Toulmin has so patiently explained, even contemporary science is finding its way back to the questions posed by the earlier tradition of natural theology, the emergence of popular creationism, while distressing, is hardly surprising. Though creationism is intellectually vacant, it is not for that reason any the less in history's vanguard. Only in science is creationism the argument time forgot. As a social symbolism it is one of the most glaring symptoms of the times we are in.

FOOTNOTES

[1] John Angus Campbell, "Historical Reason: Field As Consciousness," Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association,1981), p. 102. ____________, "On The Rhetoric of History: Epochal Discourse and Discovery of The Universal Audience," Unpublished essay.

[2] Robert M. O'Neil, "Creationism, Curriculum, and the Constitution," Academe, (March-April 1982), pp.21-26. William R. Overton, "Rev. Bill McLean vs. Arkansas Board of Education," Academe, (March-April 1982), pp. 27-36. For a discussion of other education related issues concerning creationism see other essays in the same edition.

[3] Philip Kitcher, Abusing Science: The Case Against Creationism, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,1982). Norman D. Newell, Creation and Evolution: Myth or Reality?, (New York: Columbia University Press,1982). Douglas J. Futuyama, (New York: Pantheon,1983). Laurie R. Godfrey, ed., Scientists Confront Creationism, (New York: Norton,1983). Niles Eldredge, The Monkey Business: A Scientist Looks At Creationism, (New York: Washington Square Press,1982). Davis A. Young, Christianity and the Age of the Earth, (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1982). Michael Ruse, Darwinism Defended: A Guide to the Evolution Controversies, (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley,1982). For creationist views see: T. Barnes, Origin and Destiny of the Earth's Magnetic Field, (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers,1973). 21 Scientists Who Believe in Creation, (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers: 1977). D.T. Gish, Evolution? The Fossils Say No!, (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers, 1979). H. Hiebert, Evolution: Its Collapse in View?, (Alberta: Horizon Books,1979). J. Moore, Should Evolution Be Taught?, (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers,1974). H.M. Morris, Scientific Creationism, (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers,1974), H.M. Morris, The Troubled Waters of Evolution (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers,1974). J. Whitcomb & H.M. Morris, The Genesis Flood, (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker,1961). A.E. Wilder-Smith, The Creation of Life, (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers,1970). A.E. Wilder-Smith, The Natural Sciences Know Nothing of Evolution, (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers,1981). Did Man Get Here By Evolution Or By Creation?, (New York: Watchtower Bible & Tract Society, Inc.,1967).

[4] For example, Catherine A. Callaghan, "Evolution and Creationist Arguments," The American Biology Teacher, 42, No. 7 (October,1980), pp.422-427. Sidney W. Fox, "From Inanimate Matter to Living Systems " The American Biology Teacher, 43 No. 3 (March 1981), pp.127-135., David H. Milne, "How to Debate With Creationists—and 'Win'" The American Biology Teacher, 43 No. 5 (May 1981), pp.235-245. Preston Cloud, "Scientific Creationism: A New Inquisition?" The Humanist (January-February 1977), pp.6-15. See also the special issue of Commonweal, "Creationism," (October 22,1982).

[5] E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & CO., Inc.,1954), p.17. Burtt's book was first published in 1924.

[6] Edmund Husserl, "The Thesis of the Natural Standpoint and Its Suspension," in Joseph Kockelmans, Ed., *Phenomenology*, (Garden City, NY: 1969), pp.76-79.

[7] William North Rice, "Twenty-five Years of Scientific Progress," *Bibliotheca Sacra*, L (December,1891), p.27.

[8] On the Scopes trail & the intellectual milieu surrounding it, see, Ray Ginger, *Six Days or Forever* (Boston: Beacon Press,1959). Also for how little historical reason there is for such surprise, Max Lerner, *America As A Civilization,* (New York: Simon & Schuster,1957), pp.706-708.

[9] That the mid-1880's marks the point when main-line American Protestantism began to accept some form of evolutionism finds support in: John Angus Campbell, *A Rhetorical Analysis of "The Origin of Species" And of American Christianity's Response To Darwinism*, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh,1968, pp.330-338. That the whole debate was passe in intellectual Protestant circles by 1890 see esp. p.335. That one significant reason for creationism's persistence is cultural lag has long been recognized. See, for instance, R.J. Wilson, Ed., *Darwinism And The American Intellectual*, (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press,1967), "The atmosphere which bred the anti-evolution laws of the 1920's and the Scopes trial in Dayton was not a problem for [James] Woodrow and men like him in the 1880's, for the simple reason that most laymen had not even heard enough about Darwinism to feel threatened by it." p.42.

[10] Auguste Comte, *Cours De Philosophie Positive*, 4 (Paris: Bachelier, Imprimeur Libraire,1839), pp.653-736.

[11] For a discussion of the general issue see Eric Voegelin, *From Enlightenment To Revolution*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,1975). On Comte in particular see pp.136-159. A distinct, but markedly parallel analysis may be found in James H. Billington, *Fire In The Minds of Men*, (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,1980), pp.1-14.

[12] Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, II, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959) p.305, Vol.III, pp.337.

[13] Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Can Capitalism Survive?* (New York: Harper & Row,1978), pp.61-70. Lawrence R. Klein, *The Keynesian Revolution* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1954), pp.165-187.

[14] Walker Percy, *Lost in The Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book*, (New York: Farrar,Strause & Giroux,1983), pp.5-13.

[15] Schumpeter, pp.61-70, Klein, pp.165-187.

[16] Charles Darwin, *On The Origin of Species: A Facsimilie of the First Edition*, (New York: Atheneum,1967), p.30.

[17] Ibid,esp. pp.77-79.

[18] Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, (New York: Haper Tourchbooks,1957), pp.12-32, 197-203, 270-278.

[19] Darwin, pp.83,84.

[20] Ibid., p.84.

[21] Ibid.,

[22] For Marx's response see, Gertrude Himmelfarb, *Darwin And The Darwinian Revolution*, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1962), p.421. On Andrew Carnegie, see, Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought*,(Boston: Beacon Press,1968), pp.45,46.

[23] Stephen Toulmin, *The Return To Cosmology: Postmodern Science and the Theology of Nature*, (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), pp.234-235.

[24] Hofstadter's account of Social Darwinism would seem to fall easily within the range of science-based myths discussed by Toulmin, pp.21-85.

[25] Toulmin, p.70.

[26] Ibid., pp.217-274.

[27] R.C. Lewontin, "Darwin's Real Revolution," *New York Review of Books*, XX, No.10 (June 16,1983), p.22.

[28] Arthur C. Clarke, *Rendezvous With Rama*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace Janovich, Inc.,1973), p.7,76.

[29] Walter R. Fisher, "Narration as a Rhetorical Paradigm: The Case of The Nuclear Controversy," Unpublished paper, Third Summer Conference on Argumentation, pp.10-21. As my use of the narrative principle in this essay indicates, I find Professor Fisher's concept heuristically rich. My own view of the relation of narrative rationality to rationality per se is identical to Lonergan's distinction between the dramatic and the intellectual patterns of experience. See Bernard J.F. Lonerzan, *Insight* (New York: Harper & Row,1958), pp.181-191.

[30] Campbell, "On The Rhetoric of History," p.29.

[31] George Foster, "The Anatomy of Envy: A Study in Symbolic Behavior," Current Anthropology, 13 No.2 (April 1972), pp.165-188.

[32] Ibid, pp.187-202.

[33] Ibid., pp.165.

[34] Ibid., pp.167-168.

[35] Ibid, pp.175-182.

[36] Exodus 20:3-4., Republic Book 10: 595 a-608 b.

[37] For the relation of Israelite Monotheism to philosophy, see Eric Voegelin, Order And History, I Israel And Revelation, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,1956), pp.240-241, also 6,13,439. Eric Voegelin, Order And History, II The World of The Polis, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,1957), pp.24. On the philospher's psyche as an embodiment of transcendent order see Eric Voegelin, Order And History, III Plato And Aristotle (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,1957), pp.13,14,18-23,36, 39-45, 133,134.

[38] II Timothy 6:17, Gorgias,493 a—494 a.

[39] Douglas Collins, "The Found Object."

[40] Psalm 115:5-8

[41] Collins, p. 30

[42] Ibid, p. 31

[43] On the inherently anti-metaphysical stance of capitalism see Joseph A. Schumpeter, Can Capitalism Survive? (New York: Harper & Row,1978), "The capitalist process rationalizes behavior and ideas and by so doing chases from our minds, along with metaphysical belief, mystic and romantic ideas of all sorts. Thus it reshapes not only our methods of attaining our ends but also these ultimate ends themselves. 'Free thinking' in the sense of materialistic monism, laicism and pragmatic acceptance of the world this side of the grave follow from this not indeed by logical necessity but nevertheless very naturally." p.67. The difference between my view and Schumpeter's at this stage in the analysis is one of emphasis. In my view, if one approaches history with an awareness of historical epochs, each with a style of self-understanding distinct to itself, "rationalism" while widespread in our time, will reveal itself to be not very deeply rooted. Change the social and economic conditions and what one would expect to find, on the basis of a rhetoric of history model, is that people would rediscover other modes of self-understanding. There is then, nothing necessarily final about "rationalism." I would only add that my economic and social arguments concern only the conditions favoring or opposing a symbol's popular success. I am not saying philosophy or theology is merely a reflection of material conditions.

[44] Collins, p.37

[45] The Origin. For the sake of clarity I am using the wording of the fifth edition of The Origin, rather than that of the first. See Morse Peckham, Ed. The Origin of Species by Charles Darwin: A Variorum Text (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,1959) p.758.

[46] Foucault, p.387.

[47] For the theology of environmentalism see, for example Ian McHarg, Design With Nature (Garden City, NY: Natural History Press,1969), p.27, 68,76,197. On Karl Barth see Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,1964),pp.3-37., Toulmin, pp.272-274 The manifest differences in the content of these symbols should not conceal the underlying similarity that each has as its focus a point of reference that is not human, but that stands over against humanity.

PUBLIC MORAL ARGUMENT: THE NUCLEAR CONTROVERSY

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Unbeknownst to me when I wrote "Toward a Logic of Good Reasons," I was moving toward an alternative paradigm for human communication.[1] Indications of it are found in the assumption that "*Humans as rhetorical beings are as much valuing as they are reasoning animals*"[2] and in the conception of good reasons as "*those elements that provide warrants for accepting or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of communication that can be considered rhetorical*."[3] Its nature became clearer as a result of an exploration of argument in drama and literature.[4] And it became explicit after investigating the character of public moral argument and the reading of Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, where he makes the observation that "man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal."[5] Given this view, "enacted dramatic narrative"[6] is the "basic and essential genre for the characterization of human actions."[7]

Consistent with the orientation of Wayne Brockriede's "Arguing about Human Understanding," I shall not maintain that the narrative paradigm is the only legitimate, useful way to appreciate human communication.[8] This is obviously not the case. As already indicated, I will propose the narrative paradigm as an alternative. I do not even claim that it is entirely "new." W. Lance Bennett has published a book and two essays that directly bear on the present enterprise, one concerning political communication and one on legal communication.[9] Except for these studies, I know of no other attempt to posit narration as a paradigm. There is, of course, a tradition in rhetorical theory that focuses attention on narration as an element in discourse and as a genre in and of itself.

If I can establish that narration deserves to be accepted as a paradigm, it will vie with the reigning paradigm, which I will refer to as the rational world paradigm. In truth, however, the narrative paradigm, like other paradigms in the human sciences, does not so much deny what has gone before as it subsumes it. The rational world paradigm will be seen as one way to tell the story of how persons reason together in certain settings.

I shall begin by characterizing and contrasting the two paradigims. I shall then examine the controversy over nuclear warfare, a public moral argument, noting particular problems with the rational world paradigm and indicating how the narrative paradigm provides a way of possibly resolving them. Following this discussion, I shall reconsider the narrative paradigm and conclude with several implications for further inquiry.

The Rational World Paradigm

This paradigm is very familiar, having been in existence since Aristotle's *Organon* became foundational to Western thought. Regardless of its historic forms, the rational world paradigm presupposes that (1) humans are essentially rational beings; (2) the paradigmatic mode of human decision-making and communication is argument--clearcut inferential (implicative) structures; (3) the conduct of argument is ruled by the dictates of situations--legal, scientific, legislative, public, and so on; (4) rationality is determined by subject matter knowledge, argumentative ability, and skill in employing the rules of advocacy in given fields; and (5) the world is a set of logical puzzles which can be resolved through appropriate analysis and application of reason. In short, argument as product and process is *the* means of being human, the agency of all that humans can know and realize in achieving their telos. The philosophical ground of the rational world paradigm is epistemology. Its linguistic materials are self-evident propositions, demonstrations, and proofs, the verbal expressions of certain and probable knowing.

Actualization of the rational world paradigm, it should be noted, depends on a form of society that permits, if not requires, participation of qualified persons in public decision-making. It further demands a citizenry that shares a common language, general adherence to the values of the state, information relevant to the questions that confront the community to be arbitrated by argument, and an understanding of argumentative issues and the various forms of reasoning and their appropriate assessment. In other words, there must exist something that can be called public or social knowledge and there must be a "public" for argument to be the kind of force envisioned for it.[10] Because the rational world paradigm has these requirements and because *being rational must be learned*, an historic mission of education in the West has been to generate a consciousness of national community and to instruct citizens in at least the rudiments of logic and rhetoric.[11]

Needless to say, the rational world paradigm, which is by and large a heritage of the classical period, has not been untouched by "modernism." The impact of moderism has been recounted and reacted to by many writers.[12] The line of thought which has done most to subvert the rational world paradigm is, along with existentialism, "naturalism." One of its schools starts with physics and mathematics and makes the logical structure of scientific knowledge fundamental; the other school, involving biology, psychology, and the social sciences, adapts this structure and conception of knowledge to the human sciences. According to John Herman Randall, Jr.:

> The major practical issue still left between the two types of naturalism concerns the treatment of values. The philosophies starting from physics tend to exclude questions of value from the field of science and the scope of scientific method. They either leave them to traditional non-scientific treatment, handing them over, with Russell, to the poet and mystic; or else with the logical empiricists they dismiss the whole matter as 'meaningless,' maintaining with Ayer, that any judgment of value is an expression of mere personal feeling. The philosophies of human experience--all the heirs of Hegel, from dialectical materialism to Dewey--subject them to the same scientific methods of criticism and testing as other beliefs; and thus offer the hope of using all we have learned of scientific procedure to erect at last a science of values comparable to the science that was the glory of Greek thought.[13]

It is clear: with the first type of naturalism, there can be neither public or social knowledge nor rational public or social argument, for both are permeated by values. As Habermas notes: "the relationship of theory to practice can now only assert itself as the purposive rational application of techniques assured by empirical science."[14]

With the second type of naturalism, one can hope with Randall that it produces the work he sees possible in it. But the fact is that no science of values has appeared or seems likely to do so; further, Dewey himself noted the eclipse of the "public" and doubted its reemergence.[15] His hope was the development of "communities." Interestingly, fifty-five years later, MacIntyre concludes After Virtue with the observation: "What matters at this state is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained...."[16]

The effects of "naturalism" have been to restrict the rational world paradigm to specialized studies and to relegate everyday argument to an irrational exercise. The reaction to this state of affairs has been a historic effort to recover the rational world paradigm for human decision-making and communication by (1) reconstituting the conception of knowledge;[17] (2) reconceptualizing the public--in terms of rational enterprises, fields, and/or communities;[18] (3) formulating a logic

appropriate for practical reasoning;[19] and (4) reconceiving the conceptions of validity, reason, and rationality.[20] And there have been numerous proposals to reconstruct the concept of argument itself.[21]

The motive underlying these various studies, and the movement of which they are an energizing force, is, as I have suggested, to repair the rational world paradigm so that it once again will serve everyday argument. One may well applaud the motive and the movement and yet ask: has the reformation been successful? is there a more beneficial way to conceive and to articulate the structures of everyday argument? It is too early to answer the first question with finality but one cannot deny that much useful work has been done, especially in establishing at least the semblance of rationality for fields of argument. I shall maintain, however, that similar progress has not been made in the arena where argument is most general and is most obviously concerned with values: public moral argument, as the examination of the nuclear controversy will show later.

This failure suggests to me that the problem in restoring rationality to everyday argument may be the assumption that the reaffirmation of the rational world paradigm is the only solution. The position I am taking is that another paradigm, the narrative paradigm, may offer a better solution, one that will provide substance not only for public moral argument, but also all other forms of non-technical argument, for human communication in general. My answer to the second question, then, is: "Yes, I think so." Adoption of the narrative paradigm, I hasten to repeat, does not mean rejection of all the good work that has been done; it means a rethinking of it and investigating new moves that can be made to enrich our understanding of communicative interaction.[22]

The Narrative Paradigm

Many different root metaphors have been put forth to represent the essential nature of human beings: homo faber, homo economous, homo politicus, homo sociologicus, "psychological man," ecclesiastical "man," homo sapiens, and, of course, "rational man." I now propose "homo narrans" to be added to the list.

Preliminary to an attempt to delineate the presuppositions that structure the narrative paradigm, I should indicate how the "homo narrans" metaphor relates to those that have preceded it. First, each of the root metaphors may be held to be the master metaphor, thereby standing as the ground, while the others are manifest as figures. In the terminology of the narrative perspective, the master metaphor sets the plot of human experience and the others the subplots. When any of the other metaphors are asserted as the master metaphor, narration is as it is considered now: a type of human interaction--an activity, an art, a genre, or mode of expression.

Second, when narration is taken as the master metaphor, it subsumes the others. The other metaphors are then considered conceptions that inform various ways of *recounting* or *accounting for* human choice and action. Recounting takes the forms of history, biography, or autobiography. Accounting for takes the forms of theoretical explanation or argument. Recounting and accounting for can be also expressed in poetic forms: drama, poetry, novel, and so on. Recounting and accounting for are, in addition, the bases for all advisory discourse. Regardless of the form they may assume, recounting and accounting for are stories we tell ourselves and each other to establish a meaningful life-world. The character of the narrator(s), the conflicts, the resolutions, and the style will vary, but each mode of recounting and accounting for is but a way of relating a "truth" about the human condition.

Third, the "homo narrans" metaphor is an incorporation and extension of Burke's definition of "man" as the "symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal...."[23] The idea of human beings as storytellers indicates the generic form of all symbol composition; it holds that symbols are created and communicated ultimately as stories meant to give order to human experience and to induce others to dwell-in them to establish ways of living in common, in communities in which there is sanction for the story that constitutes one's life. And one's life is, as suggested by Burke, a story that participates in the stories of those who have lived, who live now, and who will live in the future. He asks: "Where does the drama get its materials?" I would modify the question to read: "Where do our narratives get their material?" And, I would accept his answer:

> From the 'unending conversation' that is going on in history when we are born. Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others have long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion,a discussion too heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, the discussion had already begun long before any of them got there, so that no one present is qualified to retrace for you all the steps that had gone before. You listen for awhile, until you decide that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; another comes to your defense; another aligns himself against you, to either the embarrassment or gratification of your opponent, depending upon the quality of your ally's assistance. However, the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you must depart. And you do depart, with the discussion still vigorously in progress.[24]

As Heidegger observes: "We are a conversation....Conversation and its unity support our existence."[25]

The presuppositions that structure the narrative paradigm should now be clear: (1) humans are essentially storytellers; (2) the paradigmatic mode of human decision-making and communication is "good reasons" which vary in form among communication situations, genres, and media; (3) the production and practice of good reasons is ruled by the kinds of forces identified in the Frentz-Farrell language action paradigm;[26] (4) rationality is determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings--their inherent awareness of *narrative probability*, what constitutes a coherent story, and their constant habit of testing *narrative fidelity*, whether the stories they experience ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives (narrative probability and narrative fidelity, it will be noted, are analogous to the concepts of dramatic probability and versimilitude; as MacIntyre observes: "The difference between imaginary characters and real ones is not in the narrative form of what they do; it is in the degree of their authorship of that form and of their own deeds.")[27] and (5) the world is a set of stories which must be chosen among to live the good life in a process of continual re-creation. In short, good reasons are the stuff of stories, the means by which humans realize their nature as reasoning-valuing animals. The philosophical ground of the narrative paradigm is ontology. The material of the narrative paradigm is symbols, signs of consubstantiation, and good reasons, the communicative expressions of social reality.

Where the rational world paradigm is an ever-present part of our consciousness because we have been educated into it, the narrative impulse is part of our very being.[28] That narrative is a feature of human nature and that it crosses time and culture is attested by historian White: "far from being one code among many that a culture may utilize for endowing experience with meaning, narrative is a metacode, a human universal on the basis of which transcultural messages about the shared reality can be transmitted....the absence of narrative capacity or a refusal of narrative indicates an absence or refusal of meaning itself;"[29] by anthropologist Turner: "if we regard narrative etically, as the supreme instrument for building 'values' and 'goals,' in Dilthey's sense of these terms, which motivate human conduct into situational structures of 'meaning,' then we must concede it to be a universal cultural activity, embedded in the very center of the social drama, itself another cross-cultural and transtemporal unit in social process"[30]; and by linguist-folklorist Dell Hymes: "the narrative use of language is not a property of subordinate cultures, whether folk, or working class, or the like, but a universal function."[31] Gregory Bateson goes so far as to claim: "if I am at all fundamentally right in what I am saying, then *thinking in terms of stories* must be shared by all mind or minds, whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea anemones."[32]

In theme, if not in every detail, narrative, then, is meaningful for persons in particular and in general, across communities as well as cultures, across time and place. Narratives enable us to understand the actions of others "because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand our own lives in terms of narratives...."[33]

Rationality from this perspective involves, as I have proposed, the principles of narrative probability and narrative fidelity. These principles do not contradict the constituents of rationality I have outlined earlier.[34] The earlier notion was attuned to the rational world paradigm and essentially held that rationality was a matter of argumentative competence: knowledge of issues, modes of reasoning, appropriate tests, and rules of advocacy in given fields. As such, rationality was something to be learned, depended on deliberation, and required a high degree of self-consciousness. Narrative rationality does not make these demands. It is a capacity we all share. It depends on our minds being as Booth represents them in *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent*, a key point of which is: "Not only do human beings successfully infer other beings' states of mind from symbolic clues; we know that they characteristically, in all societies, build each other's minds. This is obvious knowledge--all the more genuine for being obvious."[35] The operative principle of narrative rationality is identification rather than deliberation.[36]

Narrative rationality differs from traditional rationality in another significant way. Narrative rationality is not an account of the "laws of thought" and it is not normative in the sense that one must reason according to prescribed rules of calculation or inference making. Traditional rationality posits the way people think when they reason truly or with certainty. As MacIntyre notes: "To call an argument fallacious is always at once to describe and to evaluate it."[37] It is, therefore, a normative construct. Narrative rationality is, on the other hand, descriptive as it offers an account, an understanding, of any instance of human choice and action, including science.[38] At the same time, it is a basis for critique, because it implies a praxis, an ideal democratic society. Traditional rationality implies some sort of hierarchical system, a community in which some persons are qualified to judge and to lead and some other persons are to follow.

Narrative rationality is inimical to elitist politics, whether fascist, communist, or even democratic--if traditional rationality is the prevailing societal view. And this seems to be the case with American democracy (as the examination of the nuclear controversy will show). The prevalent position is that voters are rational if they know enough about public issues, are cognizant of argumentative procedures, forms, and functions, and weigh carefully all the arguments they hear and read in a systematic, deliberative process. Contrary to this notion is that of V.O. Key, Jr. In a classic study of presidential voting between 1936 and 1960, he concluded that "voters are not fools," which is what they must be considered if measured by traditional rationality. His data led him to conclude that the American electorate is not "straitjacketed by social determinants or moved by subconscious urges triggered by devilously skillful propangandists." They are moved by their perceptions and appraisals of "central and relevant questions of public policy, of governmental performance, and of executive personality."[39] These perceptions and appraisals of political discourse and action become stories, narratives that must stand the tests of probability and fidelity. And these stories are no less valuable than the stories constructed by persons who are rational in the traditional way. There is no evidence to support the claim that "experts" know better than anyone else who should be elected president.

Obviously, as I will note later, some stories are better than others, more coherent, more "true" to the way people and the world are--in fact and in value--, and better, in other words, in satisfying the criteria of the logic of good reasons. Persons may even choose not to participate in the making of public narratives (vote) if they feel that they are meaningless pawns rather than co-authors. But, all persons have the capacity to be rational in the narrative paradigm. And, by and large, persons are that--at least in the fashioning of their daily lives. Persons do not have the capacity to be equally rational in the rational world paradigm. Because persons have the capacity of narrative rationality, it is reasonable to have juries of lay persons and popular elections. I want to stress, however, that narrative rationality does not negate traditional rationality. It holds that traditional rationality is only relevant in specialized fields and even in those arenas narrative rationality is meaningful and useful.

Certain other features of the narrative paradigm should be noted before moving to the case of public moral argument. First, the paradigm is a ground for resolving the dualisms of modernism: fact-value, intellect-imagination, reason-emotion, and so on. Stories are the enactment of the whole mind in concert with itself. Second, narratives are moral constructs. As White asserts: "Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moral impulse is present too."[40] Third, the narrative paradigm is consonant with the notion of reason proposed by Schrag: "Reason, as the performance of vision and insight, commemoration and foresight, occasions the recognition of a process of meaning-formation that gathers within it the logic of technical reason and the *logos* of myth."[41] And fourth, as I will attempt to show, the narrative paradigm offers ways of resolving the problems of public moral argument.

The Case: Public Moral Argument

It should be apparent by now that I think that MacIntyre's *After Virtue* is a remarkable work. Equally remarkable, in its own way, is Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth*.[42] Schell's book would seem to be exemplary of contemporary moral argument intended to persuade a general audience, the "public." His concluding argument is:

> Either we will sink into the final coma and end it all or, as I trust and believe, we will awaken to the truth of our peril, a truth as great as life itself, and, like a person who has swallowed a lethal posion but shakes off his stupor at the last moment and vomits the poison up, we will break through the layers of denials, put aside our faint-hearted excuses, and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons.[41]

The validity of Schell's argument is not the question here. Our concern is its reception, which reveals the limits, perhaps the impossibility, of persuasive moral argument in our time, given the rational world paradigm.

Critical response to *The Fate of the Earth* is of two sorts. The first is celebratory. Reviewers in this group are obviously in sympathy with the book's moral thrust, its depiction of the results of nuclear war and its call for action--for life instead of death--but not with every detail of its argument. Although reviewers in this group include distinguished figures from a variety of professions: journalists Walter Cronkite, James Reston, and James Kilpatrick; historians Harrison Salisbury, John Hersey, and Henry Steele Commager; and politicians Barry Commoner, W. Averell Harriman, and Walter Mondale--none is a current member of the federal administration or the defense establishment.[44] Each of them bears witness to an attitude--opposition to nuclear annihilation--but none testifies to the technical merits of Schell's representation of "deterrence theory," his inferences about its meaning in terms of strategy and tactics, or his conclusions about national soverignty. They, like Schell, are not "experts" in the field in which the argument is made. They, like Schell, are active in the realm of rhetorical knowledge, in the sphere of social-political policy and behavior.[45]

Reviewers in the second group, on the other hand, are purveyors of ideological, bureaucratic, or technical arguments. Such arguments may overlap, be used by the same arguer, but each is distinguished by a particular privileged position: political "truth," administrative sanction, or subject matter expertise. The thrust of the ideological argument is that one violates ultimate "facts," is fundamentally wrong-headed; the bureaucratic argument stresses feasibility in regard to administrative approval; and the technical argument alleges ignorance of the "facts," that opponents are "unrealistic," meaning they do not have a firm grasp on reality.

The subversive pattern of ideological, bureaucratic, and technical arguments is evident in the following attacks on Schell's reasoning. Samuel McCracken, writing in *National Review*, labels Schell an "alarmist" and concludes: "The danger is that Mr. Schell's followers may triumph and bring about a freeze that by making present inequities permanent will prove destablizing in the short run and in the long run productive of both redness and deadness."[46] Focusing on the linch-pin arguments of *The Fate of the Earth* (Schell's interpretation of deterrence theory and his suggested solution--abolishing national sovereignty--), Murray Hausknecht first cites Alexander Haig and then observes that "It is not hard to imagine Ronald Reagan saying, 'Okay, so it may be the end of the species, but we can't let the bastards get away with it.'" In regard to Schell's solution, he concludes: "Successful political action demands significant but realisable goals."[47] The same charge appears in the *Foreign Affairs* review by Andrew J. Pierre, who approves the moral force of Schell's position and then writes: "Yet Schell provides no realistic alternative to our nuclear policy based on the concept of deterrence. His argument--that knowledge that nuclear weapons can extinguish mankind must be the new deterrent in a disarmed world--is very weak."[48]

The strategy of these reviews is clear: reaffirmation of the moral concern, subversion of the reasoning. The tactics are also obvious: juxtapose Schell's reasoning with what is right-headed, what is approved by the administration, or what is "realistic." Insofar as there is merit in these "arguments," it lies not in the way they foreclose debate but in their narrative probability and narrative fidelity. Yet, this is not their intended appeal or effect. The effects are to discredit Schell as an arguer and to dismiss his argument as unfounded. Public moral argument is thus overwhelmed by privileged argument. Put another way, it is submerged by ideological and bureaucratic arguments which insist on rival moralities and technical argument which denudes it of morality altogether, making the dispute one for "experts" alone to consider.[49]

The question that arises at this point is, what happens when "experts" argue about moral issues in public? Before considering this question, however, it is essential to sketch the general characteristics of "public moral argument."

Public moral argument is to be distinguished from reasoned discourse in interpersonal interactions and arguments occurring in specialized communities, such as theological disputes, academic debates, and arguments before the Supreme Court. The features differentiating public moral argument from such encounters are, one: it is publicized, made available for consumption and persuasion of the public at large; and two, it is aimed at what Aristotle called "untrained thinkers," or, to be effective, it should be.[50] Most important *public* moral argument is a form of controversy that inherently crosses fields. It is not contained in the way that legal, scientific, or theological argument are by subject matter, particular conceptions of argumentative competence, and well recognized rules of advocacy. Because this is so and because its realm is public-social knowledge, public moral argument naturally invites participation by field experts and is dominated by the rational superiority of their arguments. Public moral argument, which is oriented toward what ought to be, is undermined by the "truth" that prevails at the moment. The presence of "experts" in public moral argument makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the public of "untrained thinkers" to win an argument or even judge them well--given, again, the rational world paradigm.

Public *moral* argument is moral in the sense that it is founded on ultimate questions--of life and death, of how persons should be defined and treated, of preferred patterns of living. Gusfield designates such questions as "status issues." Their resolution, he writes, indicates "the group, culture, or style of life to which the government and society are publicly commited."[51] In addition to nuclear warfare, desegregation would be included in the category as well as abortion and school prayer.

Public moral *argument* refers to clearcut inferential structures in the rational world paradigm, and to "good reasons" in the narrative paradigm. Public moral *argument* may also refer to public controversies--disputes and debates--about moral issues. The nuclear warfare controversy is an obvious case in point, but so are the others mentioned above. One could add disputes over pornography, ERA, crime and punishment, and so on. This characterization of public moral *argument* is attentive to argument as product and as process.[52]

The problem posed by the presence of experts in public moral argument is illustrated by the dispute between Hans Bethe and Edward Teller over the nuclear freeze proposition in California, 1982. Their positions were published in the *Los Angeles Times*, so they were public.[53] They obviously concerned a moral issue and they were reasoned statements. Both persons have credibility. Which one is to be believed and followed? Who in the general public could contend with them? Teller answers the second question in unequivocal terms: "The American public is ignorant, even of the general ideas on which they (nuclear weapons) are based."[54] Here is revealed the fate of non-experts who argue about nuclear warfare. Only experts can argue with experts and their arguments, while public, cannot be rationally questioned. As Perelman notes: rationality in and of itself forecloses discussion and debate.[55] In the audience of experts, the public is left with no reason (from the perspective of the rational world paradigm) to believe one over the other. One is not a judge but a spectator who must choose between actors. From the narrative paradigm view, the experts are storytellers

and the audience is not a group of observers but are active participants in the meaning-formation of stories.

It may be asked at this point: How is it that freeze referendums were approved in eight out of nine states and in twenty-eight cities and counties in 1982? One answer is "fear," the "most intelligent feeling of our time...."[56] Another answer is "distrust," distrust of those responsible for the development, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. This answer is, I believe, more accurate. It does not deny the existence of fear. It insists on the "rationality" of those who voted for and against the referendum. Those who opposed the referendum did so because of a basic distrust of Soviet leaders and a fundamental trust of our own.

What I am saying is that there are good reasons for trust and distrust, that the response of voters was rational, given the narrative paradigm. The good reasons that are expressed in public moral argument relate to issues not accounted for in the rational world paradigm. These issues include the motivations and values of the characters involved in the ongoing narrative of nuclear warfare, the way in which they conceive and behave in respect to the conflict, and the narrative probability and narrative fidelity of the particular stories they tell, which may well take the form of "reasoned argument." Experts and lay persons meet on common ground, given the narrative paradigm. As Toulmin observes: "a scientist off duty is as much an 'ordinary' man as a tinker or a bus-conductor off duty."[57]

Viewed from the perspective of the rational world paradigm, Schell's case, his argument and its reception, evokes despair. If one looks to MacIntyre's *After Virtue* for relief, one will be disappointed and disheartened further, for he provides the historical and philosophical reasons for the fate of *The Fate of the Earth* and similar such arguments. His own argument is that "we still, in spite of the efforts of three centuries of moral philosophy and one of sociology, lack any coherent rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualist point of view...."[58] He offers some hope with the idea that "the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way that restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and commitments." He observes, however, "the new dark ages" are "already upon us." The "barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of this that constitutes part of our predicament. We are waiting not for Godot, but for another--doubtless very different--St. Benedict."[59]

The reasons for this state of affairs are (1) the rejection of a teleological view of human nature and the classical conception of reason as embodied in Aristotelian logic and rhetoric; (2) the separation of morality from theological, legal, and aesthetic concerns; and (3) the evolution of the individualistic sense of self and the rise of emotivism. The consequences of these movements is a situation in which ethical arguments in public are rendered ineffectual because of "conceptual incommensurability."

A case in point is protest--where advocates of reform argue from a position of "rights" and those who oppose them reason from the stance of "utility." MacIntyre observes that "the facts of incommensurability ensure that protestors can never win an *argument*; the indignant self-righteousness of protestors arises because the facts of incommensurability ensure equally that the protestors can never lose an argument either. Hence, the utterance of protest is characteristically addressed to those who already *share* the protestors' premises.... This is not to say that protest cannot be effective; it is to say that protest cannot be *rationally* effective."[60] Thus, when arguers appealing to justice and equality contend with adversaries who base their case on success, survival, and liberty, they talk past each other.

From the perspective of the narrative paradigm, the dynamic of this situation is that rival stories are being told. Any story, any form of rhetorical communication, not only says something about the world, it also implies an audience, persons who conceive of themselves in very specific ways. If a story denies a person's self-conception, it does not matter what it says about the world. In the instance of protest, the rival factions' stories deny each other in terms of self-conceptions and the world. The only way to bridge this gap, if it can be bridged through discourse, is by telling stories that do not negate the self-conceptions people hold of themselves.

It may be germane to note at this point that narrative as *a mode of discourse* is more universal and probably more efficacious than argument for nontechnical forms of communication.[61] There are several reasons why this should be true. First, narration comes closer to capturing the experience of the world, simultaneousely appealing to the various senses, to reason and emotion, to intellect and imagination, and to fact and value. It does not presume intellectual contact only. Second, one does not have to learn narrative probability and narrative fidelity, one acquires them through a universal faculty and experience. As Gadamer declares: "I am even convinced of the fact that there are no people who do not 'think' sometime and somewhere. That means there is no one who does not form general views about life and death, and freedom and human living together, about the good and happiness."[62] In other words, persons are reflective and, I believe, their reflections are evident in the narratives they live by. Appreciation of argument requires specialized knowledge of issues, reasoning, rules of rationality, and so on. Third, narration works by suggestion and identification; argument operates by inferential moves and deliberation. Both forms, however, are modes of expressing

good reasons--given the narrative paradigm--so the differences between them are structural rather than substantive.

Summary and Conclusions

This essay began with a concern with the concept of technical reason and the way it rendered the public unreasonable; with the idea of rationality being a matter of argumentative competence in specialized fields, leaving the public and its discourse irrational; with the apparent impossibility of bridging the gaps between experts and the public and between segments of the public; and with the necessity to learn what was supposed to be of the essence of persons--rationality--so that one class of citizens can always be superior to another. While I do not mean to maintain that the narrative paradigm resolves these problems out of existence, I do think that it provides a basis for reconsideration of them.

In closing, I should like to make two additional comments. First, I think that the concepts of public and social knowledge should be reconceived in terms of the narrative paradigm. The effect would be to give shape to these ideas as identifiable entities in the discourse of the citizenry, to give it a form of being. To consider that public-social knowledge is to be found in the stories that we tell one another would enable us to observe not only our differences, but also our commonalities, and in such observation we might be able to reform the notion of the "public."

Second, and closely related to the discovery of our communal identity, is the matter of what makes one story better than another. Two features come to mind: formal and substantive. Formal features are attributes of narrative probability, the consistency of characters, coherence in the progression of action, accommodation of the identity of auditors, and so on. The strongest, most compelling stories are mythic.[63] Substantive features concern narrative fidelity and the logic of good reasons: the questions of fact, relevance, consistency, consequence, and the transcendental issue.[64] As these questions relate to values, they do not have to be learned as much as brought to the consciousness of persons. The best, most helpful and inspiring stories are moral. As John Gardener wrote: "Moral action is action which affirms life."[65]

One may get the impression that the conception of rationality I have presented leads to a denial of "logic." It does but only as logic is conceived so that persons are considered irrational beings. With Heidegger, I would assert that "To think 'counter to logic' does not mean to stick up for the illogical, but only means to think the logos, and its essence as it appeared in the early days of thought; i.e. to make an effort first of all to prepare such an act of re-flecting" (*Nachdenka*)."[66] In an earlier essay, I attempted to make such an effort by showing the relationship of the logic of good reasons to Aristotle's concept of "practical wisdom."[67]

Application of narrative rationality to specific stories may further clarify its nature and value. From the perspective of narrative rationality, Hitler's *Mein Kampf* must be judged a bad story. Although it has formal coherence in its structure, as McGuire demonstrated, it denies the identity of significant persons and demeans others. It also lacks fidelity to the truths humanity shares in regard to reason, justice, veracity, and peaceful ways to resolve social-political differences.[68] On the other hand, one may cite the cosmological myths of Laotse, Buddha, Zoroaster, Christ, and Mohammed which satisfy both narrative probability and narrative fidelity for those cultures for whom they were intended--and many others across time and place. They not only do not deny the humanity of persons, they elevate it to the profoundest moral and metaphysicl level the world has known. One could also cite such works as the *Iliad*, The *Odyssey*, the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Virgil's *Aeneid*, Dante's *Commedia*, the plays of Shakespeare, and the novels of Tolstoy, Melville, Thomas Mann, and James Joyce. In terms of political discourse, one could cite many of the speeches and writings of Adlai Stevenson and Winston Churchill. While these classic expressions of religious, social, cultural, and political life have been celebrated by persons committed to traditional rationality, it has been because they have not restricted themselves to "logic" but have recognized and responded to the values fostered by this literature, by its reaffirmation of the human spirit as the transcendent ground of existence.

Finally, I do not mean to maintain that "knowledge of agents" is superior to "knowledge of objects." With Toulmin, I would hold that "A decent respect for each kind of knowledge is surely compatible with conceding the legitimate claims of the other."[69] With knowledge of agents, we can expect "truth" in the form of *trustworthy* or *reliable*; with knowledge of objects we can look for *veracity*. The world requires both.

Karl Wallace was right: "One could do worse than characterise rhetoric as the art of finding and effectively presenting good reasons."[70] MacIntyre is also right: "The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest. Quests sometimes fail, are frustrated, abandoned or dissipated; and human lives may in all these ways also fail. But the criteria for success or failure in a human life as a whole are the criteria of success or failure in a narrated or to-be-narrated quest."[71] And that quest is "for the good life" for all persons.[72]

Footnotes

[1] Walter R. Fisher, "Toward a Logic of Good Reasons," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 64 (December 1978), 376-84.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 376.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 378.

[4] Walter R. Fisher and Richard A. Filloy, "Argument in Drama and Literature: An Exploration," in *Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research*, eds., J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), pp. 343-62.

[5] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 201.

[6] *Ibid*., p. 200.

[7] *Ibid*., p. 194.

[8] Wayne Brockriede, "Arguing about Human Understanding," *Communication Monographs*, 49 (September 1982), 137-47.

[9] W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman, *Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981); W. Lance Bennett, "Political Scenarios and the Nature of Politics," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 8 (Winter 1975), 23-42; W. Lance Bennett, "Storytelling in Criminal Trials: A Model of Social Judgment," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 64 (February 1978), 1-22.

[10] Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Rhetoric and Public Knowledge," in *Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature*, ed., Don M. Burks (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1978), pp. 67-93; Thomas B. Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 62 (February 1976), 1-14.

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[54] *Ibid*., p. 2.

[55] Chaim Perelman, "The Rational and the Reasonable," in *The New Rhetoric and the Humanities: Essays on Rhetoric and Its Applications* (Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1979), pp. 117-23.

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[58] MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 241.

[59] *Ibid*., p. 245.

[60] *Ibid*., p. 69.

[61] Walter R. Fisher, "Romantic Democracy, Ronald Reagan, and Presidential Heroes," *Western Journal of Speech Communication*, 46 (Summer 1982), 299-310.

[62] Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 58.

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[65] John Gardener, *On Moral Fiction* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978), p. 23.

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[69] Toulmin, *The Return to Cosmology*, p. 244.

[70] Karl Wallace, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 49 (October 1963), 248.

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STORYTELLING AS A MODE OF MORAL ARGUMENT:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FISHER

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As I am only offering comments on a well developed paper, I should begin this response by saying that the ideas I am about to articulate will not be developed completely. I essentially will be suggesting only the structure of arguments I would advance with stronger evidence had I more time. If there is time at the end of this session, I will be happy to sketch what the contours of that evidence might look like.

Allow me one additional prefatory comment: When Professor Fisher sent me his paper, he asked that I "be kind to the Old Man." As a faithful and successful alumnus of the graduate program in which I teach, Professor Fisher assuredly is deserving of kindness. And so, following the Biblical injunctions which are a part of my upbringing as a pietistic Norwegian Lutheran, I will be as kind as I can and in the only way I know how--by offering gentle but firm corrections. Anyone raised on as much Old Testament literature as I was knows that correction is an ultimate expression of kindness and love. And so, Professor Fisher, rest assured that what follows is not meant as rebuff, but as moral and intellectual guidance.

Let me begin, then, with a bald statement of two positions I am taking on issues raised by Professor Fisher's paper: I will concede--and indeed, vigorously support--the notion that narrative is perhaps the most important (and, to me, even the most interesting) form of human communication. But, with equal vigor, I will deny that narrative is a paradigm--or even, more simply, a form--of moral argument. To explicate these two propositions, I will start where Professor Fisher starts, with some ontological and epistemological concerns. Such philosophical statements will set up what I still consider to be some important distinctions between narrative and argumentative discourse.

ONTOLOGICAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF HUMAN BEINGS

In support of the analysis of narrative and argumentation I wish to put forth today, I must begin with an ontological consideration different from--but inclusive of--the one articulated by Professor Fisher. With Ernst Cassirer and Kenneth Burke,[1] I take the notion of **animal symbolicum** as the first principle of humanity. That is, I take the distinguishing characteristic of human beings to be their symbol-using abilities. As a corollary to this proposition, further, I take all other ontological descriptors of human beings-- **homo faber**, **homo sociologus**, **homo dramatis**, and yes, even **homo rationalis** and **homo narrens** --as descriptors subsumed by or derived from the central notion of **animal symbolicum**. Thus, I would argue that:

As **homo faber**, my constructive actions have meaning
    only because of the symbolic interpretations attached to them by myself and others.
As **homo sociologus**, my relationships with others are
    governed and made meaningful only because our roles and rules for their execution have been formulated in a cultural symbolicum.
As **homo dramatis**, my lines of conduct are meaningful
    to others only because scripts-for-life are pre-given in the society into which I was born.
As **homo rationalis**, my inferences are found valid or
    not according to logical rules articulated in particular arenas or situations by significant others.
And, as **homo narrens**, my understanding of narrative
    structures is derived from socialization--from having been taught how to tell and interpret stories.[2]

Were I not **animal symbolicum**, I would have none of the capacities suggested by the second-level descriptors. If you do not believe that, try convincing your dog (a) that its action of defecating on the floor is morally corrupt; (b) that your master-slave relationship with it is justified by the social order; (c) that **Lassie Come Home** provides it with a mythic depiction of an ideal life for dogs; (d) that it logically, no matter how much it wishes to, cannot be both in and outside the house simultaneously; and (e) that **Benjie** is a literary artifact which violated the classical unities of time and space.

It may seem that I am asserting the obvious when urging that we understand the human being to be **animal symbolicum**, but the point must be made explicitly if we are going to conceptualize properly the relationships between narrative and argumentative discourse. If both **homo rationalis** and **homo narrens** are understood to be second-level descriptors of human characteristics, then we can be rather sure that they operate in comparatively discrete realms of human activity, and that they serve separable functions in human life. More specifically, I will argue shortly, **homo rationalis** and **homo narrens** bear different and separable relationships to the collective process of moral decision-making.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE

Before we can assess properly those relationships, however, I must say a few words about epistemology and social knowledge, for how we come to know assuredly has profound effects on how we make collective moral decisions. Again, I cannot really develop an epistemology fully here, but I at least can assert some propositions essential to my position. With more time, I would defend the following notions:

(1) That which counts as "knowledge" in any society is acquired but partially through personal interaction with the world of sensory experience. Our most useful and important kinds of knowledge are gained in interaction with "significant others"--family members, acquaintances, and institutional representatives--in our lives.

(2) We, therefore, are born into a pre-existing cultural symbolicum, a world or web of meaning which comes to us individually as pre-formulated social knowledge.

(3) We acquire that social knowledge in myriad ways, but primarily through admonition, imitation, and technical instruction.[3]

(4) Narratives are especially important vehicles by which cultural representatives pass on social knowledge to new members of societies. (a) Because a narrative discourse of necessity must position its messages in time and space--that is, in the fundamental orientational per-

spectives of existence itself--narratives make strong demands upon our innate perceptual processes. (b) Because the essence of narrative discourse is "storytelling," such discourses are centered on personae and their actions, and hence are imitative of human life.[4] (c) Because narrative discourses structure characters and their actions, they become primary vehicles for admonition, including moral admonitions. (d) But, because narratives create and populate a universe in some ways familiar to but in an important sense separable from their readers or spectators, those admonitions usually are only implied.[5] (e) Hence, while narrative discourse is preeminently useful in inculcating social creatures, narratives themselves do not "argue" as such; one only can argue from narratives, not within them.

My last assumption--4e--is beginning to move us into some distinctions between narrative and argumentative discourse, and hence I should stop for a comment. The epistemological assumptions I have just articulated, of course, may not be universally acceded to, yet they have strong support from a large and growing intellectual community, including scholars from anthropology, political science, mythic studies, literary criticism, social theory and sociology, rhetorical studies, and even psychology. In variant forms, these assumptions collectively provide the base for the many types of "social constructionism" theory, "social constructivism," and most other branches of symbolic interactionism in twentieth-century thought.[6]

NARRATIVE, ARGUMENT, AND MORAL DILEMMAS

Having advanced some basic, abstract philosophical propositions, I now am ready to plunge into the question governing Professor Fisher's paper: Via what means do social beings put their knowledge into action, especially in situations characterized by moral dilemmas? Or, phrased in a slightly different manner, in what forms is social knowledge made relevant to the processes of moral decision making?

Within the Aristotelian tradition of practical discourse, the answer to these questions is clear: rhetorical and dialectical discourse. To Aristotle, "rhetoric" was understood as a systematic method of inquiry into the world of contingent human affairs; the result of that inquiry was the persuasive discourse, a discourse capable of generating assent to moral/advisory propositions put to one's culturemates. And, "dialectic" was understood as a parallel systematic method of inquiry into the principles governing those human affairs; the result of that inquiry was the philosophical discourse, a discourse capable of generating assent to ontological, epistemological, teleological, and metacritical propositions put to one's intellectual peers in the academy. Both "rhetoric" and "dialectic" were presumed to operate argumentatively--bilaterally, justificatorily, and verbally.[7]

And, then, what of Professor Fisher's answers to these questions? He argues that the narrative paradigm produces persuasive discourse for popular audiences, at least insofar as it is used by discoursers sensitive to the demands of narrative probability and narrative fidelity. He supports that argument both theoretically and practically, i.e. by discussing both characteristics of narrative discourse and attributes of popular audiences who are presumed incapable of following expert rhetorical discourse in a technological age. If I may suggest an implication of Professor Fisher's position vis-a-vis Aristotle's, it seems that he is leaving intact dialogical inquiry as a tool for the intelligentsia, but, in following arguments similar to some advanced by Bitzer,[8] he distrusts "ordinary" citizens' abilities to make moral judgments when confronted

by conflicting rhetorical or popular argumentative discourses. In other words, Professor Fisher presumably accepts an Aristotelian notion of dialectic, and is only out to replace rhetorical inquiry as a precursor to persuasive discourse treating moral dilemmas.

Given assumptions I already have laid out, you probably can guess that I am adhering to a neo-Aristotelian position on matters relative to narrative, rhetoric, and moral dilemmas. Hence I would offer the following kind corrections to Professor Fisher:

(1) I certainly agree that narrative discourse can be and ought to be thought of as a premiere communication paradigm. If nothing else, the work of Havelock on the classical Greeks as well that of most of the mythicists demonstrate narrative's ancient heritage, and, of course, contemporary narrative theory is rich in such implications.[9]

(2) I agree that a doctrine of "good reasons" and its logic are central to an understanding of moral decision-making processes, but--and here I begin my correction of Professor Fisher--I deny that the narrative paradigm is adequate as a logic. Interestingly, Professor Fisher begins his present paper with a reference to his award-winning 1978 essay, "Toward a Logic of Good Reasons."[10] I say "interestingly" because I chaired the SCA Committee on Awards that gave him a prize for that essay. I therefore know the essay well, but even now as I reread it I find no implication whatsoever for a narrative paradigm of moral decision making. While he certainly does suggest, in the Toulmin-like model of argumentation he constructs therein, that the sources of valuative warrants for arguments are varied, he is very clear in saying that the source of argumentative logic--of the inferential process per se--is Aristotelian. To quote the 1978 Fisher on the matter of adequate reasoning criteria: "[Judgmental criteria must] be infused with the tests of different types of reasoning: example, analogy, sign, cause, definition, and authority."[11]

(3) I deny the adequacy of the narrative paradigm as an argumentative frame because "storytelling" is grounded in mimetic rather than enthymematic psychological activity. That is, a "story" is adjudged adequate or inadequate on the bases of its verisimilitude--its similarity to human experience and its internal consistency--while an enthymematic argument is adjudged adequate or inadequate on the bases of its conformity to culture-specific rules of reasoning. As I noted earlier, I believe one cannot argue within, but only from, a story. I accept on this point a position taken by Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann:

> As long as I live in fantasy worlds, I cannot 'produce,' in the sense of an act which gears into the external world and alters it. As long as I tarry in the world of fantasy I cannot accomplish anything, save just to engage in fantasy. However, under certain circumstances, I can sketch out in advance the course of fantasy as such (I will imagine the fairy gives me three wishes), and I can then fulfill the project. It is still uncertain whether this falls under a broadly conceived definition of the concept 'action.' It is important that fantasying remains secluded by itself, that the intention to act is absent--in contrast to the plan of an act in the everyday life-world which (strictly as a plan) is also in a certain sense 'merely thinking.' . . . . In fantasy's finite province of meaning only factual, not logical, incompatibilities can be overcome.[12]

In a similar argument likewise quoting Schutz and Luckmann's analysis, my colleague Michael McGee concludes that "Stories as such function ontologically, establishing the grounds for accepting such-and-such interpretations as 'factual.'"[17] Again, then, stories can define, can even reinforce social criteria for legitimating thus-and-so as factual, even as valued, but **they cannot argue**. In the language of faculty psychology, stories can control perception, to be sure, but they cannot serve as inferences. Narratives can only be interiorized, not exteriorized.

(4) In general, then, I still would maintain that "argumentation" and "narrative" comprehend disparate mental operations. More specifically, (a) argumentation depends upon reasoning facilities, and narrative, upon abilities of listeners to comprehend fictive or non-fictive symbolic universes; (b) argumentation works by representation, while narratives work by presentation; (c) argumentation becomes a matter of intellection, while narrative force lies in the power of depiction; and (d) adequate argumentation relies upon inference, while adequate narratives rely upon characterological enactment.

PARTING THOUGHTS

On several key points, then, it might appear that I am taking Professor Fisher to task with some little severity--something I promised not to do. Actually, I do not think I am, for when all the dust clears I really am calling only for one adjustment of his position. His analysis of the narrative paradigm, its mechanisms, and its force can stand if he quits his attempt to describe it as a paradigm of argumentation, that is, if he more simply recognizes that human beings argue **from** and not **within** such structures. With that adjustment, his discussions of narration and perception, of "conceptual incommensurability," of the engines of narratives, and of narratives' relationships to audiences will make generally good sense. With that adjustment, he will be helping us understand the importance of narratives as the sources of social knowledge--knowledge advocates can bring to bear even on issues as complicated, twisted, and sociopolitically important as nuclear war.

In keynoting this conference four years ago, I discussed the crisis in the study of argumentation and rationality. I talked about the new "-isms" and "-ologies" which have been challenging the traditional assumptions of validity as standards of argumentative rationality--primarily, the substitution of community-based "rules" for mathematical constructs. I concluded from a review of recent research that the "**theory of argumentation over the last fifteen years has been viewed by the new prophets as a poetic rather than a logical enterprise.**"[18] The essentially poetic stress upon argumentative actors and upon the scripts they employ in their interaction with others, to my mind then and now, is not something to be denigrated or feared, however. That stress is to be applauded, for it allows us to conceptualize and analyze argumentative discourse contextually, in situ. And, insofar as we come to understand the situational demands which govern decision making, and--with Professor Fisher--the role of narratives in orienting argumentative actors' fundamental perceptions of the world, we will be advancing significantly our ability to both characterize **and resolve** our culture's moral dilemmas. And, I would add, insofar as we seek to analyze the role of cultural conditioning in the "ordinary" citizen's struggles to make moral decisions in the face even of technical arguments, we need not fear this citizen's irrationality, for we will have come to understand popular reasoning as it **can** --rather than **should** --operate in human affairs.

Professor Fisher, then, for his contributions to a fundamental characterization of narrative procedures, is to be applauded--with all the kindness I can muster.

Notes

1\.

Most of Cassirer's writings deal in one way or another with the notion of **animal symbolicum**. See, e.g., his **Language and Myth** (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1953) and his **An Essay on Man** (New York: Bantam Books, 1970). Cf. David Bidney, "On the Philosophical Anthropology of Ernst Cassirer and Its Relation to the History of Anthropological Thought," in **The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer**, ed. Paul Schilpp (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1958), pp. 502ff. Perhaps Kenneth Burke's clearest statement on this ontological question comes in his "Definition of Man," in his **Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method** (1966; rpt. Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1973), pp. 3-24.

2\.

I develop most of these ideas in "Dramaturgical Theory and Criticism: The State of the Art (or Science?)," **Western Journal of Speech Communication**, 44 (Fall 1980), 315-330; "On Classes of Inferences and Force," in **Explorations in Rhetoric: Studies in Honor of Douglas Ehninger**, ed. Ray E. McKerrow (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1982), pp. 85-106; and "Sociocultural Notions of Argument Fields: A Primer," in **Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation**, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 1-20.

3\.

These three routes to learning Edward Hall terms "formal," "informal," and "technical" learning. See his still-useful **The Silent Language** (1959; rpt. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1966), "The Major Triad," pp. 63-92.

4\.

This, of course, is the whole point of Aristotle's definition of "tragedy" in the **Poetics** (1449b). Because drama (poetic literature) is "an imitation of an action," action (**mythos**) is its primary element, and character (**ethos**) is a close second in importance. As well, thought (**dianoia**) is the third element in the Aristotelian model; his discussion of "thought" (1456a-1456b) could well have been written by a scholar interested in "the social construction of reality." One further point: Aristotle's discussion of **dianoia** is comparatively short, because, as he tells his readers (1456a), the concept is well developed in the **Rhetoric**. Hence, intriguingly, he essentially collapses the distinction between poetic and rhetorical works on the question of social knowledge. There is at least a suggestion, therefore, that pre-given, culture-specific role requirements and rules-for-living are foundational to all processes of meaning-assignation. Even in Aristotle, thus, does the human being come off as **animal symbolicum**. I treat this idea more fully in Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Narrative, Enactment, and Television Programming," **Southern Speech Communication Journal**, 48 (Spring 1983), 229-243.

5\.

If poetic discourses actually state admonitions, we usually would identify them with such rhetorical-generic labels as "didactic" or "propagandistic" literature. That is because any admonition offered in a narrative discourse is assumed to apply to the characters within the dramatic or poetic universe, not the "real world," and because, as noted earlier, the notion of "imitation" implies a separation (normally called "aesthetic distance") between the narrative and the "real" worlds. The relationships existing between narrative structures and real-world or social structures, hence, are highly complex, given that both "identification" and yet "separation" are essential to understanding those relationships. This, I suspect, is why Kenneth Burke makes so much of the idea of "representative anecdote" as the connective construct between fictive and factual life in his **A Grammar of Motives** (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1945), esp. pp. 59-61, and his **Language as Symbolic Action**, "Form and Persecution in the Oresteia," pp. 125-138.

6.
I sketch my understanding of these intellectual moves more fully in Gronbeck, "Dramaturgical . . . ," and my "Qualitative Communication Theory and Rhetorical Studies in the 1980s," **Central States Speech Journal**, 32 (Winter 1981), 243-253. I would add, for good measure, that I think most of these assumptions would pass muster among many continental scholars writing in the neo-Marxist traditions of England, France, and Germany, although of course they would more fully analyze perceptual processes within the phenomenological frame governing much of their work, and would make more of the ways in which class structures control our dealings with and understanding of the material world.

7.
For dilations of my understanding of Aristotle on these matters, see Richard McKeon, ed. and intro., **The Basic Works of Aristotle** (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. xxvi-xxxii, and James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," **Speech [Communication] Monographs**, 3 (1936), 49-74.

8.
Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Rhetoric and Public Knowledge," in **Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature: An Explanation**, ed. Don M. Burks (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1978), pp. 67-93.

9.
The centrality of narrative forms to the very formation of Greek culture--and, by implication, of all cultures--is demonstrated brilliantly by Eric A. Havelock in his **Preface to Plato**, Belknap Press (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963)--a book almost universally quoted by narrative and oral scholars. I shall not, here, reproduce in support of this proposition a complete bibliography on myth and society. Suffice it to say that the mythic catalogues produced by Fraser and Bullfinch, the multi-volumed analyses of ancient myths offered by Joseph Campbell, the contemporary structuralist studies of myth prepared by Claude Levi-Strauss and Roland Barthes, the political analyses of Murray Edelman, the sociological work of Orrin Klapp, and the anthropological-structuralist work of Victor Turner all document this claim. Finally, I would urge the reader to follow Professor Fisher's lead in examining the Fall 1980 number of **Critical Inquiry** (now available in bookform as **On Narrative**) for numerous articles outlining current understandings of narrative theory.

10.
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64 (December 1978), 376-384.

11.
Fisher, p. 380.

12.
Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann, **The Structures of the Life-World**, trans. Richard M. Zaner and H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 29, 31. I deal at some length with the functions of **mimesis** and enthymematic structures within televised narratives in a forthcoming essay, "Audience Engagement in 'Family,'" in **Rhetorical Dimensions in Media: A Critical Casebook**, ed. Martin J. Medhurst and Thomas W. Benson (forthcoming Dubuque, Ia.: Kendall/Hunt, 1984).

13.
See his "1984: Some Issues in the Rhetorical Study of Political Communication," forthcoming in the **Political Communication Yearbook**, to be published by Sage Publishing Co. and edited by Keith Sanders.

14.
Bruce E. Gronbéck, "From Argument to Argumentation: Fifteen Years of Identity Crises," in **Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation**, ed. Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell (Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association, 1979), p. 10.

THE JOHNSTONIAN PREDICAMENT IN MORAL ARGUMENT:

THE CASE OF THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY

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> "Babies are not like bad teeth to be jerked out just because they cause suffering. An unborn baby is a baby nevertheless."
>
> "There ought to be no special laws regulating abortion. Such an operation should be available in the same way as, say, an operation for the beautification of a nose."[1]

Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., has devoted an illustrious career to the examination of the nature and implications of incommensurable philosophical disputes.[2] He outlines a situation in which disputants, when challenged, defend their claims with increasingly fundamental philosophical propositions. At some point in such a dispute, he claims, it is no longer possible to launch *ad rem* objections (i.e., arguments that appeal empirically to evidence) to the opposing position because the philosophical system behind that position is both so alien to one's own and so all-encompassing as even to define what is and is not "evidence."[3] Therefore, all *ad rem* arguments ultimately beg the question. Given this predicament, he claims, the only relevant arguments which one can bring to bear are *ad hominem* arguments, i.e., those which convict the opponent of self-contradiction.[4]

In this essay, I intend to examine the current political furor surrounding abortion as an example of this Johnstonian predicament. This controversy, re-ignited just last month when the Supreme Court reaffirmed its famous 1973 decisions legalizing many abortions, is one of the most intractable on the American political agenda: a coalition of Catholics, protestant fundamentalists, political conservatives, and Moral Majoritarians -- the so-called "New Right" -- are working hard to overturn the Court's rulings with a constitutional amendment prohibiting abortion.[5]

Analysts of this controversy are beginning to recognize the depth of the philosophical/theological chasm separating anti-abortionists and repealists, but no one yet has considered the dispute using the tools which Johnstone provides.[6] Hence, my project is dual: to discuss the abortion debate as an exemplar of the Johnstonian predicament; and to consider the possible uses of consistency arguments, including *argumentum ad hominem*, in resolving this debate. The broader purpose of this analysis is to examine the relationship between philosophical argument and public moral argument, suggesting that the interaction of these two realms of discourse is both promising and perilous.

I

Even a cursory examination of the abortion debate reveals its complexity. The debate is not simply a clash of values, for, as Celeste Railsback has noted perceptively: "Although it is true that the key god term of the Pro-Life forces is 'life' and that the key value term of the Pro-Choice forces is 'freedom,' it is not true that either side generally disparages life or freedom."[7] Nor, she continues, is the debate merely one in which "life" and "freedom" mean different things to the opposing sides and form different hierarchies in their moral visions.[8] Rather, there seems to be a growing consensus that the abortion debate represents, more fundamentally, a clash over *the nature of* value, that it is, in other words, not just an ethical but also a metaethical dispute, and thus may be, at bottom, a case of philosophical incommensurability.[9] As R. J. Gerber expresses it: "In the abortion debate, it is not merely two individuals facing each other; it is a confrontation between the world views of two fairly distinct cultures, one traditional and dated, the other new and untested."[10] He continues, sketching the outlines of this fundamental antagonism as follows:

> Central to the abortion debate is the question: how define human value? . . . is humanity determined by structure or by function? By genetic code or by social interaction? By an a priori deduction or by an inference from social activity? In a larger context, is human value a metaphysical conclusion of an abstract system such as natural law, or is it attested only in the pragmatic, social interests emphasized by sociological jurisprudence?[11]

This metaethical dispute may be characterized in a variety of related ways, one of which is the dichotomy between "principle" and "utility." Anti-abortionists claim to uphold the former and disparage the latter. Robert and Mary Joyce, for example, attack the "utilitarian values" that justify abortion on the grounds that "whatever man *can* do for his own convenience, he *should* do," and conclude that "courageous adherence to the basic truths of humanity, despite the infection of utilitarian 'ethics,' is continually necessary in keeping human destruction and suffering at a minimum."[12] Senator James Buckley of New York believes that "at the heart of the matter is whether the United States will reject the ethical precepts of the past in favor of a new utilitarian view of human life."[13] And Clifford Bajema warns of the "nihilistic implications" of the new ethic, in graphic terms: "It may be too late for this nation of peoples. The red-hot sun of a new quality-of-life ethic has dawned long before this day, and it is scorching the spirit of man, slowly reducing him to a self-obsessed automaton of social utility."[14]

As anti-abortionists see the conflict, therefore, they who staunchly defend the basic moral principle "thou shalt not kill," confront others bent callously on violating this principle with impunity whenever it suits their selfish needs. Two comments regarding this vision are necessary. First, these are not "objective" accounts of the nature of the abortion debate but, instead, are strategic descriptions. While some defenses of abortion truly are grounded in quality-of-life considerations, e.g., in cases of rape- or incest-induced pregnancy, fetal deformity and retardation, or in order to reduce the burdens of unwanted children, such as overpopulation or welfare costs, this description ignores, or treats as merely euphemistic "rhetoric," the principled defense of abortion on grounds of a woman's right to bodily integrity and reproductive freedom.[15] Second, the easy equation of utilitarianism with a quality-of-life ethic is problematic, and the ready equation of both with sheer selfish convenience is flatly wrong and would be rejected by moral philosophers. Nonetheless, the description does provide valuable evidence of the philosophical chasm as anti-abortionists perceive it, a chasm which can be delineated more fully as follows.[16]

Anti-abortionists believe that morality is fundamentally deontological, i.e., concerned with the rightness or wrongness of actions as determined by universal moral rules of conduct such as "thou shalt not kill"; this view of morality is contrasted with the teleological view (of which utilitarianism is one form),[17] which is concerned with the goodness or badness of actions. Anti-abortionists also hold that morality is intrinsicalist, i.e., that acts are right or wrong by virtue of their nature (the characteristics of the acts themselves), and not circumstantialist, i.e., that acts are right or wrong depending upon the circumstances under which they occur.[18] Put another way, rightness and wrongness are properties of acts, not simply predicated of them. Relatedly, the anti-abortionist approach to morality is formalist as opposed to consequentialist. That is, acts are recognized to be right or wrong by virtue of their relation to the moral law, irrespective of whatever consequences, good or bad, they may produce. It is worth noting that intrinsicalism and formalism are mutually reinforcing. When acts are viewed as intrinsically right or wrong, it is relatively easy to formulate moral rules which prescribe or proscribe them. However, when the morality of an act depends upon numerous extrinsic factors such as the intent with which it was committed, the circumstances under which it occurred, or the consequences it produced, formulation of a general moral rule is difficult, if not impossible, because relevant factors vary widely from case to case.

This approach to the nature of morality is manifest in numerous anti-abortionist arguments. All circumstances of

pregnancy, including rape and incest, typically are dismissed as "emotionally diverting hardship cases" which do not alter the facts of the fetus' humanity, or our duty not to kill.[19] Thus, circumstances have no bearing on the moral evaluation of abortion. In fact, anti-abortionists argue, the proper course of action is to manipulate the circumstances so as to make abortion unnecessary, e.g., by enforcing rape laws and providing adoption services for unwanted children.[20] Circumstances can be controlled in order to eliminate the need for an intrinsically wrong act.

Nor do consequences have any bearing on the moral evaluation of abortion. Anti-abortionists provide two kinds of support for their claim that persons have a right to life which we are obligated not to abridge: (1) our moral tradition recognizes this right, which has been called "an almost absolute value in history"[21]; and (2) the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution recognize this right. Both are formalistic: no anti-abortionist argues that depriving the fetus of life is wrong because, say, this will reduce the size of the pool of youths eligible for military service. And just as abortion is not wrong because it produces undesirable consequences, but because it violates the moral law, so, anti-abortionists claim, positive consequences do not mitigate the wrongness of the act.[22] The U.S. Catholic Conference testifies: "What moral principle can equitably and justly balance the potential accomplishment of social goods with the direct and deliberate destruction of one million or more unborn human beings each year? There is no such principle."[23]

Lastly, anti-abortionists view morality as absolutist rather than relativist.[24] In part, this means that, because life is an absolute value, abortion, which by definition takes an innocent life, is always wrong.[25] It also means that moral codes, and their sources in external authority (natural law, the church, etc.), are objective and unchanging.[26] Thus anti-abortionists also reject the panoply of views subsumed by "situation ethics," "ethical relativism," and "moral skepticism," the notions that right and wrong may vary by situation or culture, or may be a purely subjective matter determined by individual choice.[27] Formalism demands such absolutism because, if a moral rule proscribes a certain act, then by definition that act is always wrong; the purpose of rule-making would be defeated if, say, under the rule "thou shalt not kill" some abortions were judged wrong while others (*ex hypothesi* identical acts) were not. Similarly, intrinsicalism requires absolutism. If an act is wrong by nature, because of what it is, then it always must be wrong, for it could be valued differently only if its nature were to change, in which case it would be a different act.

In summary, morality, to anti-abortionists, is deontological, intrinsicalist, formalist, absolutist, and objectivist. There exist basic moral principles, universal and unchanging, which determine right and wrong independent of subjective individual judgments or of considerations of intent, circumstance, or consequence. Classes of action which violate these principles are inherently wrong. Abortion, which violates the moral rule against killing, therefore is immoral.

Relatedly, anti-abortionists perceive a philosophical chasm in the abortion debate regarding the moral character of human beings. At best, people are thought to be weak-willed and self-centered; at worst, they are maliciously immoral. As the constant references to "convenience" suggest, the individual abortion decision uniformly is portrayed as, at best, an unfeeling, unreflective, impulsive choice dictated by a selfish desire to escape the responsibilities of motherhood and by transitory emotional fears.[28] Hundreds of thousands of preborn children, anti-abortionists claim, are "routinely" aborted just because they are not "wanted" by their mothers.[29] Moreover, repealists "have deep suicidal tendencies,"[30] and unsuspecting mothers often are "forced" into abortion by unscrupulous doctors and family planning clinics out to make a fast buck.[31] Indeed, because repealist expressions of concern for the welfare of the mother are "often a mask for a deeply rooted urge to kill," the decision at its worst manifests a cold-blooded, murderous intent.[32] So pervasive is such evil, anti-abortionists warn, once abortion becomes morally acceptable, related evils will overwhelm us; infanticide, euthanasia, and genocide against the "unfit" and the "unwanted" inevitably will result.[33] In the end, we will submit to a new Nazi-like totalitarianism in which matters of life and death will be decided by the state on grounds of social convenience, and we all shall be at the mercy of the "behavioristic social planners" satirized by Huxley and Orwell.[34] One anti-abortionist warns: "The implications of abortion on demand will destroy both medicine and our society. In a brave new world of relative values where even respect for life itself is relative, and 'wantedness' and 'unwantedness' are the measures by which we accept or reject other human beings, nothing will be sacred."[35]

These views of the nature of morality and the moral character of humans are mutually reinforcing. A deontological focus on moral rules gives rise to what has been termed the "thematic primacy of evil," that is, an emphasis on abstention from evildoing rather than on promotion of good-doing.[36] Because people are fundamentally evil (or at least flawed), moral rules are necessary to prevent them from pursuing the immoral courses of action which they otherwise "naturally" would pursue. As one Japanese anti-abortionist declares: "The sooner Japan returns to a solid law which forbids the taking of the life of the unborn, the better for our nation. . . . We need such laws to save us from our individual and collective weakness."[37]

The thematic primacy of evil is in stark contrast to the repealist defense of individual freedom of choice, which assumes that people are competent to choose, e.g., aware of their situations, conscientious in weighing pros and cons, possessing no debilitating character flaws which would bias decisions consistently, and so on.[38] Nor is this chasm likely to be bridged, because a final implication of the deontological view is that compromise is impossible. Because abortion is always wrong, "neutrality" is but a compromise with evil. John Noonan, Jr., argues: "On a life and death matter of this kind, no neutrality is possible. The Government either decides that there is human life present and acts to protect it, or it decides the contrary and stands by as the life is taken."[39] The Joyces claim: "Since there is no middle ground between life and death, there are no grounds for compromise on innocent human life. . . . Only a false sense of liberty will suggest that all laws are subject to compromise. Liberty ends where the right to life begins."[40]

Thus, it should come as no surprise that each side in the abortion debate often finds the arguments of the other side to be question-begging.[41] For there are good reasons to believe that an important reason for the intractability of the controversy is that the opposing sides are philosophically incommensurable, at least through normal, evidence-based argument, and that, therefore, the controversy exemplifies the Johnstonian predicament.

II

It is not possible, however, to know conclusively whether this is a case of philosophical incommensurability in the strict Johnstonian sense. The reason, implied above, is that the public arguments surrounding abortion, even though philosophical, are nonetheless fragmentary; they are more enthymematic and less developed than philosophical arguments, they lack a rigorous philosophical analysis of concepts, and popular moral maxims remain critically unexamined. Given such "looseness," we cannot know for sure (and indeed it is doubtful) that this debate fulfills the Johnstonian paradigm completely; rather, the "fit" is only approximate.

This state of affairs also affects one's answer to the question, "can this impasse be broken?" Johnstone's solution, as noted above, is argumentum ad hominem, which convicts one's opponent of formal self-contradiction, as in the following case of the naturalist:

> If the naturalist holds that all knowledge is a function of the adjustment of the organism to its environment and at that same time pleads that his own knowledge is an exception to this generalization, he cannot hope to be taken seriously. If he tries to extricate himself from this predicament by declaring that just some knowledge is a function of the adjustment of the organism to its environment, he is no longer advocating naturalism, but is only making a quite unexceptional empirical statement. Thus the stake of the naturalist in his own situation is measured by his desire to be taken seriously and at the same time to be a naturalist.[42]

Argumentum ad hominem is one form of consistency argument, a number of other forms of which appear quite frequently in the public debate surrounding abortion. Repealists often argue that anti-abortionists do not consistently uphold the principle of the right to life, e.g., when they grant an exception to the prohibition of abortion in cases where the mother's life is at stake, or in the contexts of capital punishment or war.[43] Repealists also argue that the Church, which opposes abortion, nonetheless does not consistently hold the fetus to be a human person because the Church does not baptize or give funeral rites to the spontaneously aborted.[44] Similarly, repealists argue that the state does not seriously hold the fetus to be a human person because the unborn are not counted in the census, and the state measures age from birth, not conception.[45] For their part, anti-abortionists argue that anyone who is seriously concerned with civil rights in general and women's rights in particular must also, if s/he is to be consistent, be concerned with the rights of the fetus.[46] And anti-abortionists also occasionally invoke the argument implicit in the question, "what if your mother had aborted you?"[47]

These are not *ad hominem* arguments, strictly speaking, and they are not conclusive against their targets. In response to the mother's life exception, anti-abortionists may develop a theory of self-defense, and they may distinguish abortion from capital punishment and war on the grounds that, only in the former case is the victim of killing "innocent."[48] Further, they may argue that the state indeed does recognize the humanity of the fetus in other areas, e.g., in the inheritance of property.[49] And for their part, repealists answer the question, "what if your mother had aborted you?", with the response that, if indeed this had occurred, then they would not exist, and thus could not care one way or the other about the matter.[50]

I know of no pure *ad hominem* arguments in the public debate on abortion, and so for purposes of argument and illustration, I offer my own: the anti-abortion position is self-contradictory because its advocates inconsistently must exempt themselves from their own moral point of view in the process of arguing for that point of view. The thematic primacy of evil (and its religious equivalent, the doctrine of original sin, which evangelical anti-abortionists accept) means that all people naturally will succumb (and have succumbed) to the weaknesses of the flesh, and thus require the certainty of the moral law to determine right from wrong. Yet, if all humanity is basically evil, then so are anti-abortionists.[51] If people by their corrupt nature tend to make immoral choices grounded in selfish convenience, then so do anti-abortionists. And we cannot know that their views on abortion are any exception. Perhaps their insistence on an absolute moral injunction against killing, and its complete authority in the abortion question, is merely a convenient device to legitimate the malicious oppression of women. Or perhaps it is a subterfuge to escape the *angst* and responsibility which accompany authentic moral choice. Or most probably, perhaps the entire deontological point of view is a simple, convenient means of imposing order and stability upon an otherwise bewildering, frightening world.

An anti-abortionist might reply that the moral knowledge concerning abortion is exempt from the general pattern because it is the product of intuition or revelation to those who have been "saved" by "grace." However, this doctrine of salvation may itself be a *deus ex machina* contrived out of the same selfish motives. The only noncircular response available appears to be that only some people tend to be evil, and then only some of the time. But then, like Johnstone's naturalist, the anti-abortionist would have abandoned the deontological moral point of view and, with it, the justification for a complete and exceptionless prohibition of abortion.

Yet, I do not believe that even this *argumentum ad hominem* would be conclusive against an anti-abortionist, who would, I suspect, reject the conclusions and the methods of philosophy. For example, "every one of the best known English academic moral philosophers has put out a doctrine according to which, e.g., it is not possible to hold that it cannot be right to kill the innocent as a means to any end whatsoever and that someone who thinks otherwise is in error."[52] Thus, while virtually all moral philosophy is arrayed against the basic anti-abortionist moral principle, in all probability anti-abortionists, undaunted, would agree with G. E. M. Anscombe: "If someone really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent should be quite excluded from consideration--I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind."[53]

Relatedly, in scrutinizing the legitimacy of moral principles such as "thou shalt not kill," modern philosophy employs casuistic analysis of so-called "hard cases." Such cases can be relatively mundane, as with rape- or incest-induced pregnancy, or they can be quite exotic. Thus, Judith Jarvis Thomson defends the morality of abortion by arguing, in part, from the hypothetical situation in which a person is kidnapped and placed back-to-back in bed with a famous, dying violinist, for nine months, with the two circulatory systems connected so that the person's kidneys can be used to prevent the death of the violinist.[54] And Michael Tooley defends both abortion and infanticide by examining, among other situations, whether it would be wrong to destroy a frozen Frankenstein, or a boy operated on by a religious sect and suffering from a disease that would kill him before puberty.[55] However, this entire analytic procedure is antithetical to the anti-abortionist emphasis on the ordinary, typical cases, and has been rejected explicitly.[56]

In fact, it is quite possible that an anti-abortionist would reject the consistency principle itself as a meaningful test of his or her position.[57] The best exemplar of such anti-abortionist moves appears at the conclusion of an exchange between Senators Birch Bayh and Dewey Bartlett regarding the question, would a constitutional amendment prohibiting abortion also prohibit certain popular forms of contraception?

> BAYH: Do we not have to be consistent? I am trying to find the answers, but it seems to me that whether it is a Senator or a theologian or a doctor who says, "Senator Bayh, life begins when the sperm and the egg join in fertilization," then if we are going to be consistent, and you say you are not supposed to prohibit life, then almost per se you have to logically follow in your reasoning that any effort taken, whether it is commonly called morning after pill or the intrauterine device, that those are really abortive, and thus do, indeed, take life. Is that not consistent logic?
> BARTLETT: Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the Buckley amendment deals with life after implantation. What I would hate to see this committee do is become involved in alot of legalistic specifics and ignore the basic issue of the thousands and thousands of human beings that are killed today by regular abortions, long after implantation.[58]

In short, I suspect that an anti-abortionist similarly would dismiss my ad hominem argument regarding moral point of view, as a legalistic technicality which "begs the question" of the "real issue" of the death of the unborn. And so the usefulness of Johnstone's solution would seem to be severely circumscribed.

III

Therefore, it may be more accurate to speak of the chasm separating anti-abortionists and repealists as a conceptual incommensurability than as a philosophical incommensurability in Johnstone's sense. This conceptual incommensurability is even more fundamental and defiant of resolution in that the opposing sides have not even the formal principle of internal consistency in common (whether as the result of only an imperfect awareness of practical inconsistencies[59] or the rejection of the principle itself). Hence, the anti-abortionist position can tell, in narrative terms, a dramatic story about the human moral condition and its relation to abortion, against which the technical rules of argument have no force. For some, the horror of abortion is beyond argument itself. As one medical journalist says of his experience in watching a fetus-*in utero* recoil from a needle prick: "Whatever else may be said in abortion's defense, the vision of that other defense will not vanish from my eyes. . . . And it has happened that you cannot reason with me now. For what can language do against the truth of what I saw?"[60]

The foregoing analysis thus suggests three tentative conclusions concerning the relationship between philosophical and public argument. First, public argument may participate in

philosophical argument to a great extent: their subject matters (e.g., abortion) may be the same: public argument may make use of philosophical concepts (e.g., utility) in analyzing that subject matter: and public argument may employ philosophical methods (e.g., some consistency arguments). But, second, these similarities are born of expedience, which public argument may abandon when philosophical argument would lead to unwanted conclusions. Therefore, third, philosophical argument at best can tell us only what people "should" believe, which, in the face of a divisive public blood-letting, is rather a pyrrhic achievement.

ENDNOTES

[1] Both statements, by Mrs. Jill Knight and Dr. Thomas Szasz, respectively, are quoted in R. J. Gerber, "Abortion: Parameters for Decision," *Ethics* 82 (January 1972): 137.

[2] I am concerned in this essay only with his original formulation of the nature of *argumentum ad hominem*, found in Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., *Philosophy and Argument* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959). Thus it is not necessary to cite his numerous and more recent discussions of the nature of the self, the role of bilaterality in argument, and other implications of this original formulation.

[3] Johnstone, esp. pp. 57-92. This position is similar to Polanyi's view of the relational nature of "facts"; see Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, *Meaning* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), esp. pp. 22-65.

[4] Johnstone, pp. 56-80.

[5] On June 15, the Court struck down a series of restrictions on abortion in decisions resolving disputes from Virginia, Missouri, and Akron, Ohio, and reinforced its original decisions in *Roe v. Wade* and *Doe v. Bolton*. See "Limits on abortions eased," *Des Moines Register*, 16 June 1983, pp. 1Aff. The details of the campaign to prohibit abortions are in flux. For one recent report, see Betty Cuniberti, "10 Years Later, Abortion Battle is Still Raging," *Los Angeles Times*, 20 Jan. 1983, Pt. V, pp. 1-2. The most recent proposed consitutional amendment, which was rejected in the Senate on June 28, reads: "A right to abortion is not secured by this Constitution,"and is not universally supported by anti-abortionists. See "Senate rebuffs backers of plan to curb abortions," *Des Moines Register*, 29 June 1983, pp. 1Aff.

[6] I have adopted the terms "anti-abortionists" and "repealists" rather than expressions such as "Pro-Lifers" or "Pro-Choice forces" because the former seem best to describe the positions of the respective sides with a minimum of emotional prejudice. "Anti-abortionists" are opposed to abortions and wish them outlawed; "repealists" may or may not favor abortions, but in any case believe that the decision to abort should be an individual one, and that all laws restricting such choice should be repealed.

[7] Celeste Condit Railsback, "Pro-Life, Pro-Choice: Different Conceptions of Value," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Anaheim, CA, November, 1981, p. 2.

[8] Railsback, p. 2.

[9] I say "may be" because there are certain difficulties, to be discussed below, associated with the application of a philosophical framework to public moral argument.

[10] Gerber, p. 138.

[11] Gerber, p. 138.

[12] Robert and Mary Rosera Joyce, *Let Us Be Born: The Inhumanity of Abortion* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1970), pp. 4-5, 78.

[13] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, *Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, Part II, Hearings*, before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, p. 678.

[14] Clifford Bajema, *Abortion and the Meaning of Personhood* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1974), p. 85.

[15] Dr. Mildred Jefferson of the National Right to Life Committee typifies this tendency when she describes one "pro-abortionist emotional appeal" as "proposing to defend a 'right to choose' without finishing the sentence which regarding pregnancy means demanding the private right to choose to kill an unborn child." U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, *Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, Part I, Hearings*, before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, p. 452. Gerber and Railsback, who otherwise describe the principle v. utility issue well, similarly oversimplify.. The most direct principled defense of abortion which addresses this question directly is Lucinda Cisler, "Unfinished Business: Birth Control and Women's Liberation," in *Sisterhood is Powerful*, ed. Robin Morgan (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 245-289, esp. pp. 276-277.

[16] The following summary is derived principally from Randall A. Lake, "The Ethics of Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Ethics in the Abortion Controversy," paper presented at the Southern Speech Communication Association Convention, Hot Springs, AR, April, 1982; and Randall A. Lake, "The Ethics of Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Ethics in the Abortion Controversy" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1982), pp. 161-245.

[17] For discussions of deontological ethics, including contrasts with teleology, see Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964); W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); and Bernard Gert, *The Moral Rules: A New Rational Foundation for Morality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

[18] See Aurel Kolnai, "A Defense of Intrinsicalism Against 'Situation Ethics,'" in *Situationism and the New Morality*, ed. Robert L. Cunningham (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), esp. pp. 266-268. On the other hand, see R. G. Frey, "Circum-

stances and Consequences," *Personalist* 57 (Winter 1976): 34.

[19] This phrase appears in House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, p. 683.

[20] See Bajema, p. 67; House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, pp. 669, 683, 1062.

[21] John T. Noonan, Jr., ed., *The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 1-59. This tradition is said to be 200 years long in House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, p. 315, and 2000 years long in House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, p. 679.

[22] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, p. 677.

[23] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, p. 293.

[24] Railsback, pp. 4-6.

[25] With the possible exception of when the mother's life is at stake. Most anti-abortionists are willing to grant this single exception; see, for example, Bajema, pp. 46-47, House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, pp. 46, 415, and *Part II*, p. 683. However, some anti-abortionists doubt the validity even of therapeutic abortion; see Joyce, p. 42, and Baruch Brody, *Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life: A Philosophical View* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1975).

[26] Bajema, p. 7.

[27] For the seminal statement of "situation ethics," see Joseph Fletcher, *Situation Ethics: The New Morality* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966). Fletcher notes that situationism holds a nominalist, rather than intrinsicalist, theory of value; pp. 57-58. On ethical relativism, see Abraham Edel, *Ethical Judgment: The Use of Science in Ethics* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 26, 205-209, and, in general, John Ladd, ed., *Ethical Relativism* (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1973). On moral skepticism, see Richard B. Brandt, "Ethical Relativism," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards, III (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), pp. 75-76.

[28] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, p. 659; Bajema, p. 79.

[29] See, for example, the advertisement placed by the Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Life in the *Eau Claire Leader-Telegram*, 14 Apr. 1980, p. 12A.

[30] Joyce, p. xi.

[31] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, pp. 683, 934.

[32] Joyce, p. 53.

[33] For infanticide see House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, pp. 195-196, 261, and *Part II*, pp. 674, 676, 682, 780, 957, 1032; for euthanasia, see House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, pp. 393, 398-399, 462, and *Part II*, pp. 672, 674, 682, 931, 1057; for the unfit, see House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, p. 197, and Bajema, p. 64.

[34] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, p. 1073; see also Bajema, p. 12, and Joyce, p. 78.

[35] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, p. 932.

[36] The phrase appears in Kolnai, p. 240; see also Ross, pp. 21-22, and Gert, pp. 8, 44-59.

[37] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, p. 945.

[38] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, p. 331.

[39] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, p. 86.

[40] Joyce, p. 7.

[41] For examples, see: Joseph Margolis, "Abortion," *Ethics* 84 (October 1973): 52-53; House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, p. 53; Jan Narveson, "Semantics, Future Generations, and the Abortion Problem: Comments on a Fallacious Case Against the Morality of Abortion," *Social Theory and Practice* 3 (Fall 1975): 461-485; George Sher, "Hare, Abortion, and the Golden Rule," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6 (Winter 1977): 185-190; House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, pp. 1034-1039; and House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, p. 133.

[42] Johnstone, p. 75.

[43] Railsback, p. 2.

[44] See Ralph Potter, Jr., quoted in Philip E. Devine, *The Ethics of Homicide* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 88; and House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, p. 497.

[45] Potter, in Devine, p. 88.

[46] Steven R. Valentine, for example, writes: "If the moral basis for support of the feminist cause is opposition to oppression, then is it not inconsistent to endorse the ultimate oppression of depriving an unborn child of his or her right to live?" "Republicans are Right on Abortion," *Minneapolis Tribune*, 13 Oct. 1980, p. 8A.

[47] See Garrett Hardin, *Mandatory Motherhood: The True Meaning of 'Right to Life'* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974), p. 65.

[48] See, respectively, House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*,

p. 707, and Bajema, pp. 53-54.

[49] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, p. 297; see also Devine, pp. 88-90.

[50] Hardin, p. 65; see also House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, p. 680.

[51] Indeed, if fetuses are human from conception, then they too must be evil, although anti-abortionists generally defend the fetal right to life on the grounds that the fetus is an *innocent* victim whose death cannot be justified.

[52] G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," *Philosophy* 33 (1958): 9-10.

[53] Anscombe, p. 17.

[54] Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1 (Fall 1971): 47-66.

[55] Michael Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 2 (Fall 1972): 37-65.

[56] Kolnai, p. 242; and John T. Noonan, Jr., "How to Argue About Abortion," in *Contemporary Issues in Bioethics*, eds. Tom L. Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters (Belmont, Cal.: Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc.,1978), pp. 210-212.

[57] See Missouri Attorney General John Danforth's testimony in House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, p. 384.

[58] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part II*, p. 690.

[59] See Daryl J. Bem's discussion of "opinion molecules" in *Beliefs, Attitudes and Human Affairs* (Belmont, Cal.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 38-39.

[60] House, *Proposed Amendments*, *Part I*, p. 86.

THE INSTITUTE FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS: PUBLIC EDUCATION IN ARGUMENTATION, 1937-1942[*]

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Argumentation has a long tradition as both an interdisciplinary and an applied field of inquiry. Perhaps no organization better illustrates these two facets of the argumentation field than does the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, an association that existed between 1937 and 1942. Truly, the Institute's nature was interdisciplinary, for it brought together talented academicians and writers from a wide range of disciplines in the arts, sciences, and professions. The mission of the Institute was a program of applied rhetorical education. The endeavor was to apply concepts of rhetoric and critical thinking to current political, social, and economic events and, thereby, educate citizens in using principles of argumentation and logic as lenses for a more careful consumption of communication.

This paper is a brief survey of the Institute's interdisciplinary and applied work that brought argumentation theory to the general public. The paper reports findings about the emergence, work, and demise of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. This research shows that the Institute was founded in response to then-prevalent concerns about the power of propaganda and that the Institute developed an influential program to educate the public about propaganda. The Institute disbanded as social and academic concerns shifted, first, from reform (in the 1930s) to winning World War II, and, later, to society's general desire to get back to business and academe's specific intention to advance theoretical social science.

The Founding of the Institute

By the 1930s, many writers, educators and business leaders were concerned that the general public was all too susceptible to the then-apparently-increasing voices of domestic and foreign propagandists. The organizing of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, in 1936 and 1937, was seen as one useful response to the powerful propagandas of the age. In particular, the public spirited leaders of a growing propaganda analysis movement believed that an Institute could help Americans better cope with three dangerous propagandas of the period: war propaganda, extremist political propaganda, and the propaganda of commercial advertising.

Probably it was war propaganda that most concerned those of the propaganda analysis movement. During World War I, as H. C. Peterson notes, "people under the influence of the propaganda came to look upon the struggle of 1914-18 as a simple conflict between the forces of good and evil; they felt that all that was wrong was that certain malevolent individuals had gained control of an autocratic government and were attempting to dictate to the rest of the world."[1] In contrast, soon after the war, the conviction grew that America's entry into World War I was due to exaggerated claims about Germany's evil and threatening nature. This view was born of the disillusionment that followed the World War. Scores of books and articles reported the details of the promotional campaign in which the fight of the Allies against Germany became a struggle of right versus wrong. Exposes by popular writers, descriptions by the World War I propagandists, themselves, and accounts by scholars, all produced the popular feeling that the U.S. government and, especially, the Allied governments of Britain and France, had exaggerated the need for and morality of the 1914-1918 crusade to defeat the Central Powers.

Harold Lasswell's 1927 study of *Propaganda Technique in the World War*[2] is typical of the skeptical view of World War I that became accepted in the decade after 1918. Lasswell showed how governments tailored their statements of war aims to appeal to different public groups: labor organizations, business groups, liberal idealists, and religious leaders. He noted the efforts to transform a brutal war (what Lasswell had called, at one point, "the late struggle for world supremacy" [p. 60]) into a contest of good (the Allies) versus evil (the Central Powers). As a specific example of the atmosphere of distortion, Lasswell (p. 66) cited the case of how the war aim of ending "secret diplomacy"--a diplomatic activity practiced by both the Allies and the Central Powers--was transformed into an indictment of only Germany and her cohorts. Lasswell's book chronicles the self-serving nature of many of the calls for United States' participation in the war: For example, the British and French wanted our help to attain their selfish war aims; and America's J. P. Morgan and Company saw U.S. entry as a way to safeguard its loans to the British (pp. 78-79). Lasswell (p. 82) noted the reuse by propagandists of war atrocity stories that had served in previous wars. He cited the use by propagandists of such outright fabrications as altered, faked pictures and staged events (pp. 206-207).

The revelations about World War I brought about a revisionist sentiment in the 1920s. By the 1930s, as war tensions increased in Europe, many influential persons worried that the propaganda of war--idealistic war aims, atrocity stories, and the like--again would drag the United States into needless participation in a European conflict. This particular fear had a major influence on the founder of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Clyde R. Miller, who was a member of the faculty of education and a publicist for Columbia University. According to Harold Lavine,[3] the Editorial Director of the Institute, Miller had been a news reporter at the time of World War I and had then fully subscribed to the "crush the Hun" spirit of the times. Miller was on hand when Eugene V. Debs, a socialist leader, spoke against the war in Canton, Ohio on June 16, 1918. Because Miller had reported the speech, he felt partly responsible for the growth of public condemnation of Debs--the flurry of criticism that led to Debs' subsequent indictment, conviction, and imprisonment for sedition. Miller, who had testified at Debs' trial, came to share the contemporary rethinking of the war and joined others who worked to secure a pardon for Debs. As the years passed, Miller maintained the conviction that he had been hoodwinked by war propaganda. His founding of the Institute was part of a personal commitment that the nation should not again be stampeded into a war fury.

War propaganda was not the only concern of the opinion leaders who worked to establish the Institute. The advocates of propaganda analysis feared that extremist propaganda (e.g., of the Ku Klux Klan, the communists and the domestic fascists) and the commercial propaganda of mass advertising both might be undermining the ability of Americans intelligently to participate in their democratic institutions. Concern that propagandas were inhibiting people's ability to think clearly and straight prompted Edward A. Filene, a wealthy Boston merchant and liberal-minded philanthropist, to call two meetings that gave birth to the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. In his memoirs, Edward L. Bernays recalled those meetings.[4] The first session, held at the University Club in Boston, brought together "a score of educators, psychologists and publicists" who confronted the question of "How to make Americans think, not what to make Americans think." Bernays reports that "Filene told us he was afraid that America was becoming the victim of propaganda (the year was 1936), that Americans had lost their capacity to think things through. He wished to make Americans think so that they could meet the problems democracy was facing and had provided $10,000 a year toward this purpose." Each of the persons present offered, in turn, a suggestion as to how the public best could be educated against propaganda. Suggestions included more aid to teachers colleges, better motion pictures, and better adult education. Bernays notes that the evening wore on with nothing accomplished. Some months later, when another similar meeting seemed on the verge of failure, Filene, "with an air of near desperation" turned to one of those present, Clyde R. Miller, of Columbia University, and gave him the $10,000, saying "I don't care how you spend the money . . . The American nation must be taught to think."

Miller went to work, recruiting a distinguished group of academicians to serve as officers of the Institute and as members of its Advisory Board. This interdisciplinary group eventually included persons from the fields of psychology (Hadley Cantril and Leonard Doob), sociology (Robert S. Lynd and Alfred McClung Lee), history (Charles A. Beard and James Shotwell), education (Edgar Dale and Robert Speer), philosophy (E.C. Lindeman), political science (Peter Odegard), economics (Paul Douglas), geology (Kirtley F. Mather), and journalism (Ralph Casey). Miller created two major staff positions, those of Editorial Director and Educational Director, positions that corresponded to the major work of the Institute. Harold Lavine, a newspaper reporter, assumed the former position, and Violet Edwards (Lavine), a Columbia graduate student who had been Miller's assistant, took the later assignment.

The Work of the Institute

Miller's commitment, Filene's grant, and the distinguished officers, board members and staff members combined to give the Institute for Propaganda Analysis an auspicious start. Another strong point in the Institute's early favor was the development of the seven propaganda devices, the best-known of the organization's methods of rhetorical analysis. In the second issue of the Institute's bulletin, *Propaganda Analysis*, the now-standard roster of "the seven common propaganda devices" made its first appearance[5]: name calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonial, plain folks, card stacking, and band wagon. Harold Lavine observes that the seven devices were a useful 'gimmick" that captured people's imaginations.[6] Edgar Dale recalls that "the quick popularity of the anti-propaganda movement was caused by the fact that there were seven neat, easily understood principles set up."[7]

But the seven devices were and are more than mere gimmick. They supplied a compact roster of terms for rhetorical analysis. The Institute's propaganda devices applied, in short hand form, facets of traditional informal logic to the audience-centered nature of rhetorical transactions. Most of the terms explicitly were defined to connect a technique of message construction (e.g., referring to opponents by a prejudicial name) to the audience (i.e., noting that name calling "appeals to our hate and fear"). To be sure, the devices may be improved upon as in the expanded typology[8] developed by Alfred McClung Lee, the Institute's later Executive Director and Professor Emeritus of Sociology and Anthropology, Brooklyn College. But to dismiss this embryonic roster, today, because, for instance, the seven terms are not reliable categories for a contemporary-style statistical content analysis,[9] is to miss their import. At the time (1937) they were a remarkable rhetorical insight and they still have usefulness as touchstones for the rhetorical analysis of social interaction. In the 1930s the seven devices became centerpieces of the Institute's applied studies of then-contemporary propaganda, for instance, serving as the basis for a review of the "Propaganda Techniques of German Fascism" (Propaganda Analysis, I, No. 8, May 1938 , 37-52). The devices are cited even today in textbooks in speech, English, and sociology.

The seven propaganda devices reveal the universality of the Institute's rhetorical approach to the subject of propaganda. Noting that many students of the subject "want to have propaganda describe only the hidden techniques, leaving the other parts to be called 'argumentation,'" the Institute adopted the alternate course of viewing propaganda as a synonym for argumentation. That is, the Institute defined propaganda broadly so that it encompassed all techniques used "to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends."[10] The Institute's program, therefore, was an effort to educate the public about the activities of the major forces seeking to promote social attitudes and actions.

As I observed, earlier, there were two focal points to the work of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. One was its publications program, featuring the monthly Propaganda Analysis bulletins. The other was its educational program that involved both the preparation of curricular materials and the testing of and distributing of these materials in schools and among adult groups.

The Propaganda Analysis bulletins were monthly newsletters of between four and ten pages in length, containing (1) a feature article that probed some persuasive campaign or event and (2) a concluding educational section with exercises, suggested readings, and discussion material. The lead articles of the bulletins originated in discussions among members of the Institute's staff. The articles were worked into final form by the Editorial Director who then submitted the pieces to the members of the Institute's Advisory Board for approval and comment. Harold Lavine, whose tenure as Editorial Director involved preparation of most of the bulletins, notes that some of the board members were quite conscientious in correcting the issues, notably Charles A. Beard.[11]

The bulletin's feature articles were of several types. A few of the issues, especially the early ones, presented more in the way of a general theory or methodology of propaganda analysis. Issues on "How to Detect Propaganda" (Propaganda Analysis, I, No. 2, November 1937) and "Some ABC's of Propaganda Analysis"(Propaganda Analysis, I, No. 3, December 1937) are particular cases in point. Still other of the lead articles applied principles of propaganda analysis to particular media of communication. Examples included the issues on "How to Analyze Newspapers" (Propaganda Analysis, I, No. 4, January 1938), "The Movies and Propaganda" (Propaganda Analysis, I, No. 6, March 1938), and "Propaganda on the Air" (Propaganda Analysis, I, No. 9, June 1938). The Institute's case study type articles were the most frequent of all. Two examples were: (1) "The Ford Sunday Evening Hour" (Propaganda Analysis, I, No. 10, July 1938) which analyzed the content of and techniques in a radio program sponsored by Henry Ford; and (2) "The A & P Campaign" (Propaganda Analysis, II, No. 3, December 1, 1938) which explored A & P's efforts to combat anti-chain store legislation. Finally, some bulletins were timely comments on current events. For example, in the "News from Europe" (Propaganda Analysis, II, No. 1, October 1, 1938) the Institute considered the problems reporters had in keeping up with and reporting on the maneuverings of Europe's great powers, Germany, England, and France.

In preparing the articles, the predominant approach was to research the given subject and then to analyze the medium, person, campaign or event on the basis of this research. In this way, the Institute for Propaganda Analysis showcased the work of academicians and other credible writers.[12] Overall, the articles read much like either (1) academic analyses of contemporary persuasive situations by scholars of rhetoric or (2) the analysis or background stories of today's journalists.

While the bulletin's feature stories had an insightful, analytic tone, they could not be described as absolutely neutral. Indeed, one letter writer compained to the Institute that "I expected that your bulletins would be so full of the attitude of the scientific research worker that there would be no room for any of the layman's sympathies or prejudices. But I was disappointed . . . for they reveal bias, not merely in the study of propaganda methods, but in fact even about the actual subjects of propaganda."[13] This commentator correctly observed the presence in the bulletin of indications of the Institute's point of view. For instance, there is an undeniable disapproving tone present in the earlier-mentioned review in the bulletin of the "Propaganda Techniques of German Fascism." However, the Institute emphasized its effort to base analysis on documented research. An often-appearing phrase in the bulletins was: "The Institute does not have all the answers . . . If it makes mistakes, it will acknowledge them. It asks those who receive its letters to check its work." In this connection, then, the varying degrees of the Institute's editorial position that were contained in the articles can be seen as reasoned applications of the ethics, validity, and truth standards that today are recognized as acceptable bases for academic studies of argumentation in the fields of speech and English. Still, the evaluative tone of the articles made them appear far less scientific than the results of quantitative content analysis, a situation which contributed to the later declining interest by social scientists in participating in the applied work of the Institute. Leonard Doob, a member of the Institute's Advisory Board, and also Sterling Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Yale University, hypothesizes that the Institute eventually might have switched to the then-rapidly-developing content analytic methods.[14]

At the time of the Institute's closing in early 1942, the circulation of the monthly *Propaganda Analysis* bulletins was 10,000, an increase from earlier subscription lists of 5,500 (in September 1938) and 7,000 (in September 1939).[15] As the Institute noted in its final issue of the bulletin, however, the influence of the organization should be seen in more than numerical terms: "Thirty-seven percent of the subscriptions were for educators or schools, colleges, or public and business libraries. Twenty-five percent of the subscribers were persons of community or national prominence, including governmental officials, ministers, editors, advertising and public relations men, school superintendents, college professors, lecturers."[16]

While the *Propaganda Analysis* bulletins were the major publishing vehicle of the Institute, the organization did sponsor two books. One, *The Fine Art of Propaganda*, by Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee, was published by Harcourt, Brace in 1939,[17] and the other, *War Propaganda and the United States*, by Harold Lavine and James Wechsler, was published in 1940 by Yale University Press.[18] The Lees' book was an analysis of the argumentation in the radio speeches of Father Coughlin, a Catholic priest whose right-wing appeals drew a considerable following prior to World War II. By 1942, some 13,500 copies of this book, which was written around the seven propaganda devices, had been sold.[19] It still is in print by the International Society for General Semantics (paperbound) and by Octagon Books (hardbound). Lavine and Wechsler's book reviewed the war propaganda directed at the United States in late 1939 and early 1940. It was reprinted by the Arno Press in 1972.

In addition to the rhetorical analyses published by or sponsored by the Institute, the organization devoted considerable resources to its educational program. Under Violet Edwards, Educational Director, the Institute supplemented its rhetorical studies with pedagogical notes, exercises, bibliographies, and discussion material. A major component of this pedagogical program was presented in the educational section of the monthly *Propaganda Analysis* bulletins. This explicit educational dimension of the bulletins was present from the first in the form of "Suggested Activities and Discussion Notes" which usually occupied about one-half page. These suggestions read very much like the questions or probes that often follow chapters in a textbook. A typical probe is this sample from the March 1938 bulletin in which the lead article had analyzed "The Movies and Propaganda": "Discuss some of the assumptions taken for granted by the stories of current films. For instance, is happiness the chief goal of life? . . ."[20]

Beginning with volume II, the educational section of the bulletins was retitled "Propaganda Analysis Worksheet," reflecting the greater length (around two to ten pages) and more varied content of the pedagogical section. The worksheet pages presented further analyses, relevant excerpts, and bibliographies to complement the lead article. Other types of educational material included samples of the Institute's tests of critical thinking. Representative of the expanded educational pages was the worksheet of the June 10, 1939 issue of *Propaganda Analysis*. The lead article, "Britain Woos America," analyzed the efforts by the English government, in the wake of deteriorating relations with Germany, to solidify British relations with Canada and the United States. The article discussed the symbolic and persuasive dimensions of the visit by King George VI and Queen Elizabeth to Canada and the USA. Conclusions about the probable effect and intent of the visit were reinforced with citations from academic studies of Britain's efforts to win favor and support before and during America's participation in World War I. The essay concluded with one-paragraph analyses of the royal visit by leading journalists, not all of whom (e.g., William Randolph Hearst) agreed with the Institute's views. Following this five-page article was a three-page "Propaganda Analysis Worksheet" that (1) discussed possible persuasive-propagandistic intentions of Britain's exhibition, at the 1939 World's Fair, of the Magna Carta and a family tree diagram showing George Washington's English ancestry; (2) analyzed the argumentative techniques of identification that were being used by Britain; (3) presented exercises, such as one suggesting that readers gather cartoons, newspaper and magazine accounts of the royal visit of 1939; and (4) suggested readings, such as Lasswell's *Propaganda Technique in the World War* and other academic or well-known journalistic studies of propaganda in the late war.[21] This approach of using the educational pages as an extension of the lead article was a pattern reflected in many later bulletins, such as in the January 1941 issue which probed propaganda of pacifist groups against United States' entry into World War II.[22]

The educational pages of the *Propaganda Analysis* bulletins probably were the most publicly visible aspect of the Institute's educational operation. The Institute, however, also opened a second front of propaganda education. This took the form of a direct effort to develop, test and distribute educational materials for public schools, colleges, and adult civic, social, and study groups. The major arsenal of this front was the *Group Leader's Guide to Propaganda Analysis*, written in 1938 by Violet Edwards.[23] As with other aspects of the Institute's work, the *Leader's Guide* was written to promote critical thinking and informed discussion about current issues. The *Leader's Guide* contained theoretical reviews of propaganda, of the scientific method, and of the Institute's pedagogical philosophy. It presented group projects and exercises. It gave examples of how propaganda analysis, for instance, might be used to scrutinize the techniques of suggestion and argumentation in advertisements. It discussed how propaganda analysis applied to and could be used in the subjects of English literature, music, speech, art, history, journalism, current events, social science, logic, mathematics, and in other fields. Overall, the *Leader's Guide* contained much in the way of helpful hints for the classroom teacher or adult discussion leader. Five experimental study units were presented, complete with learning objectives, educational procedures, activities, and readings.

The *Leader's Guide* concluded with an extensive review of group discussion as an educational technique. By September 1939, the Institute's educational materials were being used in 550 cooperating high schools and colleges and were in use in numerous adult civic and study groups.[24]

The Demise of the Institute

At a meeting on October 29, 1941, in the Advertising Club in New York City, the Institute's board of advisers voted to suspend operations.[25] In a press release of October 31, the Institute explained that it was suspending publication of *Propaganda Analysis* "for the duration of the war crisis,"[26] in view of President Roosevelt's announcement that the United States apparently was entering the shooting stage of the war. In the last issue of *Propaganda Analysis* the Institute further clarified its decision to suspend activities, noting that "the publication of dispassionate analyses of all kinds of propaganda, 'good' and 'bad,' is easily misunderstood during a war emergency, and more important, the analyses could be misused for undesirable purposes by persons opposing the government's efforts."[27] Wanting neither to publish analyses of the U.S. government's propaganda nor to take a *de facto* partisan position by analyzing only enemy propaganda, the Institute closed, believing that "long-time programs like the Institute's could wait" while friends and supporters made, elsewhere, "their own effort to aid democracy in the crisis."[28]

That the immediate situation of war prompted the suspension of the Institute's editorial and educational activities is not surprising. That the Institute did not after World War II reemerge from its suspension is a more complex and interesting story. The demise of the chief promoting organization of propaganda analysis can be attributed to a number of factors, including the individual interests of the Institute's participants, the social atmosphere of the postwar period, and certain new opportunities for academicians who formerly participated in the Institute's work.

The most direct reason that the Institute did not reemerge is that the people who were on board when the organization closed in 1942 pursued other interests, chiefly academic research, after 1945. Two members of the Institute's board, Edgar Dale and Leonard Doob both report that they were quite busy with their own postwar research projects.[29] Doob indicates that he essentially forgot about the Institute. And while Alfred McClung Lee kept up the charter of the Institute for a time, he, too, pursued other individual academic projects.[30] Lee notes that, given the funding problem, restarting the Institute would have required the philanthropy of an Edward A. Filene, and that foundations such as Ford's or Rockefeller's would not have been interested.[31] Harold Lavine adds that the Institute's founder, Clyde Miller, who was more of a promoter than an academic writer, no longer had the strength for such a considerable undertaking.[32] So while Lee kept the Institute legally alive until 1950, the organization actually had died some time earlier.

Still, to say that the individuals who made up the Institute's staff and board no longer made the Institute a priority raises the question of why concern in academe for educating the public about propaganda had waned between 1941 and 1945. A number of factors seem to have been at work. First, in the postwar period, there existed less sense of a need to reform society. The turbulent economic crises and war concerns had lessened. Domestic extremists were less publicly active. Harold Lavine, the Institute's former Editorial Director, who had gone to work for *Newsweek* in 1946, reports the overall complacency of the public mood. The times were prosperous and stable, especially in comparison to what people had experienced in the 1930s. Further, Lavine notes, there was no significant revisionist sentiment about American participation in World War II. Most people remained satisfied that our entry into the war had been necessary and proper, and that our victory had been worthwhile.[33]

A second reason why the academicians who formerly promoted public propaganda analysis now largely forsook this interest was the pressure placed on academicians not to criticize society. These pressures had been building in the late 1930s and early 1940s in view of such dampers on social criticism as the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities. In fact, perhaps prompted by the Institute's critical scrutiny of the committee's tactics (*Propaganda Analysis*, III, No. 4, January 15, 1940), Martin Dies, chairman of the committee announced, in February 1940 that the Institute had been "under investigation" for two years. However, the Institute's president, Kirtley Mather of Harvard University, was unable to get any more specific information about the alleged investigation.[34] Harold Lavine notes that at this time--before the postwar panic about domestic and foreign communists had taken hold--suggestions that criticism was "un-American" were not taken particiularly seriously. Violet Edwards recalls that Dies had suggested she was a communist, an unsubstantiated charge that was treated humorously by the president of Columbia University.[35] However, even in the relatively skeptical prewar period, the mere unsupported suggestion by Dies that he was investigating the Institute brought, according to Alfred McClung Lee, some resignations from academicians serving on the Institute's board. And, notes Lee, the pressures on academics not to rock society's boat increased after World War II, a situation that brought about much self-censorship by the professoriate.[36]

Harold Lavine observes that, for working journalists, the McCarthy, communist-scare era was not a damper on reporters since they only wanted good stories. In fact, he notes that the witch-hunting, red-baiting days of the McCarthy period marked a plenitude of stories for journalists. Speaking of his earlier experiences as the Institute's chief writer, Lavine recalled that while organizations did not appreciate close scrutiny by the Institute, there was not much pressure applied given the lack of a cold war to legitimize McCarthy-style charges.[37]

The postwar pressures not to criticize and the concomitant academic self-censorship only partially account for the disinterest in academe for a revival of the public educational program of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. It was not that the professors simply shied away from critical analyses of contemporary society. Rather, the postwar situation provided an attractive alternative for scholars in social science. Leonard Doob reports that many social scientists did not view the work of the Institute has having a great deal of objectivity or scientific character. Doob, himself, saw the Institute's propaganda studies as useful efforts to reform society but not as theoretical advances in social science. He notes that an academician could not fully serve both the causes of social reform and theoretical social psychology. Doob observes that in liberal arts universities, such as Yale, theoretical research is more prestigious than applied work. Further, as Doob indicates, the very term "propaganda" began to lose favor as the more objective sounding concepts of communication, persuasion, and public opinion replaced it in the lexicon of social science. Indeed, Doob reports he would not have dreamed of using propaganda as a significant theoretical term in his 1961 study of Communication in Africa. Overall, Doob reports the predominant feeling among psychologists in the postwar period and beyond that studies of the type published by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis were obsolete given the vast increase in psychological knowledge and the considerable sophistication of experimental and survey research methods. Doob adds that it would not have occurred to him to have used the seven propaganda devices in the postwar period, believing as he did that this typology was "old stuff" that had been superseded by the new knowledge in and methods of academic social science.[38]

Doob's hard distinction between the applied rhetorical work of the Institute and the theoretical,quantitative methods of academic social science is not entirely shared by Alfred McClung Lee. Lee views the propaganda analysis of the Institute as being an applied sociology--an effort by participant observers to get out and see what was happening in society. Taking a view of science as careful observation, Lee believes that 1930s-style propaganda analysis amounted to clinical studies of messages, using an eclectic approach that scrutinized every facet of the communication.[39]

Lee's observations are in keeping with today's less rigid separation of qualitative and quantitative methods in social science. Still, because the Propaganda Analysis bulletin's articles were unsigned and were not fully footnoted, they would not be completely academicallycredible today. In the context of the 1940s, the work of the Institute further suffered by being entirely nonquantitative in an era that saw great advances in experimental and survey techniques. Beyond this, because social scientists then (and now) did (do) not make use of the extensive corpus of writings on rhetoric and argumentation, the nonquantitative rhetorical studies of the Institute would not appear to these researchers to be very theoretically productive. Thus, while an argumentation scholar in the fields of speech, English or philosophy might give the Institute's studies academic credence from the perspective of 2500 years of writings on rhetoric, the nature of the Institute's publications (applied, evaluative, nonquantitative) and the tenor of postwar social science (theoretical, nonevaluative, quantitative) combined to make academic social scientists disinterested in reviving the Institute's work.

So, born of the strife of the 1930s, the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, in general, seemed out of place in a more peaceful and prosperous world. Specifically, the academicians who earlier had sustained this remarkable effort at public education in argumentation came to see their earlier applied interests as nonrelevant to the now more important pursuit of theoretical social science. Sharing the relatively complacent public mood of the 1940s and 1950s, and implicitly or explicitly aware of the more powerful dampers on social criticism, the academicians embraced the new terminology and technology of academic social science. A unique experiment in applied rhetorical education had come to an close.

Footnotes

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[26] Interview with Alfred McClung Lee.

[27] Propaganda Analysis, IV, No. 13 [February 1942], p. 1.

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[29] Interview with Leonard Doob, and Interview with Edgar Dale, Columbus, Ohio, June 14, 1982.

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[38] Interview with Leonard Doob.

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TOWARD A MODEL OF EFFECTIVE PUBLIC ARGUMENTATION:

A CASE STUDY OF EXECUTIVE PRESENTATIONS TO CITY COUNCILS

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When public officials go before their governing boards and councils to secure approval for the ordinances, contracts, budgets and policy statements that keep our city and state governments operating, we are observing the essence of public argumentation. Moreover, when these public officials, persons such as the Chief of Police, city engineer, personnel director and airport manager succeed in getting the council members to vote for the recommendations their staffs prepare, we can assume that the result will be an improved quality of life for the citizens of the community. As communication scholars, therefore, we have a vested interest in assuring that these legislative presentations become outstanding models of public argumentation.[1] More specifically, we must help these public servants acquire insights and abilities needed to prepare and deliver messages that are clear, concise, and reasonable--reasonable not only to the elected members of the council or board, but more importantly, reasonable to the general populace upon whom all action impacts and from whom all action is authorized.

During the past two years, my consulting activity has given me the opportunity to study dozens of successful and unsuccessful presentations at the invitation of city managers in both large and small municipalities. The case history of one agenda item, in particular, has served to characterize the difficulties many government officials have with public argumentation. I will review the case here so the model of effective public argumentation I develop in this paper can be perceived from an appropriate contextual orientation.

Quite simply, the Chief of Police wanted the city council to authorize a "contract towing" system to replace the practice of having the police refer to a rotation list in order to offer towing opportunities to every garage, wrecking yard and service station in town. The reasons offered for this change included a need to stabilize costs, guarantee responsiveness, decrease citizen complaints, reduce paperwork, and improve the productivity of the police department. Approximately two hundred tows, mostly impounded vehicles involved in drunk driving situations and abandoned vehicles condemned for salvage, were assigned to ten operators on the rotation list. In a realistic sense, this appeared to be a minor issue which would receive rapid approval. Such was not the case.

Initially, the police chief developed a "draft ordinance" which clearly served to define the contract towing concept and to assert the claim that this was a superior way to manage one small segment of police activity. Approximately six pages of argument supported this policy claim.[2] The central argument consisted of a series of testimonies from police officials in neighboring communities attesting to the success they were having with the contract tow system. Moreover, since the arguments were authored by a special task force, they were optimally credible.

As the proposal moved through the management system, the city attorney was asked to approve the wording of the proposed ordinance and the city manager was asked to place the matter on the agenda for council action. The idea, now ready to become law, was formally offered up to the council as a written "staff report."

Staff reports vary in length from four to several hundred pages. In any given week, a member of the city council in a major urban environment can expect to receive between twelve and forty agenda items with anywhere form 50-2000 pages of supporting arguments. These supporting arguments may be extremely succinct; as when an action is mandated by law, or long and complex; as when several city officials and numerous external consultants combine their efforts to justify some complex activity such as an urban renewal project.

This paper avalanche, of course, puts a tremendous burden upon the council member. Since most of them are only part time public servants, it comes as no surprise to find that these written arguments are seldom read in full. Consequently, the oral presentation assumes a preeminent role in the overall governmental system. As such, the public argumentation skills of our city officials become the keystone that keeps our city and state governments operating effectively. Nevertheless, the oral presentation must be preceded by the written staff report.

In this instance, the staff report consisted of a standardized cover sheet and the six pages of supporting arguments which had been authored by the police department task group. On the cover sheet, it was made clear that the council was being asked to assent to the policy of contract towing by voting approval for the Chief of Police to call for sealed bids by any and all interested tow-truck operators. In appropriate legal terms, of course, the ordinance specified a host of particular conditions that bidders would have to meet to be eligible to win the contract. Chief among the conditions was a requirement that the tow operator be able to demonstrate that they could provide a fenced and lighted storage yard within city limits and a minimum of two fully equipped tow trucks.

When read with some care, the staff report constituted a reasonably compelling argument in support of a fairly minor change of public policy. Moreover, the issue appeared to impact on a rather small segment of the community. As such, I was initially surprised to find that three public sessions and a total of one hour and ten minutes of the council's time was consumed by this proposal.

At the first session, the Chief of Police, using the staff report as a reference, simply pointed out that he was before the council to urge their approval for a contract towing system. He noted that three neighboring communities used such a system and that he felt it would help his officers if it were adopted locally. He then asked if the mayor or members of the council had any questions.

Forty minutes of rambling dialogue followed. In desperation, the action was tabled for later consideration and the Chief was given three specific questions to research: 1) how many tow companies would be eligible to bid for the contract as it was specified in the ordinance; 2) what cost benefits would accrue the citizens; and 3) could the current system be made to work if fixed rates were specified for all tows?

The city manager, assistant city manager and chief of police spent several hours preparing responses to these questions. Three days after the initial presentation, the Chief again appeared before the council to answer the three questions. At the appropriate time, the Chief did exactly that. He restated the questions he had been asked and offered his responses. Perceived out of context, however, the responses offered by the Chief simply confused the citizens in the audience and thus a small tow truck operator felt compelled to come forth and oppose the ordinance. Twenty minutes of dialogue again led to a postponement. This time, the City Attorney was charged with the task of writing an escape clause that said the council could reject all bids if they felt that too few tow companies responded to the call for bids.

At the third council session, the item was once again brought to the floor. This time, however, the Chief of Police and the other senior officials of the city government had attended the "executive presentation workshop" and had acquired both the insights and abilities needed to make effective public arguments. As a consequence, the Chief delivered a clear, concise and reasonable argument for contract towing and the matter was passed amid a flurry of comments praising him for the quality of his newly acquired argumentation skill.

The case history of this "contract towing" proposal and numerous other observations, has led me to conclude that highly successful administrators were making four consistent errors when they prepared public arguments for their city councils:

1) arguments were grounded upon an incomplete analysis of the audience;

2) arguments were developed in a problem--solution rather than a solution--reasons format;

3) the presenters assumed a passive advocacy role as evidenced by the excessive reliance upon questions from the council; and

4) the presenters offered equivocal messages as evidenced by something akin to a two-sided approach to persuasion.

Each of these problems will be elaborated upon in the following section of this paper. Moreover, the principles of public argumentation that were developed to counter these weaknesses and the prescriptions that were developed to serve as the basis for a public argumentation model will be included here. In the final section of the paper, the final argument that was developed by the Chief of Police to support the proposal for a contract towing system will be offered as a summary example of the model itself.

THE PERSONAL COUNCIL VS THE PUBLIC AUDIENCE

Given the small number of council members and a politically astute mayor, it is natural for city officials to try and tailor their arguments to fit the perceived perspectives of those "persons" that make up the council. During strategy discussions, therefore, it is inevitable that the probable responses of each council member will be anticipated. Moreover, when objections are anticipated, an attempt will be made to counter the objection with an argument deemed appropriate to the value systems of the individual involved.

If, for example, one council person represents a low income area of the community, special consideration may be given to an analysis of the objections which might be anticipated from a person representing poor people. If another council person represents key business interests, a similar anticipation of his or her special orientation to the proposed plan might lead to the formation of an argument to the rich. Realize, however, that any effort to "make everyone happy" by selecting arguments tailored to each individual will almost certainly prove frustrating at best. Nevertheless, the written argument, or "staff report," is often designed to cover all bases and counter all objections. Paragraph by paragraph, in other words, the written staff report often grows into a hodgepodge of custom tailored arguments which may actually serve both as support and refutation for the claim being advanced.

Since my focus here, however, is upon the oral presentation rather than the written staff report, I will not elaborate upon this point further except to suggest that the written material be removed from consideration as a component of the oral presentation. The perspective taken in this paper, in effect, posits that an oral message should always be self contained. The speaker, in other words, should never rest an oral message upon the assumption that a written message has laid a foundation of shared understandings. Rather, the act of audience analysis should always be initiated with the assumption that the speaker will encounter a naive audience. To be effective, given this view, messages should include all the definitions, historical orientations, vitalizing examples, and credibility enhancing uses of evidence needed to convince those persons who did not encounter the written staff report--the public audience.

In keeping with the Perelman's notion that "every argument presupposes a meeting of minds--a meeting which social and political institutions can facilitate or prevent,"[3] it is important for the presenter to use an institution such as the City Council to help assure that the minds of our governing officials meet with the minds of those to be governed. Or, stated another way, the presenter needs to speak through the council

to the community as a whole whether or not specific members of the community are or are not in the council chambers during the presentation. This follows because all council actions impact upon some segment of the community. Consequently, arguments supporting a proposed council action must ultimately persuade those persons who are to be impacted--whether or not they are present at the council session where the proposition is discussed.

Effective public argumentation, given this view, begins when the speaker develops a mental construction of the audience he or she seeks to influence. Moreover, this construction must incorporate relevant subgroups of the communiy into the mix so as to transform the council into a truly representative public audience. "However," notes Perelman, "an orator does not have to be confronted with several organized factions to think of the compositenature of his audience."[4] Rather, the flesh and blood receivers that make up the council are encouraged to symbolically insert themselves into a series of different subpopulations where they are assumed to take on the perspectives of those groups in keeping with their role as representatives. Realize, too, that all 7-12 members of the council take on each of these assigned perspectives as a group. When the speaker says "This ordinance will benefit our police officers" the council evaluates the reasoning offered to support that claim by taking, to the best of their ability, the perspective of a police officer. when the speaker suggests that "this ordinance will benefit tow-truck operators" they attempt to veiw the arguments offered as support for such a claim, as if, for a moment, they were in fact tow-truck operators.

From the perspective of the speaker, therefore, the task of inventing arguments to convince each segment of the audience he or she is constructing occurs when they mentally take on the perspective of each constituent group. In other words, in a natural and virtually unconscious process of political sensitivity, the speaker views the topic through the eyes of those persons in the community who are to be impacted by the proposed change. From this borrowed perspective, they look back upon their proposition and essentially convince "themselves" about the worth of their plan and in so doing invent arguments that are suitable for public use. Or, viewed from the dramatistic perspective of Klumpp, it is simply being argued here that "perspective taking is a natural part of experiencing and that perspective taking has social and substantive elements which unite in argument."[5] Effective public argumentation, therefore, begins when the speaker mentally constructs an appropriate audience so that the orientations of each constituent group can be empathetically borrowed as perspectives from which to test the suitability of possible arguments.

To some, the notion of "constructed audiences" and the need for the source to assume "multiple perspectives" may seem impractical. After all, no one person can be all things to all people. Realize, however, that we all hold much more in common one-with-another than the use of cultural and sociological labels[6] like poor person or business leader would seem to indicate. Jacobs and Jackson, for one, emphasize the commonalities that bind us together when they write: "In communicating an individual does not simply take the perspective of the particular other to whom s/he speaks. The individual takes the perspective of the social institution within which both individuals are participating and assumes that his/her fellow interlocutor does the same."[7] A chief of police, therefore, can empathetically view a proposal for contract towing from the perspectives of his or her line officers, the tow truck operators and a citizen charged with drunk driving simply because the political, religious, social and legal institutions that serve to define a community also serve to unite individuals. All the constituent components of the community, therefore, share the larger values of economy, safety, efficiency and fairness. These commonalities, moreover, allow us to interact over messages from a shared social field.[8]

It is reasonable, in this view, for a tow-truck operator to approve the plan to institute contract towing if the contract is awarded fairly and if the change does in fact help the police and save the citizens money. Moreover, the quality of such arguments can be tested by each of us as we simply view them from the borrowed perspective of the tow truck operator as he or she considers the needs of the community. We can even imagine the tow truck operator's opposing arguments for the contract towing proposal and test their worth as public opposition to the plan.

In a theoretical sense, therefore, pubic policy argument, as it occurs during presentations before city councils, sees reasoning developed for all three of the audiences recognized by Chaim Perelman:

> I. The Intrapersonal Audience Argument begins, Perelman suggests, during private encounters with our selves. The very notion that one should urge colleagues, council members, and the community as a whole to effect a change of policy must first be made reasonable to the "self". Communication at this level, therefore, is characterized by a source "trying out arguments with themselves to test the extent that they wish to be associasted with them in public."[9]
>
> II. The Interpersonal Audience Constructed by the source, this audience is made up of the constituent groups who are perceived to be impacted by the policy claim. They are identified when the source, reasoning alone or in a strategy session with the help of others, chooses the perspectives that will be taken to effect a public argument in support of the policy claim. This invention process, moreover, is largely determined by the subject matter under consideration. In other words, a constituent analysis of the topic reveals the nature of the interpersonal audience which must be convinced during a public argument.

CONSTITUENT ANALYSIS

All public policy claims can be broken down into a few discrete components by simply asking the question: Who is impacted by the change being advocated here? For example, the proposal regarding contract towing clearly impacts three constituent groups: 1) the police who order up the tow; 2) the two truck operators who make the tows; and 3) the citizens whose vehicles are in fact towed. If the policy under consideration was a request by the airport manager to enlarge the airport, it could be reasoned that the constituent groups were: 1) citizens and business persons who fly for fun or profit; 2) the airlines who seek to serve the community; and 3) the homeowners and business persons who own property near the airport. Or, for a third example, if the policy under consideration was a request for new prison facilities, it could be reasoned that the constituent groups were: 1) the criminals who are to be incarcerated; 2) the law enforcement officials who arrest, try, and supervise criminals; and 3) citizens who desire to see convicted felons incarcerated but who also constitute the tax paying public.

Once identified, the constituent groups inform the speaker about the reasons that need to be developed within the framework of their' public argument. Or, stated another way, a constituent analysis informs the city official about the relevant perspectives he or she must urge the council members to take when they evaluate the request for approval or disapproval of a policy change.

> III. The Universal Audience Again, only an imaginary entity used to test the quality of argument, this particular "receiver" is constructed by a source when he or she attempts to view the world from the perspective of most people. Or, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, say:
>
> > Of course, the universal audience never actually exists; it is an ideal audience, a mental construction of him who refers to it. We could easily show that this so called 'universal audience' varies with the epoch and with the person: each creates its own idea of the universal audience.[10]

As a creation of the source, the universal audience that each individual constructs is necessarily influenced by his or her cultural biases. It is limited by the sources' education and experience, and, quite possibly distorted by one or more personality quirks. Nevertheless, for each of us, there is a psycho-logically consistent map of the world we carry around to help us understand, predict and control our encounters with "reality." This map allows us to maximize the rewards and minimize the punishments which follows from every encounter with the world. In a sense, therefore, we can borrow the macrotheoretic notions developed by Kenneth Boulding to conclude that each individuals' "universal audience" is constructed when they use their Image[11] of reality to identify the implicit values, beliefs, and attitudes that make social behavior rational.

In a practical sense, therefore, our Image of reality offers each of us a data base from which to formulate an imaginary entity--a single universal other--the perspective of whom we borrow to conduct a test of reasonableness. A test, according to Zarefsky, which allows us to hold that our "inference is reasonable if it could be made by most people when they were exercising their critical judgment."12

In the case of public officials conducting public arguments before their governing councils and boards, the universal audience is simply the general public. It is that imaginary entity which serves to legitimize political acitivity. In other words, often labeled as "the people" or "the citizens," this "receiver" must be the critical audience for whom all public policy argument is formed. Or, put another way, public argument should not be targeted only to the individual receivers that make up the council or governing board. Rather, public argument is designed to pass through those immediate receivers so that it may "convince" the general public that symbolically sustains those political representatives.

To summarize, public arguments are generated to impact three critical audiences: the intrapersonal, the interpersonal, and the universal. Emerging from intrapersonal thought processes, the worth of the policy change idea is tested upon the critical faculties of the self. If internally generated arguments appear suitable for public articulation they are then validated when the emerging change agent offers them up to a few trusted colleagues. Their approval then, affirms the basic worth of the policy claim.

Passing this conceptual test, the policy claim is formalized and made ready for the process of political ratification within the arena of public argumentation. A "constituent analysis" of the topic reveals the interpersonal audiences that must be convinced to accept the policy. Or, more realistically, an awareness of the community groups who are most directly bound up with the policy issue informs the speaker of the role perspectives he or she must urge the council members to "borrow."

Finally, the specific justification claims and supporting evidence the speaker employs in the public presentation of their argument are chosen for a role specific universal audience. In other words, arguments for each constituent group are tested for "reasonableness" as the change agent views possible reasons for the policy claim through the borrowed eyes of a general citizen cast into the specific roles of each constituent group. In effect, they convince "everyman" as police officer; "everyman" as a tow-truck operator; and, "everyman" as car owner, that a contract towing system would be good.

PROBLEM --> SOLUTION vs SOLUTION --> REASONS ARGUMENTATION FORMATS

The public argumentation format I advocate to city officials is registered and labeled as the "On Target" approach. As an overarching philosophy, therefore, I instruct city officials to design their written and oral messages so that the action they urge upon the city council is stated within the first few sentences. The balance of the message, in turn, offers reasons for performing the desired action. For most successful public officials, however, this solution--reasons format is quite alien to them. Traditionally, they have viewed the council presentation as an arena in which problem--solution "dialogues" tend to prevail.

Numerous scholars encourage such assumptions. John Dewey, of course, serves as the chief advocate for the problem--solution format.[13] His model of "reflective thinking" forms the heart of what most scholars in the field of communication continue to advocate as a model of the effective decision making format. For example, Patton and Giffin summarize their "model of decision making" in such a way as to make it a virtual duplication of John Dewey's seventy year old idea. They write:

> The decision-making process ideally, or logically, consists of 1) identification of a group problem, including determination of the nature of concern shared by the group members; 2) analysis of the nature of the problem including contributing factors, restraining factors, and the degree of intensity of the difficulty; 3) critical evaluation of the possible ways of trying to resolve the difficulty; and 4) development of a plan for group action designed to implement the problem--solution agreed upon by the group.[14]

More to the point of public argumentation, Susan L. Kline demonstrates that this same problem-solution orientation is implicitly urged upon practicing advocates when she writes:

> Contemporary argumentation theorists have elaborated the system of stasis into a set of stock issues associated with the adoption of a policy proposition. Debaters, especially, apply these familiar "stock" questions in analyzing policy propositions: 1) is there an ill in the present state of affairs?; 2) is this ill curable?; 3) will the proposed remedy cure this ill?; 4) will the cure cost too much? The assumption remains that application of these questions represents the most rational method for analyzing a policy proposition since they are an exhaustive list of the potential issues around which controversy may emerge. That is, stock issue, or stasis, represent all the general issues that might be contested by an opposing party.[15]

As a model of the thought processes persons intuitively follow when they think about change, Dewey's reflective thinking sequence and the debater's stock issues questions continue to make good sense. On the other hand, as a model of the ideal way to urge others to accept the conclusions we have reached with our thinking, the problem-solution format makes little sense. In fact, problem-solution deliberations should only contribute to the public argumentation context as an explanation for how a city official was able to intrapersonally formulate the initial idea for a policy change. In other words, the problem-solution model only explains the thought process that leads to the initial formulation of a claim.

Following this intrapersonal problem-solution phase, the city official has in fact discovered a solution that seems sufficiently compelling to drive him or her to commence a sequence of public arguments that will lead others to ratify that solution. As such, the proper role of the advocate is simply to state the solution they support and then offer a series of reasons as to why the change implied by the solution is good. These reasons, inevitably, will demonstrate the worth of the policy claim by demonstrating that the changes being advocated will solve problems that currently exist. As such, the public argument summarizes the change agents own thought processes while simultaneously facilitating the decision making process of their receivers.

Returning to our "contract towing" example, we can reason that the Chief of Police initially invented the idea of contracting for tow-truck services when a citizen complained about price gouging or after one of his officers wasted half a day trying to get an abandoned car removed from a vacant lot. Inexplicably, in the privacy of his or her own thought process, the solution dawns. It is tested for flaws, as reasoned earlier, when the Chief becomes a critical audience for him or herself. Arguments for and against the contract towing idea, at this stage, are tested intrapersonally. Satisfied, the Chief tested the worth of the proposal by mentioning the solution idea to others. With their encouragement the idea is formalized as a staff report and soon it is a draft ordinance to be placed on the agenda of the city council. For the Chief, however, it is important to realize that the problem-solution format ceased to be an appropriate argumentation model the second she or he discovered the contract towing idea as a solution. With that discovery, the Chief becomes an advocate engaging in public argument. A solution--reasons format for both the written and oral messages that advocate the public policy claim thus becomes appropriate.

SELF CONTAINED, STATEMENT CENTERED PRESENTATIONS

Ideally, presentations to councils and boards should be characterized by a two stage process: 1) the staff official makes a 2-5 minute oral presentation made up of a statement of purpose and some supporting statements which detail the reasonableness of a policy claim; and 2) the members of the council or board either move directly to a vote or they ask a few questions to resolve any residual uncertainty they may have regarding the proposal. Given such a system, of course, the center of power resides in the staff official rather than within the collective body of the governing board or the city council.

Interestingly enough, however, this source centered perspective toward public argumentation is neither practiced nor preached in many circumstances. Rather, many staff officials appear to perceive the presentation opportunity as a receiver centered context in which they are expected to conduct themselves as though they were simply knowledge resources called forth to answer any questions the council may have. Moreover, this tendency is exacerbated by the presence of the written staff report. It is almost as though the city official enters the public argumentation arena with an implicit introductory statement such as the following: "Mayor, members of the Council, you have all read an contemplated the staff report before you. In that report, I stated the action we urge you to take and I offered many pages of written arguments to justify our perspective. I now offer myself as a knowledge resource. You may ask me questions."

By assuming this passive role, of course, the advocate almost certainly will find that the questions which ensue will prove disappointing in two ways: 1) many of the questions will be inane; and 2) the questions will be offered up according to random logic which will virtually assure that many observers of the process will find themselves increasingly confused. In other words, though each of the individuals on the council or board systematically pursue understanding according to their own needs and interests, when their questions are interspersed among the discovery efforts of the other council members, the result is overarching confusion. Such was the case, obviously, when the Chief of Police in our case study example initially went before the City Council. In that case, as was noted, the end result was a postponement of action and a call for more information.

Realize, of course, that no attempt is being made here to abolish questions from the public argumentation experience. Quite the contrary, questions from council members prove useful within the total context of a legislative process because on the one hand, they enable the advocate to tailor his or her message to the individual asking the question, while, on the other hand, they enable the council member to publicly demonstrate his or her credibility as a thoughtful public servant. Consequently, what is being argued here is a model of the public argumentation process which is initiated by a coherent, self-contained oral message that is then followed by a question-answer dialogue.

Monologues, rather than dialogues, are being advocated under the assumption that the overall quality of the decision making process improves, given the ascendancyof the advocates well prepared presentation, simply because the advocate's argument is accurately and thoroughly understood by everyone before the questions commence. Both the persons forewarned by the written staff report and those who either didn't receive or didn't read the report are therefore allowed to assess the worth of the city officials proposition from a shared perspective. Questions, as a result, can now be perceived as useful rather than inane. More importantly, they can be viewed from the logical framework offered up by the advocate. Both the question and the answer, therefore, will contribute to the overall argument and the informed and uninformed receiver alike will thus be able to follow the reasoning process that eventually leads to a positive or negative vote from the Council.

UNEQUIVOCAL, ONE SIDED ADVOCACY MESSAGES

Public officials, given the mere handful of presentations observed to date, frequently confuse their receivers by offering up two or more response options. In so doing, of course, the exact policy claim or council action that is being advocated becomes confused. Consequently, this equivocality of purpose dramatically weakens the presentation. More to the point, however, it violates the fundamental rules of effective argumentation. In other words, Rieke and Sillars point out that "Argumentation can be lengthy and involved process with hundreds of arguments and issues developing around a single claim of fact, value, or policy (emphasis added)."[10] Their key point being, as the emphasis indicates, that only one overarching claim underlies a typical argument. Again, the singularity of this perspective is stated even more directly when these same authors define the notion of a claim by writing: "A claim (frequently called a proposition) is a single statement that a person is prepared to support."[17]

Within the context of city government, of course, reason and rules of good form do not automatically prevail over tradition and political sensitivity. Consequently it is quite common for city officials to demand that formal staff reports essentially follow a format in which a perceived problem is explained and documented and then many possible solutions are advanced and evaluated. In all the cases I have observed, in fact, staff report guidelines forbid the city official from recommending one solution over another. Rather, they are instructed to offer the council member two or three response options.

Whether or not this basic problem-solution format and its built in equivocality are appropriate for staff reports is not my concern here. When it comes to the oral presentation and the context of public argumentation, on the other hand, it seems essential that persons interested in improving the decision making acitivities of boards and councils realize one simple truth: Effective argumentation is the ultimate defense against poor government. In other words, the council cannot take action to either support or reject the recommendations of our public officials until and unless they first of all know exactly what the official does or does not want to do. To tell us "dogs are good and bad" is to tell us nothing.

To some, of course, such equivocality is mistakenly perceived as a two-sided presentation.[18] Strategically, some advocates seem to perceive themselves as being candid and open minded public servants by the very fact that they justify not only their own preferred claim but also the claims of those opponents whose perspectives had been rejected during the staff meetings that led up to the formulation of a formal staff report. Stylistically, some persons reflexively perceive themselves as being overly aggressive and somewhat pushy or arrogant when they try to advocate an unequivocal policy claim. The very heart of the message model which has proven to be so successful during the executive presentation workshops, however, allows for no equivocation of purpose. In fact, the format calls for the city official to model their public policy claims after the following sentence frame:

I WANT MY AUDIENCE TO DO "X"

For example, to a city engineer this has become: "I want the City Council to authorize the expenditure of $36,850.00 for an HP total survey instrument." For a librarian, this model led her to state: "I want the members of the library board to adopt the "right to read" statement on censorship." And, finally, this model led a Chief of Police to say: "I want the City Council to approve a contract towing system for our community."

In an abbreviated fashion, the public argument the Chief of Police delivered to the City Council will be summarized below. Developmentally, the message acquired its essential form when the Chief prepared a three element "message skeleton" during the Executive Presentation Workshop. Using a 3 x 5 card, reproduced below, this skeleton included the following three elements: 1) a "purpose statement" (PS) which unequivocally stated the action being sought from the council; 2) an "organizing question" (OQ) which served to identify the nature of the receivers uncertainty which would have to be effectually reduced before the desired action could be undertaken by the Council; and 3) three parallel "ideas" that responded to the organizing question. The ideas, of course, identified the effects of the Chief's policy proposition upon the key constituent elements within the community. In its final form, it appeared as follows:

Potential Message Skeleton

PS I WANT MY AUDIENCE TO approve contract towing.

OQ WHY SHOULD I approve contract towing ?

ideas

I. Contract towing will benefit the citizens.

II. Contract towing will benefit the police.

III. Contract towing will benefit the tow-truck operators.

The public presentation of this argument began with the following statement:

> Mayor Smith, members of the Council, I am here today to request your support for an ordinance that will authorize the Police Department to initiate a contract towing program within our city. The exact ordinance, as approved by the City Attourney, is in your packet. In proper legal terminology, it authorizes us to accept bids from the tow-truck operators in our community who would like to receive all of the towing business generated by the police. In other words, auto accident tows, drunk driving impounds, abandoned vehicle removals, and parking violation incidents. The successful bidder, as the ordinance specifies, must have two trucks and an appropriate storage facility. Most importantly, however, they must

> offer their services at the lowest rate in order to win the contract.
>
> My staff and the City Manager have studied this proposal and have been able to conclude that it will benefit the citizens, the police, and the tow-truck operators in our community.

In less than three minutes, the balance of this message offered appropriate facts, examples, and testimony to support each of the "idea" statements. The message concluded as follows:

> This ordinance, Mr. Mayor and members of the Council, deserves to be enacted into law. We request that you approve contract towing for the good of our citizens, the police department, and the tow-truck operators in our community. If you have any questions, I will be happy to respond.

CONCLUSION

Using a presentation by the Chief of Police as a case study in public argumentation, it was reasoned that these persuasive appeals for action are best viewed as situations calling for unequivocal solution--reasons arguments directed to the constituent groups that will be impacted by the proposed change of law. Effective messages, it was argued, anticipate and forestall the need for questions from the council members. As such, the resultant model of public argumentation has enabled city officials to develop presentations that are remarkably brief but uncharacteristically successful.

ENDNOTES

[1] For a discussion of both "legislation" and "presentations" as special circumstances for argumentation, see Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm O. Sillars, Argumentation and the Decision Making Process (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), pp. 169-70. Note that they view the presentation as "an extraordinary form a case designed to secure approval of a plan of action."

[2] The notion that draft ordinances are essentially "policy claims" is consistent with the implicit call for action that is embodied in the notion of "should". Therefore, though the key word "should" is only implied in these kinds of propositions, they would fit the definition of policy claim advanced by Rieke and Sillars, p. 50; and by George W. Ziegelmueller and Charles A. Dause, Argumentation Inquiry and Advocacy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 15.

[3] Chaim Perelman, The Realm of Rhetoric (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), p. 11.

[4] Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), p. 22.

[5] James F. Klumpp, "A Dramatistic Approach to Fields," in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1981), p. 51.

[6] As interpersonal constructs, the notions of Cultural, Sociological and Psychological data are defined in Gerald R. Miller and Mark Steinberg, Between People (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1975), pp. 12-22.

[7] Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Conversational Argument: A Discourse Analytic Method," in J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Wilard, Eds. Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981).

[8] J. Robert Cox, "Investigating Policy Argument as a Field" in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Associaton, 1981), p. 138.

[9] Rieke and Sillars, p. 21.

[10] Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, "Act and Person in Argument," Ethics, LVI (July, 1951), p. 252.

[11] Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1956).

[12] David Zarefsky, "Reasonableness In Public Policy Argument: Fields As Institutions," in Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the

Second Summer Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1981), p. 88.

[13] John Dewey, How We Think (Boston, D.C. Heath, 1910).

[14] Bobby R. Patton and Kim Giffin, Decision-Making Group Interaction, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 113-14.

[15] Susan L. Kline, "Toward A Contemporary Linguistic Interpretation of the Concept of Stasis," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 16 (Fall, 1979), pp. 95-6.

[16] Rieke and Sillars, p. 51.

[17] Rieke and Sillars, p. 49.

[18] The arguments for a two-sided presentation are carefully developed in Ronald L. Applbaum and Karl W.E. Anatol, Strategies for Persuasive Communication (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1974), pp. 98-9.

GENERIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ARGUMENTATION IN EVERYDAY DISCOURSE

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One contemporary approach to the study of argumentation involves examination of how ordinary social actors engage in arguments.[1] Some theorists have focused attention on the most clear-cut cases of the concept. These cases are called "paradigm cases"[2] of argument because they "elicit widespread agreement that these *are* in fact examples of the concept in question."[3] Characteristics of these cases can be called paradigmatic characteristics. Others have chosen to focus on a combination of paradigm and peripheral cases.[4] Characteristics derived from these cases are called "generic characteristics" because they are more general than paradigmatic cases. In this essay I will examine both paradigm and peripheral cases of arguments in order to illustrate two generic characteristics of argument as accomplished by ordinary social actors engaged in face-to-face interaction.

Methods

The data for this study consisted of sixty transcripts of conversation. These transcripts were gathered from two general sources. First, some of the transcripts were recorded by this investigator. Second, some of the transcripts were gathered from published sources on argument and dispute. One hundred and forty-one persons then were asked to sort these transcripts into three categories described simply as "argument," "not argument," and "not sure." These persons were students in communication and speech communication classes at the University of Denver, the University of Northern Colorado, and Red Rocks Community College.

Instead of asking each of the persons to read each of the sixty transcripts, the transcripts were divided into six sets of transcripts, and each person was asked to respond to one set of ten. In order to compensate for the fact that all persons did not see all transcripts, yet all persons' judgments were combined, the transcripts were randomly assigned to the sets of ten and then were randomly assigned to persons for categorisation. The above procedure yielded twenty-three or twenty-four responses to each transcript. The frequency with which each transcript was placed in each of the three categories was counted and subjected to analysis by Chi Square.[5]

The .05 confidence was established as an initial screening level, with the .001 confidence level established as the final probability level. This higher confidence level was desired because the Chi Square statistic was repeated sixty times. At the .05 level, one would expect to find three cases departing from the expected due to random variation alone. For this reason, the .001 confidence level was selected to insure greater confidence that the selected cases were in fact "paradigm cases." The use of these two confidence levels yielded five final categories:

1. Paradigm cases of argument. In this category were eight transcripts sorted into the argument category more frequently than expected. The confidence level for this category was .001.

2. Cases between paradigm and peripheral cases. This category contained three more transcripts that were sorted into the argument category more frequently than expected. The confidence level for this category ranged from .05 to .01.

3. Peripheral cases of argument. In this category were fourteen transcripts apparently sorted at random. These cases were neither clearly arguments nor not arguments.

4. Conversations other than arguments. This category included ten transcripts sorted into the category of "not argument" more frequently than expected. The confidence level for this category was .05 or .01.

5. Paradigm cases of conversations other than arguments. In this category were twenty-five transcripts sorted into the category "not argument" at the .001 level of confidence. These clearly constitute the cases of conversation that persons did not consider to be arguments.

These data were then analysed using a variation of the grounded-theory approach.[6] The primary aim of this analysis was to discover how the various examples were alike. The characteristics that bind these examples together are the generic characteristics. The goal of this essay is to *illustrate* rather than demonstrate the findings of this study.[7] In *illustrating* the findings of this study, I intend to make visible the theoretical explanations that are implicit in the data. In Schutz' language, these are my second-order constructs derived from the first-order constructs of naive social actors.

Generic Characteristics of Argument

Two generic characteristics of argument were derived from the twenty-five cases ranging from paradigm to peripheral cases of argument. The first characteristic involves disagreeing and the second involves reason-giving. Argument is a process whereby persons attempt to manage the amount of disagreement and agreement between them. Generally they attempt to move from disagreement to agreement although they occasionally attempt to maintain disagreement. In either case, reason-giving is the method by which they attempt to manage agreement and disagreement. Thus the two characteristics of argument are dramatically interrelated.

Disagreeing

Potential disagreeing involves one person making a statement that risks invoking disagreement from another person. It also can involve asking a question, the answer to which one of the persons engaged in the interaction can find objectionable. Potential disagreeing can be recognizable from the perspective of a speaker when that person realizes that a speech act might invoke a disagreeing speech act from another person. Potential disagreeing is recognizable only retrospectively from the point of view of an observer. Only after actual disagreeing occurs are we given any hint of the speech act that might have provoked the disagreement. Indeed, in some instances, potential disagreeing is recognizable only retrospectively even to the speaker. In those cases the speech act was not intended to invoke disagreeing.

People can disagree without arguing. Arguing only occurs when disagreement is actualized. Actual disagreeing occurs when two or more persons make and/or support statements that they construe to be mutually incompatible.[8] Actual disagreement therefore involves both potentiation and actuation. This disagreement is indicative of persons construing their statements and/or positions as being mutually incompatible.

The enacting of disagreeing is clear in the following example:

Example 06 (Paradigm case of argument)[9]

01 S: Pam those Spanish People gonna tell on *you!*

02 P: *They* ain't *Spanish*. They *Portaricoan*.

03 S: *How* ya know they Portaricoan.

04 P: They TALK PORtor*i*coan.

05 S: AH: YOU DON'T EVEN KNOW HOW PORTARICCAN people *talk*. So shut up.

When S said to P "those Spanish People gonna tell on *you!*" S may have expected P to disagree about whether or not the people would in *fact* "tell." S probably did not expecte P to disagree about the nationality of the people. Nevertheless, P's typification of them as "Spanish people" potentiated an actual disagreement about whether they were "Spanish" or "Portaricoan."

Disagreement can be described as clear and direct or as involving the clash of taken-for-granteds. Clear and direct disagreement occurs when a speech act is offered which then is followed by a second speech act that directly refutes some part of the first speech act. A common type of this argumentative form is the familiar "Yes it is, No it isn't" construction. This clear and direct disagreement between two speech acts is visible in example 06. In turn 02, P's response that "*They* ain't *Spanish*. They *Portaricoan*," directly refutes part of S's turn 01 statement *that* "those Spanish People gonna tell on *you!*" This clear and direct disagreement displays people maintaining what *they* construe to be mutually incompatible views of reality.

Six of the eight paradigm cases of argument involved clear and direct disagreement. Four of those six cases involved clear and direct disagreement that was sustained over at least four turns. These four cases follow the pattern of assertion, denial, reassertion, and redenial. Thus both of the people involved in the argument stated and restated the positions that they had construed as mutually incompatible. To provide a more graphic illustration of the parallels among these four examples, portions of the transcripts were reproduced in Figure 1. As noted, the four examples contain five instances of clear, direct, and sustained disagreement. This pattern of clear, direct, and sustained disagreement occurred *only* in the paradigm cases of argument. It never occurred in the examples of *argument* in categories two and three.

Much more interesting are the argumentative constructions involving speech acts that, while they might not clearly and directly refute one another, take-for-granted assumptions that display speakers to be maintaining views of reality that they construe as mutually incompatible. Two of the eight paradigm cases of argument readily illustrate this clash of taken-for-granteds and how this clash displays the incompatibility of the positions construed by the arguers. The following is a brief description of the taken-for-granted assumptions in these examples and how those taken-for-granteds display the arguers' views of reality.

Example 20 (Paradigm case of argument)[10]

Husband and Wife cohosts of a radio news/talk program talking about the wife's answer to one of the daily quiz questions.

01 W: Prove it.

02 H: I don't have to prove anything.

03 W: Who says?

04 H: I do.

05 W: Who made you the big sheriff around here?

06 H: Look, I'm the producer of this show=

07 W: =then let's hear you produce something.

Lines 01 and 02 display the arguers' competing views of reality. These views of reality concern the question of whether or not W has a legitimate right to request that H "prove it." "Prove it" in turn 01 is heard as a request to perform some action. The response in turn 02 "I don't have to prove anything" is heard as a denial of the request "prove it" only when one understands the taken-for-granted assumption underlying W's request. In order for "prove it" to be a felicitious request,[11] W must take for granted that she has some right to make such a demand or request. "I don't have to prove anything" denies the statement "prove it" by denying the taken-for-granted assumption underlying that statement.

Relevant to the disagreeing present in conversational argument is the occurrence of derogatory comments such as insults, threats, name-calling, and the like. While such derogatory comments usually are not considered central to traditional conceptions of argument, they are unavoidable in the transcripts of the paradigm cases. Seven of the eight paradigm cases of argument contained one or more instances of clear and unambiguous derogatory comments. T (Figure One, example 54) refers to E as "you dummy." Some of the examples contained rather clear and undisguised threats such as, "You gonna get shot too you come over here" (Figure One, example 27), "I'm warning you" (Figure One, example 58), and "Play and you gonna get knock down" (Figure One, example 56). Only one of the paradigm cases of argument was free of clear and unambiguous derogatory comments. On the other hand, such clear and unambiguous derogatory comments were absent from all but one of the examples in categories two and three.

An intriguing aspect of disagreement in argument concerns the relationship between content and relational aspects of disagreement. Theorists of interpersonal communication insist that all interpersonal communication has both content and relational aspects. If this is true of interpersonal communication in general, it should also be true of argument in face-to-face interaction. One difficulty with describing the content and relational aspects of disagreement from transcripts is that we are privy only to the linguistic aspects of the conversation. A disagreement that on the surface might appear to a content disagreement might be interpreted by one or both of the participants as a relational disagreement because of extra-linguistic aspects of the argument such as the context of situation.

Some instances include language about the relational aspects of the disagreement. Such is the case in example 12:

Example 12 (Peripheral case of argument) [12]

E is J and B's ten-year-old daughter J, B and E are talking while J and E are cleaning E's room.

01 J: Will you get that calendar down?

02 E: What Calendar?

03 /J points to calendar pinned above a window./

04 E: I like my calendar it's got doggies on it=

05 J: =E the thing about it that kind of gets to me —

06 E: Geeee that's not very nice.

07 B: what isn't — She didn't even say anything.

08 E: She's saying mean things about me.

09 B: She didn't say anything yet= let's see what she was going to say.

10 J: I didn't say anything

11 B: What were you going to say?

12 J: Well I was going to say—I like most everything you have on your wall=honest=everything in the room —

13 E: Except for all my stuff.

14 J: Now except the only thing I don't like is it's just too spread out we need to — Dad and I need to come up with something=

15 E: Why do you have to do it?—/sobbing/

16 J: Come on let's finish cleaning.

17 E: Why can't I do it?

18 J: You can=come here—okay now you can help=see like all that little /unintelligible/ can you find=maybe you can get ah something to put in a drawer like this—put em in there to keep em all together--ribbons, clips--you know--that would help lots okay—you need a little organization.

19 E: Mom!!

20 J: I'm trying to be very helpful E.

21 E: I know but

The first eight turns of this conversation are important to the present discussion. If we limit our analysis to the content aspects of this disagreement we would view this as a disagreement about whether or not the calendar should be taken down. In turn 08 E accuses J of "saying mean things about me." A quick review of the language of the previous turns reveals that J said nothing at all about E. If one takes a relational perspective on this argument, one might conclude that E interpreted J's comments about the calendar as an attack on her instead of a comment about the appropriateness of the calendar. Further, since mother/daughter relationships are supposed to be positive, the ten-year-old might have been upset at her Mother for making what she considered to be negative comments about her.

While example 12 is perhaps a rare example where the relational aspects of the conflict are actually indicated in the language of the argument, the possibility that relational aspects entered into most or all of the other examples is a distinct probability. Consider, for instance, Example 07:

Example 07 (Peripheral case of argument)[13]

01 B: Will you help me plant the trees this afternoon?

02 J: No, I could help tomorrow.

03 B: But I need help today.

04 J: I have to clean the house

05 B: The house is clean.

06 J: No, you see, that's the difference between men and women.

An analysis of the content aspects of this argument would lead one to believe that B and J were arguing about the relative importance of cleaning the house and planting the trees. This might well have been an important aspect of the argument. Another possibility is that either or both of the arguers might have seen the relational aspects of the disagreement as equally important. A possible interpretation of this argument is that it includes a disagreement about the importance attached to the roles that are typically performed in this family. Both person might have felt the need to defend the importance of certain tasks because those tasks are indicative of the importance of their role vis-a-vis the other person. Such interpretations are, of course, only speculations at this time, but point to the theoretical utility of considering relational aspects of disagreement.

All of the examples of argument (categories one, two, and three) involved some type of disagreement—whether clear and direct disagreement or disagreement resulting from the clash of taken-for-granteds. In the paradigm cases, disagreeing was often accompanied by derogatory comments such as threats and name-calling. One therefore can consider disagreement to be a generic characteristic of argument.

Reason-Giving

A second characteristic of argument in face-to-face interaction involves reason-giving.[14] The process of reason-giving in interpersonal argumentation involves persons comparing and contrasting views of reality. This involves an attempt on the part of the arguers to find some shared view of reality other than the original disputed view that one person can then link to the original disputed view of reality. When one has succeeded in locating some other view of reality that both arguers agree is shared and is linked to the original disputed view, one has succeeded in producing a "good reason"[15] for the other person to change his or her position regarding the original disputed view of reality. This process of linking the disputed view of reality to some other shared view of reality seems to constitute the nature of good reasons. Once a person has convinced another that a disputed view can be linked to a shared view, that person can be said to have presented a good reason for the second person to accept the first person's view of the disputed reality. In this sense, we might say that the linking of a shared view of reality to a disputed view of reality counts as a good reason for changing the disputed view of reality into a shared view of reality.

Reason-giving can either focus on the construal of some separate view of reality, or the linking of that separate view of reality to the original disputed view of reality, or on both processes. The examples that follow illustrate how arguers use reason-giving in an attempt to construe some shared view of reality that is separate from but related to the original disputed view. In all of these examples this attempt to come to a shared view fails.

Example 54 (Paradigm Case of Argument)[16]

Two inner-city black children talking

01 E: ((singing)) You didn't have to go to school today, did you.

02 T: Yes we did have to go to school today!

03 E: ((singing)) No you didn't have to go to school (1.0 sec. pause) was on strike.

04 T: We had our school today! The strike is off you dummy.

05 E: uhuh. The strike- // came on.

06 T: The strike is off.

07 E: The strike came on today.

08 T: I don't wanna hear it. I don't wanna hear it.

09 E: I know. Cuz, I betcha I won't go to school tomorrow.

10 T: Take a biscuit

In example 54, the disputed view of reality concerned whether or not two children had "to go to school" on that particular day. In lines 03 through 07, both of the children attempted to link the disputed view to a related view of whether or not there was a "strike."

Example 07, reported earlier, involved B and J arguing about whether J should help B "plant the trees" or "clean the house." In that example the disputed view concerns appropriateness of a certain action rather than the truth or falsity of a proposition.[18] B has requested that J help him "plant the trees." J has refused this request because her view was that she needed to "clean the house." That she needs to "clean the house" is a view of reality that is separate from but potentially linked to the disputed view regarding whether or not she should help B "plant the trees." As we see in 05, this never gains the status of a "shared" view of reality since B believes "the house is clean." Nevertheless, reason-giving in this example focuses on the construal of a separate view of reality.

Example 06, reported earlier in this essay, involved S and P arguing about the nationality of a family. In this example the disputed view or reality concerned whether a family was "Spanish" or "Portaricoan." The person who believed the family to be "Portaricoan" attempted to link this view to another view of reality when in line 04 she said, "They TALK PORtaricoan." This is a separate view of reality that P hopes S will share and see as relevant to the original disputed reality concerning the nationality of the Venezuelan family. In 05, S rejects P's attempt to construe this view of reality as "shared."

Even when arguers are able to share a separate view of reality, disagreement continues unless the arguers see that separate view as linked to the original disputed view of reality. In the examples that follow, the reason-giving focuses on whether separate views of reality are relevant or irrelevant to the original view that is the subject of dispute:

Example 03 (peripheral case of argument)[19]

01 A: If you have time, why don't you get the car washed too when you get the gas.

02 B: But I gotta go to the grocery store and I gotta do laundry and I got/ / classes.

03 A: Yea::h, but it'll only take about five minutes to do that.

04 B: Ohh O::Kay.

05 A: It's not really that much time

06 B: Okay

07 A: It's awfully dirty.

08 B: Oka:y! I'll do it when I get the gas.

Turn 02 is heard as a tentative attempt to refuse A's request in 01 that B "get the car washed." B does not directly refuse the request, but offers an alternative view in the hope that A will consider this alternative view related to and inconsistent with the request to "get the car washed." In earlier examples, argument proceeded over the correctness of the alternative view of reality. However in this example, A does not question the fact that B has "to go to the grocery store. . . do laundry and /go to/ classes." Instead A denies that this view of reality is related to the question of whether or not A should "get the car washed" by asserting "it'll only take about five minutes to do that." Thus, from the perspective of A, B has failed to provide a good reason for refusing the request. In turns 04, 06, and 08 B reluctantly grants A's request. In 05 A reinforces the lack of a relationship between the viewpoint expressed by B in 02 and A's initial desire to refuse the request. In 07 A provides a view of reality (one that B might have already assumed), that is related to the initial request. Thus A "won" this argument because B failed to provide a "good reason" for refusing a request.

Example 14 (Between Paradigm and Peripheral case of argument)[20]

01 E: Maybe you don't like it but I like it.

02 J: Shall we ask Dad for a compromise?

03 E: It's my room.

04 J: I know—but god E=you can't=there's no space in this room=you can't put anything=

05 E: =not when you scooped everything out in the middle of the floor there isn't.
/pause/
some of it isn't even mine.

06 J: what isn't your's /unintelligible/?
/pause/
get everything that isn't yours in the hall get all the clothes up off the floor.

Turns 01 through 03 are relevant to this discussion. From the introductory material and from E's statement in turn 01 we learn that E and J hold what they consider to be mutually incompatible views regarding the proper arrangement of E's room. In turn 02 J suggests where a separate view of reality might be found when she suggests "shall we ask Dad for a compromise?" Without even waiting to find out what Dad's view might be, E rejects the position that Dad's view is relevant to the disputed view by saying "it's my room." Thus Dad's point of view (whatever it might be) is seen as irrelevant to the dispute over the arrangement of E's room. No matter what Dad might say, E would not consider his opinion a "good reason" for rearranging her room.

In most cases reason-giving is used as a tool to change disagreement to agreement. In these cases the goal is the production of "good reasons." In other cases, one or more of the arguers might attempt to maintain disagreement. In these cases the goal of the arguer is to avoid allowing the other participant to produce a "good reason." In the example that follows one person seems to be attempting to move to agreement by producing a "good reason" while the other seems to be attempting to maintain disagreement (or at least ambiguity) by disrupting the process of producing "good reasons." In the example that follows, one of the person's actions might be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to preserve the ambiguity of the situation perhaps so later she could not be held to an agreement:

Example 15 (peripheral case of argument)[21]

E is J and B's ten-year-old daughter. They are discussing remodeling E's new room.

01 J: If you could do anything to that room what would you do?

02 E: Take down all the paneling=rip out all the carpet=take out//

03 J: I don't think we can take out the carpet but//

04 E: The carpet is disgusting!!

05 J: Okay listen—it's pale blue.

06 E: I hate it.

07 B: I don't think we can afford it.

08 E: Well just rip it out—don't put any new in.

09 J: You've always wanted carpet in your room.

10 E: I don't want—Mom—If I want carpet I want carpet I like

11 J: Okay look at it like this—try this one on—in that we don't have lots of money and can't do everything right away—if we could like take out the paneling and paint the room the color that you like and get curtains that you like—do all that stuff—do you think you could live with the carpet until we can afford it?

12 E: Not unless the door shuts.

13 J: Dad'll fix the door.

14 E: But it's an ugly door.

The disputed view displayed in this conversation concerns divergent viewpoints regarding what ought to be done about the carpet in E's room. The point of presenting this example is to examine not the dispute, but the ambiguous conclusion of this conversation. In turn 11, J summarized what to her appeared to be a reasonable compromise and one that she hoped E would accept. In turn 12, E completely changed the topic from the carpet to the door. Turns 12 through 14 focused on the door. This resulted in an argument that, through turn 11, looked as if it might be resolved, but it turned into an argument, the conclusion of which was very ambiguous. One interpretation of this tactic would be the implication that E has changed the subject deliberately in an attempt to avoid agreeing to the compromise offered in turn 11. While reason-giving is normally a technique used by arguers to move from disagreement to agreement, it can also be used to maintain disagreement when that is to the advantage of the arguer.

Thus the production of "good reasons" in interpersonal argument can be viewed as involving two elements. First, arguers attempt to construe shared views of reality separate from the original disputed views. Second, arguers attempt to link those shared views to the original disputed view so that the other participant in the argument will change his or her position regarding the original disputed viewpoint. In most instances the goal of reason-giving is to move from disagreement to agreement. In others it is to maintain disagreement.

Summary

If this research has accomplished nothing more, I hope it has at least established the viability of the concept of argument from the perspective of everyday arguers. Considerable disagreement has existed regarding whether or not the concept could usefully be studied from the perspective of naive social actors.[22] If I have succeeded in describing argument from the perspective of naive social actors in a manner that is both manageable and heuristic, this theoretical controversy can now be supplanted with empirical evidence.

From the data I have examined, I believe interpersonal argument can be generally described by two characteristic. The first characteristic is disagreeing. Disagreeing results when persons construe their views of reality as if they were mutually incompatible and continues until they construe those views as compatible. The second characteristic of interpersonal argument involves the process of reason-giving. In general, this process of comparing views of reality allows us to view argument as an attempt to move our views of reality from a position of disagreement to a position of agreement. This process of comparing views of reality includes both searching for some shared view of reality and linking that shared view of reality to the original disputed view. When both of these elements occur, an arguer has presented a "good reason" for his or her viewpoint.

These two generic characteristics of interpersonal argument are clearly interrelated. Argument is characterized by disagreement. Disagreement is something that people generally attempt to move away from. The process whereby this move is attempted involves comparing views of reality. Hence a constant tension exists between these two processes. More of one characteristic seems to result in less of the other—the more persons disagree, the less likely they might be to engage in reason-giving. Conversely, as persons become more successful at reason-giving, they might find their disagreement diminishing.

Throughout this essay, I have made a variety of claims that are based on data. These claims represent potentially disputable views of reality. The data themselves represent shared views of reality since, at the very least, researchers must be trusted to present their data accurately. The potential disagreement inherent in my claims may become actual disagreement if others come to view my claims as incompatible with the claims they would make about the same data. Should such an argument occur, I would be in a position where I would be required to compare our views of reality. I would be required to link my view of the disputed reality (my characteristics of argument) to the shared view (data) and to show how others' view of reality was not incompatible with my own. Stated differently, the success or failure of this essay hinges on the degree to which I have been able to link potentially disputable views of reality (characteristics of argument) to shared views of reality (data). This study has involved both the "talking about argument" and the "doing of argument." The credibility of the former is dependent on the latter.

Form	Example 27	Example 54	Example 54	Example 56	Example 58
Assertion	I'm on Michael side.	You didn't have to go to school today, did you.	The strike is off.	Play and you gonna get knock down.	[I'm] making coffee.
Denial	No you not.	Yes we did	Uh uh. The strike- // The strike came on	Nuh uh,	No.
Reassertion	Yes I is	No you didn't.	The strike is // off.	Mm hm,	Yes.
Redenial	No you aint.	We had our school today	The strike ca//me on today.	Nuh uh, y'all,	NO!
Reassertion				Yes you are playin.	YES!

Figure 1

Clear, Direct, and Sustained Disagreement

REFERENCES

[1] Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66 (1980), 251 - 265.

[2] Daniel J. O'Keefe, "The Concepts of Argument and Arguing," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, eds. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois Press, 1983).

[3] O'Keefe.

[4] Wayne Brockriede, "Where is Argument?," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 9 (1975), 189 - 192., and Barbara J. O'Keefe and Pamela J. Benoit, "Children's Arguments," in Cox and Willard.

[5] The expected frequency was obtained by dividing the total responses to each incident by three (the number of categories). Those transcripts categorized by twenty-four persons had expected frequencies of 8.0 per category and those categorized by twenty-three persons had expected frequencies of 7.67.

[6] Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (New York: Aldine, 1967).

[7] The space required to adequately demonstrate the findings of a qualitative investigation is often not commensurate with the space allotted for publication. Hence, illustration seems to a satisfactory alternative for the presentation of these initial findings.

[8] I have chosen to use language very similar to that used by Willard. He writes that argument is "a specific genre of interaction (occurring within certain kinds of rhetorical situations) in which the participants perceive mutual incompatibilities in their respective positions and attempt to 'hash out' the differences or to persuade the other individuals to adopt more consistent beliefs or positions on the issues." Charles Arthur Willard, "On the Utility of Descriptive Diagrams for the Analysis and Criticism of Arguments," Communication Monographs, 43 (1976), 132.

[9] This example is from an unpublished and undated paper by Marjorie Harness Goodwin.

[10] This example is from Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Conversational Argument: A Discourse Analytic Approach," in Cox and Willard.

[11] A felicitious request is one that is appropriate given speakers' definitions of context. For a discussion of felicity conditions and conversational argument see Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Argument as a Natural Category: The Routine Grounds for Arguing in Conversion," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 45 (1981), 118 - 132.

[12] This example was recorded by the author. All such examples will hereinafter be referred to as Trapp samples.

[13] Trapp sample

[14] Robert Trapp. "Characteristics of Argument in Interpersonal Communication," Unpublished Dissertation, University of Denver 1982, p. 108. I had originally called this characteristic "comparing views of reality" but have been persuaded to adopt language more in line with that used by other argumentation theorists. The change in terms certainly does no violence to the concepts.

[15] I have chosen the term "good reasons" because of the interesting possibilities raised by comparing this process in interpersonal argument to other approaches to the nature of "good reasons." See for instance Karl R. Wallace, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 49 (1963), 239 - 249; Walter R. Fisher, "Toward a Logic of Good Reasons," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 64 (1978), 376 - 384.

[16] This example is from Marjorie Harness Goodwin, "Processes of Dispute Management among Urban Black Children," American Ethnologist, In Press.

[17] Trapp sample

[18] Jackson and Jacobs refer to this as disagreement at the performative level rather than at the propositional level.

[19] Jackson and Jacobs, 1981.

[20] Trapp sample

[21] Trapp example

[22] Brant R. Burleson, "The Senses of Argument Revisited: Prolegomen to Future Characterizations of Argument," Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation, eds. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, (Annadale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1981), 955 - 979.

REASONING: AN ANALYSIS OF UNPLANNED, INTERACTIONAL DISCOURSE

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Most writers in the field of argumentation have, at some point, attempted to define the concept of reasoning. Doing so is not necesarily difficult and may often prove to be of heuristic value. Viewing reasoning from the perspective of Toulmin, Rieke and Janik as "the central activity of presenting the reasons in support of claim, so as to show how those reasons succeed in giving strength to a claim"[1]--or, in fact, from other similar perspectives-- can offer the researcher an initial point of departure for the exploration of reasoning. Yet, despite that, the process of reasoning in human discourse is an elusive concept. Many theorists have argued that reasoning is situational in nature, and that may well be true. However, insufficient attention has been paid to the situational factors affecting reasoning. This paper attempts to characterize reasoning based on research findings in two different situations, and proceed toward defining a field of reasoning. A situational focus on reasoning may be a first step toward a more broad conceptualization of reasoning in human discourse. John Lofland has set forth some of the advantages which stem from developing a situational focus: "To conceive a situation generically is to discriminate and bring forward social aspects that possess more generalized, more common, more universal relevance. A given situation is scrutinized in terms of the kinds of general human concerns that are being coped with and acted toward. ...To scrutinize a situation generically is to seek out its abstract, transcendent, formal, analytic aspects. It is by such an operation that the specific becomes general, the esoteric becomes exoteric, the obscure and irrelevant become clear and relevant."[2] There can be no question about the utility of finding such generic considerations that affect the process of argumentation. By assessing the situational nature of reasoning, it may be possible to begin to offer more broad-based conclusions about the nature of the reasoning process itself.

Traditionally, argumentation scholars have tended to explain reasoning in the fields of science, politics, law, etc. Such an approach, though, has frequently proved problematic as it tends to be somewhat limited. As Brant R. Burleson has noted, "Such traditional foci of study are message-centered rather than interactionally- or cognitively-centered, are largely prescriptive rather than descriptive in nature, and are focused on atypical, highly structured contexts rather than routine, everyday contexts."[3] As a result, more attention today is being focused upon reasoning in ordinary social situations, where the careful planning typical of the aforementioned fields does not commonly occur. In the last decade, discourse analysis has come into its own in the discipline

of speech communication. Such scholars as Hawes and Foley,[4] Jackson and Jacobs,[5] Rieke[6] and Willbrand[7] are all developing methods to study human conversation. Yet, as Robert Trapp notes, "When the discipline of speech communication broadened its focus to include interpersonal communication, the study of argumentation failed to seem 'relevant' to this 'new' concern."[8] For a period of time, argumentation theorists trailed their colleagues in pioneering efforts in the study of interpersonal communication. However, recently attempts have been made to integrate the study of argumentation with the study of ordinary human discourse. Trapp continues: "...during the last few years argumentation has undergone a change parallel to the change in speech communication. In addition to the more traditional views of argumentation, scholars are coming to view argumentation as a specific type of interpersonal communication."[9] The value of utilizing such an additional focus was articulated by Burleson when he contended "a better understanding of how naive social actors engage in the process of arguing can enhance and complement more traditional work concerned with argument analysis and criticism."[10] The effort to explore reasoning in ordinary human discourse, then, is not an attempt to substitute a new field of reasoning for an older one, but rather to provide an additional domain for application. As Lofland noted, greater insights into the newer field may serendipitously provide greater insights into the older field as well.

The purpose of this paper is to examine unplanned reasoned discourse in controversial and noncontroversial situations in order to assess the nature and types of reasoning used in such differing situations. This work departs from the restrictive research techniques used by Rieke and Willbrand as it is designed to test reasoning during spontaneous interpersonal dyadic interactions as opposed to a one-sided approach.[11]

Three research questions guided this investigation:

(1) Is nonrestrictive reasoning consistent with the findings of past research?

(2) Is a common reference point significant in reasoning?

(3) What is the role of controversy in the reasoning process?

It is hoped that these questions will help make some distinctions as to the situational nature of reasoning, and offer some new insights into describing and defining fields of reasoning.

Method

As a pilot effort, this study consisted of formulating two scenarios in which members of a dyad would need to engage in the process of reasoning. In one scenario, polarized reference points were assigned to the participants; in the other, no reference points were assigned. Six dyads (two male/female, two female/female, two male/male) from an introductory communication course at the University of Utah and several community colleges in the twin cities area participated in the study conducted from the fall of 1980 to the spring of 1983. Students were told they were finalists in the Third Annual See-America-First give away contest. Their role as finalists was to mutually decide on a location for the trip, then attempt to justify that decision as though they were presenting their reasons to the contest selection committee.

In one scenario, the participants in each dyad were individually assigned a different location to advocate (a skiing trip in Utah or a sightseeing tour of southern California) based on a prior interest survey. Each was then to try to convince the other that the trip should be to his/her assigned location. In this way, controversy was built in to the situation.

In the second scenario, the dyad partners were told they were to select a mutually acceptable location for the trip, with the only constraint that the site must be in the United States. In this respect, no controversy was imposed upon the situation and any ensuing controversy would necessarily result from the participants' own decision to disagree.

Each dyad was allowed ten minutes to discuss its situation. The conversations were audio taped, transcribed, and numbered according to utterance. These utterances were separated into reasoning and non-reasoning, then categorized according to a system similar to the one established by Rieke[12] and Willbrand.[13] The category system and the definitions were as follows:

CONTENT: These categories were based on the substantive reasons given about the specific scenarios.

Geographical: These were both positive and negative reasons about the geography, i.e., terrain, etc., of the various areas discussed.

Climate: These included both positive and negative reasons about the climate of the various areas discussed.

Cultural: These were both positive and negative reasons regarding the culture of the various areas discussed.

Activities: These included both positive and negative reasons pertaining to the various activities available at the areas discussed.

Variety: These reasons appealed to the diversity of experience(s) offered by an alternative.

Personal Opinion Credibility: These reasons were based on a participant's own past experiences and judgments.

Outside Opinion Credibility: These reasons were based on the opinions of others as stated by a participant.

Personal Desire: These reasons included statements that expressed the personal wishes or feelings of the speaker for or against a certain alternative.

Rule Compliance: These were reasons based on the rules of the contest given in the situation.

Particularities: These were reasons particular to a preceeding reason, supporting that reason, or offering a specific fact.

Positive Alternative: These reasons were suggested alternatives to ideas which had previously been stated.

FORM: These categories were based on approaches to the reasoning process utilized in the specific scenarios.

Burden Switch: These propositions included charges or challenges to the other participant to advance reasons for purposes of debate.

Data Solicitation: These statements asked for specific information from the other person.

Data Response: These statements responded to the above-mentioned data solicitations.

Closure Attempt: These propositions included proposals in declarative or interrogative form for the addressee to accept the claim.

OTHER: This category was used to include any statement that was not applicable to the discourse as a reason.

Following the ten minutes, the experimenter asked each participant to comment on what had just taken place. They were prompted with the question, "Would you say you were giving reasons, making arguments, negotiating, or what?" All subjects contended and agreed that they were giving reasons. The critical issues here are not whether a disinterested observer would agree that the utterances were reasons nor whether such an observer would evaluate those reasons as "strong or weak." Much as we have come to rely on the perceptions of the participants to determine whether or not an argument is taking place, we must also rely on the perceptions of the participants as to whether reasoning is used in support of those arguments. Because people act on the basis of what they perceive to be the case, such determinations are best left to the naive social actor rather than to the disinterested outside observer. The types and amounts of reasons used by the participants exemplify exactly what people believe reasoning to be. A summary of their reasons is included in Table I.

The above, however, is not to suggest that "reasons" are "reasons" simply because the participants identify utterances as such. Rather, it is to suggest that the participants must be given credit for intuitively sensing what the scholars would identify as the conditions for assessing reason-giving discourse. Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson note the fundamental properties of such discourse: "A unique contribution of discourse analysis to the study of argument is its ability to give a principled account of what is and is not reason-giving. ... Part of the solution to this puzzle is that the felicity conditions for speech acts serve as both an interpretive and a productive rule, so that the principles that determine what can be given as a reason also determines what can be heard as a reason."[14] It is our contention that the participants themselves recognized such felicity acts and that, therefore, the perceptions of an outside observer become somewhat irrelevant to what those individuals judged to be a reasoning process.

Results

Geographical and climatical reasons were used nearly equally by the participants in the controversial and non-controversial scenarios, i.e., approximately 11% of the time. The following example incorporated both types of reasons.

G: San Diego is just an hour's drive to the mountains, you can ski in July. Or else you can go to the ocean. So you can have your choice of both.
P: Yeh, but it's hotter down in southern California.
G: It's hot, but the humidity is not like Minnesota. It's gorgeous. In the morning there's dew on the grass, and it's just, it's gorgeous. You have the breeze coming in from the ocean, it's nice.

Cultural reasons were significantly more important to the dyads in the noncontroversial scenario, where they were used nearly 10% the time, as compared to minimal usage by the controversial dyads. The following example illustrates how this reasoning was used.

C: And look at Hawaii, they're one proud people and they're beautiful. And I, and I think, I dunno, you get a spirit over there that's ah, just pride. Yunno, and I think we need that.
M: Proud of what they are and what they mean and everything.

The various activities native to the areas were reasons used twice as often by the controversial dyads, 14% to 7%. Because the appeals were of a personalized nature, it would appear that activities were used to lure one party into accepting the other's claim. The following are two such examples:

G: You could hang glide! You can fish, go out on a great big boat ship and fish out there. You can, you can do everything. You can ski. More opportunities if we go to San Diego in southern California.
O: California has a lot more activities to be involved in, see?
S: There's almost too much to see so that you can't really yunno, you want to see everything and you wear yourself out doing it.

The variety reason was used equally by the dyads, approximately 3% of the time. Variety was indicated in the following three examples:

M: We're always around mountains here...we should go to something different.

F: Where I've grown up in Nevada and I've been to Utah, I haven't experienced anything different. And ah, people here are more the same. Where the people in California are a little bit different, from what I've experienced. And I want to get over there and see more.

O: That's true, but I think people would have a funner time in southern California rather than skiing in Utah.
S: They'd have more to do.
O: Right
S: That doesn't mean it would be more fun. You'd see more things, but if you enjoy skiing...
O: You'd get more variety.

Personal opinion credibility reasons were used nearly 10% of the time, used slightly more by the controversial dyads. The following is a typical example:

C: And I hated Hawaii.
M: Did you really?
C: We, is that, that's the big island? I did not like it.
M: Why?
C: Wait, was that the big island? Because...you can't get in the ocean there. Because
M: So many people.
C: ...No...there are these big bugs and they just bite. They're like mosquitos and they just bite, bite you.

Personal desire reasons were used five times as often by the controversial dyads as by the noncontroversial dyads. Here are two examples:

C: Skiing to me it's just something I would really like to learn.
G: Well I can understand because I love to ski. But still I would like to go to California.

L: Well you like the East coast, I like Boston.

Outside opinion credibility was used only once, in reference to a cousin who had had a relevant experience.

The remainder of the content categories were used primarily by a single dyad and no relevant comparisons or conclusions could be drawn from them based on this sample.

In the form categories, burden switches were used more by the controversial dyads, constituting 5% of these utterances. Typical burden switches included questions, "Where do you want to go?" "Then all we want to do is just ski?" and statements, "O.K., you go first," and "It depends on what you want to do." In certain situations these may also constitute solicitations for information or opinions and were so coded. However, in the majority of burden switches, a challenge was issued which required an answer from the other participant.

Data solicitations and responses were used frequently by nearly all dyads, comprising nearly 13% of the utterances. These statements, although some might regard them as merely questions and answers regarding certain information, were identified as reasons by the participants. At the very least, they would certainly have to be viewed, even by an outside observer, as integral to the reasoning process.

Closure attempts, though infrequent, were used by all dyads and constitute an important element in reasoning. These utterances finalized a chain of reasoning by calling for the acceptance of a given claim. Closure attempts were illustrated by such statements as, "And that's why I want to go there," "So I think we've covered everything," and "I think we've decided." These remarks often signaled the end of the dyadic interchange.

Discussion

The first research question guiding this investigation was, "Is nonrestrictive reasoning consistent with the findings of past research?" This question must be answered affirmatively, based on the statements of all participants that they were engaging in reasoning. Several dayds concluded with the following statements:

H: So that's the reason we want to go.

L: That's our reasons, yeah.

M: And we've outlined all our reasons.

It is difficult to quarrel with such unequivocal statements. In fact, when asked to recall in their dialogue anything that was not a reason, the participants could not identify any statement which was not reasoning. Thus it is fair to conclude with Rieke that what was collected was a "sample of what people *say* when they *say* they are giving reasons."[15] While the data took numerous different forms in terms of categorization, the process must still be characterized as reasoning.

The second research question was, "Is a common reference point significant in reasoning?" The findings indicated that the participants seemed to need a common reference point from which to reason. In one case, the participants decided on a location for the trip very early in their conversation, which then became their common reference point.

M: O.K. Where do you want to go?
C: Personally, I want to go to Hawaii.
M: Do you? Me, too.

This dyad then proceeded to recite a myriad of reasons for their decision. In another dyad, participants set up a priori criteria for their decisions, then reasoned according to those criteria. In essence, the participants searched for a common reference point to begin the discussion. To illustrate:

R: Well, I think we should establish the criteria for where we'd like to go, whether we want something warm, or like mountains.
M: Warm.
R: Or something like that.
M: At least relatively warm.
R: Do we want a beach area, as compared to a mountainous area, or maybe a urban area like New York City where there's plays and, and theater.

Thus, the criteria served as the initial point for the development of further reasoning.

The participants in the dyads with the built-in controversy began by stating their personal reasons and, after discovering mutual areas of interest, negotiated these points to try and convince the other person.

P: It all depends on what you want to go on the trip for. If you like to ski, you want to go someplace where it's nice skiing all the time.
G: Well you can ski from there (California), too.
P: Yea, but Utah is known for its skiing.

It seems appropriate to conclude that when a common reference point does not initially exist, a preliminary behavior effort involves an attempt to establish a common point from which to reason.

The third research question addressed was, "What is the role of controversy in the reasoning process?" Based on this research, it would appear that reasoning occurs for the purpose of minimizing controversy. In the presence of conflict, individuals attempt to achieve consensus in decision-making. Clearly, there would be no need for argumentation and the consequent reason-giving process if there were no conflict present. As Sillars and Ganer have noted, "Conflict occurs in argumentation when differences arise over beliefs and values but cooperative means of resolving those conflicts are essential to argumentation."[16] Reason-giving thus becomes one of the cooperative means of resolving conflict. However, when satisfactory consensus in a decision has been reached and the reasons for that decision agreed upon, there appears no need for further reasoning. This is evidenced by the fact that in the noncontroversial scenario, dyads reached a decision, justified it, and then ceased dialogue. One dyad used nine minutes for this process, another took only five minutes, while the third dyad took slightly under three minutes. In the controversial scenario, two dyads were unable to reach a mutually acceptable decision and so the reasoning process continued for the entire time. The third controversial dyad came to an agreement in six minutes, then shifted their topic of discussion, thus reflecting the same process engaged in by the noncontroversial group. Hence, it is apparent that reasoning occurs to a much more significant extent when controversy exists.

An independent finding could also be stated in this area: that reasoning occurs to alleviate post decisional dissonance. Indeed, this may be a secondary answer to the question, "Why do people reason?" Two noncontroversial dyads both reached their decisions to go to Hawaii after four, and thirty-one responses. The dyad choosing Vermont did so after thirty-eight responses. The remainder of their discourse dealt with convincing each other, the contest selection committee, and/or themselves that their decision was the best one, periodically ruling out alternative locations as not meeting their established criteria or reinforcing their initial decision. Several examples illustrate:

C: Do you think Hawaii would be better than Alaska?
M: Oh, by far.
C: I'd never want to go to Alaska, it's too cold.
M: It is.
C: I heard it's pretty in summer, but I think for a trip like this,
M: The summer's only two months long, and
C: Yeah, and you have to get there.
M: And then its frozen again.
C: Right.
M: But like Hawaii, like you said, it'll be warm, it'll be pretty climate, there's really a lot to do there.
C: I'm sure.
M: The water and everything.
C: I think that'd be the best place in the United States.

C: There's other places like back East. I've never been back East.
M: Ooo, I have; it's like New York, that's
C: My cousin loved it.
M: It's scary, really scary.

M: Like Washington, D.C. That would be the best place to visit. I've been there twice. And that place is beautiful. It's so clean, it's just got gorgeous buildings. It's got all those historical sites. Now that would be really fun. That would be good, another alternative. But like, I don't know. Hawaii does have a better climate and I like warm weather. And that's why I would choose Hawaii over Washington, D.C.

In the preceeding example in just one short turn, one participant proposed a new alternative, supported it, then rejected it without any input from the other member of the dyad. In essense. the participant appeared to be attempting to justify the decision, both intrapersonally and to the other participant. Hence it can be concluded that reasoning not only exists to achieve mutual agreement, but that once a decision has been made, reasoning occurs to justify that decision so as to reduce any internal or external dissonance factors. In all instances, the dyads seemed to move full circle back to their common reference point after justifying their decision from all angles.

A final observation seems appropriate in characterizing fields of reasoning based on this data. In restricted interactional reasoning situations[17], questions normally constituted burden switches. However, in nonrestricted interactional reasoning situations, questions constituted solicitations for data or information, seeking to further establish a common reference point. This observation would seem to support the concept that reasoning occurs situationally, at least in form.

Though reasoning is often an elusive concept, it is hoped that this research has helped to make some important distinctions as to the situational nature of reasoning, drawn some significant parallels between current research efforts, and offered some new insights in describing and defining reasoning in interpersonal communication.

But such can only be considered a preliminary effort. Assessing the nature of situational reasoning in 1981, Rieke commented "Clearly, no single study, nor even a decade of studies is likely to resolve these and other issues. But a repetoire of perspectives and methodologies has begun to emerge which promise to begin the job. ... ...all perspectives and methodologies should be encouraged and received with an open mind."[17] In that spirit, no claim is made for this paper beyond the claim that it is an additional means of exploring the emerging area of argumentation in ordinary human discourse.

In essence, this paper is an argument--with what the authors perceive as reasons--and, as such, it invites argumentative rejoinder. As Dale Hample has observed, "An argument may result in total rejection of the new belief, its integration into the cognitive system, or some intermediate result involving partial adherence."[18] While we would obviously prefer one of the latter results rather than the former, we would certainly, from the argumentative standpoint, settle for the first. In doing so, of course, we would comfort ourselves with the thought that academics rarely engage in "ordinary human discourse!"

TABLE I

NUMBER OF RESPONSES FOR EACH TYPE OF REASONING FOR EACH DYAD

TYPE OF REASON	CONTROVERSIAL DYAD				NONCONTROVERSIAL DYAD				
	1	2	3	Subtotal	1	2	3	Subtotal	Total
CONTENT									
Geographical									
Positive	4	7	5	16	5	7	3	15	31
Negative	5	4	1	10	10	1		11	21
Climate									
Positive	3	11	5	19	9	2	1	12	31
Negative	4	1	4	9	19			19	28
Cultural									
Positive		1	1	2	32	5	3	40	42
Negative		2	3	5	13			13	18
Activities									
Positive	10	28	16	54	5	9	9	23	77
Negative	2	5	9	16	6	4		10	26
Variety	12	2	3	17	6	8		14	31
Personal Opinion	20	17	24	61	29		3	32	93
Outside Opinion				0	6			6	6
Personal Desire	18	11	6	35	1		8	9	44
Rule Compliance	1		6	7		8	3	11	18
Particulars	15	12	13	40	9	3		12	52
Positive Alternative	8	13	9	30				0	30
FORM									
Burden Switch	8	10	6	24	7		7	14	38
Solicitation	16	8	4	28	24		9	33	61
Response	20	7	3	30	29		9	38	68
Closure	2	7	2	11	4	2	2	8	19
OTHER	47	22	24	93	90	38	14	142	235
TOTAL*	195 (189)	168 (162)	144 (132)	507	304 (293)	87 (84)	71 (58)	462	969

*Category total may not equal final total due to double coding.

Double coding occurred when an utterance contained multiple reasons or where it was significant to both content and form categories. Total number of utterances is in parentheses.

FOOTNOTES

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[11] Richard D. Rieke, "Adult Reasons in Supplication: Nondebaters vs. Debaters: Nontraditional vs. Traditional," in Dimensions of Argument, Eds. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, (Salt Lake City: Speech Communication Association, 1981), pp. 579-94 and Mary Louise Willbrand, "The Other Witch-poos Won't Like You," in 1980 Mid-America Linguistics Conference Papers, Ed. M. Henderson, (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 1981).

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[14] Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson, "Argumentation as a Natural Category: The Routine Grounds for Arguing in a Conversation," in Western Journal of Speech Communication, 45 (Spring 1981), 128.

[15] Rieke, "Adult Reasons in Supplication: Nondebaters vs. Debaters: Nontraditional vs. Traditional," p. 584.

[16] Malcolm O. Sillars and Patricia H. Ganer, "Values and Beliefs: A Systematic Basis for Argumentation," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, Eds. J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), p. 189.

[17] Rieke, "Adult Reasons in Supplication: Nondebaters vs. Debaters: Nontraditional vs. Traditional," p. 582.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF ARGUING FROM A SOCIAL ACTOR'S PERSPECTIVE

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Everyday arguments are practical accomplishments for the social actor. "Having an argument" is a complex and organized event regulated by rules and refined through strategies that serve as lines of action for accomplishing everyday interactants' intentions. Everyday arguments have been approached from a language-games metaphor (Jacobs, 1982), as disagreement-relevant speech acts organized by adjacency pair structures (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980), and as speech events with generic characteristics (O'Keefe & Benoit, 1982; Trapp, 1982). An alternative perspective is to view arguments as scripts which detail appropriate lines of action for the social actor.

This paper combines an interpretive view of interaction with a script-based theory of argument as interaction. The social world is a place of created meaning and behavior becomes sensical through the application of interpretive schemes. Interpretive schemes organize the behavior of an interactant and provide a framework for understanding their lines of action. Human beings perceive behavior as being caused and consequently see their own actions and understand others' behaviors as linked to goals or intentions (e.g., plan-based). A powerful organizing scheme for producing and interpreting discourse is the script, a routinized plan that is recognized by the social actor and calls forth possible lines of action. Benoit (1982) argues that social actors have distinct scripts for arguing and discussing. Data collected from critical incidents and follow-up interviews suggests that the argument and discussion scripts are perceived by social actors as motivated from different goals and consequently producing distinct lines of action. This paper sketches a view of argument and focuses on describing scripts as an explanatory metaphor to view everyday argument. Attention is given to a description and analysis of the headers which mark discourse as argument or non-argument.

The first section sets out the basic assumptions of an interpretive view of interaction and describes a script-based perspective. The second section sketches a model of argument as interaction derived from an interpretive and script-based perspective. This involves an examination of headers which mark discourse as part of the argument script or involving shifting scripts. The last section suggests hypotheses derived from a script-based theory of the naive social actor's conception of argument and deduces support for the usefulness of the perspective.

I

Human beings interact within a social world characterized by the creation of patterned meanings. The behavioral stream becomes sensical only when it is interpreted from a scheme that assigns subjective meaning to particular behaviors. O'Keefe, Delia, and O'Keefe (1980) outline the tenets of an interpretive view:

> An interpretive view takes as its fundamental premise the idea that the human social world is a world of meaning. We see human actors as equipped with cognitive structures and processes through which they categorize and order events; such structures give meaning, rationality, coherence, and predictability to the individual's experience of the world (p. 26).

Cognitive interpretive schemes serve as sense making mechanisms, providing structure to the social world by presuming coherence between events.

The social world is a place where events are perceived as caused. Behavior that is random defies the order necessary for making sense of events and will be massaged by social actors until it does make sense (Garfinkel, 1967). Schank & Abelson (1977) adopt a basic premise that states that social actors understand the action of others "because the other person is a human being with certain standard needs who lives in a world which has certain standard methods of getting those needs fulfilled" (p. 37). Prediction becomes possible by inferring that individuals' actions are guided by goals or intentions and the inverse, that actions can be interpreted as a display of goals or intentions. Intersubjectivity enters as persons share interpretations of behaviors by referencing the standard needs or goals which created the events observed:

> First, there are behaviors, events, and other factlike phenomena on the ground floor. Then there are individual "persons" that inhabit the world; and finally, there is, for each person, a system of accompanying interpretations, beliefs, and perceptions of the fact-world that parallel them on the second floor. Intersubjectivity (or a world known in common) results when the potentially distinct meaning structures in a group of individual persons turns out to be the same, become the same over time, or mesh in certain ways (Schwarts & Jacobs, 1979, p. 371).

Patterned meanings are created as social actors share schemes for organizing events and utilize discourse to reference those schemes to produce an ordered social world.

An interpretive view of interaction is outlined by O'Keefe, Delia, and O'Keefe (1980) and postulates organizing schemes as

"coordinating devices which allow one person to produce acts with recognizeable implications for another person's behavior and permit persons to respond coherently and appropriately to acts which have been produced" (p. 26). Interactions involve the fitting together of multiple lines of action and are understood through shared organizing schemes (e.g., plans, scripts). This position is developed through five characteristics of interactional organization:

1. Organization is schematic. Behavior makes sense through reference to shared organizing schemes.
2. Organization is local. The development of an interaction is dependent on the interactant's understanding of the interaction in progress. Organizing schemes are locally applied and relevant.
3. Organization is hierarchical. Layers of organizing schemes are embedded within one another. General schemes are activiated, then call up specific local procedures.
4. Organization is historically emergent. Organizing schemes are procedures for interpreting and producing discourse but they do not provide the process for coordinating action and thus the organization is dependent upon the local unfolding of the discourse.
5. Organization is an interactional achievement. Order in interaction is executed through the active coordination of lines of action, the production of relevant discourse within shared schemes, and the interpretation of another's discourse within shared schemes.

In summary, interaction is produced and understood by social actors through shared schemes for organizing behavior. Interactions are organized by several schemes (e.g., plans or scripts) and by more specific schemes (e.g., openings within telephone conversations). Organizing schemes provide the social actor with a repertoire of appropriate lines of action and provide an interpretation of the behavior of a conversational partner by reference to the abstract schemes which produced the behavior. The collaborative work required to mesh interactants' lines of action is displayed through the emergence of the discourse. Communication coordinates the intentions of conversational partners (Burke, 1982).

The assumptions of an interpretive view of interaction can be allied with a script based theory. From artificial intelligence, Schank & Abelson (1977) describe the function of plans and scripts in the understanding of discourse. To understand a story as coherent, general knowledge and specific knowledge are accessed. General knowledge (plans) links needs to lines of action that fulfill those needs and specific knowledge (scripts) detail knowledge of a repeated event. Plans are described as:

> the set of choices that a person has when he sets out to accomplish a goal. In listening to discourses, people use plans to make sense of seemingly disconnected sentences.

> By finding a plan, an understander can make guesses about the intentions of an action in an unfolding story and use these guesses to make sense of the story (p. 70).

Plans function as organizing schemes by linking behavior to intentions. The behavioral stream is perceived as meaningful as lines of action are connected to the goals which generated the discourse. Behavior is thus seen as coherent within the framework provided by the plan.

Scripts are plans that have become standardized through repeated occurrence so that enacting the script keys up a sequence of expected behaviors. Scripts assume that memory is organized around episodes rather than semantic categories, which allows for the recognition of repeated lines of action. When a line of action is recognized as belonging to a particular script, it facilitates understanding of the story. In discourse, when both interactants know the script and agree that this particular script is appropriate, then scripts serve as "a great economy. . . because neither party need invest effort deciding what the actions of others mean and how appropriately to respond" (Schank & Abelson, 1977, p. 61).

A script specifies the sequence of actions that occur in a well-defined situation. This implies that the script contains knowledge of each action required for completion and the temporal ordering of each action within the script. Each action is perceived as filling a slot that affects each successive action. Scripts are routine and thereby handle the standardized case, novelties require shifting out of the script to the apparatus of a plan to achieve understanding.

While the concepts of plans and scripts are useful in connecting discourse (i.e. linguistic action) to intentions to explain the process of understanding stories, these concepts require revision to be consistent with the assumptions of an interpretive view of interaction. Scripts are viewed as predetermined temporally ordered sequences of events. Schank and Abelson's (1977) restaurant script embodies a series of actions that occur in a specified order (e.g. Patron seated at table, waitress provides menu, patron orders . . .). The pattern is set and each action must occur in the order specified for the script to be enacted. To understand the story, the appropriate script is enacted and further lines in the story are interpreted within the frame provided by the script. When scripts are unavailable, plans represent general knowledge that relates action to intentions to produce understanding. But, interactions are a more complex matter. The recognition of a plan or script in the story of a single teller is considerably easier than the meshing of individual plans and scripts across the development of discourse. While plans and scripts serve as resources to interactants, the situational context is an additional resource and complication. Burke (1982) argues that the cognitive science orientation to plans is rigid and static "because it neglects

the extent to which interactional goals and plans are shaped by the concrete situations in which interactants find themselves" (p. 14). The interpretive view of interaction recognises that interactional organization is emergent so that an interactant's intentions may shift during the discourse affecting the talk used to accomplish the goals, plans or scripts that are appropriate at any given point may be negotiated, or particular plans to accomplish intentions may be unsuccessul and alternative lines of action must be created by the interactants. Schank and Abelson's desciption is simplistic in assuming that a plan or script is simply recognised and enacted independent of contextual influences that could change its course. Plans and scripts are organising schemes but the coordination of these devices in discourse is an interactional phenomena.

Scripts become conventionalised by the repeated sequencing of actions. Schank and Abelson (1977) appear to shift away from a functional description to a temporally ordered scheme to achieve understadning. It is reasonable to argue that even though there is not a direct correspondence between actions and intentions, social actors develop methods for displaying intentions and that these methods begin to exhibit regularities. But, the coherence does not come for a regularity in the sequencing. Rather, these sequecning regularities are to be taken as displays of the functional relationships being articulated. This distinction may appear minor but it has implications for the analysis of discourse (O'Keefe, Delia & O'Keefe, 1980). If the analyst is interested in functional relationships, the intentions expressed through the discourse are of primary importance. The analyst does not expect those relationships to be expressed through a rigid temporal pattern although convention may lead to sequential patterns. Multiple lines of action are viewed as possible to achieve an actor's intentions, actions may be accomplished in a single turn or over a series of turns, actions may be collaboratively built by interactants through the process of discourse, and the actions of a single interactant affect the discourse which follows. In this sense, scripts are conventionalised norms for lines of action given certain intentions but the selection of particular lines of action exert considerable influence on the actual sequencing of the discourse.

To integrate an interpretive view of interaction with a plan/script based theory, the following assumptions have been sketched:

1. Interactants make sense of the world by applying interpretive procedures to sense data.
2. Interactants perceive the social world as a world of causality; discourse is perceived as caused by interactants intentions. Therefore, to understand discourse the hearer infers the intentions of the speaker and to communicate the speaker attempts to display intentions to the hearer through the discourse.
3. Plans and scripts are general organising schemes that

are affected by the situational context of the interaction in progress.

4. Interaction is a collaborative activity. The coordination of intention is evidenced through the negotiated unfolding of discourse.

5. Scripts specify a functional relationship between intentions and linguistic action. Scripts designate appropriate lines of action to interactants. Therefore, scripts suggest behaviors that could be followed given certain intentions and those behaviors are recognized by hearers as conveying particular intentions and calling forth possible lines of actions as responses.

II

An interperetive perspective contends that social actors create subjective meaning. A theorist interested in an event in the everyday world becomes committed to an examination of the "individual, his actions and interpretations" in order "to explain the actions and interactions of those members" (Schwartz & Jacobs, 1980, p. 188). Trapp (1982) argues that the analyst must bracket his presuppositions by "having naive social actors sort data into categories" (p. 9) instead of imposing the researcher's conception of the nature of argument on the data.

The methods adopted for this study seek to display the naive social actor's characterization of argument. The data is derived from three sources. Fifty undergraduate students were asked to recall a critical incident of argument (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and follow up questions probed their interpretations of the events reconstructed. Students were paired and instructed to argue or discuss an issue and follow up interviews explored their perceptions of this event and their characterizations of arguments and discussions in general. In addition, the author collected naturally occurring intances of argument to further substantiate the claims being made in the paper. This data provides a sense of the social actor's perception of the intention underlying argument, the preconditions necessary for the occurrence of argument, and the headers which signal an argument in progress.

Viewing arguments as scripts commits the theorist to the assumption that naive social actors recognize commonalities in episodes that take on the label "arguments." When social actors were asked to describe why they characterized incidents as arguments, it became apparent that there is a shared orientation to the nature of argument. Social actors characterise arguments as expressions of disagreement accompanied by negative nonverbal, emotional, one-sided, and communicating negative relational messages (Benoit, 1982). Through repeated experience and the storage of such experience in episodic memory, the naive social actor is able to recognize "characteristic" lines of action which signal an argument script and intentions for characteristic arguments. In an interview following an argument, the social actor (P) makes clear a conscious recognition of an argument script:

> I: OK. If I'd given you the instructions to discuss instead of to argue what would you have done differently if anything?
>
> P: Probably in my thinking, I would look at things I have. I argue that I'm right rather than being willing to just listen to what he had to say. It's kinda like in my head, when I hear the word argue, its kinda like, I have to fight for something I believe in. . .

When an argument script is recognized, it provides a framework for understanding discourse, for predicting the development of the interaction, and for preparing responses based on the prediction of possible lines of action by a conversational partner. In one sense, scripts operate much like frames (Goffman, 1974) in that their recognition provides an explanation of what follows consistent with the perception of the event being framed. Perceiving that an argument script is in play consequently leads to the perception that discourse occurring within that frame is argumentative. Since arguments can achieve intentions through multiple lines of action, there is not a rigid temporal or structural ordering to argument. There are a variety of acts to accomplish a single intention and the choice of acts (e.g., insult vs. assertion) have implications for the development of the discourse. Discourse is viewed as collaborative and consequently the enactment of a script is a jointly produced event and shifts in scripts during an interaction require the coordinated efforts of the interactants.

Figure 1 sketches a brief model of argument as interaction utilizing an interpretive perspective and a script based theory as explanatory metaphors. The model originates at the level of intentions. Social actors generally perceive arguments as intending to induce conversational partners to recognize the rightness of their beliefs or actions (Benoit, 1982). Follow-up interviews elicit such typical comments as "We both felt the other was wrong and we were right," "Neither of us would look at the other persons' views or reasons for thinking that way," "This is my stance and that's got to be it," and "It has to be something you're so--that side on, to feel that you believe and you"re not willing to change no matter what the other person says. That you're going to try so hard to convince them that you're right." This intention may be pursued through such subsidiary goals as establishing that the conversational partner is wrong or making the conversational partner feel guilty or stupid for holding a position discrepant from the speaker. Grice's (1975) maxim that an interactant should believe what is said appears to have a corollary which posits that an interactant should argue for that which is believed. Beliefs and actions represent the portrait of an individual's image to others (Schlenker, 1980) and arguments about their rightness are perceived as attacks on the self which elicit defense (e.g., "I had to defend my actions to the point where we were both mad," "I felt like I made my partner defensive," and "I have to fight for something I believe in"). Thus, arguments may become emotional and bitter (e.g., "out of control," "an outpour of emotion," and "bitter voices") and exert negative long term effects on the relationship between the interactants. Even arguments about inconsequential beliefs can be perceived as communicating underlying relational messages with considerably more effect than their content would suggest (e.g., "It seems as though the words themselves have a lot more meaning behind them--besides argument. The anger builds up and frustration"). Consider this instance, in which an argument generated by disagreement over the severity of an injury left these interactants at the point where "not another word was said for three weeks and still no 'I'm sorry.'"

> A: I don't think you will die ((B hurt herself in a softball game)).
> B: Why don;t you go to hell?
> A: Oooh. Forgive me.
> B: If you don't have anything nice to say to me, then keep your fucking mouth shut.
> A: You only get what you give.

While the content of the disagreement would not predict consequential effects on the relationship, an intention perceived as a challenge of an interactant's created identity of "injured party" does exert considerable impact on the development of the relationship. The data also yields instances of arguments about who does more dishes that leave interactants "angry and defensive" or instances where controversy the definition of a word leaves interactants "hurt and feeling stupid for having argued about it. Arguments are linked to a speaker's intention to promulgate their own beliefs while rejecting the hearer's beliefs. The connection to such an intention provides force to an argument that the content may not reveal.

The intent to induce the conversational partner to recognize the rightness of beliefs or actions leads to a particular script for discourse in which overt disagreement is appropriate (Trapp, 1982; O'Keefe & Benoit, 1982; Benoit, 1982). When the speaker accomplishes an action or states a belief that is inconsistent with the hearer's view, an argument script may ensue by the production of an act that expresses that disagreement. This act is taken by the hearer as evidence that 1) the interactant holds a belief perceived as inconsistent, 2) the interactant believes that his own belief is right and the partner's belief is wrong, and 3) the interactant is willing to engage in an altercation to correct the partner's belief. Jacobs & Jackson (1981) and Benoit (forthcoming) have described the open ended quality of the arguable for virtually any statement or action may be taken up as the issue of an argument if an interactant perceives it as standing in opposition to personal beliefs.

To express overt disagreement, the interactant may choose from a variety of speech acts (e.g., criticism, insult, threat, challenge, etc.). The choice of the particular speech act is strategic. The acts are capable of conveying the intensity of the disagreement (e.g., criticism vs. insult), and may be selected to accomplish subsidiary goals (e.g., challenge may be adopted if the interactant wants to make the conversational partner feel stupid), and carry pragmatic implications (e.g., an argument initiated with an insult has a different course of development than an argument initiated by a challenge).

The speech act is used by the interactant to infer the speaker's intentions. The discourse serves as an indication of the goals sought by the speaker. So, when a speaker issues a challenge, it is seen by the hearer as an expression of disagreement that is motivated by the speaker's intent to induce negotiation of the rightness of their views. But, the speech act is not the only resource for understnading the speaker's intent. As Burke (1982) notes the situated context and background understandings influence a hearer's interpretation of the discourse. Since correspondence between form and intent is indirect, it is possible for the same utterance to be interpreted as motivated by distinct intentions. In this example previous conversation between A and B has indicated A's frustration in postponing a book order. Given this background understanding, A's statement is understood by B as an implied criticism. The action adapted (criticism) is linked to A's intention to exert dominance by prodding A to look for the book list and an argument ensues.

> A: We were going to order books last week. Have you looked for your list ((of books)) yet?

The point here is that this act is interpretable in light of previous discourse and that an analysis of the act alone could have heard this utterance within a discussion script. The situated context within which the utterance occurs is another resource. For example, when an argument script has preceded, future discourse is frequently interpreted in light of this script:

> 1. A: And then I gotta work on my paper, but I don't know where I'm going with it yet.
> 2. B: I know. I mean *where* are we going to do it?
> 3. A: Why are you so frustrated with me? I don't know what I'm going to do so I don't know where I'm going to do it.
> 4. B: Why don't I take her and come back and you'll know?
> 5. A: Why am I the one deciding here? Do you need to work in the office?
> 6. B: There or in the library.
> 7. A: Yeah. You've got to work on your paper. Not on that response. What's the matter?
> 8. B: I don't think I like you telling me what I have to work on.
> 9. A: God. I was just kidding.

In lines 2 and 3 it is apparent that an argument script is in place while at line 7, A attempts to introudce a tease which is interpreted as a criticism and order consistent with the argument script.

To deal with argument as interaction requires an extension of this thinking to utterances produced by a conversational partner. When a speaker makes a statement of overt opposition, it opens a slot for the conversational partner to respond. What resources does the hearer have in formulating a response? At this point, the hearer has made an inference about the speaker's intentions and any response will be directed at those intentions. An an argument, a response may be motivated to protect beliefs which could generate lines of action such as denials, justifications, counter-beliefs, counter-examples etc. . . The conversant chooses an utterance which responds to the intentions of the partner and to the particular act used to convey those intentions. Communication becomes the coordination of interactants intentions.

The model makes these claims: 1. Social actors utilize argument scripts which set out expectations about the conventional relationship between statements of overt disagreement and the intention to prove one's own belief as right, between intentions and particular acts which express disagreement, and between lines of action which are likely to generate conventional responses, 2. A speaker's intentions are inferred from the act, its situated context and the background understandings, 3. Multiple acts can convey an intention and choices between acts are strategic, 4. Arguments are collaborative productions.

After sketching this model, it is possible to take up two important issues in understanding the argument script. The first asks what calls up an argument script. Schank and Abelson (1977) describe four types of headers which define when a script is to be called into play: precondition, instrumental, locale, and internal conceptualization. A precondition header triggers the script by referencing a precondition for that script. The line "I'm hungry" in a story calls up the restaurant script since hunger is a precondition for going to a restaurant. An instrumental header involves inputs about multiple contexts in which one can be interpreted as instrumental for the other (e.g. driving to a restaurant is instrumental to the restaurant script). A locale header specifieds a place where the script typically occurs and internal conceptualization headers reference roles recognized as part of the script(e.g. waitress). The precondition header is the only type prompting the argument script into play.

Data from social actors indicate two precondtions for the argument script. The argument script requires that interactants view their positions as in opposition. If the precondition is not satisfied an argument can not take place:

I: Your instructions said that you were to have an argument. Do you think it was an argument?
P: No.
I: What was it?
P: It was just a discussion and we--there wasn't anything I could argue. We were in agreement on the same end. So it was not a conflicting argument. . .we were just discussing.

The opposition must be perceived by both interactans since the argument script is a joint production. In this instance, a forwards an act which could generate an argument, but B's agreement short circuits the script:

A: Well I think that were going to get ourselves overextended.
B: Well you know, I think I agree with you.

A's remark is intended as a criticism and assumes that B will disagree, but an argument is avoided by indicating a shared orientation to the issue. It is recognized that it takes two to argue.

A second precondition states that an argument must be worth the investment required to accomplish the script. This precondition notes that arguments do not occur in every instance where a perceived disagreement is observed. A conversant may allow a minor disagreement to pass "because it wasn't worth arguing about." Even when there is a disagreement and one of the interactants has initiated the argument script, it may be declined by the partner if the argument is not perceived as worth the investment:

A: Are we going to talk about it yet?
B: Not now ok? I'm not up to it.

B has avoided talk on a subject and A's request to talk about it is taken as a criticism by B; yet, B decides to decline the argument at this point. It is worth noting that if the interactants do not share this perception, an argument may ensue over that issue. A recognition that the investment is exceeding any benefits from the argument can function to terminate the argument:

S: Can we coordinate this? I stopped for that car and you kept on walking.
B: Ok. Let's coordinate this. ((sarcastic tone))
S: Don't be a snit.
B: Well I felt like you were blaming me.
S: No. I just want to coordinate this. Why are we fighting about this? This is stupid. Let's not fight about this anymore.
B: Ok.

S makes the claim that the argument is not important enough to invest the effort and risk the costs and closes down the argument script by claiming a violation of a precondition. This is not to suggest that arguments do not occur about seemingly "trivial" matters, but that the interactants must perceive the argument as worth the effort required at the time at which it occurs.

The preconditions mustbe referenced to signal that an argument script is being called up. The precondition which states that there must be perceived opposition is apparent through the discourse. There are conventional forms of discourse for the expression of disagreement and the occurrence of these forms is recognized as signalling an argument and its correspondent intentions. Insults, criticisms, challenges, threats are all ecplicitly seen as displaying disagreement. In addition, the social actor recognizes that disagreement is conveyed through the nonverbal channel and an increase in volume, a sarcastic tone, or a short staccatto delivery are taken as evidence of disagreement. Background understandings are also used to key argument scripts. Knowledge of controversial issues that "always start fights" or previous discourse on the same issue which was argumentative will color the interpretation of discourse. The precondition concerning the investment required to engage in an argument is apparent by the discourse. A speaker choosing to issue an action heard as disagreement has implicitly agreed that the issue is worth arguing about and the partner who responds to the disagreement has agreed to enact the script. The joint production required for an argument script demands a pair of statements that are perceived as in opposition and by the issuance of their utterances also perceived as worthy of argument.

The instrumental header is of little use in activating the argument script since there are rarely a series of subgoals needed to reach the primary intention of an argument. An exception to this generalization may be the case in which an argument is sought but must be preceded by a series of discussions to find something to disagree about. The locale header presupposes that the script is more likely to occur in a particular location but arguments have no such boundaries. Arguments may occur anywhere although the conventions for appropriate lines of actions may be restrained by the situation in which the argument takes place. The internal conceptualization header references roles that enact a script. Parties in an argument as interaction do not have particular social roles to accomplish. They do have expected behaviors but these are derived more from their intentions than from a particular role.

Once argument scripts have been called into play, they will be used to interpret all successive discourse until they are called out of play. Social actors indicate that arguments are terminated when one of the interactants terminate the interaction (e.g., walks out, hangs up), the partner gives in or the interactants reach some agreement, the interactants recognize that the argument is pointless, the interactants change the topic or change the nature of the interaction (Benoit, 1982). These termination strategies can be understood within the model of everyday argument that has been sketched. An argument script is called out of play when the preconditions are no longer satisfied. An implicit precondition for argument in interaction is that it requires at least two parties. When one of the parties abruptly leaves the interaction, the argument must come to an end at least until the interactants meet again. Arguments require overt opposition and this precondition is violated when the partner gives in, both interactants reach some agreement or the topic is changed to an issue where there is no disagreement. The argument script also requires joint agreement that the script is worth continuing and so perceiving the argument as pointless is enough to call the argument script out of play.

Schank & Abelson (1977) describe distractions which involve

unexpected states or actions that serve to initiate new goals that temporarily or permanently move the actors out of script. Lines of action which signal a change in intentions to the hearer may take the argument script out of play. In this example, A levels a criticism and B responds with a hostile nonverbal look enacting the argument script but an unexpected line of action for the argument script by A shifts the discourse away from the argument script.

A: You want her ((their child)) to hold her bowl up like that? ((mocking tone: B has recently criticized A for the very same action))
B: ((horrible look))
A: ((Walks over to B)) We love mommy. We love mommy. ((A gives B kisses, and their child starts to also give B kisses))

An argument script can be called out of play through explicit negotiation to move another script or plan to direct discourse. Metatalk occurring within arguments appears to suggest that the argument script is inappropriate and should be replaced by a different course of action. In this example, the argument is perceived as not getting anywhere and that script is is then replaced by a discussion script:

A: We're not getting anywhere by yelling. Let's cool off and talk this out rationally.
B: If we can.
A: Let's make a list of the pro's and con's and we'll try to keep the emotion out of it, OK?
B: OK.
A: Well, there's. . . ((A begins to make a list))

Interactants jointly produce the move to an alternative plan or script by "procedure" talk.

Argument scripts are called into play by referencing preconditions. Arguments must include two parties, contain perceived disagreements, and be considered worthy of the investment. They are called out of play when the preconditions are no longer satisfied, lines of action occur which are recognized as out of script, or metatalk negotiates an alteration in scripts.

III

This paper has attempted to outline a framework that explains everyday argument consistent with the naive social actor's characterization. At most, it is suggestive of the usefulness of a perspective relying upon an interpretive script based view of argument. Such a perspective leads to the formulation of other speculations to be investigated in further research:

1. What are the conventional lines of action for argument?

What acts do social actors perceive as appropriate for argument scripts?

2. What are the strategic implications of choices between lines of action? How does the selection of a particular line of action affect the development of the discourse?

3. What are the functions of metatalk within argument? Does metatalk indicate violations of conventions adopted in the script, when the script is appropriate, or when it is dysfunctional? Are there individual differences in the recognition and production of argument scripts?

4. If argument scripts are cognitive representations of repeated events, will persons with greater differentiation skills have more refined scripts? Are there individual styles of arguing so that particular lines of action are preferred and arguments become routine?

5. How are argument scripts learned? How are argument scripts between persons with long term relationships developed? How does the nature of the relationship influence the conventional vs. negotiated aspects of the argument script?

6. How are argument scripts a collaborative effort by the interactants?

7. Are there subscripts within argument with a particular structure? Jacobs (1982) discussion of the confrontation pattern may be the description of a single form of the argument script.

This approach provides a useful framework for viewing everyday argument. It is generated from the characterizations of everyday argument provided by the naive social actor and suggests a variety of issues to investigate in order to develop a theory of everyday argument.

The paper outlines the assumptions of an interpretive view of interaction and a script based theory of discourse. A meld of these perspectives is presented and applied to everyday argument. A model of everyday argument drawing the relationships between intentions, acts, and interaction is discussed. The social actors' perceptions of the intentions of an argument, the preconditions operating for an argument script to be in play, and the consequences of an argument are examined, and special attention is given to the issues of calling an argument script into and out of play.

Production of First Move		Understanding	Production of Second Move		Understanding
Speaker 1					
Intention---------	Lines of Action ---	Intention ---------	Intention---	Lines of Action---	Intention
1. primary	Expression of Disagreement	Act	1. primary		Act
2. subsidiary		Situated context	2. subsidiary		Situated context
		Background Understandings			Background understandings
	Acts as Strategies				

Figure 1. A model of argument as interaction.

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THE FUNCTIONS OF ARGUMENT

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This paper is about the functions of argument: Why do people argue? What is argument for? Answers to these questions will, of course, be of intrinsic interest to students of argument, but I hope to show that those conclusions have more than face value. I claim two special virtues for this functional account.

First, it can unify our current understandings of argument. O'Keefe (1977; 1982), in familiar and well-received essays, says that argument$_1$ and argument$_2$ are distinct *things*, which are indexed by different meanings of "argument." I have no objection to this analysis, but I would point out this limitation to it: O'Keefe leaves us with two separate things; he does not attempt a synthesis, or even imply that one is possible. File cards and legal pads, for instance, are clearly distinct things, yet we can generalize them to "stationery" or "paper products" if we want to work on a higher level of abstraction. Where are the analogous terms (or meanings, on the assumption that we will probably want to use "argument" for the general usage, too) for argumentation scholars? Wenzel (1980; see Zarefsky, 1980) makes a similar contribution by describing three different perspectives scholars can use in studying argument. But though the perspectives and their implications are spelled out, they are never quite unified. It is as though the perspective shift is a gestalt change (see Kuhn, 1970), and argument doesn't really have any inherent character of its own. Now these limitations may turn out to be unavoidable: maybe argument really isn't a single kind of thing. But for many of us, this would be a difficult conclusion to accept. This paper is an attempt to avoid it, at least in part, by providing a point of view which encompasses the others.

Secondly, this functional account is a noncompetitive alternative to our various structuralisms. Several schemes, notably the syllogism and the Toulmin model, have been put forward as the structure of argument. These theories have fallen out of favor in the last quarter century (see, as a particularly vociferous example, Willard, 1976). As one who still has some sympathy for the older theories, I read the contemporary objections as saying that structuralism is inadequate, not that it is wrong. In other words, the problem with the structural schemes is that they claim to be *complete* analyses of arguing—and they clearly aren't. But that doesn't imply (and this implication is, I fear, widely held) that the structural accounts are not accurate as far as they go. This essay's functionalism is modeled after psychology's functional movement, and is therefore designed (in part) to provide an acceptable theoretical home for our structural orphans.

In writing, I have kept in mind the functional psychology which originated in America in the first years of this century. That school of thought has been sufficiently liberal in scope that it continues as the dominant point of view in psychology today (see Carr, 1930; Heidbreder, 1933, ch. 6; Boring, 1957, ch. 22; McKinney, 1978; Marx & Hillix, 1979, ch. 5). Functionalism was inspired by Darwin's exciting theory of evolution, and began as a reaction against the sterile structuralism of Wundt and Titchener (see Heibreder, 1933, ch. 4; Marx & Hillix, 1979, ch. 4; Lindenfeld, 1978; Lindberg, 1979; Rappard, Sanders & de Swart, 1980). The structuralists' goal had been to give a strict scientific description of "consciousness experiencing sensation." They were analytical in the harshest sense. Seeking the most elementary components of sensation, they held that meanings and feelings were inferential and so unacceptable as scientific data; this seems closely analogous to the conflict between logic and interactionism portrayed in Willard (1976). The careful introspective accounts of sensation produced in the structuralists' labs were stripped of all but the most atomistic descriptions of psychophysical reactions (Boring, 1953; but see Danziger, 1980). The functionalists wanted to study more than psychophysical sensation, and so they used a much less constrained introspective methodology. They wanted to know what consciousness *is for*, not merely what it *is*.

Functionalism did not so much refute structuralism as encompass it. Consciousness was seen as having survival value in Darwin's sense: it helps the human species adapt to its environment. Consciousness therefore has a *use*; it is *for* something. "From the most general standpoint, the business of the mind is to adapt the organism to its environment" (Ogden, 1926, p. 8). Working from this first principle, functionalists went on to study the functions of various human abilities and behaviors, including those which were once the structuralists' foci. The distinguishing question in functionalism is about the use of a thing; more specifically, a functionalist will wonder how a phenomenon helps or hinders the organism in dealing with its surroundings.

Joining this tradition, I will try to describe argument functionally. My first effort will be to generate a profile of argument, considered as an undifferentiated entity. Next I will decompose it, and study how its elements contribute to its overall function. Each component will be shown to have its own distinct use. The following section of the paper indicates how those functions are manifest in argument, whether it is situated textually, cognitively or interpersonally. Thus the notion of function will be used in an attempt to unify our several disparate descriptions of argument. The closing section remarks upon this advantage, and attends to the limitations of telic theory.

What Is Argument For?

I am, of course, not the first to wonder about the functions of argument. Nearly everyone who has written more than a few systematic pages about rhetoric has had some remarks to make about why we argue. Most of these people were explicitly talking about rhetoric rather than argument, but their comments are still pertinent, for I follow Whately (*Elements of Rhetoric*, II. 1) in thinking that the only *unique* thing about rhetoric is the inventing and arranging of arguments. Therefore, if we are discussing rhetoric's essential nature, we are pretty sure of talking about argument, too. For the same reason (though I admit we must be more cautious here), some contemporary discussions of communication or attitude functions also have some relevance for us.

My plan in this section is to consider three general categories of function--persuasion, knowledge and personal growth--which seem to be the chief answers to "what is argument for?" My purpose in this review is to try to reduce these to a single idea. This effort is not designed to show that earlier writers were wrong or lacked vision--merely that unification of those commentaries is possible at a reasonable level of generality. To say what is the one true function of argument would be a doomed ambition, because one thing can almost always be said to have several different functions depending on one's point of view. "The" function of the ability to eat, for instance, might be to give the organism pleasure, to give it energy, to give it material for growth, to allow it to survive. Thus Wenzel (1980) has been able to show how different critical perspectives imply different purposes for an argument. So I will be satisfied if the reader only finds my case plausible.

Persuasion

For two millenia, persuasion has been seen as the main function of rhetoric (Hudson, 1923). Writing from within that tradition, Fisher and Sayles say that "When men argue, regardless of the form of their discourse, they intend that their arguments shall convince or persuade. Put another way, argument's function is to establish 'proof'" (1966, p. 19). No less emphatically, "all argumentation aims at gaining the adherence of minds..." (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 14, italics omitted).

Many of our best thinkers have sharpened this focus further, to the point that rhetoric becomes a persuasive instrument for the public good. This ethical purification makes rhetoric nobler and less sophistical. On this view, rhetoric "seeks to establish correct judgments, primarily in the areas of practical and humane affairs, for the speaker or writer and for the audience addressed" (Bitzer, 1978, p. 68; cf. Bryant, 1953). Wallace's (1963; 1964) advisory rhetoric, for example, is secured by (and only arises because of) sound arguments about the good.

This position has clear classical foundations. Cicero (*De Inventione*, I. ii. 2) credits reason and eloquence with man's rise from savagery to civilization (cf. Plato, *Critias*, 109b-c). And in the best centuries of Athens and Rome, rhetoric was an essential tool for the conduct of the public business. Aristotle, who only identifies three kinds of oratory, centers them all squarely in the public's ethical sphere: forensic speaking deals with justice and injustice, epideictic with honor and dishonor, and deliberative with the expedient and inexpedient (*Rhetoric*, I. 3).

Persuading on the public's behalf, in those happy times, led to personal rewards for the orator and others. Rhetoric in the hands of a good citizen "renders life safe, honorable, glorious and even agreeable.... From eloquence those who have acquired it obtain glory and honour and high esteem. From eloquence comes the surest and safest protection for one's friends" (Cicero, *De Inventione*, I. iv. 5). But ominously, when Roman freedoms began to wither, rhetoricians still compiled similar lists of benefits and functions. Tacitus, for instance, has several such paeans to rhetoric, but sometimes they describe public-spirited orators and sometimes vile informers (*Dialogue on Orators*, 5-8). I think it says more about the writer's era than about argument when a rhetorician insists that eloquence gives "one man an ascendant over others, superior even to what despotism itself can bestow" (Campbell, *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, I. 1). Today, this sounds hopeful but naive. Objective realities may well interfere with one's symbolic reality-structuring (Kneupper, 1980). The good is not necessary in rhetoric, and the good rhetoric will not always persuade. In our present search for the essential function of argument, then, we ought not insist on the quality of its outcome.

A more neutral formulation is that argument is for problem solving or disagreement regulation. Several contemporary writers see these functions as definitive for argument (Willard, 1983, p. 21; Jacobs & Jackson, 1982, pp. 224-228). Wenzel (1980, pp. 117-118) finds argument, whether viewed as process, product or procedure, to be centrally involved with decision making. This characterization links argumentation with various practical settings in which decisions are made (e.g., Enos, 1981). Problem solving may occur at the level of a polity, but many current scholars now seem to have a more individual level of analysis in mind. Hence, where Bitzer or Wallace might discuss the public's fund of shared values, McKerrow merely says, "People who agree to enter into arguments do so with a commitment to the belief that, in principle, conflicts can be resolved in a deliberative manner" (1982, p. 110). This commitment to procedure is an issue to which we will recur; for now, we need only observe that persuasion may be fueled by many values, not just the democratic ones we endorse. The absence of ethical taxonomies in most contemporary discussions of argument suggests that most writers, while they would agree that argument is value-laden, would not root it in one conception of the nature of the good (I except from this conclusion work which explores the ethical implications of the *procedural* commitments made by arguers; Habermas and Buber provide starting points).

Argument, then, is a tool, and persuasion is its function--at least as we have it so far. Dance says that one end of communication is to regulate human behavior (Dance & Larson, 1976; Dance, 1978). "In speaking there is always some end proposed, some effect which the speaker intends to produce on the hearer" (Campbell, *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, I. 1). Even in epideictic discourse, the arguer persuades (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I. 9; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, sec. 11). Some writers may object that expressive oratory has only pleasure as its object (Campbell, *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, intro.; Kinneavy, 1971), but a sounder view is that arguing is always persuasive (Hudson, 1923, 177; Smith, *Lectures*, lect. 22). Thus Cicero (*De Optimo Genere Oratorum*, I. 3-4) says that instructing the audience is an orator's duty, and moving them is indispensable, but pleasing them is only a "free gift to the audience." No matter what the topic or setting, then, the classical theory is that rhetoric is utilitarian, decisive, persuasive.

Knowledge

An apparently divergent claim is that argument seeks knowledge or truth, rather than the mere belief persuasion yields. This knowledge may be a boon to the arguer or to the audience or to both. Willard's new book is vitally concerned with arguing and knowing. Knowing, he insists, "is something that people do--often together" (1983, p. 5), and they do it by arguing. Rhetoricians have ordinarily been ambitious to ally themselves with philosophy and dialectic (an exception is Cicero, *De Inventione*, I. v. 8). Thus we have Perelman's universal audience, which can elevate rhetoric to truth; a similar motive no doubt prompted many early theorists to teach that argument's structure is that of logic.

But there is a serious problem with claiming that arguments produce knowledge. Wenzel's (1980) discussion of argument-as-procedure gives us a clue to that difficulty. He says that we may consider an argument as product, process or procedure. Critically, he does *not* say that an argument *will be* one of these three things--just that we may view it in those ways (cf. Zarefsky, 1980). These are perspectives, not kinds of argument. So the scholar taking a dialectical view of, say, Plato's *Meno* is not obliged to say that the dialogue *is* dialectic; only that it is an argument which can be considered from the perspective of (i.e., the standards of) dialectic.

This is a useful way of letting us apply epistemological standards to discourse which may have any situated form or intent. But as I will explain in a moment, the implication of this approach is that we cannot reliably say that *Meno* is rhetoric or dialectic. Wenzel lets us use either set of criteria. So the critic's perspective, and not the nature of the discourse, determines whether we shall see its goal as belief or truth. This is Wenzel's clue to us.

For if we could actually tell knowledge and belief apart, Wenzel's idea would be idle. The fact that his program of perspective-shifting seems reasonable can only be due to our inability to assign, once and for all, a bit of discourse to categories such as "rhetoric," "philosophy" or "science." No one would use the multiplication tables to critique a poem, for example, because poetics and arithmetic are easily distinguished. But we are allowed to analyse what might really be dialectic as though it were rhetoric. We are therefore reduced to discussing "paradigm cases" for theoretical purity, and then moving from one perspective to another in studying actual discourse.

This is not the place to decide whether tangible differences really do exist between rhetoric and dialectic. For now, the issue seems to reduce to this: In theory, rhetoric's function is persuasion, and dialectic's is knowledge. In practice, we cannot tell rhetoric from dialectic, or belief from knowledge (or at least, the overlaps are so considerable that the pairs may be treated alike). Since we could make these distinctions if dialectic were obviously different from rhetoric, or if knowledge were obviously different from belief, we cannot avoid the conclusion that only the critic--never the discourse--controls the classifying.

At this point, several routes are possible for the rhetorician: persuasion could be assimilated to dialectic; knowledge could be claimed as only a kind of belief; both pairs (rhetoric/belief and dialectic/knowledge) could be exactly, not metaphorically, equated; or the critic could be licensed to use whatever perspective seems useful at the moment. We do not have to choose between these possibilities here. I intend to move us to a single function of argument in a page or two, and all I need to establish here is that neither persuasion nor knowledge has an exclusive claim to be that single function. Both will be accommodated without distorting their natures, which are subjective and ephemeral anyway.

Personal Growth

Lastly, we should be aware that some writers imply that personal development ought to concern us here. Dance (1978; Dance & Larson, 1976), for instance, says that communication serves a mentation function--that is, it develops our minds. Katz (1960) sees ego-defense and catharsis through value expression as two functions of attitudes. McKerrow (1973) and Knaupper (1980) both make claims for the centrality of symbolization in personhood. Current work on children's arguments would also probably find this view a congenial one (e.g., O'Keefe & Benoit, 1982).

All these writings describe people maturing through argument. People find satisfaction, self and love by interacting with others. This idea, which could be traced to dozens of philosophers and social scientists, is that communication is our one human means of adapting ourselves to our environment, and our environment to ourselves. To grow is to grow in place, and arguing is one way to prevent the place from overwhelming us.

Consolidation

Brief as this discussion has been, certain points are beginning to emerge. Culture-linked functions are too specific, too idiosyncratic, to serve us properly. A small stretch of imagination enables us to envision a culture which does not especially value truth-seeking or verbal self-defense. But surely argument would continue to function, even in such a brute, piratical society. So we must do our best to set aside our cultural biases and focus only on the human organism and its struggle for survival. To say, as Dance does, that communication links the individual and his/her environment is a start, but "link" is a peculiarly passive expression of this relationship. Through communication and argument, the individual tries to exercise mastery over his/her surroundings.

The prime function of arguing, it seems to me, is therefore to enable people to control their environment. In a particular society, this value might be manifest in court or in dissertation defenses, in shouts coordinating mastadon assaults or in sexual repartee. Persuasion, knowledge seeking and personal growth are all incarnations of this prime function. What these have in common is argument directed at some exigence (Bitzer, 1968) in the hope of smoothing life's road.

Thus, I think it is no accident that argumentation has been so often associated with the verb "to move." Arguments move people, both literally and metaphorically. We commonly say that an argument moves from

premises to conclusion, from need to plan, from one belief to another. Argument moves things, transmutes threats into treaties, sets aside obstacles, clears paths, energizes behavior. But argument is also selective. Peirce says that doubt "stimulates us to action until it is destroyed," and likens this to the way irritation of a nerve calls forth a reflex action (1958, p. 99). Mechanism aside, argument must also be stimulated in the same way. Only a felt need--a doubt, an uncertainty (Brockriede, 1975), an affront, an unmet drive--will loose arguments on the environment with the aim of altering it. So the special function of argument is to adjust the environment to satisfy felt needs. This statement of argument's function is abstract enough to be organismic and broad enough to encompass the ideas of Aristotle, Dance and others. Whether argument occurs cognitively, textually or interpersonally, it always serves this general purpose.

Functions Within Argument

We may carry our functional analysis a step further by asking how it is that an argument pursues its object. This question requires that we first do a structural description of argument (recall that historically functionalism absorbed structuralism--the functionalists were always perfectly willing to accept the structuralists' data, as far as it went). Once having identified the components of argument, we can then explore the way they work together within argument. In other words, we will ask the functionalist's question of each component: what is it for?

Actually, I have already written a paper which is more or less directed to these issues, though I now wish I had been more sensitive to functionalism (Hample, 1977). The thesis of that essay is that the Toulmin model, considered functionally, amounts to a series of hypothetical syllogisms. That earlier claim needs only minor recasting to fit here.

The three most basic functions are what Toulmin (1958) calls claim, data and warrant. While it may not be possible in practice to inspect a particular statement and be certain that it is, say, a warrant, all the functions must somehow be carried out in a full argument, even if the audience must supply one or more functions enthymematically. The function of a claim is to announce the specific environmental change desired by the arguer; this will often be phrased in terms of what he/she wants the audience to know or do. This is the point of the argument, the implicit announcement of what is wrong with the arguer's surroundings. The data function is to support the claim by providing acceptable information which can be linked to the conclusion. This linking is the responsibility of the warrant, which always has the function (though rarely the form) of "if data then claim." Though one or more of these functions may not be obvious or explicit in an enthymeme, they are each essential if a thing is to be called an argument. It is no more reasonable to label an unconnected data and claim a bad argument than it is to say that a piece of rawhide and a steak are a bad cow.

This basic unit of proof--data, warrant and claim--is often fleshed out by three additional but coordinated arguments, giving us three subordinate functions. One of these is the objecting unit. Toulmin says that reservations are directed against warrants; thus, if the reservation is true, the (original) warrant is not. As I claimed in the earlier paper, the reservation must be tested with data in order to have any force. So the objecting unit also has the structure of data, warrant, claim: "data for the reservation are true; if the data are true then the original warrant is not; so the original warrant is false."

The three basic functions also constitute the second optional unit, the supportive one. Toulmin's model includes backing to support the warrant. Backing is data-like, and the warrant obviously serves a claim function in this argument. My earlier essay insists that a supplementary warrant is also required, giving: "backing is true; if backing is true then the warrant is true; so the warrant is true." The original data may also be supported by a subordinate argument as well.

A third optional use for the data, warrant, claim system is to qualify a claim. Any component of an argument may use a modal qualifier, in my view, and the effects of these are cumulative (actually, in my own model, they are multiplicative, but I will not insist on the exact mathematical form in this general account). So, we might have: "data are true; if the data are true then the claim is probably true; so the claim is probably true." Or: "perhaps the data are true; if the data are only perhaps true then the claim is probably not; so the claim is probably false." Any argument, including supportive or objecting ones, may make use of qualification.

In Toulmin's original model, qualification seems to be essentially a function of what I have here called the objecting unit. Of all the functions I have discussed in this paper, I am least sure that qualifying deserves to be separate. One might plausibly say that this is an extremely subordinate function which is really done by a suitably altered argument unit which has another main aim--supporting or objecting, for instance. But even if the reader feels that qualification ought not be a distinct function, my analysis is only simplified, not endangered.

An argument, then, necessarily includes a central data, warrant, claim unit, and optionally may also have one or more subordinate units. All of the components will be coordinated and focused on the central claim. The three basic functions can replicate indefinitely, creating complex series of arguments. This leads to an awkwardness in usage: the central argument, the optional units, and the combination of all of them are all properly called arguments, due to the defining actions of the three functional components. Notice, too, that the contact between linked arguments is a shared component, which has different functions in the two arguments (e.g., the claim from a supportive argument may serve as the warrant in the central argument). So we have a system of arguments (perhaps we should call this a discourse) which consists of one or more sets of the three functions. The links within the system are done at the component level, not the more abstract functional one.

Function and system are closely related ideas in social theory (see Chafetz, 1978). An indirect check of the adequacy of this (or any) functional theory is to see how well it does in describing the systemic operation of the theory's object. This is a topic which probably deserves its own paper, but we can do a quick sketch by borrowing a list of a system's attributes (Littlejohn, 1978, ch. 2) and seeing whether the present analysis can satisfy them.

One feature of a system is wholeness. Certainly an argument is whole only if the data, warrant and claim functions are satisfied within its compass; if they are, the argument will be coherent and complete. A system's components are interdependent. This is true in an argument because its components only get a clear functional identity (e.g., is this a claim or a warrant?) within a context of other functions; one belief or statement in complete isolation is argumentatively meaningless. Systems are also characterized by hierarchy, and so is argument. The optional units are subordinate to the central one, and the data and warrant support the claim. A true system has self-regulation and control. In an argument, once the claim is set, the rest of the argument steers toward it, adapting to concessions and objections en route. Systems interchange with their environments. Arguments necessarily do this because their materials must be supplied by the people and beliefs outside the argument; and let us not forget, an argument's overall function is to change the world beyond it. Next, a system is characterized by equilibrium. Arguments are responsive to objections, and attempt to rebound from them, striving to regain the original probative configuration insofar as possible. Change and adaptability characterize systems, and we have seen how arguments are also adaptive. Lastly, both systems and arguments have equifinality, for there are many ways to prove any given claim.

I do not mean to be taken literally, as asserting that an argument is a system. In truth, the real authority and control of an argument come from the arguer; to pretend otherwise--that an argument is a live, self-regulating organism--would involve indefensible animism. But this last exercise has still been useful because it shows argument-as-system to be metaphorically reasonable, and this is enough to suggest a new theoretical perspective. Besides, my purpose in this essay is only to outline a superordinate point of view for argumentation scholars, not to reveal the truth about argument-the-thing. Finally, therefore, it is time to see whether this functional perspective can in fact unify our other disparate understandings of argument, the thing(s).

Avatars of Argument

The data, warrant and claim functions are the only defining features of argument. The structural components which carry out these functions may be paragraphs of an essay, turns at talk, or thoughts. These three possibilities correspond loosely to what O'Keefe (1977; 1982) has called argument$_1$ and argument$_2$, and what I have called argument$_0$ (Hample, 1982). The burden of this section is to show that the same functions appear in every incarnation of argument.

Table 1 shows the correspondence among the three most important avatars of argument: argument as private reasoning, as a static public document, and as interpersonal communication. The table is constructed with labels which attempt to exaggerate the differences among the three settings, but some of those differences in functional description are little more than cosmetic. But the less distinct the settings appear in the body of the table, the more support I claim for my argument that all three can be seen as the same kind of thing, at least functionally. To the degree that a functional description of the components from one column could just as easily have been in a different column, setting is transparent to this theory of argument.

Table 1: Various Manifestations of Argument Functions

Argument Type:	Argument$_0$	Argument$_1$	Argument$_2$
Typical Form:	Thought	Text	Conversation
Audience:	Self	Other(s)	Present Other(s)
Functions			
Primary			
Claim	Belief	Proposition	Utterance
Data	Previous Beliefs	Accepted Information	Other's Statements/Concessions
Warrant	Belief-Belief Relationship	Proposition-Proposition Relationship	Utterance-Utterance Relationship
Supplementary			
Objection	Test/Reconsider	Adapt to Audience/Show Two-Sidedness	Adapt to Other/Show Respect for Other/Test
Support	Elaborate/Backtrack	Fortify/Adapt to Audience	Cooperate/Clarify/Establish Agreements
Qualification	Acheive Accuracy/Keep Flexibility	Adapt to Audience/Show Moderation, Fairmindedness/Acheive Accuracy	Disclaimer/Minor Concession/Show Moderation, Fairmindedness/Acheive Accuracy

For the most part, the table's differences simply reflect the different manifestations of the argument. Components of thought-contained arguments will be beliefs, those of textually constituted arguments will be sentences or propositions, and the elements of interpersonal arguments

will be utterances or turns at talk. This physical difference between the arguments explains many of the distinctions in the table. The other main difference is in the physicality of the argument's target. One may argue with self, with a non-present other, or with a conversational partner. Thus an arguer reconsiders for self but adapts to another, and this has implications for self-presentation during the argument.

Given that the arguments and their audiences are physically different in argument$_0$, argument$_1$ and argument$_2$, the arguments' components will also vary physically. But as Table 1 seems to indicate, the functions of argument are almost exactly the same in all three processes. From this emerges the important conclusion that argument$_0$, argument$_1$ and argument$_2$ are not different things. They are different types of the same thing.

The final practical test of this conclusion will occur over time, as we see whether researchers need more than these few functions to study argument, and whether they need clearly different functions for special cases. My reductionist faith is that all structural or functional analyses of the components of any kind of argument can be assimilated into Table 1. My own work on cognitive argument is fully compatible with this functional theory. For textual argument, my earlier analysis of Toulmin's essentially text-based theory affords a presumption that the table is reasonably complete. Conversations have been viewed as enthymemes by a number of scholars (see Jackson & Jacobs, 1980; Nofsinger, 1976; Bowers, Elliott & Desmond, 1977), suggesting application of this functional scheme in that arena as well.

In closing this section, I cannot resist making one more systems-related point: that, in some circumstances, it is appropriate to regard argument$_0$ as nested within argument$_1$, which can in turn be subordinate to argument$_2$. A person in a conversation may think of an argument$_0$ as the basis for production of an argument$_1$, which may combine with other utterances in context to constitute an argument$_2$. As before, a particular component of one argument, even when suitably manifest in a new physical form, may serve a different function at each level. For example, a person may generate an argument$_0$ to test a claim, use that former claim as data in a self-contained argument$_1$, and that argument$_1$ can serve an objecting function in an argument$_2$. This theoretically convenient nesting may not always occur in practice, of course--a person may simply think through an argument$_0$ and never express it, or may communicate an argument$_1$ in a non-interpersonal setting--but its potential exhibits the principle of hierarchy once more. It also makes clear that the question of priority--which type of argument is most important?--depends for its answer on the scholar's perspective (for mine, see Hample, 1982).

Conclusions

We are too small a specialty to survive much further specialization. We have for several years been speaking and writing as though argument$_1$ and argument$_2$ were radically different things. This emphasis was forgivable in O'Keefe's original paper, but the longer this distinction remains oversharp in our thinking, the more we endanger our own disciplinary unity. These various kinds of argument really are different, of course, and deserve to be studied with different methods and in connection with different theories. But at one level, at least, everything ought to come together. That level, I have tried to show, is the functional one.

Lastly, let me say that a solely functional theory, being merely teleological, does not provide a complete scientific theory of anything. A function does not cause a behavior; a use does not call a phenomenon into being; a goal is not an effect; a function is different from a rule. We should not be satisfied with any solely functional theories, including the one I have outlined here. The thoughts I have expressed do not constitute a description of everything we need to know about argument. But though the theory's own domain is modest, I think its sphere of applicability is not.

In summary, this paper has suggested a functional theory of argument. The overall function of argument is adjusting the environment to meet felt needs. This adjustment is mediated by the argument's audience. The functions of argument's components are claim, data, warrant, objecting, supporting and qualifying. These functions retain their identity in cognitive, textual and interpersonal argumentation. Therefore, the present functional approach has been presented as unifying our presently disparate notions of what an argument is.

I wish to acknowledge the value of Joseph Wenzel's criticisms and advice on an earlier draft of this paper.

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RECIPROCITY OF COMMUNICATION AND THE "SOCIAL SKILLS" APPROACH TO MARRIAGE

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Much of the literature on interpersonal argument is guided by a "social skills" or "behavioral skills" metaphor. This implies that the competent conduct of argument is a matter of appropriate technique, much like playing tennis or doing algebra involve a definable and prescribable set of skills with clear standards for correctness. In the Communication discipline this orientation is reflected in the many textbooks on interpersonal communication which refer to open, descriptive and supportive communication about conflict as "skills." The more prescriptive authors in other fields provide much the the same outlook. For example, a variety of communication and negotiation "skills" are taught in the context of marital therapy and enrichment to increase a couple's adaptability and their satisfaction with the process of communication (see Birchler, 1979). These include listening, paraphrasing, self disclosure, directly confronting conflict and appropriate reciprocity of communication (e.g., Miller, Nunally & Wackmen, 1976; Guerney, 1977).

Several authors have criticized such advice for its ideological flavor (e.g., Bochner, 1981; Parks, 1981; Kursh, 1971). However, the critics have mostly taken issue with the substance of the advice, particularly the heavy emphasis on self disclosure. In contrast, our focus is on the concept of interpersonal argument as a skill. We believe that this metaphor inadvertantly calls attention to research questions which are ultimately futile, such as whether a particular style of communication is more competent than another. Although applicable in specific contexts, the idea of communication as a skill has been greatly overextended. In its place, we would substitute a more socially and culturally contingent view of interpersonal communication. Two studies of marital communication are discussed which support and illustrate our position.

Communication as a Social Skill

Three things are implied by the social skills metaphor. *First*, there is a right and wrong way to argue. In other words, there is generally a well-defined, consensually-shared set of rules governing what behavior is competent in a given situation. *Second*, the range of stylistic variations which are competent in a situation is limited. This suggests that the effects of communication are relatively homogeneous across different social groups. *Third*, a communication skills deficit is responsible for many problems which occur in interpersonal relationships. Further, more effective communication is an asset in helping individuals manage all other problems which may occur. This implies that relationships are relatively plastic, that is, they can be modified to accommodate internal and external pressures for change if the participants are skillful at negotiation. A skills orientation may state that the various forms a relationship can take are indeterminant and relativistic but the skills useful in accomplishing relationship negotiation are the same for all couples (e.g., Miller et al., 1976).

Two points speak against the skills metaphor. For one thing, the metaphor takes too seriously the old cliche that communication is the *sine qua non* of a healthy relationship. There are many factors which determine marital quality besides communication, for example, basic compatibilities, work pressures and money, to name a few. Although these factors are also manifested in communciation and argument, it should not be taken-for-granted that patterns of argument are the ultimate cause of incompatibility. In some cases problems in relationships don't occur because of poor communication, poor communication occurs because of problems in relationships.

A second problem with the skills metaphor is that it assumes that a single style of relating is satisfying for all people. Generally, this reflects a middle-class, nontraditional image of marriage, one which emphasizes companionate over instrumental aspects of marriage, is change or "growth" oriented, and sees open communication as an essential part of a satisfying relationship. In contrast to this image, traditional marriage may emphasize tactfulness over communicative openness. Further, communication may be tangential to the core issues affecting compatibility, because expectations for the relationship are set according to traditional roles and not according to explicit verbal negotiation (see Fitzpatrick, 1977; Sillars, Pike, Jones & Redmon, in press).

Social Skill and Reciprocity of Argument

The most sophisticated version of the social skills metaphor is proposed by marital therapists. Some approaches to marital therapy have shown a special concern for the reciprocity of communication, under the premise that happy couples reciprocate positive statements more often and negative statements less often than distressed couples (Azrin, Naster & Jones, 1973; Jacobson, 1976; Lederer & Jackson, 1968; Weiss, Birchler & Vincent, 1974). The distinctive thing about this approach is that the authors conceive of communication skills in terms of the contingent relationship between acts. That is, getting along is less a matter of how you act than how you respond. The subleties of this point are easily and often missed. If two spouses talk nicely to one another most of the time, then, by coincidence, they may seem to have more positive reciprocity than negative reciprocity. The reciprocity hypothesis of marital therapists implies more than this. It suggests that there is some unique explanatory power to the pattern of communication above and beyond the overall frequency of positive and negative statements.

The interest in reciprocity is partly based on a reinforcement principle. Homans(1961) suggests that communication patterns actually represent patterns of reinforcement. Azrin,et al.. (1973) further suggest that spouses continually reinterpret reinforcement. They stress the need for only giving reinforcers after reinforcers have been received. However, research on the reciprocity hypothesis has been mixed. Distressed marital couples appear to have greater reciprocity of negative communication but not necessarily less immediate reciprocity of positive communication (Billings, 1979; Gottman, Markman & Notarius, 1977; Gottman, 1979). In two studies reported by Gottman (1979), distressed couples actually had somewhat greater immediate reciprocity of positive affect, although nondistressed couples were more likely to reciprocate positive affect several acts later.

Our research provides a further look at the reciprocity hypothesis. In contrast to the aforementioned studies, the couples in our research represented a typical range of satisfaction scores rather than the extremes (i.e., clinically-referred versus highly satisfied couples). Therefore, the present research does not speak to the viability of reciprocity councilling or other approaches to marital therapy. However, the implications of the reciprocity hypothesis speak to a much wider audience.

The reciprocity hypothesis suggests that a communication skills deficit causes marital dissatisfaction. This assumption makes sense as long as the reciprocity hypothels holds, because the data would then be most easily explained by the idea that dissatisfied couples are less skilled at contingent reinforcement. However, there is little explanatory power to thesocial skills approach if satisfied and dissatisfied couples differ merely in base rates and not in reciprocity. For example, if less satisfied couples are more often negative than satisfied couples, but reciprocity is otherwise the same, a social skills interpretation is not needed. The simplest explanation is that people are more negative *because* they are unhappy. It is not as persuasive to argue that negative communciation causes marital dissatisfaction in a simple, direct way, because there are many factors that affect satisfaction besides communication.

In the forthcoming pages we describe a sequential analysis of verbal and nonverbal communication. According to the reciprocity hypothesis, more satisfied couples should have greater reciprocity of positive nonverbal affect and less reciprocity of negative affect than less satisfied couples. A parallel hypothesis implied by marital enrichment programs is that more satisfied couples reciprocate disclosive and supportive statements to a greater extent than less satisfied couples.

In order to give the reciprocity hypothesis a fair test, we considered the possible role of time and topic importance as intervening variables. Billings (1979) suggested that time may play an important role in influencing reciprocity. His research indicated that hostile communication may escalate over time for distressed couples. On the other hand, Gottman et al. (1976) indicated that important topics produce greater differences in the reciprocity of negative communication.

METHODS

The data used in this research came from two studies. The data from these two studies was combined so that the number of observations would be adequate to test complex relationships.

Subjects

Forty-two married couples participated in the first study and forty participated in the second. The couples were contacted through extension courses for public school teachers in the Appalachian region of the United States. Course members and spouses who agreed to participate did so on a voluntary basis. Forty-four percent of the males were employed in public schools, thirty-two percent percent were in other white collar occupations, twenty percent were in blue collar occupations and four percent were self-employed or unemployed. Sixty-seven percent of the women were employed in public schools, thirteen percent were in clerical positions, eight percent were in other white collar occupations and thirteen percent described themselves as homemakers. The mean age was 30 for the women and 32 for men. The couples had been married an average of 8 years and had an average of 1.7 children. The sample was not self-selective. Only two couples contacted declined to participate, although nine couples did not complete all phases of the study.

Data Collection

Data collection procedures were identical in both studies. Couples were given a packet of materials and instructions to take home. The materials included questionnaires and instructions for a discussion of marital issues, which the couples were to complete by themselves and record on audiotape. Nine couples completed the questionnaires but did not complete the discussion portion of the study. By having the couples tape themselves at home some standardization was lost; however, there was a realistic quality to the discussions which is difficult to achieve in a research laboratory.

Couples were instructed to set aside a period of time in which they could complete the questionnaire and discussion without being interrupted. Each spouse completed an identical questionnaire. The instructions stressed that spouses should answer their own questionnaires separately without revealing their answers to one another. Couples were informed that they did not need to answer questions which they deemed to be too personal or threatening. Upon completion of the questionnaires, couples were instructed to seal the questionnaires within an envelope and proceed to the discussion portion of the study.

In the discussion, couples were asked to consider the following ten potential conflicts in marriage:

1. Pressures or problems at work that have affected your relationship.
2. Criticism or one another's lifestyle, beliefs, ideas or activities.
3. Taking care of household responsibilities, such as cleaning, yardwork, home repairs, shopping, etc.
4. Lack of affection or attention paid by one or both of you to the other person.
5. Disagreements about spending money.
6. One or both of you have been irritable, depressed, bossy, or otherwise hard to get along with.
7. Disagreements about how to spend your leisure time, such as what to do on weekends, what television programs or movies to watch, what parties to attend, etc.
8. Lack of communication between the two of you.
9. Disagreements about how to discipline or raise the children.
10. One of you feels that the two of you do not do enough things together.

These topics were printed on index cards and presented in random order. Couples were asked to discuss with one another the extent to which each topic had been a problem in their own relationship. The couples were instructed to discuss the topics one at a time until they had nothing further to say and then go on to the next topic. Again couples were advised to skip any topics which they felt were too personal or threatening. Couples later returned the questionnaires and audiotapes to the researchers.

Questionnaires

In the first part of the questionnaires demographic information was elicited. The second part elicited perceptions of the ten marital conflict issues used in the discussion task. This portion of the questionnaire was different for the two studies. To indicate how salient the issues were, spouses in the first study rated, on five-point scales, the extent to which each issue was present in their relationship, how important the issue was, and how much the issue bothered them. The last item was omitted from the second study to accommodate additional scales that have been reported in other papers (Sillars, Pike, Jones & Redmon, in press; Sillars, Pike, Jones & Murphy, 1983). Breakpoints were adjusted to compensate for the omission of these questions. The third part of the questionnaires consisted of the satisfaction subscale from Spainer's (1976) marital adjustment measure. Alpha reliabilities for satisfaction in the two studies were .90 and .79 respectively.

The second and third parts of the questionnaire were used to group spouses for subsequent analysis. Responses to the second set of items were used to classify topics as either low, moderate or high in importance.[1] Spainer's satisfaction subscale was used to group spouses as either more or less satisfied based on a median split. The median was 40 of a possible score of 51, with a standard deviation of 5.2 and a range of 29. As in most studies of marital satisfaction, the scores were positively skewed (Orden & Bradburn, 1968; Renee, 1970).

Coding Procedures

The audiotaped discussions were coded for nonverbal affect and verbal conflict tactics (Sillars, Coletti, Parry & Rogers, 1982). The basic coding unit was the act. An "act," as used here, is generally a speaking turn, except that an occasional speaking turn may contain two or more acts when there is a distinct, sequential change of function within a turn. In addition, the procedures for coding verbal tacts stipulate that a speaking turn is not coded if a clear interpretation cannot be given (Sillars, 1982).

Nonverbal affect was scored from vocal tone based on Gottman's (1979) Couples Interaction Scoring System. An act was deemed positive if the vocal quality conveyed happiness, tenderness, empathy, love, satisfaction, or similar qualities. An act was deemed negative if it was cold, tense, impatient, blaming, sarcastic, and so forth. If vocal quality did not evidence any such qualities then an act was considered neutral.

The procedures for coding verbal tactics classify acts into twenty-seven categories, which collapse into seven intermediate categories and three gross categories. The three most general categories are referred to as "avoidance," "distributive" and "integrative." Roughly speaking, avoidance acts are nondisclosive, distributive acts are verbally competitive, and integrative acts are disclosive and supportive (Sillars, 1982). We employed the three category scheme in this analysis to more parsimoniously describe the contingent relationship between acts. The full set of coding categories is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1 here

To improve the interpretability of the coded data, discussion segments were coded only if the topic was moderately or highly important to the speaker. This step was particularly important to the coding of verbal tactics, since the avoidance codes explicitly assume that the topic of conversation is a salient conflict issue. After less salient topics were excluded, the total number of codes was 2958 for affect and 2892 for verbal tacts.

In order to estimate coding reliability, four independent coders rated 605 speaking turns. Reliability checks were spread evenly over an eight-week period, during which the data from both studies was coded. Scott's pi (Scott, 1955) for the 27-category verbal tactics scheme was .87 overall and did not drop below .84 for any given two-week period. Scott's pi for the three gross categories was .89 and did not drop below .86. Scott's pi for affect coding was .81 and did not drop below .72. The overall percentage of agreement among coders was 94% for the three-code verbal tactics scheme and 94% for affect. The percentage of agreement among coders identifying the number of acts within a speaking turn was 94%.

During the coding, topics were identified as occurring in either the first or second half of the discussion. This allowed us to consider time as a variable in subsequent analyses.

Data Analysis

The data were analyzed using log-linear models. This analysis is appropriate for multidimensional contingency tables (Bishop, Fineberg & Holland, 1975; Knoke & Burke, 1980). It is a marriage of traditional ANOVA, regression-based ANOVA, and Chi-square procedures (Kennedy, 1983). Log-linear interactions are analogous to ANOVA interactions except that a two-way interaction in log-linear is equivalent to a main effect in ANOVA, a three-way interaction is equivalent to a first-order ANOVA interaction, and so forth. A series of models are generated which provide theoretical explanations of the data. Goodness-of-fit comparisons are then made between the model and the actual data (a good fit is assumed if the x^2 is nonsignificant). The z-tests reported in subsequent pages are based on the simplest model (i.e., the model with the fewest interaction terms) that fit the data well.

RESULTS

Affect

Spouses tended to be neutral in their paralinguistic tone. Approximately 62% of all affect codes were neutral. Of the remaining codes, the vast majority were negative (30%). Only 8% of the affect codes were positive. Affect codes were summarized into two four-dimensional tables. The first was formed by cross-classifying (a) the spouse's act, (b) the partner's immediately preceding act, (c) topic importance, and (d) marital satisfaction. Analysis of this table revealed three significant two-way interactions and a significant three-way interaction. These interactions are clarified by the conditional proportions in Table 2. Proportions have an asterisk by them if the frequency in a particular cell significantly contributed to the expected frequency for that cell according to z-tests on the effects parameters for lambdas (Knoke & Burke, 1980). The "+" or "-" signs adjacent to the asterisks indicate whether the effects were positive or negative.

Table 2 here

The first subtable in Table 2 depicts the interaction between the spouse's act and the partner's preceding act. This effect was highly significant ($LRx^2=480.99$; df=6; $p<.0001$). The conditional proportions reveal strong reciprocity tendencies. Positive affect tended to be followed by positive affect (.41), neutral affect tended to be followed by neutral affect (.74), and negative affect tended to be followed by negative affect (.59). When there was no partner's act preceding the spouse's act (for example, at the beginning of a topic) the spouse was usually neutral (.74).

The second subtable shows the interaction between the spouse's act and topic importance ($LRx^2=22.51$; df=2; $p<.0001$). The conditional proportions revealed that spouses were significantly less positive on highly important topics (.05) than on moderately important topics (.10). At the same time, spouses were more negative on topics of high importance (.39) than on topics of moderate importance (.25).

The third subtable shows the relationship between the spouse's act and marital satisfaction ($LRx^2=35.33$; df=2; $p<.0001$). The conditional proportions indicated that more satisfied spouses were significantly more positive (.11) than their less satisfied counterparts (.06). More satisfied spouses also used less negative affect (.21) than less satisfied spouses (.36). There was a further tendency for more satisifed spouses to be more neutral, but this difference was apparently attributable to effects other than satisfaction, because the lambdas were not significant.

The final subtable shows the relationship between the spouse's act, the partner's preceding act and satisfaction (LRx^2=27.55; df=6; $p<.0001$). The conditional proportions indicated an effect opposite to what the reciprocity hypothesis predicts. More satisfied spouses were less likely to reciprocate positive affect (.36) than their less satisfied counterparts (.46). This was true despite the fact that more satisfied spouses were more positive overall. Less satisfied spouses did have greater negative reciprocity; however, this difference was apparently due to the difference in base rates, since the lambdas for negative reciprocity were not significant. Topic importance did not affect reciprocity or accentuate differences between more and less satisfied spouses.

In order to test the effects of time, a second contingency table was formed by cross-classifying (a) the spouse's act, (b) the partner's preceding act, (c) time period, and (d) satisfaction. The analysis indicated a significant two-way interaction and two significant three-way interactions involving time. These interactions are clarified by the conditional proportions in Table 3.

Table 3 here

The first subtable shows the relationship between the spouse's act and time (LRx^2=7.57; df=2; $p<.05$). The conditional proportions revealed that spouses were significantly less neutral in the second half of the discussions (.60) than in the first half (.64). Spouses were also more negative in the second half of the discussions, (.31) in comparison to the first half (.28), but these effects were not significant.

The analysis further indicated that there was a three-way interaction between the spouse's act, time and satisfaction (LRx^2=7.97; df=2; $p<.05$). The interaction was due to negative affect. Less satisfied spouses began highly negative (.36 in the first half of the discussions) and stayed that way (.35 in the second half). The more satisfied spouses were less negative overall but they became more negative over time. They shifted from .16 negative affect in the first half to .26 negative affect in the second half of the discussions.

The final subtable shows the relationship between the spouse's act, the partner's preceding act, and time (LRx^2=14.5; df=6; $p<.05$). The conditional proportions indicated that there was significantly more reciprocity of neutral affect in the second half of the discussions (.75) than in the first half (.72). While this increase was not dramatic, it was significant because the proportion of neutral acts declined over time. The reciprocity of positive and negative affect was not related to time. Further, time did not affect the relationship between satisfaction and reciprocity.

Content

Our research indicated that spouses preferred avoidance as a verbal tactic. Approximately 44% of the verbal tactics were coded as avoidance. Of the remaining codes, 30% were distributive and 26% were integrative. As before, content codes were summed into two four-dimensional tables. The first was formed by cross-classifying (a) the spouse's act, (b) the partner's preceding act, (c) topic importance, and (d) marital satisfaction. The analysis revealed three significant two-way interactions, a three-way interaction, and a four-way interaction. These interactions are clarified by the conditional proportions in Table 4.

Table 4 here

The first subtable in Table 4 shows the interaction between the spouse's act and the partner's preceding act. Again the conditional proportions revealed strong reciprocity tendencies (LRx^2=710.63; df=6; $p<.0001$). Avoidance acts were followed by avoidance acts (.70), distributive acts were followed by distributive acts (.67), and integrative acts were followed by integrative acts (.46). When there was no preceding act the spouse usually engaged in avoidance (.55).

The second subtable shows the relationship between the spouse's act and topic importance (LRx^2=19.21; df=2; $p<.0001$). The conditional proportions revealed that spouses were significantly less likely to use avoidance on high importance topics (.33) than on topics of moderate importance (.50). Spouses were also more likely to use both distributive and integrative tactics on high importance topics (.36 and .31) than on topics of moderate importance (.26 and .24).

The third subtable shows the relationship between the spouse's act and marital satisfaction (LRx^2=15.57; df=2; $p<.001$). The contingent proportions revealed that more satisfied spouses were significantly more likely to engage in avoidance tactics (.52) than less satisfied spouses (.39). More satisfied spouses were less likely to engage in distributive (.26) and integrative (.22) tactics than their less satisfied counterparts (.33 and .29).

The fourth subtable shows the relationship between the spouse's act, the partner's preceding act and topic importance (LRx^2=15.23; df=6; $p<.05$). The conditional proportions revealed that avoidance tactics were reciprocated much more frequently on topics of moderate importance (.76) than on highly important topics (.56). The reciprocity of distributive acts was also greater on moderately important topics (.70) than on topics of high importance (.64).

The final subtable shows the four-way interaction between the spouse's act, the partner's previous act, topic importance and marital satisfaction (LRx^2=17.46; df=6; $p<.01$). The conditional proportions revealed that the strongest effect was for the reciprocity of avoidance. As indicated above, reciprocity of avoidance was greatest for moderately important topics. The four-way interaction indicated that this tendency was most pronounced for more satisfied spouses. On topics of high importance, more satisfied spouses had a lower rate of reciprocity for avoidance (.50) than did less satisfied spouses (.60). Exactly the opposite pattern was observed on moderately important topics. More satisfied spouses were more likely to reciprocate avoidance (.80) than less satisfied spouses (.68).

The conditional proportions also revealed that more and less satisfied spouses differed in their response to distributive tactics. This effect was present in discussions of high importance topics and not present in discussions of moderately important topics. On topics of high importance, more satisfied spouses were more likely to respond to distributive tactics with avoidance (.25) than were less satisfied spouses (.13). Less satisfied spouses were more likely to respond to distributive tactics with integrative tactics (.23) than were more satisfied spouses (.11). Less satisfied spouses were also more likely to respond in a distributive manner to integrative tactics (.30) than were more satisfied spouses (.18). This suggests that, on highly salient topics, more satisfied spouses channel distributive tactics into avoidance, while less satisfied spouses shift from distributive to integrative and back to distributive tactics.

In order to test the effects of time, a second four-dimensional table was formed by cross-classifying (a) the spouse's act, (b) the partner's preceding act, (c) time period, and (d) the spouse's marital satisfaction. Log-linear analysis revealed no significant interactions above and beyond those identified previously.

DISCUSSION

The results of this research can be summarized as follows:

1. There was strong support for the idea that communication consists of a contingent relationship between acts. Indeed, the relationship between antecedent and consequent acts was the strongest relationship in this research. For both nonverbal affect and verbal tactics, the contingent relationship was one of reciprocity.
2. The distribution of acts was a better discriminator between more and less satisfied spouses than sequential structure. While both were able to discriminate between more and less satisfied spouses, the effect for the simple distribution of acts was stronger.
3. The expected relationship between satisfaction and reciprocity was not supported. More satisfied spouses actually had a lower rate of positive reciprocity than less satisfied spouses. Time and topic importance did not accentuate couple differences in the reciprocity of affect. For verbal tactics a complex relationship between sequential structure and marital satisfaction was observed.

The reciprocity hypothesis is important mainly due to its affiliation with a social skills interpretation of marital satisfaction. A social skills approach suggests that marital satisfaction is the result of effective communication. In the strong version of this approach, effective communication is reflected in the contingent relationship between acts. That is, more satisfied couples are more skilled at contingent reinforcement or are otherwise more congruent with transient changes in the partner and situation. In the weak version, more satisfied couples are merely assumed to have a higher base rate of socially desirable communication, for example, more positiveness, less negativeness, more self-disclosure, more supportiveness, and so forth. The weaker version lacks explanatory power because it does not presume that communication is appropriate to context. Further, the interpretative problems associated with the latter version are extreme, because a simple correlation between communication (e.g., overall positiveness or negativeness) and satisfaction may easily reflect the causal influence of satisfaction on communication rather than the opposite.

Our research provided little support for the stronger version of the social skills interpretation. The results clearly disconfirmed the reciprocity hypothesis as it applies to nonverbal affect. Several earlier studies have found a relationship between negative reciprocity and marital satisfaction but this research compared distressed and nondistressed couples, whereas our research compared more and less satisfied couples (Billings, 1979; Gottman, 1979). Thus, it may be the case that highly dissatisfied couples have a skills deficity in comparison with highly satisfied couples. However, the generalization of this idea (i.e., as negative reciprocity declines, satisfaction increases) does not seem to hold with a less extreme sample. Rather, group differences in satisfaction were dwarfed by the overriding tendency of all couples to reciprocate the partner's preceding act.

The results concerning verbal tactics were more involved. Some results did not support the predominant social skills interpretation. For example, more satisfied couples were more likely to engage in avoidance and less likely to engage in frank discussion of marital problems than less satisfied couples. Further, more satisfied couples had a tendency to back off (i.e., shift to avoidance) when the partner was distributive and the topic was highly salient, rather than attempting to explore and resolve the problem (i.e., shift to an integrative style).

Although the findings did not support a simple version of the reciprocity hypothesis, there were a few other results conducive to a social skills interpretation. For one, more satisfied spouses had greater reciprocity of avoidance on less important topics and less reciprocity of avoidance on more important topics. One could interpret this finding to mean that more satisfied spouses discriminate contexts in which avoidance is appropriate (less important topics) from contextx in which it is not (important conflicts). Second, less satisfied couples had a tendency to engage in a distributive-to-integrative-to-distributive cycle. This matched our informal observation that there was an "attack-apologize" pattern in the more tense discussions.

However, a social skills interpretation of these data is unnecessary. For example, the "attack-apologize" pattern of less satisfied spouses may have simply been a result of tensions, which lead to conflicting fight and flight tendencies. In lieu of a strong theory to suggest otherwise, the presumption should be in favor of marital satisfaction being the cause of communication patterns, and not vice versa, because satisfaction is the more general and stable variable.

Whereas authors may have once overemphasized the homeostatic nature of the family (Speer, 1970), some may now overrate the plasticity of close relationships. Dissatisfaction in marriage is often seen as the result of ineffective communication, with "effective communication" construed as technical competence in the construction and sequencing of messages (Guerney, 1977; Miller, Nunally & Wackman, 1975; Parks, 1981; Thomas, 1977). As we have seen, a strong version of this approach to marital satisfaction is not consistent with our research.

This is not to suggest that communication has no effect on marital quality However, communication should not take all of the credit or blame, because many factors (e.g., external stress, family life cycle, basic compatibilities, personal values) help determine satisfaction. We would substitute a "social systems" for a "social skills" metaphor. That is, there is an entire matrix of influences on marital quality. The role of communication should be considered in terms of the way it fits within this matrix. For example, communication patterns do not generally have a firm meaning independent of the social and cultural context in which they occur. Our prior research addressed this point (Sillars, et al., in press). This research indicated that the role of communication in marriage was mediated by a couple's value system. The widely-held belief that self disclosure is conducive to marital satisfaction was supported with only one type of couple. These individuals, labeled "independents" by Fitzpatrick (1977) , endorsed a high degree of sharing between married partners and rejected traditional beliefs about marriage. They generally fit the stereotype of the modern, change-oriented and communication-sensitive couple. On the other hand, there was very little relationship between communication and satisfaction for traditional couples, presumably because traditional norms played a more important role in defining modes of conduct for these couples and verbal communication played a lesser role. Finally, open discussion of conflict was negatively related to the satisfaction of couples who professed little sharing in their relationship ("separates"). Thus, the negative relationship between integrative tactics and marital satisfaction reported earlier in this paper was probably due to the fact that separates outnumbered independnets in our sample.

The theoretical underpinnings of the social skills approach presuppose that communication skill rests in the contingent relationship between acts, particularly differential rates of reciprocity. Our research suggests that this conception of communication skill does not account for marital quality in a simple way.

NOTES

1. On a five-point scale, low importance was defined as an average rating less than or equal to 2, moderate was a rating between 2 and 4, and high was a rating greater than 4.

Table 1

SUMMARY OF CODING CATEGORIES

I. *Avoidance Acts*. Acts which minimize explicit discussion of conflicts.

  A. *Denial*. Statements which deny conflict.
    1. *Simple denial*. Unelaborated statements which deny that a conflict is present.
    2. *Extended denial*. Denial statements which elaborate on the basis of the denial.
    3. *Ambivalence*. Shifting or contradictory statements about the presence of conflict.

  B. *Noncontinuity*. Acts ehich direct the focus of conversation away from the discussion of conflict issues.
    1. *Topic shifting*. Statements that terminate discussion of a conflict issue before the discussion has reached a natural culmination.
    2. *Topic avoidance*. Statements that terminate discussion of a conflict before an opinion has been expressed.
    3. *Nonresponsiveness*. Failure to acknowledge or deny the presence of a conflict following a statement or inquiry about the conflict by the partner.
    4. *Semantic focus*. Statements about the meaning of words or the appropriateness of labels that supplant discussion of conflict.
    5. *Process focus*. Procedural statements that supplant discussion of conflict.
    6. *Pessimism*. Pessimistic statements about conflict which minimize the discussion of conflict issues.

  C. *Shifting Levels*. Indirect discussion of conflict.
    1. *Abstractness*. Abstract principles, generalizations, and hypothetical statements that supplant discussion of concrete individuals and events related to conflict.
    2. *Joking*. Nonhostile joking that supplants serious discussion of conflict.

II. *Distributive Acts*. Verbally competitive and individualistic acts.

  A. *Direct Distributive*.
    1. *Faulting*. Statements that directly criticize the personal characteristics of the partner.
    2. *Rejection*. Statements in response to the partner's previous statement that indicate personal antagonism toward the partner as well as disagreement.
    3. *Prescription*. Demands, arguments, threats and other prescriptive statements which attempt to resolve conflict by getting the partner to change.

  B. *Indirect Distributive*.
    1. *Hostile questions*. Directive or leading questions which fault the partner.

    2. *Hostile jokes*. Joking or teasing that faults the partner.
    3. *Presumptive attribution*. Statements that attribute thoughts, feelings, intentions, or motivations to the partner that the partner does not acknowledge.
    4. *Avoiding responsibility*. Statements that minimize or deny personal responsibility for conflict.

III. *Integrative Acts*. Verbally disclosive and supportive acts.

  A. *Informational*. Nonevaluative giving and seeking of information about conflicts.
    1. *Description*. Nonevaluative statements about observable events related to conflict.
    2. *Disclosure*. Nonevaluative statements about events related to conflict which the partner cannot observe, such as thoughts, feelings, intentions, motivations, and past history.
    3. *Qualification*. Statements that explicitly qualify the nature and extent of conflict without denying its presence.
    4. *Soliciting disclosure*. Soliciting information from the partner about events related to conflict which one cannot observe.
    5. *Negative inquiry*. Soliciting complaints about oneself.
    6. *Problem-solving*. Statements that initiate mutual consideration of solutions to conflict.

  B. *Supportiveness*

    1. *Support*. Statements that express understanding, acceptance, or positive regard for the partner (despite acknowledgement of a conflict).
    2. *Emphasizing commonalities*. Statements which comment on shared interests, goals, or compatibilities with the partner (despite acknowledgement of a conflict).
    3. *Accepting responsibility*. Statements that attribute responsibility for conflicts to self or to both parties.

Table 2

CONDITIONAL PROPORTIONS OF POSITIVE, NEUTRAL AND NEGATIVE AFFECT GIVEN PARTNER'S ACT, TOPIC IMPORTANCE AND SATISFACTION

PARTNER'S ACT		SPOUSE'S ACT	
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
Positive	.41***(+)	.45***(-)	.15***(-)
Neutral	.06***(-)	.74***(+)	.20
Negative	.03***(-)	.37***(-)	.59***(+)
No Act	.08	.74***(+)	.18

IMPORTANCE		SPOUSE'S ACT	
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
High	.05***(-)	.56	.39***(+)
Moderate	.10***(+)	.65	.25***(-)

SATISFACTION		SPOUSE'S ACT	
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
More	.11***(+)	.68	.21***(-)
Less	.06***(-)	.58	.36***(+)

SATISFACTION/PARTNER'S ACT		SPOUSE'S ACT	
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
More			
Positive	.36***(-)	.54**(+)	.10
Neutral	.08	.78	.14
Negative	.08**(+)	.40***(-)	.52
No Act	.10	.80	.10
Less			
Positive	.46***(+)	.34**(-)	.20
Neutral	.04	.70	.26
Negative	.01**(-)	.36***(+)	.63
No Act	.07	.70	.23

(*) p<.05
(**) p<.01
(***) p<.001

Table 3

CONDITIONAL PROPORTIONS OF POSITIVE, NEUTRAL AND NEGATIVE AFFECT GIVEN PARTNER'S ACT, TIME AND SATISFACTION

TIME		SPOUSE'S ACT	
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
First	.08	.64**(+)	.28
Second	.09	.60**(-)	.31

SATISFACTION/TIME		SPOUSE'S ACT	
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
More			
First	.10	.73	.16**(-)
Second	.12	.62	.26**(+)
Less			
First	.05	.58	.36**(+)
Second	.07	.58	.35**(-)

TIME/PARTNER'S ACT		SPOUSE'S ACT	
	Positive	Neutral	Negative
First			
Positive	.37	.51	.12
Neutral	.06	.72*(-)	.22*(+)
Negative	.04	.43	.53
No Act	.07	.76	.17
Second			
Positive	.43	.40	.17
Neutral	.06	.75*(+)	.19*(-)
Negative	.03	.31	.66
No Act	.09	.72	.19

(*) p .05
(**) p .01
(***)p .001

Table 4

CONDITIONAL PROPORTIONS OF AVOIDANCE, DISTRIBUTIVE AND INTEGRATIVE TACTICS

GIVEN PARTNER'S ACT, TOPIC IMPORTANCE AND SATISFACTION

PARTNER'S ACT		SPOUSE'S ACT	
	Avoidance	Distributive	Integrative
Avoidance	.70***(+)	.12***(-)	.18**(-)
Distributive	.17***(-)	.67***(+)	.16***(-)
Integrative	.30***(-)	.24*(-)	.46
No Act	.55***(+)	.17***(-)	.28

IMPORTANCE		SPOUSE'S ACT	
	Avoidance	Distributive	Integrative
High	.33***(-)	.36***(+)	.31*(+)
Moderate	.50***(+)	.26***(-)	.24*(-)

SATISFACTION		SPOUSE'S ACT	
	Avoidance	Distributive	Integrative
More	.52***(+)	.26*(-)	.22*(-)
Less	.39***(-)	.33*(+)	.29*(+)

IMPORTANCE/PARTNER'S ACT		SPOUSE'S ACT	
	Avoidance	Distributive	Integrative
High			
Avoidance	.56*(-)	.20	.24
Distributive	.16	.64***(-)	.20
Integrative	.25	.28	.47
No Act	.45	.23	.32
Moderate			
Avoidance	.76*(+)	.10	.14
Distributive	.18	.70***(+)	.12
Integrative	.32	.22	.45
No Act	.59	.14	.27

(*) p .05
(**) p .01
(***) p .001

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INTERACTIONAL ANTECEDENTS OF SOCIAL REASONING DEVELOPMENT:

INTERPRETING THE EFFECTS OF PARENT DISCIPLINE ON CHILDREN

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In several previous papers I have articulated some general parameters of a cognitive-developmental perspective on argument (Burleson, 1979, 1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1982). In general, the cognitive-developmental approach to argument maintains: (a) that human reasoning processes occur through the application of underlying cognitive structures, (b) that these cognitive structures develop in distinct, content-related domains of activity and involvement, (c) that developmental and individual differences in reasoning processes exist as a function of corresponding differences in underlying cognitive structures, (d) that developmental and individual differences in reasoning processes impact on the nature and substance of the arguments people make, (e) that differences in reasoning processes impact on the character of the argumentative interactions in which persons engage, and (f) that differences in reasoning processes affect both the short-term and long-term outcomes of argumentative interactions.

The present paper is concerned with some of the social factors assumed responsible for the production of individual differences in *social* reasoning development (i.e., reasoning processes concerned with aspects and qualities of persons, interpersonal relationships, social conventions, and moral issues). Although biological and maturational factors clearly play a significant role in the development of social reasoning processes, recent research indicates that the types of argumentative behaviors to which children are exposed over the course of development are related to individual differences in their social reasoning abilities. In particular, variations in the typical disciplinary strategies employed by parents have been found associated with individual differences in children's social reasoning. The remainder of this paper first summarizes the research relating variations in parental discipline to differences in children's social reasoning development. Subsequently, three theoretical issues concerning the character of the relationship between parental discipline and child reasoning are examined.

Parental Disciplinary Styles and Their Relationship to Children's Social Reasoning and Social Behavior

The activity of a parent disciplining a child can be usefully viewed as a type of argumentative interaction. Prototypically, argumentative encounters may be regarded as interactions in which overt disagreement among interactants occurs (D. O'Keefe, 1982); such interactions are further characterized by a relationship of opposition existing among the participants (B. O'Keefe & Benoit, 1982). In the disciplinary encounter, the child typically wants to do something (or has done something) that is contrary to parental desires or expectations. This "relationship of opposition" often leads to "overt disagreement" and an attempt by the parent to impose his or her will on the child. Frequently, in the effort to impose his or her will and control the children's behavior, the parent will make "arguments" to the child.[1] The typical form and substance of these displinary arguments may have a lasting impact on the cognitive life of the child.

Researchers have identified two dominant types of disciplinary strategies employed by parents.[2] These two types of strategies have been referred to by a number of different terms (e.g., position-centered/person-centered, authoritatian/authoritative, parent-centered, child-centered, punishment-oriented/reasoning-oriented). However, the labels employed by Martin Hoffman, "power assertion" and "induction," have gained wide usage (Hoffman, 1977; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967). *Power assertion* is defined as "physical punishment or any other exercise of physical of material power over the child (such as threatening loss of privileges and physically forcing the child to do or not to do something)" while *induction* is defined as the act of "pointing out to a transgressor the consequences of his behavior for other persons (the parents themselves or a third party)" (Saltzstein, 1976, p. 254). Power assertion, then, seeks to bring the child's behavior into conformity with parental expectations through the use of physical or material rewards or punishments, or through the direct exercise of power through imperatives, commands, or physical actions. In power assertion, the goal of the disciplinarian is simply to produce an immediate modification in the child's behavior or to administer punishment for a transgression. Induction, on the other hand, seeks to produce conformity with parental expectations through the use of reasoning, particularly reasoning about how an act and/or its consequences impact on others. In induction, "the goal of the disciplinarian is to make children understand why their transgressions are wrong, why they should follow various rules and regulations, and how they might alter their behavior to achieve that end" (Brody & Shaffer, 1982, p. 37). With power assertion, the basis for control is *external*; i.e., the child conforms with parental expectations in order to avoid (or obtain) parent-controlled punishments (or rewards). In contrast, with induction the basis for control is *internal*; i.e., the child conforms with parental expectations in order to act in a manner consistent with certain beliefs or values held by the child.

A large number of studies have examined the relationship between parental disciplinary styles and indices of social and moral development in children (see the review of Brody & Shaffer, 1982). In general, these studies have found that parents typically employing inductive disciplinary strategies have children who are relatively more honest (e.g., Mussen, Rutherford, Harris, Keasey, 1970), altruistic (e.g., Hoffman, 1975a), empathic (e.g., Feshbach, 1974), considerate of others (e.g., Hoffman, 1963), generous (Dlugokinski &

Firestone, 1974), guilty about transgressions (e.g., Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967), popular with and accepted by peers and teachers (e.g., Shure & Spivack, 1978), and effective communicators (e.g., Bearison & Cassel, 1975). In contrast, parents typically practicing a power-assertive disciplinary style generally had children who scored relatively lower on the above mentioned indices of social and moral development.

Of particular importance are studies indicating that parental induction is positively associated with indices of children's social reasoning development (e.g., role-taking, moral reasoning, interpersonal cognitive problem solving) while parental power assertion is negatively associated with advanced forms of these social reasoning indices (e.g., Delia, Burleson, & Kline, 1979: Fodor, 1972; Gutkin, 1975; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; Jones, Rickel, & Smith, 1980; Leahy, 1981; Olejnik, 1980; Parikh, 1980; Shure & Spivack, 1978; Spivack, Platt, & Shure, 1976). Moreover, the relationships between parental disciplinary styles and children's social reasoning development have been found to remain significant even when controlling for a variety of potentially confounding variables (e.g., social class, intelligence, age and sex of the child, birth order, etc.). It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that there is a stable and meaningful relationship between the characteristic mode of discipline employed by parents and their children's social reasoning development.

Although research has established a relationship between parent disciplinary strategies and children's social reasoning development, several aspects of this relationship are unclear. In particular, three specific issues merit detailed analysis: (a) the causal direction implied by the relation between parental behavior and child cognition, (b) the specific features of inductive discipline that may lead to enhanced social reasoning development, and (c) the theoretical interpretation to be placed on the relation between parental induction and child social reasoning. Each of these issues receives detailed treatment below.

Direction of Causality

Nearly all studies detecting relationships between parental disciplinary strategies and children's social reasoning have been correlational in nature; consequently, there is some ambiguity about whether variations in parental discipline produce differences in child social reasoning or child characteristics lead to and elicit different forms of parental discipline. Although many researchers have assumed on intuitive grounds that it is most reasonable to view influence flowing from parent to child, other researchers have suggested that the opposite causal path is equally plausible. For example, Bell (1968), has specifically argued that congenital characteristics of the child (e.g., habits, temperment factors, general moral orientations) may lead parents to consistently select specific disciplinary strategies, and that the child tends to reinforce parents for employing certain forms of discipline, the reinforced disciplinary forms becoming the most frequently used (also see Saltzstein, 1976).

Hoffman (1975b) has explicitly addressed many of Bell's contentions, arguing that while characteristics of the child may influence or constrain parental actions, (a) parents are inherently more powerful than their children, and thus control more salient reinforcers, (b) children typically accommodate to parental wishes in the disciplinary encounter, (c) congenital characteristics of the child do not negate the influence of disciplinary strategies on the child, and (d) there is no direct evidence indicating that characteristics of the child actually elicit different forms of parental discipline. Hoffman concludes his critique of Bell by arguing that it makes good theoretical sense to view parental disciplinary strategies as impacting on the child, this view fitting what is known about the everyday pattern of interaction between parent and child.

More recently, in a frequently cited study, Grusec and Kuczynski (1980) argue that characteristics of the child's misdeed or transgression are responsible for variations in parental disciplinary strategies. These researchers presented a sample of mothers with 12 hypothetical situations depicting different types of misbehaivor; for each situation, mothers were asked how they would handle the situation. Grusec and Kuczyhski found that substantially more variation in disciplinary strategy selection was attributable to type of misdeed than to the mothers. These researchers conclude: "clearly then, the nature of the child's disobedience dictated the selection of disciplinary strategies to a greater extent than did the nature of the mother" (Grusec & Kuczynski, 1980, p. 4).

Although the major claim made by Grusec and Kuczynski has some plausibility, the empirical support they present for this claim is badly flawed. Apparently, many of the disciplinary situations Grusec and Kuczynski presented to their mothers described instances in which the hypothetical mother had already employed an inductive strategy prior to the misdeed mothers were asked to respond to. For example, one of Grusec and Kuczynski's hypothetical situations reads as follows:

(Sound of bouncing ball.)

Mother: Kim, don't bounce that ball in here. You're too close to that table. That's an expensive vase that belonged to your grandmother.

(Sound of ball bouncing.)

Mother: Kim, take that ball somewhere else. You're going to knock over that vase.

(Sound of ball bouncing, then loud crash.)

With this situation, the actual mother was asked what she would do after the loud crash. Note that in the description of the situation the hypothetical mother employs an inductive strategy (i.e., gives reasons for modifying behavior, discusses consequences of the child's actions).

This is a highly significant fact since, as Saltzstein (1976) notes, even mothers who typically employ induction will rely on power-assertive strategies when prior inductive efforts have been ignored by the misbehaving child. Moreover, the tendency of parents to rely on power assertion after inductive efforts have failed is consistent with Grusec and Kuczynski's finding that most of the mothers in their study employed power-assertive techniques in responding to most of the situations. In sum, because many of the hypothetical situations employed by Grusec and Kuczynski contained scripts in which inductive disciplinary strategies had been employed, it is not possible to conclude from this study that the nature of the child's misdeed is a more important determining factor of disciplinary strategies than the nature of the parent.

Other research without the design flaws of the Grusec and Kuczynski study has found a relatively high degree of parental consistency in the use of disciplinary strategies. For example, Applegate, Burke, Burleson, Delia, and Kline (in press) presented a sample of mothers with five hypothetical situations depicting misbehavior by their child and were asked what they would do in response to the situation (no "preliminary" responses were given). Mothers' responses were hierarchically scored for the extent to which the child was encouraged to reflect upon his behavior and reason through the consequences of his act. A high degree of personal consistency in mothers' use of disciplinary strategies was found (Cronbach's alpha = .90). This high degree of consistency suggests that it is variables within the *parent*, rather than situational variables, that are responsible for selection of disciplinary strategies.

Several other pieces of evidence support the notion that it is parental discipline that affects the child's cognition and behavior rather than the reverse. As noted above, the consistency with which parents employ certain disciplinary strategies suggests that variables within the parent influence the mode of discipline employed. This notion has received direct empirical support: Hoffman and Saltzstein (1967) found that the use of induction was positively related with endorsement of humanistic values, while Applegate et al. (in press) found that the use of reflection-enhancing disciplinary strategies was positively associated with the interpersonal construct system development of the parent. These findings strongly suggest that cognitive and personality characteristics of the parent influence disciplinary mode, and it is difficult to imagine that features of the child's cognition or behavior could impact substantially on the presumably enduring cognitive and personality characteristics of parents. Indeed, while moderate associations have been found between parental behavior and child cognition, there is little relationship between child behavior and parent cognition (Applegate, 1978; Spivack, Platt, & Shure, 1976). Moreover, parental disciplinary styles have been found associated with the cognition and behavior of even very young (15-30 months) children (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow & King, 1979); it seems unlikely that the behavior of such young children could substantially affect either the personality characteristics or general behavioral dispositions of parents.

Finally, there is some experimental evidence supporting the notion that inductive disciplinary strategies lead to enhanced social reasoning development in children. Shure and her colleagues (Shure, 1982; Shure & Spivack, 1978; Spivack, Platt, & Shure, 1976) conducted several studies in which both mothers and teachers of young children were trained in the use of inductive disciplinary strategies and other child-centered social skills. Results of these studies consistently indicate that children exposed to the trained inductive practices developed more sophisticated social reasoning skills.

In sum, it appears that the weight of evidence strongly supports the conclusion that characteristic modes of parental discipline have a direct and significant effect on children's social reasoning development. Although children obviously have an effect on the behavior of parents, it would be unreasonable to assume that parental practices do not substantially affect the cognitive processes and behaviors of children. As Saltzstein (1976) notes, definitive evidence regarding the relation between parental discipline and child cognition requires longitudinal research employing cross-lagged correlational designs. In the absence of such research, however, the claim that styles of parental discipline substantially influence social reasoning development in children appears reasonably secure.

Aspects of Induction Leading to Enhanced Social Reasoning Development: Some Theoretical Mechanisms and Interpretations

Assuming that inductive disciplinary strategies do lead to enhanced social reasoning in children, it becomes theoretically and pragmatically important to understand the mechanism through which induction produces this effect. The issue regarding the mechanism through which induction affects child reasoning has obvious theoretical significance. Pragmatically, the nature of this mechanism is important since training efforts designed to improve parental discipline need to know what specific aspects of parental behavior should be trained.

There are actually two distinct, albeit related, issues embedded in the question regarding the "mechanism" of induction. First, what is it in the child that is affected by induction? That is, what specific aspects of the child's cognitive structures, reasoning processes, values, self-concept, personality, etc. are acted upon by inductive disciplinary strategies? Second, what is the "effective ingredient" in induction? That is, what aspect (or aspects) of inductive disciplinary strategies work to create changes in the child's cognitive and personality characteristics?

Obtaining answers to both of these more specific questions is complicated by several factors. Both the entity affected by induction and the effective ingredient of induction may vary with development and circumstances. It is certainly plausible, for example, that the effective ingredient of inductive strategies is different for four-year-olds than for twelve-year-olds. Answering either question regarding the mechanism of induction is further complicated by the fact that there is no "ideal" or even prototypical inductive strategy that can be used to define the necessary and sufficient conditions of this disciplinary mode. Rather, there are (at best) an implicit set of general characteristics or dimensions that researchers have determined concrete inductive strategies (more or less) share. Reason-giving, discussion of the consequences of the child's action, and, somewhat less generally, mention of the subjective states of others are frequently cited as the major components of inductive strategies. However, given the range of different circumstances in which parents discipline their children, wide variation must be expected in the form and content of inductive strategies.

As noted above, the issues regarding the psychological entities affected by induction and the specific features of inductive strategies producing changes in these psychological entities are distinct, but also related. That is, if it is hypothesized that a particular psychological entity in the child (e.g., social perception skill, moral judgment) is affected by inductive discipline, one must also be able to specify some feature of inductive strategies plausibly producing that effect. As previously indicated, use of induction by parents has been found positively associated with several aspects of the child's social reasoning (e.g., role-taking skills, social perception, moral judgment). Researchers have proposed that certain specific features of inductive disciplinary strategies may be responsible for enhancing the development of these social reasoning processes.

For example, Spivack, Platt, and Shure (1976) suggest two features of parental induction -- discussion of the consequences of the child's act and elicitation from the child of alternative behaviors that could be enacted in similar situations -- are particularly important with respect to enhancing the child's social reasoning. Encouraging the child to consider the consequences of his misdeed (for himself, the parent, and other involved parties) should help the child become more aware of the impact of his behavior and reflective about the probable consequences of future actions. Getting the child to articulate alternative actions should reduce the impulsivity of the child and help him to act in future situations only after considering alternative responses. Empirical support has been developed for these contentions: Spivack, Platt, and Shure (1976; also see Shure & Spivack, 1978) report that parents and teachers trained to use inductive strategies emphasizing the consequences of acts and alternative behavioral responses have had a positive impact on children's development of interpersonal cognitive problem solving skills.

Applegate and Delia (1980; also see Applegate, et al., in press) suggest that the focus of inductive appeals on the perspectives and feelings of others helps lead to the development of enhanced social perception skills. Presumably, articulating the feelings, intentions, motivations, and other subjective states of those whom the child's misdeeds impact on make these "invisible" features of the social world salient to the child. Repeated discussions of others' perspectives and feelings should lead the child to focus on these psychological qualities and elaborate cognitive structures (e.g., interpersonal constructs) and processes (e.g., role-taking skills) designed to represent others' psychological states. Again, empirical support exists for this position: children whose parents typically employ inductive modes of discipline have been found to have more developed interpersonal construct systems and role-taking skills (e.g., Delia, Burleson, & Kline, 1979).

Hoffman (1975b) suggests that inductive discipline functions to enhance the empathic tendencies of children. Empathy is understood here as the tendency to feel what another feels. By pointing out how a child's misdeeds impact negatively on others and discussing the feelings of those affected by the misdeed, parental induction draws the child's attention to others' emotional states and encourages the child to consider these emotions in future situations. The child's heightened sensitivity to others' emotions presumably results in higher levels of empathy. Although Hoffman's reasoning appears plausible, it is not supported by the available empirical research: two different studies (Barnett, King, Howard, & Dino, 1980; Feshbach, 1974) have found essentially no relationship between parental induction and children's empathic tendencies. However, both of these studies employed Feshbach and Roe's (1968) measure of empathy, and this measure has recently been subject to severe criticism (e.g., Eisenberg-Berg & Lennon, 1980). Thus, it is possible that the relation between parental induction and children's empathic responsiveness has yet to be adequately assessed.

Finally, a number of researchers have suggested that parental induction functions to enhance the child's moral reasoning. Inductive strategies present reasons to the child about why he or she should modify his or her conduct. Often, these reasons take the form of general principles that ought to govern behavior across situations. Inductive strategies also often attempt to elicit the child's own reasoning about the situation; this reasoning is often compared with the parent's reasoning and similarities and differences in the two lines of reasoning are noted. The focus on general principles, good reasons for actions, and comparison of different lines of reasoning are all characteristic of advanced forms of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1969). Moreover, there is considerable experimental evidence indicating that exposure to high levels of moral reasoning has a facilitative effect on the child's moral reasoning development (e.g., Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1966; Walker, 1982). If inductive disciplinary strategies are viewed as exercises in moral reasoning, then, it should be expected that exposure to inductive discipline will lead to enhanced moral reasoning in children. There is substantial empirical support for this position (e.g., Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; Olejnik, 1980; Parikh, 1980).

In sum, it appears that a variety of social reasoning structures and processes in children are enhanced by inductive disciplinary strategies. It is difficult to specify the precise features of induction responsibile for these enhancements, although several plausible hypotheses have been extended. Detailed empirical investigations that manipulate specific features of inductive strategies will be needed if researchers are to identify the precise "active ingredients" of induction. However, it may be that two general features of inductive strategies are of central importance with respect to enhanced social reasoning development in children.

The first of these general features pertains to the *form* of inductive strategies. When employing induction parents *make arguments* to their children; that is, they introduce claims and supply reasons supporting these claims. Moreover, in inductive strategies the reasons offered by parents in support of their claims are typically *good* reasons: reasons that support their claims by virtue of their *cogency* rather than their coercive potential (e.g., "You shouldn't call Johnny names because it hurts his feelings. That gets him mad, and then he wants to hurt back, just like you do when someone hurts your feelings. And if you hurt people, then they won't like you and won't want to play with you," rather than "If you call Johnny names again, you're going to get your mouth washed out with soap"). Induction, then, implicitly tells the child that one's conduct ought to be governed by good reasons (that, over time, become internalized principles and standards) rather than being governed by external forces and constraints. In the most general sense, induction instantiates and models *rationality* to the child. By presenting and modeling the value of reason, induction encourages the child to value, use, and develop his or her own reasoning skills.

The second general feature of induction leading to enhanced social reasoning development in the child pertains to the *content* of inductive strategies. As noted above, many inductive strategies make reference to the feelings, needs, perspectives, motivations, and other psychological qualities of those whom the child's behavior affects. A focus on such psychological qualities is important because such qualities are obviously not directly observable, and the young child has a natural tendency to think of others in terms of concrete physical and behavioral characteristics (see Burleson, 1981). By explicitly mentioning others' psychological qualities, inductive strategies lead the child to attend to these qualities, see these qualities as salient features of others, and utilize these qualities as a basis for action. Over time, discussion of others' psychological states and the salience of these states for the childs' conduct may lead the child to develop an abstract, person-centered orientation (see Applegate et al., in press).

Both the form and content of inductive disciplinary strategies thus appear to be important with respect to enhancing the child's social reasoning development. These general features of inductive strategies apparently model the reasoning process to the child, lead to the internalization of general moral principles and values, and help the child attend to and understand the relevance of others' psychological states and perspectives.

Conclusion

It has been suggested that disciplinary encounters between parent and child can be viewed as argumentative interactions, and that the specific strategies that parents employ in seeking to control their child's behavior can be viewed as arguments. Consistent with the cognitive-developmental approach to argumentation, it has been found that characteristic modes of parental discipline are related to systematic differences in the development of social reasoning skills by children. The available empirical evidence supports the following additional conclusions: that variations in the characteristic mode of parental discipline are responsible for producing differences in children's social reasoning skills, that a variety of specific social reasoning skills appear affected by parental discipline, and that certain specific features of disciplinary strategies appear responsible for the effects on children's social reasoning development. What have been termed "inductive" disciplinary strategies appear to have a particularly facilitative effect on children's social reasoning. Inductive disciplinary strategies constitute what most theorists would regard as "good arguments" in that they depend on the cogency of their reasoning for their effectiveness rather than on external forms of domination and constraint. Inductive discipline thus models good reasoning to the child and can be assumed to enhance the child's rational processes and valuing of rationality.

As has been emphasized throughout, many of the claims and interpretations presented in this paper are in need of further empirical testing. It is particularly satisfying to note, however, that the extant empirical findings support an intuition that many argumentation theorists have long shared: that acts of good reasoning result in the production of good reasoners.

NOTES

1. "Argument" here must be understood in a rather loose sense as many power-assertive disciplinary strategies (e.g., imperatives, commands) contain only implicit justifications for their "claims." Explicit reason-giving has been identified by O'Keefe (1982) as a feature of paradigm cases of argument.

2. Hoffman (1977) also discusses a third major disciplinary technique, "love withdrawal." However, this technique has been found to be used relatively infrequently, and no systematic relation between love-withdrawal and the child's social reasoning has been detected. Consequently, discussion of love-withdrawal is excluded from this review.

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MORAL REASONING DEVELOPMENT:
AN INTRODUCTORY REVIEW OF CORRELATES AND ANTECEDENTS

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Traditionally, our discipline has studied arguments produced by cultural and social conflicts and evaluated these arguments for their quality of reasoning. The value we place in rationally-developed, well-supported arguments has been accompanied by an interest in their moral quality. That is, we often study arguments for their underlying assumptions about matters of justice and fairness. With the goal of contributing to an understanding of moral argument, we offer an introductory review of studies within the body of research prompted by Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development.

Our review is selective and introductory. We will simply summarize the moral reasoning research that has been spawed from cognitive-developmental theory. This excludes studies of moral reasoning performed within a social learning or psychoanalytic approach. We do not attempt to compare or contrast the efficacy of these theoretical perspectives for explaining the relationships among processes related to moral reasoning. Our review relies heavily on research reviews since research based on Kohlberg's theory includes over one thousand studies.[1]

Our review is organized in the following fashion. An overview of cognitive-developmental theory followed by Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories of moral development will first be presented. Then five propositions will be examined: (1) moral reasoning development proceeds through sequence of stages that are progressive, consecutive and irreversible; (2) moral reasoning development is universal; (3) moral reasoning stages form hierarchic integrations; (4) moral reasoning stages are structured wholes; (5) moral reasoning development is facilitated by social interaction; (6) moral reasoning development is related to moral argument.

Cognitive Development Theories of Moral Reasoning

Cognitive Developmental Theory

Jean Piaget and Heinz Werner, the giants of developmental psychology, have produced two rather distinct approaches in cognitive developmental theory, approaches that have been discussed and analyzed by nearly every other developmental psychologist.[2]

Basically, both approaches to development are "interpretive;" that is, they assume that persons' actions are channelized by the ways they interpret objects and events in the world. Interpretation is the process whereby persons apply cognitive structures or "schemas" in ways that assign meaning to objects and events in the world. These meanings are organized into knowledge that is structured and stable. Cognitive schemas develop as a person carries out his plans, interaction with the world. By assimilating new experiences into existing cognitive schemas and by accommodating existing cognitive schemas to the structures of the world, individuals achieve a pragmatically adequate understanding of the world.

Cognitive development theorists further assume that the cognitive structures through which persons interpret the world emerge and change over development in very particular ways.[3] First, cognitive structures develop through a sequence of stages, each stage representing a structured whole. This means that the stages are a series of transformations which affect modes of thinking and action across a variety of domains and contexts. Second, cognitive stages are hierarchially ordered in that later emerging stages are more developmentally advanced. That is, higher stages enable a person to think in more differentiated, articulated and integrated and hence more adaptive ways. Third, cognitive stages form an invariant sequence, such that development through the stages is consecutive, progressive and irreversible. Finally, although the rate and end point of development may differ, the stage sequence is universal.

We realize this is a brief overview of cognitive-developmental theory. Important details will hopefully become clearer as we discuss Piagent's and Kohlberg's theories of moral reasoning.

Piaget's Theory of Moral Reasoning

In The Moral Judgment of the Child[4] Piaget outlined two types of morality, the "morality of constraint" and, as cognitive development proceeds, the "morality of cooperation." The morality of constraint is predominant in children aged 5-8 and is characterized by a belief in immanent justice and the sacredness of rules, a unilateral respect for adults, and a determination of right and wrong based on the consequences of actions. By contrast, the morality of cooperation is more "equilibrated," appearing in older children as they recognize diverse views of right and wrong, develop mutual respect, use information about intentions in moral evaluations, determine punishment in accordance with the misdeed and understanding that rules are maintained to satisfy mutually valued goals.

Although Piaget called these two moralities "stages," he denied that they are tightly organized or distinct. He believed that the shift from the morality of constraint to the morality of cooperation is gradual and facilitated by peer interactions (and, to a lesser extent, parenting practices). Peer interactions, Piaget explained, stimulate development by requiring children to negotiate with people of equal power and status, which in turn leads them to create rules of cooperation that are mutually beneficial.

Evidence for Piaget's Theory. Piaget investigated a number of dimensions of children's moral thinking such as absolutism, rules, immanent justice, objective responsibility, punishment and obedience to authority. Generally he interviewed children over hypothetical moral stories that he presented to them. Thorough reviews of Piaget's and related research are given by Rest, Hoffman, Karniol, Keasey, Lickona and Grueniech.[5] Since most research on Piaget's theory has focused on children's views of punishment and responsibility, only this body of research will be summarized here.

Piaget believed that young children used the criteria of objective responsibility to judge others' actions by focusing on the concrete rules and consequences of others' actions. Older children make judgments based on subjective responsibility by focusing on the intentions and purposes underlying social rules and actions.

To learn what ages children use intention and consequence information in their moral judgments, Piagent presented children with pairs of stories describing acts such as clumsiness, stealing and lying. One story featured a supposedly well-intended child creating great damage and one story featured an ill-intended child creating a little damage. The child was then asked which story character was naughtier and more deserving of punishment.

Employing this method Piaget found that children as young as 6 use the concept of intention in their moral judgments but that not until age 10 do children evaluate actors in terms of their intentions. He also found that while the influence of objective responsibility decreases, some children continue to give responses based on consequences up to the age of ten.

Replication studies of Piagent's research generally indicate that children between ages 6 and 17 show an increasing preference for subjective responsibility.[6] However, there are numerous qualifications. Studies indicate that whether a young child uses intention cues in evaluating others' actions is influenced by the explicitness of the intention cues, whether the consequences are positive or negative, their extent or degree, whether the consequences were intended, and if so, to what extent, the order in which consequences and intention cues are presented, the mode of story presentation, the response format, the kind of social sanctions following the actions of the story character, and memory abilities of the subjects.[7] Finally, the age of the story character, the amount of information the child has about the story character's personality, circumstances offered for a character's actions, the type of character's harm, the child's relationship to the story character, and whether the child is asked to role play the story character all influence a child's focus on intentions, attribution of blame and recommended punishment.[8]

Analysis of Piagentian Research. Considering these qualifications, the status of Piaget's claims seem to be in question. The increasing preference for using intentions in evaluating moral actions appears to be heavily influenced by context, task stimuli and task demands. Yet when these factors are controlled for, as a recent study by Rotenberg has done, older children still appear to base their moral judgments on intentions whereas younger children base their moral judgments on consequences.[9]

Despite Rotenberg's research, recent reviewers are probably correct in their criticism that Piaget's concepts of intention and consequences are incomplete, oversimplistic and restricting.[10] Keasey argues that Piaget has conceptually confounded "intentionality" and "motive," a confusion which prevents us from observing that their development seems to follow different sequences. Both Keasey and Karniol suggest that future research ought to pinpoint developmental changes in the integration of intent and consequence information. Grueniech and Trabasso suggest that theories of story comprehension can help explain these developmental changes.[11] On the other hand, Surber suggests using information integration theory; in a recent study Surber found that developmental changes in the moral judgments of adults appear to be in decreasing the relative importance of consequence cues rather than increasing the importance of intention cues.[12]

Most of the suggestions by reviewers have focused on the need to clarify the processes by which children use information to make inferences about others. While such research is valuable, Rest concludes that it distracts us from our fundamental task of learning how people's understandings of their worlds lead them to both use and prefer using some forms of reasoning over others.

Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Reasoning

Lawrence Kohlberg's attempt to replicate Piaget's work on moral development has resulted in what is now the largest, most focused body of research on moral reasoning.[13] Expanding on Piaget's ideas, Kohlberg originally contended that changes in reasoning about moral delemmas proceed through a sequence of six (not two) stages. Each stage of reasoning describes a progressively advanced conception of justice and social relations and as well as an advanced understanding of how people prioritize and balance the legitimate claims of others. Talbe I describes Kohlberg's original six stage scheme.

As can been seen from Table I, Stages 1 and 2 of Kohlberg's system comprise a preconventional level of moral reasoning. In these stages rules are either followed for avoiding punishment or followed for a specific reciprocal arrangement. Stages 3 and 4 comprise the conventional level of moral reasoning, in which rules are either followed to show good behavior or followed for the purpose of maintaining the social order. Finally, Stages 5 and 6 comprise postconventional reasoning, which involves the acknowledgement of self-derived principles as the basis for morality.

Several points need to be made about Kohlberg's stages. Unlike Piaget, each stage describes a unified perspective on reasoning about matters of justice. The stages describe successive transformations in the way we organize our thoughts about moral problems. Furthermore, the stages describe specific transformations that occur from childhood through adulthood. Kohlberg believes that developmental change in moral reasoning is mostly facilitated by "role-taking opportunities," which he describes as the opportunities supplied by parents, peers and the community for children and adults to discuss others' points of view, make decisions with others and participate in the institutions of government and business.

Kohlberg's Methodology. Like Piaget, Kohlberg uses the clinical interview to investigate moral reasoning. Kohlberg and his associates have created a series of nine hypothetical delemmas about moral problems. Probably the most widely used dilemma is that of "Heinz," the husband with a dying wife and no money to pay for the expensive drugs she needs. Heinz must decide whether to steal the needed drugs. Each of the moral dilemmas is presented to subjects along with a set of semi-structured probes, and subjects are encouraged to make specific arguments justifying their judgments about the moral delemma. These arguments are then scored for their level of moral reasoning.

Kohlberg and his associates have devoted considerable effort to devising scoring procedures for handling free-response data, and to creating a valid description of moral reasoning stages. Their latest scoring system requires the researcher to classify the two main arguments each subject gives on a dilemma into "issues." The evidence and warrant for each issue is then classified into "norms," and then into "elements." At this point the researcher can determine what stage of reasoning the subject is using. While not much research has been reported with the newly revised scoring system, Rest reports high test-retest and interrater reliability correlations and high internal consistency scores for the scoring system.[14]

It should be noted that over the years Kohlberg has developed several different scoring procedures for determining what stage of moral reasoning a person is operating with. This makes comparative analysis across studies difficult. Moreover, even though Kohlberg and his associates have tried hard to standardize the interview and objectify the scoring procedures, researchers must nevertheless acquire a certain amount of training before they can reliably employ Kohlberg's method. This has led James Rest to devleop The Defining Issues Test, an objective written questionnaire that uses six hypothetical moral dilemmas.[15] For each delemma subject's must rate twelve pre-chosen issue statements for their importance in reaching a decision on how the delimma ought to be resolved. Subjects are not asked to make arguments in support of their judgments but only to rate the importance of stage-prototypic statements. Rest reports that the test requires a twelve-year old reading level and that it has high interrater relibility and internal consistency scores.

Now that we have discussed the general methods used to measure moral reasoning we can turn to the six propositions. Each represents a criteria that Kohlberg suggests can be used to evaluate his theory. It should be noted that the research summarized under each proposition is often taken as evidence for more than one proposition.

Moral Reasoning Development is Progressive, Consecutive and Irreversible

One of Kohlberg's stage criteria is that there should be a steadily upward tendency in development. As Kohlberg puts it, "a stage sequence disregarded by a single adult is no sequence." Four types of evidence are relevant to this claim.

First, cross-sectional studies show age-related developmental changes from Stage 1 to Stage 6.[16] Most people reason at Stage 4. Pure Stage 6 reasoning almost never occurs.

Second, longitudinal studies also show that there are progressive changes in moral reasoning.[17] Results of each longitudinal studies led Kohlberg to drop scoring Stage 6 reasoning since it never occured, and to add a Stage 4 1/2, which would take into consideration the relativistic thinking early adolescents engage in. Using this newest scoring system Murphy and Gilligan find that over a twenty year period most subjects start out at Stage 2 and end up at Stage 4.[18] No one has been observed to skip a stage but many subjects show no change, and about 7% of the subjects regress.

A third type of evidence for the invariant sequence claim comes from a Guttman "quasi-simplex" pattern of correlations that Kohlberg presents.[19] These correlations demonstrate sequentiality since they show that adjacent stages correlate more highly with each other than with more distant stages. (Kurtines and Greif take issue with Kohlberg's analysis, however).[20]

A final type of evidence for Kohlberg's claims comes from a series of experimental studies conducted by Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg.[21] These studies provide impressive evidence that subjects attain higher stages of reasoning in a consecutive manner:

subjects who are presented with moral reasoning one and two stages above their own don't understand the reasoning two stages above their own and when asked to recapitulate the reasoning can't at that level; they also don't like the reasoning below their own stage of development although they can comprehend that reasoning prefectly well. Most significantly, subjects resist using the reasoning stages lower than their own and prefer using reasoning that is one stage above their own. Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg take these results as evidence for the claim that moral reasoning development is progressive, consecutive and irreversible.

To summarize, then, most of the evidence supports Kohlbeg's claim that moral reasoning development is steadily progressive. Yet change appears to be slow and there remain a persistant percentage of subjects who do not progress over the time interval studied or who accually regress. These results are disturbing. They could be due to measurement error or they could be due to acutual varations in stage use. If the latter, we must then abandon a hard line conception of a "stage" and permit the view that more than one reasoning level can be used by a subject at a time. This issue will be returned to later.

Moral Reasoning Development is Universal

A second criteria that Kohlberg suggests should be used to judge his theory of moral reasoning is that the stages form an envariant sequence that should be found in every culture, every social class and in both sexes. Kohlberg maintains that while "role-taking opportunities" may create conditions that speed up, slow down or stop development such conditions should not change the developmental sequence of moral reasoning.

Cultural Evidence

In support of his claim for stage universality Kohlberg originally presented cross-sectional evidence that 10-16 years olds in the U.S., Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey and the Yucatan all reason progressively through stage 5.[22] Since then the universality of moral reasoning stages has been checked by researchers interviewing a wide variety of age groups in Kenya, the Bahamas, Honduran Carit, India, Turkey, Nigeria, Israel, Thialand, England, Canada and Brazil.[23] These studies consistently find that Kohlberg's tests, interviewing and scoring procedures appear to be effectively adapted for different cultural groups, and that with age the use of Stage 1 and 2 reasoning decreases while Stage 2 and 4 reasoning increases. Stage 5 reasoning has not always consistently appeared in the protocals and Stage 6 reasoning is rarely found. In addition, Stage 4, 5 and 6 reasoning do not appear in the proitocals of persons coming from peasant or tribal communities.

To check whether Kohlberg's moral reasoning stages from a universal, invariant sequence, three longitutinal studies have been conducted in the Bahamas and Turkey.[24] These studies show that with age there is an advance in moral reasoning, at least through the first three stages, with few people showing regressions and no person skipping a stage. Finally, the longitudinal studies show that the rate of moral reasoning development is slower among villagers than among urban dwellers.

The absence of post-conventional reasoning in other cultures leads Simpson to proclaim Kohlberg's developmental sequence a case of cultural bias.[25] She argues that not all cultures emphasize self-derived principles of autonomy and justice nor do all cultures express concepts like justice, equality and reciprocity at such a high level of linguistic abstraction.

In Kohlberg's defense, early on he suggested that Stages 4, 5 and 6 might be viewed as types of mature moral reasoning rather than a developmental sequence.[26] For different cultures there will be different terminal points of development, depending upon the complexity of the institutional relations in the culture. So, for example, Edwards explains that Stage 3 reasoning assumes less complex institutions for resolving civil disputes than Stage 4 reasoning, which assumes more complex legal systems. These differences correspond to the differences in moral reasoning found in rural and urban communities, respectively.[27]

In summary, the cross-culture evidence appears to support the invariant sequence through the first four stages of moral reasoning. The absence of stages 5 and 6 may refer to the complexity of the society under question which future conceptual analysis should probably pursue.

Social Groups Evidence

As far as social groups go, the research evidence on moral reasoning show that stages 1-5 are represented in persons who expose a variety of political position, religious beliefs and socio-economic positions. Significant differences between those social factors and moral reasoning development has generally been found to be a function of formal education.[28] Rest reports cross-sectional and longitudinal studies which show that moral reasoning development reaches a plateau whenever people stop their formal education and that highly educated people have higher moral reasoning levels.

Sex Differences Evidence

If the invariant sequence claim is correct then males and females alike should proceed consecutively through all six stages of moral reasoning. In general, cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence shows that all six stages are used by males and females and that the stages are used in the expected sequence.[29] However there appear to be sex differences in older adolescents and adults; for example Haan and her associates find that females generally plateau at Stage 3 reasoning, while males plateau at Stage 4 reasoning.[30] Similarly, Holstein finds Stage 3 reasoning model for females, while Stage 4 reasoning is model for males.[31]

Rest argues that any sex differences that emerge in the research is a function of differences in education and any sex bias is probably erased in the newly revised scoring system.[32] Yet Murphy and Gilligan have conducted a longitudinal study of middle-class undergraduates, and using the newest scoring system, found that males scored one-third of a stage higher than females at three of four times tested.[33]

Recently Carol Gilligan has charged that Kohlberg's theory of moral development is sex biased because it was developed on data that included only adolescent males who were given hypothetical dilemmas over conflicting rights.[34] Gilligan has developed a sequence of moral reasoning stages for females by interviewing 29 females over their pending decision to continue or abort a pregnancy. She found that while women's moral reasoning progressed from an egocentric through a societal to a universal perspective. This progression is characterized by changing interpretations of the conflict between selfishness and responsibility. Gilligan found that women's moral reasoning proceeds "from an initial concern with survival, to a focus on goodness, and finally to a principled understanding of nonviolence as the most adequate guide to the resolution of moral conflicts."[35] This principled understanding is not accompanied by the value of automony that is present in Kohlberg's conception of post conventional reasoning.

Gilligan rightly advocates conducting more studies of both men and women who are faced with actual dilemmas of moral conflict and choice. Only then will we be able to reach a conclusion on the issue of sex differences in moral reasoning development.

Moral Reasoning Stages are Hierarchic Integrations

Kohlberg also contends that stages of moral reasoning are hierarchically ordered because each stage represents a progressively more differentiated, organized, generalized perspective on morality.

One way to assess the claim of hierarchic integration is to examine again the line of research by Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg on moral comprehension. One major finding of these studies is that comprehension of these stages is commulative, that is, Stage 1 concepts are easiest to understand, then Stage 2, Stage 3, etc. Comprehension of a particular stage of reasoning intails comprehension of all lower stages of reasoning. Hence the higher stages are more advanced than the lower stages.

Another way to examine the claim of hierarchic integration is to check whether moral reasoning development is related to developmental changes in related cognitive activities. Kohlberg contended that changes in moral reasoning are dependent upon changes in cognitive operational thought, role-taking, empathy and ego development.[36] Advancements in these processes should be prerequisites for advancements in moral reasoning; in particular, advancements in cognitive operations and role-taking are required for advancement in moral reasoning.

First, Kohlberg believes that moral reasoning is partially dependent upon the acquistion of cognative operations. Using Piaget's term, cognitive operations are the means of mentally transforming data about the real world so that the data can be organized and used selectively in the solution to a problem.[37] Piaget described two types of cognitive operations. Concrete operations are actions performed on objects to bring them together into classes of various order and to bring them together into classes of various orders and to establish relations between them. Acquiring the concrete operation of classification, serial ordering and reversibility allows a young child to coordinate characteristics of an immediate situation. At the beginning of adolescence a new capacity for hypothetical reasoning develops. "Formal operations" allow a child to consider numerous possibilities in problem-solving by subordinating the real to the possible and hy being able to reflect upon one's own thoughts. Piaget and Inhelder have developed a rariety of tasks to measure concrete and formal operational thinking.

Kohlberg believes that the acquisition of concrete operation of classification, serial ordering and reversibility should encourage movements from Stage 1 reasoning to Stage 2 and 3 reasoning because such operations are necessary to shift from focusing on the consequences of actions to focusing on differentiating unobservable psychological states. With complete mastery of concrete options a reasoner is able to differentiate norms from actual practices. With the emergence of formal operational thought a reasoner can think about rights and obligations independent of social context; this, in turn, leads him to be able to reason at Stages 4, 5 and 6. Kohlberg believed that cognitive operation set on upper limit on the level of moral reasoning a person will attain.

The evidence for the above claim is supportive, though not entirely so. In general, correlational studies show that even when intelligence is controlled for, there is a positive relationship between cognitive operation and moral reasoning.[38] In addition, Colby and Kohlberg report pooled data from five studies which shows that only 1% of the subjects who lack beginning formal operations are at Stage 3 moral reasoning.[39] However Damon presents compelling evidence that logical operations may not be structual prerequisites in reasoning about justice; his data suggests that the direction of causality may also be that the direction of causality may also be the other way around, that is, it may be that moral development leads to changes in cognitive operations.[40] Damon proposes that the development of moral reasoning and cognitive operations are paralell processes which influence the other.

Kohlberg also believed that role-taking should also be a structural prerequisite for advance in moral reasoning. It is now fairly well established that the role-taking concept includes multiple types and multiple activities. Role-taking can refer to the ability to assume the spatial view point of another (perceptual role-taking), role-taking can refer to the ability to assume the conceptual view point of another (cognitive role-taking) or role-taking can refer to the ability to understand the emotional states of others (affective).

Kohlberg considers cognitive role-taking to be the most important prerequisite for moral development. He uses Selman's stages of social perspective taking in explaining that preconventional reasoning requires concrete individual perspective-taking, conventional perspective-taking requires taking a societal perspective and post-conventional reasoning requires taking a "prior-to-society" perspective. Kohlberg further assumes that development in role-taking are dependent upon particular cognitive operations. So logical operations are prerequisite for particular role-taking abilities which in turn are prerequisite for particular stages of moral reasoning.

Turning to the research, then, we find generally positive relationships observed between cognitive role-taking and moral reasoning.[41] Furthermore, Selman and others find that moral reasoning is generally not at a higher stage then the corresponding role-taking stage.[42] However conflicting results are provided by Kurdek, who found that moral reasoning development preceded not followed changes in role-taking abilities.[43] Perhaps changes in moral reasoning and role-taking exert mutual impact upon one another.

It is obvious that more conceptual and empirical analysis of these relationships needs to be undertaken. No precise accounts have been given to explain how particular logical operations prompt changes in specific role-taking abilities which, in turn, facilitates changes in specific features of moral reasoning. Until such conceptual analysis is done empirical work will be less informative. Nevertheless, it can still be concluded that moral reasoning development is positively related to the development of cognitive operations and role-taking ability.

Moral Reasoning Stages are Structured Wholes

Kohlberg contended that his stages of moral reasoning constitute "structured wholes". This means that each stage should describe a total organizational structure for an individual's thoughts about moral problems. Only one stage is available at one time in a subject and the stage should generate consistent patterns of reasoning across various moral contexts and domains. Earlier stages are not the preferred mode of reasoning.

If the above is true, then people should not evidence a mixture of reasoning patterns. Yet Rest reports that only one-third of Kohlberg's subjects consistently reason at one stage-level.[44] If one above is true then people should not shift their moral reasoning levels in responding to the same dilemma. Yet Kohlberg finds that one third of subjects fluctuate about one-third of a stage over a two week period, which is equivalent to a four year gain in Kohlberg's longitudinal study.[45] Finally, if persons are "in" a stage they should not be influenced by one testing materials or the speaking context. Yet Levine has shown that respondents use different modes of reasoning depending upon the protagonist implicated in the moral dilemma.[46] Levine suggests that stage stability can only be assessed after a sampling of many types of moral dilemmas so that the claim of stage stability cannot be said to exist because of the task dilemmas used in the research.

Recently the stage concept has been discussed by Flavell, Wholwiel and Levine.[47] In general, stage acquisition is now considered not to be abrupt but gradual. Stages are not considered to be extinguished with development, but rather remain available for use. Levine points out that Kohlberg maintains that individuals become consistant in their reasoning because of a hiearchical preference to use their most advanced stage of reasoning. However, Kohlberg also argues that social experience influence the way stages of reasoning will be used. Thus it could be argued that some social experiences may encourage the use of a reasoning stage other than the most advanced stage the person is capable of using. Levine proposes that researchers adopt a nondisplacement perspective, as originally described by Werner. If we understand moral reasoning as an additive-inclusive sequence, then less complex modes of reasoning are not discarded but remain available for use. Transformation becomes a process of acquiring later stages "through the manipulation of one's knowledge of earlier stages rather than through the manipulation of these stages per se."

Moral Reasoning Development is Facilitated by Social Interaction

Piaget and Kohlberg believe that social interaction produces new experiences for indivuduals that often puts them in a state of cognitive disequalibrium, which in turn, leads them to change their cognitive structures. In particular, they believe that changes in moral reasoning is facilitated by interactions which require people to coordinate, reconcile and balance various points of view.

The research evidence supporting this claim is vast. There are research literatures documenting the influence of parenting styles on moral reasoning, the influence of peer interactions on moral reasoning, the effect of short-term interventions on moral reasoning and the effects of educational programs on moral reasoning. We only offer our conclusions about these bodies of research.

First, moral reasoning development appears to be facilitated by a parenting style Martin Hoffman calls "induction."[48] An interactive disciplinary style represents the attempt to make children understand why their transgressions are wrong, why then should follow rules and regulations, what the consequences of their behavior will be for others involved and how they might alter their behavior to satisfy themselves and others. Brody and Shaffer have recently reviewed the research on the relation between discipline style and moral reasoning development and have found generally positive relationships.[49] Moral reasoning development also appears to be positively related to democratic family discussion styles.[50]

Second, moral reasoning development appears to be facilitated by particular kinds of peer interaction.[51] Specifically, in moral reasoning are positively related to extensive participation in clubs and special activity groups, popularity among peers and service in leadership roles.

Third, moral reasoning development appears to be related to short-term intervention techniques.[52] Given that cognitive disequalibrium is the mechanism of change in moral reasoning, arguments which produce disequalibrium are more likely to facilitate moral reasoning development. The line of research began by Tariel is again relevant here, for it substantiates that moral arguments which are one stage more advanced than the sugjects' level of moral reasoning are most likely to facilitate changes in moral reasoning. Arguments that are two stages more advanced may also have positive effects on moral reasoning developments.

Fourth, moral reasoning development appears to be facilitated by educational programs.[53] Despite methodological shortcomings of many of these studies, changes in moral reasoning appear to be positively related to practice in solving moral dilemmas with one's peers, accompanied by the mutual probing of each other's solutions and negotiating with each other to determine a final solution.

To summarize, then, moral reasoning development appears to be facilitated by social interaction.

Moral Reasoning Development is Related to Moral Arguments

Finally, Kohlberg believes that our level of moral reasoning channelizes how we will comprehend moral dilemma and how we will consider possible action choices in a real moral situation. While there have been a number of studies conducted that relate moral reasoning to behavior there have not been very many studies relating moral reasoning developments to arguments produced in actual real-life contexts.[54] Of the studies that have been conducted, the most critical findings are these; people do not always reason at th same level as they do when responding to hypothetical dilemmas. More often, actual reasoning is at a lower level.

Damon, for example, finds that the level of moral reasoning chosen depends on the degree of self-interest in the situation.[55] In trying to be fair in a real situation, a person constructs knowledge and behavior according to the person's specific wants and

desires in the actual situation as well as according to the available concepts in the person's understanding of morality concepts such as justice, equality, fairness and cooperation). Moral knowledge combines the constructive efforts of the person with the particular social context the person is in. If a person has multiple wants or desires which are contradictory, such wants and desires may lead to a different understanding of the interactional context and hence lead to the production of different arguments.

Thus a person must coordinate knowledge of moral concepts with his specific wants in deciding on a course of action. However each may influence the other. That is, concepts such as justice, equality, fairness, rights and obligations are filters through which we interpret real life moral dilemmas and formulate our behavioral plans. Our behavioral objectives can also lead us to employ particular understandings of moral concepts that will then lead us to a different interpretation of the moral delimma. Haan believes that the coordination of multiple communicative objectives with available understandings of moral concepts in ongoing interactional situations is mastered only when a person has acquired dialogue skills.[56]

Conclusion

Despite it's problems we believe that Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning has helped to explain developmental and individual differences in reasoning about moral delemmas. Future conceptual and empirical analysis need to proceed in at least three directions. First, we need to follow Damon's and Rest's lead and learn precisely how moral concepts such as fairness, equality, cooperation, rights and obligations are developed.[57] Second, we need to pinpoint the relationships between developmental changes in these concepts and changes in cognitive operations and role-taking abilities. Finally, we need to learn the extent to which this generalized understanding is coordinated with our communicative objectives in actual interactional situations involving moral commitment and choice. Such works, we believe, would add to our understanding of moral argument.

TABLE 1: KOHLBERG'S STAGES OF MORAL REASONING

I. Preconventional Level

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interpretes these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation: The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of what instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms such as those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II. Conventional Level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons of groups involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is what pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention- "he (or she) means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of ghe groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and of standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of boligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal ethical principal orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, or the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of the respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.

From Kohlberg, 1971a, pp. 164-165.

Footnotes

[1] James R. Rest, "Morality," in *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology*, 4th ed., ed. Paul Mussen (New York, Wiley, 1982).

[2] For example, see Jean Piaget, *The Language and Thought of the Child*, trans. M. Gabrian. (London: Routledge & Kegan-Paul 1926); "Piaget's Theory," in *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology*, ed. Paul Mussen, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1970); and Heinz Werner, "The Conception of Development From a Comparative and Organismic Point of View," in *The Concept of Development*, ed. D. Harris (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minn. Press, 1957). For general discussions see John Flavell, *Cognitive Development*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977) and Lawrence Kohlberg, "State and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization," in *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, ed. D.A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969). For an overview of the cognitive-developmental approach to studying argument, see Brant Burleson, "Foundations for the Study of Argument: Assumtions and contributions of the Cognitive-Developmental Perspective," Paper presented at the SCA Annual Convention, 1982.

[3] This discussion of cognitive-developmental theory ignores important distinctions between Piaget's and Werner's ideas. Such distinctions will be elucidated as they become relevant.

[4] Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, trans. Marjorie Gabain. (New York, The Free Press, 1965).

[5] Martin Hoffman, "Moral Development," in *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology*, 4th ed., ed. Paul Mussen (New York: Wiley, 1982); Rest, 1982; R. Karniol, "Children's use of Intention Cues in Evaluating Behavior," *Psychological Bulletin*, 85 (1978), 76-85; C. Keasly, "Children's Developing Awareness and Useage of Intentionality and Motives," in *1977 Nebraska Symposium*, ed. C. Keasey (Lincoln, Neb.: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1977); Thomas Lickona, ed. *Moral Development and Behavior* (New York: Holt, 1975); and Royal Grueneric, "Issues in the Developmental Study of How Children Use Intention and Consequence Information to Make Moral Evaluations," *Child Development*, 53 (1982), 29-43.

[6] See Keasey's 1977 review.

[7] See the reviews listed above.

[8] See the reviews listed above.

[9] Ken Rotenberg, *Genetic Psychology Monographs*, 100 (1982), 359-69.

[10] See the criticisms of the reviewers cited in footnote #5.

[11] See the reviews cited in footnote #5.

[12] Colleen Surber, "Developmental Process in Social Inference: Averaging of Intention and Consequence in Moral Judgment," *Developmental Psychology*, 13 (1977), 654-65.

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THE ARGUER IN INTERPERSONAL ARGUMENT: PROS AND CONS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS

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Over the past five years, a new research area has emerged from the overlap between argumentation theory and interpersonal communication theory. Although it is a relatively narrow sub-specialty, theories developing within this area show a level of diversity equal to the diversity within communication theory generally. Interpersonal argument theorists disagree among themselves on all sorts of philosophical and methodological issues. I wish to discuss only one such issue, the issue of whether analysis of interpersonal argument is more profitably conducted at the individual level of analysis or at the social level of analysis.

All communication theorists must take sides on this issue, implicitly or explicitly, for all must somehow come to terms with both the individual and the social *in* communication. In analyzing meaning, for example, neither the radical position that meaning is entirely a matter of individual interpretation nor the radical position that meaning is entirely a matter of convention has been found satisfactory. The former fails to come to terms with the fact of understanding, the latter with the fact of misunderstanding. Likewise, the concept of rationality defies either radical individualist (subjectivist) or radical socialist (objectivist) analysis, the former failing to come to terms with the existence of public standards for proof and the latter failing to come to terms with the relativity of proof to the beliefs of speaker and hearer. Communication, by its nature, involves individuals trying to coordinate their individual beliefs and behaviors with others', so that it must involve both individual-level and social-level processes. Any adequate theory will speak to the relationship between the individual and the social, but as to the specific nature of this relationship, any number of plausible positions may be taken.

Within argumentation theory, we may cast this issue either in terms of our central interest (arguers versus abstract argumentative structures) or in terms of the substantive relationship assumed to hold between the individual and the social (individual processes as primary structures from which social structures derive versus individual processes as constrained by a self-organized social structure). Either way, the issue allows us to define two gross groupings of positions within interpersonal argument which, despite other differences, hold similar views on the relationship between the arguer and argument.

Gross grouping 1 is defined by an approach to argument as a social institution or rule system which is not reducible to properties of individual users of the system. This group includes most descriptive analyses of natural conversation (e.g., Benoit, 1981; Hewes, 1981; Jackson & Jacobs, 1980; Jacobs & Jackson, 1982; O'Keefe & Benoit, 1982; Trapp, 1982). These approaches try to lay out what might be thought of as social constraints on individual behavior. For example, Jacobs and Jackson (1981) see the goal of argumentation theory as a "technical description of the tacit knowledge which enables any natural language user to recognize and produce the patterns displayed by collected instances of argument." The system is self-organized, and individuals must operate within it in order to communicate.

Gross grouping 2 is characterized by an interest in the arguer. Structure and patterning at the social level are seen as derivative from the characteristics of individuals. In this group, I place most analyses based on individuality or individual differences, including analyses of cognitive structure (e.g., Hample, 1981), analyses of individual or subjective interpretation (e.g., Willard, 1978, 1983), analyses of individual variations in style or skill (e.g., Infante, 1978; Reinhard & Crawford, 1983; Sillars & Pike, 1983), and analyses of developmental changes in arguers and their arguments (e.g., Burleson, 1981, 1983; Elliott, 1981; Kline, 1983). Obviously, these individualist positions diverge on any number of theoretical and methodological issues, but the common theme in all is treatment of individual characteristics as primary and social patterning as a product of patterning at the individual level. Hample (1981), for example, views argument "as something that happens within a person, not within a message," so that arguing "refers only to the way beliefs are processed within an individual's cognitive system." Willard (1983) comments explicitly on the relationship between the individual and the social, arguing that the "social grounds of knowledge" are to be found only in individuals' ways of knowing. Reinard and Crawford (1983) describe face-to-face argument as being structured by arguers' stable individual preferences for four basic strategic modes. Whether analysis of individual differences focuses on cognitive processes (as with Hample or Willard) or on behavioral characteristics (as with Reinard & Crawford), structure at the social or interactional level is seen as a product of co-operating individual systems.

The difference between these two groups of analyses is not so much *what* each chooses to study as *how* each looks at the phenomena chosen for study. Confronted with "the same" set of phenomena to explain, the individual-level analyst and the social-level analyst choose quite different points of entry. Consider a concept like the universal audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). Something like the concept of the universal audience is likely to figure in either an individual-level or a social-level analysis of argument, representing the public accountability of reasons one person offers for another to do or believe something. However, individual-level and social-level interpretations of the universal audience are likely to differ sharply, especially in the sort of *content* they attribute to the universal audience. An individualist position might take the universal audience to be a body of substantive belief shared by all persons, so that the perspective of the universal audience consists of the overlap in many individual belief systems. A socialist position, by contrast, would analyze the universal audience as a set of principles or structures which are shared, not in the sense that each individual arrives separately at some core of commonly held beliefs, but in the sense that individuals agree to operate within a set of constraints that, individually, would have no function. Within my own discourse analytic perspective (Jacobs & Jackson, 1982), the universal audience is considered to be a set of discourse rules which provide individuals arguers the resources necessary to raise, and possibly resolve, disagreements, so that its content would contain knowledge about when and how to challenge others' utterances, but not substantive beliefs about the subject matter discussed. Where the individualist might note that there will never be complete overlap in belief systems among individuals, the socialist would focus instead on the fact that language provides the means by which an argument can be extended indefinitely, limited only by communicators' assessments of how much effort coming to agreement is worth.

One may reasonably choose to study communication either from a primarily social-level perspective or from a primarily individual-level perspective, so long as both individuality and sociality are somehow acknowledged. The choice one makes between primary emphasis on the individual and primary emphasis on the social obviously involves some gains in explanatory power and some losses. In responding to papers on individuality in argument and reasoning, I will confine my remarks to the costs and benefits of individual-level analysis.

The primary advantage I see in an individual-level analysis of argument is that it offers the best immediate prospects for practical application. At the present stage of theoretical development, individual-level approaches offer more promise than social-level approaches for producing *better* arguers. Social-level analyses of argument do not lend themselves well to pedagogical innovation or other practical application, since they often aim only to provide description of what communicators already tacitly know. Individual-level approaches take for granted basic shared structures and try to identify variations among individuals in style or skill. To the extent that these variations are related to the *quality* of argument, they offer obvious avenues for *helping* identifiable classes of people (poor arguers).

Individual-level approaches are uniquely able to generate and use concepts like style and skill. These concepts imply individuality. Argument style is clearly not a system-level construct. Different argument styles are not like different languages or even like different dialects within a language. Style describes variations not in the set of possible messages available to an arguer, but to preferences within a common set of possibilities. This is particularly clear in Reinard and Crawford's analysis: they assume that all arguers share a common set of four basic strategies, but that individuals differ in preferences among these strategies. The practical significance of the style concept is also clear: as Reinard and Crawford argue, knowledge of a person's stylistic preferences can provide valuable insights into the problem of adapting a message to a listener.

The notion of argument skill is also inherently an individual-level concept. Only if there is individual variation in the quality of argumentation does it make sense to speak of the skillfulness of the arguer. A social-level explanation aims to describe a structure or system shared by all language users. Such approaches are indifferent to variations in the skill with which individuals *use* the socially-constituted system.

The analyses presented by Sillars and Pike, by Kline, and by Burleson all identify individual differences that might be considered skill variations. To the extent that these differences can be shown to relate to communication outcomes or other indices of effectiveness, there is obvious applied potential in studies of this sort. Depending on how the skill is conceptualized, one may either train skills directly (e.g., advise parents to cast arguments with their children in terms of reasons rather than threats) or encourage development of skills indirectly through changes in underlying cognitive skills. Although we do not yet have conclusive evidence that individual differences identified so far are true *skill* variables (Sillars & Pike's results specifically negate the idea that ability to reciprocate positive affect is a skill), any link found between these differences and communication outcomes will be a valuable source of advice to arguers.

Clearly, an individual-level analysis of argument is a worthwhile area for research. However, the adoption of an individual-level approach has costs associated with it, some of which may affect the prospects for successful application of argumentation research findings. The most central problem with approaches focussed on the arguer is the danger that the individual difference variables selected for study may relate partially, tangentially, or not at all to whatever it is that makes argument an interesting communicative phenomenon. The important role of the individual in argument or other communication should not lead us to assume that all characteristics of individuals affect the arguments they produce, nor that all characteristics of individuals will be worthy of study. Beginning with a social-level approach has the advantage of suggesting what sorts of individual characteristics should be related to skill in arguing. An approach based on rules for producing speech acts, for example, would delineate the classes of knowledge a speaker must have in order to make appropriate requests.

If we begin with a theory of the characteristics of interpersonal *arguments*, rather than with a theory of the characteristics of *arguers*, we have better assurance that the individual difference variables we identify will be relevant to argument. Assume, as most social-level analysts now do, that arguments in everyday interaction have defining features or generic characteristics. There is general agreement that argument is about disagreement-regulation (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980; O'Keefe & Benoit, 1982; Trapp, 1982); a variety of additional suggestions have failed to achieve widespread agreement. No analysis that I am familiar with suggests that reciprocity is a necessary or likely feature of argument. Sillars and Pike observed no clear relationship between reciprocity and relational satisfaction and inferred from this that skill in arguing is not as important as might be thought. Certainly this is possible--and the point that communication should not take all the blame or credit for relational outcomes is well-taken. But it is also possible that skill *is* important, and that reciprocity simply isn't the place to look for skill.

Even individual difference variables whose relevance to argumentation seems sure (e.g., moral reasoning) may have nothing to do with arguments as they are produced in interaction. A person's level of moral reasoning refers to the kind of justifications the individual gives for deciding right and wrong, not to the kinds of reasons an individual gives to gain compliance. These *are* distinct. One thing we know about conversational argument is that the content of the argument is as much the responsibility of the addressee as it is the responsibility of the speaker. Typically in conversation, argument comes about through an addressee's challenge to a speaker's utterance--for example, through a challenge or objection to a request or an assertion. And one thing we know about moral reasoning is that individuals are not very good at dealing with arguments cast at levels above their own. A Level 5 reasoner arguing with a Level 1 reasoner is not necessarily going to produce arguments based on principle. In fact, if the argument comes about through a challenge like "What's in it for me?", the Level 5 arguer may produce arguments which are no better than the arguments of a Level 1 arguer. Interactionally, there may be no difference between arguers at different levels of reasoning, since the arguments actually produced may reflect the speaker's level, the addressee's level, or the speaker's assumptions about the addressee's level. The relevance of moral reasoning *is* open to doubt and must be established through demonstration of individual variation in argument content.

Defining individual differences in terms suggested by the features of the social *system* may offer the best prospects for development of theory and improvement of practice. Elliott (1981) argues that a meaningful analysis of individual development depends upon some prior conception of the system toward which the individual is developing. Seibold et al. (1981) code argument content in terms of structural or conventional features, and use these features to distinguish successful and unsuccessful arguments. Finally, Millar (1983) uses a speech acts based coding of argument content to derive a stylistic characterization of arguers. Although consistent theoretical positions on argument must commit themselves to some one position on the relationship between the individual and the social, we must be careful never to suppose that the relationship is truly one of indifference.

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ARGUMENTATIVENESS: ITS ROLE IN LEADERSHIP PERCEPTION AND GROUP COMMUNICATON

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Leadership research in the small group over the past 50 years has encompassed a number of approaches--traits and personal characteristics, style, situational or contingency models, and group needs and functions. Despite a voluminous literature, most critics charge that we do not have a unified theory to explain the emergence of leadership, nor a model that will allow us either to predict or to train potential leaders [Stogdill, 1974; Hare, 1976].

There has been both dissatisfaction with the various theoretical approaches and criticism of how the data on leadership in the small group have been gathered. Among the major charges are inadequate conclusions drawn from ad hoc, short-term groups, from groups engaged in tasks not requiring communicative interaction, and from groups without a commitment to solution. There has also been criticism of the reliance on data not involving communicative processes within the group, nor on what happens to groups over time, nor how group members affect and influence both process and outcome [Gouran, 1973; Fisher, 1971]. Indeed, the almost exclusive emphasis on outcome has obscured what processes leaders use to establish and maintain their credibility. Moreover, the failure to recognize to what extent leadership is dependent on the perceptions of followers has led to the development of long lists of prescriptives that do not readily translate to how leaders actually "lead" the small group involved in problem-solving or decision-making.

Confronted by the litany of problems detailed in critical reviews of leadership research and, motivated by my own observations of the types of activities that increase the effectiveness of problem-solving groups, I designed an experimental study that would meet the objections of the critics as well as allow the evaluation of those acts that distinguish leaders from non-leaders. This paper will present the results of this first study and the findings of three additional studies generated by the first study, leading to an unexpected conclusion: that of the many variables that leaders display, the trait of argumentativeness, that is, the willingness to argue forcefully and persistently for a proposed solution or an alternative view, is an essential attribute of leadership perception. The implications of the role of argumentativeness, its impact both on leadership perception and the decision-making process, are the focus of this discussion.

Study I [Schultz, 1974]

This study involved nine groups (n=64) of six to eight members formed around problems of interest. Each group met for five sessions of approximately 45 minutes, discussing a self-selected political and social problem. Each was asked to discuss their solution in a public presentation. After each session, group members rated each other, self included, on a 7-point semantic differential scale composed of items abstracted from the literature on leadership, presenting both personal qualities and functions contributing to the group. Each group member was also asked to indicate if any person(s) had emerged as a leader. The term "leader" was not defined, however.

In design, this study met many of the critics' expressed objections. It comprised groups meeting over time, with a task to complete, some significance attached to the outcome, communicative interaction over repeated sessions, and opportunities for evaluating communicative processes from session to session. The hypotheses tested were based on the following assumptions: that any leader has some distinctive qualities, that these qualities will be consistent among leaders, regardless of group composition or nature of problem, although certain characteristics will be more valued according to what phase the group is in in its deliberations. Thus, this study asked, (1) Is there a specific set of characteristics attributed to leaders? (2) Are these characteristics consistent across leaders? (3) Are these characteristics differentially valued?

The evaluation of leader characteristics was accomplished by a Multivariate Q factor analysis (Quanal program), enabling the clustering of subjects, rather than variables, for later communal labeling. The Quanal program contains a phase wherein it rank orders the loadings of variables positively and negatively on each factor. Comparing the groups' ratings and nominations of leaders with factor analyses (45 factor analyses, one for each group for each session) showed that leaders clustered in factor types differently from non-leaders.

The highest loadings were on the variables gives directions, formulates goals, and self-assured. The ability to summarize and to be assertive was also highly rated. With somewhat less potency than the positive loadings, leaders were also distinguished from non-leaders as being more quarrelsome and less sensible, although these results were somewhat discounted at this time. They did not seem to fit my presumption that leaders are valued for their positive attributes.

The study hypotheses were confirmed. Leadership is associated with a limited set of characteristics. These characteristics are consistent across leaders, but vary in prominence according to phase of deliberation. Giving directions, for example, was more prominent in the early sessions; quarrelsomeness appeared more frequently in the middle sessions, while goal orientation was more frequent in the closing sessions.

One implication of this study is an alternative explanation of leadership emergence. In contrast with situational and contingency models which spell out an "It depends" relationship, this study showed that whether group members were satisfied or interacted well, leaders were still chosen on the basis of some few communicative functions. Rather than suggesting additional personality characteristics, this study suggests that leaders are identified because of their communicative skills. Although we do not know what types of statements emergent leaders made that brought forth the particular judgments of group members, we do know that individuals who were rated most positively in giving directions, formulating goals, and self-assuredness, but more negatively in quarrelsomeness or sensibleness, were consistently the leader choices of their respective groups.

This study indicates that although some few positive functions are associated with leadership, some of the functions, typically perceived in our culture as negative attributes, were also embodied in leadership perception. Only in subsequent research did I begin to pay attention to this datum. That I chose to ignore the evidence of my study shows to what extent I had bought into the view of leadership as meaning exceptional but positive attributes.

Study 2 [Schultz, 1978]

With the identification of some few communicative functions as associated with leadership perception, the next question became, are those functions of sufficient potency to allow one to predict emergent leaders. A second study, therefore, was designed to test the hypothesis that emergent leaders could be predicted on the basis of a small number of communicative functions. Using conditions similar to the first study, this study included nine discussion groups (n=70), ranging in size from six to nine members, meeting for five sessions, discussing a self-selected problem, and asked to present their solution to the class. Members were asked to rate each other, self included, after each session, but in a departure from the first study, members were not asked to name a leader until the close of the fifth and final session.

Rating sheets of the first session were used to compute mean scores on each participant in each group on two of the variables found potent in the previous study: formulates goals and summarizes, as a first pass. The variable gives directions was used when the first two variables were not sufficiently discriminatory to allow prediction. My interest in using just these few variables was that they were most closely associated with communicative functions and they would allow one to test an economical model. Thus, on the basis of either two or three variables, I predicted a single potential leader would emerge in three of the groups and two potential leaders for the remaining six groups, making a total of 15 potential leaders.

Since this study focused on predicting emergent leaders, one can ask then, how good were the predictions? Where mean scores on two or three variables clearly indicated that only one leader would emerge, that person was the undisputed choice of members in two of the three groups and a co-leader in a third group. In the six groups where mean scores indicated that either or both individuals could emerge as leaders, these predicted leaders were named with greater frequency than non-predicted leaders. Only in one group did I fail to predict any of the leader choices of the group.

With predicted leaders emerging as group nominated leaders in eight of the nine groups, it seems reasonable to conclude that communicative functions at an initial session are of sufficient power for use in predicting potential leaders. While members of a group may not or cannot say who is the emergent leader, they do make distinctions in their ratings of communicative functions, and in evaluating these ratings, an investigator can predict with some degree of certainty, who is likely to emerge as leader in the group. This study was exploratory, however. It was limited to nine groups and used only two or three variables for prediction. There was clearly a need to experiment with these conditions, either by using more groups, or varied groups, or additional variables, or ratings from more than one session, to improve the forecasting of emergent leaders.

Study 3 [Schultz, 1980]

Some of these suggestions were undertaken in a third study. I had a unique opportunity to test the predictive strength of communicative functions with natural groups meeting over an extended period of time. The subjects (n=75) were members of an introductory class in theatre in which the instructor utilized a group format for training. On the first day of classes, their instructor randomly divided the class into ten groups of seven to ten members; they were initially leaderless and would remain in their groups for a 14 week semester.

After the groups were formed and had met for about 15 minutes, group members were asked to rate each other on the 19 variables used in the first study. Mean scores on three variables--gives directions, formulates goals, and summarizes--were computed in a first pass to discriminate leaders from non-leaders. When greater discrimination was needed, the variable self-assured was used. If these four positive variables still did not allow prediction of one or two potential leaders, then the variables quarrelsome and sensible, on which leaders were perceived more negatively than non-leaders, were computed.

In all, one or two potential leaders were predicted for eight groups and only one potential leader for a ninth group. My predictions were not shared with the course instructor until the end of the semester. Nor did I interact with group members until the last session of class. During the last class session, members were again asked to rate each other on the 19 variable questionnaire. In addition, they were asked to respond to four questions: "Who was the leader?" "Who had the best ideas?" "Who was the best liked?" "How satisfied were you with the group experience?"

The pre-and post ratings allowed for checking the consistency with which members evaluated one another. The questions were used to assess the extent to which their choices for each category corresponded with their ratings of the 19 variables. The questions were also used to appraise whether task functions were differentiated from socio-emotional roles, and what influence, if any, these differences had on leader choice.

In all, 17 potential leaders were predicted for the nine groups. Where one or two leaders were predicted, one of them was nominated by the group as leader. In the group where only one leader was predicted, that one individual did emerge as leader. Only in one group did neither of the predicted leaders emerge. Thus, in eight of the nine groups, I was able to accurately predict an emergent leader. Of interest also is how the other predicted potential leaders, who did not become the groups' overall choice, were perceived by their groups. This examination led to the finding, evident in the first study, but discounted at that time, that variables negatively perceived also have an impact on leadership choice.

The experimenter-predicted leaders not chosen by their groups as leaders were, nevertheless, highly rated. If they were rated highest in quarrelsomeness, but not as highly as the group's choice on the positive variables, then that potential leader was not named by the group as the overall leader. An individual who received the groups highest ratings on the positive variables, and very high ratings on quarrelsomeness, or even the highest ratings, was the person most likely to be named as overall leader. Another factor also seemed to be operating. If the experimenter-predicted leader was rated very highly on the variable sensible, then that individual was rejected from leadership choice. In sum, the data showed that no one who received very high ratings in sensible was nominated by the group as leader. While one could not be ranked highest in quarrelsome without also receiving highest ratings on the positive variables to be nominated as leader, no one could be nominated as leader who was not ranked as more quarrelsome than other members of the group.

While this study confirmed the potency of communicative functions as measures for predicting emergent leaders, it also highlighted an earlier finding. Unlike personality variables that are elusive and somewhat difficulty to measure, communicative functions appear to offer more stable measures of members' perceptions, allowing one to predict emergent leadership. Group members' ratings were consistent from the beginning of the semester to the end. Another finding that was emphasized was that characteristics typically perceived as negative may be essential for leadership perception. Although there is some evidence that negative traits tend to eliminate group members from leadership contention [Geier, 1967], in this study negative traits seemed to have some value in leadership perception. Leaders were chosen from among those who were highly rated in giving directions and formulating goals, but they were also rated as more quarrelsome and, whatever it may mean, less sensible. That leaders should, in addition to displaying positive attributes, also embody negative attributes, is a finding worth additional examination.

Study 4 [Schultz, 1982]

This study was designed to confront an important issue raised in the previous study--how quarrelsome may one be and still maintain leadership in the group. To answer this question required an inferential leap. Since leaders were regarded more positively overall than non-leaders, but lower than non-leaders on quarrelsome and sensible, I assumed that quarrelsome meant being argumentative--from a positive perspective--someone willing to present viewpoints or alternatives for the group to consider. Perhaps that is also the meaning of the rating, not sensible. A "not sensible" individual may be one who presents non-conventional views--off-the-wall--ergo, not sensible, but valued. The present study did not investigate the variable sensible; rather, the focus was on the relationship between perception of argumentativeness and perception of leadership. This study also evaluated how argumentativeness in the leader affects the decision-making process of the group. The study asked whether a leader who is argumentative succeeds in extending the range of alternatives a group will consider, and thus will this process affect the group's decision-making process and the quality of the decision itself.

Eighty subjects were randomly assigned to groups of four to six persons, with a balanced ratio of men to women. Groups met twice, in one hour sessions each, with a month's interval between sessions. In the first group session participants were asked to discuss possible solutions to a problem that pre-tests with other groups had shown to be both provocative and emotional. Solutions typically offered were based on a middle course between extreme solutions. The problem, a case study examining whether parents had the right to let a deformed baby die without state interference, usually brought solutions of "help the parents to understand what they must do," or "put the child out for adoption." Rarely did any group opt for "letting the baby die," or "forcing the parents to take care of the baby." These solutions became the extreme solutions used for training argumentative leaders.

After the first discussion session, group members were told to think over the problem and any other possible solutions they might want to bring back to the group. The second session, one month later, would be for coming to decision as a group. Between the first and second discussion sessions, I held training sessions for those individuals who, on the basis of ratings on communicative functions, I predicted would be the leaders in their groups. Two separate training sessions of about one hour each were held to explain each extreme solution. Potential leaders, randomly assigned to a position, were given a brief outline of possible arguments to use in support of that position. They were asked to argue forcefully for their position, inserting it into the discussion at least three times. The purpose of the experiment, they were told, was to evaluate the effect of a minority view on the decision-making processes of a group.

This study was designed to allow the measurement of degree of argumentativeness. Since the prior studies had shown that to be perceived as a leader meant having some type of quarrelsomeness, potential leaders were trained to be argumentative in the extreme to ensure that varying degrees of argumentativeness would be represented. In both the first and second discussion sessions, participants rated each other and self on the 19 variables used in prior studies. In addition, they responded to a Leadership Questionnaire developed by Morris and Hackman [1969] and adapted for use in this experiment. Questions dealing with degree of argumentativeness and influence on the group's decision were added to the 15 item Morris and Hackman questionnaire, the major focus of which is "Who is the real leader of the group?"

The results of the study showed that the training of argumentative leaders produced the desired effect. Trained leaders were seen as significantly more quarrelsome and argumentative than untrained leaders. More importantly, the parameters of argumentativenss were displayed: to be Highly Argumentative (4 on a scale of 1-5) meant highest ratings on the Leadership scale; it also meant being perceived as most influential on the group's decision. Leaders were not chosen from those participants labeled as "mildly" or "moderately" argumentative. In influencing the choices a group will consider before coming to decision, individuals classified as "highly argumentative" were the most influential, but even "extremely argumentative" individuals exerted an enormous amount of influence on the group's decision. Although these individuals were downgraded in ratings after the second discussion session, extremely argumentative individuals affected the decisions made by their groups--whichever position they advocated, that position became the group position, although their groups did not acknowledge that such influence had occurred.

Although some of the groups presumably had a choice in leaders, yet those who were trained to be argumentative, whether perceived as extremely or highly argumentative, were the nominated leaders in their groups. For whatever reasons, groups did not turn to the other potentially able leaders, who to have been predicted as a potential leader, had to have displayed some degree of quarrelsomeness. This finding again illustrates the importance of the role of argumentativeness in the perception of leadership.

In sum, this study assessed the impact of argumentativeness on the perception of leadership and its role in influencing a group's decision. What has been learned is that ratings of highly argumentative are associated with highest ratings on Leadership. Ratings of extremely argumentative, on the other hand, corresponded with lowered ratings on Leadership, but still higher than those accorded ratings of mildly or moderately argumentative. Ratings of highly argumentative correspond with being most influential on a group's decision, while extremely argumentative brought ratings of least influential, although in actual influence, that was not the case. When examining the number of solutions proposed after the first and after the second discussion sessions, one learns that the range of alternatives considered by each group after intervention by trained leaders expanded markedly, and for each group, the solution advocated by the trained leader, became the group solution. Degree of argumentativeness apparently will influence perception of leadership, with the more argumentative individual chosen over the less argumentative individual, assuming that each shows a sufficient number of positive attributes leading to consideration as a leader. Degree of argumentativeness also influences the group decision, extending the range of choices a group will entertain, and thus affecting the choice of solution.

The results of all of these studies point to the importance of communicative functions in leadership perception. A group will choose individuals who can provide these functions because a group's task requires that these skills be provided. Not only does a potential leader demonstrate positive attributes in assisting a group's outcome but, contrary to conventional wisdom, aids their framing of issues by being argumentative, a characteristic usually evaluated negatively.

Summary and Conclusions

These data suggest a number of implications. Many studies on leadership have pointed to the role of participation in leadership perception, although the amount of participation, while not specified, is stated in relative terms. That is, those who were perceived as leaders talked more than other participants. Some qualifications have been placed on the concept of participation, however. Studies of Hollander [1971], Stogdill [1974], and Burke [1968] suggest that participation must be consonate with competence in guiding a group toward its goals. Geier's [1967] work indicating that overtalking may lead to being rejected from leadership contention, and the data from Morris and Hackman [1969] showing that some leaders are chosen who are not the most participative lend credibility to a view that participation by itself is not a sufficient criterion for perception of leadership.

The Schultz data offer a way to interpret the concept of participation. It is not only talk that is valued, but talk that encompasses argument. Perhaps argumentativeness is valued because it increases interaction in the group. In so doing it promotes a healthier group in that there are more opportunities for exchange of ideas, more possibilities for relationship and therefore more satisfaction. Argumentativeness also provides direction in moving the group to complete its task. Since groups tend to be uncomfortable without direction, argumentativeness provides some sense of the possibilities that the group could choose to exercise. Perhaps the most meaningful contribution to group effectiveness that argumentativeness provides is the introduction of conflict over issues that has the effect of enlarging the group's repertoire, improving the quality of their communication, and influencing the choice of an unorthodox, possibly of higher quality, solution.

While it seems reasonable to suggest that argumentativeness in the leader aids the group, we also have data that states disagreement can be destructive to a group's morale [Gouran and Baird, 1972]. A contrast is usually drawn so that argument directed at issues and not personalities is more likely to produce unexpected benefits for the group. The group will examine more options and, in their consideration of a diversity of views, will become more effective problem solvers. However, if argumentativeness leads to disagreement that disintegrates into personal attacks, or treads upon individual egos, then there may be harmful affects [Torrence, 1957; Ziller, 1955]. While we know that the highly argumentative person is valued in the group, and the extremely argumentative person tends to be devalued, it is difficult to ascertain how the highly argumentative person keeps the discussion focused on the issues, but does not allow the conflict to become destructive or threatening to group members. The training of argumentative leaders stressed the rational side of argument--a best case presentation--but we also know how intertwined are the logical and emotional components of an argument. Whatever the mix of factors, it is important that we continue to investigate how argumentativeness functions in group decision-making.

Rossiter and Pearce [1975] maintain that people develop sets of rules, or "implicit contracts" to regulate their communicative behavior. We need to understand what constitutes the set of rules about argumentative behavior. What is accepted and acceptable? What is not acceptable and should not be used. When does argument become advocacy that is resisted? And under what conditions does argument help a group become more effective. We need to have a better sense of which statements enhance a group's activity and which statements cause deterioration.

The data suggest that a potential leader trained to argue for a non-orthodox or minority view, but also protective of prevailing views, can maintain a considerable position of influence [Wahrman and Pugh, 1972]. Argumentativeness may be the essential skill in this process, given that change is so often perceived as discomforting, haphazard or irrational. One question these studies raise is whether any person in the group trained to be argumentative can favorably influence the group's deliberations or, is it the case, that argumentativeness can be accepted only from those perceived as leaders of the group. (I have run this study, but with computer crash, have not analyzed the results) If, as I believe, that the skill of argumentativeness may indeed enhance one's status as well as contributing to the effectiveness of the group's decision process, then training in argumentativeness may be important for all group members. Perhaps argumentativeness works because a requirement of the group is people who can help them come to decision. An individual's willingness to be perceived as somewhat irrational in the push for high quality decisions, albeit with some risk of loss in being perceived as leader, can markedly assist a group's decision involving more radical and potentially superior alternatives.

These findings may be applicable in natural settings. Although we have an extensive literature on the sex variable and perception of leadership, the results do not show that whether one is male or female, explains sufficiently the variance in perception of leadership. The question becomes, do men and women exhibit different leadership behaviors. In my study on argumentativeness, women as well as men, were trained to be argumentative, and all trainees were perceived as leaders. On the other hand, women, in our society, who wish to be perceived as leaders are often put into a "double bind." They are socialized to be pleasant, to smile, and to be accommodating; yet, if they are to be selected as leaders and to be influential, they will need to articulate more forcefully, to be more argumentative, in their presentation of issues. If they follow the latter course, however, they may be perceived as violating societal expectations.

One implication is that women, to survive in the upper levels of the organization and to be perceived as leaders, will have to remove the constraints of pleasing others. As other studies have shown, and this discussion emphasizes, it may not be possible to be both liked and respected as a leader. Indeed, what is more probably is that argumentative people will be more likely to be perceived as leaders and will be more influential than non-argumentative people. Studies examining leadership behavior in real world settings would be most useful. Then we would be able to assess to what extent women will be permitted to be argumentative and chosen on that basis to be a leader.

Leaders who are argumentative may strongly influence the outcomes of volatile social and political issues. For example, as the battle for the Equal Rights Amendment continues, the leaders of the movement may want to consider using a more highly argumentative approach. As Phyllis Scheffly demonstrated, a vigorous, persistent, strident, albeit inaccurate, presentation, overwhelmed the more moderate rhetorical arguments of ERA proponents. The implications for argumentativeness in leaders should be examined with such other controversial issues as abortion, prayer in school, and the nuclear freeze movement.

Perhaps the greatest contribution that argumentativeness makes is providing a way to frame issues and to influence direction. Although there may be some risk to the individual who is argumentative or to the group which may turn away from issues to personal attacks, nevertheless, the aid in processing better solutions could be sufficient offsetting compensation.

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COMPLEXITY: THE FUNCTION OF LEADERSHIP

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In 1980 Cragan and Wright synthesized and critiqued the small group communication research.[1] They identified the need for a communication theory of group behavior as one major concern and identified the Fisher and Hawes process model as one promising approach to developing this theory. The purpose of the present study is to employ the Fisher and Hawes model to explore emergent leadership communication in the small, decision-making group, and, hopefully, to contribute in some way to the development of this theory.

Fisher and Hawes propose the Interact System Model (ISM) as a framework to explore the interdependence of group behavior.[2] The Interact System Model conceptualizes the group as a self organizing social system. The components of this system are communicative behaviors. The essence of the system, and therefore the focus of analysis, is the interdependence of the components. This interdependence is reflected in the formal consistency of recurring patterns of communicative behaviors.

The preponderance of extant emergent leadership literature employs independent communicative behaviors or perceptions of independent communicative behaviors as the focus of analysis. This research has identified a list of specific behaviors performed in small groups which distinguish emergent leaders from nonleaders.[3] Although some of this research implies the interdependence of leader-follower behaviors, none of this research has directly explored the nature of this interdependence.

Two studies are unique in their focus on the interdependence of emergent leader-follower communication. Both of these studies employed the ISM to explore emergent leadership communication in decision-making groups. Ellis found emergent leaders tend to interact differently with group members, but nonleaders tend to interact similarly with other nonleaders.[4] This study, however, examined the interaction of only 2 groups and analyzed only the relationship-control dimension of communication.[5]

Drecksel examined the interaction of 15 groups and analyzed both the content and relationship dimension of communication.[6] This study also found the interaction of leaders with group members tends to be different from the interaction of nonleaders with other nonleaders. Further, the patterns which characterize this emergent leader interaction change across group history.

The present report includes part of this larger study. Although the larger study explored 4 content functions and 1 relationship function of communication, the present report analyzes only 1 of the 4 sets of content functions explored in the larger study. The research question of the present study is: do the evolution of information interaction characteristics of emergent leaders differ from the evolution of information interaction charateristics of nonleaders?

Method

The interaction of 15 emergent leadership groups were included in the data of the present study. Group members were students enrolled in the basic decision-making course at a large western university. Group size ranged from 5 to 7 members.[7] The interaction of these groups was an integral part of the decision-making course.

Emergent leadership was operationally defined as leadership status which is earned through behavior in a particular group and based on authority which is willingly accorded by followers.[8] Several conditions were required to meet the assumptions of this definition (i.e., to minimize the impact of extra group status and authority). The groups of the study were initially leaderless, zero history groups; members' assignment to groups was random, and external task instructions were minimal.

The emergent leader was that group member identified as leader at the final group meeting by all (or all but one) of the group members. Each member rated every other member of his/her particular group using a diary form which included a continuum of status hierarchy ranging from leader to nonleader. These paper-and-pencil ratings were recorded at the conclusion of each group meeting.

The group decision-making task was operationally defined as a task involving problems for which no external verification of the solution is possible. That is, solutions to the group problem could be discovered only through group acceptance. Thus, the only check on the validity of the solution was whether it achieved group consensus.[9] The groups of the study were required to reach a consensus decision on two tasks: a solution to a social problem of their choice and a group analysis task.

Group contact time must be adequate to facilitate natural emergence of leadership.[10] Therefore, each group was scheduled to meet for one hour, twice weekly, during one academic quarter.

To provide a semipermanent record for analysis, the interaction of each group was recorded on audiotape. Each group was assigned to a private discussion room equipped with an overhead microphone connected to a tape recorder in a central control room.

Group members were aware of the tape-recording procedures and were informed that the taped records were available to them as a resource for their group analysis task. The researcher was not among the course instructors.

The interaction from the audiotapes was coded into the categories of an interaction analysis system which reflects the evolution of information.[11] This interaction analysis system conceptualizes the group as an information processing system which evolves through a process of selective adaptation. Information serves as the metabolism of the system and the direction of system development emerges from the interaction patterns of informational states. The categories of this system are as follows:

1. Enactment
2. Positive Selection
3. Negative Selection
4. Retention

Reliability for this interaction analysis system was tested using Guetzkow's formula.[12] Reliability among 3 pairs of raters ranges from .7684 to .7459. The author coded all interaction of the study. The interaction was coded from the tape recordings. The unit of coding was one uninterrupted utterance.

The coded data were submitted to Markov analysis designed specifically for interaction data.[13] This program has the capability to analyze separately the interaction patterns of every possible dyad in a particular group (i.e., possible dyads include each group member as both antecedent and as subsequent speaker) and compare each dyad's interaction to the overall interaction patterns of the group. Dyadic interaction patterns are displayed in matrix form.

The investigation sought to answer the question of differences in interaction of specific group members, including leaders and followers. Therefore, the interaction patterns of each possible dyadic matrix within a particular group were compared to the interaction patterns of the composite matrix of interaction patterns of all members of the relevant group. A Homogeneity test determined which dyadic pairs generated communication significantly atypical of the communication in the group as a whole.[14] The null hypothesis of this test states that the communication of the dyad is homogeneous with (i.e., selected from the same population as) the group's overall communication patterns. A statistically significant homogeneity test result rejects the null hypothesis and indicates the dyadic interaction represented in the significant matrix is different from the group interaction taken as a whole (p .05, cv=21.0261, 12 df). Discovering the characteristic distribution of the interaction data within a significant matrix results from examining the cells of the matrix which deviate from expectation of zero order frequencies. Gottman and Bakeman devised a z-test for this purpose.[15]

Results

A total of 50,131 statements were coded into the categories of the evolution of information system and submitted to Markov analysis. The computer analysis generated and examined 300 4x4 dyadic interaction matrices. Of these matrices, 107 met the criterion of significance. These significant matrices reflect idiosyncratic interaction or dyadic interaction which is significantly different from the overall interaction of the relevant group. Table 1 summarizes the significant dyadic matrices.

The computer-analyzed data were organized into 2 sets for further analysis. One set comprised the idiosyncratic interaction which characterized leader-follower dyads across all groups, and the other set comprised the idiosyncratic interaction which characterized nonleader-nonleader dyads across all groups. The two sets were then compared. Leader-follower dyads accounted for 54 of the 107 significant interaction matrices and nonleader-nonleader dyads accounted for 53 of these matrices (see Table 1).

Each matrix comprised 16 cells. Discovering the specific nature of the idiosyncratic interaction which characterized each matrix required testing 1712 cells for significance with Gottman and Bakeman's z-test. The tests identified 2 general characterizations of idiosyncratic interaction. One set of significant matrices was characterized by random interaction patterns. That is, the dyadic interaction identified in these matrices was idiosyncratic in the sense that it did not differ significantly from zero-order expectation. One plausible explanation of this result is that the overall group interaction was characterized by a specific structure, but the interaction identified in the specific dyadic matrix was not. A total of 56 idiosyncratic interaction matrices were characterized by random interaction. Leader-follower dyads accounted for 22 of these matrices and nonleader-nonleader dyads accounted for 34 of these matrices (see Table 1).

The remaining 51 dyadic matrices were characterized by structured idiosyncratic interaction. In other words, these matrices displayed connectedness or sequentiality of informational states. Further, the particular interaction patterns identified in the matrix were idiosyncratic or different from the overall group interaction patterns. Leader-follower interaction accounted for 30 of these matrices and nonleader-nonleader interaction accounted for 21 of the matrices (see Table 1).

The results of the z-scores identified a further distinction within the structured idiosyncratic interaction. Two forms of significant interacts were revealed. A statistically significant positive z-score identified an interaction pattern which was greater than expected from the distribution of independent (i.e., zero-order) acts. That is, a positive z-score indicated the characteristic interaction of a particular dyad which did not reflect the overall group interaction patterns. On the other hand, a statistically significant negative z-score identified the absence of an interaction pattern which would have been expected from the distribution of independent acts. That is, a negative z-score indicated the avoidance of an interact which would have been expected to occur in the dyad whose interaction differed significantly from the group interaction.

Table 2 summarizes the paired informational states identified by the z-scores.[16] Four forms of interacts (i.e., paired informational states) accounted for 91 of the 108 structured interaction cells. One of the identified idiosyncratic interacts (+ 1-1) indicates the presence of brainstorming (i.e., concatenous pairs of utterances which introduce new information without critical analysis of that information). This form of idiosyncratic interaction characterized 33 dyads. Of these dyads 20 were leader-follower dyads and 13 were nonleader-nonleader dyads.

A second interact (- 1-2) indicates the avoidance of paired utterances which cycle from information introduction to positive selection of that information. This interact describes the introduction of information followed by an utterance providing supportive evidence which favors the selection of that information. The avoidance of this typical form of interaction characterized 24 dyads. Of these dyads 14 were leader-follower dyads and 10 were nonleader-nonleader dyads.

A third interact (+ 2-2) indicates the presence of paired utterances which provide evidence to support the selection of information already existing in the system. This form of idiosyncratic interaction characterized 19 dyads. Of these dyads 12 were leader-follower dyads and 7 were nonleader-nonleader dyads.

The fourth interact (- 2-1) indicates the avoidance of paired utterances which cycle from evidence favoring the selection of information already existing in the system to the introduction of new information. The avoidance of this expected interaction pattern characterized 17 dyads. Of these dyads 12 were leader-follower dyads and 5 were nonleader-nonleader dyads.

The idiosyncratic interaction data were then reorganized to compare differences between leader-follower and nonleader-nonleader dyads within each group. Table 1 provided the data for this comparison. First, the total frequency and variety of forms of idiosyncratic interaction which characterized leader-follower dyads and nonleader-nonleader dyads were compared.[17] Leader-follower dyads displayed greater frequency of idiosyncratic interaction forms in 9 of the 15 groups, nonleader-nonleader dyads did so in 5 groups and the frequency for the two sets of data was the same in 1 group. Leader-follower dyads also were characterized by participation in a wider variety of forms of idiosyncratic interaction in 11 of the 15 groups and nonleader-nonleader dyads were so characterized in 4 groups.

The interaction data were again reorganized to compare the differences between leader and nonleader dyadic interaction within each group. Table 1 provided the data for this comparison. The first comparison examined the number of idiosyncratic dyads in which each member participated.[18] In 10 of the 15 groups no member participated in idiosyncratic interaction dyads more frequently than did the leader. Only in 5 of the 15 groups was there any member who did. In two of these 5 groups (i.e., Group 3 and Group 13) a member identified by the relevant group as a leader contender was that person.

The second comparison examined the variety of dyadic partners with whom each group member participated in idiosyncratic interaction. In 10 of the 15 groups no member engaged in idiosyncratic interaction with a wider variety of dyadic partners than did the leader. Only in 5 of the 15 groups was there any member who did. In 2 of these 5 groups (i.e., Group 3 and Group 13) a member identified by the relevant group as a leadership contender was the person who participated in idiosyncratic interaction across the widest variety of dyadic partners.

The third comparison examined the total frequency of idiosyncratic interaction forms in which each member participated.[19] In 11 of the 15 groups no member participated in a greater frequency of idiosyncratic interaction forms than did the leader. Only in 4 of the 15 groups did a nonleader do so. In 2 of these 4 exceptional groups (i.e., Group 3 and Group 13), that member was an identified leadership contender.

The fourth comparison examined the variety of interaction forms which characterized each member's participation in idiosyncratic interaction.[20] In 10 of the 15 groups no member participated in a wider variety of idiosyncratic interaction forms than did the leader. Only in 5 of the 15 groups did a nonleader do so. In 2 of these exceptional groups (i.e., Group 3 and Group 13) that member was an identified leadership contender.

The data were then analyzed to explore the similarity of emergent leader participation in idiosyncratic interaction across groups to determine the list of specific evolution-of-information behaviors which characterized emergent leaders of the study. A particular combination of interact forms characterized each leader's idiosyncratic dyadic interaction. For example, the interaction of the Group 1 leader was characterized by random structure, + 1-1, + 2-2, - 1-2, and - 2-1 interacts (see Table 1). The characteristic idiosyncratic interaction of each leader was then compared to the characteristic interaction of every other leader. In all groups the leader's characteristic interaction was somehow different from the characteristic interaction of other leaders. In 10 of the 15 groups no similarity was displayed. In 2 of the groups (i.e., Group 11 and Group 12) the emergent leader interaction was characterized by random interaction structure. The participation of these 2 leaders was different, however, in the sense that the leader in Group 11 participated in randomly structured interaction as the antecedent speaker and the leader in Group 12 participated as both antecedent and subsequent speaker.

In 3 groups (i.e., Group 6, 7, and 9) the leaders' idiosyncratic interaction was characterized by random structure, and + 1-1, - 2-1, - 1-2 interacts. The interaction of these 3 leaders was also different, however. For example, Group 6's leader participated only as antecedent speaker in randomly structured interaction, Group 9's leader participated in such interaction only as subsequent speaker, and Group 7's leader interacted as both antecedent and subsequent speaker. Apparently, no list of specific behaviors characterizes emergent leader interaction in the groups of the study.

The data were finally analyzed to explore the similarity of emergent leader idiosyncratic interaction across members within each group. The objective of this analysis was to determine the list of specific behaviors which characterized the idiosyncratic dyadic interaction of a particular leader across the members of that leader's particular group. With the interaction of the leader in Group 4 as an example, the leader participated in 5 dyads which were characterized by idiosyncratic interaction. This emergent leader's interaction with member 4 as the antecedent speaker is characterized by random structure. With member 5 as subsequent speaker the dyad is characterized by the presence of brainstorming (+ 1-1). This leader's interaction with member 6 as antecedent speaker is characterized by the presence of brainstorming (+ 1-1) and concatenous utterances which favor the selection of information already existing in the system (+ 2-2). This leader's interaction with member 3 as subsequent speaker is more varied: brainstorming (+ 1-1), avoidance of paired utterances which cycle from positive selection of existing information to the introduction of new information (- 2-1), and the avoidance of paired informational states which cycle from the introduction of information to the retention of that information (- 1-4). The leader's interaction with member 3 as antecendent speaker is also more differentiated: brainstorming (+ 1-1), avoidance of paired utterances which cycle from positive selection of existing information to introduction of new information (- 2-1), avoidance of paired informational states which cycle from introduction of new information to the positive selection of that information (- 1-2), and avoidance of paired informational states which cycle from the simple retention of existing information to the introduction of new information (- 4-1). Clearly, the idiosyncratic interaction which characterizes the leader's interaction with other members is in some way dissimilar. This differentiation of leader-follower interaction patterns is true of every group included in the study. The only within-group similarities are instances of dyads which have no characteristic interaction patterns (i.e., random structure). Clearly no list of specific behaviors characterized the interaction of any particular group.

Discussion

The purpose of the present study was to explore one aspect of emergent leadership interaction in the decision-making group. The theoretical framework of the study, the Interact System Model, directed the focus of analysis to the interdependence of communicative behaviors. The research question asked whether the evolution-of-information interaction characteristics of emergent leaders differ from the evolution-of-information interaction characteristics of nonleaders.

The results of the analysis suggest leaders and nonleaders across all groups of the study tended to participate in similar forms of idiosyncratic evolution of information interaction. It appears, however, that emergent leaders tended to participate in all forms of idiosyncratic interaction slightly more often than might be expected. The interaction of leaders with all possible dyads might be expected to account for two-fifths of all interaction and all remaining possible dyads accounting for three-fifths of all interaction. Contrary to this expectation, leader-follower dyads accounted for one-half or more of each form of idiosyncratic interaction (with the exception of random structure).

Some aspects of interaction of leader-follower dyads within each group tended to be different from the interaction which characterized nonleader-nonleader dyads. Leader-follower dyads tended to participate in higher frequency of idiosyncratic interaction forms and tended to distribute this participation across a wider variety of interaction forms than did nonleader-nonleader dyads.

Emergent leaders also tended to participate differently in idiosyncratic interaction with nonleaders than nonleaders did with one another. When the participation of each emergent leader was compared to the participation of all other members within a particular group, the emergent leaders tended to be that group member who participated more frequently in idiosyncratic interaction and distributed this participation across a wider variety of dyadic partners. Further, emergent leaders tended to participate in a greater frequency of idiosyncratic interaction forms and tended to distribute this participation across a wider variety of interaction forms than did nonleaders.

The exploration of emergent leader evolution-of-information interaction revealed no list of specific behaviors which characterized that interaction. The idiosyncratic interaction of each leader tended to be characterized by participation in a combination of interaction forms which was different from the combination of interaction forms participated in by all other leaders. Further, the particular combination of interaction forms which characterized a particular leader distributed differently across each dyad in which that leader participated.

In summary, the interaction characteristics of emergent leaders differ from those of nonleaders not in the specific functions of communication which identify leadership but in the overall complexity of communication functions. Emergent leader interaction is complex in the sense that it comprises a greater number of components, a greater variety of components and a greater variety of relationships across components than does nonleader interaction. The interaction tends to be differentiated and unpredictable.

It is not revolutionary to describe communication as a complex process. Research into group leadership, however, has typically viewed complexity as an empirical problem and has attempted to simplify it empirically or conceptually. The present study suggests a different approach. Since the research results suggest complexity itself characterizes emergent leadership interaction, the focus shifts to exploring, describing and understanding that complexity.

Weick's leader-as-medium provides a useful guide to understanding emergent leadership interaction as complexity.[21] This metaphor describes the group leader as a medium of social information processing and suggests some characteristics which enhance medium qualities. The crucial quality of a good medium is complexity.

Three interrelated assumptions inform this metaphor. First, a group as a social information processing system is extremely complex in that it comprises a great variety of information sources, ways to state information, interpretations of statements, rules to make sense of information, etc. This complexity emphasizes the problem of equivocality in processing information. The second assumption suggests equivocality of social information must be reduced to manageable levels for the group to accomplish its task. Weick applies the "law of requisite variety" to explain the process of equivocality reduction: only variety can regulate variety. Weick explains, "Order consists of data in which equivocality has been suppressed, but equivocality can be suppressed only after processes have first registered that equivocality."[22]

The third assumption suggests a good medium registers accurately the information to which it is exposed. According to Heider, three properites are associated with a good medium: (1) many elements; (2) independence of elements; and, (3) weak internal constraint.[23]

The interaction of the emergent leaders in the present study reflected these characteristics. Emergent leader interaction tended to be comprised of many elements which appeared to be rather independent and loosely coupled. That is, emergent leader interaction was not characterized by specific behaviors generalizable to all situations. Instead, emergent leader interaction varied from dyad to dyad and tended to be differentiated and unpredictable. Emergent leader interaction functioned to provide the complexity necessary for registering the variety required by the particular group information environment. As the metaphor suggests, accurate registering of equivocality facilitates the reduction of information equivocality in the group information processing system.

Plausible alternative interpretations, of course, should be considered. For example, perhaps the specific behaviors which characterize emergent leaders' evolution of information interaction were not accessible to the interaction analysis system which was employed. The results of the larger study of which the present study is a part, however, suggest otherwise. The larger study explored 4 content and 1 relationship function of communication, and complexity characterized emergent leader interaction across all sets of functions. The larger study found emergent leaders' participation in idiosyncratic interaction tended to be more complex within each function as well as across the 5 functions. These 5 functions

were source of information, information time orientation, evolution of information, reduction of information equivocality, and relational control. Certainly further research to explore other aspects of social information processes and relational processes is needed to address this challenge.

The function of the emergent leader in exceptional groups (i.e., groups in which a nonleader was the most complex group member) also requires further study. The function of the emergent leader in groups with one other member who equaled the complexity of the emergent leader also requires further study. The results of the larger study of which the present study is a part, suggest some plausible explanations. In 4 of the 15 groups (i.e., Groups 5, 9, 11, and 12) 1 other member equaled the complexity of the leader across several measures. In Group 11 the leader and the rival were the only group members who participated in idiosyncratic evolution of information interaction. In Group 9 the leader and the rival were the only group members who participated in structured idiosyncratic interaction. Further, the results of the larger study suggest the emergent leader in each of these 4 groups distributed participation in idiosyncratic interaction across several functions. That is, the Group 5 leader displayed greatest complexity in the source of information function and some complexity in the time orientation function and information evolution function. The Group 9 leader displayed greatest complexity in the reduction of information equivocality function, source of information function, and time orientation function, and some complexity in the evolution of information function. The Group 11 leader displayed greatest complexity in the source of information function and time orientation function, and some complexity in the evolution of information function.

The Group 12 leader displayed greatest complexity in the source of information function and some complexity in the information time orientation function, information evolution function and the reduction of information equivocality function.

Invoking the concepts of the leader-as-medium metaphor, this explanation suggests each of these groups required accurate registration of equivocality in different communication functions, and each leader was registering equivocality which reflected the particular group's unique information environment. Certainly further data analysis is required to test this speculation.

In 2 of the groups of the present study (i.e., Groups 3 and 13) an identified leadership contender was consistently more complex than the emergent leader. In each of these 2 groups the emergent leader's participation in idiosyncratic interaction was more concentrated in functions other than information evolution. Further data analysis is required to explore the differences between emergent leader and leadership contender interaction, as well as checking the validity of the perceptions of group members in identifying the leader.

Two of the 15 groups of the present study (i.e., Groups 6 and 15) appear to be anomalies. That is, some member other than the emergent leader consistently was more complex than or equally as complex as the emergent leader. Group 15 was the only group which identified shared leadership. That is, at the final group meeting 2 members were simultaneously identified as the leader. A larger data base is required to explore differences in emergent leader interaction and shared emergent leader interaction.

In summary, the leader-as-medium metaphor assumes group information processing is extremely complex or equivocal. For the group to accomplish its task, information equivocality must first be accurately registered. A good medium possesses characteristics which accurately register equivocality. In order to deal with equivocal information in all its variety, such detailed registering must occur. The leader-as-medium provides this vital function to the group information processing system. The leader-as-medium registers information with accuracy. Consequently, the leader-as-medium provides the group the complexity necessary for processing information and reducing equivocality of information in the social system of the decision-making group.

The leader-as-medium, then, would be capable of interacting differently across a variety of changing conditions. The leader-as-medium would act within the informational environment with a variety of actions necessary to reflect the degree of equivocality within that environment. Consequently the interaction of the leader-as-medium would not be characterized by a preponderance of specific types of actions, but rather by the degree of complexity required by a particular group system in a particular informational environment. The leader-as-medium would register a variety of elements at least as great as the variety of elements in the group system. This leader would typically display a repertoire of actions rather than specific behaviors generalizable to all situations. Further, these actions would distribute across a repertoire of dyadic partners. The evolution of information interaction of the emergent leaders in the present study tended to reflect these characteristics.

Table 1

Summary of Dyadic Interaction Significantly Different from Overall Group Interaction

Group	Leader-Follower Dyads (characteristic interacts)	Nonleader-Nonleader Dyads (characteristic interacts)
1	1/2 (Random Structure)	2/4 (Random Structure)
	1/4 (Random Structure)	3/4 (Random Structure)
	2/1 (Random Structure)	5/4 (Random Structure)
	1/5 (+: 1-1, 2-2)	6/5 (Random Structure)
	5/1 (+: 1-1, 2-2; -: 1-2, 2-1)	
	3/1 (+: 1-1)	
2	1/2 (Random Structure)	2/3 (Random Structure)
	5/1 (Random Structure)	3/2 (Random Structure)
	1/3 (+: 1-1)	2/5 (+: 1-1)
	1/5 (+: 1-1, 2-2; -: 1-2)	4/2 (-: 1-2)
	2/1 (+: 1-1; 1-2, 3-1)	
	4/1 (+: 1-1, 2-2, 4-4; -: 1-2, 2-3, 3-1)	
3	1/2 (+: 2-2)	4/2 (Random Structure)
		2/3 (+: 2-2; -: 1-2, 2-1)
		2/4 (+: 1-1)
		3/5 (+: 1-1)
4	4/1 (Random Structure)	5/3 (Random Structure)
	1/3 (+: 1-1; -: 2-1, 1-4)	5/6 (Random Structure)
	3/1 (+: 1-1; -; 2-1, 1-2, 4-1)	6/3 (+: 1-1, -: 1-2)
	6/1 (+: 1-1, 2-2)	
	1/5 (+: 1-1)	

Table 1 (Continued)

11	1/4 (Random Structure)	
12	1/3 (Random Structure) 4/1 (Random Structure)	4/2 (Random Structure) 6/2 (Random Structure) 6/4 (Random Structure) 3/5 (+: 2-2; -: 2-3) 5/4 (+: 2-2) 5/6 (-: 1-4) 6/5 (+: 1-1; -: 4-1)
13	1/6 (+: 1-1)	2/5 (Random Structure) 4/6 (Random Structure) 5/2 (Random Structure) 5/6 (Random Structure) 5/4 (+: 1-1, 2-2; -: 2-1) 6/5 (-: 1-2)
14	1/3 (Random Structure) 5/1 (Random Structure) 1/2 (+: 1-4; -: 1-1) 2/1 (+: 4-1; -: 1-1, 4-4) 1/4 (+: 1-1, 2-2; -: 1-2, 2-1) 4/1 (+: 2-2)	2/6 (Random Structure) 3/6 (Random Structure) 6/2 (Random Structure) 6/5 (Random Structure) 2/3 (+ 1-1, 2-2; -: 1-2, 2-1) 3/4 (+: 2-2; -: 1-2, 2-1) 4/3 (+: 2-2; -: 1-2)
15	2/1 (+: 2-2; -: 2-1) 1/5 (+: 1-1, 2-2; -: 1-2)	5/3 (Random Structure) 5/2 (Random Structure)

Table 1 (Continued)

5	1/2 (Random Structure) 6/1 (Random Structure) 1/5 (+: 1-1, 2-2; -: 2-1) 2/1 (+: 1-1)	3/2 (Random Structure) 5/2 (Random Structure) 2/3 (+: 1-1) 3/4 (+: 1-1) 3/5 (+: 1-1, -: 1-2)
6	1/3 (Random Structure) 1/4 (-: 2-1) 4/1 (+: 1-1; -: 1-2)	2/3 (Random Structure) 2/4 (Random Structure) 3/5 (Random Structure) 4/3 (Random Structure) 5/4 (Random Structure) 4/5 (+: 1-1; -: 1-2)
7	1/6 (Random Structure) 4/1 (Random Structure) 3/1 (+: 1-1; -: 1-2, 2-1)	3/4 (Random Structure) 4/3 (+: 1-1)
8	1/2 (Random Structure) 1/4 (Random Structure) 3/1 (Random Structure) 4/1 (-: 1-2)	4/3 (+: 1-1; -: 1-2, 2-1)
9	3/1 (Random Structure) 2/1 (+: 1-1; -: 1-2, 2-1)	2/5 (Random Structure)
10	1/5 (Random Structure) 3/1 (Random Structure) 1/4 (-: 2-1) 2/1 (+: 1-1; -: 1-2) 4/1 (+: 2-2, -: 1-2, 2-1) 5/1 (-: 1-2, 4-1)	2/4 (Random Structure) 4/5 (Random Structure) 5/2 (Random Structure)

Table 2

Summary of Idiosyncratic Interaction Forms

Description	Leader-Follower Dyads	Nonleader-Nonleader Dyads	Total
+ 1-1	20	13	33
- 1-2	14	10	24
+ 2-2	12	7	19
- 2-1	12	5	17
- 4-1	2	1	3
- 1-1	2	0	2
- 1-4	1	1	2
- 3-1	2	0	2
- 2-3	1	1	2
+ 4-4	1	0	1
+ 1-4	1	0	1
- 4-4	1	0	1
+ 4-1	1	0	1
Random Structure	22	34	56

Notes

1. J.F. Cragan and D.W. Wright, "Small Group Communication Research of the 1970's: A Snythesis and Critique," *Central States Speech Journal*, *31* (1980), 197-213.

2. B.A. Fisher and L.C. Hawes, "An Interact System Model: Generating Grounded Theory of Small Groups," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, *57* (1971), 444-453.

3. For example see, C.U. Larson, "The Verbal Responses of Groups to the Absence or Presence of Leadership," *Speech Monographs*, *38* (1971), 177-181; T. Knutson and W. Holdrige, "Orientation Behavior, Leadership and Consensus: A Possible Functional Relationship," *Speech Monographs*, *42* (1975), 107-114; C.D. Mortensen, "Should the Discussion Group Have an Assigned Leader?" *The Speech Teacher*, *15* (1966), 34-41; B. Schultz, "Communicative Correlates of Perceived Leaders," *Small Group Behavior*, *11* (1980), 175-192; B. Schultz, "Argumentativeness: Its Effect in Group Decision-Making and its Role in Leadership Perception," *Communication Quarterly*, *30* (1982), 368-375; R.T. Stein, "Identifying Emergent Leaders from Verbal and Non-verbal Communication," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *32* (1975), 125-235; V.J. Lashbrook, "Leadership Emergence and Source Valence: Concepts in Support of Interaction Theory and Measurement," *Human Communication Research*, *1* (1975), 308-315.

4. D.G. Ellis, "Relational Control in Two Group Systems," *Communication Monographs*, *46* (1979), 153-166.

5. Watzlawick and others have suggested all communication comprises both a content and relationship dimension. See P. Watzlawick, J. Beavin, and D. Jackson, *Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967).

6. G.L. Drecksel, "Interaction Characteristics of Emergent Leadership," unpublished manuscript, University of Utah, 1983.

7. The range in group size was due to fluctuating enrollment and drop out rate.

8. See C.A. Gibb, "Leadership," in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd ed., eds. G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Reading Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 205-282; and C.R. Holloman, "Leadership and Headship: There is a Difference," *Personnel Administration*, *31* (1968), pp. 38-44.

9. The definition of "group task" reflects the distinction between group tasks and individual tasks as defined by N. Maier, *Problem-Solving Decisions and Conferences* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963).

10. Several scholars have described leadership emergence as a process which occurs over time. For example see, E.P. Hollander, "Competence and Conformity in the Acceptance of Influence," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61 (1960), 345-359; and E. Bormann, Discussion and Group Methods (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

11. An Empirical rationale for this system is found in B.A. Fisher, L. Drecksel, and W. Werbel, "Social Information Processing Analysis (SIPA): Coding Ongoing Human Communication," Small Group Behavior, 10 (1978), 3-21. The larger study of which the present study is a part analyzed the 4 dimensions of SIPA. The present study analyzed Dimension 3.

12. Guetzkow, "Utilizing and Categorizing Problems in Coding Qualitative Data," Journal of Clinical Psychology, 6 (1950), 47-58.

13. For a complete discussion of Markov Chains see T.W. Anderson and L.A. Goodman, "Statistical Inference about Markov Chains," Annals of Mathmatical Statistics, 28 (1957), 89-110.

14. The test for Markovity was taken from the formula devised by S. Kullback, M. Kupperman and H. Ku, "Tests for Contingency Tables and Markov Chains," Technometrics, 4 (1962), 573-608.

15. J. Gottman and R. Bakeman, "The Sequential Analysis of Observational Data," in Methodological Problems in the Study of Social Interaction, eds. M. Lamb, S. Suomi, and G. Stephenson (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

16. Some dyads are characterized by more than one form of idiosyncratic interact.

17. The total frequency of idiosyncratic interaction forms comprised the raw frequency of descriptions or characterizations of idiosyncratic interaction. For example: RS, +: 1-1, 2-2, 1-1 equals 4 descriptions. The total variety of idiosyncratic forms included the number of different descriptions. For example: RS, +: 1-1, 2-2, 1-1 equals 3 varieties.

18. This description included every possible dyad within the group (i.e., each member as both antecedent and subsequent partner). This count is equivalent to the raw frequency of significant interaction matrices in which each group member participated.

19. The total frequency of idiosyncratic interaction forms comprised the raw frequency of descriptions or characterizations of idiosyncratic interaction in which each member participated. For example, RS, +: 1-1, 2-2, 1-1 equals 4 forms.

20. The variety of idiosyncratic interaction forms only included the number of different forms in which each member participated. For example, RS, +: 1-1, 2-2, 1-1 equals 3 varieties.

21. For a thorough discussion of this metaphor see K.E. Weick, "The Spines of Leaders," in Leadership: Where Else Can We Go? eds. M. McCall and M. Lombardo (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978), pp. 37-61.

22. K.E. Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, 2nd ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 189.

23. F. Heider, "Thing and Medium," Psychological Issues, 1 (1959), 1-34.

COMMUNICATIVE INFLUENCES ON INFERENTIAL JUDGMENTS IN DECISION-MAKING GROUPS: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

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PURPOSE

The past several years have witnessed a growing interest in inferential processes, especially among cognitively oriented psychologists. (See, for instance, Carroll and Payne, 1976; Hogarth, 1980; Nisbett and Ross, 1980, Wallsten, 1980; Wyer and Carlston, 1979) For the most part, the scholarship that has been generated focuses primarily on the mental factors and predispositions that contribute to inappropriate, erroneous, or otherwise questionable judgments and has been singularly devoid of much consideration of either social influences on the process of inference-drawing or the possible consequences of errors in judgment. One notable exception has been the work of Sarbin (1960) whose interest in inferential processes was prompted by the frequent misdiagnosis of psychological disorders displayed in his experience by both untrained and trained clinicians.

My own interest in the subject was sparked by a concern with the possible impact that erroneous and questionable inferences may have on decision-making in small groups. Whereas the value of group decision-making has sometimes been promoted on the grounds that a higher number of corrective influences are operating in the group context (see Shaw, 1981, pp. 57-68), other evidence from controlled laboratory studies (Hoffman, 1965) and case studies (Janis, 1982) suggests that the effect of group interaction may often be to exacerbate rather than obviate the problem of misjudgment. Insofar as erroneous or "normatively inappropriate" inferences contribute to the decisions that groups reach, the possible exacerbating influence of interaction appears to be worthy of attention.

In two previous essays (see Gouran, 1981, 1982), I have attempted to describe ways in which communication among the members of decision-making groups could conceivably function to promote collectively shared errors in judgment and to identify the theoretical principles that make sense of such possibilities. That work was largely speculative, however, and did not establish that communication does, in fact, have the suspected consequences identified. As a result, the present investigation was designed to permit examination of the content of a selected sample of decision-making discussions and to discover on empirical grounds, if possible, what subsequently occurs when a group member draws an inference of questionable warrant.

METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

The Sample

From a collection of 53 discussions involving decisions concerning what to be done in either a case of student plagiarism or one involving the destruction of personal property, three of the top rated ones in each category were selected for analysis. These discussions ranged from 15 to 25 minutes in length, with the majority falling between 20 and 25 minutes. The decision reached by each group had been rated by three judges on four criteria: appropriateness, warrantability, reasonableness, and fairness. Since the criteria were highly correlated, ratings were summed across categories, which allowed for a maximum possible rating of 84. The groups, which consisted of three members each, ranged from 66 to 78 (5.5 to 6.5 on a seven-point scale) in the perceived quality of their decisions. Since all six groups were at the upper end of the scale, there was little variation in the interrater assessments. Unfortunately, because the judges were not the same ones in all six cases (the samples came from different judging sets among the original 53 discussions), an accurate index of reliability could not be computed on so small a number of cases.

Groups having the highest quality ratings were selected as a conservative measure. Presumably, if corrective influences on questionable judgments were present, one would have the greatest likelihood of detecting them in discussions judged to produce good or high quality decisions. Correspondingly, one would also expect to find a relatively low rate of questionable inferences in such discussions.

The Cases

Following are reproductions of the information that each of the two sets of decision-making groups was given. Because the discussants were all students from an introductory course in group communication, topics dealing with issues in which they had some interest and and to which they could relate were used.

Topic 1. "A Case of Student Misconduct"

> Sharon Green, a freshman at a large state university, has been brought before the student judicial board on charges of willful destruction of her roommate's personal property. Specifically, she had broken a $500 stereo tape deck, ruined several cassette recordings of popular music, and broke the strings on her roommate's guitar. In all, the total damage was estimated at $100. Since Ms. Green had agreed to pay for the damages, the case was not referred to authorities outside the university; nevertheless, the case was referred to the judicial board by the Dean for Undergraduate Life on disciplinary grounds. The board consisted of three student representatives and three members of the faculty.
>
> During the scheduled hearing, Ms. Green at first appeared sullen and uncooperative. She refused to explain why she had engaged in the acts she committed and argued that since she had agreed to pay the damages, there was no reason why she should be charged with misconduct. In response to this argument, the chairperson of the board pointed out that intentional damaging of university property or that of any person occupying university facilities constituted a violation of the student code of conduct and is therefore subject to penalty, regardless of whether the offending party has made restitution.
>
> Having been apprised of the university regulation, Ms. Green,

although still resentful, agreed to respond to questions put to her by members of the board. When asked, 'Would you mind telling us why you damaged your roommate's property?', Ms. Green replied, 'Because I don't like her.'

'Surely, there was more to it than that,' observed one of the members.

'No, there wasn't,' snapped Ms. Green.

'Look,' said the chairperson, 'We are trying to understand the full set of circumstances leading to your actions. If you refuse to help us, then you are not leaving us much choice in this matter.'

'What does that mean?'

'It means that we may have to recommend to the Dean for Undergraduate Life that you be dismissed from the university.'

'Well, how about her?', said Ms. Green defensively.

'Who?'

'My roommate. Who do you think?'

'What about your roommate?', inquired one of the other board members.

'Just because she had finished all of her midterms, that didn't give her any right to keep me from studying. She knew that I'm having a hard time in my math course and that I needed to get a high grade to keep from having an F going into the second half of the semester. Punk rock and studying don't go together very well, you know. Why don't you do something about people like her?

'Did you ask your roommate not to play her music while you were studying?'

'It wouldn't have done any good.'

'How do you know that?', asked the chairperson.

'Because I tried that before, and all she ever says is, 'It's my room too.''

'Now let me get this straight,' said one of the faculty representatives. 'You decided that your roommate would not cooperate with you without even making an effort to find out. Is that correct?'

'That's right.'

'Don't you think you should have tried?'

'I told you before that it would not have done any good.'

'I think we are going around in circles,' suggested one of the

student representatives. 'Let me ask another question. Why didn't you go to the lounge or to the library to study?'

'Why should I have to do that? The dorm is supposed to have quiet hours from 7:00 to 10:00 every night. Why didn't she go somewhere else?'

'Did you tell your RA about the problem?', the student wondered.

'She's never there at night until after quiet hours. She's got a boyfriend or something.'

Changing the subject, another of the student members inquired, 'What did you get on the math test?'

'A D,' replied Ms. Green.

'So that's when you decided to get back at your roommate?'

'No, I did that before the exam.'

'But you had no way of knowing at that point how you would do,' the student remarked.

'I knew. I mean, I knew I wouldn't be able to do very well because she had me so upset.'

'But you apparently had been doing poorly all semester. Was that her fault also?'

'Not exactly.'

'Then maybe you damaged her property for reasons other than interfering with your studying,' observed the student.

'I told you I didn't like her, but I did what I did because she was bothering me.'

'I think, perhaps, we have asked you enough questions about what happened,' the chairperson remarked. 'Let us ask you one more thing. Are you sorry about what you did?'

'Not really,' responded Ms. Green.

'In that event, I think that we should close the hearing and let you go. We shall be in touch with the dean in a week or so. You will be notified of what action, if any, is going to be taken.'

Topic 2. "A Case of Plagiarism"

Martin Adamson, a Professor of Journalism at a major midwestern university, had assigned the members of one of his advanced classes in news writing skills to prepare an editorial on the federal government's energy policy. The purpose of the assignment was to assist students in recognizing that different types of journalistic tasks require different skills and different writing styles. 'Whereas reporting a news event involves as objective and as representative a reconstruction of the details associated with the event as possible,' Professor Adamson explained, 'developing an editorial requires that the writer take a position and, in so doing, be as original as he or she can be in developing that position.' 'To be sure,' he continued, 'one should not try to be original for its own sake, but because unless one approaches a controversial subject from a fresh perspective, nothing is added to the dialogue surrounding the issue of interest. Two equally skilled journalists, then, might produce highly similar accounts of the same news event, but were they each to write an editorial about it, their separate pieces would be quite distinctive.'

Acknowledging similarity in point of view as a characteristic of many editorials, the professor went on to point out that, 'One must not confuse a shared point of view with a lack of originality.' To clarify his point, Professor Adamson suggested that William F. Buckley, Jr. and George Will, for example, 'share a conservative view and often take the same position on controversial issues, but their editorials are clearly distinguishable. This difference is attributable to originality.' The professor then asked if there were any questions about the assignment. 'Since there are no questions,' he said, 'I shall assume that everyone knows what he or she is supposed to do.'

While reading the editorials that he had assigned his students to write, Professor Adamson felt that one by a student named James Jordan was particularly impressive but somehow familiar in respect to both its content and style. Mr. Jordan, a senior majoring in Journalism, was a student the professor had not previously encountered, yet he recalled other members of the faculty having mentioned the young man's name on several occasions--and always in a favorable way. As a result, the professor decided that he was probably just tired from reading too many of the editorials in one sitting and that he was, therefore, being unnecessarily suspicious. The next day, however, when he began re-reading Mr. Jordan's editorial, the professor recalled that William F. Buckley had written an editorial on energy policy a few weeks earlier and had advanced many of the same arguments as Mr. Jordan. Upon checking, Professor Adamson discovered that substantial portions of the Buckley editorial had been outright plagiarized.

Furious over the episode, the professor asked the departmental secretary to schedule an appointment for Mr. Jordan as soon as possible. When Jordan arrived, Professor Adamson began the conversation rather sarcastically by saying, 'I have read your editorial, and I think you might want to consider suing William F. Buckley because he apparently has been stealing your ideas.'

'I don't know what you are talking about,' replied Mr. Jordan.

'Oh, you don't?'

'No, I don't.'

'Well, then,' began the professor, 'how else do you explain the remarkable similarity between these two editorials? When I used Buckley as an example in class, I was not suggesting that you go out and

copy some of his work.'

'You said in class, didn't you, that different editorial writers often share a common point of view,' Mr. Jordan pointed out in defending himself.

'Yes, but I certainly did not say that they copy each other's language and try to conceal the fact by not acknowledging their sources.'

'Oh, come on now. It's done all the time. For any side of a given issue, there aren't very many things that can be said. I read the Buckley editorial and found that he said nearly everything I would have said in taking a position on our energy policy. What's wrong with that? Besides, some of my points were not from the Buckley editorial.'

'I guess I had better not pursue where you got your other ideas.'

'They were mine,' the student replied somewhat resentfully.

'Please, Mr. Jordan, do not insult my intelligence by claiming that because you added some new sentences here and there, your essay, therefore, qualifies as being original.'

'All right, you tell me then how anybody can meet your standards of originality when you assign us to write on things that have been hashed over for years.'

'The subject of religion has been 'hashed over'--as you put it--since the beginning of time, and still people find original ways to talk about it.'

'If that's so,' replied Jordan, 'then why could I go to 20 different churches on Christmas and hear the same sermon?'

'Have your ever gone to 20 churches on the same day?', the professor retorted.

'No, but'

'Look,' said the professor interrupting Mr. Jordan, 'this is all quite irrelevant. I don't care how many people are lacking originality or how many dishonestly represent others' thinking as their own. The point is that I asked you to write an original editorial and, instead, you chose largely to copy one that William F. Buckley had written. Perhaps if you had done your research on the subject with primary materials rather than running to secondary sources, you might not have come to the conclusion that everything you could have said on the subject has already been said. It is one thing to take a position or develop an argument and then discover that someone else has had similar thoughts and quite another to copy someone else's work and pass it off as your own. The former is quite natural, but the latter is dishonest.

'Okay, I understand your position,' said Mr. Jordan, 'but what are you going to do to me?'

'I'll have to think about it,' he responded, 'but rest assured, I will let you know my decision.'

The Object of Analysis

The object of analysis for this investigation was the inference, which was operationally defined as any judgment about something unknown based on something known or assumed. This definition was derived from characterizations of inferences by Bruner (1964), Hempel (1965), Newell (1968), and Sarbin (1960). Inferences were classified according to Nisbett and Ross' (1980) classificational scheme. They suggest that inferences can be grouped into five categories, including: description, covariation, causation, prediction, and theory testing.[1]

Inferences by their very nature have some degree of questionability and vary considerably in this respect. No attempt was made, however, to determine the degree of questionability of any of the inferences identified. The basic purpose of the inquiry was simply to describe the interaction immediately following the incidence of an inference, however questionable it might be.

Procedure

Having selected the sample on the basis of judges' ratings of the quality of decisions reached by the six discussion groups under study and the classificational scheme, I listened to an audio tape recording of each discussion, noted and transcribed each inference made, and continued transcribing the subsequent interaction up to the point that a change in theme occurred. Hence, the segments reported in the results section vary in length and the number of utterances they contain. In some instances, I have included utterances prior to the inference where they appear to have been a precipitating influence.

RESULTS

Following is a reconstruction of the discussion segments in which each inference in the six groups analyzed appears. In every case, the inference is identified and the subsequent interaction characterized.[2]

Topic 1: Student Misconduct

Group 1. C: "Now we gotta see what to do about Sue Green, I mean, Sharon Green. She seems not to have exhausted whatever she could have." (Descriptive inference)
A: "Yah." (Reinforcement)
C: "That's for sure. She flew off the handle kinda fast." (Extension of original inference)

A: "I would say, I don't know [concerning what action to take]. She's obviously having some problem living with someone else. She's a freshman. (Descriptive inference)
C: "Right." (Reinforcement)

B: "You might give her a single [room].
A: "Or make her live off campus. She's a freshman and probably hasn't been away from home, or something like that." (Descriptive inference)
C: "She's not adjusting, right." (Reinforcement)

A: "You know, it seems pretty petty why she did it. Her roommate wasn't right in not being considerate enough, but it seems a bit extreme." (Descriptive inference)
B: "Sort of psychotic." (Descriptive inference)
A: "Yah, something's wrong. You know, even having another roommate might not do it." (Reinforcement and predictive inference)
C: "The noise just may just may have been the final straw." (Causal inference)

A: "She still thinks she's right in doing that, so I'm sure that if the circumstances come up again, she'd do it again." (Predictive inference)
C: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)
A: "Especially if she has the money to pay for it." (Extension)
B: "Yah." (Reinforcement)
C: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

B: "I don't know how much this public service duty is actually going to do. I mean, I know my friend did it for like some stupid little reason, and it was just more thought up, like being a pain and sort of like a big joke. But it had to be done. Now as a serious, I mean, what he did was really stupid. I know he was (inaudible). It like was such a stupid thing. It was like a punishment to him. It was just annoying." (Predictive inference)
C: "Yah." (Reinforcement)
B: "And I think she needs to be punished more." (Extension)
A: "She needs the counseling. She's gotta know that she was wrong." (Extension)

A: "You could probably do something like that [under pressure], or else she's really a sick person." (Causal inference)
B: "She sounds extremely immature." (Descriptive inference)
A: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

B: "I don't like her."
C: "Yah, I wonder what kind of person she'd be like. You know, I wonder what she would look like. A little brat with" (Descriptive inference)
B: "With pigtails." (Extension)
C: "Pigtails, yah, carrying around a hammer inside of her pocket." (Extension)

C: "But what if she refuses counseling?"
B: "See, I don't think universities, or whoever it is, physicians, like, er, uh, what do I want to say? Like, give her the counseling, you know what I mean?" (Predictive inference)
C: "Yah." (Reinforcement)
B: "I don't feel that they, first of all, you don't know, what if the counselor is a jerk?" (Extension)
C: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)
B: "You know, I've been to counselors here before. They're not extremely cool people, and like I know my friend went to the health center once to see the psychiatrist, you know, just to talk and stuff, and she

just came out of there hysterically laughing because it just, you know, the lady did just absolutely no good." (Further extension and descriptive inference)

C: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

B: "So it's sort of like a judgmental thing on who she talks to and stuff." (Further extension of original inference)

C: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

A: "Yah, but she does need some kind of" (Partial reinforcement)

B: "But I don't think the university has that kind of counselor anyway. The people they hire here for, you know, like the health center's where they're at." (Descriptive inference)

C: "Right." (Reinforcement)

A: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

B: "I mean, they're not going to be the kind of the top grade." (Extension)

A: "If she's 18 years old, maybe her parents don't want to have anything to do with her." (Descriptive inference)

C: "Right. They could be just sending her off to school." (Reinforcement and extension)

A: "Yah. You may not have any cooperation at all there." (Further extension)

B: "But aren't, don't we have to decide if we're going to let her stay?"

C: "Yah, where are we going to let her, where's she going to stay? You know, who knows, her roommate may just want to get out of there. May want to just" (Descriptive inference)

B: "But see, the point, even maybe they could like move her just because you don't want her to get any kind of feeling that she's sort of wanted." (Descriptive/predictive inference)

A: "She's wanted." (Reinforcement)

C: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

B: "And that's exactly what will happen. I mean" (Predictive inference)

C: "Yah, that's a good point." (Reinforcement)

A: "That would be a form of punishment. Making her get her things and get out." (Extension of the original inference)

C: "Yah, it would. Not necessarily take her off campus, but make her move some place else." (Reinforcement and extension)

B: "Another dorm or (inaudible) another single." (Extension)

A: "There are singles sitting around now on campus. That sounds good because the other roommate, you know, probably by now has a lot of friends on the floor. She's not going to want to move out." Reinforcement and descriptive/predictive inference)

C: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

B: "Maybe, I don't know if we should do something with the other roommate or if we just talk to her because she must have provoked something." (Causal inference)

C: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

A: "Yah, I would talk to her. I think I'd bring her before the board too." (Reinforcement)

C: "That's kind of funny they didn't bring put them bring them both up at the same time an have each explain their side of the story and what happened." (Reinforcement and descriptive inference)

Group 2. A: "The fact that she is pretty obstinate. She did it just out of her own will. It wasn't by accident. It wasn't" (Descriptive/causal inference)

B: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

C: "She wasn't very willing to discuss it either. I" (Descriptive inference)

A: "She's definitely got a chip on her shoulder. And there's almost, you almost have to bring forth some sort of punishment to prevent this from happening again." (Extension, descriptive inference, and predictive inference)

C: "Right." (Reinforcement)

A: "Because the way she's acting, it could happen to someone else, whoever she has as a roommate. Because it kind of proved that the girl didn't really do anything because she did it even before she even got a bad grade on a test, and she had bad grades all the way. (Predictive, causal, and descriptive inference).

C: "Good point." (Reinforcement)

A: "So apparently, apparently, she had something else wrong. And she could take it out as a (inaudible) does on her roommate." (Extension of previous causal and descriptive inferences)

C: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

B: "Because I think it's something, a lot of it might be just between the two of them." (Descriptive inference)

A: "Mmm hmm. Well, she might even have more other personal problems that even willing she's not willing to talk about what's at hand. So there's probably even underlying things that's bothering her." (Reinforcement and causal inference)

C: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

A: "Being a freshman." (Extension)

C: "Requirements." (Further extension)

B: "Yah, she could be, you know, it could be she is far away from home." (Reinforcement and extension)

A: "Right." (Reinforcement)

B: "I don't know, just by her actions, the way she acted to the board, it could be that she wanted complete silence, and any stereo music bothered her." (Descriptive inference)

A: "Right." (Reinforcement)

B: "She just wanted everything silent." (Extension)

A: "And that [bringing both roommates before the board] might help resolve their problems too at the same time because they might be able to talk. With now talking to each other by talking to the board, they might hear each other for once." (Predictive inference)

B: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

C: "Exactly." (Reinforcement)

A: "Rather than just shutting off to them, to each other." (Extension)

A: "She obviously has study problems." (Descriptive inference)

B: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

A: "Getting a D in a class." (Extension)

C: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

B: "And the RAs on those floors [referring to a proposal to moving the student to a quiet dorm floor] are better equipped to handle things like that." (Descriptive inference)

C: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

A: "Okay, the placement of being on the quiet academic floor, well, we figured that might help her grades." (Predictive inference)

B: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

C: "Mmm hmm." (Further reinforcement)

A: "Plus, she wouldn't be disturbed then. She wouldn't have the disturbing music that she so dislikes." (Predictive inference)

B: "Plus, she would have people around her that need to study, and they would motivate her." (Extension/predictive inference)

A: "Exactly." (Reinforcement)

C: "Right." (Reinforcement)

B: "Then if it happens again [referring to any problem with other students after the individual in the case has been given another room], you know it's her fault." (Descriptive inference)

C: "Mmm hmm. Let's see, she would be more at ease with a different person. (Reinforcement and predictive inference)

B: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

B: "Maybe you could talk to the RA."

C: "Mmm hmm."

B: "She might be around in the day time." (Predictive inference)

A: "Yah, but it seems like she's not around enough to really know her people on the floor." (Descriptive inference)

B: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

Group 3. A: "Yah, there's a lot of other things involved than just that there. They've probably been going at it for a long time." (Descriptive inference)

B: "Also, to, I mean, to expel someone, I know the act was maybe intentional and it was, I mean, so you're talking a hundred dollars damage. You're talking, you know, four years of education. To expel her would be kind of stupid." (Extension and descriptive inference)

A: "Especially when it's the first offense. Now if she was habitual and this kind of stuff, you might want to get her off campus for sure." (Extension)

B: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

A: "There's no evidence that she's been doing this stuff before, so we'll go on that. (Descriptive inference)

B: "That might be good to have her roommate come in on it because maybe her roommate has other gripes that might" (Predictive inference)

C: "It was probably one-sided (inaudible)." (Apparent descriptive inference)

A: "Okay, so, okay, decide which ones were appropriate now. One, do you think some punishment should happen out of this? I mean, do you think, you know, it seems to me, like you know, she did go a little whacko, and, you know, she should have some sort of reminder that she can't be doing this stuff. You know, you can't just go tear up somebody's stuff without a little bit more of a reason than that. You know, without" (Descriptive inference)

C: "Without, she didn't even try to avoid" (Descriptive inference)

A: "Exactly." (Reinforcement)

A: "Given the facts we have, probably assume this is a first offense." (Descriptive inference)

C: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

B: "You know, I think that the aggrieved party or whatever, you know, I mean, she probably, as long as she gets her hundred bucks and gets everything restored back to the way it was, and if they get through some kind of deal maybe where, you know, a little counseling to figure out what her problem is, then I think that would keep both parties happy." (Predictive inference)

A: "What do you think? Probably out of these we should or a combination. I think it would be a combination of things." (Extension)

C: "Yah, I do too. I like, uh, the idea of some sort of probation along with a, uh, a session with both roommates to, uh, with some counseling." (Reinforcement)

A: "With somebody that's got experience in handling these problems." (Extension)

B: Yah, and, like, this is not really fair to the girl to just slap a probation on her and then just pop her back in because they, you know, if there is a problem that exists, you can't help reach dealing with it. And she'll probably run into the same situation again. Then, just because the university maybe didn't apply themselves and use all of their resources, the girl will be out of an education. So" (Predictive inference)

A: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

C: "Along with the RA. The RA should be more aware of the problem."

A: "Yah, that's a separate thing that I think that, you know, that should be brought up, you know. You know, this report, you know, they should have recommendations in this report like that the person in charge of, let's say, McNutt and Briscoe [dormitories] or wherever, but just say a dorm, you know, that says, you know, also, you know, we have had reason to believe that the RA is neglecting his duties in such and such (inaudible). I was thinking maybe we just, uh, give her a probation period, you know, because this is something you gotta impress on her she can't do. You know, sounds like it might be ruining her educational career because she's having problems, you know, adjusting, studying, and stuff like that." (Descriptive inference and predictive inference).

B: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

Topic 2: Plagiarism

Group 1. C: "Maybe they talked about him in a good manner for the same reason that he was caught for plagiarizing. Because he was recognized because his style of writing was exceptional. So, maybe all along he's been plagiarizing." (Descriptive inference)

B: "Yah. That's a good point." (Reinforcement)

A: "That could be." (Further reinforcement)

B: "It's a good point." (Further reinforcement)

A: "First of all, ten to one, he's going to do it again. Whether he gets caught or not depends on the degree that he does it." (Predictive inference)

B: "Yah, and if he's continually doing this on his own major, I guess that expulsion would definitely prove its point. (Reinforcement and predictive inference)

C: "Prove necessary." (Reinforcement)

A: "Because sounds like that's the way the type of guy [the professor] he is anyway. I mean, he starts it [the confrontation] out by joking." (Descriptive inference)
B: "Yah." (Reinforcement)
C: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

C: "Any good university probably wouldn't stand for that" [committing plagiarism more than once]. (Descriptive inference)
B: "Mmm hmm ." (Reinforcement)
C: "So, especially in your major. If it was something like HPER [Health, Physical Education, and Recreation], you know" (Extension)
B: "Lots of times they may throw you out of school, but we don't need to talk about that." (Further extension)

C: "I don't know, like, I know the Business School, they they'll throw you out of the university. They say expulsion from the university, so" (Predictive inference)
B: "Which for them is one and the same" (Extension)
C: "They just say boop." (Further extension)
A: "Yah, for sure." (Reinforcement)

C: "And if he's caught again, well, then he really doesn't deserve to continue because he's not learning anything anyway." (Descriptive inference)
A: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)
C: "So, he really doesn't care. That's" (Extension)
B: "Well put, Jerry." (Reinforcement)

Group 2. A: "Since he's a senior, there has probably to be a lot of his stuff floating around somewhere" [referring to other papers that could be checked for plagiarism]. (Descriptive inference)
B: "Sure." (Reinforcement)

A: "Recommendation reasonable in light of the circumstances? Yah, we just said, 'You've been warned.'" (Descriptive inference)
B: "Especially, a Journalism major." (Extension)
C: "He should have"
B: "He should know better." (Extension and descriptive inference)
A: "He should know better." (Reinforcement)

B: "Because it it [failing the class] would make a distinct impression on him because it was wrong." (Predictive inference)
C. "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)
A: "The only thing that we the teacher might feel funny about, I don't know, if he's a senior, he might have to stay a whole extra semester just to retake this class." (Predictive inference)
B: "Mmm hmm. Yah." (Reinforcement)
A: "Something like (inaudible)
C: "And he's been good. I, this is the first time this has happened." (Descriptive inference)
A: "That's the only dissonance that would be in that" [failing the student]. (Extension of speaker's original inference)

A: "And don't you think any other Journalism teacher would have picked something like this up before? (Descriptive inference)
B. "Yah, I would say yes. After all that time, after him being a senior. That's four years of taking Journalism classes. Someone along the way would have picked it up if he had done it before." (Reinforcement and extension)
C: "Yah." (Reinforcement)
A: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

C: "It [an F on the paper] would bring his grade down. And so, if he had consistent As all through the course" (Predictive inference)
A: "Except at I.U.'s School of Journalism, nobody gets As, so you can say Bs. Alls that matters is F. How many papers could they ask you to write? Maybe five or six at the most. (Extension and descriptive inference)
C: "Yah." (Reinforcement)
A: "An F could bring it down to a C." (Extension of original inference)
B: "So it could bring it down a full grade." (Further extension)

A: "It [an F on the paper] is not as severe as an F in the class." (Descriptive inference)
B: "Which would hold him back." (Extension and predictive inference)
A: "Right. Might prevent him from graduating." (Extension)
C: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

Group 3. A: "In a situation like that, you know, the professor can play God. And if he says you're (inaudible) if says it's plagiarism" (Descriptive inference)
B: "It's his word against yours, right." (Extension and reinforcement)
C: "If he's got the article, he's got enough evidence probably." (Descriptive inference)

C: "Well, this guy's a senior. He's a major in Journalism. He should, I think, somebody, you think he'd know better." (Descriptive inference)
A: "Yah. Well, you can't really kick him out of the university after four years." (Reinforcement of inference, but not suggestion)

A: "The thing you gotta remember though with Journalism is that honesty is one of their, you know, things (inaudible). If he did that" (Descriptive inference)
B: "That's right." (Reinforcement)
A: "Trying to look for a job, he's going to have a hard time unless he goes to the National Enquirer or something." (Predictive inference)
B: (Laughter) "Yah. Hmm. So maybe it should, well, right, okay, right there, that scars his record, doesn't it, unless they do nothing about it." (Reinforcement and extension)
A: "Yah." (Reinforcement)
B: "But, hmm, that seems like that would be just bad enough, you know, having a bad record, almost, because he's ruined unless he totally moves to other countries, you know, and" (Further extension of previous inference)
C: "Gets out of the United States." (Extension)

B: "They might. It doesn't, I mean, what would they, you know, he's certainly not going to write out a resume, and maybe, well, he could never give any references." (Predictive inference)

C: "I think that would almost be more harsh than kicking him out." (Descriptive inference)

B: "Yah, that's what I thought." (Reinforcement)

A: "His, well, if he goes for interviews and takes his papers, they're going to have his transcript and see, you know, his class is this F, and they're going to ask him why. And if he tells them, 'well, I just, you know, didn't do verywell with this (inaudible) professor, (inaudible)." (Apparent predictive inference)

B: "Mmm hmm. Yah, that could be really damaging, I mean, your career, something he's worked for this whole time." (Reinforcement and extension)

B: "Yah, that that [an F on the paper] would, oh yah, that would cancel out the ruining of his career, don't you think? (Predictive inference)

C: "Mmm hmm." (Reinforcement)

B: "If it was the first assignment, then it [an F on the paper] wouldn't be do any good. But if it was like later, or if it was a major assignment, oh, they wouldn't give you a major assignment right in the beginning, would they?" (Predictive and descriptive inference)

C: "No." (Reinforcement)

A: "Well, if you fail him from the course, you know, and tell him it's going to be on his transcript, he's going to have to make a decision then." (Predictive inference)

B: "Right." (Reinforcement)

C: "Making him take the course over again probably would be [too harsh]." Especially, if, you know, that could have a lot more meaning, especially if he could have graduated." (Descriptive/predictive inference)

A: "Right." (Reinforcement

C: "But it [taking the course over] shouldn't hurt his career I don't think. So" (Predictive inference)

B: "Yah, if we, yah, do that one thing you talked about." (Reinforcement and extension)

A: "It would give hin a chance to make up for it (inaudible)." (Extension)

B: "Yah, really, I mean, it's, as I say, well, most people, you know, have to learn the hard way. And when you're just in college, it's probably nothing compared to career life. If you can give him a chance to, you know, make up for it now and make it a little harder to where he's not going to want to have to do that again. You know what I mean? He wouldn't" (Descriptive and predictive inference)

C: "We really don't have enough information to know whether that's going to be, you know, a painful experience--making him take the class over again." (Challenge to inference)

B: "Well, it, take it, well, it may not be painful, but it is a hassle. (Descriptive inference)

C: "Yah." (Reinforcement)

B: "I mean, any class you take over unless you really love it." (Extension of previous inference)

DISCUSSION

From the preceding analysis, a number of interested findings emerged.

In the 47 discussion segments studied, there were a total of 81 inferences (13.5 per group). The number ofsegments containing inferences in each group were roughly proportional to the length of the discussion, with the longest ones having the most inferences and the shortest ones having the least. Since the discussions of the case of student misconduct, on the average, were six minutes longer than those dealing with the case of plagiarism, they had a higher frequency of occurrence of inferences but appeared to differ in no other respect.

Of the five categories of inference considered, there were no instances of judgments involving "covariation" or "theory testing." With a few exceptions, nearly all of the inferences identified involved description and prediction, with the description category being substantially more numerically well represented.

Of greater importance than the frequency and distribution of inferences, however, are the findings concerning responses to them. In virtually every case, the statements following the introduction of an inference were (1) a reinforcement of the inference, (2) an extension of the inference, or (3) another inference. In the one instance in which a challenge to an inference was made ("We don't really have enough information to know whether that's going to be, you know, a painful experience . . . . Topic 2, Group 3, Segment 9), the protester was in agreement with the original target of his objection in his verynext utterance. Although reinforcing statements appeared to very in their strength, in the six discussions studied there was virtually no disagreement with inferences made or even questioning of their appropriateness. This may have been due to the fact that many of the inferences made were couched in qualifying language, such as "could," "might," and the like. Still, one finds no evidence of questioning even in the case of strongly worded and categorical inferences.[3]

Although merely descriptive, this investigation is suggestive of a pattern of interaction that can help to unravel the process by which the members of groups come to share inferences and subsequently act on them. Although it was not possible in this study to determine if the groups would have reached different decisions under conditions involving more critical examination of the inferences drawn, making such determinations is a logical next step in research. At present, the only thing one can safely conclude is that under the conditions of the present inquiry, the members of decision-making groups engage in rather uncritical acceptance of inferences, regardless of their questionability. What consequences that condition, when it exists, has for other aspects of the decisional process remains to be determined.

NOTES

1. Descriptive inferences involve judgments of three kinds: placing objects and other phenomena into categories on the basis of a partial knowledge of their characteristics, characterizations of samples, and conclusions about populations based on samples. Inferences of covariation are judgments about the extent to which different phenomena vary systematically. Causal inferences entail drawing conclusions from effects about the factors responsible for them. Predictive inferences represent a class of judgments in which one makes assessments of what is likely to occur under given sets of circumstances. Theory testing, as Nisbett and Ross use the term, is the same thing as deductive reasoning; that is, one draws conclusions about a phenomenon or set of phenomena on the basis of assumptions and generalizations that he or she presumes to be true.

2. Statements without terminal punctuation were interrupted and should be read that way.

3. The language in which inferences were couched reflect three levels of strength. One might characterize these as: possibility, probability, and certainty.

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ON THE RELATION BETWEEN ARGUMENTATIVE AND COMPLIANCE-GAINING STRATEGIES

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The study of persuasive messages and their effects upon audiences has long held a prominent place in communication research. Communication researchers interested in persuasive messages and their effects have defined, manipulated, measured and devised tagonomies of raters' perceptions of message sources, message structure, organization, placement of arguments and language style as well as exploring how audience characteristics and context or situation characteristics/ constraints affect the impact a persuasive message is likely to have on listeners' cognitions and behaviors. Those researchers more interested in interpersonal influence, i.e., the persuasive strategies an individual uses to influence the behavior of others in private conversation as opposed to the public speaking situation, have generated an extensive corpus of research devoted to identifying an exhaustive taxonomy of compliance-gaining strategies. Generally, research in this area focuses upon personality influences on the selection of compliance-gaining messages or context constraints on the use and impact of compliance-gaining messages.

A compliance-gaining message may be viewed as a claim that certain desirable consequences will occur if one complies with the request specified in the message (typically called a proposition of policy). In order to substantiate this claim, the speaker may feel compelled to provide reasons for the "truth" of the claim or the listener may request evidence in support of the claim. In either case, the compliance-gaining message may be viewed as an argument or "train of reasoning" (Toulmin, Rieke and Janik, 1979, p.11). Researchers interested in compliance-gaining strategies have primarily analyzed consequences of compliance or noncompliance but ignored the evidence and reasoning offered in support of the speakers claim.

My purpose is to (1) determine what relationships there might be between argumentative strategies and compliance-gaining strategies in the research to-date and (2) explore research questions that might develop in the future.

In order to address the first concern of this paper, I need to apriori devise or adopt a definition and model of argument that seems optimally suited to assessing the relationships between argumentative strategies and compliance-gaining strategies. Additionally, such an analysis ought to be useful as a form of test of the definition and model of argument I select. One approach to this task would entail adopting Toulmin's model of argument. Toulmin's model is of limited utility however since it does not provide for detailed analysis of the motive appeals in propositions of policy, that is, claims that desirable consequences will occur if one complies. The key word here is consequences and the Toulmin model doesnot adequately provide for consequences. Since some compliance-gaining strategies may be viewed as propositions of policy which point up the desirable consequences of a specific pattern of behavior, a model that can provide for these consequences is mandatory. Cronkhite (1964, 1969, 1976, in press) has developed a paradigm of persuasion he calls the Affective and Epistemological Structure of Perlocution or Pragmatics (AESOP). This model takes advantage of and expands upon the Toulmin model of argument and it is this modification of the Toulmin model of argument that appears to be especially useful for analyzing compliance strategies. I will confine my discussion of Toulmin's model to the three major components (claim, data and warrant) since I have selected Cronkhite's model and he uses only those three components in his AESOP model.

In Cronkhite's terms, argument is persuasion conducted under conditions designed to produce decisions that are maximally rational. These conditions are generally specified in some set of rules which may be written or unwritten and adhered to tacitly or explicitly (Cronkhite, this volume). Generally a persuader attempts to cause a listener to perceive a relationship between two stimuli; i.e., between a plan and a consequence (motive or value). A plan is a sequence(s) of behavior(s) which allegedly must be performed in order to achieve or avoid a particular consequence or outcome and consequences are outcomes that may be positively or negatively valued. According to this formulation, a claim (or belief) is a statement that a plan is related to a value/motive/consequence. The claim that a plan is related to a valued consequence or outcome is a cause-to-effect claim. Other types of claim are used in persuasion however; e.g., effect-to-cause, correlational/sign, similarity/analogy, categorization/deduction and approval. Consequently, a speaker may argue that a particular plan will cause a desired outcome and then offer evidence in support of that claim. The speaker is thus in the position of carefully analysing the likely consequences the listeners will value and must carefully specify the ways in which the proposed plan will produce the desired consequences. Consequences/motives/values may be classified by the functions they serve for the listener, e.g., physical, consistency or knowledge, social reward and punishment and ego-maintenance. Plans and their consequences constitute the righthand side of the model pictured in Figure 1. Note that more than one consequence may result, some valued and others not. In fact, the speaker is quite likely to mention only those consequences the listeners are likely to value.

The lefthand side of the model consisting of data (evidence or reasons) and warrant is the most relevant to research on argument. As in the Toulmin model, evidence constitutes data in the form of propositions that support or are alleged to support a belief/claim and the warrant is the statement of the inference linking the evidence with the belief/claim. Here too it is important to remember that units of proof (evidence and warrants) may be added ad infinitum as required to demonstrate the validity of the claim or belief or truncated by the speaker should they feel confident in assuming that the listeners will automatically provide the data or warrant (or both).

A cursory review of the literature on compliance messages clearly indicates that most definitions of compliance messages focus upon the consequences/motives for adopting the compliance plan, much of the research has focused upon taxonomic development, and the resulting taxonomies are classifications of motive appeals. In short, the compliance research to date has been devoted largely to investigating the righthand side of the AESOP model, i.e., the consequences alleged to result from adopting the speaker's plan.

In general, definitions of compliance strategies are remarkably similar in their focus upon plans and consequences. Miller and Steinberg (1975) describe compliance-gaining behavior as the attempt of an actor to effect a specific, preconceived response from some target. Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman and Georgacarakos (1982) assert that compliance-gaining strategies contain (explicitly or implicitly) the response intended for the target to undertake and an inducement that provides a reason or motivation for doing it (p.93). Part of the definition of compliance I offered earlier also underscores the plans and consequences portion of the AESOP model. In part, a compliance message is a claim that certain desirable consequences will occur if one complies with the request specified in the message. Given that definitions like the ones mentioned here are typical of compliance message definitions in general and given that these definitions are likely to influence the nature of the research questions raised, it comes as no surprise that many compliance studies have focused on plans and consequences. In addition these studies have generally sought to provide an exhaustive taxonomy of compliance strategies. As I will illustrate momentarily, these taxonomies of compliance strategies can also be interpreted as taxonomies of consequences or motive appeals.

Some studies have provided raters with lists of compliance strategies and asked raters to select those strategies they deem most desirable and effective for a variety of types of situations.[1] Another collection of studies have asked raters to generate compliance messages they would be most likely to use and rate their effectiveness in a variety of situations.[2] Some studies (Wiseman and Schenck-Hamlin, 1981; Miller, Boster , Roloff and Seibold, 1977) attempted to distinguish among types of compliance messages and others (Cody, Woelfel and Jordan, 1983; Jackson and Backus, 1982) have focused upon the dimensions raters use to differentiate relevant compliance situation factors. One study in particular however had an important influence on the direction compliance research has taken. The strategies generated in this study (Marwell and Schmitt, 1967) have been used extensively by other researchers interested in compliance messages. Marwell and Schmitt identified a five-factor solution of compliance-gaining strategies. Marwell and Schmitt labeled those five factors (1) rewarding activity, (2) punishing activity, (3) expertise, (4) activation of impersonal commitments and (5) activation of personal commitments. Each of the factors (which Marwell and Schmitt labeled strategies) is composed of several tactics which loaded on that factor. Each of these tactics is a different consequence with which the listener is being threatened or promised. A brief discussion of a couple of these tactics might be useful here. Marwell and Scmnitt identify two tactics that constitute the strategy labeled "punishing activity." In one instance the speaker states that the listener will be punished if he/she does not comply. In the other instance, the speaker punishes the target, making cessation contingent on compliance. In one case the speaker is threatening the listener with punishment and in the other, promising to stop. Four tactics comprise the strategy labeled "activation of impersonal commitments." The speaker may tell the listener that they will (1) feel better about themselves if they comply or worse if they don't, (2) if you want to continue perceiving yourself as having good qualities you must comply, (3) people you value will think better (worse) of you if you do (donot) comply and (4) you are immoral if you do not comply. Again, in each instance the speaker is either promising or threatening a listener with specific consequences. In this case the consequences are psychological or social.

Now, if we examine the list of compliance tactics (consequences) offered by Marwell and Schmitt, the items appear to be quite similar to the lists of motive appeals one might encounter in a public speaking or persuasion textbook. Persuaders regularly attempt to induce compliance by assuring their listeners that their motives will be fulfilled (specific consequences will ensue) if the listeners accept the persuaders proposal. Cronkhite provides a classification scheme for categorizing consequences according to the functions (or motives) they serve for the listener. For example, a speaker may argue that compliance will ensure such social rewards as approval or liking by people or groups the listener values or the speaker may claim that one consequence of noncompliance is that people the listener values will respect or like him/her less. The speaker may claim that compliance will result in physical reward or punishment or that compliance will make the listener feel good about himself. The AESOP model classifies consequences or motives thusly: (1) social reward and punishment, (2) physical reward and punishment, (3) maintenance of consistency and (4) psychological needs such as expressing and maintaining one's self concept and defending one's ego against guilt and threats.

The point is that researchers interested in compliance messages have directed their energies toward producing a description of the kinds of consequences speakers threaten and promise to listeners. What is lacking is a description of how speakers go about proving that a specific consequence will occur.[3] The result is that we seem to have a decent listing of consequences speakers are likely to choose but little, if any, insight into the proof a speaker is likely to offer in support of a particular claim of consequence. Further, we know very little about the extent to which listeners expect a speaker to demonstrate to them that a particular consequence will ensue if they actually adopt the plan. I believe this severely limits our understanding of compliance messages.

In part, the definitions/characterizations of the compliance process initially adopted by many researchers limits compliance research questions to the plan-consequence portion of the model. As a preface to some suggestions for compliance research that focuses on the data-warrant side of the model, I want to explicate a conceptualization of compliance that is consistent with the model used here and with current perspective on compliance. In traditional argument one is likely to argue three types of propositions: propositions of value, propositions of fact and propositions of policy.[4] I am going to restate these definitions in compliance terms and suggest that all three propositions may be characterized as propositions of policy. A proposition of value may be stated as "You should like...," which I will call affective compliance, a proposition of policy may be stated as "You should do...," which I will call behavioral compliance, and a proposition of fact may be stated as "You should believe...," which I will call cognitive compliance. In all cases one is arguing that desirable consequences will ensue or that a listener can avoid undesirable consequences if they adopt the proposed plan or belief or value. How then can these types of compliance requests benefit our understanding of compliance messages? I have no hard empirical data to support this forthcoming claim so it constitutes a suspicion I intend to investigate in the near future. I suspect that people who are attempting to induce affective or cognitive compliance are more likely to provide or be expected to produce "trains of reasoning" then will an individual attempting to induce behavioral compliance who may be more likely to focus on consequences/motives and truncate or eliminate "trains of reasons." I do not intend to imply that affective or cognitive compliance requests ignore consequences/motives or that requests for behavioral compliance avoid the use of reasons. My guess is that speakers and listeners may emphasize the use of reasons in requests for affective or cognitive compliance while requests for behavioral compliance may emphasize consequences/motives.

When a speaker proposes that a listener do something such as volunteer to be a member of blockwatch and the listener asks why, the speaker is likely to provide the listener with a list of things that will result from compliance. For example, the speaker may assert that the listener will be safer, feel better about himself and command more respect from people he values if he joins blockwatch. A request for behavioral compliance generally compels the compliance inducer to specify the consequences of (non) compliance. In fact, the phrasing of a request for behavioral compliance requires that the speaker specify the consequences of compliance but may not induce the speaker to provide proof (data and warrants). On the other hand, a request for affective or cognitive compliance that is questioned is likely to elicit proof (data and warrants) to substantiate the claim. Propositions of fact or value can be recast as propositions of policy but in ordinary conversation they are not. The phrasing of the proposition (which to some extent dictates a range of acceptable responses to the question "why") forces the speaker to fucus on the data and warrant. One might even take offense if instead of providing proof, the speaker responded with a specific consequence. For example, a speaker says, "I think we're going to get involved in a war in El Salvador ("You should believe that we're going to get involved in a war in El Salvador" is the understood proposition) and a listener asks, "Why?" How responding with "because you'd be right" is not likely to be considered appropriate. In the case of affective and cognitive compliance, specifying the consequence may well be socially unacceptable. We simply do not condone speakers who use the following tactics: (1)"Like this idea or I'll beat you, (2) "believe this because you're the kind of person who believes this sort of thing and (3) "believe this because if you do you'll be right." I suspect then that speakers avoid specifying the consequences, thereby avoiding social sanctions, when seeking affective or cognitive compliance and instead generate proof in support of their claim. Thus, in this example, the speaker may offer an extended example comparing the events leading up to our involvment in Viet Nam with the events occuring in El Salvador or cite the opinions of military and political experts who believe that we are likely to be involved in a war in El Salvador.

I would like to briefly outline some additional research questions that arise from the data-warrant portion of the model and may illuminate differences among the three types of compliance requests offered here. (1) Under what conditions do compliance inducers use data and warrants? (2) What types of data and warrants are typically used and in what ways do sources, audiences and context constraints affect the selection and impact of data and warrants? (3) How much detail (chains of units of proof) is used and in what ways do sources, audiences and context constraints affect the amount of detail provided or expected? (4) Do compliance inducers use one line of argument or more? Under what conditions, for example, is a speaker likely to use or a listener likely to expect two or more lines of reasoning such as an extended example and an expert opinion?

Each of these research questions requires a conceptualization and model of compliance that includes the means for analysing the extent to which compliance inducers provide or are expected to provide warranted evidence in support of their claims. We may find that there are some regular and predictable patterns in the types of data and warrants that are especially well-suited (from the sources or listeners point of view) to particular plan-consequence pairs, a finding not likely to result from a conceptualization of compliance that focuses on the plan-consequence portion of the model instead of the data-warrant side of the model.

On the other hand, the study of argument might profit from attention to the plan-consequence portion of the AESOP model. Consider for example that a thorough and exhaustive analysis of "Twelve Angry Men" necessitates examining both the data-warrant side of the model as well as the plan-consequence side of the model. At one level the jury was faced with the task of sifting through the evidence offered in support of the claim that the accused had the motive, opportunity and weapon to murder his father and was actually observed in the act of doing so. The determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rests on the quality of evidence offered in support of the claim. At another level however, we learn that most of the characters were motivated to vote guilty for a number of different reasons, reasons independent of the evidence offered. In addition, many of the jurors changed their vote to not guilty for reasons equally independent of the evidence. The baseball fan, for instance, changed his vote to not guilty because he wanted to finish as quickly as possible. Thus he may have decided that changing his vote to not guilty would break the tie and enhance the speed with which the deliberation would proceed. Generally he appeared quite unconcerned about whether the evidence supportedthe claim of guilt. It appeared the garage owner (played by the late Ed Begley) and the most obviously prejudiced member of the jury, changed his vote to not guilty largely as a result of group pressure. His decision to vote in favor of acquittal had little to do with the evidence. The point here is that a complete understanding of the jurors and their deliberation mandates an analysis that includes plans and consequences as well as data and warrants. In short, critical analysis of argument as it actually occurs requires an understanding of plans and consequences as well as an understanding of data and warrants, and analysis of compliance messages requires an understanding of data and warrants in addition to an understanding of motives.

FIGURE 1



Affective and Epistemological Structure of Perlocution or Pragmatics (AESOP)

NOTES

[1] See for example: Marwell and Schmitt, 1967; Miller, Boster, Roloff and Siebold, 1977; Roloff and Bornicott, 1978; and Sillars, 1980.

[2] See for example: Falbo, 1977; Miller, et.al., 1977; Roloff and Bornicott, 1978; Clarke,1979; Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman and Georgacarakos, 1980; and Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson, 1980.

[3] The way many compliance studies have been designed and executed may have prevented subjects from offering proof in support of their claims. First, in some studies raters merely select from a list of strategies those which they are most likely to use in a variety of situations and rank order those strategies in terms of their potential effectiveness. This kind of design does not allow raters to provide data and warrants even if they want to or are likely to in "real" conversation. Second, those raters who are asked to write essays describing the ways in which they would attempt to induce compliance in situations specified by the researcher may include proof but the proof may not be analyzed since the research question/hypothesis may not provide for an analysis of the proof. Third, the situations raters are asked to respond to appear to be likely to encourage raters to focus on plans and consequences. Fourth, the constraints of the research design may prevent raters from providing reasons to justify their claim, e.g., raters may not have enough time to write out compliance dialogues or the kinds of situations they are asked to respond to may be so unfamiliar or unrealistic as to inhibit their ability to construct arguments.

[4] I have deliberately avoided listing propositions of definition since they can generally be rewritten as propositions of fact or policy.

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CONVENTIONAL POSTULATES OF INTERPERSONAL ARGUMENT

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Generally I define "argument" as a form of persuasive discourse conducted within a set of rules designed to facilitate a maximally critical decision. The purpose of argument thus defined is not persuasion, it is the production of a maximally critical decision. Persuasion is a means to that end. Persuasion unconstrained does not have a purely virginal reputation. In argument, persuasion is constrained; those strategies suspected of undermining critical decision-making are countermanded, and procedures are ordained that are expected to direct the minds involved into a critical direction.

I do not use the term "rule" in the rather promiscuous manner that seems to be the momentary vogue in our discipline. Too often contemporary usage in our discipline "confuses a rule with an induction," as Ed Black has put it.[1] I am not a devotee of the "Rules is Everything" movement, in which any regularity in human behavior is attributed to a rule. Such usage is a manifestation of the Mad Hatter Syndrome, victims of which use a single word to mean everything and then simply pay it extra, with the consequence that the word is soon worn smooth and meaningless. Such were the fates of "instinct," "drive," "reinforcement," and "dissonance," for example, under previously deposed regimes.

Not that the term "rule" *cannot* be used to refer to any regularity in human behavior; rather, to do so will cause it to lose its utility and precision. The word "verbal" is suffering just such a fate as the public, the press, and even communication scholars use it to mean "oral," which has resulted in such absurdities as the news report that "The player has agreed verbally to play for Iowa." I want to be there when he confirms his intention with a *non*verbal agreement. I occasionally wake in a cold sweat after suffering through another episode of a recurring nightmare in which I am trampled by hordes of graduate students prattling about the "Rule of Gravity."

For my purposes here, I propose to use the terms "rule," "norm," and "principle/strategy" to designate a set of related but distinguishable concepts. A rule, for my purposes, is a regularity (formalised or otherwise, written, understood, or tacitly observed) that *defines* an activity. If a participant violates a rule, the person is no longer playing that game. Grimshaw, in "Talk as Social Control," writes that "Hearers sometimes respond to rule violations ... generally by treating the rule violator as 'careless' or 'stupid' or not a native speaker - but *not as in some way morally defective*."[2]

What I have been describing are what John Searle has termed "constitutive rules"[3] in that they *constitute* a given game or activity. My second category of regularities, "norms," coincides with Searle's "regulative rules." A norm is a prescription for the behavior of those participating in a given activity, adherence to which is generally encouraged by social approval and disapproval.

For an example of the rule-norm distinction, consider the game of bridge. The values of the cards, the order of the bidding, and what constitutes "taking the bid" are some of the matters specified by rules. If these rules are violated by a player, others are most likely to correct him dispassionately and conclude he is a novice. However, if a player deliberately overbids his hand to prevent his opponents from taking a bid they are fairly certain to make, the inferences of the other players will lead them to a different conclusion, and they will be likely to apply whatever social sanctions they have at their disposal. In this case the player is playing bridge as defined by the rules, but he has violated a norm. Violations of other norms may even elicit physical sanctions such as a kick under the table.

Someone is bound to object, however, that rule violations *are* sometimes treated as moral lapses, as when a poker player hides an ace up his sleeve and introduces it into the game at a time that increases his chances of winning. Note, however, that this has been done deliberately, surreptitiously, and for his own benefit to the detriment of the other players. That sort of rule violation is definitive of cheating, and there is a norm against cheating. It is violation of the *norm* that will cause this player to contract lead poisoning, not violation of the rules *per se*.

My third category of regularity I will term "principles," which are closely related to "strategies." Specifically, persuasive *strategies* are generally based on communicological/psychological/sociological *principles*, or are intended to be. A "principle" is a behavioral regularity that is *not* conventional or arbitrary, but rather is discovered inductively. The relation between rules and principles is parallel to that between symbols and symptoms. A rule is a regularity only because it is used as one, to paraphrase Peirce's well-known definition of a symbol,[4] whereas a principle is a naturally occurring regularity. A "strategy," then, is a procedure adopted (for example, by a persuader) to take advantage of a set of principles.

Let me return to the example of a bridge game. Once novices have learned the *rules that constitute* the game of bridge, and once they have learned to abide by the *norms that regulate* the game, they must learn the *principles/strategies by which they can win the game*, or at least by which they can play it well. If a player uses ineffective strategies based on erroneous principles he will generally be perceived as a poor player, neither (necessarily) ignorant of the constitutive rules nor morally repugnant.

Now suppose we return to the definition of "argument." Not all attempts to do things with words constitute argument, obviously. Austin has distinguished between two types of speech acts, the illocutionary and the perlocutionary.[5] The illocutionary force of an utterance is accomplished *in* the act of producing that utterance, whereas perlocutionary effects are achieved *by* the utterance. For example, to make a *promise* one need only utter the words "I promise" followed by the propositional content; the promise has been made regardless of whether the recipient believes it or responds to it in any way. However, to *deceive* another entails more than the pronouncement of a promise, it also entails the listener's belief in the speaker's sincerity.

"Argument" and "persuasion" are two terms that can be distinguished on this ground. One can be said to have "argued" even though there has been no discernable effect on the listener, but in order to "persuade" someone must be persuaded. "Argue" and "persuade" can both be intransitive verbs, in that they do not require explicit direct objects, but in both cases an object is understood. The difference is that the understood object of "argue" is a proposition, whereas the understood object of "persuade" is a person or group. A proposition can be argued in spite of itself, but a person must acquiesce to be persuaded.

The complication is that, in the present definition, persuasion is represented as the means by which argument achieves its goal, a critical decision. One can argue without persuading, but one cannot argue *successfully* without persuading; one can strive without achieving, but one cannot strive successfully without achieving.

Grimshaw has performed an exhausting if not exhaustive analysis of the modes of verbal influence. His model describes a *source* who "select[s] a particular verbal strategy (*instrumentality*) in seeking desired outcomes (*results*)" on the part of different listeners (*goals*).[6] Thus, for example, Reagan (source) appears to have persuaded (instrumentality) the Congress (goal) to vote for deployment of the MX (result). Grimshaw analyzes the following instrumentalities, among others: "ordered," "asked," "wheedled," "commanded," "bamboozled," "cajoled," "begged," "conned,"[7] "suggested," "requested," "hinted," and "persuaded," of course.[8]

I am sure theorists of argument could produce hundreds of such instrumentalities by scanning their personal vocabularies and those of their students and colleagues, perhaps even without resorting to a thesaurus. Among those terms, of course, would surely appear "argued."

How would "argue" differ from others on the list? It is an illocutionary act that, in order to be successful, must produce perlocutionary effects. But there are others on the list of which the same can be said. One can "cajole," for example, without producing the desired effects, but not successfully. But the purpose of argument is not merely to persuade. *Argumentative* persuasion, to be successful, must produce a maximally critical decision.

The question at hand, then, is this: What are those constitutive rules by which the activity of interpersonal argument can be distinguished from other modes of interpersonal persuasion, from other verbal instrumentalities?

I believe Grice's maxims provide a useful starting point.[9] He begins with a statement of his general Cooperative Principle: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." He then translates this general principle into four more specific categories of maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner. The Quantity maxims, taken together, specify that one should make one's contribution to a conversation neither more nor less informative than required. The "supermaxim" of Quality is "Try to make your contribution one that is true," and includes admonitions against saying that which you believe to be false or that for which you lack adequate evidence. The maxim of relation is simply "Be relevant." The category of Manner includes admonitions to avoid obscurity and ambiguity and to be brief and orderly.

All this sounds as if it were excerpted from some Renaissance tome titled "The Compleat Gentleman," but the maxims are not intended to be prescriptive, even though their phrasing appears to be so. Grice's thesis is that these are conventional assumptions on which we operate in conversation. We interpret utterances in conversation in part by assuming that the maxims are operant. This he terms "conversational implicature." For example, if I ask another how to get to the Rustlers' Inn, I operate on the assumption he will tell me everything I need to know to get there, not merely some of the directions, and that his response will be relevant to my question.

Obviously the maxims are violated as frequently as they are observed, but the fact that they are not violated at random bears witness to their existence. Grice has listed in his original paper, and in a more recent paper dealing exclusively with this issue, a number of reasons for which such violations occur and the inferences that can be drawn from them.[10] Bowers and his colleagues have described how the maxims can be exploited to produce devious messages,[11] as when a first person asks a second, "Are you going to the pub tonight?" and the second responds, "I have to study for an exam." The first person, assuming the Relevance maxim is operant, concludes the second person is not going to the pub, when in fact no such statement was made.

Grice represents the maxims as being assumed in conversation in general, but there are certain conditions under which he apparently feels they *should* be observed:

> So I would like to be able to show that observance of the CP [Cooperative Principle] and maxims is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: that any one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participating in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the CP and the maxims.[12]

Just what is the force of these maxims? I believe that depends on the type of conversational game/activity in progress. Obviously they are not constitutive rules in casual conversation, for they can be and are frequently violated within the structure of that game. In fact, they do not even appear to be norms in casual conversation, since their violation does not appear to imply moral terpitude on the part of the violator, nor does it call down social sanctions on his head, unless he is violating them for the purpose of deceiving another for his own benefit. The force of the maxims in casual conversation appears to be that of principles/strategies, in that they are strictly adhered to only when the participants turn for a moment to the purpose of maximally efficient information exchange. The maxims are principles for achieving efficient information exchange in such a case.

In more formal conversation, however, as in a business meeting or a discussion at a scientific/academic conference, in which efficient information exchange and decision-making may be paramount, adherence to these maxims may become normative, so that social sanctions will be imposed by the group to assure that no member persistently violates them.

What I am now proposing is that whenever the participants in a conversation agree, explicitly or tacitly, to define their game/activity as an "argument" (in the sense of the opening paragraph of this paper, not as in the sense of conflict or confrontation), then Grice's maxims become definitive. That is, the maxims become the rules that constitute the activity, so that a participant who violates them simply ceases to play the game in which he has agreed to participate. The appropriate response to a violation will be to call it to the attention of the violator who, if he is sincere, will reaffirm his commitment to the activity of argument and attempt to refrain from further errors. If the violations continue, the violator's understanding of the nature of argument will be called into question, unless the other participants find some reason to believe he may be feigning cooperation in the argumentative enterprise in order to camouflage attempts to persuade in other less critical modes.

Obviously pure argument will not be encountered frequently in conversation, in part because few conversational groups will contain members who are adequately trained in argumentative procedures, and in part because few situations will inspire uniform devotion to the ideal of critical decision-making, which would be required to motivate imposition of these rules. However, such instances might occur more frequently if the rules were taught in more introductory communication courses in secondary schools and colleges. Further, the rules are also useful to critics who are interested in assessing instances of discourse that may qualify as argument, and to assess the extent to which examples of discourse exhibit the characteristics of argument.

But Grice's maxims need elaboration. I cannot elaborate on all of them, but there is one that is more vague and more central to argument than the others. That is the maxim of Relevance. What does it mean to say that discourse must be "relevant" in order to constitute argument?

My answer to that question is going to be framed in terms of a model of persuasion I have developed over a number of years. I have described it most recently as a representation of the cognitive deep structure of persuasion/pragmatics/perlocution, and have made explicit an assumption I have entertained tacitly for some time: that it can be used to describe the cognitive structure and process of decision-making in response to communication as well as the structure of persuasive messages themselves.[13] I have given it the name AESOP, an acronym for Affective and Epistemological Structure of Persuasion/Pragmatics/Perlocution. (See Figure.)

The initial assumption embodied in the model is that an act of persuasion consists of an attempt by a persuader to cause a listener to perceive desired relationships between a proposed Plan and valued Consequences or motive satisfactions. The persuader advances Claims that adopting the Plan will facilitate positively valued Consequences and prevent those that are negatively valued. His purpose is to modify the Beliefs that relate the Plan to Consequences in the mind of the listener so the listener will be more likely to adopt the Plan.

The Consequences to which I refer can be physical reward and punishment, social reward and punishment, or a variety of psychological consequences, especially maintenance of consistency, value-expression (maintenance and expression of self-concept), ego-defense, and ego-maintenance.

That this model fits propositions of policy seems obvious. The way it fits propositions of fact and value may not be so transparent. Liska, in this volume, has noted that propositions of fact and value can be transformed into propositions of policy by rephrasing them, respectively, into the formats: "You should believe ... " and "You should like ...." She terms these, respectively, Plans for cognitive compliance and affective compliance, and propositions of policy Plans for behavioral compliance. The most obvious Consequence a persuader is likely to mention to induce a listener to adopt a Plan of cognitive compliance is that he will be right (consistent with the facts), but persuaders certainly at least imply others, including "If you believe ... others will like you better, you will be more consistent, you will better express the type of person you are," and the like.

The Toulmin model of argument[14] can be conveniently spliced into the model as described thus far. The Claim of relationship between the Plan and each Consequence can be supported by Data/Evidence related to the Claim by a Warrant. However, I have performed some modifications on the basic Toulmin model to make it more comprehensive. The first of these is rather simple and largely semantic. I have long been dissatisfied with the terms "data" and "evidence" as applied here. I toyed with the term "factoid," that which gives the appearance of a fact, before settling on "protofact." What is advanced in an argument to support a Claim is a candidate for facthood, an allegation by the speaker that is submitted to the listener for testing, to be accepted or rejected on the basis of criteria of the listener's choosing - thus, a "protofact."

A more substantive modification, actually an expansion, is the specification that, when a listener rejects a Protofact (or when the speaker expects him to reject it), the persuader will be obliged to provide a subsidiary unit of proof, including a new Protofact and a new Warrant, to support it. In effect, the original Protofact then becomes a Protofact-Claim. This chaining of units of proof in series can be continued as deeply as necessary. Similarly, a rejected Warrant must be supported by a subsidiary unit of proof if it is to be resuscitated.

A third modification is the specification that more than one unit of proof can be used in parallel to support a given Claim. Thus one Protofact supporting a Claim might consist of an example related to the Claim by a Warrant that asserts its representativeness, but a second Protofact supporting the same Claim might consist of an assertion that an alleged expert testifies to the truth of the Claim, with a Warrant that asserts the "expert's" credibility.

Now within this framework let me list what I believe to be the components of Grice's maxim of Relevance as applied to argument. I will phrase them as criteria for the judgment of relevance.

Criterion #1: *Does the discourse revolve around a proposition, preferably explicit, in which is described the Plan proposed by the participant who initiated the argument?* Obviously no judgment of relevance can be made without something to which an utterance can be judged to be relevant. Other participants can propose counterplans which will be relevant to the proposition insofar as they constitute alternatives to the Plan that initiated the argument.

Criterion #2: *Do the other participants wait for the initiator to establish a prima facie case before beginning their refutation or offering their own alternative plans?* This rests on the assumption that the initiator assumes the burden of proof. In other forums of argument there may be grounds for other assignments of presumption and burden of proof, but in interpersonal argument, at least, the only available rule seems to be "He who asserts must prove."

Criterion #3: *Does the initiator proceed to establish a prima facie case by advancing at least one Consequential Claim in behalf of his Plan?* Of course, a Claim can be understood or implied within the context of the conversation. The group may have been discussing a desirable Consequence just before the initiator proposed his Plan, in which case it will be understood, given Grice's maxim of Relevance, that the initiator believes his Plan will yield that Consequence.

Criterion #4: *Is the relationship alleged (or implied or understood) in each Claim a cause-to-effect relationship?* This criterion may seem so obvious as to be almost unnecessary, especially in clear propositions of policy, but in fact persuaders in conversation frequently attempt to persuade by establishing other types of Claim relationships. Such persuasion is easiest to illustrate using examples from advertising, with which we are all familiar. Salem cigarettes have become associated with springtime freshness, for instance, not because anyone has claimed and demonstrated that smoking Salems will cause springtime freshness, but because of an extensive and expensive *conditioning* program

to which we have all been subjected. Other cigarette advertisements attempt to persuade us that the design of their cigarettes is *similar* to the design of fashionable clothes, while other manufacturers pay sports and entertainment figures exorbitant fees to say they *approve* of their products. Some advertisements attempt to place the consumer and the product in the same *category*, which is the basis for "image" advertising, while others tout the product in some sort of *sign* relation with a valued entity. Finally, a few advertisements describe the attractive people who produce the product or the interesting process by which it is manufactured, thus making the product the *effect* of a valued entity rather than the *cause* of valued Consequences. These relationships of conditioning, similarity, mere approval, categorization, sign, and effect-to-cause are frequently claimed or otherwise established between a persuader's Plan and other entities the persuadee is believed to value, but these means of persuasion do not fit my definition of argument, in that they are unlikely to facilitate critical decisions.

Criterion # 5: *Do the participants provide empirically meaningful Protofacts to support their Claims?* By "empirically meaningful" I mean Protofacts that have some chance of being verified by the experiences of the other participants, thus excluding appeals to divine revelation and other mystical or totally personal experiences.

Criterion # 6: *Do the participants provide or imply Warrants to justify their inference from each Protofact to the Warrant it is alleged to support?*

Criterion # 7: *Do the participants provide subsidiary units of proof to support Protofacts and Warrants that are questioned by others?*

Criterion # 8: *Do the participants analyze the units of proof by reference to tests appropriate to each type of reasoning involved?* By "types of reasoning" I mean analogy, testimony, categorical reasoning, contingency (including sign, effect-to-cause, and cause-to-effect), and generalization (including the use of examples and statistics). Others may, of course, substitute their own categorization systems.

If there is something of value in this, it may not be the specific criteria of relevance I have proposed. Others may offer more accurate and useful lists of constitutive rules. Certainly I hope my conceptualization and the criteria derived from it prove valuable in the heuristic sense. But logically prior to these criteria is the notion that the observable regularities in argument can be usefully distinguished into the categories of rules, norms, and principles/strategies. I believe I have demonstrated that the distinctions can be made. The question of the utility of those distinctions remains.

I believe the distinctions are useful in teaching, criticism, and empirical research. It should be useful to teach our students the differences among argumentative rules, norms, and principles/strategies, and the sanctions likely to be imposed in each case. A student can surely profit from understanding that the failure to state a proposition is a rule violation punishable, if at all, by personal embarrassment at being revealed as a novice, whereas falsifying evidence is a violation of a norm that is likely to be dealt with more harshly. Further, it seems it is profitable to emphasize that learning to abide by the rules and norms is only a prerequisite to the most satisfying aspect of argument - creating and engaging strategies to acquit oneself well in the game.

The distinctions are also useful in critical analysis and other forms of research. Surely it is important for the critic to identify where argumentative deficiencies lie, but beyond that there are important theoretical questions to be answered. For example, under what conditions, by whom, in what ways, and with what effects are rules and norms violated in conversational argument? Within each category there are other questions to be asked. For example, which of Grice's maxims is most frequently violated? When is the relevance maxim most frequently violated, in what ways, by whom? Which violations are most frequently recognized as such by other participants?

Finally, and most importantly, I believe, to what extent does argument thus defined occur in conversation, when is it most likely to occur, and how can we facilitate its occurrence?

Of course, the test of the utility of this conceptualization will be the extent to which it gives impetus to future research, not any lists of research questions I provide here.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Edwin Black, seminar in the Department of Rhetoric at the University of California at Davis, 1978.

[2] Allen Grimshaw, "Talk and Social Control," in *Language as Social Resource: Essays by Allen Grimshaw*, ed. Anwar S. Dil. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1981, p. 268.

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[6] Grimshaw, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

[7] Grimshaw, *op. cit.*

[8] Allen Grimshaw, "Instrumentality Selection in Naturally Occurring Conversation: A Research Agenda," in *Essays*, pp. 321-337.

[9] H.P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in *Syntax and Semantics*, Vol. 3: *Speech Acts*, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan. New York: Academic Press, 1975, pp. 41-58.

[10] H.P. Grice, "Further Notes on Logic and Conversation," in *Syntax and Semantics*, Vol. 9, *Pragmatics*, ed. Peter Cole. New York: Academic Press, 1978, pp. 113-127.

[11] John Bowers, Norman Elliott, and Roger Desmond, "Exploiting Pragmatic Rules: Devious Messages." *Human Communication Research*, 3(1977), 235-242.

[12] Grice, "Logic and Conversation," p. 49.

[13] Gary Cronkhite, "Perception and Meaning," in *Handbook of Rhetoric and Communication*, ed. Carroll Arnold and John Bowers. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, in press.

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CONTROL AND INTENT PROFILES
OF INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT

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> Observing how a friend of their's was dominating her spouse, the husband stated, "Marriages are all alike. Haven't you noticed how one spouse always leads and the other follows?"
>
> Contemplating their relationship, the wife said, "I guess that's what makes our marriage so interesting."
>
> The husband replied, "Right, after fifteen years we're still jockeying for position."

Research in relational dynamics is relatively scarce. Several explanations for this relative scarcity could be suggested but are collapsible into three general reasons. The reasons are interrelated and mutually reinforce research paradigms that effectively exclude investigation of the "jockeying for position" characteristics of interpersonal relationships - the characteristic structuring processes that provide relationships life, vitality and fun. Methodologically, there are few extant schemes that observe processual dynamics, but several that attempt to inferentially assess personality traits, motives, attitudes and cognitions. Conceptually, relational variables have been subordinated to intra-individual variables so that a given relationship's shape and dynamics are asserted to be a simple, linear, additive result of intra-subsystem "causes." Epistemologically, social science in general has not taken a processual, evolutionary view of social relationships, assuming instead a static, normative, deterministic view.

A growing uneasiness with social science models oriented toward consensus, normative order and static equilibrium has rekindled interest in the phenomenon of conflict. Within normative models, conflict is basically dismissed as an aberrant event which is caused by the actions of a deviant member. Dynamic models, on the other hand, view conflict as an inevitable occurrence in the continuous re-structuring of interpersonal relationships. As Simmel (1955, p. 15) points out, it is a basic misunderstanding of social dynamics to think of conflict as interaction that "tears down" what harmony and consensus "build up." The "unity" of a group resides in mutuality of interactional processes: "contradiction and conflict not only precede this unity but are operative in it at every moment of its existence" (Simmel, 1955, p. 15).

Previous studies have assumed that a dyad's "unity" is immanent in patterns of message exchange and have attempted to describe aspects of the "jockeying for position" dynamics of husband-wife conversations (Millar & Rogers, 1976; Millar, Rogers & Courtright, 1979; Courtright, Millar & Rogers, 1979; Rogers & Millar, 1979; Rogers, Courtright & Millar, 1980; Rogers, 1982; Millar, Courtright & Rogers, 1982). These works used the Rogers and Farace (1975) Relational Communication Control Coding procedures (RC^3) to describe the "control" dynamics of interpersonal relationships as manifested in verbal behavior. Recently, Millar, Rogers and Beavin Bavelas (1983) suggested that a conflict pattern can be structurally identified as the occurrence of three, contiguous, one-up maneuvers (i.e., a double-transact of two competitive symmetrical transacts). This operationalization unambiguously identifies the event of conflict, "locates" that event in the sequential control implications of verbalizations, and was derived from the active opposition conceptualization of conflict (Coser, 1956; Frost & Wilmot, 1978; Foss, 1980). As Frost and Wilmot emphasize, "...conflict is communicative behavior; it is impossible to have conflict without either verbal or nonverbal behavior, or both" (1978, p. 9).

Although earlier investigations with RC^3 have evidenced its empirical utility and provided some interesting findings, these studies are limited and limiting. Quite obviously, they are limited to verbal patterns as nonverbal behaviors are excluded from analyses. A more serious theoretical limitation is that other dimensions of dyadic relationships (i.e., love, affection, intimacy, trust and meaning - various labels are offered in the literature) have not been identified and other intersubjective aspects of verbalizations have not been analyzed. The primary purpose of this paper is to provide a fairly comprehensive review of another methodological tool for describing verbal dynamics - the Verbal Response Mode Taxonomy (VRM) proposed by Stiles (1978a; 1978b; 1979; 1980; 1981).

Our interest in the VRM stems from the quest to use other descriptive tools in combination with RC^3 to more accurately describe relational dynamics in general and conflictual patterns in particular. Stiles' scheme attempts to classify the "intentional" aspects of verbalizations, while Rogers' attempts to delineate the pragmatic control implications of verbal behavior. Several similarities exist between the two methods which appear to warrant the exploration of their combined use. For instance, proponents of both schemes: purport to describe qualitative aspects of interpersonal relations in comprehensive and quantitative ways; assume that verbal statements are intersubjective acts in which Other is simultaneously context for and contextualized by Speaker's behavior; assume that meta-levels of meanings are used by interactants' to construct meanings about behaviors, but attempt to describe verbalizations at their most overt levels; offer similar therapeutic suggestions, i.e., since relationships emerge in talk, the change implication is to alter or modify how people behave vis-a-vis one another; and, finally, both procedures are analytically derived, content-free descriptive tools concerned with "how behavior means" for relationships rather than "what behavior means" to participants (Scheflen, 1974, p. 181).

Despite these several similarities, there are some fundamental differences between VRM and RC^{3}. The differences primarily revolve around the unitising rules for coding a verbalization and the explanatory target of these respective schemes. The VRM uses a "psychological unit of experience" (Stiles, 1978a, p. 32) to unitize verbalizations, while RC^{3} uses pragmatic function (typically the conversational turn) as its unitizing rule. Stiles' studies, by focusing on the intent structure, primarily use the individual as the unit of explanation, while Rogers' and her colleagues attempt to use the conjointly created relationship per se to explain interactants' behaviors.

VERBAL RESPONSE MODE TAXONOMY

Stiles assumes that each utterance or illocutionary act includes an "intersubjective aspect" that "connects two centers of experience in a particular way" and, thereby, "defines relationship of speaker to other for that utterance" (1981, p. 228) Each interactant is viewed as a center of experience and experience is thought of as a continuous stream within the individual. A communicative act is, therefore, conceived of as a "point of contact (or attempted contact) between two streams" of experience (Stiles, 1981, p. 229). An ongoing profile of the interpersonal relationship as momentarily defined by the speaker is created by classifying every illocutionary act. In so doing, the taxonomy attempts to serve as a "conceptual bridge from individual speech acts to two-person discourse and interpersonal relationships" (Stiles, 1981, p. 231). Each utterance classification is called a "verbal response mode" which is defined as "a category of language behavior that implies a particular interpersonal intent or micro-relationship between communicator and recipient" (Stiles, 1978b, p. 693).

Classification Principles

Each verbal response mode category is based on three analytically derived, dichotomous principles of classification stemming from the conception of verbal interaction as occurring between two centers of experience - speaker and other. Loosely, the classification principles are defined by the following three questions asked about every utterance: Whose experience is the topic of that illocutionary act? Whose frame of reference is used to understand the utterance? On whom is the statement focused? The *source of experience* question asks whose experience is the topic mentioned and refers to "whether the utterance concerns the speaker's or other's ideas, information, feelings or behaviors" (Stiles, 1981, p. 229). The second question results in the *frame of reference* principle which concerns whether the central topic of the utterance is "expressed from the speaker's own point of view or from a viewpoint shared with the other" (Stiles, 1981, p. 230). Since no utterance is meaningful in isolation, "the frame of reference is the context in which the truth, accuracy, or relevance of a statement is intended to be judged" (Stiles, 1978b, p. 695). Finally, the third question illustrates the *focus* principle which refers to "whether the speaker implicitly presumes to know what the other's experience or frame of reference is or should be" (Stiles, 1981, p. 230). On the basis of these three classification principles with their two possible values, eight verbal response modes are distinguished. The eight VRM categories are shown in Table 1.

VRM Categories

The eight categories will be briefly illustrated in order to provide a better "feel" for how the three classification principles are used to code verbal behavior. (Abridged definitions of the eight verbal response modes are listed in Table 2.) *Disclosure* "concerns the speaker's expression in the speaker's frame of reference, focused on the speaker" (Stiles, 1978b, p. 695). For example, the disclosure "I used to be afraid of making a public speech," reveals the speaker's experience (fear), in the speaker's frame of reference (associated feelings, perceptions and memories) and is focused on the speaker (no specific knowledge of other is presumed or implied). A *question*, e.g., "What references did you use for your speech?" concerns the other's experience (search for references), in the speaker's frame of reference (lacks information about the material used to prepare the speech) without presuming to know the other's frame of reference (if the asker knew the bibliographical material used, she wouldn't have to ask).

An *edification*, e.g., "John just finished giving his speech," declares the speaker's experience (knowledge of what happened), is focused on the speaker (no specific knowledge of other is presumed) and uses a generalized other's frame of reference (the semantic context is an assumed to be commonly shared frame of reference about "objective" reality that any cultural member in the right place at the right time with sufficient skills would observe and report). *Acknowledgements* are somewhat different from the other categories in that they signal reception of or receptiveness to the statements of another and, in that sense, lack clear denotative contents. Statements such as "Yeah," "Mm-Hm," "Well, " and "Hi" are coded as acknowledgements.

Advisements, such as "you should have cited more statistics in your speech today," concern the speaker's experience (the idea that not enough statistics were cited), in the other's frame of reference (preparation for today's speech) and are focused on the other (impose the speaker's knowledge about what constitutes a "good" speech on other). A statement like "You contradicted yourself in today's speech," is classified as

TABLE 1: Taxonomy of Verbal Response Modes

Focus	Frame of Reference	Source of Experience	
		Speaker	Other
Speaker	Speaker	Disclosure (D)	Question (Q)
	Other	Edification (E)	Acknowledgement (K)
Other	Speaker	Advisement (A)	Interpretation (I)
	Other	Confirmation (C)	Reflection (R)

Note: The *focus* taxonomic principle refers to "whether the speaker implicitly presumes to know what the other's experience or frame of reference is or should be. An utterance is focused on the speaker if its meaning does not depend on such a presumption." The *frame of reference* principle concerns whose viewpoint is to be used as the context for giving the utterance meaning. Put another way, "the frame of reference is the viewpoint from which the truth, accuracy, or relevance of a statement is intended to be judged." *Source of experience*, as a taxonomic principle, "refers to the person whose experience is the topic of the utterance. ...Each utterance concerns one experience (one central idea or topic), and the source of that experience" must logically be either the speaker or the other. (Stiles, 1978a, pp. 4-5)

an *interpretation*. Interpretations concern the other's experience (other's verbal presentation in the above example), are focused on the other's experience (what he said during the speech) but contextualize other's experience in the speaker's frame of reference (the other's speech was judged as contradictory according to the speaker's standards).

Confirmation, e.g.,"We don't agree on the substance of your speech," declares the speaker's experience (lack of agreement), in the other's frame of reference (other's ideas presented in speech) and presumes to understand the other's frame of reference (the focus principle). Finally, a *reflection*, such as "You feel badly about your speech today," concerns the other's experience (how he feels), from the other's frame of reference (in terms of the other's judgemental context about self) and is focused on the other (the speaker must presume to know that other feels bad in order to restate or clarify the other's experience).

Coding with VRM

When utilizing Stiles' taxonomy, each utterance is coded twice; once for its grammatical form and once for its inter-

TABLE 2: Abridged Definitions of Verbal Response Modes*

	Grammatical Form	Intended Function
Disclosure (D)	Declarative, first person singular ("I")	Reveals thoughts, feelings, perceptions, intentions
Question (Q)	Interrogative, inverted subject-verb order	Requests information or guidance
Edification (E)	Declarative, third person (e.g., "he," "she," "it")	States objective information
Acknowledgement (K)	Nonlexical or contentless utterances, terms of address and salutation	Conveys receipt of or receptiveness to communication
Advisement (A)	Imperative or second person with verb of permission, prohibition, or obligation	Attempts to guide behavior; suggestions, commands, advice
Interpretation (I)	Second person ("you") verb implies an attribute or ability, terms of evaluation	Explains or labels the other; judgements, evaluations of other
Confirmation (C)	First person plural ("we") where referent includes other	Compares speaker's experience with other's; agreement, disagreement
Reflection (R)	Second person ("you") verb implies internal experience or volitional action, finishing other's sentence	Puts other's experience into words; repetitions, restatements, clarifications

Note: Both the form and intent are coded for each utterance. The form code is written first and the intent code second, in parentheses. To illustrate: "Clean up your room" is a pure advisement, coded A(A); however, the utterance "Don't you think you should clean up your room?" is a mixed mode with a question form and advisement intent, coded Q(A).

*The abridged definitions listed are quoted from Table 1 in Stiles and White (1981, p. 233). Essentially the same definitions can be found in Stiles, Putnam, Wolf and James (1979c, p. 67[illegible]).

personal intent. The form codes are claimed to represent "a more overt, explicit, superficial, or 'formal' level of the relationship, while the intent values represent a more covert, implicit, deeper, or 'intentional' level" (Stiles, Putnam, James & Wolf, 1979c, p. 337). The word 'intent' in this taxonomy does not imply that mind-reading the speaker is necessary for coding. Rather, the use of the term 'intent' stems from the assertion that "illocutionary force is a reflexive intent" which means that an utterance "is intended to be recognized as intended to be recognized" (Stiles, 1981, p. 247). The notion of reflexive intent, then, emphasizes that the recognition of a verbalization's effect *is* the effect recognized; since recognition is dependent upon message reception, illocutionary intent is publicly manifested and observable.

An utterance is thought to be a "psychological unit of experience" (Stiles, 1978a, p. 32); thus, any given conversational turn may contain one or more utterances. Operationally, "each independent clause, each nonrestrictive dependent clause, each term of address or acknowledgement, and each element of a compound predicate" (Stiles, 1978a, p. 32) is unitized as an utterance. The coding of each and every utterance for both form and intent locates a statement into one of 64 (8 x 8) possible classifications. The eight modes that have the same form and intent codings are called "pure modes" and the 56 which contain different form and intent codings are called "mixed modes" (Stiles, 1978a, p. 12).

Quite obviously, the VRM's unitizing rule and dual coding procedures generate a large amount of data for even short dyadic exchanges. However, given the target of these procedures is an ongoing description of the momentarily defined micro-relationship in terms of the speaker's current stream of awareness, these procedures seem necessary if not absolutely mandatory. In sum, the classification principles, unitizing rule and dual codings of VRM appear to provide an analytically rigorous, internally consistent, comprehensive and empirical way of "capturing" the subtleties and complexities of verbal interaction.

VRM's Reliability

Reliability estimates are, not surprisingly, higher for form than intent codings. The average pairwise agreement amongst independent coders is about 85% for form and 75% for intent (Stiles, 1978b, p. 699). However, when three coders are used, the average "two-out-of-three" percent agreement is improved to about 95% or better for both form and intent (Stiles, 1978b; Stiles et al, 1979b; Stiles, Waszak & Barton, 1979d; Cansler & Stiles, 1981). This improvement over the pairwise agreements "reflects coders disagreeing between only two modes, rather than among all eight (e.g., coders might disagree about whether an utterance's intent was disclosure or edification, but none would call it reflection)" (Stiles et al, 1979d, p. 163). The use of three independent coders

and of a "two-out-of-three" decision rule (assuming reasonable pairwise agreement initially) is recommended for interactional coding even though this adds considerable time and expense to the research. The recommendation is based on the primacy of the reliability criterion for interactional analyses (Menzel, 1979).

Felicity Criterion for VRM Categories

Since every verbalization is an attempt to connect "two centers of experience," felicity rather than empirical or metaphysical truth is the primary criterion for evaluating the semantic-pragmatic aspects of talk. Felicity conditions are not determined by comparing the content of statements against some presupposed external reality, but by analyzing the speaker in the context of the currently developing interpersonal reality (Pearce & Cronen, 1980, p. 110). The three basic classification principles are again used by Stiles (1981, pp. 232-234) to enumerate and explain the different felicity conditions of the eight categories. The felicity criterion for each VRM category is specified in Table 3. Analyzing statements' felicities seems especially important in studying conflict patterns because such assessments allow the researcher to at least partially explain how and when conflicts emerge in conversation. For example, other doubts the sincerity of speaker's disclosure and actively opposes its content; the speaker, in turn, responds by declaring his sincerity so that the "topic" of the conversation quickly becomes judgements about the speaker and not the denotative referent of his original statement.

Interpersonal Dimensions and Roles

The dichotomous classification principles are also used to define three interpersonal dimensions of relationships as immanent in verbal behavior (Stiles, 1978b; Stiles et al, 1979b; Stiles, 1981). The source of experience principle is the basis for an *attentiveness—nonattentiveness* dimension which "refers to the degree to which a person's utterances concern the other's experience" (Stiles, 1978b, p. 699). The *acquiescence—nonacquiescence* dimension is grounded in the frame of reference principle and concerns the "extent to which a person uses the other's frame of reference or accedes to the other's viewpoint" during the dyadic exchange (Stiles, 1978b, p. 700). The third dimension, called *presumptuousness—nonpresumptuousness*, is rooted in the focus principle; this continuum concerns the "extent to which a person presumes knowledge of the other" during the course of the conversation (Stiles, 1978b, p. 700).

Because each of the three principles can have values of speaker or other, six interpersonal roles are defined in terms of the three dimensions. The six interpersonal roles delineated are called attentive, informative, acquiescent, directive, presumptuous, and unassuming. The roles can be identified for

TABLE 3: Felicity Criteria of Verbal Response Modes*

VRM Category	Felicity Comparison	Felicity Criterion
Disclosure (D)	Speaker's frame of reference	Sincerity: the speaker must have had the experience reported
Question (Q)	Speaker's frame of reference	Answerability: the speaker must believe that other has knowledge that could fit into his/her frame of reference
Edification (E)	"Objective" reality, a consensually validated frame of reference	Empirical truth: the reported content must fit the objective facts about the experience reported
Acknowledgement (K)	"Objective" reality, a consensually validated frame of reference	Timeliness: the statement must be temporally relevant to the other's statement signalling recognition that other has something to say
Advisement (A)	Speaker's frame of reference	Feasibility: the speaker must believe it's possible for other to follow the guidance offered and experience the imposed suggestion
Interpretation (I)	Speaker's frame of reference	Acuteness: the statement must accurately characterize the other's experience in terms of the speaker's frame of reference
Confirmation (C)	Other's frame of reference	Sincerity and Insight: the statement must accurately represent the private experiences of both speaker and other
Reflection (R)	Other's frame of reference	Empathic: the statement must accurately articulate what other is experiencing from other's frame of reference

*The comparison standards and criteria listed are based upon Stiles' discussion of felicity (1981, pp. 232-234).

TABLE 4: Interpersonal Dimensions and Roles from VRM*

Principle	Interpersonal Dimension	Summed VRM Proportions	Individual's Role Index
Source of Experience	Attentiveness———	Other (Q,K,I,R)	Attentive
	Nonattentiveness	Speaker (D,E,A,C)	Informative
Frame of Reference	Acquiescence———	Other (E,K,C,R)	Acquiescent
	Nonacquiescence	Speaker (D,Q,A,I)	Directive
Focus	Presumptuousness—	Other (A,I,C,R)	Presumptuous
	Nonpresumptuousness	Speaker (D,Q,E,K)	Unassuming

*The role index labels shown are those used by Stiles (1981, p. 237) and Cansler and Stiles (1981, p. 463). These same proportions are given other names in Stiles (1978b, pp. 699-700), Stiles, Putnam, James and Wolf (1979b, pp. 336-337) and Stiles (1980, p. 361). The latter study raised some doubts about the dimensions' names; therefore, it seemed reasonable to assume that the names used in the most recent articles are those considered the least inappropriate.

either or both the form and intent codings. The six roles are actually three convertible indices (i.e., 1 — % attentive = informative; 1 — % acquiescent = directive; and 1 — % presumptuous = unassuming) that were conceptually distinguished and labelled to "approximate their psychological impact" (Stiles, 1981, p. 237). Table 4 summarizes the derivation of the three interpersonal dimensions and the six roles created by summing the proportional use of the eight VRM categories.

Interpersonal Role Space

The three dimensions and the role indices created by VRM's classification principles can be combined into an interpersonal role space. (See Figure 1.) The rankings of the categories along the three axes are derived from their conceptual definitions. The arrangement of the three dimensions (i.e., presumptuousness as the vertical axis, acquiescence as the horizontal axis and attentiveness as the diagonal axis) is a guess which was partially derived from the classification principles' definitions and partially induced from the results of a study by Stiles (1980).

FIGURE 1: Interpersonal Role Space



Any given interactant can be located in this interpersonal space by simultaneously plotting the proportions of utterances he/she manifested during a dyadic exchange. More significantly, any given dyad as well as different types of dyads (e.g., husband-wife, parent-child, professor-student, etc.) can be located in this space by plotting both interactants' along the three axes and noting the spatial distance between them. By so doing, the distance-regulating function (Kantor & Lehr, 1975) of interpersonal relationships is quantified, however tentatively. The average and expected "distance" between interactants can be compared across interpersonal relations to

assess similarities and differences in their shapes. Further, coding procedures like VRM and RC3 can be used to describe how interactants regulate the expected distance between them in order to describe the qualitative distinctions between relations that have similar and different shapes. In so doing, researchers can begin to identify both the gross distinctions between social relations and the subtle nuances manifested as interactants jockey for position vis-a-vis one another. However, before these ambitious research goals can be accomplished, much more research by other researchers is necessary to evidence the empirical utility and construct validity of the role space dimensions derived from VRM's procedures.

Selected Research Findings

Research utilizing the VRM taxonomy has begun to evidence the scheme's relaibility and descriptive utility across a variety of noun-pairs (e.g., physician-patient, parent-child, professor-student, etc.) The findings are accumulating in ways that support the construct validity and empirical sensitivity of VRM's conceptualizations and measurements (Stiles, 1979; Stiles et al. 1979a; Stiles et al. 1979b; McDaniel, Stiles & McGaughey, 1981). However, the studies to date have had small sample sizes (the relevant sample size for interpersonal research is the number of relations and not the number of utterances) and relatively brief dyadic exchanges. The generalizability of the findings are, therefore, suspect.

Several findings are of interest to communication researchers (Stiles, 1980 which compared perceptual and behavioral indices is particularly interesting), but only those concerned with the interpersonal dimensions and roles will be highlighted. The attentiveness and acquiescence dimensions have not yet received much empirical support in differentiating interpersonal roles in dyadic exchanges, although the results of Stiles et al (1979b) are suggestive. The presumptuous index, however, has clearly differentiated status-discrepant dyads: for instance, physicians manifested more presumptuous modes (i.e., A, I, C, and R) than their patients (Stiles et al, 1979c); professors were more presumptuous than their students (Stiles et al, 1979d); parents were more presumptuous than their children (Stiles & White, 1981); psychotherapists were more presumptuous than their clients (Stiles & Sultan, 1979); and seniors were more presumptuous in senior-freshman dyads, but were less presumptuous than professors in senior-professor conversations (Cansler & Stiles, 1981).

Collectively, these five studies strongly suggest that the shape of the relationship between status-discrepant persons is remarkably similar across differing dyadic setting. Higher-status persons typically used several questions and more presumptuous modes that lower-status persons who, in turn, used mostly the exposition modes (i.e., D(D), E(D), E(E), and D(E)) and modes with acknowledgement forms (e.g., "yes" and "no" answers to other's questions). These comparisons begin to quantify the common observation that status-discrepant relationships resemble and recapitulate the parent-child relationship in significant ways, independent of the content of the interaction (Stiles & Whites, 1981, p. 239). On the one hand, this resemblance in relational shape is not surprising and is expected from cultural preconceptions about these noun-pairs; on the other hand, Stiles and his colleagues are to be commended for quantifying the expected similarity and for providing tentative, behaviorally-based descriptions of how this similarity is established and maintained.

Comparison with RC^3

Several lines of investigation into the combined use of VRM and RC^3 are apparent in this review. The interpersonal role indices seem roughly analogous to the domineeringness, submissiveness and levellingness measures (Rogers & Millar, 1979). Specifically, the acquiescent and unassuming proportions are expected to correlate with the submissiveness index (i.e., the proportion of one-down movements manifested by an individual); the directive and presumptuous measures appear similar to the domineeringness score (i.e., the proportion of one-up maneuvers expressed by an individual); and the attentive and informative indices are expected to be correlated with the levellingness measure (i.e., the individual's proportion of one-across moves). These expectations are testable and, if moderately substantiated (strong correlations are not expected because of differences in unitizing rules), would help "translate" between the descriptions and explanations offered by these two methods. RC^3 researchers are advised to follow Stiles' lead and use all three indices to more accurately characterize an individual as domineering, submissive or levelling rather than ground these characterizations in only one proportional measure.

If these correlations are substantiated, then conflicts (i.e., three contiguous one-ups) would contain primarily directive and presumptuous utterances. All felicity criteria except timeliness and empirical truth (see Tables 3 and 4) would be used to analyze the dynamics of conflicts. This observation suggests that the experience of conflict is largely concerned with the other's infelicity and not primarily concerned with the accuracy of "objective" facts, even though the latter may be the manifest content of the conflict. Perhaps conflicts, as structurally identified, about the accuracy of "facts" (about the contents of an assumed to be shared frame of reference) are what people commonly call disagreements, and what Coser (1956) calls "realistic conflict" and Foss (1980) terms "instrumental conflict." This reasoning, then, grounds theoretical terms in communicative behaviors and allows for the empirical testing of several insighful hypotheses about the dynamics and consequences of engaging in conflict.

Secondly, the interpersonal role proportions suggested by Stiles can be combined into static profiles for comparison with the frequency of complementary, symmetrical and transitory transacts identified by RC^3. Significantly different VRM proportions would define complementary and transitory structures, while non-significant differences between the interactants' proportions would identify symmetrical ones. Specifically, the following role ratios could be compared in order to assess the degree of "translatibility" between the VRM and RC^3 concepts: % complementary to presumptuous/acquiescent and directive/unassuming ratios; % transitory to attentive/acquiescent, unassuming/informative, presumptuous/attentive, and directive/informative ratios; % competitive symmetry to presumptuous/presumptuous and directive/directive ratios; % neutralized symmetry to attentive/attentive and informative/informative ratios; and % submissive symmetry to acquiescent/acquiescent and unassuming/unassuming ratios.

The "translations" specified are conceptual only and are not operationally equivalent; the Rogers-Farace transacts are identified by contiguous behaviors, while the VRM ratios are based on proportions manifested by each interactant over the conversation or some segment of it. However, if these expectations are evidenced, then the theoretical breadth of the complementary, symmetrical and transitory concepts is enriched and supportive of these communication terms as a theoretical language for describing and understanding interpersonal dynamics. Further, if these "translations" are evidenced, then communicative descriptions and explanations are provided for how, when and why (i.e., felicity judgements) some marital dyads appear "conflict-habituated" (too many conflicts), some appear "devitalized" (too few conflicts) and others appear "vital" (frequent, but managed conflicts) (Cuber & Haroff, 1965, pp. 44-59). Similarly, status-discrepant interactions are expected to manifest few conflicts; thus, status-discrepant conversation might appear "devitalized" and be experienced as devitalizing. Too few conflicts, in turn, are characteristic of a rigid transactional structure that may or may not be functional for the dyad's ostentive purpose, but that does maintain the culturally prescribed "distance" between interactants in self-fulfilling and self-sustaining ways.

Even if none of the above correlations are evidenced, the combined use of VRM and RC^3 ought to be useful in describing qualitative differences in the emergence, management, and resolution of interpersonal conflicts. The combination of intent comparisons from VRM with the sequential control movements of RC^3 seems especially useful in differentiating structurally identified conflict from intersubjectively experienced conflict - a limitation of the three-step operationalization proposed by Millar et al (1983). Even if this last suggestion is not born out, the combined use of these procedures will be useful in sensitizing researchers to how culturally induced expectations about relational dynamics are immanent in communicative behaviors and are, therefore, "validated" in self-fulfilling and self-sustaining patterns.

CONCLUSION

What is particularly impressive about Stiles' work is the consistent application of three analytically distinct choices: Whose experience is the topic of the utterance? Whose frame of reference is used to contextualize the statement? On whom does the message focus? These three logically independent decisions are used to derive coding procedures for verbalizations at both the grammatical form and reflexive intent levels. These same three principles are also the conceptual foundation for identifying three interpersonal dimensions and six interpersonal roles for describing and comparing interpersonal dynamics. The dimensions proposed can be combined into an interpersonal role space for comparing the distances between dyadic partners in order to statically profile the shape of various relations. The VRM procedures, because of the unitizing rule and dual codings, are not suitable for sequential, stochastic statistics like lag-sequential and Markov analyses. In sum, the logical consistency and analytical rigor of Stiles' conceptualizations and operationalizations are genuinely praiseworthy.

Initial investigations utilizing the VRM have evidenced the scheme's reliability, practicality for empirical research, and are supportive of its construct validity. The researcher contemplating the use of VRM, however, should be cautioned that "new coders often report that coding the first few transcripts is laborious and time-consuming, requiring frequent reference to the manual" (Stiles, 1978a, pp. 2-3). This same caution, of course, is relevant to the use of any interactional coding scheme. But, if empirically-grounded, communication theories about relational dynamics in general, and interpersonal conflicts in particular, are to evolve, the researcher has little choice but to extend the effort required. Our field, particularly in the area of conflict, has too long suffered from the "ideology of intimacy" (Parks, 1982); an ideology that moralistically prescribes behaviors and, therefore, steadfastly avoids empirical descriptions of functional and dysfunctional behavioral patterns - the basis of communication theory.

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INTERPERSONAL DISAGREEMENT: THE STUDY OF SOCIAL CONFRONTATION

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All argument occuring between two individuals—no matter how we choose to define it--occurs, by nature, in a problematic situation. We claim that this problematic situation is a prerequisite to all interpersonal argument. Imagine any form of interpersonal argument. Give the term argument any popular definition you wish, be it argument as conflict, argument as reasoning, argument as persuasion. The situation which you have imagined takes place because one of the individuals—possibly both—perceives a problem existing between the two. This problem manifests itself in many forms, of which we can say there are two predominant types: disagreement over ideas or disagreement over behaviors. For the purposes of this and future research, we term this particular situation type as "social confrontation" and claim such a situation exists whenever two or more individuals disagree over an idea or behavior and communicate that disagreement to one another. More specifically, we define "social confrontation" as that encounter which begins when one person says to another, "I disagree" or "I don't like" in reference to the other's ideas or behaviors. As a problematic situation, social confrontation subsumes the behaviors that follow this initial interaction, including argument, explanation, negotiation, avoidance, among others.

Despite its obvious importance in the process of argumentation, few researchers have approached the concept of social confrontation. In a previous paper (1982), we began this research from an initiating angle, asking and uncovering what factors work to facilitate or constrain confrontation. In this paper, we propose to take the next step toward understanding the situation which is studying the interaction of the situation itself. We will demonstrate in this paper that an inherent component of the social confrontation situation is negotiating social rules in order to complete the confrontation. As such, our focus is both interpersonally and argumentatively oriented. Since social confrontation is a situation where individuals typically negotiate rules, the situation can be viewed as an important maintenance device in any relationship. How people "do" confrontation then becomes a component of how they "do" maintenance. We also envision a complimentary relation with argumentation. Argument has been defined in a myriad of ways and a recurrent component of the definitions is "disagreement." Jacobs and Jackson (1981), for example, suggest one characteristic of argument is disagreement-relevance. The problem for the observer and even for the participants is in "hearing" disagreement-relevance. Given our definition of social confrontation, however, we believe it is reasonable to listen to talk within the encounter as disagreement-relevant. Rather than looking for argument as

a form of talk, we use argument as a perspective to guide our observations.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

To describe social confrontation as a particular type of problematic situation implies that the act of confrontation creates a rend in the social order. Either (a) the current social order—the way things are done--is challenged, or (b) an action is "brought forward, into the light," showing the current social order to be a falsehood. Stokes and Hewitt (1976) describe the problematic situation from the participants' perspective:

> Interaction is disrupted, identities are threatened, meanings are unclear, situations seem disorderly, people have intentions that run counter to others' wishes, seemingly inexplicable events take place, people don't know what is happening to them...(p. 842)

The focus of the interaction is upon taking care of the problem. One can expect a certain kind of talk. Morris and Hopper (1980) suggest "the talk centers on appropriateness of particular conduct in particular contexts." Stokes and Hewitt (1976) call this kind of talk "aligning actions." They describe the actions as:

> Largely verbal efforts to restore or assure a meaningful interaction in the face of problematic situations of one kind or another, activities such as disclaiming, requesting and giving accounts, constructing quasi-theoretical explanations of problematic situations, offering apologies, formulating the definition of a situation, and talking about motives...(p. 838).

We are interested in describing how people identify or establish a problem, negotiate the nature of the problem, and work their way toward a resolution.

Morris and Hopper (1980) point out that "during problematic situations, rules become evident, salient, and vulnerable to analysis" (p. 266). However, we are not interested in identifying specific relational rules or expectations. Rather, we are interested in identifying how rules are negotiated in relationships in order to maintain them. Morris and Hopper (1980) argue:

> Rules for social intercourse deal with many acts... Lists and descriptions of these rules would add little to understanding of rules, or of communication. By contrast, the process of negotiation of such rules may be of great interest. We have provided one layer of such description in the concepts of remediation and legislation in talk. Another useful layer of description could concern the verbal tactics used to constitute moves in the negotiative process (p. 273).

Morris and Hopper have identified two important processes used when a situation becomes problematic: (1) remediation suggests that the participants agree upon the legitimacy of an old relational rule or expectation but develop more specifically their understanding of how and when the rule applies; and (2) legislation suggests that participants agree upon a new rule or expectation. As Morris and Hopper advise, our analysis will be aimed at another layer of description: the verbal tactics used by participants within remediation and legislation.

To further clarify our goal and the phenomenon of interest, we will briefly contrast our view of confrontation with other researchers. Two major operationalizations of confrontation have been represented in two methods in previous research: rhetorical analysis and discourse analysis. Rhetorical analysis has tended to focus on confrontation as a radical revolutionary activity. Cathcart in "Movements: Confrontation as Rhetorical Form" (1978) describes confrontation as follows:

> Confrontational rhetoric shouts "stop!" at the system, saying, "you cannot go on assuming you are the true and correct order; you must see yourself as the evil thing you are" (p. 243).

This definition of confrontation correlates with ours only in terms of focusing on the encounter of challenging the social order. However, due to the scale of the context--social movements--the analysis views confrontation as a public ritual, a taking up of sides. Negotiation of differences is impossible, neglected or irrelevant.

Discourse analysis focuses more upon doing different types of talk rather than on using talk to accomplish relational functions. Jacobs (1982) uses discourse analysis to refine a linguistic definition of confrontation presented by Bleiberg and Churchill (1975). Jacobs provides a clear statement of the purpose of discourse analysis:

> The goal of a discourse analytic approach is to produce a technical description of the tacit knowledge that natural language users rely upon to methodically produce any particular pattern of interest. A description of that sort of knowledge permits the analyst to explain how the pattern is generated and why it has the properties it does (p. 9).

Jacobs, thus, describes confrontation as consisting of a sequence of three acts:

1. Confronted performs a speech act, A, which commits him to belief in proposition, P.
2. Confronter requests information, $I^1 . . . I^i$, which confronted supplies and thereby commits himself to belief in that information.
3. Confronter performs a speech act, R, that expresses a proposition, C, where it is mutually understood that
   a. R is a reply to A
   b. C is the contradiction of P
   c. C is a conclusion drawn from $I^1 . . . I^i$
   d. confronted has performed a self-contradiction (p. 18).

In discourse analysis, the focus is upon how actors generate confrontation "talk." In contrast, our perspective views confrontation as a situation where confrontation "talk" may or may not be present, but the purpose of the situation is confrontation--addressing a relational problem. By transposing the definition from a type of discourse to a type of encounter, we are better able to examine the relational implications of the interaction.

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

GENERATING DATA

Twelve subjects (six males, six females) were recruited from the basic fundamentals of communication course at Utah State University. The subjects were asked to: (1) fill out questionnaires, (2) participate in two fifteen minute role-playing situations, (3) participate in an interview with the researcher about the role-playing situations. The role-playing situations were of two types, confrontation over ideas and confrontation over behaviors. For the purpose of this paper we will analyze just the instances of role-playing confrontation over behaviors.

Each subject participated in one confrontation over behaviors. The role-playing situations involved dyads. So six role-playing confrontations over behaviors occured. The subjects were paired and assigned to a role-playing situation based upon their responses to a questionnaire. The questionnaire presented five situations describing confrontation over behaviors. For each situation the subject was asked: (1) Have you ever been in a situation like this, or can you imagine yourself in this situation? (2) Which person can you relate to, or identify with? (3) Would you find this a threatening situation to role-play? The situations were derived from earlier research (Newell and Stutman, 1982) where subjects from the same population had been asked to describe a situation where they had confronted someone. No subjects were assigned to a role-playing situation perceived as threatening. Subjects were put into situations they had experienced, and put in the role they could identify with. The resulting role-playing situations were:

A. Tracy is the manager of J.B.'s restaurant. Chris is a waiter there. Tracy asks Chris to do something Chris doesn't think is part of the job. Chris confronts Tracy. (Two dyads performed this role-playing situation. Each dyad was composed of a male and a female. In each case the female performed the manager role.)

B. You have been dating rather steadily for about six months. Kelly suspects that Kris has been secretly dating other people, and now decides to confront Kris. Kelly has just picked Kris up for a date. (Two dyads performed this role-playing situation. Each dyad was composed of a male and a female. In each case the male performed the confronter role.)

C. You are roommates. Terry has discovered that Marty has been spreading rumors about her. Finding herself alone in the apartment with Marty, Terry decides to confront her. (One dyad, composed of two females performed this role-playing situation.)

D. You are roommates. Kim has once again borrowed some of Jerry's clothing without asking. It's first thing in the morning when Kim and Jerry are getting ready for school. Jerry decides to confront Kim about his behavior. (One dyad, composed of two males performed this role-playing situation.)

All the subjects participated in a 30-minute training session on how to role-play. The researchers reassured the subjects that they would not be evaluated, and their privacy would be protected.

The role-playing took place in a private room. When the dyad arrived the researcher: (1) presented them with their role-playing situation, (2) answered any questions about the situation, (3) urged the subjects to arrange the room to fit their needs, (4) suggested the subjects agree on any background information they would need to role-play the situation, and (5) told them to go until they felt they had reached a "natural" conclusion, no matter if it took one minute or ten minutes. The subjects were then left alone in the room with the tape recorder in clear, but not obtrusive, sight.

VALIDITY OF THE DATA

Validity of the data centers on two questions: (1) To what extent does the role-playing reflect how anyone would actually do social confrontation? and (2) To what extent does the role-playing reflect how the participants would actually do social confrontation? The easiest way to answer question 1 is to answer question 2: ask the participants to listen to the tapes of the confrontation and comment on whether they sound like themselves or not. An affirmative answer would suggest that the role-playing is reflective of how someone would actually do social confrontation. However, a negative answer to question 2 does not necessarily imply a negative answer to question 1 — relegating the role playing to parrody. Just because a participant does not interpret or "hear" the tape as an accurate reflection of how he or she does social confrontation does not eliminate the possibility that the role-playing still reflects how someone might do social confrontation. At this point, both the researchers and the readers must use their judgment as competent social actors to assess whether or not the confrontation sounds believable, "real." At this time in our research the matching of the individual with the particular role-playing performance is not necessary. We are concerned with describing how people do social confrontation. Later when we start asking questions of how personality, past history of the relationship, perceptions of the situation, etc., relate to how someone does social confrontation, then the critical question of validity will be: Does this sample of talk accurately reflect how this particular individual (or dyad) does social confrontation?

A week or so after participating in the role-playing situation each participant was interviewed by a researcher. First, the subject was asked for general responses to the situation. Most subjects commented on

being nervous at first, and then "getting into" the confrontation. They reported that it was "fun" and fairly typical of similar confrontation situations. Then the researcher played the tape of the role-playing situation and asked the subject to stop the tape any place s/he had a comment as to how they sounded. They were instructed to especially listen to if they sounded real or "phony" to themselves. Most comments concerned the content of what was said. For example "I wouldn't really invite him to my apartment for dinner. I can't cook." In a couple of instances, one subject admitted to "pushing" the confrontation a little more than he probably would, and another subject suggested that he held back a bit in the role-playing situation. In listening to the tapes, both researchers were amazed by how believable or "real" the confrontations sounded.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Each role-playing interaction was audio tape recorded and then transcribed. The transcripts were then read and reread to discover patterns of confrontation. This search was guided by an argumentation perspective, searching for claim, data, warrant, and by an interpersonal rules perspective searching for invocation of rules, negotiation of rules--the resolution of the problem.

VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF OBSERVATIONS

Our observations should be evaluated by the standard of inter-subjectivity. First, the researchers have engaged in a "haggling" over observations in order to refine and discipline our observations. Second, the reader, as a competent social actor, must judge the reasonability of our interpretations. Glaser and Strauss (1967) call this the "joint responsibility" for establishing the credibility of research (p. 232). While space limitations prohibit the inclusion of complete transcripts, each observation is generously documented with samples of talk.

OBSERVATIONS

INITIATION OF CONFRONTATION

The subjects used a number of different tactics in initiating confrontation. The direct challenge of "I don't like your behavior" is the exception rather than the norm. The most direct confrontation occured when the other person brought up the issue:

> *E: I really need someone to help bus tables. You know we're short tonight and other people said you were complaining about it. But you know it needs to be done. I really need you to do it.
>
> R: Well that's not my job. My job is waiter here.

The confronter here makes a direct statement that the other is breaking a rule.

A variation involves a statement of conflicting expectations and a request for clarification. In the other encounters between a waiter and

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*In the samples of talk "R" will be used to designate the confronter, and "E" to designate the confrontee.

manager, the confronter expresses the confusion of being put in a double-bind situation.

> Well two weeks ago, we--when we first interviewed, you said that the waiters and waitresses wouldn't be expected to wash dishes. But just the other night everything was you know, things were in a jam. All of a sudden somebody said "Tracy we need some help, we think you ought'a go back and help them wash dishes," and uh I really didn't mind it, but it was just that at the initial interview it was said that I would never have to wash dishes. And it kind of bothered me.

In these variations of a direct approach, the confronter makes specific reference to the rule or expectation which is being broken.

In the more indirect approaches, the confronter begins with an expression of his or her feelings, initially avoiding directly stating that the other has violated an expectation. The statement of feelings is used as a "demand ticket" (Nofsinger, 1975) to get the other involved in the conversation, and then the rule or expectation is invoked:

R: Well my feelings are really hurt today.
E: How come?
R: Well, I heard from Debbie that you've been telling everybody about all the little personal things I've been doing. How could you do--you know we're roommates--how could you do something like that?

Or the person may act hurt, or at least "odd" so that the other person is put in the place of initiating the encounter. In the situation of the couple, dating for six months, the couple makes small talk for three or four minutes until finally the female is compelled to ask the male, "Is something wrong?" The conversation continues:

R: No. (very softly)
E: Nothing?
R: I don't know. I've just been kind of wondering lately, you just don't seem to feel like you care any more. You don't ever seem to want to go out with me or anything. And I don't know, I just thought maybe--Have you been going out with another guy? (voice cracks)

Not only has the confronter compelled the other person to bring up the discussion of something not being right, but he also avoids confronting her "with the facts" and instead suggests he just suspects she might be seeing someone else. Later in the conversation he reveals that his roommates have seen her at the movies with another guy. So he could have confronted her directly with this perceived breach in behavior.

The last two confrontations reflect that the confronters may lack confidence in the legitimacy of their expectations. They initiate the conversation by pointing out the behavior, seemingly giving the other person the opportunity to admit guilt:

R: I think I seen ya the other night.
E: Did ya? Where, where was that?
R: At the drive-in.
E: At the drive-in.
R: Ya.
E: Ya, I was there with some friends of mine.
R: Friends? I only seen one person there, besides you.
E: Well, uhm, he's a friend of mine ya. I didn't know you were there. Why didn't you come over and say, "Hi"?
R: I thought you'd probably be uncomfcrtable. I decided to stay away so you could enjoy the movie.
E: It was a good show, wasn't it?
(Laughter)
R: Ya it was. I didn't see much of it, I was watching you two guys. Observing the car there.
E: Well I'm sorry about that. I didn't know you were going to be there.
R: I thought, man we've been going together for about six months, and, uhm, I thought you liked me.

The female's response appears to confirm that the expectation of an exclusive dating situation was not explicit in the relationship. She maintains the impression that her actions were perfectly normal: "Why didn't you come over and say, "Hi." When she does express remorse, it is directed toward having hurt his feelings rather than an acknowledgement of breaking a rule. The confronter also suggests that his expectations may not have been an explicit understanding of the relationship. Rather than referring to the rule as established, he asks what her expectations are: "You wouldn't be offended if I like dated other girls, would ya?" Her response confirms that for her the expectation was not clear: "No buh uh, I think, I think we never really stated that so maybe we need to, maybe it would be good for both of us if we did."

In the last confrontation, the situation involves two male roommates where one borrows the other's clothing without asking. Again, the confrontation is done by bringing up the behavior without reference to a rule or expectation:

R: You going to wear that shirt today?
E: Ya, I like wearing this shirt. There's this girl I have in this class who really likes it. She thinks it's pretty nice.
R: Ya, my mom got me that shirt for my birthday.
E: She has got super taste, you know, it's a super shirt. A real nice expensive one too.
R: Don't you have shirts like it at all you could maybe wear?
E: Not exactly like this. This has a nice tailored look to it. It's got the single needle thing around the collar and the whole bit man. It's pretty nice.
R: I was kinda, you know, wanted to wear that tomorrow. But it will be dirty now.
E: Well maybe we'll find somebody to wash it, I don't know. How'd that be? You know, this girl gotta impress her. I want to take her out Saturday.

R: You know E, you always wear my clothes without asking me.

This last turn could be heard as reference to a rule or expectation; however, the response denies the sharedness of the expectation. In fact, just the opposite is expressed: "I know man, but you have such nice taste you know and we're roommates and that, you know, and it's kind of expected." The confronter is then forced to try and elicit the other's expectations if the situation were reversed:

R: Well, like, would you like it if I went around wearing your clothes all the time?
E: Well you wear some of them, you know.
R: Without asking you?
E. Well, I don't know.

The encounter is difficult to pursue if the other fails to grant the legitimacy of your claim.

LEGITIMACY OF THE RULE

How confrontation is initiated may reflect the confidence of the confronter in the legitimacy, or shared understanding, of the rule, and thus influence the entire process of the confrontation encounter. As we have just seen in the previous two examples when the rule is unclear the talk centers upon clarification of expectations. In an attempt to get the other to understand how the confronter feels, the other is asked to role-take.

Of course, sometimes the confronter may assume that a rule is so basic that it should be understood. The direct confrontation may then leave the confrontee surprised and embarrassed, at a loss of words and searching for a justification for the behavior, as in the case of one roommate confronting the other for spreading rumors: "Well I didn't think it would really, I mean—I just did it cause they were kinda funny little things and I just did it—I don't know I thought you'd probably do the same thing about you know my little habits, you know, I just did it to kind of blow off steam every now and then. But I didn't know it would really offend ya, I mean—." And later in the conversation, the confrontee continues: "I'm sorry. If it really bothers you I won't do it. Is that what you want me to say? I mean I don't know what to say; I feel embarrassed." The confrontation proceeds with a clarification of how the behavior made the confronter feel, establishing a justification for the rule. Again, the confrontee is asked to role-take:

R: I mean how would you feel if I went around and told people that. . .some things you didn't want them to know?
E: It depends on what they were (laughing). Some of them I probably would feel bad. I guess I can see where you're coming from. I don't know I just, I just. . .but I guess I can understand where that would bother you. . .

Direct confrontation can lead to open disagreement or conflict when the other is not willing to grant the legitimacy of the rule, or invokes a superseding rule. Disagreement will continue if the confronter does not now acknowledge the legitimacy of the superseding rule. In the case of the waiter asked to bus tables the manager invokes the superseding rule of need:

E: I need you to bus tables. Someone has to do it. We're short tonight. You know that. . .I know you're busy too, but it's gotta be done.
R: Well you know I can't afford just to bus tables. I make most—you know my wages—I haven't gotten a raise in six months and I make most of my money from tips. I can't afford to do it. I can't do it tonight.
E: R, do you like your job?
R: Well, yes I do, when I'm doing my own job. But I don't want to do everybody else's jobs.

The conversation continues with a weighing of needs—the need of the manager to keep the restaurant running, the need of the waiter to make enough money to live. The conflict continues as long as the participants continue to perceive their needs in competition with one another. Since the rules are perceived to be in competition, neither is granted legitimacy.

When the direct confrontation involves a statement of conflicting expectations and a request for clarification, the confronter appears open to remediation or the invokation of a superseding rule. In the other situation, where the waiter asks for clarification of his role, the manager explains the situation and provides the superseding rule:

> One thing that we have to realise is—and I realise that I said that you wouldn't be washing dishes and our dishwasher is pretty reliable. Now when he or she gets behind we need to help everybody. Like if we see another waitress or waiter and they look like they need help we should go up and offer to help them. Because in a working situation we should all work together.

The confrontation here is probably smoothed by the manager's ability to role-take the position of the waiter:

> I'm sure that you being here to wait tables felt like you were probably being uhm taken—having some of your tables taken away. When you receive tips and you're counting on that money. Am I correct?. . .

And the understanding is reinforced with a remediation of the situation:

> And now that we know that you helped with the dishes that time and missed out on some of your tables what we can do is when someone helps with the dishes, we could like have a chart in here and we could mark it down. And the next time, ask someone else to where it would be even. How is that going to agree with you?

The last confrontation situation provides an example of how the legitimacy of a rule may be accepted but the confrontee may deny the rule has been broken because the behavior is not the behavior specified by the rule (argument by definition). In the situation where the couple had been dating for six months, the woman was asked if she had been dating someone else. She replied:

E: Well, I've been seeing a guy, but just like friends you know. I just have a couple classes with him and sometimes uhm (pause and sigh) I don't know--not really, no.

R: Are you sure?

E: I wouldn't say. Well uh what do you mean? Why are ya asking me?

R: Well when we started going out I thought you said that we, you wouldn't go out with anybody if I would go out with anybody.

E. Well we did, that's right.

R: Well have you been going out with him?

E: Uhm well I don't think I've been going out with him. I've been seeing him, you're right. But he hasn't really like asked me to do any thing on a date really. We just kind of, just like we meet to study and stuff...I don't think I've been seeing him, well, I have been seeing him but I don't think I have been dating him.

The encounter, then, tends to focus on whether or not her behavior constituted a breaking of the rule. To make clear his perception of the situation, the confronter asks the female to role-take:

> How would you behave if like say I met some girl in this class and she was just like a ten, I mean just the most beautiful little girl and we become friends and we was going out to the movie and we'd go roller skating and we went swimming and playing racket ball. How would you behave if I went like that and didn't call you for two or three weeks? What would you do?

The female admits the emotional response, but holds to her position that her behavior did not violate the rule:

> I would probably be more irrational than you've been. I'd probably scream and demand attention and I don't know what else. So you're right, I can see--I don't know. . .Well it looks like what's happened is I've started something that is looking wrong. It's looking like more than it really is and--oh I don't know.

RESOLUTION OF CONFRONTATION

As suggested by the previous example, if participants cannot reach a shared understanding of the situation than the relationship itself may suffer. In this particular role-playing situation, the confrontation was resolved by agreeing to an essential dissolution of the relationship--an avoidance or escape from the problem:

E: And what's happened is that it's a misinterpretation. . . .But it looks like you're holding the ball right now. If you want to say that's the end I guess I'll have to go along with that. It's your decision but I want you to know that I still care.

R: I don't think we should end it. I just think we should like quit seeing each other maybe for a couple of weeks and let time have its process.

E: Maybe that's a good idea and we'll see what works out.

Resolution of confrontation may also be made difficult by a perception that even if the situation is remediated (the application of the rule is clarified) the damage has been done. In the situation where one roommate was spreading rumors about the other, despite offers to remedy the situation in the future, one gets the impression that the problem is left hanging. The encounter ends with:

E: I'm sorry. I guess it's a rotten thing to do, I guess. I have kind of--maybe I shouldn't talk about things like that. And if it bothers you I'll stop.

R: Appreciate it. It's too late now.

E: I'll feel like an idiot if it makes you feel better.

R: I hope so. I don't know.

If the reaching of reasonable expectations has been difficult, as in the case of the waiter asked to bus tables, the resolution may be in the form of an immediate, but temporary remediation. He offers, for that night only:

R: Okay, well if if--I'll do it for half the time, if you'll get somebody else to do it for the other half of my shift. I'm not going to do it my whole shift though.

E: Hey, that's good then. I could go for that. You want the first half or last half?

R: Well I'll take the last half because the first half is my busiest time.

E: Okay, we'll go with that then.

A resolution for the immediate situation relieves the participants and allows them to go on with other activites. However, the resolution may mask a deeper relational problem of perceived competition of interests.

When the interaction establishes that an expectation has not been clearly understood in the relationship, then a rule may be legislated. As shown earlier, in the one dating situation, the female pointed out that they had never stated whether their relationship should be exclusive or not. The result was the legislation of the rule that they should see other people. When the expectation of the confronter is not confirmed he may engage in "face-saving" behavior. The encounter was ended with the male referring to the evening at the drive-in where he saw the female with another guy:

R: Well hey I'm not picking on ya or anything I was just kinda curious you know, I didn't--

E: Well I appreciate you talking to me about it, being cool about it.

R: That's good. Well I was there with somebody too.

E: Oh were ya?

(Laughter)

Good I don't feel so bad now.

R: Sorta even, all right?
E: You got it.

When an expectation is clarified at least a base is established for negotiating future situations. In the situation where one roommate borrowed the other's clothing without asking, the roommate makes an offer to try to do better:

E: Well, maybe I'll try to ask, you know.
R: I'd appreciate it.
E: You would?
R: I really would

However, one is left wondering to what extent the agreement to the rule is sincere, or presented because it's expected and provides an end to the encounter.

Some resolutions to confrontation appear to reflect relational stability. In the situation where the waiter has essentially asked for clarification of his role, he accepts the superseding rule of helping one another out and tells the manager: "to me it sounds fine. Just so that I'll know, you know, that next time when the thing happens that I'm asked, I'll walk back and do it." Perhaps furthering the success of this resolution, the manager offered a remediation in terms of making sure requests for help are shared. She ends the confrontation with a reinforcement of the relational bond:

> Okay, well really thanks a lot for coming in and you're doing a great job. . .We're really glad that we hired you and we see a lot of success. The customers as they leave remark how the waitresses are and things. And you got some really high compliments on your service. So hey thanks a lot.

How a social confrontation is resolved, then, appears to be related to issues concerning the legitimacy, or shared understanding, of the rule invoked by the confronter.

A MODEL OF SOCIAL CONFRONTATION

From these six social confrontations we can begin to see the multitude of ways in which social confrontation may be done. Trying to identify all the different ways would be an exercise in futility. However, these six encounters do suggest certain issues by which the type of confrontation might be described.

Although the confrontation is initiated in a number of ways, one may hear the claim as an implication that the other has broken a rule. To make this clear, we will use the analogy of a court of law. The underlying principal, or warrant, which makes the argument meaningful is the legitimacy of the "law." Since a court of law reflects a formalized system, the legitimacy of the law is not contested (at least not in that forum). But in interpersonal relationships rules or expectations are not usually clearly formalized. Furthermore, since the "system" in which the expectation exists is the relationship between the two people, one can expect the rule to be much more transcient, and open to interpretation and negotiation. Social confrontations, then, may focus upon the legitimacy of the expectation—the warrant of the argument is itself open to dispute. So where a court of law focuses upon establishing the guilt or innocence of the individual, social confrontation focuses more upon the nature of the rule itself, its legitimacy, its clarification (remediation) and the negotiation of new rules (legislation). We propose the following model of social confrontation to display the major issues which may develop in social confrontation. See Figure 1.



Figure 1. A model of social confrontation.

The model is not meant to be linear. The order of "steps" may occur in a different sequence than displayed. As we have seen, the discussion of behaviors may precede the discussion of rules, depending on how the encounter is initiated. The model may be used to identify different types of confrontations. A major dichotomy of confrontations appears to be between encounters where the legitimacy, or shared understanding, of the rule is accepted by the participants and those encounters where the legitimacy of the rule, the warrant for the argument, is not accepted. If the legitimacy of the rule is not accepted, then discussion of whether or not a behavior occured is fairly irrelevant. One would expect this sort of confrontation to proceed to legislation—making clear the expectations of the relationship. We saw an example of this type of conflict in the dating situation where the identification of the behavior of dating other people led the participants to agree upon the expectation that they should see other people.

If the legitimacy of the rule is at least implicitly accepted, then the focus of discussion is on whether or not the behavior was performed. If the behavior is admitted, then the issue may be whether or not the behavior meets the definition of the rule. Denying behavior took place would probably lead to a "tis/'taint" sort of argument, or a weighing of the "evidence." Admitting the performance of the behavior would lead either to a remediation of the rule definition, or legislation of a new rule.

CONCLUSION

In viewing social confrontation as a problematic situation, we were able to observe how interpersonal relationships are negotiated and maintained. From pragmatic observations of confrontation encounters generated by role-playing, a model of social confrontation was developed. This model promises to be useful in capturing major variations of confrontation. After further data collection, this model might be refined to predict how confrontations may be resolved based upon the points of agreement and disagreement of the participants. Eventually, the model might prove useful in predicting the impact of the encounter upon the relationship.

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NEGOTIATING SOCIAL CONFLICT IN VARYING RELATIONAL CONTEXTS

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Studying the process of negotiating relationships inevitably entails characterizing how interactants mutually manage the discovery of differences and/or possible disagreement. The inevitability lies in the nature of the underlying negotiation metaphor used to explore communication as relationship.

Communication is viewed as a process of negotiating definitions of social relationships, i.e., negotiation is applied as a process not a context. The central assumption of viewing negotiation as a process of defining social relationships is one of interaction. The essence of the relationship is the participant's interaction and its patterning. A social relationship is an entity continually created through interaction, primarly talk, and not a consequence of individual psychologies.

Three central elements characterize the process of negotiating relational definitions (Fisher, 1982). First, negotiating presupposes a social relationship based upon a unique blend of cooperation and competition, commonality and conflict. The consequence of participant's interaction, even a troublesome event, is the enactment or creation of an outcome/relationship incorporating both common and diverse elements. Second, individuals bring their selves to the relationship and subsequently negotiate with other selves; They bring their commodities of self or conversational behaviors which constitute the essence of the relationship. These commodities or offers of self, whether they are an opinion, personal story, an account, a reflection, an interpretation, or whatever, can be countered, accepted, rejected, or confirmed. Third, when participants enter into this negotiation an element of risk is always involved. Negotiation renders participants susceptible to obligations so when some aspect of self is offered, susceptibility to self obligation increases.

In the process of negotiating definitions it will not be unusual, then, to uncover instances when a participant's offer or action becomes exposed to some sort of "valuative inquiry" (Scott & Lyman, 1968). Such inquiry can occur when an unexpected action is committed or expected obligations do not occur. One conversational method participants use to manage these occasions is the account sequence (McLaughlin, Cody, Rosenstein, 1983). The sequence embodies a sequence of moves which participants use to "manage the discovery of difference and negotiate the disposition of disagreeables as conversational events" (p. 121).[1]

Account sequences are comprised of a minimum of three moves. A "reproach" gives notice to the other that something about their self offer/behavior (i.e., the offense) is "not in conformity with the way the reproacher sees things" (p. 103). The other is then obligated to offer an "account" or reply which deals with the reproach in some manner. The third move is a reproacher obligation to offer an evaluation weighing the quality of the account.

Mclaughlin, Cody, and Rosenstein (1983) propose that one basis for the generation of account sequences is the desire of at least one participant to focus on conversational similarity or commonality. When an occasion arises of impending difference, one interactant will reproach the other's behavior hoping to elicit an account sequence thereby allowing for the collective reinterpretation of the "disagreeable" (p. 104). They argue further that if this preference is the case then interactants will demonstrate a preference, structurally, for mitigation in both the account and evaluation. If the preferred form of the account and evaluation is offered then the interactants have circumvented argument. However, if the dispreferred is offered an argument is likely.

Mclaughlin, Cody, and Rosenstein (1983) investigate the nature of account sequences used in initial encounters[2] by strangers to manage troublesome events. Specifically, they attempt to answer questions concerning the relationships between types of offenses and subsequent reproaches, styles of reproaches and subsequent types of account strategies, and the effects of particular strategies on the settlement of troublesome events. Subjects were placed, in training rooms, into stranger dyads and asked to discuss, for thirty minutes, various topics. The conversations were then transcribed and categories of offenses, reproaches, accounts, and evaluations were derived from the account sequence samples.

Mclaughlin, Cody, and Rosenstein (1983) and Mclaughlin, Cody and O'Hair (1983) in discussing their research suggest that future research should investigate the nature of account sequences in other relational contexts and in naturalistic settings. The purpose of this paper is to report some preliminary observations concerning the nature of account sequences in acquaintance interaction.

METHOD

Four individuals, recruited through direct contact, were given a tape recorder and tapes and asked to gather samples of their talk with one of their acquaintances.[3] The individuals were given only two requirements for collecting data: (1) the samples had to be of dyadic interaction and (2) where and when the data was collected was left solely up to the discretion of the individuals.

A total of 5½ hours of acquaintance conversation, provided by the individuals, was then inspected for occurrences of account sequences. Account sequences were identified according to the Mclaughlin, Cody, and Rosenstein (1983) characterization of reproach, account, and evaluation.[4]

OBSERVATIONS AND QUESTIONS

The Mclaughlin, Cody, and Rosenstein (1983) and Mclaughlin, Cody and O'Hair (1983) research findings suggest that the reproach is the best predictor of the type of account strategy used by an individual to manage a failure event. More aggravating forms of reproach (e.g., direct rebukes) tend to be followed by more aggravating styles of accounts (e.g., refusal) and more mitigating reproaches (e.g., direct requests) tend to be followed by more mitigating accounts (e.g., concessions). When analyzing the account sequences of acquaintances this trend was not the case in some instances.[5]

Acquaintances tend to offer self as experiential. Often the interaction involves the reciprocation of individual experiences orientated toward topics in a parallel, often contingent manner. As their conversation proceeds areas of disagreement or dissimilarity may be discovered. Typically, reproaches than are elicited to redefine the disagreeable. Specifically, the function for generating account sequences is to negotiate the adequacy of information offered by one of the acquaintances. For example, reproaches of another's taste/attitude/belief offense was not uncommon in their conversation.

L: he well I I kinda wanted an Aspen an Aspen an Aspen cluster
   that (   )
J: quaking Aspen you mean
L: yeah I guess
J: is that what he wants because that seems to be what people plant
   in clusters . . uh you dont really want one of those=they look
   beautiful on tha mountain=they dont grow very well in tha
   valley . an tha second part abouthem is theres been real bad
   virus goin around an it makes em drop all their leaves so// theyre
   not
L: uh hah
J: before tha winter goes=I mean before they turn yellow which is
   part of their charm // third ya dont want em is cuz they . . uh
L: yeah
J: . multiply by stolon (   ) theyre like . runners that grow
   under // neath tha ground
L: uh hah
J: an they spread all through your grass an tha only way ya can
   keep them in bounds . is . . uh yeah is ta like put a big ring
   of metal on (   ) roots=
L: =an ground it clear down so (   ) well maybe Ill give ya the
   money to get tha Japanese mapel ((laughs)) I mean- it is then
   whenever ya go
J: yeah

J in this example directly rebukes L for "kinda" wanting to plant Aspen clusters, "you dont really want one of those." A direct rebuke serves notice to the other that something about their offer is unacceptable (i.e., incorrect, misguided, or offensive) (Mclaughlin, Cody, & Rosenstein, 1983, p. 110). A direct rebuke is considered a more aggravating form of reproach than other forms and since more aggravating reproaches tend to lead to more aggravating forms of accounts one might expect an argument to ensue or the topic be dropped or switched. Strangers, any way, tend to not account after direct rebukes or refuse to account following a direct rebuke of a taste/attitude/belief offense (Mclaughlin, Cody, & Rosenstein, 1983). J, however, does account J offers a more mitigating account of concession as opposed to an excuse or justification. J conceded to the reproach by having J pick up another kind of tree.

In another example J concedes to a reproach given by L of J's taste/attitude/belief offer.

J: uh: I hope Russia doesnt decide ta come in
L: well they say Russias been in on that
J: oh yeah // they always are theyre in on everything=
L: cours-
L: =well see theyre in with Cuba // too
J: yeah

L rebukes J's hope that "Russia doesnt decide ta come in" with the claim that "they" have said it is not so. J concedes to the rebuke commenting on the general behavior of "Russia."

L in the following case directly rebukes J's taste/attitude/offense concerning "watering flowers." L directly rebukes with her "observation" offering no reasons for the rebuke except that it is derived from her experience. J in this case concedes to the rebuke correcting his taste/attitude/belief offense with the reason it is incorrect or unacceptable to L.

J: ya know no matter ya know as long as youre not . . . dumb enough
ta overwater er underwater er somethin like // that then yer okay=
L: yeah
L: =I really think its really better to underwater
J: well // itsafer
L: from my observation ((laughs))
J: safer ( ) actually

These instances raise several questions concerning the aggravating nature of reproaches; in this case direct rebukes. More specifically, what characteristics of an interactant's account sequence might play a role in determining the aggravating nature of rebukes? First, the nature of the precipitating offense may play a role. For instance, the nature of the rebuke may depend on: (a) the expressed saliency of the offense (e.g., "kinda") and (b) the nature of the grounds for the taste/attitude/belief offense (e.g., in example two the offense involves knowledge of a current event and in example three the base for the offense is personal experience). Second, the nature of the rebuke itself may be important. Does the rebuker only serve notice that another's offer is somehow unacceptable or does he/she serve notice and provide reasons for the rebuke? Reasons often are used by interactants to circumvent argument or bring it to an end. Does providing reasons with a rebuke serve to lessen the aggravating nature of the rebuke? Other factors may include: (a) whether the rebuker is considered by the other as an expert on the topic of the rebuke; (b) whether the topic of the rebuke is important to either interactant; (c) whether the offense or rebuke can be easily verified by outside sources; and (d) whether the precipitating offense is a knowledge claim of another outside the dyad (e.g., "he claims its ya know what ya eat").

Rebukes negatively characterize the other. Their aggravating nature

may depend on just what aspect of the offense they characterize negatively and how they characterize the offense as negative.

A second observation focuses on the use of the "disagreeable" as a "preference for agreement" or as a "conversational resource" (Mclaughlin, Cody, and Rosenstein, 1983). The primary mechanism for generating account sequences in initial encounters is the interactants perference for agreement. Account sequences are elicited by strangers to reinterpret discovered disagreement and difference because of their desire to maximize commonality. Strangers in the face of disagreement will almost always provide the preferred form of account and evaluation for the purpose of circumventing argument or repairing the troublesome event. When this repair is accomplished they can get to the "business at hand" (Mclaughlin, Cody, & Rosenstein, 1983).

Mclaughlin, Cody and Rosenstein (1983) offer another mechanism for generating account sequences. They discuss whether strangers will elicit account sequences as a "conversational resource" (p. 107). In this case, difference and disagreement is problematic only in the sense of eliciting a sequence of turns. Since strangers, they argue, talk about issues which usually carry little relational consequence, they may be inclined to expand the account sequence by refusing initially to account or rejecting accounts in order to produce turns at talk. However, they found in stranger's interaction a greater tendency for "reproaches to be legitimated by accounts, and for accounts to be honored" (p. 107-108), therefore, demonstrating the preference for agreement.

Acquaintances, while demonstrating a preference for agreement, also mutually construct turns which expand the account sequence. Instead of considering the disagreeable as troublesome and something to be repaired it becomes the actual business at hand rather than dysfunctional to the participants desire for maximizing similarity. Consider the following example:

B: you know Ill give ya the honest that I feel . . that my
inclination towards machinary . . an towards gadgetry an
towards eye hand coordination is inherited . . dead serious
S: think so
B: I really feel that strongly . not just because of you know I
have some intuition coming from outer space . . but my
grandfather . . is . a real sharp tinkerer . he invented the
altimeter ten years before it was invented . . an he . didn
have enough money to scrape up a patent . . an he was going
ta take a mortgage out on his car ta do it
S: uh hah
B: an his mom wouldnt let him . . . she advised he didnt do it
he just lost in his shorts
S: uh hah
B: but that kinda runs in our family dads invented a couple
of things in the dental area hes patented an . . . uses quite
a lot . . . so well see
S: it-it makes you wonder . . yo-you because a lot of the great
inventers . . men but it was because of- . they just you
know by their s- by their status were given the tools . an

the facilities=
B: =yeah
S: ta do that I mean // it takes someone like
B: an what is a woman like ta tinker back in tha eighteen
hundreds // what would she get
S: to-
S: you take someone like ah:: Madam Curie=
B: =yeah true
S: an have done well with it
B: well- . true
S: is // it something
B: that's an interesting thought

B offers his theory explaining his "inclination towards gadgetry." S then reproaches B's offer with a direct request for an accounting of that explanation. B proceeds to fulfill that obligation by offering a further justification for his theory. S then offers his evaluation of the account by taking issue with it. S accomplishes this by offering his theory. B then honors S's theory by considering it "true" and "interesting."

In the following example the account sequence is expanded in a different manner.

B: lunch time in tha _______mall is one of tha better times . . .
for a number of reasons
S: oh its just a joy to see tha beauties of nature right=
B: =ah: yes
S: kinda like windo shopping
B: when you dont have any money
S: ehhehh . . well I wouldnt put it that way
B: well . . . can you afford it?
S: ((laughs))
B: I mean I put it to you
S: ((inhales)) yeah youre probably right . . . . . but its not . .
you cant afford something when you wanna but it . . . but
if you don wanna buy an your just looking its not a matter of
affording
B: so in this case how doya think youre gonna save up?
S: well its like going to a jewelry store an seeing some nice
jewelry butcha don like jewelry
B: oh I like this jewelry
S: ((laughs))
B: that analogy wouldnt work
S: yer gonna burn in hell
B: naw: I donthink so=Im too nice a guy . . . . . they wouldnt
do that to me

S reproaches B's belief that watching "women" in the mall is like "window shopping" without "money." S compares what he thinks it's like thereby discrediting B i.e., S reproaches B. B acccounts justifying his part of the analogy by questioning S. A positive answer from S would justify B's offense. S does not answer and B again asks his question. S then accepts the account but within the same turn takes issue with it by denying it is an issue of "affording." B again tries to justify

his part of the analogy by questioning S. S again reinstates his reproach. B later rebukes S's analogy by claiming S's "wouldnt work." S refuses to account and rebukes B afterwhich B accounts by offering the excuse that "they wouldnt do that to me" because he's a "nice guy."

These expanded sequences raise some questions about their use in acquaintance interaction. Mclaughlin, Cody, and Rosenstein (1983) posit that if strangers expand the account sequence, i.e., let the argument ensue by offering the dispreferred accounts and evaluations, they would do so in the context of issues which have little consequence to their relational development. The assumption is that argument in the context of important issues is dysfunctional for strangers therefore has a tendency to be circumvented. But what about the use of expanded sequences in acquaintance interaction?

The above two examples demonstrate the mutual construction of expanded account sequences. If those account sequences take place in the context of issues having little consequence for future interaction then what function do they have beyond argument for argument's sake? In the first example, two acquaintances allow themselves the occasion for exploring their views of an issue. This sharing of their experiential selves provides knowledge about each other which may be used in their decisions of whether to develop the relationship further. In the second example, the acquaintance pair allows themselves the opportunity to "enjoy" argument for argument's sake. They have fun exploring an analogy to describe their personal pleasure in "girlwatching" or "window shopping" and in the "price" paid for liking the "jewelry."

Describing these expanded account sequences brings to mind a final set of questions. Does the nature of the issue effect the relational consequences of an expanded sequence? What are the moves interactants offer which mutually serve to expand an account sequence? Do the ways in which an account sequence expands relate to the issue it deals with and/or vice versa? What are the moves interactants offer which allow them to change reproacher - reproached roles?

CONCLUSION

Mclaughlin, Cody, and O'Hair (1983) were "simply forced to conclude" that "within the same relationship, strategies for remedying the effects of untoward acts may vary considerably, depending on the nature of the very specific circumstances surrounding the offense and its evaluation" (p. 223). This paper described the character of some of those circumstances.

It should be noted that the questions this paper raises are in no way intended to disconfirm the coding schemes or findings of the research cited in this paper for two reasons: (1) account sequence samples were drawn from a different relational context and (2) this preliminary analysis did not code sets of sequences and subsequently run statistical procedures on the data so there is no way of knowing whether any contradictions are significant to acquaintances in general or relationally idiosyncratic. The questions are to be used to stimulate further inquiry into the nature of account sequences and their use in the process of negotiating relational definitions.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Sociologist Peter Schonbach (1980) examines account sequences in long term relationships. Other similar treatments of accounts include Goffman's (1967) "corrective interchange" and Stokes and Hewitt's (1976) "aligning actions."

[2] Sociologists almost always study account sequences in well established relationships.

[3] Data used for this paper was selected from the author's dissertation data. Four individuals were asked to collect samples of conversation with an acquaintance, friend, and maritial partner. The audio tapes were then collected and transcripts were made.

[4] For a more thorough explanation of the classifications of offense, reproach, account, and evaluations see Mclaughlin, Cody, and Rosenstein, (1983).

[5] The author used the categories of offense, reproach, and evaluation derived by Mclaughlin, Cody, and Rosenstein from initial encounters. While it is not assumed that stranger interaction is the same as acquaintance interaction to use the categories derived from well established relationships would assume acquaintances use relational exploitation like guilt as tactics in accounting. This is an assumption the author is not willing to make at this time.

[6] Justifications accept the occurrence of an offense but minimizes in some manner its severity while at the same time demonstrating its positive aspects (Mclaughlin, Cody, & Rosenstein, 1983).

WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: AN APPLICATION OF FIELD THEORY TO RHETORICAL CONFLICT

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Argument fields are composed of a constellation of interpretive categories, fundamental beliefs and values, norms of conduct, and sources of authority which provide an institutional framework within which to conduct argument. The frameworks of different fields may share much in common, or they may be radically incompatible. Every field pursues its own characteristic interests within a domain of issues which constitutes its rhetorical problems, the subject-matter of its arguments. Fields provide publicly organized ways of reasoning and knowing about a domain. Every field provides those who work within it with a sense of legitimacy, rationality, and objectivity for evaluating arguments. Every field supplies the background knowledge necessary to understand the meaning and force of an argument. The field notion, then, stresses that all argumentative deliberations occur within some socio-historical context and that all reasoning is reasoning-in-context.

One of the more interesting implications of field theory is that the same principles of rationality which promote the resolution of conflict when arguments are conducted *within* a field may actually preclude the possibility of consensus when arguments are conducted *between* fields. Where fields produce quite different assessments of what is reasonable, factual, authoritative, relevant, coherent, and so on, arguers from those fields may find themselves unable to resolve their disagreements. Incommensurable positions in a dispute are interesting not simply because they suggest the social relativity of knowledge and the field-dependent nature of rationality; incommensurable positions are interesting places in which to study how fields accomplish their sense of authority. What sorts of argumentative practices are used by members of a field to justify the legitimacy of that field's authority, the rationality of its practices, and the objectivity of its knowledge?

The process of argument between incommensurable fields is neatly illustrated in a rhetorical event that is manufactured whenever preacher Jed Smock addresses college campus audiences. I have been studying these events for the past several years, observing and recording the interactions between preacher and students, and interviewing the participants about what was going on.[1] Smock has visited over 300 college campuses across the United States, and pretty much the same thing happens wherever he appears. He preaches a fundamentalist doctrine, stressing the sinfulness of campus life and the incompatibility of the tenets of "secular humanism" with God's Word. He warns the students that they must repent and turn away from sin to find

salvation in Jesus Christ or they will surely perish in the fires of Hell. But the students are not moved by the preacher's rhetoric. They consistently respond with mocking, teasing, heckling, and challenging.

Preacher and audience quickly find themselves plunging into an intractable conflict, one that is anchored in a comprehensive and fundamental disagreement over facts, values, norms of rhetorical conduct, sources of authority, categories for describing the world, even the meaning of the event itself. The participants themselves widely perceive the comprehensive and irresolvable nature of their differences. These disagreements result from the quite different perspectives which fundamentalist and secular humanist bring to bear in participating in the event. These perspectives can usefully be treated as different fields of argument. Each perspective represents a socially sanctioned way of reasoning about the affairs of everyday life (though that is only a point of overlap in the domains of these fields) and each has its own understanding of how to conduct argument about the issues in its domain.

What is particularly interesting for the purposes of this paper are the "meta-arguments" which fundamentalist and secular humanist supply in interviews to demonstrate the legitimacy of their position in this conflict, to discredit the rhetorical contributions of the other party, and to explain the apparent failure of the engaged parties to move toward some sort of consensus on the issues. These accounts show the reflexive nature of a field's standards for good argument: when those standards are challenged, the standards themselves are used to evaluate the force and nature of the challenge. The accounts which both parties provide reveal important aspects of the way in which fields preserve their authority as frameworks for argument.

In working within a field, arguers take for granted the authority of that framework as a way of knowing and reasoning about issues in its domain. This is especially true where, as with the fundamentalist and the secular humanist, a field is not simply self-consciously adopted "as if" it created objective knowledge for some specialized interest, but is so basic to a person's way of life that it is equated with commonsense itself. These arguers work on the mundane assumption that faithful application of a field's framework will produce factual evidence, sound reasons, valid conclusions, in short, objective knowledge. Any field supplies arguers with a stock of facts, assumptions, values, and forms of inference which are taken to be "obvious," the kind of knowledge which any reasonable person would be expected to possess. Fields, then, supply those who argue within them with a trusted framework within which any reasonable persons can be expected to move toward agreement on the reality of an issue.

The problem posed for the analyst by a conflict like the one which the preacher and students produce is how these fields could hold such authority for their occupants while having so little authority for those who occupy other fields. One would think that the fact of open, sustained, and intense conflict like that which occurs between the preacher and students would pose a powerful challenge to either party's faith in the authority of their own field. At the very least, this conflict would seem to point to the legitimacy of multiple ways of knowing and reasoning about the issues of the conflict.

But this is not what happens. Rather than abandoning faith in the authority of their fields, both the fundamentalist and the secular humanist are able to use the assumed authority of their fields to "explain away" the rhetorical knots as the product of defective contributions by the other party. What is particularly striking about the sorts of accounts the participants construct to accomplish the sense of authority for their own field is their reciprocal usage. The preacher and audience members alike are able to sustain the sense of objectivity, rationality, and legitimacy of their own field's practices by issuing accounts which attribute irrational and immoral character-types to the other party, which treat them as being incapable of seeing what is obvious, which accuse them of being deliberately insincere, and so on.

Let me first give some sense for how these processes operate within the secular humanist field of argument. The audience assumes the validity of their own values and beliefs, yet they find the content of Smock's rhetoric consistently at odds with those values and beliefs. The audience repeatedly challenges the preacher's stands on a variety of substantive issues: his views on rock 'n roll, drinking, sex, drug use, homosexuality, women's rights, creationism. They also challenge the preacher on procedural and stylistic issues: his absolutist stands, his condemnations and accusatory mode, his emphasis on sin, his lack of social tolerance. Despite repeated argument on these issues, they find themselves unable to sway the preacher to their position--though their claims and arguments appear quite sound to other humanists. This is taken not as proof that something is defective in the sense of rationality and objectivity that their field assigns to such arguments; it becomes proof that the preacher is irrational, perhaps even deliberately perverse. Likewise, because so many of Smock's arguments have no compelling logic for the audience (many don't even make sense), this is further proof that he is incapable of rational argument.

Or again, Smock's beliefs are widely portrayed as being absurd and crazy. The students simply cannot accept the idea that a rational person could believe that, for example, he and God would one day "re-enter the Earth's atmosphere" to destroy the armies of the Earth with a "super cosmic ray" or that when God drove Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden (which many take to be a pretty weird story in itself) God also transformed lions from herbivores into carnivores and snakes into venomous creatures. They can't believe that a person of sound mind could talk about demon possession or God's wrath at work on Earth (for example, God causing drought in San Francisco in the early 1970's because of its homosexual population). They cannot accept the authority of Biblical categories like sin, fornication, or drunkard in describing campus life, the use of Biblical law to guide ethical

decisions, or the use of Biblical parallels to interpret world events. The evidence the preacher submits to support his arguments appears to be "obviously" ridiculous because it does not live up to the kind of background knowledge that informs a secular humanist field of argument.

Or once again, Smock is seen as perverse and immoral because his rhetorical conduct does not live up to audience standards. His use of Biblical labels and personal accusations run counter to audience understandings of when civility and mutual respect are called for. His failure to accept any authority other than the Bible and his absolutist stance being justified by an ordination by God appear to be nothing more than an ego-maniacal closed-mindedness. The important thing to see here is that all of these accounts are justified by a secular humanist framework, and all serve to reinforce the assumed adequacy of that framework by explaining why the arguments of a secular humanist should have no impact on a person like Jed Smock.

But the secular audience is not alone in reflexively reasoned accounts. Fundamentalists, like Smock and others, also display a rich set of procedures for explaining away the opposition of the audience. For example, by assuming the factual character of the sinfulness of the audience, the fundamentalist is able to construct a variety of accounts for their opposition to the preacher. A common theme among fundamentalists is that when the truth is preached, people become angry as their sins are exposed for all to see. Repeatedly, fundamentalists expressed the idea that heckling was a normal, expectable reaction from those who love their sin. Just as they try to hide from their sins through drugs and booze, so also they try to hide from the truth through heckling and other forms of opposition. So, through such accounts, the opposition of the audience becomes proof of their sinfulness rather than a challenge to the field in which sin is a sensible concept.

Just as the secular humanist attributes an inability to reason as a way of displaying the rationality of their own arguments, the fundamentalist attributes irrationality to the secular audience. While the audience widely sees heckling as a way of reflecting, and as a result of, the irrationality of the preacher, the preacher sees it as proof that the audience has no rational response to his position. They have already decided to reject God's Word, and that is why they remain unmoved by what is obviously the truth. Interestingly, one of the very same issues that the audience uses to show Smock's irrational character--that he can't justify his faith in the Bible to the satisfaction of the audience--is turned within the fundamentalist field into proof of the audience's irrationality. The secular humanist is claimed to be irrational because s/he refuses to consider the Bible from the premise that it might be the Word of God. The audience won't even read it. They only challenge the assumption that the Bible is God's Word and demand a justification according to standards outside of God's Order. That demand is obviously irrational because such standards are bound to find the Bible lacking precisely because they are outside of God. For the fundamentalist, the only rational approach is to "open your heart" to God and to accept Him on His own terms.

Likewise, just as the secular audience is able to use secular categories like "fascist," "bigot," "sexist," or "ego-maniac" to see and explain the apparent immorality and perversity of the stands taken by the preacher, so also the fundamentalist employs a set of Biblically authorized categories like "sinner" or "Pharisee" to discredit the conduct of the audience. In fact, the Biblical vocabulary of motives supplies the fundamentalist with accounts for the audience's opposition that reveal the presence of Satanic forces, e.g., describing persons as being in bondage to lust, demon-possessed, or captivated by evil spirits.

Such attributions work in a way that allows the fundamentalist to accept the appearance of the motives and understandings avowed by the secular humanist while finding the validity of his own position in the underlying causes for these motives and understandings. A person may well have doubts about the Bible, but those doubts have been sown by the Devil; he may well think sexual intercourse outside of marriage is just innocent fun, but that is because he has been lured away from God by the ways of the Flesh. Just as a secular audience member might accept the fact that Smock really believes he will one day re-enter the Earth's atmosphere with God to destroy the armies of the world because he is so driven by ego needs that he must construct a reality that affirms his potency, so also the preacher constructs similar underlying causes that discredit the beliefs and values of the audience.

So, both fundamentalist and secular humanist are reasoning in ways that maintain the consistency between their sense of authority for their field of argument and the fact that others are not impressed by the force of arguments generated by the framework of that field. The very same framework that is apparently being challenged by unyeilding opposition is, through a variety of common argumentative practices, used to construct accounts that discredit that challenge (because it is inconsistent with that framework).

What, then, should we make of all this? There are two levels of implications. The first concerns the social organization of knowledge and the way that argumentative practices like those described create incommensurable frameworks for addressing some issue. The second concerns the critical limits of rational argument itself.

First, the sociological level. It should be clear that when fields operate according to the argumentative practices described above, social conflict is perpetuated in just the way that analysts like Burgess or Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson describe.[2] This can be illustrated with two examples. In both cases a kind of mutual interlocking of incompatible interpretations is created which reaffirm the adequacy of both fields.

Smock will only discuss issues at any length with those he takes to be willing to accept the validity of the Bible. In so doing, he avoids calling into question a central premise in his field. But by only discussing issues with (at least potential) believers, he demonstrates to the audience his own irrationality and insincerity. Likewise, by questioning the validity of the Bible--or Smock's interpretation of it--the audience presumes the legitimacy of secular standards for judgment and so preserves a central premise in their field. But by questioning the validity of the Bible instead of tentatively assuming its truth, the audience proves to Smock their insincerity and irrationality. And by showing their insincerity and irrationality, the audience justifies for Smock his not taking them seriously. By showing his irrationality and insincerity, Smock justifies for the audience their continual challenging of him.

Or again, on the basis of past experience Smock views himself as understanding the attitudes and lifestyle of campus youth. By describing his picture of campus life, however, he only proves to the audience that he possesses no such understanding. He provides the audience with material for questioning whether he was ever a part of campus life. His "obviously" distorted caricature leads the audience to mock and tease him. But this teasing and mocking only proves to Smock that he has struck a nerve, that the audience is trying to hide from the truth of their sinfulness. Their agitation reinforces his belief that he has correctly characterized what goes on on college campuses.

Now, some critical implications. I think it should be clear that the kind of reflexive reasoning processes described in this paper are field-invariant. I think they are a fundamental aspect of rationality itself.[3] Every field has some way of characterizing the insane, the perverse, the absurd, and so on--and what counts as evidence for these characterizations is a failure to live up to the standards of rationality, legitimacy, and objectivity which one's field legislates. At the very least, this fact about rationality places limits on the force of an ethical demand of critical "openness" in argument. Justification of a field's standards for the conduct of argument must, by necessity, be made in terms of those self-same standards. Appeal to any other standards will literally make no sense. The same holds true of interfield argument. "Closure" in arguments between incommensurable fields is not an ethical defect, but an epistemological necessity.[4] While any field may be required to be open to revision, even abandonment, the arguments which force such moves will be based on principles of self-consistency and the requirement that a field handle new issues on the horizon of its domain in a way that satisfies its own standards and interests.

Footnotes

[1] For a more detailed description of this event, see Scott Jacobs, "The Rhetoric of Witnessing and Heckling: A Case Study in Ethnorhetoric," diss. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1982; Scott Jacobs and Charles Lauferswelier, "The Social Enactment of Dramatic Forms: An Ethnographic Study of Confrontation Rhetoric," paper presented at the annual convention of the Speech Communication Association, Anaheim, California, November, 1981.

[2] Parke G. Burgess, "The Rhetoric of Black Power: A Moral Demand?" *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 54 (1968), 122-133; "The Rhetoric of Moral Conflict: Two Critical Dimensions," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 56 (1970), 120-130; Paul Watzlawick, Janet Helmick Beavin, and Don D. Jackson, *Pragmatics of Human Communication* (New York: Norton, 1967).

[3] I make no claims that the actual rhetoric in this event contains much in the way of rational argument. The participants themselves make no such claims. Their meta-arguments, however, are claimed to be rational accounts for why such rational argumentation is absent from the event.

[4] Cf. Charles Arthur Willard, *Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1983), pp. 270-278.

CAN WE SAVE POLICY MAKING

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Robert Dorfman wrote a few years ago that:

> Public policy decisions are therefore argued out by people who, for various reasons, give primacy to different considerations. It is becoming fashionable to perceive the virtues of this circumstance--in effect to advocate advocacy. My own feeling is that extolling advocacy in public affairs is a bit like lauding the virtues of gravity or friction. Now that the issue has come up, candor compels me to disclose that I personally am rather in favor of the law of gravity..., but I am bitterly opposed to the second law of thermodynamics. And I believe that anyones' attitude toward advocacy in public affairs is about equally consequential.[1] .

There is little doubt that argument and debate have an important role in disputes about public policy. The focus of dispute for many in the debate community is the framework within which arguments about public policy should take. In many variations, "policy making" has been, during the last 10 years, the perspective of choice among critics of academic debate.[2]

Recently, the policy making perspective has been under attack, most prominently from Robert C.Rowland and his view of function as the central determination of a good paradigm. The research question posed by this essay is : Can we save policy making? The answer will probably be one which will please neither Rowland nor the policy makers who were the focus of his earlier critiques. The position taken in this essay is that the function of academic debate is the instruction of argument, and that such a function may be best fulfilled by utilizing a full range of potential argumentative topics--one of which is the nature of rule related arguments associated with policy making and policy analysis. One critical place for the instruction of argument is the discovery of various dimensions and nuances of previous perspectives on the analysis of public policy--and the advocacy of a proper association between those models and policy related problems. This paper will assert that the policy metaphor provides material for advocacy beyond that which has been isolated by both proponents and opponents of policy making to date.

This essay will be divided into three parts. First, it will summarize some reasons why arguments about the framework for analysis is an important concern for academic debate; second, it will respond to Rowland's criticism of policymaking in light of accepting the appropriateness of arguments about policy analysis perspectives; third, it will discuss Rowland's standards of good paradigms as they applied to policy making in light of the present discussion of perspectives related to the description and evaluation of public policy.

In a series of previous essays, Hynes has argued that "rules" should be an important concern of debaters and critics of the arguments of those debaters.[3] They are important for several reasons. First, it is impossible to understand the meaning of factual information without a clear understanding of the procedural rules through which these facts are to be observed. According to Cueto Rua:

> The "fact finding" process is clearly related to legal rules and to their interpretation and application. Certain facts regardless of the situational reality are "found" because the judge, by virtue of the operation of certain rules of law, e.g., legal presumption, feels compelled to find them. On the contrary, other "facts" which have been found on the basis of evidence, may be ignored because the judge is instructed by rules to ignore them, for instance, because of the immoral nature of such "facts."[4]

Second, by appealing to the basis of a particular rule or perspective, the acceptance or rejection of that rule or perspective may be evaluated. In many ways, certain debate concepts have remained in use because their implications have not been discussed fully. Many of the debate practices which have been found objectionable by debaters and coaches alike have proven to be successful over time in those instances where the assumptions of these practices were not explored. In those instances where the debate community undertook such an exploration, the practice has not met with long term success. For instance, the exploration of the view that the resolution serves as the basis for jurisdiction--rather than a statement to be subject to general proof by means of induction--served as one means of arguing that counterwarrants should not be accepted.[5]

Third, arguments about rules and perspectives improve the basis of criticism in debates. Arguments about perspectives and rules make these perspectives more explicit to the arguers. When the critic is observing competing rules before him/her, the choice of rules for justification becomes much easier--and obviously more certain. Moreover, arguments about rules make the need for post hoc reasoning less likely. To make explicit such arguments means that the reasons used to justify a decision will more closely approach the grounds by which the critic made the decision initially. [6]

The study of policy analysis is one area where the prospects for rules related disputes is great. Ukeles briefly reports the divergent approaches of policy analysis in the 1950s and early 1960s--comparing the Rand call for increased application of systems analysis to the study of public policy with the attacks on rationalism in policy analysis of Lindblom or the middle ground described by Dror, among others.[7] To a great extent, both normative and descriptive models of the ways in which public policy is explained and/or developed is the subject of

considerable argument. The basis for these arguments to a large extent turns on the types of public policy problems facing the policy analyst, as well as the advocates involved in the present dimension of public policy. Moreover, these models are used by advocates within a public policy setting almost constantly. Lindblom and Cohen report: "Even if the PSI [Professional Social Inquiry] is itself as objective or disinterested as possible, these uses of it are partisan in that they serve to advance the interests of persons who, playing roles in an interactive process, are necessarily partisan."[8] In other words, schemes of policy system analysis often vary among different problems of public policy. According to Rowen, "...the contribution of policy analysis is essentially heuristic: to provide a conceptual framework (or several) for relating means to ends, for identifying the existing technical alternatives, and for inventing new ones."[9]

The application of a single model of policy analysis is not only difficult, but unwise. It is difficult because it will undoubtedly compel advocates to force fit a model to a problem for which it is ill-suited. It is unwise because it leaves from the range of argument topics a rich field of argument premises and conclusions. It is for these reasons that rules about policy analysis ought to be a potential field of arguments in academic debate, and that previous defenders of the policy system perspective may not have fared well against their attackers, because they also have artificially limited the field. These previous discussions will be the focus of the second portion of this essay.

RESPONSES TO CRITICISM OF POLICY MAKING

Rowland's 1981 essay " Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation"[10] serves as the framework for this defense of policy making. While the essay contains a series of other indictments of various other perspectives or paradigms of academic debate, it does devote considerable attention to policy making.

Rowland begins that section with a general description of policy making which can be divided into four observations. First, that..."Unlike stock issues judges, policy makers require the negative to defend a specific counterproposal to the affirmative plan."(p452). Second, that ..." Policy makers do not require debaters to identify the prime cause of a problem."(p452). Third, and associated with two, " Thus the affirmative fulfills their inherency burden by describing the structure of their proposed system, and by proving that the present system will not solve whatever is under discussion."(p453). Fourth, " The policy making paradigm is modeled after the attempt by systems theorists to develop a truly rational model for evaluating public policy."(p.453)

There may be some general agreement for the first three observations. The first may be modified by those who would argue that a system is a "complex interrelated entity" which would permit a system defense without much systemic description. The second is true to a point--although the process of policy comparison and the cost benefit comparison requires identification of cause to the extent that the altered system has achieved the means of meeting claimed benefits. The third may be true from the system perspective articulated by Lichtman and Rohrer, but not from the perspectives of all of those who would claim to be " policy makers." Not all who would claim association with policy making would claim that the present system is static--and hence would impose upon the affirmative the burden of establishing that the evolutionary present system is comparatively inferior to the proposed revolutionary--or resolutional change.[11]

The fourth observation is not one with which one can easily agree. Rationalism is certainly not inherent to policy making neither as it is applied to academic debate nor as it is found in policy analysis literature. Rowland's attack here may be appropriate to Lichtman and Rohrer's view of policy making, but certainly not to the views of other theorists who claim association with the view of debate as an analysis of public policy making.[12] While true of some schools of policy systems analysis, rationalism hardly rests at the root of all. To ignore the debate among those who are policy analysts as to the strengths and weaknesses of rationalism--as well as its range and limits--is to ignore a fruitful area of argument. While Rowland observes that incrementalism was derived from sources different from those of policy analysis, he does not address the notion that incrementalism may be appropriate as description of some dimensions of public policy. Moreover, he does not address the question of whether the policy analysis metaphor can be used in varying forms as competing frameworks for argument.

The bulk of Rowland's attack upon policy making focuses on his application of standards for the evaluation of a paradigm.[13] The general application of these standards will be the focus of the final portion of this essay. At this point, the discussion will simply assess the strengths of Rowlands' indictments, reserving judgment on the standards.

Rowland first suggests that the policy making perspective is unclear. He provides three examples for this claim. According to Rowland, "Inherency, for example, is defined somewhat inconsistently."(p 454) He secondly observes that policy making theorists have been unclear in their determination of whether advocates may defend multiple decisions. According to Rowland:

> At some points, policy makers clearly limit the negative to a single position, while at other points they argue that the negative may defend a series of independent positions... The proponents of policy making want to have it both ways. For practical reasons, they want to limit the alternatives considered in the debate, while for theoretical reasons they want to allow the negative to defend multiple alternatives. This uncertainty is apparent in the judging philosophies of many policy makers. Some allow the negative to defend hypothetical or conditional alternatives while others do not. The result is confusion on the part of both debaters and judges. (p455)

Finally, he indicates that allowing multiple options blurs the distinction between policy-making and hypothesis testing. Taken together, these examples establish for Rowland proof that the policy making perspective is unclear.

The first example is not compelling. While a paradigm should be clear, there is no reason provided to explain why all elements of that perspective must be clear. Otherwise, the room for argument would be limited indeed. Rowland seems to presume that all proponents of a perspective will agree totally with every important portion of that perspective--and that only under such circumstances will a paradigm be viewed as clear. But taking Rowland's own standards as an illustration, agreement with general statements do not always provide clarity in the sense Rowland applies here. Rowland's fourth standard for a good paradigm " that it should operate within the current form of debate"[14] is suggested because, according to Rowland," If debate is to teach the most advanced argumentative skills, then it is the various debate paradigms which must direct debaters toward superior analysis and away from weak arguments."(p 140) Of course, what is or is not a strong argument depends on a number of factors, making all paradigms at least as unclear as policy making based upon this example. In fact, from this view, debate has never operated from an acceptable perspective, given Lagrave's observations of inherency as an historically unclear concept.[15] Third, to argue about what is inherent may well be the vehicle for good argument--especially in those instances where topics present problems where causes rather than effects seem the critical policy question. Finally, as Rowland himself suggests, inherency and causality are not very important to the proponent of policy making. If his description of policy making is correct, the lack of clarity in this area is a problem of little consequence.

Concerning the second area cited by Rowland as unclear, Lichtman and Rohrer are not very helpful in their own defense. They concur that multiple options are allowed with policy making, only responding that such options must be consistent within a policy making framework.[16] While this is not as clear as it might be, it does begin to respond to Rowland's requirement that a perspective be clear--that is, that "...a paradigm drawn from a metaphor should include a statement of when and where the metaphor is applicable."[17]

The clearest way to explain Lichtman and Rohrer's argument here is that multiple policy options are appropriate when advocates can establish proof that there is a connection between the policy problem at hand and the theoretical framework of policy analysis used to justify multiple options. While open to some idiosyncratic interpretations of those holding a policy making perspective, it is certainly not less clear than differences which judges derive from non-paradigmatic concerns. While all critics begin with some suspension of disbelief, there are certain core values which may cause a lack of clarity in evaluation, and which cannot be clearly stated in even a functional view of debate. Tribe, for instance, has argued that man-centered views of the world consistently skew evaluation of numerous public policy issues.

> Thus the distortion results not from a logical flaw in the techniques of policy analysis but rather from what I have elsewhere described as the ideological bias of the system in which the analysis is imbedded, a system that has come to treat the human individual will and its wants as the center around which reason as calculation must revolve.[18]

Rowland asserts that unclear or inconsistent paradigms will produce arguments which mirror the paradigm itself--unclear and inconsistent.[19] On the contrary, given the need for advocates to seek connections with the metaphor, arguments have the potential for greater depth, increased clarity, and instruction in the assumptions of claims about which debaters argue.

Finally concerning the third example of failures in clarity and consistency in policy making, Rowland argues that allowing multiple policy options blurs the distinction between policy making and hypothesis testing. Rowland identifies as trivial the differences between policy making and hypothesis testing generated by the requirement of plan specificity.

Such differences are not trivial. The ability of the affirmative to make alterations in the plan as a result of a claim that a disadvantage is " not generic" to the resolution is more than a trivial difference. The ability to present multiple options--either as an affirmative or a negative--would seem to create a distinction with a difference. As long as the advocate is required to provide reasons for the "fit" between relevant portions of the policy metaphor and multiple policy options--rather than have such options be assumed as a necessary part of the perspective, the development of arguments within the perspective will be clear and consistent--and hence the evaluation of those arguments.

Rowland concludes that policy making is unclear. It is unclear only in its specifics. He may be correct in asserting that Lichtman and Rohrer do not make things as clear as they might when they accept the core function of debate as the key to the evaluation of debate paradigms or perspectives. As a tool in the general guidance of argument, the logic of policy analysis--as it is to be applied to particular policy scenarios--is clear and consistent throughout the arguments of policy system advocates.

Rowland's second standard of paradigm evaluation is that a paradigm must be fair. He argues that policy making does not meet this standard as it is biased toward the affirmative. According to Rowland, such is the case for two reasons. First, because it is easier to isolate future benefits than it is to isolate future risks. Second, because problems of implementation are given minimal attention by policy analysts.

As to the first problem, this is dependent on the view that the perspective of policy analysis inherently makes predictions of future program success. This is not consistent with every day observation of the use of policy analysis data in usual political circles. Lindblom and Cohen are correct in their assessment that practitioners of Professional Social Inquiry may be used by advocates supporting change or stability.[20] Recent news reports in virtually every area of intellectual development provides evidence of the relative balance of those who dread or cherish future worlds.

The Green article cited by Rowland to support this claim is not clearly conclusive of the assertion that policy analysis always underestimates potential costs and overestimates potential benefits. Even without considering the limiting effect of the context of new technology and epidemiological studies--certainly not central to the discussion of policy changes-- Green observes that the introduction of qualitative dimensions of harm would better serve the policy process. According to Green: " ...it would probably be more meaningful to state what the possible forms of injury are, why there is an absence of reliable data as to the probability that such injury will result, and how and when the uncertainty may be expected to be resolved."[21] The introduction of values, such as those associated with injury forms, will be related to the policy making process later. It should be clear at this point that such requirements as the need for data and the time frame for resolution of benefit/cost uncertainty fit quite neatly into most views of policy analysis.[22]

It is curious that Rowland claims the underestimation of positive results(p 459 and a successful moon landing predicted as unlikely) when he has previously observed that policy analysis inherently overpredicts benefits and inherently underpredicts costs. In sum, policy making is biased for the affirmative only insofar as negative advocates allow the perspective to be biased.

Concerning the second problem, this is also a reflection of early liberal assumptions of policy analysis. Such is clearly not a necessary condition of policy making, but rather is the result of debater/judge behaviors independent of the logic of policy-making. Quade, for instance, indicates that implemntational characteristics are arguably an important dimension of some policy analytic frameworks.

> We must recognize that some programs have a better chance than others of being successfully installed and implemented. Hence the alternatives suggested to the decision-makers should not necessarily be the one with the greatest potential for excess benefits over costs unless the possibilities of successful initiation and implimentation have been estimated and the expected costs that would be incurred by failure have been taken into account."[23]

That debate advocates have not utilized this literature to support such arguments is certainly not an indictment of the use of the policy metaphor as a general perspective for argument.

Finally, there are dimensions of the policy models which may be exploited by the negative. The section describing the lack of clarity of the policy metaphor describes the potential use by the negative of multiple policy options. This would seem to mitigate any initial affirmative bias. Every perspective has strengths and weaknesses to exploit. To say that there are certain advantages that one side may exploit does not address the question of whether there are other benefits which may be exploited by the other. Only under those circumstances where there are no countervailing weaknesses is a perspective unfair.[24]

Rowland's third major objection to policy making is that the perspective provides a skewed view of the policy environment. To use the language of the initial *Journal of The American Forensic Association* essay,:" a good paradigm provides a more accurate reflection of the issues being debated than its competitors provide." 25 The indictments of policy making are two-fold; that it understates soft values and that it overemphasizes probability discussions, emphasizing debates on large significance issues only. Here, Rowland states that probability judgment " ignores questions of responsibility and hence misstates the analysis."(p. 459)

These are problems which are not the result of the logic of policy choice, but only those dimensions of the logic chosen by Lichtman and Rohrer. Tribe addresses the ability of policy makers to address this problem if those concerned with policy analysis wish to address them. Initially he notes that value related concerns may certainly be introduced with policy analytic techniques.

> Having said all this, however, one must concede that there is nothing in the structure of the techniques themselves, or in the logical premises upon which they rest, that inherently precludes their intelligent use by a public decision maker in the service of these "intangible" or otherwise "fuzzy" concerns. Despite what appears to be a widely held assumption to the contrary, all such concerns can in theory be incorporated in a rigorous analysis, either by using various market prices or other surrogates to value extra-market costs or benefits, or by the technique of "shadow pricing"-- that is qualitatively describing as best one can the contents of a constraint as intangible as natural beauty or procedural fairness or respect for future generations, and then calculating the tangible benefits that would have to be foregone if one were to insist that one's policy conform to the constraint described.[26]

Moreover, he observes that difficulties associated with the consideration of soft variables are inherent to the discussion of these issues, rather than problems associated with policy analysis." That their decision would be difficult reflects not any intrinsic weakness in the analytic methodology as applied to nonmonetized values, but rather the universal difficulty of choosing among incommensurables--a difficulty that can be obscured but never wholly eliminated by any method of decision making."[26]

Finally, Tribe does not seem to suggest that those who are concerned with arguments and public policy should despair over the difficulties associated with applying value judgments to decision making. On the contrary, he suggests that failing to intersect policy analysis with these pursuits will doom the practice in other areas.

> Whether or not new professions must be developed in order to perform this sort of task sensitively[the task of investigating ordering structures for the evaluation of non-comparable values] it seems clear that treating the problem as an inherent incapacity of analysis to incorporate the intangible can only retard the needed development of these important abilities.[28]

> Even the most sophisticated analyses of environmental issues have been oddly oblivious to this problem of variable ends and shifting values, in part no doubt because our understanding of value formulation is so rudimentary. But failing altogether to take this sort of dependence into account can only result in solving an unintended problem while leaving unsolved the problem initially put--rather like firing at a moving target that is connected to the marksman's arm without paying any attention to the link between the two. 29

Concerning the second question, Rowland's discussion eliminates from consideration such notions in policy analysis as micro-risk, or risk comparisons. That is, there are certain risks where the harm/probability calculus is simply inappropriate, or where consideration of these risks will undermine a system's ability to attack more pressing risks.[30] An example of the use of the concept of micro-risk may be found in the decision calculus of our travel to Alta. There is a small risk, one which approaches negative infinity for all practical purposes, that one will be injured on air travel from Alta. From one individual's perspective, the harm is infinite. Although the calculus of risk times harm would suggest that one should not come to this conference, the risk is ignored in the decision because below certain levels risks are not considered. It is the logic of policy calculus, rather than the notion of micro risk, which should be emphasized here. Probability judgment ought to be used--but the logic of policy analysis does not necessarily lead to the conclusion made by Lichtman and Rohrer--that the weight given to a problem is a simple product of harm size and probability of occurance. Rowland may be correct in his indictment of previous uses of the model. He is not correct in his assertion that a skewed view of policy is inherent for all those who would use the policy metaphor as a basis for debate arguments.

Rowland completes his analysis that the policy making perspective does not accurately reflect the world that it purposes to describe with several general comments. First, that the rationalistic model can never function properly. Second, that policy making lacks "standards which distinguish between good and bad argument"--or more precisely lacks standards which isolates areas of probable harm which should be seriously considered from those areas which should not be so considered. Third, that inaction results when policy actors wait until the rational model has run the course of examining all alternatives.

The first of these comments again indicts elements of the policy making perspective which are not inherent to that perspective. As observed above, there are some dimensions of policy making which are more amenable to rationalist analysis than others. Instructors of argument should be in the business of encouraging debaters to explore these connections, rather than dismissing those dimensions out of hand.

The charge that there are no means available to distinguish between good and bad argument seems to be a restatement of present emphasis on over stated harms in policy analysis. The charge that inaction will result from the use of policy analytic techniques is not one which has much basis in the experience of policy analysis. While Ukeles(Rowland's source of support for this claim) does indicate that attempts to discover all available alternatives may in theory be too time consuming for meaningful solutions to social problems, he suggests that this occurance is rare. As Ukeles writes:

> Most analysts, of course, are aware of this and make no attempt to collect all alternatives, quantify all the objectives and predict all the consequences of alternatives. They had to adjust their own expectations to the realities of time and data limitations. [31]

Ukeles seems to advocate continued argument in this area--" Over the coming years active debate among competing analytic models is needed if the field is to develop" [32] --which is quite consistent with the position of this essay that academic debate can serve as one vehicle for the appropriateness of policy making models.

Rowland has suggested that " Debate paradigms should not be based on the simple transfer of a metaphor from the real world to debate."[33] In the same way, a simple transfer of a metaphor to debate does not make for good argument. What makes for good argument is the thorough and careful search for fits between models and policy problems facing the advocates. This will make for good debate--even if good debate will always remain in the eye of the beholder. In the same way that policy analysts are prevented from examining all possible alternatives, so too will debaters be prevented from examining such alternatives in a debate. The combination of this with the ability of competing advocates to uncover an appropriate portion of the policy metaphor to defeat rationalist assumptions means that policy making is suited to the current form of debate. The key factor in making the model suitable is the encouragement of advocates to explore fully the rich literature of policymaking, rather than accepting a simple transfer of the metaphor.

In summary of this section of this essay, it should be noted that Rowland is often correct in his thorough analysis of policy making. This essay would argue that this is the result of previous application of the policy metaphor, rather than a result of the conclusion that the policy metaphor may serve as a place for discovering potential arguments about ways to view public policy in an academic debate context.

The final section of this essay will review Rowland's standards for paradigm evaluation, in light of the present defense of policy making.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS OF ROWLAND'S STANDARDS OF PARADIGM EVALUATION

Rowland's essay on Standards for Paradigm Evaluation lists five evaluative criteria developed in an attempt to " fairly judge the worth of the paradigm." In his response to critiques of his position, Rowland correctly observes that Lichtman and Rohrer "...accept the basic position defended in 'Standards for Paradigm Evaluation.' In fact, they support functional standards for evaluating debate paradigms and explicitly endorse the five evaluative criteria which were proposed."[34] Given the analysis in the second section of this essay, consideration of Rowland's five standards is appropriate.

Rowland first indicates that a good paradigm is clear and consistent. As suggested above, the use of the policy metaphor is clear, to the extent that the advocate has the opportunity to provide a clear relationship between a particular policy problem and the dimensions of the policy metaphor that advocates choose to argue at a given point in time. The perspective must be clear to the advocates. The policy perspective is consistent in the sense that it may be consistently applied when similar policy problems are faced by advocates and critics alike. Since the reasoning employed by advocates will be reasoning by analogy--what is appropriate in this policy analytic situtïon is appropriate here-- then the critic is consistently asked to apply tests of reasoning by analogy--tests which may be consistently applied.

Rowland's second criteria is that a good paradigm should be fair--namely, that the paradigm should grant no procedural advantage to either team. This standard seems to make sense, as long as it is amended to read that no side should be better able than their opponents to exploit procedural advantages. Given the breadth of disputes about the appropriateness of various policy perspectives, it should be clear that fairness will be maintained.

The third criterion which Rowland developed is that a good paradigm does a better job than its competitors at revealing important questions under consideration. The policy metaphor does quite well in that regard. This compels debaters to explore not only factual material, but also conceptual material which can be argued to be suited to that factual material. Such a requirement certainly meets that standard. This is especially true when compared to a perspective which derives its basis of analysis from debate as it functions today--a restriction which obviously limits the questions which can be addressed by advocates.

The fourth characteristic of a good debate paradigm is, according to Rowland, that it should fit the current form of debate. This standard has already come into question by Zarefsky.[35] Without repeating the interchange between Rowland and Zarefsky, it is clear that the policy metaphor adapts well to the current form of debate. Problems associated with fit--multiple policy options, inability to consider all available alternatives--are better suited to consideration by the advocacy process, rather than by ad hoc assessment of what does and does not fit the debate process. It is never established that the use of multiple policies, for example, creates burdens of any greater proportion than do multiple arguments within a single position.

Rowland's final standard for evaluation is that the paradigm should produce good arguments. This is where the present description of policy analysis would seem to have an advantage over competitors. It is difficult to understand how a scheme which only explores descriptive/evaluative arguments can provide a base for instruction in argument more powerful than that provided by a comparison of competing frameworks for policy evaluation. For instance, a comparison of the relative merits of a rationalist and non-rationalist view of public policy is at least as valuable as a comparison of one set of claims supported by studies[The US Study: US News and World Report indicates...] with another set of claims supported by studies[The congressional study: The Congressional Record notes...].

Rowland has provided a valuable service to the debate community by stimulating a heated discussion of the merits of various perspectives of evaluation in academic debate. This essay has indicated that Rowland is correct in his assessment that policy systems analysis, if simply applied, will often prove to be an unsatisfactory set of premises for policy analysis in academic debate. At the same time, the essay has concluded that both Rowland and previous analysts of policy analysis could do more to tap that rich area for tools debaters and critics may use for debates about issues of public policy.

Lindblom and Cohen may well have been describing a functional approach to debate when they observed debate practices in governmental bureaucracies.

> It appears that in certain circumstances common especially in the bureaucracy, a tacit agreement comes into play according to which the victory goes to the superficial "winner" of the debate. But they in effect follow the tacit rule that declares that better evidence(especially better numbers) carries the day...Such a practice makes further costly investment of effort in a continuing struggle unnecessary, settles the issue peacefully, and does so by means of a ceremony that makes decision making appear to be informed and thoughtful, as indeed it is to a degree. Evidence and argument can in fact be fragmentary, provided only that by conventional superficial standards they are judged better than contrary evidence and argument.[36]

If debate is in the business of teaching good argument, it should not be satisfied with arguments that are judged largely in terms of better evidence. Debaters can do better in their search for the premises of that evidence--and so too should the perspectives that we encourage them to take.

NOTES

1. Robert Dorfman, " An Afterword: Humane Values and Environmental Decisions," Lawrence H. Tribe, Corinne S. Schelling, John Voss, eds. *When Values Conflict*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1976)p. 169.

2 See John D. Cross and Ronald J. Matlon, " An Analysis of Judging Philosophies in Academic Debate," *Journal of The American Forensic Association*, 14 (Fall, 1978) pp.110-112

3 See Thomas J. Hynes Jr., " Significance in Academic Debate," in George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, *Dimensions of Argument* (Annandale, VA.: Speech Communication Association, 1981); " A Rule Based Defense of Perspective Taking," Paper Presented at The Speech Communication Association Annual Convention, Louisville, KY November, 1982; Daniel W. Sutherland and Thomas J. Hynes Jr., " Mixed Scanning and Policy Debate," Paper Presented at the Speech Communication Association Annual Convention, Louisville KY November, 1982; " Perspectives for Evaluation in Academic Debate," in Allan D. Louden, ed., *Foreign Policy: A New Decade*(Winston-Salem, N.C.: Debaters Research Guide,1979) pp.2-8

4 In Hynes, " A Rules Based Defense..., p. 5

5 See James W. Paulsen and Jack Rhodes," The Counterwarrant as a Negative Strategy," *JAFA*, 15, Spring, 1979, 205-210. Marjorie Keeshan and Walter Ulrich," A Critique of the Counterwarrant as a Negative Strategy," *JAFA* 17 Summer, 1980,199. Patricia Ganer," Counterwarrant, An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come," in Ziegelmueller and Rhodes, pp. 476-484;Jack Rhodes," A Defense of the Counterwarrant as a Negative Argument, in Ziegelmueller and Rhodes, pp. 485-493. Also see Hynes, " Significance in Academic Debate," p. 560.

6 See Gidon Gottlieb, *The Logic of Choice*, (New York: MacMillan Company, 1968), esp.pp. 103-104.

7 Jacob B. Ukeles, " Policy Analysis: Myth or Reality," *Public Administration Review*, 37(May/June, 1977) 223-228.

8 Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen, *Usable Knowledge: Social Scienec and Social Problem Solving*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979) p 62.

9 Henry S. Rowen, " Policy Analysis as Heuristic Aid: The Design of Means, Ends and Institutions," in Tribe, Schelling and Voss, p. 141.

10 Robert C. Rowland, "Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation," DIMENSIONS OF ARGUMENT, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes,(Annandale, Va.: Speech Communication Association,1981) pp. 448-475.

11 Without advocating all of the associated implications, this is suggested by John T. Morello, " Defending the Present System's Capacity for Incremental Changes," *Journal of The American Forensic Association* 19(Fall, 1982) 115-121.

12 For example, see Brock, Klump, et.al. *Public Policy Decision Making* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p14. Also see Morello, note 10. Michael Pfau, " The Present System Revisited Part One: Incremental Change, " *Journal of The American Forensic Association*, 17 (Fall, 1980), 80-84; and "The Present System Revisited Part Two: Policy Interrelationships," *Journal of The American Forensic Association*, 17 (Winter, 1981),146-154.

13 Robert C. Rowland, "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation," 18 *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, (Winter, 1982) 133-140.

14 Rowland, "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation," p.139

15 Charles W. LaGrave, "Inherency: An Historical View," in David Thomas, *Advanced Debate*, (Skokie: National Textbook, 1975) 50-55.

16 Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, " Policy Dispute and Paradigm Evaluation: A Response to Rowland," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*,18,(Winter,1982), p.147

17 Rowland," Standards for Paradigm Evaluation," p. 138.

18 Lawrence Tribe, "Ways not to Think About Plastic Trees," in Tribe, Schelling, and Voss, p. 74-75.

19 Rowland, "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation,"p138.

20 Lindblom and Cohen,p. 64.

21 Harold Green, " The Risk Benefit Calculus in Safety Determination," *George Washington Law Review*, 43 (March,1975) p. 804.

22 The appropriateness of this discussion is made even clearer after examination of Phillip Handler's response to the Green essay, in which he responds to the more specific indictments of policy analysis outlined by Green and cited by Rowland. See Phillip Handler, " A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for Government Regulation," *George Washington Law Review*, 43 (March, 1975), pp 808-813.

23 E.S. Quade, ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DECISIONS, (New York: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1975) p. 260.

24 See Hynes, " Perspectives for Evaluation in Academic Debate," for examples of such exploitation of assumptions of various perspectives in the analysis of public policy.

25 Rowland, " Debate Paradigms,"pp.457;" Standards for Paradigm Evaluation,"p. 138.

26 Tribe, p.64.

27 Tribe, p. 65.

28 Tribe, p.66.

29 Tribe, pp. 68-69.

30 See for instance, Max Singer, " How to Reduce Risks Rationally," *Public Interest*, 51 (Spring 1978) pp.93-112.

31 Ukeles, p. 226.

32 Ukeles, p. 226.

33 Rowland, " Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation," p. 470.

34 Rowland, " The Primacy of Standards for Paradigm Evaluation: A Rejoiner," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 18 (Winter, 1982) p. 155.

35 David Zarefsky, "The Perils of Assessing Paradigms," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*,18 (Winter, 1982) 141-144.

36 Lindblom and Cohen, pp. 65-66.

LESSONS LEARNED: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE AND THE THEORY OF DEBATE

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It requires some audacity on my part to open this discussion of forensics as a laboratory for argument when so much disagreement exists over what is encompassed by "forensics" and "argument." To protect myself somewhat, I limit my treatment of disputes within "forensics" to the recent series of exchanges over the evaluation of academic debate paradigms. Similarly, I choose to stand as an observer at the battleground over the epistemological implications of argument, arguing, and argumentation. If forensics is indeed a "laboratory" for argument, then the theory and practice of debate must bear some relationship to the theory and practice of argument. In the absence of any such relationship, we would delude ourselves in believing that academic debate could ever "test" our notions about argument or even contribute insights about argument.

You may not be surprised to learn that this essay reflects a belief that there is more than coincidence in the simultaneous appearance of a spate of articles about the epistemic status of argument and numerous exchanges about the legitimacy of argumentation over paradigms in our journals. Certainly our suspicions should be aroused by the phalanx of present and former debate coaches who have entered the fray over the seemingly esoteric subjects of argument fields and the sociology of argument. Within these conflicts over debate and over argument appears a common call for greater recognition of the constructions and intentions that participants contribute to an interaction, whether that interaction be a formal debate or an ordinary argument. The notion emerges that debaters or arguers enter processes of social comparison that embody consensually-established rules or standards. Furthermore, these participants employ such rules and standards to "pass muster on ideas," as Willard phrases it, or, more generally, to enhance their knowledge and achieve related aims by taking advantage of previous communal accomplishments in these areas (a smidgeon of functionalism).[1]

Within this view, the purpose of theory construction in argumentation or in debate is to describe the ways in which arguers adapt their interpretations of a situation (in verbal advocacy) to the communal rules and standards that are operative within that situation.[2] The critic of argumentative practices should not impose a universal evaluation of certain patterns of adaptation as right or wrong, good or evil, rational or irrational, without sensitivity to the characteristics of the situation or field within which the arguers interact.[3] Rather, the critic should bracket such universal evaluations and take the perspectives of the arguers to discover their interpretative frameworks and how they affect practices.[4]

The judging of any debate, like any other critical act, must account for these frameworks in guiding advocates toward greater competency in the process of social comparison. The judge is an argument critic in the sense that (s)he enables the arguers to understand more completely the implications of their own argumentative choices. Rather than evaluating the merits of the underlying content or substance of the ideas that arguers extract from issue fields, the judge or critic investigates how the arguer uses those ideas to make arguments.[5] The "more successful" debater or arguer is the one who understands and conveys more clearly the implications of his or her arguments within the constraints of a particular example of situated discourse (a debate).[6]

The parallels in critical stance between the sociology of argument and the theory of debate judgment thus fall into a pattern that we might call the "turn to descriptivism." "Descriptivism" in the present sense is the view that the critic must take the characteristics of an interaction (or the use of language in argument) as a given and that evaluative structures that imply a metaphysical or ontological significance to arguments beyond that perceived by the users of the arguments themselves are illegitimate. What this essay will show is that this move has been made before in another field--the emphasis in twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy upon the description of the uses of ordinary language to resolve traditional problems. Recalling the historical course of the ordinary language movement may help us to apprehend the future direction of the descriptivist position within argumentation and debate. The lesson we may learn from our exercise is that, although it serves a useful role in clarifying the pragmatics of debate, descriptivism is unlikely to achieve its goal of supplanting, or even quelling dispute over, paradigms, whether of debate or of argument. This essay will suggest that when language or argument is directed toward matters of choice or avoidance, questions of evaluation and competing beliefs about the nature of reality reappear in new guises.

DESCRIPTIVISM AND PARADIGM DISPUTES IN DEBATE

Above I have given an idealized account of the descriptivist theory of argument as applied to debate. What signs exist in the literature of such a theory, and what influence does the theory have on the paradigm dispute? To buttress the claim, we must retrace the path taken in several articles since 1976. Appropriately enough, Charles Willard leads the way with his essay on "The Nature and Implications of the 'Policy Perspective' for the Evaluation of Debate."[7] Although at first glance it could be mistaken for yet another excursis on the policy-making paradigm, the piece does far more. It characterizes the paradigm as a "perspective," "a conceptual lens, a psychological framework, a set of assumptions which a critic brings to bear upon the evaluation of a debate."[8] Willard defines his purpose as the rigorous scrutiny of this perspective as it is used by critics to interpret disorganized phenomena (which certainly is an accurate description of many debate rounds). To begin his scrutiny, he reconstructs the debate activity into an example of situated discourse within a field, an educational game. "The argumentation occurs in an artificial context which is defined by certain rules and traditions designed to enhance the educational benefits of the game."[9] The purpose of the game is to provide an opportunity to practice skills of social comparison (research, rhetorical criticism, resource evaluation, and oral delivery).[10]

Why, then, do we scrutinize the critical perspective? Because the participants make the perspective part of their definition of the situation. The critic shapes strategic choices and thus determines whether the purpose is achieved. "It follows, therefore, that critics ought to embrace that critical perspective which, when enforced upon the disputants, maximizes the educational benefits of the game."[11]

Willard next defines his "policy perspective." It is not a way to evaluate the substance of particular arguments. Rather, it is an expectation or interpretation of the actions taken by debaters in the situation. In arguing, debaters must stand for a coalescence of "laws, social traditions and attitudes" that Willard defines as a "policy." This coalescence must be coherent to be functional. Coherence implies clarity and consistency, which are cognitive lenses of long-standing value in the philosophical community.

How do these functional standards compare to alternative views? Willard defines another conceptual lens he calls "hypothesis testing." It is described as a willingness to accept inconsistencies at the factual level--"the present system is now achieving X" and "X will result in serious harms."[12] He would like to smash this lens because it ignores functional standards and thus frustrates his view of the critical purpose.

The article concludes with a reformulation of presumption and burden of proof as psychological lenses that codify judge expectations and standards of proof. With these lenses on, no judge can be a "tabula rasa" passive acceptor of participant-imposed judging criteria. "The critic, while a participant in the game, is always a teacher; and to ask the teacher to abandon his or her personal standards is to circumvent the strongest features of the system."[13]

In summary, Willard constructs a model of debate that serves as "ordinary argument interaction." Rather than specifying particular kinds of arguments as being relevant or irrelevant to policy debate, he calls upon the critic to be sensitive to the perceptions of the participants as they determine from the critic what the applicable rules and standards are to achieve success in social comparison. To fulfill the critic's role, (s)he must define those rules and standards in a way that describes the functions that the argumentative interaction called debate serve for the participants. Only descriptions that recognize the special limits of argument use in debate are plausible. Clarity and consistency are the rules and standards most likely to enhance argumentative skills.

At the same 1976 convention that showcased Willard's piece, Bill Balthrop offered a descriptivist variation.[14] Unlike Willard, however, Balthrop had the opportunity to expand upon his views in his critique of the 1981 NDT final debate.[15] Balthrop argues that debate as an argument setting possesses its own field-dependent standard "to measure its own activity according to its own purpose."[16] The very nature of debate as a laboratory for argument makes this plausible: "Academic debate created standards to evaluate argument and established procedures to make the laboratory situation an effective instrument for fulfilling its purpose."[17] (a smidgeon of personification). Because debate judges participate in a process that has the purpose of educating students in argument use and understanding, judges should apply their expertise in argumentation theory to describe, interpret and evaluate arguments.

How does the critic engage in these tasks? Balthrop recommends a hermeneutic framework. Judges will have a pre-understanding of what the situated discourse of debate should look like. But this understanding will be modified as the judge holds a critical dialogue with the debate.[18]

Balthrop shares with Willard the emphasis upon debate as a situated argumentative discourse with its own consensually-generated rules and standards. He agrees that the judge must assume an educationally-sound and participant-sensitive interpretive stance. But Balthrop moves beyond Willard in emphasizing that the passage of time within the critical dialogue affects the interpretation. The judge should not be limited to criteria of clarity or consistency. The interaction of arguments over time, the rise and fall of various positions, produces the final interpretation. Balthrop recognizes the possible charge of excessive judge discretion, but he finds limits in the plausibility of the interpretation according to what is actually said in the round.[19] This variation we might call "descriptivism with a time dimension." It decries the false objectivity of tabula rasa, as does Willard, but substitutes descriptive interpretation of argument quality and strategy over time for Willard's fixed standards of function. It is interesting to observe that Willard has adopted the critical stance in his most recent work on the sociology of argument.[20]

In the early stages of the move toward descriptivism, theorists confined their analysis to a description of the uses of argument within debate and of standards for judge interpretations consistent with such uses. But the view soon expanded (presaged perhaps by Willard's tentative exploration of "hypothesis testing") to reach a second aspect of descriptivism. This was the position that evaluative paradigms that did not conform to the uses of argument in debate as described were meaningless and needed to be replaced.

Perhaps the most prominent examples of this form of critique are those of Robin Rowland. Rowland's essay on "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation"[21] constructs a descriptionist justification for the priority of functional standards. He seconds Kuhn's argument that paradigms provide the lens through which scientists (and debate judges) view reality. Here the connection is made with the psychological lens theory of Willard. Rowland also sees the paradigm of the judge as the expectations that the participants employ to define the argumentative situation: "In sum, debate paradigms are important because they provide rules to which debaters adapt in their quest for ballots."[22] "Paradigms are also important because they define the argumentative world which debaters and judges perceive."[23] Moreover, he argues that paradigms should be evaluated not upon their internal philosophical consistency or on their faithful mapping of "real world" decision structures, but rather upon their consistency with the functions that debate serves as an activity.[24] Finally, Rowland develops functional criteria for debate paradigms: clarity and consistency, fairness, accurate reflection of issues discussed, facilitation of clash, and suitability for the debate format. If a paradigm fails to meet one or more of the criteria, it is a square peg in the round hole of debate.[25] Other theorists have presented some different lists of functional criteria and forms of descriptivist critique. Pollert and Benoit, for example, found six criteria useful in the evaluation of any decision system or set of decision rules: fitness, neutrality, clarity and consistency, facilitation of decision-making, encouragement of good argumentation, and application of criteria from original context.[26]

Perhaps the most radical critique is that begun by Riley and Hollihan.[27] They argue that paradigm disputes, in reality, are just a small part of the controversy over the appropriate communication styles for the exemplar of argumentative practice within debate. Exemplars should be the focus for debate theory because of their relationship to the purposes of debate (skill development) and the definition of the situation (norms of the debate community and gamesmanship).[28] Riley and Hollihan provide standards for communication style--rules of thumb for artistic and effective communication, basic value assumptions underlying communication practices, and descriptions of exemplars of good communication for the debate community. But the ultimate measure of exemplar models lies in their educational utility.[29]

Hollihan has extended this perspective to an evaluation of the hypothesis-testing paradigm.[30] He argues that hypothesis testing cannot be understood outside of its application by debaters in particular rounds. If it lends any credibility to contradictory arguments, it should be rejected. "Presumption rests with using academic debate as a laboratory in policy advocacy. Any declaration that other goals ought to take precedence over this one requires that presumption be placed squarely against this alternative hypothesis."[31] In this essay, Hollihan completes the turn to descriptivism. Debate theory has no ontological significance beyond its part in justifying certain uses of argument--strategic innovations. The "rationality" of debate theories lay completely in their contribution to the process of advocacy itself.

If the traditional paradigms of debate are inconsistent with the field standards of the activity, what paradigms are? The development of new paradigms of debate is another manifestation of second-generation descriptivism. Ken Strange's advocacy paradigm includes the following assumptions: policy debate is a critical method for

decision through bilateral comparison of policy alternatives, advocates who compare single policy alternatives promote rigorous comparison, and the audience or judge is bound by the ideas tested in the debate.[32] The assumptions map the view of judge as critic explicated by Willard and Balthrop onto a theory of advocate responsibility. Robin Rowland provides another example of a paradigm in "functional" form.[33] In their transformed versions, presumption yields to preponderance of evidence and coin tosses, topicality is determined by the better definition standard, burden of proof becomes a minimum standard for every argument, inherency yields to solvency, advantages and disadvantages are subject to equal proof requirements and conditional arguments are illegitimate. Rowland admits that the model of argument is not generalizable and that it contains a "crazy quilt" of theories, but defends it on descriptivist grounds--it meets the unique needs of competitive debate.[34] Hollihan, finally, has promised us a paradigm that creates ". . . . standards of effective rhetorical communication appropriate for academic debate as a unique 'communication style.'"[35]

The second stage of descriptivism brought it almost inevitably to a confrontation with traditional paradigms. The ability to reconcile the goals and purposes of debate with argument practices became the measure of good theory--a measure against which traditional paradigms were found wanting by their very nature. New paradigms were developed that began with the situated discourse of the debate round as given and added constraints that promoted the educational functions of debate. To question the usefulness of these new paradigms, one would be compelled to challenge the very principles of descriptivism themselves. Such questioning has indeed occurred--but in philosophy, not in argumentation theory.

ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY AND THE ONTOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

The philosopphy of ordinary language developed in part as a reaction to the troubles that faced logical positivism in its analysis of language as the construction of experience. Positivists such as Russell, Schlick and the early Wittgenstein believed that language was about experience, and that linguistic meaning therefore could be interpreted and reconstructed through explicit definitions and semantic rules that clarified this referral function. Truth lay in the ability to speak "correctly about things," by limiting oneself to reference statements that could be verified by syntactic necessity or empirical observation.

Wittgenstein modified his earlier view substantially in his Philosophical Investigations[36], which became a classic text in the ordinary language movement. The meaning of terms was no longer to be found in formal definitions and rules that explained how language "pictured" reality, but rather lay in the different contexts or situations of the proper use of those terms. The analyst must look to the use of terms within discourse and their systematic interrelationships with other terms of the language. Language itself is an activity, a form of life, and particular instances of discourse represent "language games" that are governed by rules and standards embedded within the context of verbal interaction itself. Knowing a language, then, requires an understanding of an elaborate system of rules of how words are used appropriately to accomplish certain purposes in interaction.

What is important for our purposes is the reconstruction that ordinary language philosophy makes of the role of the philosopher-critic. Words are used correctly when they follow the rules that serve a particular form of communication, or language game, in ordinary speech. To discover these rules, ". . . the philosopher simply concerns himself with the origins and development of our ordinary mode of speech."[37] There is, however, no ideal or preeminent language that transcends particular language games and tells the critic which particular uses of language are justified. Thus the actual uses of language must be taken "as given," as a "form of life." They cannot be criticized or improved upon.

Philosophers in the past are said to have created philosophical problems by doubting the actual use of language and mixing up uses and have attempted to solve them by imposing some overarching standard of metaphysical purity. To avoid these pseudoproblems, "[p]hilosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is."[38] The philosopher must adapt his analysis to the description of existing language practices and his principles of meaning must reflect the goals and purposes that underlie the ordinary uses of language. As Strawson argues, "[t]he actual use of linguistic expressions remains his sole and essential point of contact with the reality which he wishes to understand, conceptual reality; for this is the only point from which the actual mode of operation of concepts can be observed."[39]

Finally, the improvement of language skills comes through continuous efforts at employing language correctly in situated discourse. "Becoming clearer or more precise about the use of ordinary language is thus simply a matter of paying more conscious attention to what we have already

learned or acquired through experience."[40] It is not a matter of creating new uses for words or of denying the validity of ordinary language use. In sum, the philosopher critic is engaged in a "purely descriptive enterprise, 'therapeutic' in its effect" on the muddles of traditional philosophy. One can call the effort linguistic phenomenology, conceptual history, or conceptual anthropology, but the conceptual scheme must reflect the uses of language in ordinary discourse.

For a time, ordinary language philosophy was extremely successful in persuading its audience that traditional philosophical problems (such as the problem of validity) could be rendered meaningless within the framework of the ordinary uses of expressions. But doubts began to emerge about its passive stance toward the representation of reality within language use, its belief in the primacy of descriptivism. In 1956, J. L. Austin allowed us to infer that description of language use might not end the philosophical task. He noted that when we examine what words we should use in what situations, we look not merely at words but at the realities they represent. We use the sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of the phenomena.[41] But the philosophy of ordinary language tells us nothing about the nature of the constructions that make up language because language itself is merely a tool for achieving a communicative purpose. "*Because* language is found on examination to be but a set of tools for mundane--or at any rate, intramundane--purposes therefore the world is only what it seems. For old philosophy argued from features of language to strange realms: from adjectives to Universals, from substantives to Substances, from hypothetical expressions to a Realm of Possibilities, etc., etc. But once one sees all kinds of expressions as *tools*, one also sees all such inferences to strange entities or realms to be misguided. Hence, the world is as it seems, before we started to philosophize."[42]

One reason for this tension lies in the lack of rootedness of the descriptive view of language use itself. Recall that Wittgenstein argued for the examination of terms in use or in action in their *interrelationships* with other concepts and experience. But Quine argues that this comparison in itself assumes a background language within which these interrelationships can be interpreted. Wittgenstein denied any background language to the notions of ordinary language; they could only be perceived. "Language games, the functioning of concepts, were still *shown*, described, without, it appears, any intermediate theories."[43] The absence of any background language makes the concepts to which the terms of our ordinary language are linked ". . . free-floating and indeterminate in principle with respect to their own interpretation."[44] Thus the ordinary language philosophers cannot satisfy the philosophical desire to investigate ontology by arguing that description of language practices will reveal the folly of such investigations if ordinary language has no ontological significance. "Our confident and effective utilization of our most familiar, all-inclusive ordinary language testifies not to our pre-systematic ontological (semantic, conceptual, etc.) awareness, but rather to the ultimate meaningless of such conceptual inquiry."[45]

What has occurred with increasing frequency in the last two decades, then, is the translation of the ordinary language position into other background languages that have different ontological significance. Michael Shapiro has employed the ordinary language framework to justify his view that ordinary discourse inevitably reflects political commitments and the legitimation of power.

> "When we use familiar forms of discourse to identify 'things,' we express in our speaking a form of life that contains within it rules about who has legitimate control over what. . . . Thus, embedded in our everyday discourse about the value and significance of various objects and episodes that emerge as we actualize our language in speech are affirmations of a system of authority, that is, acceptances of various allocations of control as legitimate."[46]

Karl-Otto Apel has constructed a theory of the foundation of ethics that grounds the possibility of ordinary language use in moral norms of responsibility. "Even here a transcendental critique of meaning is able to demonstrate that the *presupposition of the validity of moral norms in general is a 'paradigmatic' precondition for the possibility of the language-game associated with the justification of norms*."[47] Maurice Cornforth incorporates the argument from paradigm case for the detection and sorting-out of verbal confusions and the clarification of meaning into Marxist materialist dialectics.[48] If Quine's view is correct, there is nothing within ordinary language philosophy that excludes this kind of ontologizing or that makes any one of these theories any more acceptable than another.

In general, the core descriptivism of ordinary language philosophy is being abandoned in favor of a renewed concern for the problem of the relationship between language and reality. As Richard Bernstein has observed, "[t]here are even signs that some younger analytic philosophers are becoming skeptical of the injunction that the exclusive job of the philosophy is to describe, and they think that perhaps philosophy, once again (informed by the care and sophistication of analytic techniques) can reaffirm the ideal of being a critical guide to the development of *praxis*."[49] Ordinary language philosophy retains what vitality it has through its connection with new metaphysical theories. Gellner's prediction in 1959 about its future has been borne out in practice: ". . . Linguistic Philosophy must abandon its self-ascribed pedestal of neutrality and condescend to argue in defence of its tacit and insinuated criteria of linguistic health and disease. It would then become interesting--and incidentally cease to have the characteristics which define 'Linguistic Philosophy' as it now is."[50] That pedestal is the descriptivist view of language use in situated discourse.

DESCRIPTIVISM AND INDETERMINACY OF PARADIGM CHOICE

The parallels between the principles of ordinary language philosophy and the views of argumentation and debate described above are quite striking in the move toward descriptivism. These latter views create a model of ordinary argumentative interaction within which certain rules and standards develop that determine how participants should use argument to achieve certain goals. Critical models should describe what those uses of argument are (the functional criteria) within the situated discourse of debate. Critical judgment should be limited to assisting the participants in clarifying the consequences of the argumentative positions that are developed, for the skills of argumentation are limited to such perspective-taking in verbal discourse. Theories of debate that attempt to impose some notion of a relationship between discourse in debate and real-world decision-making are meaningless and should be replaced. In sum, if we replace "language" with "argument" in the philosophy of ordinary language, we can produce a fairly faithful rendition of the descriptivist theories of argumentation and debate.

The lesson we learn from this resemblance is the explanation for the conclusion reached by Zarefsky[51] and others that descriptivism will not eliminate disputes over the appropriate paradigm for argument in debate or in other settings. Balthrop observed in his 1981 critique that the judge has theoretical assumptions to decide who has done the better job of debating. "It is possible from this perspective for one to adopt the critical stance and still function as a policy-maker, a hypothesis-tester, or a *tabula rasa* among others."[52] Rowland explained the implications of Kuhn's incommensurability thesis (derived itself from an application of ordinary language philosophy to science) for debate using specific types of arguments that illustrate how judges with the traditional paradigms see the world differently.[53] Finally, Riley and Hollihan distinguish two senses of Kuhn's notion of paradigms--disciplinary matrices, the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, etc. shared by members of a given community, and exemplars, concrete puzzle-solutions which can replace explicit rules when used as models.[54] It may be that traditional paradigms of debate incorporate as much of disciplinary matrices in them as they do exemplars of argument.

What is the barrier to resolving disputes over paradigms to which these previous insights point? Recall that descriptivism in ordinary language philosophy gave way to theories about the ontological significance of ordinary speech acts. In a similar manner, traditional paradigms may either declare the descriptive theories irrelevant to their purposes or attempt to rebuild their normative requirements on top of the descriptive standards. Traditional paradigms take the position that debate itself is more than a forum for the development of argumentative skills. They are commitments to certain modes of rhetorical proof for questions of ethical and political choice or avoidance that are raised by a topic's central principles.

In this view, debate mediates between particular views of the nature of reality and alternative decisions that could be made about the desirability of pursuing a particular course of action. Paradigms decide what arguments and supporting evidence are relevant to this mediation. It is this meaning that I attribute to Zarefsky's claim that "[c]ontroversy has been injected into debate theory largely because of the growing recognition that debate is not an end in itself. The activity's principles and norms are designed not to sustain themselves but to mirror something larger, on which debate is modelled."[55] Were no such intentions present in those who have constructed these paradigms, there would be no need to discuss elaborate figurative analogies to real-world decision-making structures. These structures have within them certain ways of testing proposals for truth and practicality that the advocates of competing paradigms wish to interpose between knowledge and action in debate. In sum, our disciplinary matrices, our constellations of beliefs, values, and techniques, may be involved in the choice among paradigms.

Zarefsky's essay on "Argument as Hypothesis Testing" provides a good example of the philosophical commitments inhering within choice among traditional paradigms.[56] He begins by arguing that the empiricist method of science has long been considered a valuable technique for obtaining factual knowledge that deserves the label "truth" because of its reliability and consistency. The question is whether such epistemological tools are available to assist us in resolving questions of value and policy. Drawing upon Kuhn's notion that statements of fact and of value are united in their proof by consensual validation, Zarefsky argues that confidence in rhetorical proofs requires an analogue to scientific modes of validation--falsificationist standards and clear explanations of method --that can be found in reason-giving for or against a particular proposition. The proposition is the statement which undergoes the test, and its central principles embody a proposed action to meet an implied problem of social policy. The probable truth-value of the resolution lies in the judgment of whether the resolution is necessary to solve the implied problem. Finally, the purpose of reason-giving in debate is to improve the state of our knowledge, not to commit us to action.[57] In putting forward these propositions, Zarefsky invites us to examine his intellectual commitment to empiricist and pragmatist philosophical streams that come together in his suggested mode of rhetorical verification and truth-seeking.

Lest we believe that such intellectual commitments are limited to the hypothesis-testing paradigm, consider what Dan Rohrer argued about the nature of debate and reality in his essay "Debate as a Liberal Art."[58] He submits that the true skills of argumentation are those of reasoning to develop logical means of changing conviction and belief. He sees debate as arising from the needs of a democratic society that faces rapid changes and external challenges that pose policy questions not yet resolved. Audiences in democratic societies inevitably will be moved to action and therefore must be persuaded to choose good alternatives by those who have expertise. Rather than producing certainty, debate is an art that produces approximations to "truth" within realms of probabilistic speculation. Three factors help to account for the kind of truth that emerges from policy debate: policy adapts to change, argumentation reveals knowledge, and truth is often relative in policy questions. The contingent nature of knowledge and truth as applied to the necessity for action within the policy-making model engenders presumption, probability, and predictability as standards of argument evaluation. Thus the policy-making model according to Rohrer's view combines elements of skepticism, relativism, pragmatism and materialism to justify its commitment to argument as a means of directing inevitable action on social problems.

Descriptivism cannot banish these paradigms because they serve as a gloss on the purposes of debate for which the descriptive view examines the uses of argument. If the purposes of the participants of the participants are to improve their argumentative skills, and these skills are defined according to the traditional paradigmatic views, descriptivism can say nothing definitive about the paradigms other than describing argument practices according to their success in achieving these goals. New paradigms of debate could be developed, but they, too, would reflect certain implicit philosophical commitments. In this sense, the traditional paradigms become the analogue to Quine's background language or theory into which particular argument practices can be translated.[59]

This indeterminacy of paradigms within descriptive models of argument in debate also tells us what Zarefsky may mean by the ad hominem arguments by which one paradigm may be chosen over another. They are not, as Randy Lake supposes, arguments from the nature of actual argumentative practices within debate rounds where the paradigms are invoked.[60] Either the paradigm itself modifies argument practice to fit time constraints when debaters understand the paradigm[61] or the format can be changed to accommodate the paradigm. Rather, the arguments come from the philosophical commitments that are embedded within the paradigm--the assumptions about the nature of man and government, the relative values of actions and reflection, and the relationship between contest debate and public argument, among others. That is why a pluralistic approach to paradigmatic argument, which encourages understanding of multiple world-views and translation of issues among them, can foster a search for possible ad hominem arguments.[62] If, as a result of historical change or new understandings about the purposes of argument in society, the philosophical commitments of a paradigm become inconsistent within themselves, paradigms can decay and disappear. But no consideration of argumentative practices alone will induce it.

Having gone too far, perhaps, in appearing to defend the unpopular Zarefsky, I would like to conclude by disagreeing with his position that argument about paradigms in debate rounds is not fruitful. Such argument reminds us of the philosophical commitments that we make in employing particular paradigms. If we ultimately must choose on the basis of "intuition," it should be an intuition that at least has been informed by our knowledge of the relationship between suggested modes of rhetorical proof and our beliefs in other areas. Argument about paradigms also would check the distressing tendency of some theorists to wrench philosophical statements out of their complete context in support of strategic innovations in argument practices. Finally, such argument would remind advocates of paradigms that are based upon functional definitions of debate discourse that these paradigms must meet the test of philosophical consistency as well.

The tribulations of ordinary language philosophy in recent decades should teach us some modesty in our claims about the power of our theories in the sociology of argumentation and debate. As Cornforth observes, the achievement of the ordinary language movement was to rid empirical philosophy of subjective idealism. "But this was done only at the cost of beating a full retreat from any conception of philosophy as a guide to understanding the real world and its laws, and as a guide to practical life."[63] Descriptivist theories are useful in clarifying how argument practices can be adapted better to the philosophical commitments of advocates and judges. It may be that we will come to develop and accept paradigms that conform more closely to the functional purposes and descriptive characteristics of situated discourse in argument, perhaps ". . . because of the vigor, persistence, and persuasiveness of its adherents."[64] But deference to the legitimate concerns of descriptivist debate theory will not end the search for ontologically satisfying paradigms of debate and argument. For if forensics is a laboratory for argument, it is not simply because arguments occur in forensics, but also because our views of argument in forensics reflects our notions of what argument in general ought to be.

NOTES

[1] Charles A. Willard, Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1983), p. 264.

[2] See Willard, p. 259.

[3] Willard, p. 243.

[4] Willard, p. 267.

[5] Willard, p. 199.

[6] This notion is implicit within Willard's conception of critiquing fields for the worthiness of their demands on our attention. We should not pay attention to fields that can be defeated by their own logic, that succeed only by refusing to recognize the legitimate objections of other fields, and which borrow concepts from other fields without being faithful to the argumentative consequences of such interfield borrowing. This concept of epistemic openness requires an understanding of the implications of one's own interpretations. See Willard, pp. 274-276.

[7] Charles A. Willard, "The Nature and Implications of the 'Policy Perspective' for the Evaluation of Debate," in David A. Thomas, ed., Advanced Debate (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook, 2d. ed., 1979), pp. 438-444. Hereinafter referred to as "Policy Perspective."

[8] Willard, "Policy Perspective," p. 438.

[9] Willard, "Policy Perspective," p. 439.

[10] Willard, "Policy Perspective," p. 439.

[11] Willard, "Policy Perspective," p. 440.

[12] Willard, "Policy Perspective," p. 441.

[13] Willard, "Policy Perspective," p. 444.

[14] Bill Balthrop, "Citizen, Legislator, and Bureaucrat as Evaluators of Competing Policy Systems," in David A. Thomas, ed., Advanced Debate (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook, 2d. ed., 1979), pp. 402-418.

[15] "First Judge Critique: William Balthrop, University of North Carolina," Journal of the American Forensic Association 18 (1981), 47-51. Hereinafter referred to as "1981 Critique."

[16] Balthrop, p. 415.

[17] Balthrop, p. 415.

[18] Balthrop, 1981 Critique, p. 48.

[19] Balthrop, 1981 Critique, p. 50.

[20] Willard, pp. 263-267.

[21] Robert C. Rowland, "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation," Journal of the American Forensic Association 18 (1982), 133-140.

[22] Rowland, p. 134.

[23] Rowland, p. 134.

[24] Rowland, p. 136.

[25] Rowland, p. 140. See also Robert C. Rowland, "Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation," in George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds., Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, 1981), p. 470.

[26] Vincent F. Follert and William L. Benoit, "Argument about Argument," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Anaheim, California, November 13, 1981, p. 7.

[27] Patricia Riley and Thomas A. Hollihan, "Paradigms as Eristic: A Changed Element in Intercollegiate Debate," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, Kentucky, November 5, 1982.

[28] Riley and Hollihan, pp. 4-5.

[29] Riley and Hollihan, pp. 11-14.

[30] Thomas A. Hollihan, "Conditional Arguments and the Hypothesis Testing Paradigm: A Negative View," Journal of the American Forensic Association 19 (1983), 171-178.

[31] Hollihan, p. 176.

[32] Kenneth M. Strange, "An Advocacy Paradigm of Debate," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association

Convention, Anaheim, California, November 13, 1981.

[33] Robert Rowland, "The Debate Judge as Debate Judge: A Functional Paradigm for Evaluating Debates," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, Kentucky, November 5, 1982. Hereinafter referred to as "Debate Judge."

[34] Rowland, "Debate Judge," p. 12.

[35] Thomas A. Hollihan, "Conditional Arguments and the Hypothesis Testing Paradigm: A Negative Rebuttal," *Journal of the American Forensic Association* 19 (1983), 190.

[36] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 3d. ed., 1968).

[37] George S. Romanos, *Quine and Analytic Philosophy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1983), p. 87.

[38] Wittgenstein, § 124.

[39] Peter S. Strawson, "Analysis, Science, and Metaphysics," in Richard Rorty, ed., *The Linguistic Turn* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 320.

[40] Romanos, p. 86.

[41] J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," reprinted in V. C. Chappell, ed., *Ordinary Language* (New York: Dover Publications, 1964), p. 47.

[42] Ernest Gellner, *Words and Things* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2d. ed., 1979), p. 45.

[43] Gellner, p. 156.

[44] Romanos, p. 94.

[45] Romanos, p. 96

[46] Michael J. Shapiro, *Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 63.

[47] Karl-Otto Apel, *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy*, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 255.

[48] Maurice Cornforth, *Marxism and the Linguistic Philosophy* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1965), pp. 291-302.

[49] Richard J. Bernstein, *Praxis and Action* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 319.

[50] Gellner, p. 230.

[51] David Zarefsky, "The Perils of Assessing Paradigms," *Journal of the American Forensic Association* 18 (1982), 141-144.

[52] Balthrop, 1981 Critique, p. 48.

[53] Robert C. Rowland, "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation," *Journal of the American Forensic Association* 18 (1982), 133-134.

[54] Riley and Hollihan, p. 2.

[55] Zarefsky, p. 141.

[56] David Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis Testing," in David A. Thomas, ed., *Advanced Debate* (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook, 2d. ed., 1979), pp. 427-437. Hereinafter referred to as "Hypothesis Testing."

[57] Zarefsky, "Hypothesis Testing," p. 431.

[58] Daniel M. Rohrer, "Debate as a Liberal Art," in David A. Thomas, ed., *Advanced Debate* (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook, 2d. ed., 1979), pp. 3-11.

[59] Romanos, p. 96.

[60] See Randall A. Lake, "Critical Issues in the Use of Decision Models in Debate: Debunking the Metaphor of the 'Paradigm,' paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, Kentucky, November 5, 1982, pp. 9-10.

[61] For example, critics of hypothesis testing often miss the effect of the interaction between the requirement that disadvantages be intrinsic to the resolution and that the affirmative plan be necessary to solve the problem. It changes argument practice in guiding advocates toward the central concern of the paradigm in testing resolutional against non-resolutional means of solving the affirmative harm (the inherency issue). It renders irrelevant most

discussion of the relative probability levels of benefits and costs from a particular policy, as exemplified in policy-making, unless such a balance is intrinsic to the central principles of the resolution. Hypothesis testing is therefore "conditional" only in the sense that more than one non-resolutional alternative for solving the harm can be considered. It does not sanction a subsequent claim of disadvantages from solving the harm that contradicts on the level of fact or value. Policy-making stimulates a similar shift in argumentative focus through its deemphasis of the issue of inherency.

[62] Zarefsky, p. 144.

[63] Cornforth, p. 375.

[64] Romanos, p. 90. Romanos is paraphrasing Kuhn's view of paradigmatic evolution here.

ROOT METAPHORS AND TERMINISTIC SCREENS: ANOTHER LOOK AT PARADIGMS

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After reading the exchange in the most recent Journal of the American Forensic Association, one would certainly be reminded that this month we celebrate the 500th anniversary of the end of the War of the Roses.[1] After a period of relative stability under a single paradigm, in April of 1460 a new and bold force emerged to question the old order. The first forays against the established order were but skirmishes and easily repulsed; until 1470 the established order bent under scattered attack but never broke. Then in thirteen confusing years the Red and White roses did battle, and stability was ended. Churchill comments:

> Historians have shrunk from the Wars of the Roses, and most of those who have catalogued their events have left us only a melancholy and disjointed picture. We are however in the presence of the most ferocious and implacable quarrel of which there is factual record....It was a conflict in which personal hatreds reached their maximum, and from which mass effects were happily excluded. There must have been many similar convulsions in the human story.[2]

We have neither time nor space to chronicle the thrust and parry of each event of the instability between 1460 and 1483. From the initial advantage of the Lancasters came the attacks of the Yorks, and the war began in earnest in July of 1460. By 1468 the tide had turned, and after the seige was lifted, only two were spared by the Yorks, one a twelve-year old boy of the name of Richmond, who was later to reunite the country as Henry VII. In September of 1470 Warwick and Clarence landed at Dartmouth to rescue the miserable Henry VI from the prison tower, but it was a short respite. By 1483, the Yorkists would triumph, and in July of 1483 the Duke of Buckingham tried his hand to offer the crown to Richard III; according "to an eye-witness he was so eloquent and well rehearsed that he did not even pause to spit."[3] While that plea was not successful, by the last week of July, 1483, Richard had been crowned and 500 years ago this week, the princes in the tower had been murdered. The short but unpleasant reign of Richard III was about to begin. Four years later in 1487 (or two conferences from now) we can celebrate the reuniting of England under a single paradigm. From what Churchill calls this "melancholy and disjointed picture" there may be some lessons that can be drawn, but they escape me.

I speak in metaphor, and more broadly, I will speak about metaphor. I will not retrace the history of the carnage, and anyone who would re-enter the paradigm fray will learn that it is a heavily mined field. There is no way to discuss paradigms without initiating another battle with partisans, but the purpose of this paper is to suggest a perspective on that battle. It will side with neither the Yorks nor the Lancasters. And, unless angered, I promise not to "even pause to spit."

The last fist fight I remember being involved in was at the age of seven, when after having an old wagon repainted red, I encountered a neighbor boy who had just been presented a bright, shiny, *new* red wagon. I can still hear those fighting words ringing in my ears: "Your wagon is old -- even the paint can't hide that"; "I can still see the old color coming through -- it isn't even a good paint job"; "My new red wagon is better than your old red wagon"; "Besides, my wagon can hold more." Well, as you will agree, those are fighting words.

If I can, analogically, summarize fifteen years of *JAFA*, convention and conference jousts, I think they might fall into three categories: (1) "My little red wagon is better than your little red wagon"; (2) "I have a new red wagon -- so there"; and (3) "My new red wagon can hold more than your red wagon."

In the first case, I suspect that I need not provide much data. Both journals (including the most recent one) and convention programs have involved partisans of one paradigm or another. Over the years I have chaired at least two convention programs with precisely that purpose. Generally the nature of the attacks center on the incompleteness of the paradigm, its inapplicability to debate, or its deleterious effect on debate practices. In the most recent interchange, Hollihan argues that hypothesis testing fosters conditional argument which is harmful to debate. Zarefsky and Henderson respond with arguments that such charges are hardly more appropriate to hypothesis testing than to any other paradigm.

In addition to substantitive discussion of issues relative to paradigms, as observers have noted, usch comparison of little red wagons occasionally involves some invective. Such invective is usually milder in print, as when Zarefsky and Henderson comment, "we believe that Hollihan misunderstands the paradigm and that his criticism is ill-conceived."[4] Who can forget such exciting exchanges as when Sanders discovered the ramifications of Lichtman and Rohrer on counterplans: "Bishop Whately would probably reincarnate himself if he were able to read this section";[5] "I fear we have accepted blindly and ignorantly the false god of Systems Analysis."[6] Invective begets invective, of course, so Lichtman and Rohrer were caused to respond: He "offers a spirited but irrelevant defense"[7] and "exhibits...resistance to fresh thought."[8] His "efforts at substantive commentary give way...to an effusion of invective."[8] Oral presentations of comparisons usually raise the invective stakes. Such comments are probably not what Zarefsky had in mind when he argued that attacks on paradigms are inevitably ad hominem.

A second and more recent approach is the development of new paradigms or perspectives, each with a new name. Included would be such approaches as tabula rasa, game theory, critic of argument, advocacy, judicial and rules theory. Because we were once trained to develop a "need" in debate, most of these perspectives argue the insufficiencies of other approaches, and hence the need for a new approach. These positions are usually stronger in pointing out the difficulties of competing paradigms than in solving the problems they identify. There will be an increasing number of these positions (perhaps because, in part, promotion now requires extensive publication) and they will become increasingly idiosyncratic in nature; that is, they will come to resemble extended judging philosophy statements now available at the National Debate Tournament.

A third approach is to argue that my red wagon will carry more; that is, proponents argue they present more inclusive perspectives which can incorporate other paradigms "neatly" within this perspective. Both tabula rasa and game theory would be examples of this approach. Sometimes the approach is combined with arguing the inadequacy of other paradigms (or at least their sufficiency); sometimes the approach posits that any paradigm can operate successfully within this perspective. The search here is for a "paradigm of paradigms" until we can find the transcendent paradigm which can encompass all others. All three of these approaches share common characteristics, which can be illustrated in the most recent attack on hypothesis testers.

The Winter, 1983 *Journal of the American Forensic Association* featured a contest with two jousters on each horse. While hypothesis testers have historically "gone it alone," this time Zarefsky is joined by Henderson to answer the challenges with lance of Corsi and Hollihan. The recent exchange may be notable in that there are now more attacks on hypothesis testers in debate than there are hypothesis testers. In their response, Zarefsky and Henderson make two observations that I would like to discuss in this paper (whthout necessarily getting on a horse and joining the joust):

> Hollihan misunderstands the analogy between argumentation and science: IT IS FIGURATIVE, NOT LITERAL. The point is not that the two enterprises are basically alike (for clearly they are not) but that they share the same goal of determining whether statements presented for our consideration are probably true. The analogy might be stated as follows: Argumentation is to statements of value and policy as scientific method is to statements of empirical fact. The purpose of the analogy is to remind ourselves that rigorous procedures are needed to test a value or policy statement, just as science requires rigorous procedure for testing an empirical statement.[9]

The analogy to scientific method, then, is figurative rather than literal. In fact, they state clearly, "To the contrary, the central assumption of the paradigm is that scientific methods cannot be used to determine the probable truth of statements of value or policy, matters involving prediction and uncertainty."[10]

The distinction between figurative and literal analogies helps explain some of the confusion surrounding the application of hypothesis testing to debate. What Zarefsky and Henderson have stated is probably as true of other paradigms applied to debate: they are figurative analogies. As such, the points of dissimilarity will often outweigh the points of similarity. Much of the argument about "fit" and "inclusiveness" often comes from finding points of dissimilarity in the metaphor (and I am using "metaphor" in its generic sense here). For Zarefsky and Henderson, the similarities are in the goal and rigor of method. But scientific method will not determine future probabilistic statements of policy and value.

The view of paradigm as metaphor is somewhat different from what Kuhn had in mind. The applicability of paradigms, in Kuhn's view, is most appropriate to periods of normal science. As Randy Lake has argued, "it seems clear that we are not in a period of normal science. Our debate 'paradigms' are insecure."[11] Lake goes on to "debunk" the metaphor of the paradigm, drawing from the Kuhn criteria for paradigm development. If one takes Kuhn's clarifications of the term "paradigm"—as a constellation of beliefs shared by a given community and also as concrete puzzle solutions which can be used as models which can even replace explicit rules in normal science, the difficulties become easier to understand. Both Lake, and later Holihan and Riley[12] use this definition of paradigm to argue that for debate "these 'paradigms' are not paradigms at all."[13] Riley and Hollihan would substitute "communication styles" for paradigms, but given the current popularity of the word "paradigm," it will not soon go away.

Supposedly a paradigm enables one to solve puzzles in a given area, and this puzzle-solving aspect has been translated to debate. It has meant that proponents were determined to prove that the selected paradigm could handle any aspect of debate, and refused to concede any problems in paradigm application. Rather than establishing commonalities among paradigms, proponents have tended to move farther apart, and greeted attacks on a paradigm with counterattack (and often invective). It was almost as if any puzzle not immediately solved by the paradigm rendered it useless, and hence it needed to be defended tenaciously.

It came as no surprise that some paradigms were able to handle some substantitive issues with relative ease and others present more difficulties. Cost-benefit analysis compared quantitative advantages and disadvantages with dispatch, but found more difficulty handling qualitative arguments. Hypothesis testers found the discussion of causality (especially when effects were determined throgh scientific testing) easily handled within their paradigm, but were not always able to adequately test a hypothesis from a myriad of undeveloped negative arguments. However, as a general statement, most of the paradigms could address most of the substantive arguments of a debate.

Procedural issues were quite another matter. By procedural issues, I mean issues arising from the nature of the activity rather than from the proposition itself. Two issues I could like to mention are topicality and ethical transgressions.

Issues of topicality are seldom a concern for scientists who test hypothesis or policy makers who actually make policy. It is a complex procedural issue in debate and for many judges needs to be resolved before other issues. That is, if the affirmative team is not topical, no other judgment on substantive issues need be made. But where to the standards for evaluating topicality arise? Not from the paradigms themselves, but rather from standards developed in the debate community itself. Some "rules" will arise from the uniqueness of the activity. The activity will establish the format, time limits and any number of other rules to further the activity. Some of these rules will be accepted without question; others will be the subject of some scrutiny (as has recently been the case with the 1983 National Debate Tournament Committee's "normative standards"). At times these rules may be in conflict with the application of a particular paradigm. A tabula rasa judge may hear an impressive argument why the second affirmative rebuttal should be ten minutes long, but generally will be guided by the established "rules" even if it violates his belief that one should accept positions for which adequate reasons are supplied.

Similarly, ethical issues are usually not drawn per se from the paradigms employed but rather from concensus of the activity itself. The deliberate falsification of a piece of evidence does not necessitate rejecting an hypothesis, or rejecting a policy alternative, yet any debater found guilty of fabrication is likely to lose the round. Ethical considerations often emerge from the activity itself rather than from a particular paradigm adapted for a particular round of debate.

Some issues of debate theory also fall outside the normal guidelines of paradigms. It is a generous extrapolation of policy making, for example, to believe that Lichtman and Rohrer's argument that counterplans must be non-topical and competitive follow from that paradigm. And, finally, issues about the choice of paradigm in a debate are essentially extra-paradigmatic. The choice of which paradigm best applies to a given debate is not likely to be one which can be handled by a given paradigm itself. In sum, issues of debate theory, paradigm choice, and procedural issues are not ones which readily lend themselves to the decisions of a particular paradigm.

Before entertaining the anguished cries of paradigm protagonists, it might make sense to shift our vision of paradigms. If paradigms were viewed as metaphors for decision making, we might eliminate the need for any War of the Roses after all. Zarefsky and Henderson recognise that hypothesis testing provides a goal (to test the resolution) and a method (rigor, analogous to the rigor of science). However hypothesis testing remains a figurative analogy. This position is consistent with Kuhn, when he observes, "though scientific development may resemble that in other fields more closely than has often been supposed, it is also strikingly different."[14] A vision of paradigm as metaphor would admit an imperfect fit, but argue the usefulness of metaphoric extension. It would not feel the responsibility for accounting for all aspects of debate, and hence reduce the amount of necessary causistic stretching.

A metaphor is a linguistic construct merging similarities while admitting dissimilarities. As a linguistic construct it brings with it a terministic view by which it evaluates linguistic enterprises called arguments. These paradigmatic views, which Kenneth Burke calls terministic screens, serve to reflect, select and deflect reality. That is, they feature certain aspects of reality and ignore others. Any set of terms necessarily selects and deflects; and a paradigm is a linguistic screen which features and ignores. The nature of causality may be featured in hypothesis testing; the nature of inherency may be minimized in policy making. Arguments are necessarily distorted by the vision which receives them, and that vision is the produce of the linguistic screen through which they pass. Susanne Langer's description of metaphor as "a way of seeing" calls attention to the featuring of certain elements. Ernst Cassirer speaks of light and shadows; the metaphor becomes a spotlight while that which surrounds the metaphor remains in comparative obscurity for that moment.

Such a view of paradigm as metaphor allows each paradigm the strengths of what it features, but it also admits that paradigms will inevitably shape and select a certain reality. It may well be that certain paradigms are better able to resolve different issues. No debater (to my knowledge) has yet asked a judge to be a policy maker when comparing significance of advantages to disadvantages and a hypothesis tester when analysing inherency or causality. However, it would not be surprising for a debater to make this request. Debaters do ask judges to shift paradigms during the debate, and presumably the best argument for a certain paradigm will dictate the choice of the paradigm to be used to evaluate that debate. But what if the best argument is for the application of multiple paradigms to evaluate different issues in a round?

I have often wondered how a judge claiming to be tabula rasa is able to switch paradigms back and forth in evaluating a debate. If the best argument for a certain paradigm occurs late in the debate, and the judge accepts that paradigm, then the entire debate must be processed backwards through that screen, despite the fact that another screen perceived the debate in the first place. If each view necessarily features and ignores certain aspects of argument, then a retrogressive analysis of the debate magnifies the problem of distortion. It may be that the choice of paradigm or view for evaluation is logically prior to the substantive arguments to be processed by that view. If so, the current format is hardly conducive to developing either good reasons for paradigm choice, or an appropriate place for such argument. After twenty minutes of negative argument, an underview arguing that one should take a rules perspective for evaluating the debate may actually hinder rather than help the process of accurate evaluation.

This view of paradigm as metaphor admits that not only will paradigms, as linguistic screens, distort, they will also be incomplete. There is no motive to assert that a single paradigm can or should encompass every issue in a debate — whether substantive or procedural. Rules and standards will emerge from the activity itself, and some of these rules will gain concensus. Part of the problem we are currently experiencing is the promulgation of rules or standards — some type of normative statements — to guide the behavior of the activity.

Some of these rules are both problematic and ad hoc. Some come from tournament administrators; some come from forensic committees, such as the National Debate Tournament Committee. All seem to be motivated by some desire "to improve the activity," although the effects may not do so. Some rules come from unreasonable tournament directors, such as the request not to reveal decisions, hence crimping all judges' first amendment rights. I know, since I make this request yearly. Some normative statements, such as the request for judges to refrain from reading evidence after a round, may actually impair the process of judgment.

These norms will theoretically arise from a concensus of the forensic community. If we are to believe Rowland's characterization of fields by their shared purpose, then the shared purpose of debate will create norms to govern that activity. The assumption is, of course, that purpose is shared, that the goals of debate are shared.

One of the purposes of the Sedalia Conference, some nine years ago, was to articulate goals for the activity of debate. These goals have not become univocal, nor are they universally held. There may have been a time when there was concensus on the goals of debate; at that time there may also have been a single concensus paradigm. But the current plethora of paradigms is but a sign that there is not a consensus of goals. Hence statements of norms arising from the community will continue to be the object of dispute. Despite similarities in the product (the debate, its strategies and practices), recent discussions of CEDA vs NDT debate merely illustrate the lack of concensus.

Until greater consensus of purpose is achieved, we should not expect either agreement on normative statements or the merging of paradigms. Paradigms will continue to multiply, and claims for greater inclusiveness and applicability will increase. After all, my little red wagon *is* better than your little red wagon, and it holds more. In four years, we shall return to Alta and celebrate the 500th anniversary of the end of the War of the Roses. Whether forensics will have found a unifying Henry VII, however, is in considerable doubt.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See Thomas Hollihan, "Conditional Arguments and the Hypothesis Testing Paradigm: A Negative View, *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, Winter, 1983, 171-178; Jerome Corsi, "Zarefsky's Theory of Debate as Hypothesis Testing: A Critical Re-Examination," *JAFA*, Winter, 1983, 158-170; and David Zarefsky and Bill Henderson, "Hypothesis-Testing in Theory and Practice," *JAFA*, Winter, 1983, 179-185.

[2] Winston Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, Vol I, The Birth of Britain* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1961), PP. 441-442.

[3] Churchill, p. 484.

[4] Fred Sanders, "Some Reflections on a 'General Theory of the Counterplan': or Let's Get Back to Sane Argument," *JAFA*, Spring, 1977, p. 225.

[5] Sanders, p. 227.

[6] Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel Rohrer, "A General Theory of the Counterplan Reaffirmed," *JAFA*, Summer, 1977, p. 235.

[7] Lichtman and Rohrer, p. 237

[8] Lichtman and Rohrer, p. 238.

[9] Zarefsky and Henderson, p. 180.

[10] Zarefsky and Henderson, p. 180.

[11] Randall Lake, "Critical Issues in the Use of Decision Models in Debate: Debunking the Metaphor of the 'Paradigm,'" paper presented to the Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, November, 1982, p. 2.

[12] Patricia Riley and Thomas A. Hollihan, "Paradigms as Eristic: A Changed Element in Intercollegiate Debate," paper presented to the Speech Communication Association Convention, Louisville, November, 1982, p 2

[13] Riley and Hollihan, p. 3

[14] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 209.

STASIS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIERARCHIES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF TOPICALITY

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Introduction

Debate is a linguistic exercise and like all linguistic activities it contains certain degrees of ambiguity. This ambiguity is manifested not only in disputes over substantive issues but also in theoretical constructs such as the stock issues. It is this ambiguity which is at the heart of current problems concerning the construction and evaluation of the issue of topicality. At the present time, there is no clear means by which to establish stasis on the issue of topicality. Our task is to respond to this problem by first tracing the development of topicality as an important issue and then redefining the dispute over terms as a substantive one which lacks stasis. Second, we assess the subjective character of language and consider the implications for proponents of what has come to be termed the "best definition" standard. Third, we critique the "best definition" standard on the grounds that it calls forth desirable qualities in definitions without providing a method for obtaining those qualities. Finally, we offer a theoretical formulation for topicality disputes which provides stasis and guidelines for the evaluation of argument over the meaning of terms.

I

Topicality cannot be treated as a procedural issue in the strict sense that a judicial model of argument treats issues of jurisdiction. Typically, topicality may be introduced with a variety of other arguments the negative has chosen for discussion in the debate. In an educational model of argument the critic-judge withhold judgment and criticism of the argument until the end of the debate rather than stopping the debate to determine jurisdictional questions before proceeding to other issues of the case. This distinction between the educational model of argument and the judicial model of argument illustrates the need to formulate a way of treating topicality as a substantive issue possessing the same status as that of other stock issues. Despite critic-judge's perceptions of their "jurisdiction," arguments over the meaning of terms will be developed throughout the debate as long as debaters continue to perceive definitional issues to be important. At the end of the debate topicality is treated with the same status as any other stock issue. The only difference is that topicality is considered first, as opposed to the other stock issues and even this may not be true for all debate judges.

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The competitive nature of the activity has created problems for critics, however, in evaluating the arguments offered in support of definitions of terms. Previously, if negative teams thought affirmative definitions were unreasonable they offered counter-definitions and suggested that the counter-definitions provided a more reasonable approach to the discussion of the topic. Some sort of adjustment was made by both teams and the debate usually proceeded to its conclusion. The affirmative soon discovered the way to win topicality was to present elaborate defenses of their definitions. In this way they were able to advocate cases that appeared only tangentially related to the resolution. In response to these elaborate affirmative defenses negatives began to define the boundaries of the resolution very narrowly. At the same time, affirmative teams attempted to discover definitions that enlarged the boundaries of the resolution. Strategic concerns began to replace substantive concerns while both negatives and affirmatives attempted to discover the best set of definitions to support their strategic interpretation of the resolution.

The solution for the problem of overly strategic choices of definition was to suggest "standards" for evaluating the quality of the definitions offered by both teams. Standards served as touchstones, or principles against which definitions or interpretations of the resolution might be compared to determine if they were more appropriate than another set of terms. Eventually, however, standards became subject to strategic concerns at the expense of substantive discussion. To counter the initiative negatives had taken in the area of constructing standards for interpreting the resolution affirmatives offered counter-standards. It would not be unusual for an exchange on topicality to feature numerous standards and definitions for the critic's consideration. For example, standards for defining terms of the resolution might include context, usage, experts in the field, grammatical structure, consistent usage, degree of clarity versus degree of ambiguity, reasonableness, and most recently, "best definition."

Standards could also arise out of the nature of the debate activity. For example, debaters often argued that better definitions should effectively limit discussion, should allow for increased discussion providing for greater educational value, should be fair in allocating the same amount of argumentative ground to both affirmative and negative, and should provide teams with reasonable notice (borrowing from the legal model of argument).

The complexity of the dispute was often confounded by mixing definitional standards with standards outlining the formal requirements of the resolution as a policy statement. Definitional standards referred to standards for interpreting singular terms, phrases, or the entire resolution as a policy statement; that is, a given meaning would be stipulated for a single term, phrase, or the entire resolution would be treated has having one particular meaning or perhaps operational definition. Standards for assessing the degree to which affirmatives fulfilled the formal requirements of the resolution referred to the nature of the action affirmatives were required to take in order to be topical. For example, some resolutions seemed to constrain affirmatives by specifying the agent of action through which the proposed legislation as to be adopted. Failure to implement through the appropriate agent meant that the affirmative had failed to fulfill the formal requirements for action required by the resolution. Other examples might include attention to the direction of change, the significance of change, etc., all of which complicated the issue. The possibilities for confusion were staggering and few judges found topicality to be an interesting let alone compelling issue to consider in debates.

The problem lies not in the nature of the issue but in the way debaters have approached argument over the meaning of terms. There appears to be a tendency toward the strategic at the expense of the substantive at each stage in the development of topicality as an issue. What appears to be absent in topicality exchanges is a sense of stasis.[1] In its most general sense stasis is the location of issues over which the dispute shall ensue. Otto Alvin Loeb Dieter explains that stasis was an Aristotelian concept springing from Aristotle's physical philosophy.

> The rhetoric which had been developed in harmony with the philosophy of eternal change was sophistic rhetoric: unreal, superficial, illogical, and unscientific, designed only to achieve "persuasion" by any means, and wholly inadequate in the mode of logical proof.
>
> The world of Aristotle's physical philosophy, in contrast, provided the necessary basis and prerequisites for scientific thinking and speaking, logic and rhetoric. It was a world in which, in addition to circular motions, or movements, there were also rectilinear motions, or movements "on a straight line." There is not only *metabole* and *kinesis* in this world, but also *stasis*. Since all subjects of whatever kind of motion are more concrete and more comprehensible in stasis than they are in motion, it was the concept of stasis that appealed particularly to the rhetoricians. In the long struggle of rhetoric with philosophy, as reflected, for example in the comic fragments of Epicharmus, it was Aristotle's motion and stasis that gave rhetoricians the ultimate basis for their art.[2]

Stasis was central to Aristotle's development of a scientific rhetoric. By locating the issues--the grounds of a dispute--rhetoricians could specify what was at stake in an argument. By contrast, the philosophy of rhetoric developed in accordance with the principles of eternal change emphasized strategic concerns over substantive concerns. The importance of any given statement by a sophist might change in relation to the strategic needs of his/her position in a dispute. Moreover, sophists would be willing to alter the meaning of his/her statements or the nature of the issues if s/he saw that such changes would enhance his/her position in a dispute. In short, sophists were more concerned with strategic elements as opposed to the Aristotelian system of rhetoric which strived to clearly indicate the precise grounds of the dispute.

There exists a parallel between the principles of eternal change embraced by the sophists of antiquity and the proliferation of standards to evaluate interpretations of the debate resolution. Just as sophists were content to change the issues, redefining what was at stake, or minimizing what they had previously agreed to be the burdens for the dispute, debaters often confuse topicality arguments by introducing numerous standards into a round of debate only to select strategically, as a sophist might, that standard which best serves his/her interest for the final rebuttal. In this way, substantive development of contrasting topicality positions is thwarted in favor of a strategic interest in winning the debate.

II

In addition to being subject to strategic maneuvers, the issue of topicality is problematic for the critic because of the subjective character of language. In *Philosophy of Science*, Stephen Toulmin suggests that matters of classification are not generally highly technical and in those situations in which some gray area exists one need only turn to the expert.[3] This view obviously depends on the existence of widely accepted definitions for theoretical constructs. Such an objectified conception of reality is questionable, however. I. A. Richards articulated the problem years ago when he wrote that ". . . the assumption is that words have, or should have, proper meanings which people should recognize, agree about and stick to. A pretty program, if it were possible. But outside the technical languages of the sciences, it is not possible."[4] Since argumentation is a linguistic, not a technical/scientific enterprise, ambiguity pervades the discussion of terms. Consequently, the meaning of a term can be determined only in reference to the circumstances of a particular argumentative situation.

Symbolic interactionists and social scientists both agree that in discovering a term's meaning context must be considered. As Abraham Kaplan notes, ". . . there are many terms whose meaning can be specified only as they are used together with other terms, or in full sentences."[5] Richards draws much the same conclusion.

> Outside of the sciences--in our talk about politics, society or conduct, or about science itself, in all branches of philosophy including psychology, in all discussions of art, literature, language, truth, beauty, and the good, our principal terms incessantly change their meanings with the sentences they go into and the contexts they derive from.[6]

Terms take on meaning only in relation to other terms within a given context. The problem is to discover how one term exists in relation with other relevant terms and how a term's meaning is modified by placement in contextual domains.

Unfortunately, while an analysis of context in which a term is used may clarify its meaning, such contextual analyses cannot produce an objectified meaning for a term. Here "objectification" should not be confused with terms whose stipulated meanings can be agreed on by members of an intellectual community. Some terms may derive meaning from conventional usage. In this instance, it is not the term which has been objectified or emptied of ambiguity, rather the users of the term have simply agreed to a meaning. This situation presumes agreement over the meaning of a term rather than opposing sides whose meanings or world views may be at stake. The moment a term which has enjoyed shared usage is discovered to have potential other meanings, and parties begin to have an interest in advocating a particular meaning as opposed to others, we are returned to the problem with which we began. A term's meaning can never be completely objectified when opposing interests are at stake. In Kaplan's words, ". . . facts are indefinitely indefinite: however fine a mesh we use, finer differences slip through the conceptual net."[7]

It is even more difficult to define the ambiguity away when using language outside the technical sciences because language functions to create reflections of reality. The very act of choosing specific terms over others functions to select out and feature certain aspects of reality. In the words of Kenneth Burke, ". . . men seek for vocabularies that will be faithful *reflections* of reality. To this end, they must develop vocabularies that are *selections* of reality. And any selection of reality must, in certain circumstances, function as a *deflection* of reality."[8] Since language is inherently ambiguous, and functions to select out specific reflections of reality while deflecting others, there can be no objective reality that debaters and critics can come to know. Instead, debaters must seek ways of selecting and testing terms and their interpretations in an attempt to arrive at the best definition for the debate.

III

In response to this problem many critics have endorsed the "best definition" standard.[9] While we agree that the "best definition" standard has value, it does not possess the objectified quality which some theorists have imputed to it. We would maintain that "best definition" still holds the same difficulty of ambiguity as do other standards for three reasons: (1) its use in debates confuses sheer quantity of definitions with the "best" definition; (2) it is source-dependent; (3) it fails to remove the ambiguity of terms because the operationalization of the standard remains a linguistic exercise.

First, quantity of evidence does not necessarily prove qualitative desirability of a definition. Judges often react with mild amusement to debaters who argue that because he or she reads more definitions saying the same thing that they surely deserve to win. This type of operationalization of the standard ignores any qualitative judgement that can be rendered in terms of comparing the merits of opposing definitions. At best, the quantity of evidence supporting a particular definition indicates only that the meaning of the term is shared by a number of individuals. While common usage is one point in favor of a particular definition, other standards should be considered in evaluating interpretations of terms. Quantity does not necessarily demonstrate desirability.

Second, "best definition" often relies on questions of source credibility. Evaluating sources becomes problematic simply because it is difficult for a critic to ascertain under what conditions or for what purposes a definition was conceived. Reliance on legal dictionaries which cite court cases does not resolve the issue. Even when debaters include the full court citation the critic is still not privy to the decision or the conditions upon which the definition was held valid for the case. Moreover, it is possible for a critic to be faced with several different definitions for the same term stemming from different ways in which various courts have construed its meaning. When multiple meanings from unrelated or conflicting court cases are introduced, an appeal to "best definition" provides no clear way to proceed. Uses of specialized dictionaries, court interpretations, etc., are of little utility in resolving definitional issues because the critic's understanding of the conditions under which the definition was held valid is minimal.

Further, assuming the conditions under which the various definitions were held valid could be made clear to the critic, debaterswould then be required to go one step further and argue why circumstances of various court cases were analogous to the issue at hand. At this point, however, the desirability of the definition no longer lies in the quality of the source, but in the degree to which the meaning of a term is useful to the interpretive problem at hand. This reflects a return to a consideration of the merits of the definition--which was the original problem. Thus, specialized dictionaries provide no ultimate solution to the problem.

Third, the operationalization of the "best definition" standard is inherently a linguistic exercise. For the "best definition" approach to reflect a greater degree of objectivity in the selection of meanings or interpretations of the topic, some method of validation must be evident. Proponents of "best definition," however, ignore the linguistic, hence ambiguous nature of the problem. While it may be possible to formulate a normative procedure for the discussion of definitions selected for terms, the actual choice of definitions cannot be verified as empirically true or false (correct or incorrect). Debaters and critics alike select definitions based on the degree to which they perceive a meaning to fit the interpretive problem at hand. The nature of the interpretive problem, however, will be perceived differently due to the nature of language. Further, the particular definitions selected for terms will reflect a particular version of reality or world view. In a policy proposition, however, there is no objective quality to be discovered. Debaters are called upon to argue about the appropriateness of the definition they have selected for the terms in the resolution. In this respect, there are no right or wrong definitions, only better definitions. The desirability of definitions is not discovered but demonstrated by testing them against appropriate standards. "Best definition," then, is a quality, not an empirical method that yields objectively verifiable definitions of qualitative superiority.

In conclusion, we are not suggesting that the "best definition standard is useless. On the contrary, the standard has value for resolving topicality disputes. The problem is that the standard does not remove the innate ambiguity residing in language. Additionally, even if one could determine the best definition, it is difficult to establish where in a hierarchical placement of many possible standards the best definition standard should go. Most importantly, what constitutes a "better definition"? On what bases should definitions be compared in order to determine the relative value of competing definitions? The "best definition" standard, as presently formulated, does not answer these questions. "Best definition" depends on other standards which might be introduced into topicality debate. Unless the constituent elements of a "best definition" are clearly and narrowly articulated, the standard provides no direction for debaters or critics who wish to use it. What is needed, then, is a method for demonstrating the qualitative superiority of competing definitions.

In sum, there is no specific objective meaning for the terms in a resolution. The choice of a topicality standard is an issue that needs to be resolved within the confines of each debate. Here lies the central problem: When the meaning of the resolution is at issue, that meaning can only be derived from linguistic standards. Since linguistic standards are inherently ambiguous, no objective standards exist and debaters generally do not argue about the relative merits of competing standards. All standards have potential merit, but the relative value of various standards require comparison. Our conclusion is that topicality must be transformed from a strategic issue to a substantive issue if it is to be clearly resolved within a debate. Topicality can be transformed into a substantive issue if critics require both affirmatives and negatives to clearly establish the grounds over which the argument about the meaning of the resolution will proceed. The solution lies in a formal requirement of stasis for both team's topicality arguments.

IV

Three elements of a dispute over the meaning of terms merit consideration: (1) the nature of the subject matter (can stasis be achieved when debating the meaning of terms?); the necessary elements for an argument about meanings to be considered worthy of evaluation (is the topicality argument formally complete?); (3) the quality of the case made for a given definition (what definition is better or more appropriate for the definitional problem at hand?).

The first issue to be considered is the nature of the subject matter. The issue of topicality must be a subject matter possessing stasiastic nature. Dieter explains:

> . . . that every proposed matter is either asystatic, synestotic, or stasiastic. Only stasiastic matters are fit for rhetorical treatment; astasiastic or astatic matters must be carefully avoided in the interests of a successful representation. The most common of the astatic and perhaps the easiest to detect are the asystatic, for these matters lack integration, completeness, unity, coherence; they are not whole, but incomplete, irrational, alogical, unrelated, and dissociated accumulations merely of useless materials, or phlegmata, i.e., unconstituted excretions of a body in which there is no life, and hence they are utterly worthless and unusable for rhetorical purposes.[10]

There are two classes of "phlegmata" the second having three types. The first deals with matters said to be "inchoate, unfinished, imperfect, atelic." The second class may involve elements with the appropriate number and quality, yet not meet specific requirements: (1) where there appears to be two possible movments but are actually alike and constitute only one; (2) where the subject matter is of the nature that there is only one side, not the possibility of two or more; (3) where the subject matter is difficult for critical analysis because the movements are so indistinct, unstable, fluctuating, and confusing that it is impossible for any one to find a logical way through it. This third type reflects the current view many members of the debate community have of the issue of topicality. The issue of topicality, however, is not beyond a clear, careful, and incisive treatment of the issues of meaning.[11]

Synesotic matters are not asystatic, that is, they are essentially complete, cohesive, coherent, and unified. However, they may still be unsuited for rhetorical treatment. Dieter describes synesotic matters as ". . . movements over, around, about, or in the circumstances /which/ may all be compatible with one another. . . ." These movements reflect a subject matter more fit for discussion rather than debate because these movements ". . . all merge with one another so that there is no difference between them but all become one."[12]

The essential question is whether topicality can be treated in a clear, careful, and concise manner that would yield stasis for each side of a dispute over the meaning of terms. Here the question shifts from a consideration of the strategic interests of debaters to an inquiry concerning the degree to which claims, evidence, and analysis can be rendered in distinct, stable, nonfluctuating ways to avoid confusion on the part of the debaters and critic. We think a solution can be found in the way of arranging standards for evaluating topicality arguments in a value hierarchy.

A value hierarchy would call for explicit and discrete rankings among standards and prevent debaters from offering numerous standards without specifying their relative degree of importance to other standards introduced into the round. The claims of each side would be made distinct because each party must begin the debate at the point which asserts the greatest value for a given standard. Clarity of each team's position is enhanced by assigning values to particular standards within the hierarchy developed in the debate. Stability is insured because the hierarchy would reflect an organized structure of standards for consideration by both teams. A hierarchy of standards for both teams would provide argumentative focus for the dispute by indicating which standard shall be considered primary by each party suggesting a natural logic for the consideration of alternative standards which are upper most in the hierarchy; the next ranked standard below the previously defeated standard becomes the focus of the dispute. This would force teams to limit the number of standards introduced into a debate in an attempt to extend only the most substantively defensible positions. In this way, a hierarchy of standards for the evaluation of definitions and interpretations of the resolution would provide stasis for topicality arguments by constraining possible strategic moves within the substantive limits of each team's hierarchy.

Given the focus for the dispute in the way of hierarchically arranged standards, the second element concerns the formal requirements of an argument about the meaning of terms. Two components have been specified as needing to be present in a topicality argument: a definition of a term to be tested and a standard against which to test that definition. Unless debaters take the analytical step of testing a definition against a standard, the most they have done is supplied the components of an argument without constructing one. Much like incompetent construction workers, debaters often supply the materials for an argument, yet fail to construct the argument. Mere presence of a standard and a definition in a debate is insufficient to warrant a critic's attention because debaters have left the responsibility of constructing the topicality argument to the critic; debaters must take the analytical step of comparing a definition to a standard and assume the responsibility for testing the definition against the standard. In this respect, the critic cannot be fair to both parties in the dispute. If debaters leave the analytical comparison to the judge-critic s/he is tempted to abandon the role of critic and begin to function as an advocate if left to complete the analytical step of testing definitions against standards. To assure fair evaluation of both side's positions, the formal requirements of an argument about the meaning of terms must include the definition to be considered, the standard against which the definition is to be compared, and the analytical evaluation of the definition's appropriateness for the interpretive problem at hand. Anything less than these formal requirements should not be considered worthy of evaluation.

Assuming debaters make philosophical commitments to standards and take the necessary step of testing definitions against standards, we suggest three criteria for evaluating topicality arguments. First, critics can evaluate the cases made for definitions based on a comparison of clarity. Since the nature of the dispute is one concerning meaning, the requisite of a good argument about the meaning of terms should be the clarity with which it is made. Debaters should strive to make the meaning of terms, phrases, and the entire resolution itself as clear as possible for the opposition and the critic. If definitional argument strives for clarity it also functions to allow the critic to remain as fair as possible in his/her evaluation of the argumentation. It is primary, then, to have the greatest degree of clarity so that a fair evaluation of terms can transpire.

Second, critics should evaluate cases made for definitions based on fairness in allocating argumentative ground. Since definitions function to unite and divide,[13] the choices made by affirmatives or negatives should fairly allocate equal amounts of argumentative ground.[14] This criterion eliminates overly strategic interpretations of topics by rewarding arguments which define the resolution fairly. Overly narrow or broad meanings for the resolution will be criticized on the grounds that they are unfair in allocating argumentative ground. Hence, the best definitions will be ones which fairly divide negative and affirmative ground.

Third, arguments which present the most accurate reflection of grammar and syntax for the resolution should be regarded superior to those arguments which are less accurate reflections of correct usage. Since language is a system of symbolic expression possessing rules for usage, and given the fact that the resolution is expressed linguistically, the interpretations of the resolution should conform to rules of usage. Incorrect usage vitiates language's power to express meaning in ways which other individual's may grasp; it distorts the meaning of terms preventing a clear apprehension of a term's meaning by various individuals in an argumentative encounter. Close adherence to rules of usage will prevent distortion of the resolution.

If topicality arguments are clearly developed they can be evaluated fairly by critics. If topicality arguments allocate an equal amount of argumentative ground to both teams they provide a functionally fair interpretation of the resolution. If topicality arguments accurately reflect grammar and syntax potential distortions of the resolution are minimized. If these three criteria are applied to topicality arguments in this particular order critics can discriminate qualitative differences between topicality arguments in a debate.

We propose this particular hierarchy because it places the ethic of fairness first. Absent clarity, a critic is unable to evaluate fairly both teams arguments. Absent a fair allocation of argumentative ground, the debate activity becomes subverted because one side will possess an advantage not enjoyed by the other side. And absent an accurate use of language, meanings can be distorted in ways which destroy the utility of the resolution as a topic area for debate.

Conclusion

Argument over the meaning of terms can be treated as a substantive issue in competitive debate because the definitional issue possesses stasiastic character. By requiring debaters to commit themselves to specific standards and definitions rather than issuing several and extending only those dropped by the other team, stasis is achieved. Second, "Best definition" provides no method by which to evaluate definitions and interpretations; it is, at best, a quality which critics determine at the conclusion of the debate. Third, however, by requiring debaters to assume the responsibility of testing definitions against standards, coherent topicality arguments can be constructed for critics to evaluate. Fourth, in establishing a stringent formula for the construction of topicality arguments featuring clarity, fairness, and grammatical/syntactical accuracy, topicality debates will improve as debaters strive to meet these standards.

Notes

[1] Otto Alvin Loeb Dieter, "Stasis," *Speech Monographs*, 27 (November 1950) 4, pp. 345-369.

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[3] Stephen Toulmin, *The Philosophy of Science*, First Harper Torchbook edition, (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 50-52.

[4] I. A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981 reprint), p. 72.

[5] Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 63.

[6] Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, pp. 70-72.

[7] Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, p. 67.

[8] Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), California Edition, p. 59.

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SOLVENCY AND INHERENCY:
COMPARING THE EFFICACY OF POLICIES

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Contemporary argumentation texts characteristically discuss an issue which is concerned with predicting the efficacy (or lack thereof) of proposals in solving problems or obtaining advantages. Variously termed "plan meet need", "workability", "cure", or "solvency" (the label currently in vogue in academic debate), this issue is usually described as being distinct from inherency considerations. In addition, solvency is discussed only with regard to affirmative proposals.[1]

This paper argues that solvency and inherency are the same concept. The essay argues that solvency is a measure for the prediction of system efficacy, and is therefore applicable to the analysis of resolutional alternatives as well as to affirmative proposals. In articulating this viewpoint, the paper's first two sections discuss characteristics of solvency arguments and forms of solvency arguments. The third section applies the theoretical approach described here to two argument-types currently in use in academic debate ("would-not" inherency and circumvention) to suggest that they are not germane to policy decision-making.

I. Solvency Argument Characteristics

Two principal characteristics of solvency arguments can be identified: (1) solvency arguments test claims of efficacy made for proposals; and (2) the parameters for legitimate solvency arguments (i.e., those which are pertinent to policy propositions) are based on the interpretation given the "should-would" distinction and fiat power.[2]

The efficacy-testing character of solvency suggests its identity with inherency. If inherency considers whether resolutional action is necessary to solve or ameliorate a specific problem, then inherency arguments must compare the efficacy of resolutional and nonresolutional approaches.[3] This view of inherency leads to two comments about solvency as efficacy-testing: first, negative solvency arguments evaluate the limits of topical action; and, second, affirmative inherency arguments test present system and non-resolutional system solvency.

Negative solvency arguments are influenced by Schunk's observation that topicality and inherency are integrally linked: affirmative arguments consist of those options suggested by and contained within the proposition, while negative arguments are those which are excluded from and oppose the proposition.[4]

If negative inherency arguments are nontopical alternatives to the resolution, there is no material difference between what have been labeled "inherency" and "counterplan" positions.[5] As a result, all inherency

positions must meet what have traditionally been thought of as standards for counterplans alone: competitiveness, nontopicality, and levels of net benefits. Policy analysts, given this perspective, determine whether the consequences of adopting the resolution (as measured by subtracting unique costs from unique benefits of the affirmative proposal) are superior to those of not adopting the resolution (as determined by subtracting the unique costs from the unique benefits of nontopical action).[6]

Therefore, solvency arguments answer the question, "Are the claims made for topical and nontopical action valid?" Negative solvency arguments attempt to demonstrate that topical action is incapable of achieving the benefits claimed by the affirmative. This makes the relationship between solvency and extratopicality clear: solvency arguments demonstrate that, absent extratopical actions, the benefits outlined by the affirmative cannot be obtained. Of course, the negative would simultaneously be attempting to demonstrate that these benefits could be obtained through nonresolutional actions.

Affirmative inherency arguments amount to tests of present system and nonresolutional action solvency. To establish uniqueness of advantages, affirmatives must demonstrate that these benefits cannot be produced by nontopical alternatives. Therefore, affirmative inherency arguments test the efficacy of alternative, nontopical approaches to problem-solving. Hence, inherency argumentation can be described as the comparison of the degrees of solvency obtained by topical and nontopical approaches which are competitive in nature.

The second principal characteristic of solvency arguments is their relationship to interpretations of the "should-would" distinction and fiat power. Fiat permits the evaluation of "should"controversies. While not absolving the affirmative (or the negative) of the obligation of establishing that a proposal is capable of achieving claimed results, fiat does permit the avoidance of "quibbles over whether, in the real world, such proposals could be expected to receive approval."[7]

If solvency evaluates the capabilities of proposals, conceptions of fiat determine the range of legitimate solvency arguments. Fiat restricts solvency arguments from considerations of whether or not proposals will be adopted. An argument that an approach cannot achieve its claimed benefits because it will not be adopted is not a solvency (or inherency) argument. This applies equally to affirmative analysis of alternatives to the resolution and to negative positions on resolutional action.

This paper contends that the "should-would" distinction and notions of fiat conventionally accepted imply that, for the purposes of argument and evaluation, the affirmative plan (and the negative counterplan or negative position) is adopted in the form specified by its advocates. In other words, if the plan/counterplan says that the Department of Justice will prosecute violators, it should be assumed that this agency will do exactly that. This does not mean that results (i.e., the attainment of advantages) are fiated, only that the actions specified are: this distinction will be discussed further in the third section of this paper with regard to circumvention arguments. At this point, it suffices to say that, to test the validity of claims made for a proposal (affirmative plan or negative counterplan), the proposal *as described* must be examined. As Freeley has expressed this position, " . . the negative concentrates on attempting to prove that the plan--*even if it works exactly as the affirmative wants it to*--will not solve the need".[8]

II. Types of Solvency Arguments

Given these defining characteristics, three types of solvency arguments can be identified: (1) tests of methodological adequacy; (2) reversibility; and (3) alternate causality.

Tests of methodological adequacy examine the evidence used to make solvency predictions. The manner in which experiments or field studies arrive at conclusions is evaluated. Methodological adequacy arguments focus on two considerations with regard to solvency evidence: (1) standards of care and quality in data-collection; and (2) the reasonability of using this data to make predictions about the proposal under consideration.

With reference to experiments, the types of considerations referred to above are termed internal and external errors. Internal errors refer to observed causal relationships in fact being due to some factor other than that which is hypothesized; external errors consist of erroneous generalizations of causal relationships across conceptual variables not assessed.[9] Internal errors stem from design mistakes or other problems in the conduct of the experiment; external errors arise from the ignoring of factors limiting the generalizability of results.[10]

While field studies test correlations rather than establish causation,[11] for solvency analysis purposes, the areas of inquiry are the same as for experiments. In other words, design flaws (e.g., sample population not representative of the group being studied) and unreasonable generalizations (i.e., extrapolation of data beyond its limitations) would still form the basis of solvency arguments.

Reversibility arguments are concerned with the relationship between proposed courses of action and the causal complex for problem occurrence identified by the proposal's advocates. Proposals are tested for their efficacy in reversing the sequence in which problems are produced. Hence, if Cause A is said to produce Effect B, solvency arguments consider whether Plan C prevents Effect B's continued occurrence. A proposal's proponents attempt to establish that by taking this action the causal factor is rendered incapable of producing this effect, or that countermotives are created which cancel out or replace the factors producing the problem. Reversibility attacks suggest that, while the causal factors identified have in fact produced these effects, adopting the proposal would not alter this relationship: the relationship is so well-established that it will continue despite the actions proposed.

As an example of a reversibility argument, consider an affirmative case dealing with United States Central Intelligence Agency operations against Nicaragua on the 1982-83 college debate topic, "Resolved: that all United States military intervention into the internal affairs of any foreign nation or nations in the Western Hemisphere should be prohibited". Affirmatives argued that CIA operations have had the effect of pushing Nicaragua closer to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Reversibility arguments discussed the effects of the affirmative proposal on the continued existence of Nicaraguan ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The affirmative in this instance argued that the proposal extinguished Nicaraguan motives for seeking closer ties to Havana and Moscow; hence, the effect identified could be reversed. The negative argued that the degree of Cuban-Soviet involvement in Nicaragua is already so strong that the affirmative proposal alone could not influence that country's drift leftward. Therefore, topical action could not reverse the effect identified.

Two final comments should be made about reversibility arguments. First, reversibility arguments are separate from alternate causality arguments in that they do not dispute the accuracy of the causal explanation offered. Reversibility arguments assume that the explanation provided is correct; what they dispute is the ability of the action in question to modify this causal relationship. Second, consistent with the comments made earlier, reversibility arguments apply to negative positions or counterplans. To argue that affirmative advantages are nonunique, negatives must establish that a nontopical action would reverse the causal relationship identified as producing the problems or benefits discussed by the affirmative.

The final type of solvency argument, alternate causality, is concerned with the topical limitations placed on action-taking by affirmatives and negatives. Negatives would argue that problem-solving is impeded by factors outside the scope of the affirmative resolution. Hence, such argument is reflective of the topicality-inherency and extratopicality-solvency connections discussed earlier. An alternate causality argument suggests that causes which cannot be dealt with inside the boundaries of the language of the affirmative proposal are sufficient causes for the creation of the problems the affirmative attempts to solve (i.e., alternate causes must be equifinal causes[12]). Therefore, alternate causality arguments can be characterized as independent reasons for the continued existence of the problems identified by the affirmative.

As an example of an alternate causality argument, consider a debate on the repeal of the Davis-Bacon Act on the 1981-82 college debate topic, "Resolved: that the Federal government should significantly curtail the powers of labor unions in the United States". Advocates of the repeal of this legislation claimed as an advantage that this action would increase the number of construction jobs. They argued that the Davis-Bacon Act requires that federal construction projects pay workers the prevailing wage rate for the area: in practice, the union pay scale for the area is used. Since the union scale tends to be higher than non-union rates, labor costs are increased and fewer jobs can be created for the same amount of dollars allocated. Advocates claimed that more jobs could be created at lower wage rates if the Davis-Bacon Act were repealed.

Alternate causality arguments would be those predicting no net increase in the number of construction jobs if the Davis-Bacon Act were repealed. For example, it was argued that Congress, looking for ways to decrease the budget deficit, would reduce the funds allocated to construction projects by the amount that not using the union wage scale was estimated to lower costs. The effect would be that no additional construction jobs would be produced: repeal of the Davis-Bacon Act would mean that the same number of jobs would exist, but at lower pay.

It is important to note that alternate causality is based on the limitations imposed by topic language. For example, it would be illegitimate for the affirmative to deal with the argument noted above by including a stipulation in its plan that the federal government could not cut the amount of funds allocated to construction projects. The affirmative would be extinguishing a causal factor by taking an action external to the language of the topic. However, if the affirmative could establish that federal construction projects are unlikely to be cut (and may in fact be increased), no recourse to the use of an extratopical "plan spike" is required. If this were the case, the alternate cause would be dealt with by actions external to (but unaffected by) the affirmative proposition.[13]

In addition, counterplan solvency is subject to alternate causality argument. Affirmatives would argue that benefits claimed for a counterproposal in fact are dependent on the adoption of the affirmative proposal. If this were the case, the counterplan would not be a rival alternative to the affirmative resolution: it would *be* the resolution, with the possible addition of some nontopical elements. This fits Kaplow's description of "extra-nontopicality", as the counterplan would require topical action to achieve its stated benefits.[14]

III. "Would" Considerations versus Solvency

This section discusses two types of arguments currently in use in academic debate, "would not" inherency and circumvention. These two arguments are in contrast with the theory of solvency-inherency described above: the position articulated by this paper is that each reflects a misunderstanding (or, certainly, a very different interpretation) of the "should-would" distinction and fiat power than the one given earlier in this essay.

"Would not" inherency, referred to by Schunk as "pseudo-inherency,"[15] confuses uniqueness of action-taking with uniqueness of benefits claimed for an action. The affirmative position becomes that of arguing that the present system would not adopt the proposal advocated, either because of "structural barriers" or "attitudinal barriers".

Such arguments prove only that the present system is unlikely to adopt the affirmative proposal. It is not established that the benefits claimed for this proposal are unique. Affirmatives following this approach to inherency only establish uniqueness if it is coincidentally true that there are no alternatives to the resolution in dealing with the problems cited. However, even in this instance, inherency is derived from the superior capability of resolutional action in deriving advantages, as compared with nonresolutional alternatives: that the present system is politically opposed

to resolutional action is extraneous to this issue.

Affirmatives taking this position are abusing the "should-would" distinction noted earlier. Essentially, the affirmative in this instance is arguing that, because the action under contemplation will never be adopted, the resolution should be affirmed.[16] As Strange has commented, affirmatives following this approach place an extreme reliance on fiat power: the "barriers" to action are circumvented by the "magic wand" of fiat.[17]

As an example of this approach, consider a debate on the hypothetical topic, "Resolved: that the Federal government should ban the cultivation, manufacture, sale, and distribution of tobacco and tobacco products". It is certainly provable that there are significant health risks associated with smoking cigarettes. The question for inherency should be a matter of whether the resolution is a necessary condition for dealing with these adverse health consequences. Solvency, as described in this paper, compares resolutional and nonresolutional, competitive approaches and determines the levels of benefits unique to each. In this case, the affirmative would compare the benefits of a tobacco ban with the levels of solvency obtained by non-resolutional measures for dealing with the health risks of smoking.

An affirmative following a "would not" approach to inherency would identify different issues. Inherency, given this perspective, would concentrate on "structural barriers" and "attitudinal barriers" to the adoption of a tobacco ban. It could be argued that the plan is structurally precluded because Congress has forbidden regulatory agencies (notably, the Federal Trade Commission and the Consumer Product Safety Commission) from promulgating regulations dealing with tobacco products. "Attitudinal barriers" can be found in Congressional opposition to regulations on tobacco, born of tobacco industry lobbying and the activities of tobacco-state Congressional Representatives and Senators.

Having proven that Congress would not, in all likelihood, adopt this proposal does not establish inherency, if this is thought of as a requirement that benefits be unique to a proposal. Nonresolutional alternatives such as public education campaigns to encourage voluntary quitting, changes in tobacco products, or programs to reduce air pollution or toxic substances in the workplace could also lower the adverse health consequences of smoking. Proof that an action will not be adopted says nothing about the merits of that action. The debate has shifted to a proposition of fact, "Resolved: that political motives prevent Congress from placing restrictions on tobacco". While this may be an accurate statement, it provides no reason to affirm the proposition of policy mentioned above.

Circumvention arguments focus on efforts to resist (or refusals to comply with) plan mandates. Such arguments do not test the efficacy of proposals, nor do they assume the interpretation given the "should-would" distinction and fiat above. Circumvention arguments focus on the political likelihood that affirmative mandates will be carried out: they are the negative equivalent of the "would not" inherency arguments described above.

As an example of this type of argument, consider the "CIA circumvention" argument on the 1982-83 college debate topic. This argument suggested that the Central Intelligence Agency would "circumvent" efforts to ban paramilitary operations by simply ignoring such plan mandates. To support this position, it was argued that the CIA has ignored legislative restrictions in the past and that Congressional oversight efforts have had little or no impact on agency covert operations.

Circumvention arguments of this type assume that the affirmative proposal will not be adopted (or, more precisely, that the agents specified in the affirmative's interpretation of the resolutional will not carry out plan mandates). As a result, this argument would not provide an analyst with information about the accuracy of affirmative claims about a proposal. Rather, this argument indicates that the proposal is unlikely to be carried out. For the purposes of solvency analysis, it should be presumed that the CIA would comply with the plan: this would permit allegations about the efficacy of the proposal as described to be evaluated. In other words, circumvention responds to the question, "Is the affirmative proposal capable of obtaining these benefits?" by saying, "The action will not be carried out in this manner". This answer is a non sequitur.

Additionally, circumvention arguments fit the description of "should-would" arguments provided above. As was the case with "would not" inherency arguments, circumvention arguments consider propositions of fact, not policy. The example given above would be pertinent to a debate on the proposition, "Resolved: that the Central Intelligence Agency has not been overseen by Congress". This is distinct from considerations of whether covert operations ought to be checked by Congress.[18]

Two final comments should be made about solvency-inherency arguments and "would" considerations, or the politics of proposals. First, political considerations are not excluded from this theory of policy argument: however, these arguments are the basis for disadvantages. Second, while circumvention is not germane to questions of solvency, enforcement is. Each of these comments is discussed below.

It could be argued that the view of policy argument expressed here divorces academic debate from "real world" political considerations. Whether or not handguns should be banned, for instance, the concerted opposition of the National Rifle Association makes it most unlikely that they will be. However, while evidence of political opposition to action-taking in itself is not pertinent to questions of "should", the reasons for opposition are.

The reasons why "real world" actors would oppose an action (or drag their feet in its implementation) supply the basis for cost or disadvantage arguments. To return to the tobacco example, the reasons for Congressional opposition (e.g., economic consequences of a ban for tobacco-growing states) would suggest disadvantage arguments to be balanced against the claims for the proposal.

Hence, arguments about political opposition are irrelevant with regard to policy proposition argument only if they are used to answer questions about whether action will or will not take place. Understanding the motives for opposition is pertinent to policy proposition argument, as it identifies costs (or at least perceived costs) of proposals.

Enforcement is separate from circumvention arguments. While circumvention suggests that resolution agents will not carry out plan mandates, enforcement considers compliance by the target population of the affirmative proposal. This means that circumvention enforcement differ on an agents versus objects basis. Enforcement assumes compliance with plan mandates by the agents specified in the affirmative proposal (all that can be assumed by affirmative fiat) and then asks whether it is reasonable to predict specific levels of compliance by the objects of the action taken.

An example of this distinction is provided by a resolution currently being debated by the Minnesota state legislature, "Resolved: that the State of Minnesota should require all motor vehicle occupants to wear seat belts". Circumvention, as described above, would consider whether Minnesota law enforcement officials would implement the law, or whether judges would suspend fines. Fiat suggests that this is a non-issue: the judicial system and law enforcement officials are agents of the proposal. Hence, to test the proposal's efficacy, it must be assumed that these agents will act as specified by the affirmative.

Enforcement, however, would be a legitimate consideration of solvency arguments. Simply put, given the sanctions imposed by the affirmative, how many people can it be predicted will buckle up? Solvency effects are measured by combining the potential capabilities of a proposal (in this instance, the types and aggregate numbers of accidents in which seat belt-wearing could have saved lives or reduced injuries) with the predicted response of the objects of the proposal (in this case, motor vehicle occupants). Obviously, advantages of a seventy per cent wearing rate are greater than those of a thirty per cent rate: debate would focus on the level of compliance that could be predicted, given the actions fiated by the affirmative (e.g., $50 fines, suspension of driver's license, etc., as carried out by law enforcement agencies).

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to develop a theory of policy argument in which solvency and inherency issues are integrated. Such an integration permits a clearer view of the role of solvency arguments in assessing the merits of courses of action. Policy disputes, as conceived of here, focus on choices between competing alternatives: solvency-inherency arguments compare the relative efficacy of such alternatives in obtaining benefits. This perspective also makes it clear why "would not" inherency and circumvention are considered to be illegitimate arguments by this essay. If policy propositions request judgements about courses of action, the worst thing that can be said about these arguments is that they obscure this process.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, George Ziegmueller and Charles A. Dause, *Argumentation and Advocacy*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1975, pp. 33-37; W. Scott Nobles, "Analyzing the Proposition", in Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, *Decision by Debate*, NY, Harper and Row, second edition, 1978, pp. 162-166; Austin J. Freeley, *Argumentation and Debate*, Belmont, CA, Wadsworth, fifth edition, 1981, pp. 151-155, 165-168; and J.W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, *Contemporary Debate*, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1983, pp. 130-139.

2. For a discussion of the role of the word "should" in policy proposition analysis, see Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "The Logic of Policy Dispute", *The Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 16 (1980), p. 241.

3. For discussions of this view of inherency, see David Zarefsky, "The Role of Causal Argument in Policy Controversies", *JAFA*, 13 (1977), pp. 184-188; John F. Schunk, "A Farewell to 'Structural Change': The Cure for Pseudo-Inherency", *JAFA*, 14 (1978), p. 147; and Lichtman and Rohrer, pp. 245-246.

4. Schunk, p. 147.

5. This is the position developed by Louis Kaplow. See Louis Kaplow, "Rethinking Counterplans: A Reconciliation with Debate Theory", *JAFA*, 17 (1981), pp. 219 and 221-222.

6. Given this view, advantages of the counterplan can be the same arguments as disadvantages of the affirmative plan: the same relationship exists between advantages of the resolution and disadvantages of the counterplan.

7. David A. Thomas, "Glossary of Debate Terms", in Thomas editor, *Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice, and Teaching*, Skokie, IL, National Textbook Company, p. 477.

8. Freeley, p. 199, Emphasis mine.

9. Philip G. Zimbardo, Ebbe B. Ebbesen, and Christina Maslach, *Influencing Attitudes and Changing Behavior*, Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, second edition, 1977, p. 205.

10. Ibid., pp. 205-208.

11. Ibid., pp. 196-197.

12. For a discussion of equifinality, see James F. Klumpp, Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, and John F. Cragan, "Implications of a Systems Model of Analysis on Argumentation Theory", *JAFA*, 11 (1974), pp. 2, 4.

13. Hence, extratopicality should be seen as a collateral concern of alternative causality-solvency, rather than as a distinct issue.

14. Kaplow, pp. 216-219.

15. Schunk, pp. 146-148.

16. Some authors have confused this form of argument with attitudinal inherency. See J. Michael Sproule, *Argument: Language and Its Influence*, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1980, p. 377.

17. Kenneth M. Strange, III, "Inherency Motives in Structure", paper presented at the Central States Speech Association Convention, Chicago, IL, April 2, 1976, p. 7.

18. See John F. Schunk, "Affirmative Fiat, Plan Circumvention, and the 'Process' Disadvantage: The Further Ramifications of Pseudo-Inherency", *Speaker and Gavel*, 18 (1981), pp. 85-86.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF VALUE DEBATE

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For many years the dominant form of competitive debate in both college and high school has focused on questions of policy. Although theorists recognized that it would be possible to debate questions of fact or value, almost all of their work concerned the proper theory for debating public policy.[1] Recently, however, a number of theorists have argued for the importance of debating about values as well as policies. Noting that an understanding of values is essential to an understanding of human society,[2] they have argued for the educational worth of periodically debating propositions of value.[3]

The proponents of value debate argue that debating about values could help debaters and coaches clarify their values as well as "contribute to the advancement of knowledge about value theory."[4] They also argue that debate about values is preferable to debate about policies because value debate requires more emphasis on persuasion and rhetoric than is currently found in policy debate.[5] Finally, it has been argued that because value questions are more applicable to everyday life than are questions of policy that value debate might attract more participants than policy debate.[6] This last claim has been supported by the enormous growth of the Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA) which in recent years has chosen value topics.[7]

The question which this essay considers is whether the claims that have been made for value debate can be supported. Is value debate valuable? My thesis in answering this question is quite radical. Although I do not deny the value of CEDA and other forms of value debate as educational tools, I do deny that any useful distinction can be drawn between value debate and policy debate.[8] Value debate is valuable for the same reasons that debate about policy is valuable. In fact, values cannot be rationally debated without a consideration of policies. By the same token, policy debate is inherently fruitless without a consideration of values. The choice among policies requires a consideration of the values which those policies serve. Thus, the distinction that many theorists have drawn between debate about values and debate about policies is misleading. Values and policies are so closely related that rational debate about one cannot take place without a consideration of the other. In order to develop this position I will consider three topics: 1) the need for value debate; 2) CEDA as a response to that need; and 3) the philosophical underpinnings of debating about values. This organization moves from a consideration of pragmatic aspects of value debate to a consideration of the differences between CEDA and National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate, and finally to the philosophical question whether there are essential differences between debating about values and policies.

The Need For Value Debate

According to its proponents, value debate differs from policy debate in that it focuses upon qualitative evaluation of some object or concept, rather than on whether a specific policy is desirable.[9] In this view, value debate forces debaters to weigh the worth of an object, idea, or person and move beyond the abbreviated cost-benefit analysis found in policy debate. As I have already noted, two main benefits have been claimed for value debate. The qualitative evaluation found in value debate has been defended as more conducive to persuasive communication than policy debate and as a valuable means of clarifying values and advancing value theory.

The claimed debate benefits from value debate are largely illusory. There is nothing inherent in debating values that requires persuasive delivery. Nor does value debate inherently deemphasize research.[10] It is easy to imagine a very rapid, evidence oriented debate between proponents of Kantian and utilitarian ethical theories. At the same time, there is nothing inherent in policy debate leading to the communication practices to which CEDA theorists object. High speed delivery and reliance on evidence to the exclusion of other forms of argument have developed in NDT debate because these practices have been rewarded by judges as effective strategies for dealing with broad topics. If NDT shifted to smaller topics and judges changed their evaluative standards these practices would disappear.

The value clarification benefit claimed for value debate is also illusory. My point is not that values are not clarified in value debate, but that values are also clarified in debating about policy. Here it is important to understand that policy debate necessarily includes a consideration of values.[11] The reason why one policy should be preferred to another of necessity comes down to the values which the policies fulfill. The impacts of both disadvantages and advantages (or harms) are values. Thus, policy debaters often argue about the relative importance of freedom versus tangible values such as life and monetary loss. The extent to which values are at issue in policy debate is obvious in the 1983-1984 high school debate topic: "Resolved: That the United States should establish uniform rules governing the procedure of all criminal courts in the nation." This policy topic requires debaters to weigh the importance of such values as crime control, due process, justice, uniformity, and local control. It would seem that value theory and value clarification can be generated by debating about policies because values inhere in those policies.

While the proponents of value debate admit that values are important to policy discussion, they argue that the values often get lost in policy debate. Thus, Matlon argues, "although they are embedded in 'ought to' statements, value sub-propositions usually get lost in our persistent efforts to debate only propositions of policy."[12] This criticism is unclear. Value propositions cannot get lost in policy debate. One cannot debate about policies without considering values. The impact of every advantage or disadvantage is a value. Matlon's point may be that policy debaters have done a poor job of arguing about values, but again it is unclear what this means. When defending a value such as freedom, policy debaters routinely explain the importance of freedom in our democratic society, cite historical evidence supporting their view, and argue that absent freedom life itself would lose its meaning. By constrast, when the impact of a harm of a disadvantage is life, they argue that without life all other values are meaningless. In other words, policy debaters argue for the importance of a particular set of values by showing how those values are intrinsically important or are necessary to meet some other intrinsically important value. It seems to me that the argument about values found in policy debate is quite similar to the argument about values found in philosophical argument. Admittedly, the philosophical argument is more refined, but it is not different in kind from the argument about values in policy debate.

It is undoubtedly true that many policy debaters do a poor job of arguing about values, but there is nothing inherent in debating public policy that leads to that result. At this point, the advocate of value debate might respond that while some discussion of values occurs in policy debate, the policy considerations distract the debaters from the crucial value issues. What is needed, they might argue, is a pure form of value debate. If this is correct then the rationale for value debate depends upon the importance of debating about values and only values apart from their policy implications. This issue will be considered in the next two sections.

CEDA As a Form of Value Debate

If the rationale for value (as opposed to policy) debate rests on a consideration of values apart from policies then the experiment of CEDA with value debate must be considered a failure. Here, I in no way deny the worth of CEDA as a form of debate, but only note that it has not succeeded in divorcing values from their policy implications. It is a commonplace to note that the "value" topics which CEDA has debated have actually contained a policy component. They have been what Zarefsky calls "quasi-policy" topics.[13] While the topics have been phrased in evaluative terms, they have clearly implied a policy change. A brief consideration of two representative CEDA topics makes this point clear. The topics for the 1981-1982 year were:

> Fall: "Resolved: That unauthorized immigration into the United States is seriously detrimental to the United States."
> Spring: "Resolved: That the American judicial system has overemphasized the rights of the accused."[14]

The value judgments in these topics clearly imply a corresponding change in policy. If illegal immigration is in fact "seriously detrimental" to the United States then some action should be taken to restrict it. If the courts have "overemphasized the rights of the accused" then those rights should be restricted. Moreover, without a policy component neither topic could be tested. How would one test whether the rights of the accused had been overemphasized without considering policies that restricted those rights? One way that the negative could demonstrate that the rights of the accused had not been overemphasized would be to show that a stricter system would not work or would produce harmful restrictions in freedom. In other words, the negative would make traditional solvency and disadvantage arguments to show that a policy restricting the rights of the accused was not justified. They would reason from this point to the claim that the rights of the accused had not been overemphasized. The "value" topics used by CEDA actually have contained an important policy component.

The main difference between the topics used by the NDT and CEDA is that the NDT topics explicitly called for policy change, while the CEDA topics implied that change. The NDT topics said that some action should be taken, while the CEDA topics said that the action was good (or bad) and left the policy implicit.

While the topics debated by CEDA are not pure value topics, they are not precisely similar to the policy topics debated at both the college and high school level. According to traditional theory, the affirmative and negative debate about the probable truth of the policy change defined in the resolution. If the affirmative succeeds in convincing the judge that the resolution is probably true, they win. Recently, however, the function of the resolution in policy debate has changed. Oftentimes the policy resolution describes not a single policy change, the truth of which could be disputed, but a variety of possible changes in policy. The function of the resolution is no longer to state the policy to be considered, but to set the boundaries for the dispute. Consequently, the affirmative no longer defends the entire resolution, but instead defends one particular plan as an example supporting it. So, under the high school topic calling for uniform criminal procedures, the affirmative might defend a program of uniform procedures relating to drunk driving or rape, but would not defend uniformity as a general policy. By constrast, in CEDA the entire proposition is debated. The CEDA topics have implied a broad set of policies all of which must be defended if the affirmative is to win. In this way the CEDA topics are far closer to the types of resolutions found in traditional texts on argumentation and debate than are the NDT topics. In CEDA, the truth of the resolution as a whole is still at issue. By contrast, in NDT, whether because of custom or specific wording, the function of the resolution is no longer to state a policy to be tested, but to define the scope of what may be debated. It might make sense to use different terms to distinguish between the two types of debate resolutions. The CEDA propositions are traditional resolutions, like Congressional resolutions, the truth of which is disputed. The NDT propositions are statements of parameters which define what may be considered, but are not directly tested themselves.

The distinction between topics as statements of parameters and resolutions to be tested is important. Initially, this difference implies that topicality may be a less important issue for CEDA than NDT debate. In NDT debate, if an affirmative team running a case on the boundaries of a topic can establish that their case is topical, they gain strategically. Because the case is outside the bounds of what is usually debated, they are likely to have little trouble dealing with the arguments of the negative. By contrast, the affirmative gains no similar advantage by defending such a tangential case on a CEDA topic. For example, on the crime topic cited earlier, even if the affirmative proves that the rights of computer criminals have been overemphasized, the negative can argue that on balance the rights of all criminals have been kept in the proper perspective. CEDA topics are worded in such a way that affirmatives are discouraged from defending atypical interpretations of the topic, while NDT topics are worded so as to encourage such interpretations.

The distinction between the types of topics used by CEDA and the NDT is also important because it suggests that the counter-warrant may be a perfectly appropriate strategy for CEDA, but not NDT debate. Counter-warrant theory is based on the premise that the resolution is a general statement of policy the truth of which is tested in debate.[15] According to the theory, if the affirmative defends an atypical example of the policy stated in the resolution, the negative can defeat that policy by presenting counter-warrants. These counter-warrants are examples of policies other than the affirmative that are both contained in the resolution and obviously disadvantageous. According to counter-warrant theory if the negative wins the counter-warrants they should win the debate because they have proved the affirmative to be guilty of hasty generalization and thus denied any justification for the resolution. If the counter-warrants are true, then the resolution is not justified even if the affirmative plan is a good idea. Counter-warrant theory seems well suited to CEDA where the truth of the general policy implicit in the resolution is disputed. However, if I am correct that NDT topics should not be treated as general statements of policy, but as statements of parameters defining the subject of debate, then counter-warrant theory lacks theoretical justification for NDT policy debate. If the topic is a statement of parameters then there is no reason that the affirmative should defend all of the policies contained within those paramenters. The topic as a whole is not tested, only one part of it advocated by the affirmative.

The difference between the two types of topics debated by CEDA and the NDT also explains why affirmative teams generally do not present a specific plan in CEDA debate. In NDT debate, the affirmative presents a specific plan in order to describe as precisely as possible the topical change they want to defend. The affirmative has an incentive to be precise in order to eliminate potential disadvantages. In CEDA, by contrast, the responsibility of the affirmative is not to defend a single specific proposal, but a broad set of implied policies. Because the burden of the affirmative is so much higher in this general policy debate, the affirmative is not held responsible for describing all of the details of policy implementation. The crucial point in CEDA debate is that just as the affirmative must defend the resolution as a generic whole, the negative must attack its essence. If the negative argued that the resolution should not be adopted because of a funding or implementation problem, the affirmative could argue that such problems do not inhere in the resolution, but only in a specific means of implementing it and are thus irrelevant. It is not that implementation and funding arguments are unimportant, but that they are relevant objections to a general policy resolution, such as that used by CEDA, only if they flow from a necessary part of that resolution. Put simply, when the affirmative takes on the responsibility of defending the entire set of policies implied in the resolution, the negative takes on added responsibilities as well, including the responsibility to isolate objections that inhere in those policies defended by the affirmative and that do not flow from specific means of implementing them.

There is nothing in the nature of the general resolutions debated by CEDA that prohibits the affirmative from presenting a plan describing how they would implement the entirety of the resolution. However, if the affirmative chooses to present such a plan, they take on the responsibility of defending it and give up the right to refute negative arguments by claiming that they are not inherent in the resolution. Thus, it is logically permissible (if bad strategy) for the affirmative to defend a plan when supporting a general implied policy proposition such as is found in CEDA.

The distinction which I have drawn between the general policy topics debated by CEDA and the parameter setting policy topics debated by the NDT is also important because it suggests that some aspects of the hypothesis testing paradigm may be more suited to CEDA than NDT debate.[16] The view of hypothesis testers that to be valid an objection to a proposal must inhere in the proposal, applies to CEDA, but not to NDT debate. In CEDA the truth of the resolution is at issue. By contrast, in NDT it is the relative worth of a specific policy which is debated. Thus, it is perfectly legitimate for the CEDA debater to reject objections to a proposal, because the objections do not flow from the essence of that proposal. This response is not legitimate in NDT debate, because, after topicality has been decided, it is the plan as an example of the topic which is at issue and not the entirety of the topic. The essence of the topic is therefore irrelevant. It is the specifics of the plan that matter. Here, I do not suggest that all aspects of hypothesis testing are applicable to value debate. In fact, there seems to be little reason to apply a scientific model to debate about values. However, it is clear that the aspect of hypothesis testing that requires the negative to prove that their objections inhere in the resolution is applicable to the types of resolutions debated by CEDA.

Although CEDA and NDT differ in regard to topicality, they are quite similar in other ways.[17] As I noted earlier, proponents of value debate have decried the absence of adequate theory relative to debate about values. They have also argued against filling this theoretical void by borrowing theory from policy debate. In particular, they have argued against applying the stock issues used in policy debate to value debate. Consequently, a number of theorists have attempted to develop a new set of stock issues that can meet the needs of debate about values.[18] For examples, Matlon describes two possible stock issues. The debater meets the "definitive" stock issue by identifying the proper criteria to be applied to the value question and then answers the "designative" stock issue by testing whether the value at issue meets those standards.[19]

The view that a new set of stock issues is needed to evaluate the general policy actions implied in a CEDA resolution is problematic. Initially, Matlon's distinction between definitive and designative stock issues is not helpful. Matlon is clearly correct that in evaluating values or policies (or anything else) one should first define the proper evaluative criteria and then apply those criteria. Unfortunately, this doesn't tell us very much. What are the specific criteria which should be used to test a value? The great appeal of the traditional stock issues used in policy debate was that they helped identify the crucial issues in a policy dispute. They focused consideration on issues that were important regardless of the topic or affirmative case. The categories of harm, inherency, solvency, and disadvantages point the judge and debaters to issues that are relevant in all questions of policy. For a policy to be justified there must be some reason for change (harm), some reason to believe that this harm or advantage will not be fully achieved in the present system (inherency), some reason to believe that a new policy would solve or at least ameliorate the problem (solvency), and some reason to believe that the new policy wouldn't produce worse effects (disadvantages). None of the proposed stock issues systems for value debate serve the same issue identification function served by the stock issues of policy debate.

Moreover, the proponents of value debate have been too hasty in rejecting the traditional stock issues. The questions contained in them apply not only to questions of policy but also to the implied policy proposals found in "value" topics. This point may be clarified by considering possible arguments that the negative might make against the proposition that the United States has overemphasized the rights of the accused in criminal trials. The negative might reasonably deny that there had been any overemphasis on the rights of the accused by noting that few criminals are released because of safeguards established by the courts. Alternatively they might argue that the courts are continually revising their rulings in order to balance the rights of the accused and society. The negative also might deny the claimed overemphasis on the rights of the accused, by claiming that a change in legal rules would accomplish little because juries would refuse to convict a defendant if they perceived that he or she had received unfair treatment. Finally, the negative might deny the overemphasis by arguing that any restriction on the rights of the accused would lead to the conviction of innocent people. These four arguments are, it seems to me, clearly relevant to deciding whether the rights of the accused have been overemphasized. They also demonstrate the applicability of the traditional stock issues to the general statements of implied policy that we label as value topics. If there is no harm there is no reason to endorse the evaluation in the topic. Similarly, if the present system has already recognized the value or if there is no means of operationalizing the value there is no reason to accept the resolution. Finally, if the proposition endorses a value that is in fact harmful rather than worthwhile it should be rejected. The traditional stock issues are general questions which can be applied to either an explicit policy or the implied policies found in value debate.

At this point, I have argued that the value topics that CEDA has debated are implicitly policy topics and that, with the exception of topicality, there is little inherent difference between CEDA and other forms of policy debate. None of this in any way undercuts the educational value of CEDA. CEDA does facilitate debate about values and teach persuasive skills. It is just that other forms of policy debate also fulfill these aims. However, it should be remembered that there is one major area of difference between CEDA and other forms of policy debate, topicality. Because CEDA topics imply a general policy change and deny the affirmative the right to defend only a portion of the topic, they do not require the massive quantity of in-depth research necessitated by other policy topics. This lower research burden may make it easier to introduce students to debate and retain their interest. A debater need not make as large of commitment of time to debate in CEDA as in traditional policy debate. Thus, CEDA may be a particularly valuable educational tool for teaching beginning debaters and for keeping students, who lack total commitment, in the activity. At the same time, because it is not as intensive as other forms of policy debate, CEDA may not be well suited to stringent testing of either policies or values or to the development of argumentation theory. This analysis suggests that CEDA and NDT debate should not be viewed as competing, but as complementary activities. Together they provide students of all levels of experience and commitment with an opportunity to debate.

The Interrelationships Among Values and Policies

In the previous sections I have argued that there is little need for an independent form of debate concerning values, because values are integral to policies. I have also argued that what is currently labeled as value debate is actually a somewhat modified form of policy debate in which the policy change is implied rather than explicitly stated. Although these conclusions are important, they do not demonstrate the thesis of the essay, that value and policy debate are essentially similar.

The easiest way to demonstrate that debate about values inherently involves a consideration of policies is to consider a resolution which, at least on the surface, is unambiguously a test of values not policies. I take the proposition: "Resolved: That freedom is more important than peace" to be a representative example of such a resolution. The appropriate question at this point is to consider how this topic could be debated. There are, I suggest, only two possible answers: argument by authority or reason giving. First, the debaters might defend or attack the resolution based on argument by authority. For example, the negative might support the claim that peace is more important than freedom by citing some authority who views peace as the ultimate value. Such a reliance on authority could be challenged by asking why the authority believed that peace was more important than freedom. To this challenge, the debater could either give reasons for the greater importance of peace or claim that the authority was unchallengeable. "I don't have to give reasons, the Pope said it." If the second course is chosen then meaningful debate becomes impossible. There is no way to disabuse the true believer of the notion that his or her authority has seen the truth. While statements of value may be supported by authoritative evidence, the debate about values can be meaningful, only if debaters are prepared to support the judgments of their authorities with reasons and examples.

The second means debaters might use to support either peace or freedom as the more important value is to cite reasons and examples supporting the greater importance of one or the other of the two values. If the debaters choose this alternative they are led quickly into debate about policy. This conclusion can be made clear by considering the kinds of reasons which a person can give for why peace or freedom is the more fundamental value. The debater might support his or her claim by showing how peace or freedom is related some other value. In this approach, the debater attempts to demonstrate that a commitment to peace or freedom will produce a positive result of some kind. It might be argued, for instance, that freedom is necessary for a just society. By committing ourselves to freedom we increase the likelihood of producing justice. In other words, the policy of preferring freedom to peace is likely to produce a just society.[20] If a debater argues that freedom is superior to peace because freedom is related to justice, he or she is implicitly arguing that the policy of choosing freedom over peace is superior to the policy of preferring peace to freedom, because freedom leads to justice.

It is possible that the debaters might support a value, not simply by citing reasons for the importance of that value, but by citing examples where the value served an important function in society. The debater would cite examples to prove that in the past a commitment to either peace or freedom had characterized good societies. Thus, the affirmative might defend freedom as essential by citing examples that prove that only free societies are capable of keeping the peace. This example again demonstrates that meaningful debate about values quickly reduces to debate about policies. If freedom is necessary for peace then we should pursue only such policies that leave our basic freedoms intact.

In the preceding paragraphs I have developed a familiar ethical argument. There are essentially two ways of supporting a value system: authority and reason. An ethical system based on divine revelation is derived from authority. It is also beyond rational dispute. The system

cannot be refuted by argument. If God wills it then argument is irrelevant. As a consequence, reasoned debate about values that are supported by appeal to authority is impossible. The other means of arguing for an ethical judgment is to cite reasons and examples proving that when the value is followed good or bad results are produced. In essence, one tests a value by treating it as a policy.

The view of ethical argument which I have sketched might, at first, seem to be consistent only with a utilitarian approach to ethics or value. In this view, the proponents of ethical theories other than utilitarianism might argue about ethics without considering the policy implications of their theories. Actually, my argument applies not just to utilitiarianism,but to all forms of ethical argument. In order to argue for an ethical position, a theorist must embrace some ethical standard for evaluating particular actions. And in turn that ethical standard must be justified. In order to justify an ethical standard, the theorist may appeal to some ultimate authority (God, the church, science and so on), point to positive effects gained by following the standard, or admit that rational justification is impossible and advocate the standard based on whim or emotional response. Only the second option is relevant here. If values are grounded in ultimate authority or cannot be rationally justified then meaningful debate about them is impossible. However, values may be rationally debated if the theorist assumes consensually accepted ethical standards defining the good life. In other words, ethical principles can be tested by considering the results of living by those principles. Here, the theorist rejects both ethical relativism and absolutism by taking the common sense position that following good values produces a worthwhile human life. Rescher defends this position:

> In our own view, values are founded upon a vision of how life ought to be lived. The quality of the sorts of lives that they facilitate thus becomes the arbiter of values. Perfectly objective standards are operative here, revolving about the concept of human welfare: health, well-being, comfort, freedom of action, etc.[21]

The view that values can be compared rationally by considering the quality of life, which following them produces, lies at the core of the work on value theory of Wenzel, Taylor, and Toulmin among others.[22]

At this point the close relationship between value and policy argument should become clear. The worth of a given value can be evaluated rationally by considering the effects of following the value. In other words, the worth of the value is measured by transforming the value into a statement of personal or governmental policy and testing its results. Rescher explains:

> Put in a nutshell, the proposed method of value 'criticism' is an extension into the area of value studies of the cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness approach of economic analysis. To adopt a value is to espouse principles of policy in the expenditure of resources, and the mode of value evaluation with which we are now concerned is predicated on the somewhat hard-headed standpoint of the question of whether, how, and to what extent such expenditures are worthwhile.[23]

Rescher's view is also supported by Taylor who explains that "when we evaluate rules [ethical principles] according to second order standards, we judge the effects of their being followed."[24] This view is also obvious in the work of Cornman, Lehrer, and Pappas who test ethical principles by asking about the effects of following those principles. For instance, they attack rule utilitarianism by noting that such a theory might be used to justify sadism, since in some cases sadism may produce more pleasure than pain. Cornman, Lehrer, and Pappas reason that any ethical theory which legitimizes sadism is seriously flawed.[25] Put in different terms, they test rule utilitarianism as an ethical standard by considering it as a policy to be followed. Even Kantians apply a similar standard. According to Kant one should "act according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."[26] The Kantian tests a moral principle by asking whether that principle should be universally followed. Again the ethical argument depends upon treating the value as a kind of policy and testing its implications.

The position that rational argument about values requires a consideration of policies can be strengthened by considering one aspect of the meaning of the term value itself. A value is not merely a like or dislike. Values are statements of ought which, by defining the good and bad, guide human conduct. They specify what should be done. The important point is that values by definition imply actions or policies:

> we also expect the value to manifest itself on the side of overt action. We would draw back from saying that "patriotism" ("financial security," "the advancement of learning") is one of N's values unless he behaves in action--and not just at the verbal level--so as to implement holding of this value by "acting in accordance with it" himself, by endeavoring to promote its adoption by others, etc.[27]

This view is reasonable. If someone claims to place a high value on equal educational opportunity for all in the public schools, but sends his or her children to a private school, we would question whether that person actually shares the value in question. It was this very point which led President Carter to send his daughter Amy to the public schools in Washington. In sum, we test a person's commitment to a value by asking whether he or she follows that value. Values cannot be divorced from policy because at a purely definitional level a statement endorsing a certain value implies a set of policies.

One final point may make it clear that debate about values presupposes a consideration of policies. Let us suppose that I want to convince a student to take school more seriously and consequently build the argument that he or she should place more value on education. In making this argument I speak only about the place of education in the student's value system and do not mention any specific effects of a good education. In other words I avoid considering any policy implications associated with education. If this is a pure value argument independent of policy implications then the student should not be able to refute it on the level of policy. Yet, in fact, the student can make perfectly reasonable

responses by applying the stock issues of policy debate to the value at issue. The student might deny the impact of my argument by defending any of the following positions:

1) Significance. "I don't need to place more value on education. My grades are already good."
2) Inherency. "There is no need for me to place greater value on education. I have just joined a study group."
3) Solvency. "There is no point in me caring more about education. I just don't have any more time to study."
4) Disadvantages. "I can't place more value on education, because if I did I would have to quit my job and then I would starve."

These policy issues are quite relevant to evaluating the worth of education as a value, because the only way to test a value is to consider the effects of following it. Values cannot be tested without considering the policy implications of following them.

Conclusion

The sharp distinction which many theorists have drawn between value and policy debate is unfortunate. Values and policies are so intertwined that it is impossible to consider one without the other. The relative worth of competing policies can be measured only by comparing the importance of the values which the policies fulfill. At the same time, the relative worth of competing values can be measured only by considering the effects which the values would have if they were to guide human conduct. The values can be evaluated only by treating them as implicit policies.

What has been called "value" debate differs from traditional policy debate only in that under the value topics, the policy change is implied rather than explicitly stated. But the value topics lose their meaning if those implicit policies are not considered. One cannot reasonably debate about values in the abstract. Even in the case of values such as duty and courage, which are apparently unrelated to policy choice, the worth of the values can be measured only by considering the effects of following them. I can reasonably argue that duty is more important than courage by showing that the effects of choosing courage over duty are horrible. If I ignore such personal policy implications, the dispute loses all meaning. The conclusion which should be drawn is that the traditional view that debate can occur about values, policies, and facts is inadequate. Meaningful debate can occur about facts or about values/policies or policies/values, but not about either values or policies by themselves. Values and policies are so interrelated that rational debate about one cannot occur without a consideration of the other.

Notes

[1] It is widely agreed that there is need for in depth consideration of theory relevant for value debate. See Ronald J. Matlon, "Debating Propositions of Value," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 14 (1978), p. 196; Jan Vasilius, "Presumption, Presumption, Wherefore Art Thou Presumption?" in *Perspectives on Non-Policy Argument*, ed. Don Brownlee (n.p. CEDA, 1980), pp. 36, 40; Don Brownlee, "Advocacy and Values," in *Perspectives on Non-Policy Argument*, p. 43; Janet E. Vasilius, "Back to Basics: An Intercultural Approach to Value Proposition Debate," in *CEDA Yearbook*, ed. Don Brownlee (n.p. CEDA, 1983), p. 14.

[2] See Dale Hample, "Testing A Model of Value Argument and Evidence," *Communication Monographs*, 44 (1977), p. 106.

[3] Matlon, "Debating Propositions of Value," p. 194.

[4] Matlon, "Debating Propositions of Value," p. 197. Not all theorists agree that value clarification can occur in debate. See for instance Walter R. Fisher, "Debating Value Propositions: A Game for Dialecticians," in *Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation*, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia: SCA, 1981), pp. 1014, 1022.

[5] See David A. Thomas and Maridell Fryar, "Value Resolutions, Presumptions and Stock Issues," in *Dimensions of Argument*, p. 529.

[6] See Bill Henderson, "Theoretical Implications of Debating Non-Policy Propositions," in *Perspectives on Non-Policy Argument*, p. 8.

[7] See James E. Tomlinson, "The Philosophy and Development of CEDA," in *CEDA Yearbook*, 1983, p. 4.

[8] This judgment is quite radical. It is widely accepted that debates about value and policy are very different. See Joseph W. Wenzel and Dale J. Hample, "Categories and Dimensions of Value Propositions: Exploratory Studies," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 11 (1975), p. 121; Barbara Warnick, "Arguing Value Propositions," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 18 (1981), p. 110; Jan Vasilius, "Value Proposition Debate: A Pragmatic Approach," in *Perspectives on Non-Policy Argument*, p. 49; Walter Ulrich, "Philosophical Systems as Paradigms for Value Debate," in *CEDA Yearbook*, 1983, p. 22; Dwight T. Podgurski, "Presumption in the Value Proposition Realm," *CEDA Yearbook*, 1983, p. 35.

[9] See Matlon, "Debating Propositions of Value," pp. 195-196.

[10] For the argument that some CEDA debaters are beginning to speak very rapidly and depend heavily on evidence see Jack H. Howe, "CEDA's Objectives: Lest We Forget," in *Contributions on the Philosophy and Practice of CEDA*, ed. Don Brownlee (n.p. CEDA, 1981), pp. 1-2.

[11] See Warnick, p. 111; Brownlee, "Advocacy and Values," p. 44.

[12] Matlon, "Debating Propositions of Value," p. 194.

[13] David Zarefsky, "Criteria for Evaluating Non-Policy Argument," in *Perspectives on Non-Policy Argument*, pp. 10-11. For a similar judgment see Raymond (Bud) Zeuschner and Charles Arnold Hill, "Psychological Presumption: Its Place in Value Topic Debate," in *Contributions on the Philosophy and Practice of CEDA*, p. 21.

[14] See Tomlinson, p. 5.

[15] Counter-warrant theory was originally described in James W. Paulsen and Jack Rhodes, "The Counter-warrant as a Negative Strategy: A Modest Proposal," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 15 (1979), pp. 205-210. For an argument about counter-warrant theory that is somewhat similar to the one I have developed here see Jerome R. Corsi, "Zarefsky's Theory of Debate as Hypothesis Testing: A Criticial Re-Examination," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 19 (1983), pp. 163-164.

[16] For the view that hypothesis testing is particularly applicable to value debate see Vasilius, "Back to Basics," p. 16; Vasilius, "Presumption, Presumption," p. 35.

[17] Many theorists believe that CEDA and NDT debate should be quite different. See for instance Beverly Merrill Kelley, "An Alternative to NDT Debate," in *Contributions on the Philosophy and Practice of CEDA*, p. 12; Tomlinson, p. 3; Warnick, pp. 111-112; Michael D. Bartanen, "The Role of Values in Policy Controversies," in *CEDA Yearbook*, ed. Don Brownlee (n.p. CEDA, 1982), pp. 19-21.

[18] See Thomas and Fryar, p. 524; Ronald J. Matlon, "Propositions of Value: An Inquiry Into Issue Analysis and the Locus of Presumption," in *Dimensions of Argument*, p. 497. For a conflicting view see Brownlee, "Advocacy and Values," pp. 44-45.

[19] See Matlon, "Debating Propositions of Value," pp. 201-203.

[20] It is important to understand that a policy is merely a planned action of some kind. Policies need not be governmental. Individuals follow policies as well.

[21] Nicholas Rescher, *Introduction to Value Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 196[illegible]), p. 10.

[22] See Stephen E. Toulmin, *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950; paper ed. 1960), pp. 132, 224-225; Paul W. Taylor, *Normative Discourse* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1961), pp. 77, 90, 126; Joseph W. Wenzel, "Toward A Rationale for Value-Centered Argument," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 13 (1977), pp. 152-154; A. Richard Konrad, "Justification and Moral Inquiry," *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 9 (1975), p. 267.

[23] Rescher, p. 134.

[24] Taylor, pp. 45-46.

[25] James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, and George S. Pappas, *Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction*, 3rd edition (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 301.

[26] Kant is cited by Cornman, Lehrer, and Pappas, p. 308.

[27] Rescher, p. 3, also see pp. 23, 132-133. The view that values guide action is quite general. See Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (New York: Free Press, 1973), pp. 24, 158-159.

VALUE ARGUMENT IN A COMPETITIVE SETTING: AN INHIBITION TO ORDINARY LANGUAGE USE

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Although I don't subscribe to behaviorist notions which cast humans in the role of a pinball with memory bouncing in response to external events, I do believe that the episodes we experience in life lead to reflection which in turn may move us to action. In the case of the present paper the episode which evoked this response dealt with a ballot written by a fairly experienced and successful CEDA coach. The critic wrote:

> Don't tell me about policy consequences of a value topic. You may have labelled this argument as a "pragmatic implication" of the value, but what that translates to is a policy, and I don't want to hear about policies when you are debating a non-policy resolution.[1]

Being relatively new to CEDA debate I was somewhat perplexed to read this comment. I had felt for a long time that values were intertwined with the experiences of persons. Values are meaningful because they are rooted in behaviors or actions which have been or may be apprehended by human actors.[2] It seemed to me that this critic was creating an artificial separation between value and policy propositions.

Since this initial episode I have had occasion to review the published literature on debating propositions of value as well catalog a sample of ballots written in CEDA rounds. While the sample of ballots I reviewed is not a scientifically representative group of the population of critics practicing CEDA debate, they, nevertheless, give some indication of the extensiveness of the perspective that value propositions should be separable from policy propositions. It is in response to this belief that I address this paper.

My thesis is that policy and value propositions are interdependent. This interdependence exists both in a formal propositional sense of argument correspondeing to what has been called argument$_1$ as well as in the interactional usage of argument consistent with what has been labelled argument$_2$.[3] Attempts to separate value propositions from policy propositions creates, at best, a limitation upon the advocate to the discovery of the full range of potential issues available to the consideration of the value in question. At worst, such limiting strictures make value arguments as practiced in a competitive setting an inappropriate forum for training students about the function and use of value propositions in the real world.

The claim that policy and non-policy propositions are interdependent is not an especially contentious position. Most of those who have written about the nature of value propositions acknowledge at least some level of interrelationship. Matlon, for instance, notes that "values are seldom, if ever, argued in a vacuum. They are closely intertwined with statements of fact and attitudes about policy."[4] Vasilius admits that it is unlikely that values could be divorced from their policy implications.[5] And Bartanen recognizes the "inevitable and necessary interrelationships between values and policies in political decision-making."[6]

Nevertheless, the belief appears to exist among some judges of CEDA debate that value propositions and policy propositions are separable. Further, even those theorists of value debating who acknowledge the interrelationships between value and policy propositions bemoan the tendency of debaters to focus upon the policy implications of a value topic and propose alternative strategies which would focus the debate on values without the "pseudo-policy" arguments.[7] These efforts, I submit, are doomed to failure.

The first basis for asserting that a shift away from the policy implications to a more primal focus on the values is unlikely is based upon the nature of the formal propositions itself. It has long been held that fact and value propositions serve as the underlying predicates for a policy proposition. The justification for action is based upon the facts and values which are given as reasons for the policy.[8] In the most recent explication of this relationship, Carl Flaningam both restates the subordinate relationships of values to policy propositions as well as stipulates how value arguments imply their relationship to the consideration of policy propositions:

> (A)n important function of value-centered argument is the production of rules permitting policy decisions to be made. This statement has two meanings. First, it means that, as argued, policy propositions will contain subsumed or subsidiary value propositions. . . . By subsumed or subsidiary, it is meant that the policy proposition's outcome will be dependent upon the resolution of these issues. . . . Second, saying that value-centered arguments produce decision rules means, that for a given value proposition, a connection potentially can be drawn to one or more adjacent policy propositions. This does not deny that a specific forum could restrict itself from policy considerations. However, affirming or negating value propositions creates a set of statements which could be used as decision rules in related policy propositions.[9]

I submit that the decision rules created by the value arguments require a manifestation in policy in order to be meaningful. A decision rule is a meaningless abstraction until it is applied in evaluation of some set of outcomes. When competing decision rules are advocated, a standard for their comparison evolves through the evaluation of their respective ability to maximize outcomes. As Wenzel argued, "The question becomes, not which rule is better, for both may be perfectly sound rules, but rather which course of action is likely to produce the least harm (or greatest benefits) in this specific situation."[10]

I would acknowledge that the specific nature of the non-policy resolution could influence the apparent necessity of specifying the policy implications endemic to the proposition. In non-policy propositions of the type Zarefsky labelled "quasi-policy" propositions, the resolution itself provides the principle of the action to be addressed without specifying the mechanisms by which it would be implemented.[11] Cronkhite had earlier illustrated this same point when he compared the non-policy proposition "The present system of immigration quotas is good" as implying the same set of analytic issues as the policy proposition "the present system of immigration quotas should be continued." The only difference Cronkhite contended was that the non-policy proposition focused attention upon past and present policy while the policy proposition moved to a judgment of future policy.[12]

Certain forms of non-policy propositions would have less apparent policy-like implications; perhaps those generating decision rules based upon aesthetic values,for instance.[13] However, even under the circumstance that the decision criteria seem to be abstract, the procedure for assigning criteria of judgment remains fairly constant. In the five-part categorization of non-policy propositions presented by Zarefsky, he notes that two recurring criteria are applicable throughout. These two criteria include judgment on the standards or decision rules to be employed plus an assessment of whether the circumstances in question satisfy the conditions of the decision rule.[14]

The point to be taken from the interrelationship between propositions of policy and value is that they employ similar criteria for evaluating their respective propositional forms.[15] What really differs between them is their starting point. In the case of the proposition of policy, we begin with the statement of action which is to be advocated and reason backward to discover the underlying reasons for embarking on the journey. In the case of the proposition of value, we begin with a standard for belief and discover whether it is appropriate when applied to circumstances. Anyone who has coached policy debate has probably encouraged students to look for the underlying assumptions of the case. We recognise that these assumptions, whether labelled as values, criteria, goals, etc. provide what Flaningam calls the decision rules. If we argue within the decision rules provided by the other team, our task is that much more difficult. Similarly, when a team fails to contest the circumstances to which a value is applied, the evaluation of that value favors the team which has defined the circumstances.

When I survey the various proposals which have been offered to make non-policy debate more value-centered, I didn't find much evidence to make me believe that students will abandon their fascination with policy implication arguments. Vasilius, for instance, argues that using an intercultural approach to value proposition debate would cause students to expand their evaluation of standards for choosing values.[16] I can't disagree with this. However, the selection of novel decision criteria may make it more difficult for the team to satisfy the conditions for its decision rule as well as stimulate the opposition to introduce greater numbers of adverse policy implications of the value choice. Given contemporary American values, a team which used the decision criteria that a particular value would better realise Marxist ideology could expect a torrent of adverse policy-like consequences.

Another alternative for refocusing value argument on values is offered by Ulrich who suggests that debaters draw their paradigms from philosophical systems.[17] He is probably correct in his belief that different philosophical systems would define the relevance of evidence and arguments in accordence with their own pre-suppositions (in much the same manner that different cultures would adhere to different values ala Vasilius). When competing philosophical systems are compared, Ulrich argues that their relative superiority might be demonstrated by "reducing their opponent's position to absurdity, or by noting that their system is superior since it is more complete, comprehensive, consistent, etc.," or by using "other logical means of persuasion."[18]

I imagine that the same implications which are associated with intercultural values apply equally well here, with a few additional considerations. I think Ulrich is inconsistent when he first suggests that different systems can't be evaluated by the standards of another system, and then suggests that reducing a system to absurdity is a means to compare systems. Consider, for example, the Russian execution of the kulaks to "liberate" the peasantry. To a Westerner the logic of such action is absurd, but to the Russian Marxist, the consistency of the action with socialist reality is apparent. How does one judge absurdity within the internal assumptions of a system which presumes that such actions follow from Marxist dialectical necessity? Further, internal consistency, completeness, etc., may be irrelevant criteria. These rules may be sound, as Wenzel noted earlier, yet consistency within a system for its own sake may bear no relationship to the effects of the philosophy in its manifestation (i.e., a philosophy committed to racial superiority). It would seem to me that the "other logical means of persuasion" would ultimately translate to the policy-like implications of the philosophy in operation. Even where the philosophy may consist of an abstract set of principles, "they weigh the consequences of rules in general in order to choose rationally between alternative abstract principles."[19]

Finally, Bartanen argues that a systemic agenda rather than an institutional agenda would offer a more appropriate focus for value propositions. Value debate at the systemic (social) level is less constrained by considerations of feasibility whereas institutional (policy) is subjected to considerations of whether a policy could be implemented.[20] I think there are two qualifications to be made to this position. Since the systemic agenda precedes the institutional and is, in one sense, abstracted only one level from the policy, it interacts fairly directly with policy implications. For instance, Bartanen objects to "value objections" because "frequently the public comes to accept a certain value only to discover that the value is not capable of being implemented. Dismissing arguments simply because a policy is not workable negates the importance of value debate as a legitimizing tool."[21]

This is an especially interesting argument in that Bartanen concedes that in the real world values give way to pragmatic considerations. If anything, it legitimizes policy implication-type arguments as being "real world." Several other of his examples show similar legitimacy for the real consideration of consequences. As he concludes, "In practical disputes, value statements are weighed against each other through the presentation of criteria for their acceptance or rejection in the particular circumstance."[22] Sounds like a policy implication to me.

So far my argument that policy propositions are interdependent with value propositions has been based on the characteristics of formal propositions. An argument focused here tacitly assumes that propositions have existence apart from their users, and that issues of formal association, subordination, etc. are not dependent upon the individual or social constructs which seek to represent them. I would now shift the assumptive basis for my position by arguing that to the naive actor, the propositional format in which we state our debate questions (and often seek to reduce them) is irrelevant.

I understand through the writing of Kelly that each person "anticipates events by construing their replication."[23] Using the metaphor that we are naive scientists, Kelly's construction corollary implies that we constantly seek an interpretive framework through which we may successfully predict our environment. This environment, of course, includes the discourse directed to (or intercepted by) us. Willard, expanding upon Kelly's basic theory, explains that predictiveness is the criterion used by the individual "to construe an event as 'good' or 'evil,' in terms of one constellation of events rather than another. . ."[24] Since the individual ultimately develops his own construct system with the end always directed to successfully anticipating the replication of events, formal propositional logics can be made meaningful only to the extent that the individual finds it useful as an anticipatory schema for predicting events.

Now, the question for me that is pertinent here is what happens to the person when confronted with an argument pertaining to values. Does the person make them meaningful only on the level of the abstract, or does the individual translate them to the level of description of action in order to make it more understandable to another with whom s/he wishes to share the value? Research from Social Psychology tends to indicate that it may be easiest to represent categories of objects or information which is not highly abstracted (in a vertical hierarchy).[25] And as Lake had observed, "values are notoriously abstract, and thus, ambiguous terms."[26]

Another cognitive dimension contributes to a disposition to avoid abstract representations of events and persons. Research in the area of cognitive complexity has generally found that people who are cognitively noncomplex (simple) employ fewer categories of judgment. This is not to say that persons who are cognitively simple are less intelligent (generally the two variables do not correlate), but rather that as a feature of cognitive processing ability, there are levels of threshold limitation beyond which a judgmental abstract may be beyond the processing ability of the person.[27]

The point to focusing on the individual processing capacity of the individual is to suggest that since the level of abstraction attendant to abstraction of a value proposition (or the complex of arguments within a value proposition) may itself dispose the individual to represent the value in less abstract terms. Cognitive complexity, while not a correlate of intelligence, may nevertheless carry attributions to the native capabilities of the individual. To compensate for the load, the representation of the cognitive element a person chooses to employ in discourse may naturally tend toward consequences or effects which are associated with the value, and which may not entail the same level of abstraction as the value which gave it its impetus.

Cognitive elements which are unique to the individual's construal of experiences and events would mitigate more complex and abstract value propositions. Hence, the individual may literally be "forced" to view events in less complex causal (policy implication) attributions. Despite the preferences of many within the forensic community, students may in some instances be cognitively disposed to making policy-type statements.

As a final consideration to cognitive ordering, there is not very much evidence at all to suggest that categorization schemes employed by humans follow neat taxonomies. While sociologists have suggested that there are broad patterns which can be identified[28], Willard's position that the personal construct theories employed by each language user as an interpretive frame probably varies considerably.[29] Wenzel and Hample provide some evidence of the individuality of value constructs[30] while Kelly[31] provides the theoretical explanation through his individuality corollary.

As long as the individual employs cognitive patterns of association which are not dependent upon a serial predicate order, value-policy cognitive elements in the person's construct may be as likely as other associative patterns. I began this paper with the thesis that value and policy propositions are interdependent. In the formal propositional sense, value propositions and policy propositions differ only in their beginning points, but are otherwise necessarily connected. Values not only underlie the justification for action, they also suggest the action itself. In the interactional usage of value propositions, there are cognitive elements which may mitigate a person's ability to trace abstract concepts. Insofar as value constructs seem to entail greater demands for complexity judgments on the part of the person, it may be that concretist "pseudo-policy" formulations are simply more likely. In either case, whether for the propositional characteristics or the cognitive elements, the policy-implication type of argument is not going to go away. It is natural for the ordinary language user to construe the relationship between policy and value even when our theorists would wish them away.

Endnotes

[1] CEDA Ballot from Bethel College, Oct. 15, 1982.

[2] See Gary Cronkhite, "Propositions of Past and Future Fact and Value: A Proposed Classification," JAFA (1966), 12; Joseph W. Wenzel, "Toward a Rationale for Value-Centered Arguments," JAFA (1977), 154; and Randy Lake, "The Uses of Value Argument in Debate," Cornhusker Argumentation Seminar, Univ. of Nebraska, Feb. 23, 1980, 5.

[3] Daniel J. O'Keefe, "Two Concepts of Argument," JAFA (1977), 121-128.

[4] Ronald J. Matlon, "Debating Propositions of Value," JAFA (1978), 194.

[5] Jan Vasilius, "Back to Basics: An Intercultural Approach to Value Proposition Debate," CEDA Yearbook, 1983, Don Brownlee (ed.), 14.

[6] Michael Bartanen, "The Role of Values in Policy Controversies," CEDA Yearbook, 1982, Don Brownlee (ed.), 19.

[7] This position is taken by Bartanen and Vasilius.

[8] See George Ziegelmueller and Charles Dause, Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1975), pp. 14-17.

[9] Carl Flaningam, "Value-Centered Argument and the Development of Decision Rules," JAFA (1982), 109.

[10] Wenzel, 157.

[11] David Zarefsky, "Criteria for Evaluating Non-Policy Propositions," Unpublished paper, Western Speech Communication Association Convention, Nov. 1976, 3.

[12] Cronkhite, 14.

[13] Barbara Warnick, "Arguing Value Propositions," JAFA (1981), 110-111.

[14] Zarefsky, 1-7.

[15] Ibid., 7.

[16] Vasilius, 14-16.

[17] Walter Ulrich, "Philosophical Systems as Paradigms for Value Debate," CEDA Yearbook, 1983, Don Brownlee (ed.), 25.

[18] Ibid., 26.

[19] Wenzel, 158.

[20] Bartanen, 24.

[21] Ibid., 22.

[22] Bartanen, 21.

[23] George A. Kelly, *A Theory of Personality: The Psychology of Personal Constructs* (New York: Norton, 1955), 50.

[24] Charles A. Willard, "The Epistemic Functions of Argument: Reasoning and Decision-Making from a Constructivist/Interactionist Point of View," *JAFA* (1979), 182.

[25] See Edward E. Smith, Edward J. Shoben, and Lance J. Rips, "Structure and Process in Semantic Memory," *Psychological Review* (1974), 214-241, and Lance J. Rips, "Quantification and Semantic Memory," *Cognitive Psychology* (1975), 307-340.

[26] Lake, 2-3.

[27] See Daniel J. O'Keefe and Howard E. Sypher, "Cognitive Complexity Measures and the Relationship of Cognitive Complexity to Communication," *Human Communication Research* (1981), 72-92.

[28] L.E. Sarbaugh, *Intercultural Communication* (New Rochelle, NJ: Hayden, 1979)

[29] Willard, 179-186.

[30] Joseph W. Wenzel and Dale J. Hample, "Categories and Dimensions of Value Propositions," *JAFA* (1975), 128.

[31] Kelly, 55-56.

COMPARISON OF CEDA AND NDT: DIFFERENCES IN PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS AND DIRECTOR ATTITUDES

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Philosophical disputes frequently turn on disagreements over the truthful recitation of the facts.[1] Antagonistic relations invariably are sustained by opinions nurtured by inadequate information.[2] Anyone who has attended even a single meeting of a professional forensic association has no doubt been struck by the frequency of assertions about the state of the activity based more on intuition than systematic observation. We hope that more firmly supported descriptive claims can enrich the discussion of forensic pedagogy.

During the past eleven years a number of explanations have been offered for the growth of the Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA). Generally, these explanations have focused on perceived "excesses" in National Debate tournament (NDT) debate.[3] Typically, support for these hypotheses has been garnered from comparisons of the debates themselves.[4] Departing from this approach, our investigation focused on programmatic and attitudinal differences between CEDA and NDT. The following question directed our project: Are there systematic differences in program structure, student population, teaching staff, institutional affiliation, and/or forensic director attitudes between CEDA and NDT? Although we occasionally offered some tentative explanations for the results, these are to be taken as items for future investigation. Our primary intention was to describe.

Commentators have uncritically assumed that the choice of activity is purely the product of philosophy. After all, CEDA and NDT are said to differ in "attitude toward evidence," "delivery techniques," and "emphasis on an audience-oriented approach to debate."[5] We suggest that there may be fundamental differences in situation and attitude that make one philosophy more salient than another. Our descriptive claims do not necessarily establish such connections, but they suggest that the full story cannot be revealed by exclusive reference to philosophy.

Method

A 52 item questionnaire was mailed to 110 forensic directors. Of the 85 questionnaires returned (77%), 76 were usable (69%). Three types of debate programs were surveyed: schools offering NDT only, schools offering CEDA only, and programs offering both NDT and CEDA. Of the 76 usable surveys, 22 were NDT only, 23 were CEDA only, while 31 programs offered both forms of debate. By drawing schools from each of the 9 districts, we were able to achieve a geographic cross section of NDT programs. Although a similar attempt was made to achieve geographic diversity among CEDA programs, since CEDA is more prominent in the West the sample is necessarily weighted somewhat more heavily toward that region.

The survey was divided into five sections: program characteristics, characteristics of student population, characteristics of teaching staff, characteristics of the institution, and attitudes and perceptions. The first four sections were composed of 34 forced response items which solicited descriptive data about program components. The fifth section was composed of 12 7-point attitude scales (strongly disagree/strongly agree) designed to tap perceptions of workload, importance of specific instructional goals, major problems with CEDA and NDT, and prerequisites for competitive success.

Results and Discussion

The volume of data collected exceeded the time and space allotted for a report of our findings. Consequently, we were forced to establish criteria for selecting the most interesting results. Two considerations governed our determination: first, findings were included which seemed most promising for explaining associations between items; and second, results were included which ran counter to frequently articulated mythology about CEDA and NDT. This mythology is encapsulated in an oral history and chanted at the informal forums coaches and students attend to air their evaluations of the activity. This second consideration is highly subjective because we all leave these gatherings with different impressions of which opinions are ascendant. Despite this difficulty we are confident that some of the similarities and differences reported here will surprise those who have engaged in these speculative characterizations.

Program Characteristics

The category labeled "program characteristics" included items addressing program development, funding levels, and travel patterns. The data suggested a number of tentative conclusions.

(1) *The advent of CEDA has not created new debate programs*. Of the 54 schools in the survey that reported having a CEDA component in their program, nearly 89% had formerly offered NDT exclusively. In other words, our results suggest that the growth of CEDA came not from the spawning of new programs, but rather from programmatic shifts from NDT only to an exclusive or additional CEDA offering. The remaining 11% of the sample either used to offer both and now offer only CEDA or used to offer only CEDA and now include both CEDA and NDT. Not a single school reported starting a new program since the advent of CEDA.

Of course, the numbers can be somewhat misleading. Although 93% of the schools surveyed reported having had debate programs for more than 10 years, there is no way of gauging the relative vigor of these programs during that time. Perhaps, and later evidence on participant numbers lends credence to this assumption, the advent of CEDA revitalized some dormant programs. Our question did not tap whether the debate program had been in continuous operation during the course of its history.

This trend has some potentially ominous implications for debate in general and NDT in particular. The lack of evidence indicating expansion of the activity during the last 10 years, coupled with the split between NDT and CEDA, suggests an unhealthy future. NDT members should be particularly concerned; only 2 of the CEDA programs surveyed shifted to or added NDT to their program, but 48 programs shifted exclusively to CEDA or added a CEDA component.

(2) *Current trends in debate program financing favor CEDA*. Although little difference in absolute funding levels was discovered, the results suggest CEDA programs may have weathered the crunch in educational funding more easily than NDT programs. While only 9.2% of all the debate programs surveyed experienced funding cuts greater than 10%, three times as many NDT programs suffered funding cuts (CEDA 4.3% and NDT 13.6%). The number of programs enjoying increases was similar (52.2% CEDA and 48.4% NDT), but the comparison at the 25% or more level of increase favors CEDA. CEDA schools in our survey reported that 43.5% had been given this level of increase compared to 31.8% of NDT programs.

Several factors may help explain the funding differences without regard to the relative health of the two activities. Long established NDT programs may have begun with much higher initial budgets five years ago and, consequently, the rate of increase in the budgets would be less. In addition, CEDA programs are more heavily concentrated in the sunbelt states and may have benefitted from healthier state economies.

(3) *Primary CEDA and NDT funding sources differ*. In all program categories the predominant primary funding source was reported as either an academic department, an office in the university administration, or student fee allocations. Interestingly, student fee allocations were reported as the primary funding source for 35% of CEDA only programs, 26% for those offering both, and merely 19% for forensic programs providing NDT only.

Relying on student government officials for funding may create special pressures which make CEDA an attractive option for the forensic director. The often articulated notions that CEDA is easier for the lay person to understand, that it is easier to introduce to the inexperienced student, and that its reward system encourages larger squads may make it more politically salient to the student government leader. Additional data concerning student participation and forensic directors' attitudes support this hypothesis. These results are discussed in later sections.

(4) *CEDA and NDT travel patterns are distinctly different*. NDT schools reported attending more tournaments on the average than CEDA schools. Among the 52 programs with NDT teams, 45 reported traveling to 10 or more tournaments (86.5%). Of those programs offering NDT only, 91% traveled to 10 or more tournaments and nearly 64% attended more than 14. On the other hand, CEDA squads participated in fewer tournaments with only 51% attending a minimum of 10 events. This attendance pattern was even more striking in the more than 14 tournament category: for all CEDA programs surveyed only

19% did this much traveling and for CEDA only programs 23% attended this frequently.

Given that the level of absolute financing was reported as roughly comparable, this suggests that CEDA and NDT program directors spent their money in substantially different ways. The best evidence that the determining factor was the activity itself, rather than some random personality trait distinguishing NDT and CEDA coaches, was the finding that these patterns were also reflected within squads offering both CEDA and NDT. Among schools offering both CEDA and NDT, 32% traveled to 10 or more CEDA tournaments while 81% attended 10 or more NDT tournaments.

This difference in travel patterns suggests that CEDA does place more emphasis on squad performance. We suspect that CEDA administrators travel larger numbers of students to fewer tournaments and that NDT directors enter fewer teams in many more tournaments. Whether this is a result of the CEDA reward system or merely necessitated by logistical considerations cannot be determined by our data.[6] The recent controversy surrounding the distribution of bids to the National Debate Tournament focused on the issue of travel patterns. A number of NDT participants argued that the bid system forced programs to adopt national travel schedules. The distinct difference revealed in our results between NDT and CEDA lends fuel to this contention.

Student Population

The category labeled "student population" is a synthesis of data gathered on the average number of debate participants per program, the growth rate in participation, the mean retention rate, the experience profile of incoming students, and the availability of student financial aid. The survey results suggested the following generalizations.

(5) CEDA has a comparatively larger number of participants per squad than NDT. While 87% of CEDA squads had more than 9 members, only 63% of NDT programs were that large. The second most frequent category of NDT participation was 5-8 members (27.3%), but the second ranked category for CEDA was 9-12 students (30.4%). We deliberately excluded reporting the number of squad members in programs with both NDT and CEDA because the mean level of participation in either activity would be lower than the level in CEDA only and NDT only programs. However, in programs offering both forms of debate the numbers are about evenly split with slightly more NDT participation.

Our survey results belie the notion of a large number of one or two team NDT programs. Only one respondent had four or less members and the most frequent response was 13 or more (45.5%).

(6) CEDA has a comparatively higher growth rate in number of participants per squad than NDT. The growth in squad size was calculated by comparing responses to a question addressing present program size with an item calling for respondents to estimate their average squad size over the last five years. For CEDA only programs, 39% of respondents reported a five year average of 8 or fewer debaters, but current participation at this level has fallen to 13%. The biggest jump has been in the 13 or more category moving from a five year average of 30% to nearly 57% today. The NDT participation rate per squad has remained fairly stable. There has been a 9% increase in 13 students or more programs with a corresponding decrease in the middle sized squads with some slight increase in squads of 4 or less.

Not surprisingly, programs with both CEDA and NDT reported an increase in CEDA participation and a decrease in the number of NDT debaters. Of course, as a program begins to split finite resources between two activities the new activity will grow and the old one will shrink until the program has reached equilibrium. Combined programs have now reached a point where the number of CEDA and NDT debaters is approximately equal.

(7) NDT has considerably higher retention rates than CEDA. Among all CEDA respondents, 45% indicated that the mean student tenure in their programs was 2 years or less. On the other hand, this student retention rate was reported by only 17% of NDT directors. While 45% of NDT squads reported a 3-4 year mean retention rate, only 21% of CEDA programs reported a similar rate.

Although NDT only schools and NDT programs in institutions which also offer CEDA are nearly comparable, there is a wide discrepancy between CEDA only and CEDA programs within combined squads. The 3-4 year CEDA retention rate is a meager 3% in combined CEDA/NDT programs compared to 35% for CEDA only schools. This may well indicate that many of the institutions that offer both forms of debate put more energy into NDT. One would assume that the attitude of the teaching staff would be the most critical factor in retention. CEDA often may be little more than a poor relation in some of these programs.

(8) Debaters with high school experience are more prevalent in NDT than in CEDA. Among the 53 NDT respondents, 66% reported that the majority of their NDT debaters had previous high school experience. In contrast, only 30% of CEDA squads were made up of a majority of experienced high school debaters. Only 17% of CEDA squads were composed of more than 75% high school experienced debaters compared with 49% of NDT programs. These figures are comparable for NDT and CEDA only schools as well as for institutions offering both types of debate.

The establishment of high school experience as an NDT prerequisite may partly account for the differences in growth rates. Growth in NDT participation may largely depend on the number of students debating in high school. However, CEDA apparently recruits uninitiated students off the campus. Consequently, CEDA can flourish in states with weak high school debate programs and without the financial aid necessary to attract outstanding debaters to campus. The growth potential for CEDA, at least in respect to this variable, seems comparatively unfettered.

(9) NDT debate scholarships are more widely available than are CEDA scholarships. While only 37% of respondents with CEDA programs offered scholarships to their debaters, 51% of NDT forensic directors offered financial aid. This difference cannot be accounted for by reference to variations in university policy. Those respondents offering both CEDA and NDT showed a marked difference in scholarship policy in respect to the two activities. Nearly 39% of respondents offered CEDA scholarships, but 51% offered NDT scholarships.

This difference in financial aid offerings reinforces the contention that NDT coaches feel that high school experience is a more important prerequisite to college participation than do CEDA administrators. As university financial aid offices become increasingly strapped for funds, NDT debate may suffer more than CEDA.

Teaching Staff

The category labeled "teaching staff" was composed of items inquiring into the debate directors' educational background, debate experience, academic position, age, length of tenure in present position, and number of years coaching. In addition, items were included which asked the respondents to indicate the number and status of any assistant coaches.

The surprising aspect of the teaching staff category was how few distinct differences were uncovered. The data revealed only a small difference in educational level. NDT directors were slightly more likely to hold doctorates than their CEDA counterparts. Similarly, academic appointments were not importantly different. Again NDT directors were more frequently employed in full time tenure track positions, but the gap was small. Even these slight dissimilarities can be better explained by differences in mean length of employment and average age than by anything intrinsic to the activities. Likewise, the debate backgrounds of the respondents were similar. Almost all of the forensic directors surveyed had participated in NDT debate. Of course, given the short history of CEDA this was to be expected. We did, however, discover a few interesting differences.

(10) NDT directors are considerably older and more experienced than their CEDA counterparts. NDT directors scored higher on all three measures of age and experience. While 87% of CEDA respondents were under 40, less than 52% of NDT only directors reported falling short of this mark. Directors of combined programs indicated that 68% of their ranks were under 40. The over 50 contrast was even more pronounced: 32% of NDT, 13% of CEDA, and 16% of the combined program respondents have already celebrated their fiftieth birthday.

Similar differences were discovered when the responses were tabulated for length of tenure at present position. More CEDA directors had been at their present position less than 2 years than NDT respondents (21.7% and 0% respectively) and fewer CEDA respondents have held their present position for 7 or more years than have NDT directors (34.8% and 50% respectively). Directors of combined programs tended to bunch their responses in the 3 to 6 year range (58.1%).

This same pattern emerged in responses to an item tapping coaching longevity. While 42% of NDT respondents and 32% of directors of combined programs reported coaching for more than 10 years, only 13% of CEDA respondents indicated this level of experience. At the other end of the scale, 4 times as many CEDA coaches marked the less than 5 years response than did their NDT counterparts (17.4% and 4.5% respectively).

These results belie often unstated but frequently assumed characterizations of the CEDA and NDT director. The CEDA coach stereotypically is pictured as an "old geezer" who longs for the good old days and is appalled by the present state of NDT. On the flip side, the NDT coach is portrayed as a "young turk" enamored with the so-called excesses of recent years. If our results are at all representative of the forensic fraternity, this surely is not an accurate description of the case. Whatever the driving force is behind CEDA, it is a movement populated by the young. Conversely, the alleged excesses of NDT cannot be placed at the feet of some recent generation.

(11) CEDA and NDT programs enjoy the services of a comparable number of assistant coaches. The number of CEDA and NDT respondents reporting the employment of at least one assistant coach was nearly the same (61% and 59.1% respectively). NDT programs reported having 2 or more assistants slightly more frequently than CEDA (36.4% and 30.4%). Combined programs more frequently had at least one assistant (70.9%) than either NDT or CEDA only respondents and they were more likely to report having more than two (38.7%). Of course, the travel schedule for a combined program would create a considerable need for assistant coaches.

What struck us as interesting about this phenomenon of apparent parity in the size of coaching staffs was its relationship to the small/big school debate. Both funding and the number of assistant coaches were reported at relatively comparable levels. Our data, therefore, provided little support for any division of program choice based on resources.

Characteristics of the Institution

The category labeled "characteristics of the institution" contained a variety of items designed to elicit a description of the college or university sponsoring the debate program. Respondents were asked to check appropriate responses dealing with college type, size of institution, and departmental affiliation.

Our results failed to find systematic differences on these items. The only 2 year schools in the survey were NDT only programs, but the number was so small that it was not representative. Private and public institutions were relatively evenly divided among the three program types. We detected only small differences in institutional size and those did not appear to be systematic.

The departmental affiliation item produced a maze of results that are not easily interpreted. The respondents were asked to mark whether their programs were affiliated with a department other than speech communication, no academic department, a speech communication department not offering a major, a department offering an undergraduate major only, or a department offering a master's degree or a doctorate. The three program types have nearly identical scores for affiliations with departments offering graduate degrees; the total mean score for all three program types was 39.4%. Only one CEDA respondent reported a departmental affiliation other than speech communication, but 3 NDT only and 2 combined programs reported a non-speech affiliation. In addition, 3 combined programs reported not having any departmental affiliation. In all, combined and NDT only schools reported 8 non-speech affiliations (17%) compared with only one for CEDA only (4.4%). These results may suggest that some speech departments are uncomfortable with NDT debate, but more plausibly

TABLE 1

STATISTICAL RESULTS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NDT ONLY, CEDA ONLY, AND COMBINED DEBATE PROGRAMS

Item	Sum of Squares	df	F	P
NDT demands too much work from the student	79.82	2	11.48	.0001
CEDA demands too much work from the student	6.51	2	2.30	.1076
NDT demands too much work from the coach	33.81	2	4.86	.0105
CEDA demands too much work from the coach	12.13	2	2.79	.068
Very important to teach public speaking	27.63	2	5.00	.0093
Very important to teach research skills	.43	2	.41	.6636
Very important to teach analytical skills	.21	2	.26	.771
Major problem with NDT is rapid delivery	42.60	2	4.92	.0099
Major problem with CEDA is rapid delivery	9.80	2	1.97	.1471
Major problem with NDT is too much emphasis on evidence	41.45	2	5.06	.0088
Major problem with CEDA is too much emphasis on evidence	19.56	2	5.62	.0054
Major problem with NDT is outsiders cannot understand it	7.74	2	1.71	.1872
Major problem with CEDA is outsiders cannot understand it	2.25	2	5.62	.0054
It is almost impossible for students without high school experience to compete successfully in NDT	39.87	2	5.46	.0061
It is almost impossible for students without high school experience to compete successfully in CEDA	25.84	2	7.89	.0008
NDT is elitist	23.58	2	3.30	.0423
CEDA is elitist	18.08	2	2.61	.08
Faculty get sufficient tenure credit for working with debate	1.47	2	.19	.8278

this reflects the fact that there are more NDT schools, particularly among certain elite Eastern institutions, that do not have speech communication departments.

Attitudes and Perceptions

The attitudes and perceptions category requested respondent reports on a series of 7-point attitude scales. These items addressed perceptions of workload, importance of specific instructional goals, major problems with CEDA and NDT, and attitudes concerning prerequisites for competitive success.

Attitude scale responses were blocked according to program affiliation (NDT only, CEDA only, and combined).[7] An overall F test was computed to detect significant differences between the three groups (see table 1). If a significant overall F was found, planned pairwise comparisons were conducted to determine patterns of significance. In addition, selected _t_ tests were computed using all subject responses (N=76), for the purpose of detecting significant differences between contrasting items. For example, responses to "NDT debate demands _too much_ work from the student participant" was compared with "CEDA debate demands _too much_ work from the student participant."

An interesting general pattern of mean scores was uncovered. On 15 of the 18 items, the mean score of responses from directors of combined programs fell between the extremes of NDT only and CEDA only responses. Except on those few items where the mean score of combined program respondents fell to the extreme (and statistically significant differences were detected), the results emphasized the contrast between NDT only and CEDA only respondents. The relative positions of the mean scores may suggest that ego involvement in one's own particular activity and stereotyping of the other may fuel a divergence in perceptions. Significant findings were synthesized into the following list of generalizations.

(12) _Perceptions of student workload significantly differ between CEDA and NDT directors._ When CEDA and NDT responses were compared on the item "NDT debate demands _too much_ work from the student participant," significant differences were discovered (F=20.85; df=1; p<.0001). The average mean score for the NDT only respondent was 3.4 compared with a CEDA only mean of 6.13. CEDA directors responding to the survey strongly agreed that NDT demands too much work from the student. No significant differences were detected between the responses to a companion item which asked whether "CEDA debate demands _too much_ work from the student participant." However, a _t_ test comparing _all_ responses to the two items did uncover significant differences (_t_=9.17; df=75; p<.0001). The mean score for "NDT demands _too much_ work" was 4.53 compared with a mean of [illegible].95 for "CEDA demands _too much_ work."

(13) _Perceptions of coaching workload significantly differ between CEDA and NDT._ When CEDA and NDT responses were compared on the item "NDT debate demands _too much_ work from the coach," significant differences were discovered (F=9.48; df=1; p<.003). The mean score for the NDT only respondents was 3.6 compared with a CEDA only mean of 5.49. Again, CEDA respondents tend to agree more strongly that NDT demands too much work. No significant differences were detected between the responses to the companion item tapping perceptions of the workload involved in coaching CEDA. But a _t_ test

comparing all responses to the two contrasting items did detect significant differences (t=6.82; df=75; p<.0001). The mean score for NDT coaching workload was 4.41 and for CEDA 2.47.

(14) Perceptions of the importance of teaching good public speaking skills significantly differ between CEDA and NDT. Three items in the questionnaire were designed to elicit responses on the importance placed on public speaking skills, research skills, and analytical skills. Significant differences were found only on the item worded "It is very important that debate teach good public speaking skills" (F=9.17; df=1; p<.003). The mean score for the NDT only directors was 4.5 and for the CEDA only respondents 5.96. Although the CEDA respondents feel significantly more strongly about imparting public speaking skills, NDT directors indicated that they also agreed with this statement.

(15) Perceptions of rapid delivery as the major problem with debate significantly differ between CEDA and NDT. When CEDA and NDT responses were compared on the item "The major problem with NDT is rapid delivery," significant differences were identified (F=9.73; df=1; p<.003). The mean score for NDT only was 3.5 in contrast to a CEDA only average of 5.43. No significant differences were identified when a companion item, addressing rapid delivery as the major problem in CEDA, was analyzed. However, a t test comparing all responses to the two items did detect significant differences (t=7.23; df=75; p<.0001). The mean score for rapid delivery as the major problem in NDT was 4.43 compared with an average score of 2.26 for the same problem in CEDA.

(16) Perceptions of too much emphasis on evidence as the major problem with debate significantly differ between CEDA and NDT. Responses were solicited for an item reading "The major problem with NDT debate is too much emphasis on evidence." Significant differences were identified between NDT only and CEDA only respondents (F=10; df=1; p<.002). The mean score for NDT respondents was 3.1 compared with a CEDA average of 5.23. Similarly, significant differences were identified between NDT and CEDA respondents on the companion item: "The major problem with CEDA debate is too much emphasis on evidence" (F=8.72; df=1; p<.004). The average score for NDT only directors was 1.3 and for CEDA respondents 2.39. In addition, the t test revealed significant differences between the two items (t=8.71; df=75; p<.0001). The mean score for all respondents addressing the item concerned with too much emphasis on evidence in NDT was 4.23 and for the CEDA item the mean was 1.88.

(17) Perceptions of the necessity of high school experience for competitive success significantly differ between CEDA and NDT. Responses were tabulated for an item reading "It is almost impossible for students without high school experience to compete successfully in NDT debate." Significant differences between NDT and CEDA respondents were discovered (F=8.86; df=1; p<.004). The NDT mean was 4 and the CEDA average was 5.7. Similar differences were detected between the responses to the companion item relating to CEDA (F=14.76; df=1; p<.0003). The mean score for CEDA only was 1.26 and for NDT only the average was 2.7. The execution of a t test revealed significant differences between the two items (t=9.79; df=75; p<.0001). The mean score for the item addressing the necessity for high school experience in NDT was 4.55, but the corresponding CEDA item had a mean score of only 1.86.

Interestingly, respondents perceive their own activity as less dependent on experienced high school debaters than their opposite numbers. The scores of all respondents indicate a clear perception that high school experience is more important in NDT. This result supports our earlier finding that NDT squads are more heavily populated with experienced high school debaters than are CEDA programs.

Conclusion

The study of forensic pedagogy is difficult to justify for the sake of knowledge alone. What is important is how research findings can be used to better serve the student consumer. We take on faith that a vigorous activity benefits those who participate and, consequently, decisions which govern the activity of debate directly affect the quality of student education.

While we do not claim that our results justify changes in practice, we will argue that more research is warranted in order to more definitively describe and account for some of the serious tendencies this study infers.

(1) Growth rates. There has undoubtedly been a long term decline in the number of educational institutions offering any form of debate. But, at least for NDT, the decline in the number of programs has not resulted in visibly larger squad participation rates. CEDA, on the other hand, has demonstrated an ability to increase squad participation even if it has failed to demonstrably increase the total number of debate programs. NDT decision-makers should seriously examine the causes of this trend. Our data suggest some tentative hypotheses: the comparative exclusion of non-high school debaters, the emphasis on financial aid to build programs, and the tendency to spend money on large numbers of tournaments rather than large numbers of people. Perhaps NDT should consider initiating an additional criterion for success by experimenting with recognition for squad performance.

(2) Retention rates. Why does the activity with the most demanding workload for both coach and student have the higher retention rates? One would expect that a more manageable workload, more moderate travel schedule, and a program that emphasizes the squad over the individual would far and away carry the day in terms of retaining students. Apparently there is something captivating for students about the work, the emphasis on competition, and the mastering of a rather technical skill. It may well be too early to tell, afterall CEDA debating is far from a mature form, but the way it is presently structured and practiced may not yet offer the difficult challenge to the advanced student that national level competition in NDT provides.

The ideological immolation which so often characterizes political infighting all too frequently is simulated by adherents to CEDA and NDT. One cannot help but be reminded of the state of affairs in our activity when reading William Safire's description of the 1946 Senate primary campaign in California:

> Moderate Democrat Will Rogers, Jr., campaigned against strongly liberal former Congressman Ellis Patterson for Democratic nomination to the

Senate. "The battle between Rogers and Patterson," Democratic candidate for Governor Robert Kenny said, "polarized the party. It was the one highly emotional issue and it became a touchstone. Nothing else mattered to the partisans of the two men. . . . They just didn't give a damn."[8]

Notes

[1] Charles L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), pp. 1-19.

[2] Walter B. Kolesnik, *Educational Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 520-22.

[3] See, for example, Beverly Merrill Kelley, "An Alternative to NDT Debate," in *The Philosophy and Practice of CEDA*, ed. Don Brownlee (Cross Examination Debate Association, 1981), pp. 8-14.

[4] We are not suggesting that these arguments are supported by anything approaching a rigorous content analysis, but rather that perceived differences in debate practices have been used as evidence.

[5] See Jack H. Howe, "CEDA's Objectives: Lest We Forget," in *The Philosophy and Practice of CEDA*, ed. Don Brownlee (Cross Examination Debate Association, 1981), pp. 1-3.

[6] See James E. Tomlinson, "A Rationale for Developing a CEDA Program," in *The Philosophy and Practice of CEDA*, ed. Don Brownlee (Cross Examination Debate Association, 1981), pp. 4-5.

[7] Richard J. Shavelson, *Statistical Reasoning for the Behavioral Sciences* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1981), pp. 444-46.

[8] *Safire's Political Dictionary*, enlarged ed., (1978), s.v. "Polarize."

A COMPARISION OF JUDGING PARADIGMS

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The recognition of the critical nature of the role of the judge in academic debate has spurred efforts in researching judging behavior, judging paradigms, paradigm evaluation, and the functions of the judge as an educator. However fruitful and informative these research themes have been for the past decade, there are still significant gaps in our knowledge. With few exceptions the literature concerning judging in academic debate has focused on policy proposition debate, even though such traditional debate has been supplemented by "off topic" value proposition debating at many tournaments in the past several years. In this study I hope to provide added insight into judging paradigms by studying the emerging prescriptive patterns of debate decision-making in non-policy debating, and to indicate some of the contrasts between policy and value proposition judging paradigms.

The rapid, systematic growth of the Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA) during the past ten years has provided alternative opportunities in college debating for thousands of students at hundreds of intercollegiate tournaments (Horn, 1983; Howe, 1983; CEDA, 1983). In 1982-1983, the average college in CEDA participated in approximately one CEDA tournament per month, with a significant portion attending fifteen or more tournaments during the tournament season (in addition to whatever traditional and parliamentary debate, or individual events competition they also attend). Whether one is alarmed by or gloats over this phenomenon, we all seek the best educational experiences for our students in forensics. In the current structure of tournament debate, whether in CEDA or NDT, quality judging is a key element. Studying judging behavior in value proposition debate should contribute to the emerging theoretical perspectives on argument in non-policy settings.

The research on judging paradigms has helped identify major viewpoints of debate judges and how they operate (Cox, 1974; Cross & Matlon, 1978) as well as how to evaluate the variety of judging paradigms (Rowland, 1981; Rowland, 1982; Zarefsky, 1982; Ulrich, 1982; Lichtman & Rohrer, 1982). Freeley (1981) has provided recent data on National Debate Tournament judges and their paradigms. To date only one study (Norton, 1981) has directly examined the judging behavior at CEDA tournaments. Norton's survey of judges attending the 1980 final CEDA tournament at Reno provided an early description of CEDA paradigms and indicated a mixture of NDT-CEDA overlapping criteria, some intermingling of concepts of dubious appropriateness in non-policy debate and other signs of immature judging standards in a new, but expanding debate format. Both Freeley and Norton studies suggested that more systematic, broader based studies of non-policy topic judges were warranted.

Methods of This Study

The questions used in this study were designed to build upon the results of both the Norton and Freeley studies and to provide direct comparisons of judging behavior to these and other earlier results, as well as to provide greater detail about the cluster of attitudes, concerns, theoretical approaches, and decisions rules that constitute paradigms. Following a pre-test of the survey instrument on debaters, coaches, and former coaches, the survey was distributed to debate judges at four tournaments where CEDA divisions of debate were being offered. These tournaments were selected to provide diverse national geographic sampling, to include diversity in tournament attendance, national versus regional attendance, large and small tournament size and mixed levels of competitive experience and excellence. In addition, two of the tournaments included separate divisions of traditional NDT debate and thus allowing for crossover judging by a pool of judge-coaches who work with both NDT and CEDA debaters. Additionally, by administering the surveys early in the semester, it was hoped that topic-bound assessments of judging would be minimized. The return rates for the four tournaments, based on returns as a proportion of the CEDA judging pool available at the time of distribution (adjusted for duplication of subjects at successive tournaments) ranged from 43% to 72%. Less than 5% of the returns were unusable, leaving a total of 74 questionnaires for analysis.

The debate judges in this survey reflect a wide cross-section of the judges active at CEDA tournaments in 1983. The sample is strongly biased toward judges with current (at least part time) coaching responsibilities (82.9%). Although this is primarily a study of CEDA judges, nearly one half (46%) are also responsible for coaching traditional NDT teams at their schools, and two thirds also have current responsibilities coaching individual events for their program. (See Table 1) The judges included in this sample

Table 1

BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENTS

Current Coaching Background	Number	Percent	Subtotals
CEDA/NDT/IE	27	35.4%	
CEDA/NDT	5	6.6	
Judges Who Coach Both CEDA & NDT			42.0%
NDT/IE	2	2.6%	
NDT only	1	1.3	
Combined Non-CEDA coaches			3.9%
CEDA/IE	21	27.5%	
CEDA only	10	13.2	
Combined Non-NDT coaches			40.8%
IE only	1	1.3%	
Non-coaching (administrative, hired, high school, etc.)	9	11.8	13.1%

also reflect variety in the frequency with which they judge CEDA debates, with 40% judging on a regular (once a month or more) basis, but another 15.8% on the other end of the scale, judging only occasionally--once or twice a year. (See Table 2)

Table 2

FREQUENCY OF JUDGING CEDA DEBATE

Category	Frequency	Number	Percent
Occasional	1-2 per year	12	15.8%
Moderate	3-4 per year	14	18.4
Often	Up to once per month	19	25.0
Regular	More than once per month	31	40.8

Role of the Judge in CEDA Debate

Most debate judges have grown accustomed to identifying the cluster of decision rules governing their interpretation and evaluation of debates in terms of common paradigmatic labels. Some have suggested informally that the status of non-policy debate judging is "preparadigmatic" reflecting the lack of consensus and diversity of opinion in the field. This study lends support to claims indicating a lack of consensus on components and relative importance of factors within a stated paradigm, identification of judging standards that cut across several paradigms, and a residue of policy standards in the CEDA paradigm design. Previous studies have derived paradigm classification either from publicly stated judging criteria (Cox, 1974; Thomas, 1977; Cross & Matlon, 1978) or from an assessment of open-ended questionnaire responses. In this study, we have used prior research to list possible paradigm choices, allowing self selection of the most appropriate label. Previous literature has concluded that only three, four or five paradigms were dominant in policy debate, but for this study the list was expanded significantly on the assumption that CEDA criteria would not be so clearly limited. The results (see Table 3) reflect that diversity.

Regardless of diversity, very few judges selected no paradigm. Most debate judges felt they had consistent enough standards and outlook to warrant identification of a paradigm to represent them. Only one judge indicated that the selected paradigm would shift depending on the nature of the topic being debated, which happened also to be the only judge opting for the "other" category. At least this confines the task of paradigm identification to known concepts, labels and ideas which have been discussed in forensics literature.

Results of this survey indicate that five judging paradigms are most favored by CEDA debate judges, accounting for a total of 75% of all paradigms selected. Four of these paradigms were anticipated, with stock issues, tabula rasa, value comparision and argument critic each selected by 10-20% of the respondents. A hybrid paradigm emerged

Table 3

CEDA JUDGING PARADIGMS

Paradigm Label Selected	Number	Percent
No Paradigm	2	2.9%
Argument Skills	5	7.2
Argument Critic	7	10.1
Policy Implications	1	1.5
Hypothesis Testing	3	4.3
Judicial Model	1	1.5
Game Theory	0	0.0
Public Audience	0	0.0
Stock Issues - Policy	12	17.4
Value Comparision	13	18.8
Tabula Rasa	12	17.4
Other	1	1.5
Composite: Skills/Issues/ Value/Policy	9	13.0
Composite: Games Theory/ Critic/Hypo Testing	3	4.3

from the multiple selections by a sizeable minority (13%) which clustered argument skills, stock issues, and value and/or policy implications. Despite public pronouncements by CEDA advocates (Howe, 1981; Tomlinson, 1981, 1982) that one purpose of the "CEDA alternative" was to promote an audience-oriented, "sane" approach to delivery and speaking style in debate, the vast majority of judges reject such notions in the determination of appropriate judging paradigms. Public audience models were rejected unanimously, while the skills paradigm attracted only approximately 7% of the sample.

Do these responses constitute paradigms for judging or only a convenient self-categorization? The short-term perspectives and recency of research on non-policy argument theories has caused much discussion among CEDA coaches that "true" paradigms for non-policy debate may be several years off. There have been no in-depth discussions of the alternatives in arguing and deciding many of the types of non-policy propositions, and some disagreement over the fundamental nature of such concepts as presumption, stock issues outside the policy realm, and framework for discussing value conflicts, etc. For example, the lack of commitment to a specific paradigm is indicated when, although only 17% of the judges consider themselves "tabula rasa," less than 6% of the judges would not consider paradigm-based arguments in rendering their decisions, and only 11% felt that paradigms were not debatable issues in a CEDA debate round. More importantly, over 94% of the judges would, at least part of the time, use criteria from outside their personal paradigm in rendering a voting decision. CEDA judges, whether they are also coaching NDT or not, were consistent in suggesting that different standards from the traditional policy proposition debates were needed. Table 4 indicates those results.

Table 4

NDT VS. CEDA PARADIGMS

Question: "Should a judge employ a different paradigm in CEDA and NDT debates?"

Always	26	38.2%
Sometimes	38	55.9
Never	4	5.9

Although it is difficult to make a direct comparision to Norton's findings since the labels he uses are not defined nor are they common in debate literature, several of his findings are supported by results here. First, a significant portion of respondents in both studies felt that a single existing paradigm was insufficient to describe their judging philosophy. Analysis of Norton's data indicates a minimum of 21% of the sample contributed multiple paradigm responses, compared to 17% in this study.[1] Second, the tabula rasa judge is alive and well in CEDA. Perhaps this is a natural response to uncertainty and lack of commitment on the part of judges to specific criteria, and an accompanying willingness to acceed to the wishes of specific debaters in individual debates rather than impose tentative external standards.

Findings of this study depart from Norton's conclusions in two ways. First, there was a reduced influence of delivery-oriented judges. While Norton found 10 of 28 (35.7%) judges making decisions on the basis of delivery skills, the current survey located only 7% of judges willing to identify their paradigm for decision making as "skills" or "public audience." Second, there is a major shift away from the value/value objection comparision in respondents to this study. Whereas Norton found almost one half the judges in the value comparision paradigm, less than one in five indicated such a response in the current study. The difference may be one of topic-situatedness of judging decisions. The 1980 debate topic was much more oriented to the pre-policy implications and value objections analogous to stock issues disadvantages than was the 1983 topic when the current data was collected.[2] Although efforts were made in the collection of data to minimize the influence of rigid topic-bound issue evaluation by conducting the survey shortly after the start of debating on the new Spring Semester topic, this research is not a test of the topic-dependent thesis advocated by some researchers (Dunbar, 1983).

We should not conclude that CEDA judging decisions are made in a vacuum. While a few coaches work solely with CEDA, many are currently, and almost all have a prior involvement with traditional policy debate. The comparisons between judging behavior in policy and value proposition debate indicate some expected variations. The earliest studies of judging paradigms (Cox, 1974) identified the vast majority of judges (90%) as representing traditional policy systems analysis, stock issues, or argument skills paradigms. Thomas (1977) partially confirmed Cox's findings but noted a reduced influence of skills and emerging influence of hypothesis testing in judging paradigms. These conclusions about preferred judging paradigms were reflected in the Cross and Matlon (1978) study. The Freeley research (1981) clouded the issue by indicating significantly fewer policy maker, argument skills and hypothesis testers, but an unusually large variety of more complex and varied approaches to debate judging.

Table 5

POLICY DEBATE PARADIGMS

	Judges' Paradigms Indicated (in percentages)[3]		
Paradigm	Cox (1974)	Cross & Matlon (1978)	Freeley (1981)
Policy systems	43%	49%	27%
Stock issues	32	16	12
Argument skills	16	12	0
Tabula rasa	6	10	27
Hypothesis tester	4	12	0
Judicial	-	2	-
Other (situational, game theory, or argument critic)	-	-	33

It should not surprise us that a shift away from debating propositions of policy would be accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the importance of policy-making judging standards. This study certainly confirms that expectation. "Policy implications," is one judging standard argued by some coaches (Brownlee, 1980) to be a counterpart of "policy making" evaluation by forcing reasoned discourse on value propositions to consider the value implications from a pre-policy perspective. This judging philosophy was conspicuous in its absence as a paradigm choice among CEDA judges (only 1.5% of the total). Yet to argue that CEDA judges have rejected all the assumptions of the policy making paradigm cannot be supported by the results of this study. Many of the judges in this study labeled themselves as "value comparision" judges (18.8%) or composite skills-issues-value-policy amalgam (13%). Although there is no direct and specific derivation from the policy making theories, these judging standards have many of the same content-issues implications of the policy dimension.

It is inevitable that the influences of judging non-policy debates from policy perspectives should be noticeable since most judges have their roots in traditional policy topic debate and many CEDA coaches continue to coach traditional teams. A closer look at the data on paradigm selection gives further support of this claim when controlling for which types of debate the judge coaches (i.e. both NDT and CEDA, neither, or one but not the other.) The issues, value comparisons and tabula rase paradigm choices are well distributed among the coaching categories. However, the hypothesis testing, argument critics, and skills-issues composites are located almost entirely among NDT (either with or without CEDA coaching). Second, although "no paradigm" was an option for only two judges, both were either CEDA only or did no coaching.

Components of CEDA Judging Standards

On the assumption that paradigm labels would not provide the uniformity of response nor the clarity of decision making factors that have been exhibited with NDT judges, this survey sought to provide additional descriptions of judging behaviors in two separate ways: first by descriptions of how judges saw their role in a debate round, (see table 6) and second by examining how judges responded to a selected group of debate round conditions (see table 7). In Freeley's results, the role of the judge was a fairly concise statement of issue analysis, win/loss decider and feedback producer, for which 88% of the coach-guest judges agreed (and the remainder advocating policy choice dialectic as the primary role). This study confirms that these basic roles are accepted by CEDA judges as well. Reason giving and educational feedback for improvements were clearly seen as the most important functions of the judge in the round, with issue-related analysis of secondary importance. Paradigmatic concerns, either in policy implications or determinations of truth of the proposition, were quite strongly rejected as pertinent foci of debate judges.

Table 6

ROLE OF JUDGE IN ROUND

Role of Judge	Percentage Indicating Each Role As: Critical	Important	Moderately	None
Decision Maker/Reason Giver	78.4%	20.2%	1.4%	0.0%
Educational: Criticism for Skill Improvement	55.7	38.0	6.3	0.0
Feedback on Issues & Analysis	34.7	49.3	14.7	1.3
Choose Policies/Policy Implication	8.3	30.6	38.9	22.2
Choose Values	43.1	30.6	20.8	5.5
Determine Truth	14.9	18.9	31.1	35.1

Note: Two subjects indicated "other" responses as "critical": one regarding theory building, the other educational goals of forensics as an activity.

A second dimension of a judging paradigm identifies how a judge translates paradigmatic beliefs into operation through the win/loss decision in a debate (see Table 7). The decision making functions of CEDA judging indicates some increasing intolerance of unusual cases and squirrel interpretations of the resolution, and a general

willingness to vote on improper evidence use. However, once again delivery did not emerge as a reason for casting a ballot.

Table 7

CRITICAL DECISION MAKING FACTORS

	Percentages Indicating: Usually Vote	Occasional Vote	Only One Factor	Very Little Influence	Not A Factor No Obj.
1. Marginal Topicality	30.0%	48.6%	11.4%	7.1%	2.9%
2. Unreasonable Case	52.1	32.3	12.6	1.4	1.4
3. Evidence Falsification	84.9	9.5	5.6	0.0	0.0
4. Evidence Out of Context	42.5	37.0	17.8	2.7	0.0
5. Obnoxious Behavior	19.2	37.0	23.3	17.8	2.7
6. Spread/Fast Delivery	6.9	30.1	27.4	20.5	15.1
7. Repugnant Values	8.3	33.3	23.6	15.3	19.5
8. Absence of Values	31.9	31.9	23.6	8.4	4.2
9. Lack of Evidence	26.1	30.1	32.9	8.2	2.8

In writings on the philosophy, history and practice of CEDA (Howe, 1981; Tomlinson, 1981, 1982) the three concerns of squad development, audience oriented delivery and reducing the emphasis on the amount of evidence have been expressed as goals of CEDA. Evidentiary and delivery concerns are integrally linked to the system of rewards and sanctions implemented through judging decisions (and would ultimately make their way to any paradigms consistent with CEDA philosophy.) It may be premature to assess the effects of this alternative philosophy in forensics given the recency with which CEDA has taken hold in areas outside the West Coast and Rocky Mountian areas, yet a review of the influence of delivery and evidence in CEDA judging should shed some light on this process.

Several questions in this survey were aimed at measuring judging attitudes toward delivery and delivery-related factors such as humor, and the need for flowsheets in judging (See Table 8). From the results we can infer that a judging attitude exists which prefers a non-spread, audience oriented speaking style, but does not regularly enforce those preferences and balloting. In some ways these results indicate the hope that past criticisms of debate speaking practices might be a false dichotomy after all, and that analysis of issues and appealing to non-professional audience might not end up as antagonists in a zero-sum game. The inconsistencies emerge in several ways. First judges would prefer a public audience delivery style, yet will tolerate any delivery speed which does not violate the judge's (not the public audience's) abilities to understand the round. Second, perhaps a reflection of the first fact; almost half the judges feel a "flowsheet" is always necessary for a judge. Third, even desiring a more oratorical round, few judges will compensate for debaters who refuse to respond to spread techniques. Finally, while most judges will vote, at least occasionally, against obnoxious debaters (56.2%), only a little more than a third would even on occasion vote against spread tactics. We might well conclude that the ideals of CEDA are not evidenced by any groundswell of popular support among the only group who could ever give meaning to idealistic pronuncements.

Table 8

THE ROLE OF DELIVERY FACTORS IN CEDA DEBATES

Questions	Percentages Responding Always	 Sometimes	 Never
Delivery should be audience oriented, avoiding a spread.	43%	54.1%	2.7%
CEDA debates should appeal to public.	63.4	36.6	0.0
If judge doesn't mind, a "spread" is ok.	32.4	40.5	27.1
A judge should penalize poor delivery with:			
a) low points.	61.3	38.7	0
b) loss (in spite of issues).	0	32.0	68.0
A judge should compensate for lack of issue coverage in a debate.	12.0	72.0	16.0
Humor is desirable.	58.2	38.8	3.0
Judges need a flowsheet.	49.3	49.3	1.4

With respect to Norton's findings we are encouraged in the identification of moderately more voting support for delivery skills. Norton found that only 7% of his sample (for NDT judges, only 3.5%) would vote for delivery over arguments and issues. Yet this too is only a small proportion of the 30% judging pool in that study who aligned themselves with a "delivery" paradigm. Although delivery skill voting patterns are still only exhibited by a minority of all CEDA judges, this is a fairly stark contrast with the NDT judges of the Cross and Matlon and Freeley studies. In Cross and Matlon's example (Table VI, p. 120) the judging results for an analogous situation was overwhelmingly (a 48-3 vote) in favor of the lesser skilled, accidentally refutative debaters. Even the "argument skills" judges split 5-1 against skills in their decisions. The same opinions held true in Freeley's study. Although most judges consider delivery an integral part of the debate, debaters' adjustments to the upper skill levels of judges is the target, and only 4% of the judges surveyed felt that the judge should set standards for delivery style. The codeword is: if it's understood it's ok. Cross stated the obvious: "In general, very few judges are hard-core evaluators of argument skills."

Finally, in a related concern, judges were asked a variety of questions that related to the role of evidence in a CEDA debate round. Not unsurprisingly, the results here are consistent with earlier findings and other reports of judging behavior in this study. Over half (56.1%) vote, at least occasionally, on the lack of evidence in a debate round, while only a small number of judges felt that a CEDA debate should be conducted without the benefit of traditional evidence in support of arguments. For those who have heard the exaggerated claims that CEDA is "debate without evidence," it should be evident that few CEDA judges will tolerate that liberty. A reduced research burden for debaters, perhaps, but hopefully this will be accomplished through narrower topics and not in elimination of expected evidentiary support for argument.

It is a fairly common practice in contemporary debate rounds for a judge to ask to read selected evidence sources after the completion of the debate. A variety of reasons have been advanced to legitimate this practice: ethics, clarity of issues and proof, unintelligibility of original presentation, complete source identification, etc. Some coaches complain that this practice exacerbates the tendency to incomprehensible delivery, poorly cited evidence sources, and a removal of tests of evidence to a post-round stage substituting judge analysis for refutation by debaters. With CEDA's reduced emphasis on evidence quantity and slower delivery it was anticipated that there would be more "conservative" attitudes about judges calling for evidence at the end of the round. A series of questions were asked of judges, paralleling the Freeley research, to identify judging preferences in this area (See Table 9). Once again CEDA judges indicated

Table 9

WHEN SHOULD A JUDGE CALL FOR EVIDENCE?

Situation	Percent Indicating Appropriate For Judge to Ask For
Never	4.1%
At Judge's Option	62.1
When Teams Ask	4.1
Questions of Ethics, Context Accuracy	83.8
To Resolve Issues in Round	47.3
When Not Understood	47.3
When Poor Delivery Makes Evidence Unintelligible	23.0
To Obtain Sources for Squad	16.2

more similarities with the policy debate judges than differences. Reading evidence (83.8% would) as a check on ethical concerns (i.e., context or accuracy) is an expected result. However nearly half of the judges (47.3% each) would read evidence to decide unresolved issues or when they didn't understand the evidence when originally read in the round, and nearly one quarter (23%) would ask to read evidence that was not understood in the original reading even when poor delivery on the part of the debater made the proof unintelligible. In general the results of this study confirmed Freeley's findings, extending our generalizations about judging behavior to CEDA, non-policy groups.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have seen how a cross-section of judges in a national survey have identified judging paradigms for non-policy, value debating in the intercollegiate tournament structure. Many of the themes of past research have been reaffirmed in a new population of judges, even when applied to debating propositions of much different dimensions. We have also seen how the more idealistic goals of CEDA as an alternative to traditional debate are not uniformly reflected in the judging behavior of a large number of the judges who can influence the direction of CEDA. But the trend, if we are to make comparative judgments regarding previous research findings, is in a direction of less tolerance for abusive delivery techniques and more generally supporting broad educational foci of debate.

Paradigm development in any field of intellect is a slow tedious process. CEDA debate is only now gaining a foothold in the Ohio Valley and Mid-East areas, after a rapid growth in the Midwest and West. It should not be surprising that theories and perceptions about debating have not jelled overnight. At the same time, these judging survey results do not support the more radical separatist tendencies in both camps. Most programs and judges still have strong ties to traditional policy debate. Even when that is not the case, the coaches and judges have such experiences rooted in the NDT-policy bases of intercollegiate debate that it will be many years before completely independent influences can work their way.

This study points out the necessity for several areas of continuing research. We need to know whether paradigm labels in CEDA are used in policy and value debate in the same way. Second, many of the paradigm choices remain without adequate explanation, exploration and definition to know exactly what these terms mean, especially when applied in a practical manner by a large number of judges in non-policy debates. For example, what does it mean to call oneself an "argument critic" or a "value comparision judge"? We have a body of literature describing what it means to be a policy maker or a hypothesis tester, but not their counterparts in non-policy debate.

Judging continues to be the focal point of improving debate quality for any proposition. Debaters adjust to their judge-audiences. The win or loss of the ballot, and the accompanying critical ratings are the key influence for any progress in intercollegiate debate. Any ways we can understand and adjust to judging preferences is a help to our students.

NOTES

[1] Norton's data indicates multiple responses from judges. A sample of 28 respondents (p. 10) yielded 34 responses to Question #7 (p.11). The 21% is a minimum estimate assuming no missing data from respondents on this item.

[2] The topics debated by CEDA for the Norton (1980) and current studies are: 1979-1980: Resolved: That compulsory national service for all qualified U.S. citizens is desirable. Spring, 1983: Resolved: That individual rights of privacy are more important than any other constitutional rights.

[3] To provide comparable data for the three studies, percentages are used,adjusting reported data to include only judge-coach responses (whereas Freeley's included student judges). Cox's "rhetorical proposition" category, which he defined as the "resolution is probably true" is considered in conjunction with hypothesis testing in the other studies.

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A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CEDA AND NDT JUDGES' BALLOTS

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The Cross Examination Debate Association was founded during the 1971-72 academic year as an alternative to debate on the National Policy Proposition (NDT debate).[1] Initially developed by Jack Howe and some of his colleagues on the West Coast, the organization now enjoys a national following. From its first year, when eighteen colleges and universities participated in seven tournaments, it has grown to the point where during this past year there were 161 tournaments and approximately 250 schools competing.

Since its inception, CEDA has strived to be different from NDT debate. At first, CEDA was unique in that it employed the cross examination format. Soon after, however, the NDT also adopted cross examination. While CEDA, like NDT, used policy propositions in its early years, it has since switched to quasi-value topics in an effort to further distinguish itself from NDT debate.[2] In addition, CEDA employs two topics during a season--one each semester--thereby giving debaters greater variety and discouraging the highly intensive research that engages NDT debaters. What has made CEDA most different from NDT, however, is not the format or the type of propositions used, but rather the primary goals and organizing principles of the organization. The CEDA community was united by the conviction that NDT did not serve as an appropriate argumentative laboratory. In short, the proponents of CEDA debate shared a vision of the proper orientation for an intercollegiate debate program. Understanding this vision is essential to distinguish between the two forms of debate.[3]

The CEDA vision is easily identified by examining the organization's publications. One article noted that CEDA was conceived when Howe learned that the 1971-72 academic debate proposition was so badly worded it would assure countless "squirrel" affirmative cases and that an alternative was needed.[4] A continuing theme in the CEDA literature celebrates the differences between CEDA and NDT debate. Howe declared: "CEDA began as a reaction against a prevailing style of debate that both participants and their directors found difficult to support. . . . CEDA debate is at variance with NDT debate in three major aspects: 1) in its attitude toward evidence; 2) in delivery techniques; 3) in its emphasis on an audience-oriented approach to debate."[5] Thus CEDA was created because Howe and his colleagues believed that NDT debate was failing in its educational mission. Debaters were speaking too quickly, reading too much evidence, and relying on jargon that could not be understood by anyone except trained debate judges.

CEDA debate is primarily distinguishable from NDT debate in that the organization pursues alternative exemplar models for students. CEDA coaches believe that NDT pursues as an exemplar the "information processor"--the highly skilled technician who is heavily dependent upon evidence cards and briefs, and who tries to distort the meaning of the topic in order to surprise his/her opponents with very narrow and very tricky case analysis. In contrast, CEDA coaches believe that their debate exemplar is the audience-oriented debater who uses humor, relates his/her arguments to trained and untrained judges equally well, and who relies more on analysis than evidence. While CEDA coaches comment that they would not encourage debaters to abandon evidence, they also do not want them to depend on evidence to the exclusion of other modes of proof.[6]

Obviously, this vision is compelling for many given the growth of participation in CEDA debate. Many members of CEDA, however, believe this growth may also pose the greatest threat the organization faces. As CEDA attracts new converts who were formally associated with NDT debate to its ranks, it potentially could be "corrupted" by the same forces which caused NDT debate to become unacceptable. As Howe declared:

> To those students who now debate CEDA with no regard for a communicative delivery and who believe that the key to success in CEDA is the amassing of hoards of evidence to the disparagement of argumentation and analysis and who persist in distorting our debate topics so as to make a mockery of them, I suggest that there is an alternative form of debate available. It is called NDT. Since you have not left it in spirit, then why don't you rejoin it in actuality.[7]

Thus there is a strong feeling in the CEDA community that CEDA can remain a viable activity only so long as it remains untainted by NDT's "sins." This brings us to the key question considered by this panel. How different is CEDA from NDT? Furthermore, we wish to determine whether CEDA debate has remained faithful to its stated objectives.

Maintaining CEDA's objectives rests with the debaters and their coaches of course, but most importantly, it rests with those who judge the CEDA debates. As Howe commented: "If judges gave their ballots to debaters who best represent the true ideals of CEDA, directors will be more inclined to produce teams that reflect

these ideals, and the debaters will happily conform."[8]

The judge plays a critical role in all forms of educational debate, but the judge is especially important in CEDA debate, for he/she is the "keeper of the flame" who must preserve the vision which celebrates the special goals of CEDA debate. The judge must reward the debaters who satisfy CEDA's objectives and who are the positive exemplars, and the judge must punish those debaters who begin to debate CEDA as if it were NDT.

We are not suggesting that it is either a good or a bad idea that CEDA emphasizes a specific kind of communication style and exemplar model for debate. If anything, we support the diversity that now exists in academic debate as it creates alternatives for students and programs. We are suggesting, however, that the differences between CEDA and NDT debate should be recognized for what they are--differences in exemplar models. CEDA debates are not substantially different from NDT because of their quasi-value topics. They are different only to the extent that the judges who hear the rounds perpetuate the goals of the activity by using their ballots to teach and reward debaters who reflect the goals of CEDA.

We propose the following research questions:

1) Do CEDA judges comment on those issues which are central to the CEDA vision (i.e. delivery techniques, organization, speed, etc.) more frequently than do NDT judges?

2) Do CEDA judges focus more on educational comments and personal comments to debaters than NDT judges?

3) Do CEDA judges devote less attention to discussing arguments than NDT judges in their comments to debaters?

4) Do CEDA judges express in their comments to debaters a greater willingness to intervene in the deliberation of issues than do NDT judges?

Method

This study employs a hand-coded content analysis of ballot "pink copies" completed in the Senior NDT and Senior CEDA divisions of the Great Salt Lake Debate Tournament held at the University of Utah in January, 1983. The Utah tournament was selected because it has both strong NDT and CEDA divisions which draw teams from throughout the nation, and because there is movement of judges across divisions (i.e. a judge may well be assigned to hear CEDA and NDT debate rounds). A systematic randomized sample of five ballots per preliminary round from each division was taken.

This is 22 percent of the total number of ballots (20 percent of NDT and 24 percent of CEDA ballots), an adequate sample for content analysis.[9] Two of the ballots originally included in the sample were found to be illegible and as a result a replacement sampling was conducted for those rounds.

Content analysis is a systematic and rigorous means of explicating symbolic communication, and it permits the study of large quantities of data in an orderly fashion. The key to any content analysis is a category system that enables coders to identify the salient characteristics of the data. As Holsti observed:

> Systematic means that the inclusion and exclusion of content of categories is done according to consistently applied rules. This requirement clearly eliminates analysis in which only materials supporting the investigator's hypotheses are admitted as evidence. It also implies that the categories are defined in a manner which permits them to be used according to consistently applied rules.[10]

The "theme" was chosen as the unit of analysis. A theme is a single assertion or idea about some subject. It may be a phrase, a sentence, or a larger complete thought. In a more detailed explanation of its uses, Holsti has cited the advantages and disadvantages of the theme and suggested a thematic analysis for this type of study.[11]

Coders were trained on example ballots from the junior divisions to simultaneously develop the content classification, determine the coding rules, and attain a minimum level of agreement (inter-rater reliability = .80). The categories were primarily defined by the research questions but additional categories were created to accommodate the data. Three coders independently, but concurrently, coded the themes from the ballots in the sample. All themes from each ballot were identified according to the following typology:

Types of Comments:

Decision Justification--Comments devoted to a judge's explanation for why he/she voted a certain way.

Judge's Account--Comments wherein the judge repeated, summarized, or gave their view of the arguments or other elements in the round.

Refutation--Comments regarding the debaters' responses to their opponents' arguments.

Analysis--Comments regarding the debaters' reasoning.

Proof--Comments regarding the debaters' use of evidence.

Debate Theory--Comments devoted to established debate rules, principles, or standards for evaluating arguments.

Delivery/Speed--Comments regarding debaters' rate and clarity.

Delivery/Style & Organization--Comments regarding debaters' overall delivery appeal and arrangement of arguments.

Educational Comments--Remarks devoted to the judge providing explanations, instructions, and alternatives to debaters.

Judge's Intervention--Comments explaining how a judge chose to disregard debaters' claims to resolve an issue a certain way, or otherwise supplying some personal opinion in order to resolve a dispute over an issue.

Personal Comments to Debaters--Comments directed toward the debaters which evaluated their performance or the quality of the debate.

Other Issues--Comments regarding specific issues unique to that debate.

Unintelligible--Comments for which we could not discern a meaning or which were illegible.

All themes placed in a category (except for Judge's Intervention and Unintelligible) were further subdivided into neutral, critical, or positive statements. Thus the ballot statement: "The evidence on the 'B' subpoint was really excellent," was coded as a positive statement on Proof. The comment: "I discounted most of your attacks as soon as I heard them since they simply were not developed," was coded as a Judge's Intervention. The remark: "The reason I voted negative was that the affirmative failed to show my rights were being violated," was coded as a critical Decision Justification, etc.

Results

The inter-rater reliability was determined by using Scott's index of reliability (pi = .82).[12] This level of reliability is sufficient for interpretation of the results of the thematic classification. The disagreements have no discernible pattern except for a slightly larger number than would be expected in the Judge's Intervention category. Apparently, the line between a judge's Decision Justification or Account and Judge's Intervention is not easily determined.

Both CEDA and NDT divisions had eight preliminary rounds but the time formats are different--speaking time in NDT totals 72 minutes while CEDA speaking time equals 60 minutes. Since the totals in the most often used categories (Decision Justification, Judge's Account, Refutation, and Analysis) are probably highly related to the number and variety of issues and arguments in the debates, direct comparisons between CEDA themes and NDT themes would be misleading. To correct for this difference, the number of themes in each category in the NDT analysis was proportionately reduced to match CEDA speaking time (83 percent of NDT time). This artificial correction is not without problems; the greater speaking time in NDT likely leads to more complicated arguments that may require more comment by the judge to clarify his/her decision. In this case a proportional reduction would not completely correct for the extra speaking time in NDT. We decided not to additionally reduce the NDT correctional factor because there are counter-acting situational factors--for example, the greater time in between CEDA rounds may allow judges to more fully describe the issues and explain their decision.

The total number of themes on the NDT ballots, 737 (all NDT numbers are "corrected") far outdistanced the number of themes found on CEDA ballots, 591 ($\chi^2 = 16.05$, df= 1, sig. at $p > .0001$ for a two-tailed test). The primary explanation for this difference is that the larger number of issues and arguments that result from the faster delivery and the emphasis on evidence in NDT give the NDT judges more to discuss on their ballots--25 percent more themes overall (see Table 1).

Research Question 1--Do CEDA judges comment on those issues which are central to the CEDA vision (i.e. delivery techniques, organization, speed, etc.) more frequently than do NDT judges? The results show that CEDA ballots conform to the vision. In the Delivery/Style and Organization category, there were 40 themes in CEDA (7 percent of the total) compared to 25 themes in NDT (3 percent of the total) ($\chi^2 = 8.33$, df = 1, sig. at $p > .005$ for a one-tailed test with CEDA themes proportionately weighted). In the Delivery/Speed category there is less difference than in the previous category, but CEDA ballots confirm a proportionately greater concern for speed than do the NDT ballots (2 percent versus 1.5 percent).

Research Question 2--Do CEDA judges focus more on educational comments and personal comments to debaters than do NDT judges? CEDA judges had 65 Educational Comments (11 percent) compared to just 49 themes by NDT judges (7 percent) ($\chi^2 = 9.79$, df = 1, sig. at $p > .005$ for a one-tailed test with CEDA themes proportionately weighted). In the category of Personal Comments to Debaters, CEDA judges made 91 comments (15 percent) compared to only 63 comments from the NDT judges (8.5 percent) ($\chi^2 = 14.57$, df = 1, sig. at $p > .0005$ for a one-tailed test with CEDA themes proportionately weighted).

Research Question 3--Do CEDA judges devote less attention to discussing arguments than do NDT judges in their comments to debaters? Again the research expectations were confirmed. In the category of Refutation statements, NDT judges had 114 themes (15 percent) compared to just 52 themes from CEDA ballots (9 percent) ($\chi^2 = 13.41$, df = 1, sig. at $p > .0005$ for a one-tailed test with CEDA themes proportionately weighted). In the category of Analysis, NDT themes outstripped CEDA themes 65 (9 percent) to 28 (5 percent) ($\chi^2 = 9.0$, df = 1, sig. at $p > .005$ for a one-tailed test with CEDA themes proportionately weighted). Proof, the category concerned with the use of evidence, had 45 NDT themes (6 percent) as opposed to 18 CEDA themes (3 percent) ($\chi^2 = 7.5$, df = 1, sig. at $p > .005$ for a one-tailed test with CEDA themes proportionately weighted). Finally, the category which has descriptions and summarizations of arguments, Judge's Account, shows that NDT ballots contained 193 themes while CEDA ballots had 129 themes (26 percent versus 22 percent).

Research Question 4--Do CEDA judges express in their comments to debaters a greater willingness to intervene in the deliberation of issues than do NDT judges? The category Judge's Intervention shows that CEDA ballots contained 24 themes (4 percent) while NDT ballots had only 4 themes (0.5 percent) ($\chi^2 = 19.88$, df = 1, sig. at $p > .0005$ for a one-tailed test with CEDA themes proportionately weighted).

Additional Analyses--A category called Debate Theory emerged during the coding. This category was used somewhat more by the NDT judges than the CEDA judges (2 percent versus 1 percent). Also, one of the most heavily identified themes in this analysis was Decision Justification, which was the most evenly utilized category with 134 KDT statements (18 percent) and 101 CEDA statements (17 percent).

The breakdown of most categories into neutral, critical, and positive subclassifications found that the major difference is that NDT ballots contain more critical comments (46 percent) than do CEDA ballots (39 percent) but both CEDA and NDT have more critical than positive or neutral statements. Inspection of the subclassifications in each category, however, uncovered two interesting differences. First, in Personal Comments to Debaters, the positive statements (attaboy or attagirls) are about twice as common as the negative comments, and in the Delivery/Style and Organization category the CEDA judges made approximately the same number of positive and negative statements. Second, in a different type of category, Decision Justification, NDT judges made more positive statements than negative ones.

Discussion

The results confirmed all the research expectations in the predicted direction. In essence, the content analysis found CEDA judges more interested in delivery, speed, educational and personal comments than the NDT judges, while NDT judges were more concerned with argument and theory issues than the CEDA judges. To a large extent, these findings are consistent with the goals of the Cross Examination Debate Association. It is noteworthy, however, that contrary to what CEDA coaches might expect, NDT judges are also concerned about excessive speed. The increased willingness of CEDA judges to intervene in the deliberation of issues places them more in the role of skeptical critics--as members of subjective audiences--and less as neutral arbiters of complex arguments. Similarly, the personal involvement shown by CEDA judges through their heavier use of educational comments and personal comments to debaters shows a more active role for the judge in the debate.

The NDT judges, in contrast, are more concerned with arguments than delivery, focusing on refutation, analysis, and summarizing issues. Although not unwilling to make personal comments, the NDT judge is more a technical expert who tries not to impose him/her self on the round.

What remains to be considered is whether or not these differences in judging behaviors are good ones. While the analysis shows that the CEDA judges are concerned with the guiding principles of the organization's vision, are sophisticated argumentation skills being slighted? There are, after all, other arenas where students can learn and perfect delivery skills. Conversely, does the lack of attention by NDT judges to delivery, or their unwillingness to intrude in the round, thereby allowing debaters to determine decision standards, sacrifice reasonability and the transference of "debate world" skills to the "real world?" There are also other arenas in which students can learn to play games.

While we have already made clear our support for the alternatives which are now being offered to students and coaches as they choose between CEDA and NDT debate, we do believe some compromises are in order. We are convinced that debate must do more than teach delivery techniques and persuasive communication skills and therefore that CEDA judges ought be encouraged to share more of the NDT judges' concern for summarizing the issues in the rounds so debaters will get a better sense of why the judges were voting as they were. At the same time, we believe NDT judges need to be more willing to do as CEDA judges have done and to devote more attention to debaters' communication skills. Debate is, after all, an oral activity. It is important that educated persons outside the debate community be able to understand and appreciate intercollegiate debate if our activity is to survive this era of educational accountability.

We are also concerned by the increasing level of polarization in the debate community. Advocates must be trained in both the study of argument and the skills necessary for persuasive delivery. An open dialogue between coaches and judges involved with all forms of academic debate is clearly warranted. Furthermore, we believe that there should be diversity within programs, and not just among programs.[13]

These results indicate that although the style and sophistication of debaters' skills partially determine the types of comments that appear on ballots, judges do seem to adapt to the format in which they are judging.[14] This is important since we believe that judges--imbued with collective visions--can and should exert a great deal of influence regarding the exemplar models for both CEDA and NDT. This study was undertaken to determine whether comments on the ballots of CEDA judges reflect the vision of the CEDA organization. They do, but the most interesting findings center on those comments that are omitted, or are underutilized in both CEDA and NDT (CEDA judges comment less on analysis and refutation, NDT judges comment less on delivery and style). This information, along with the other findings--e.g.,that ballots contain more critical remarks than neutral or positive comments--should provide the debate community with ideas on areas for improvement. Without a concerted effort at consensus-building, however, the debate community may find itself increasingly polarized and unaware of the impact of its own judging habits.

Notes

[1] For a discussion of the founding of CEDA see: James E. Tomlinson, "The Philosophy and Development of CEDA," in Don Brownlee, ed. The CEDA Yearbook, Cross Examination Debate Association, 1983, pp. 1-5.

[2] A value topic was first used during the Spring of 1975. We refer to these propositions as "quasi-value topics" because they frequently are topics with very strong policy implications, e.g., "Resolved: That unauthorized immigration into the United States is seriously detrimental to the United States."

[3] We use the term "vision" as Bormann used it, as a shared reality or social-cultural grouping of people who construct their world views similarly. For an explanation of Bormann's method see: Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," Quarterly Journal of Speech 58 (December 1972): 396-407.

[4] Cited by Beverly Merrill Kelley, "An Alternative to NDT Debate," in Don Brownlee, ed. Contributions on the Philosophy and Practice of CEDA, Cross Examination Debate Association, 1981, pp. 8-9.

[5] Jack H. Howe, "CEDA's Objectives: Lest We Forget," in Don Brownlee, ed. Contributions on the Philosphy and Practice of CEDA, 1981, p. 1.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Jack H. Howe, "Report of the Executive Secretary of CEDA," May, 1982, p. 1.

[8] Howe, "CEDA's Objectives," p. 3.

[9] Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969).

[10] Ibid., p. 14.

[11] Ibid., p. 116.

[12] W. A. Scott, "Reliability of Content Analysis: The Case of Nominal Scale Coding," Public Opinion Quarterly 19 (1955): 321-25.

[13] For a more complete argument on the merits of diversity see: Allan D. Louden and Curtis C. Austin, "CEDA vs. NDT: A Dysfunctional Myth," in Don Brownlee, ed. The CEDA Yearbook, Cross Examination Debate Association, 1983, pp. 6-12.

[14] We have no hard data, however, on how many of these judges are used in both divisions and/or whether most of them are typed as "CEDA" or "NDT" judges. We only know from personal experience that judges move from division to division at this tournament.

Table 1

Content Analysis Results

Categories		NDT		CEDA	
Decision Justification	Neutral	75 (63)		71	
	Critical	35 (29)		21	
	Positive	50 (42)	st=134	9	st=101
Judge's Account	Neutral	180 (149)		79	
	Critical	37 (31)		42	
	Positive	16 (13)	st=193	8	st=129
Refutation	Neutral	0		3	
	Critical	122 (101)		39	
	Positive	15 (13)	st=114	10	st=52
Analysis	Neutral	0		0	
	Critical	62 (52)		18	
	Positive	15 (13)	st=65	10	st=28
Proof	Neutral	1 (1)		1	
	Critical	37 (31)		12	
	Positive	16 (13)	st=45	5	st=18
Debate Theory	Neutral	0		0	
	Critical	17 (14)		1	
	Positive	2 (2)	st=16	5	st=6
Delivery/Speed	Neutral	2 (2)		0	
	Critical	10 (8)		9	
	Positive	1 (1)	st=11	2	st=11
Delivery/Style/Org.	Neutral	0		2	
	Critical	24 (20)		20	
	Positive	6 (5)	st=25	18	st=40
Educational Comments	Neutral	28 (23)		36	
	Critical	30 (25)		27	
	Positive	1 (1)	st=49	2	st=65
Personal Statements	Neutral	0		0	
	Critical	27 (23)		63	
	Positive	48 (40)	st=63	28	st=91
Other Issues	Neutral	2 (2)		11	
	Critical	9 (7)		10	
	Positive	2 (2)	st=11	1	st=22
Judge's Intervention		5 (4)	st=4	24	st=24
Unintelligible		8 (7)	st=7	4	st=4
			T=737		T=591

Note: Numbers in parentheses are corrected; st=subtotal, T=total.

FIRST NEGATIVE STRATEGIES:

A REEVALUATION OF NEGATIVE DIVISION OF DUTIES

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Intercollegiate debate literature abounds with suggestions of possible tactics the first negative constructive speaker has at hand in dealing with affirmative cases. Articles and textbooks describe approaches to the varying types of affirmative cases, explain the basics of arguing specific stock issues, and explore negative responsibilities in the context of counterplans, direct refutation, and systems analysis (to name a few.) The common theoretical basis underpinning this patchwork of first negative options rests with the traditional division of duties between first and second negative speakers. This paper will examine this "customary" framework, argue for an abandonment of the traditional speaker duty divisions, and examine a few of the practical ramifications of this strategic reordering.

Traditional Framework for Negative Strategy

Any coach, judge or debater can easily identify the basic duties of each negative speaker. The division of labor is one of the first concepts the novice debater is introduced to: the first negative attacks the case and the second negative analyzes the plan.[1] All debate textbooks, without exception, echo this basic approach to negative strategy. The division of labor is perpetuated through coaching and the classroom, yet its theoretical basis is rarely explored. The literature unquestionably accepts the undefended assumptions that this division is based on, and only a few articles make more than a simple reference to the fact that this division has its roots in nothing more substantial than "tradition."[2]

Freely notes that first negative deals with affirmative issues, and the plan is "customarily reserved for the second negative constructive."[3] Patterson and Zarefsky also use this traditional division as a guide for beginning debaters while noting that:

> "...the duties are assigned to specific speeches only by convention; there is no logical or strategic reason for their being assigned in this way."[4]

Murphy and Ericson explain that the duty assignments are "merely suggestions," and then go on to present them as the basis for all subsequent tactical negative considerations.[5]

A review of the literature and the relatively few references to the theoretical basis of the traditional division of labor raises several questions. What exactly are the reasons for the seemingly arbitrary statements defining negative speaker responsibilities? Is there a rational basis for instruction that follows "customary guidelines?" If the division is so important, why is there no theoretical support for it? Is simple tradition enough to use as a basis for all negative tactics that the specification of speaker duties subsumes? And finally, if the theoretical basis is nonexistent, why does the debate community tenaciously maintain its acceptance of what has become a basic tenet of intercollegiate debate?

In attempting to answer these questions, it becomes apparent that the division of duties is more tactical in nature than strategic. Thomas explained that strategy is the term used to describe a concept while tactics are "the specific actions and approaches used..."[6] If one recognizes a certain division of negative labor as only one possible tactic of many, that division should not be advanced as the basic strategy underlying all negative tactics. Promoting this traditional division as the basic strategy for the negative speakers precludes formulation of a structural framework that allows for new patterns in argumentation.

The origin of the traditional concept of negative speaker duties is a surprisingly simple one. The basis of the case/plan division was explained by James Luck:

> "This division of responsibility and labor for the negative grew naturally out of the early affirmative case pattern. Clearly, the plan could not be analyzed until it was presented, and with its presentation delayed to the second affirmative, the analysis likewise would have to be delayed."[7]

The implications of this origin are incredible! Withholding presentation of the specific affirmative policy until second affirmative constructive is a practice that has been completely abandoned in contemporary debate. The focus of debate has become so policy and systems oriented that any affirmative team that withheld their plan till their second constructive would be subject to understandable cries of "foul" by their opponents. Such a tactic would seriously cripple in-depth comparisons of competing policies. So while advocacy of policy change has evolved to allow defense of specific proposals in the first affirmative speech, the subsequent negative approach has remained relatively unchanged.

No text defends this basis of the customary division of labor; it is simply accepted as a convenient ordering of possible areas of negative attack between team members. While hopefully it is not a reflection of my limited research capabilities, I have yet to find a defense of the division of duties other than tradition. In a dynamic and academic activity such as ours, unquestioned acceptance of this apparently outmoded approach to negative strategy is reprehensible and unacceptable.

An Argument for Abandonment of the Traditional Framework

Simply pointing out that a strategy is outmoded does not warrant abandonment of that strategy. The questions of its practical and educational benefits to debaters must be considered. When one critically examines the benefits of the traditional division of duties , the conclusions regarding its strategic values are decidedly negative in nature.

To understand this conclusion, it is necessary to discuss the general purpose of any broad-based negative strategy. Patterson and Zarefsky

claim that any given negative stance should maximize options and minimize burdens. "The objective is to permit maximum flexibility."[8] The inherent nature of the negative position in relation to the resolution is geared toward strategic flexibility. Affirmative case types include needs, comparative advantage, goals, and alternative justification. A basic specification of negative strategy should allow the option of several approaches to each type of case. The variety of negative tactics and arguments for each case are an ample indication of the importance attached to flexibility. Since the affirmative defines the area for argument, the negative team should have maximum flexibility in dealing with those areas.

Unfortunately, the structural guidelines of the assignment of speaker duties fail to maximize negative flexibility to its optimum level. There are three basic reasons the standard division of labor unduly restricts negative flexibility. The initial problem is that assigning first negatives specific areas to cover restricts their tactical options. When textbooks, coaches, judges, and second negatives reinforce to first negatives that case is their domain, it is easy to realize why the majority of beginning debaters rarely stray from case issues. Presentation of plan attacks in first negative has been considered by many to be taboo, and the option has received scant attention in scholarly writings. Luck traces this to acceptance of the traditional division of labor.[9] First negative flexibility in choice of tactics is tacitly discouraged.

The second problem with religious adherence to the "ordained" duty assignments is that it allows the affirmative to maintain a "two-constructive" offensive. In any type of debate, it is recognized that there is a psychological presumption attached to being on the offensive.[10] The common affirmative strategy of defending a narrow case area allows them to remain on the offensive. And if the traditional areas of a first negative attack are restrictive, an obvious tactical advantage has been achieved by the advocates of change. Conversely:

> "The negative prefers to have the debate judged in the context of negative argument. It wants the critic to be thinking in terms of whether the negative argument is valid, not whether the affirmative case is sound."[11]

A valuable tool in shifting the focus to the negative is the plan objection. The presentation of disadvantages allows the negative to choose the areas for clash. Such arguments shift the offensive to the negative and reduce the opportunities for the affirmative to emphasize their own case. When the affirmative is arguing defensively, the negative is more likely to win the decision.

While the assignment of speaker duties does not preclude plan argumentation by the first negative, such tactics are discouraged by the divisions. Traditional strategy obviously does not encourage this tactic. This goes beyond the problem of simply reducing negative flexibility. A first negative concentrating solely on affirmative case issues allows the second affirmative speaker to remain on the offensive for ten more minutes. Twenty minutes of affirmative argument construction thus becomes offensive while half of the negative constructive time is, by tradition, defensive in nature. Adherence to a strategy that arbitrarily defines such "rules" as a guide for negatives obviously provides the affirmative with a tactical advantage.

The third problem is that a traditional division of duties undermines efforts to achieve a consistent and coherent negative position. The advantages of a well thought out position are clear. The advancement of a clear position provides the judge with a negative framework from which to weigh all arguments in the round. Patterson and Zarefsky explain in detail that such a position encourages selective attacks on vulnerable case areas, maximizes the impact of negative arguments, improves the coordination of team efforts, avoids the pitfalls of point-by-point debating,[12] reduces the likelihood of negative contradictions,[13] and focuses the round on negative ground.[14] Unfortunately, the authors also note that this "larger view of the negative stance is often neglected in academic debating."[15]

The traditional assignment of speaker duties appears to be partly to blame for the neglect of such a valuable negative strategy. Reliance on the standard negative division of labor has the obvious effect of isolating two distinct areas of attack. Debaters are actively encouraged to consider case and plan as two separate domains. Such a strategy cannot help but to narrow the thinking of each negative speaker. Each works to win on their "side of the flow" and hopes that the overall position comes together by rebuttals. First negatives risk advancing a position that limits possible plan objections, and second negatives gamely struggle in their rebuttal to extend unfamiliar case arguments as quickly as possible.

This is not as much of a problem with the few more experienced teams. The problem arises with beginning debaters -- the very debaters that supposedly require the guidance of specific rules that dictate position responsibilities. To actively train negative debaters to concentrate only on specific assigned issues appears to undermine the entire concept of a comprehensive negative position.

In the interest of maintaining optimum flexibility in selection of negative tactics, the practice of assigning set speaker responsibilities should be abandoned. Explanation of the critical issue areas common to all debates should certainly continue; but determination of which speaker should deal with which issues should be based on strategic considerations such as the topic area, case approaches, team strengths and weaknesses, amount of advance preparation, etc. To avoid these critical tactical considerations, and to always follow the customary, arbitrary, outmoded, and unbending "strategic" guidelines smacks of argumentative folly. In a given round, following the traditional assignment of duties may be the most effective tactic. But such rules should not be propagated as the basis for every negative round. If debate is to be considered a true sport of intellectuals, Willard theorizes that:

> "...the blame for the most of the pernicious recent developments ((in debate)) rests squarely with the critics who operationalize the rules of the game in its day-to-day conduct."[16]

A less strict adherence to the "speaker duty" rules would necessitate more communication between the debaters to insure a coordinated attack. Coaches and debaters would have to develop coherent positions by determining topic, as opposed to textbook, oriented speaker/argument assignments.

And each debater would need to be familiar with all the issues and evidence related to each case.[17] Such an approach would obviously require more work and thought, and it would just as obviously improve the quality and effectiveness of the negative attack.

Practical Ramifications

A strategy allowing for a more flexible designation of speaker duties has obvious ramifications. With the strict border between case and plan argumentation lessened, the options available to both first and second negatives are increased. While these options are occasionally employed by debaters, little attention has been paid to them in scholarly writing, and no theoretical foundation has been advanced in their favor. The following analysis hopes to partially fill this void.

First Negative Plan Objections:

A basic framework that allows plan objections to be advanced in the first negative constructive allows for greater strategic flexibility. Aside from this basic benefit, there are other logical and tactical reasons to support this practice. In the past, these arguments were in the realm of the second negative because the first speaker had no opportunity to examine the specific affirmative policy option. Immediate presentation of the plan in the 1AC allows the negative to directly begin analysis of plan practicality and ramifications. Even if the first negative does not plan on presenting policy objections, his examination of the policy should be standard practice in order to critically analyze affirmative solvency claims.

With the emphasis on policy specifications in academic debate, the opportunities presented by first negative plan attacks cannot be underemphasized. As Pfau notes:

> "A comparative weighing of the impact of advantages and disadvantages is at the core of the policymaker decision-making paradigm."[18]

Since this is the case, such a comparison should begin immediately to place the affirmative on the defensive in the 2AC. Luck explains that:

> "...immediate introduction of disadvantages would allow immediate comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the policy systems under consideration."[19]

Such a comparison is not always facilitated by holding all plan objections back until the last constructive speech. Dudczak and Semlak recognize this problem in their examination of second negative tactics:

> "The greatest problem encountered by the second negative in presenting disadvantages is the failure to compare the relative importance of the disadvantages to the affirmative advantages or needs."[20]

In addition to the "comparative" value of the tactic, first negative disadvantages allow for a fuller development of specific objections. This value has been recognized in traditional negative guidelines. Pfau explained that the strongest attacks should be advanced first by the second negative to ensure time for proper development.[21] The basic concept that no new arguments should be advanced in rebuttals also is based on the recognized need for maximum development and testing of arguments in each round. This concept certainly supports a rationale for first negative presentation of plan objections. It also encourages negatives to develop several tiers of extension briefs, further strengthening their position in the round.

The specific tactics involved with 1N disadvantages are relatively simple. The degree of argument development depends upon the specific negative approach in each round. One option is for the first negative to extend the attack in his rebuttal. In this instance, the attack should be as fully developed as possible in its initial presentation. This reduces the possible need for the 1NR to read a large amount of extension evidence to rebuild the attack.

The second option involves the two-constructive development of a plan objection, where the second negative deals with the 2AC responses. In this instance a superficial second affirmative pays a heavy price for poor allocation of time and analysis, as Muir and Snowball indicate:

> "Since the argument would not have received a great deal of time in first negative, the unwary second affirmative might only make 5 or 6 responses; the 2N would then have time to make 10 responses to each 2AC response and could 'dump' more impact evidence as well."[22]

A first negative may develop a skeletal, yet structurally complete disadvantage that forces a disproportionate amount of time allocation by the second affirmative. Other first negative arguments would receive less-than-usual attention, thereby enhancing prospects for a winning 1NR. The subsequent burden on the poor 1AR provides the negative with an enormous tactical advantage. It is no wonder that the more experienced teams are employing this strategy with increasing frequency.

A third option in extending first negative disadvantages is one I have observed and frowned upon. This involves division of the burden for extension between 2NC and 1NR. The second negative covers half of the 2AC answers and leaves the rest for the 1NR. The tactic smacks more of gamesmanship than of an analytical development of a clear position. It disrupts the continuity of the attack, often results in redundancy, and rarely culminates in a coherent and well explained disadvantage.

Active training of first negatives to deal with plan issues as well as case increases the probability of a well-defined and tactically superior negative position in each round. Some have gone so far as to suggest a complete reversal of negative speaker duties. This is certainly a viable option and should not be ruled out, but a strong second affirmative might be able to effectively neutralize all plan objections presented by the first negative. The most effective tactic appears to be one that incorporates both plan objection(s) and development of a competing system in the first negative.

There are several possible drawbacks to first negative presentation of disadvantages. They may increase confusion in the round and cause flowing problems for both teams and the judge. Many times the disadvantages are poorly developed. And there is the tricky question of determining whether 1AR extensions are new or simply a further development of 2AC responses. But it would seem that most of these problems result more from debater inexperience rather than from any inherent flaw in the strategy. If anything, these problems indicate a need for a better theoretical framework from which to train young debaters.

The tactical advantages of such a strategy are clear. Negative argument development is enhanced and flexibility is increased. Affirmative time allocation is distorted. And the first negative immediately places his team on an offensive footing that can be fully exploited in the 2NC/1NR block. Such a strategy also forces affirmatives to develop more detailed defenses of their plan, rather than allowing them to rely on abbreviated and clipped 1AR briefs.

Sharing Case Responsibilities:

It was noted earlier that many affirmatives hope to gain a tactical advantage through presentation of a narrow case position in their first speech. Many times an affirmative position is not fully developed until the 2AC. Such tactics pose problems for negatives following the traditional division of labor. The second negative may ignore the new 2AC developments in lieu of a previously prepared position. The first negative rebuttalist is then forced to use precious time to attack the new twists and advantages rather than focusing on his original arguments.

A more flexible framework of speaker responsibilities would permit the second negative to allocate a portion of constructive time for new case developments or areas of the original case that the first negative failed to respond to. The tactic of sharing case responsibilities is gaining prominence, and a brief discussion of this practice is warranted.

When a negative team decides to allocate a portion of 2NC for consideration of case issues, they will most likely improve their chances of defeating the affirmative justification for change. The 2NC has additional time available to analyze specific claims. This speaker is also in a position to view the complete two-constructive development of the case; and he is in a position to adapt the negative position in a way unavailable to the first negative. As Pfau explains, the second negative is in the best position to integrate and polish the overall negative approach.[23] Murphy and Ericson point out that the second negative has the "freest hand" in the debate in regard to case issues.[24] While care should be taken to avoid redunancy in argumentation, the option of second negative addressing case issues should not be foreclosed by a theoretical framework.

Several case areas are especially suited for second negatives rather than the first negative, the most obvious being the issue of inherency. The largest strategic limitation on negatives who argue inherency is the risk of contradictions. Inherency attacks must be evaluated in the context of plan objections to ensure a consistent position. And second negative, in the role of argument integrator, is in a better tactical position to examine such considerations. Dudczak and Semlak suggest that minor repair arguments might best be suited for the second negative.[25]

Other options include dividing responsibility for advantages when dealing with a multiple advantage case. Case presses in second negative have the potential to be more thought out and analytical because of the amount of preparation time available. Two-constructive development of negative counterplans is another option occasionally used by experienced teams. And, of course, a total reversal of the traditional duty assignments is a possible tactic.

Whichever tactic is used, the negative team should ideally decide upon it before the 1NC. Second negatives are advised to reserve a portion of their speaking time to account for the developments through the first three constructives. And, depending on the case and issues, it might be best for the second negative to spend his entire time on plan objections. My point is that given the objective of maintaining optimum flexibility for the negative, no strategic framework should ignore this diversity of tactical options.

Conclusions

The traditional assignment of specific areas of negative speaker duties is outmoded and lacks a contemporary strategic perspective. It has no sound theoretical basis. The division of case and plan responsibilities reduces first negative options, allows affirmatives to launch a two-constructive offensive, undermines a consistent negative position, and encourages narrow thinking by negative team members. In the interest of achieving maximum strategic flexibility in refutation, debaters should be trained in all areas of issue argumentation - not just "case" or "plan." The need for broad-based strategic planning is clear. Coaching for specific speaker positions can focus on the tactical considerations involved with each position. It appears to be a hinderance to coach first negatives according to speech content lines that have no basis and are strategically weak.

It may be claimed that such a broad-based negative approach would provide too few guidelines to beginners and only result in confusion. This criticism underestimates the abilities of both student and coach. All the basic tools and issue areas should be covered in the training process. The difference is that the flexible approach defended in this paper emphasizes the integration of these tools into team strategies and team duties - not narrow individual positions. And even if debaters are not exposed to this integrated approach through coaching, they will eventually learn it the hard way at the hands of more experienced negative opponents.

What this paper advocates is not new. Winning teams rarely adhere to the strict division of case and plan duties. It seems that the tactics employed by these teams have outpaced the theoretical position perpetuated by every academic debate text. These debaters are shaping the activity, and we as coaches, judges and scholars would be remiss if we failed to recognize this evolution. Perhaps it is time we examined the practices of the experienced debate teams and incorporated their winning stategies into a broader theoretical construct of contemporary negative duties.

FOOTNOTES

[1] James Luck, "Restructuring the Negative Attack on Comparative Advantages Cases," in Advanced Debate, ed. David Thomas (Skokie: National Textbook Co., 1981), p. 136.

[2] Luck is a notable exception; he advocates a complete reversal of traditional speaker duties.

[3] Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 5th edition (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1981), p. 206.

[4] J. W. Patterson and David Zarefsky, Contemporary Debate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1983), p. 97.

[5] James Murphy and Jon Ericson, The Debater's Guide (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1961), p. 26.

[6] David Thomas, "Rebuttal Strategy & Tactics," in Advanced Debate, p. 289.

[7] Luck, p. 136.

[8] Patterson and Zarefsky, p. 230.

[9] Luck p. 139.

[10] Roy V. Wood, Strategic Debate, 2nd edition (Skokie: National Textbook Co., 1977), p. 109.

[11] Wood, p. 109.

[12] Patterson and Zarefsky, p. 189.

[13] Ibid, p. 181.

[14] Ibid, p. 183.

[15] Ibid, p. 180.

[16] Charles A. Willard, "The Nature and Implications of the 'Policy Perspective' for the Evaluation of Debate," in Advanced Debate, p. 440.

[17] Luck, p. 17.

[18] Michael Pfau, "A Systematic Approach to Debating the Second Negative," in Advanced Debate, p. 199.

[19] Luck, p. 139.

[20] Craig Dudczak and William Semlak, "Rationale for a Rational Second Negative," in Advanced Debate, p. 171.

[21] Pfau, p. 197.

[22] Star A. Muir and W. David Snowball, A Conspectus of Theory and Practice in Academic Debate (Amherst: Univ. of Mass., June 1983), p. 30.

[23] Pfau, p. 190.

[24] Murphy and Ericson, p. 78.

[25] Dudszak and Semlak, p. 167.

CROSS-EXAMINATION REEXAMINED

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In 1972 the Blue Ribbon Committee on the NDT called for the institution of cross-examination at the National Debate Tournament.[1] Two years later, in 1974, the National Developmental Conference on Forensics recommended that "the NDT Committee should adopt the cross-examination format for the NDT as soon as practicable. . . ."[2] In making this recommendation, the Conference participants recognized that "the NDT exerts considerable influence on practices in other tournaments" and that "the adoption of alternative formats by the NDT Committee would stimulate their use elsewhere."[3] At the time of the Developmental Conference, the National Debate Tournament Committee had already begun consideration of a cross-examination format, and at its first meeting following the Conference, the Committee adopted cross-examination for the NDT.[4] As anticipated, invitational tournaments all around the country rapidly followed suit. Prior to the action of the NDT Committee and to the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee and the National Developmental Conference, cross-examination was not widely practiced at the college level. The Cross Examination Debate Association had gradually built support for the wider application of cross-examination, but its influence was limited to Association tournaments which, at that time, were held largely in the southwestern states.

This brief review of how cross-examination came to be a part of college debate is by no means complete, but it does suggest that cross-examination was adopted only after considerable thought and deliberation. Obviously, the supporters of cross-examination hoped and believed that it would heighten the educational process and, in the words of the National Developmental Conference, "sharpen the contest among arguments in debate."[5] Today, few debate coaches would seriously oppose the continued use of cross-examination in academic debate, although some would question whether the procedure is worth the time it consumes. Like most judges, I have occasionally heard rounds of debate in which the cross-examination was well executed, exciting, and decisive. More often, I have heard cross-examination which was poorly prepared and a waste of time.

Purpose and Method of Study

My purpose in this paper is to make some modest suggestions which may be helpful in teaching students how to engage in more meaningful cross-examination. In order to prepare for this task I studied the texts of the eight final rounds of the National Debate Tournament which have utilized the cross-examination format.[6] These debates provided 32 samples of cross-examination for study. In addition to the selected cross-examination samples, I also reviewed debate textbooks, cross-examination textbooks from the field of law, and recent law journal articles.

As one might expect, none of these sources directly provided much new insight. The analysis of NDT transcripts did reveal that topicality and counterplans were particularly important areas for cross-examination, but this fact is not necessarily typical of all debate rounds. The debate textbooks generally provided a list of standard rules and guidelines, and the legal articles, in the words of one critic, tend to "string together examples and suggestions without enabling the reader to understand how they might apply to their own factual situation."[7] Nevertheless, the analysis of the debate transcripts did reveal certain strengths and failures in the application of cross-examination theory, and the study of the texts and articles brought into focus some approaches to cross-examination which have not previously been explicated in reference to academic debate. These findings provide the basis for three general suggestions on how to improve the use of cross-examination in academic debate.

Strategic Perspective

First, cross-examination should be studied and developed from a strategic perspective. Such a perspective requires three things: (1) the determination of clear purposes to be achieved during the cross-examination, (2) a plan for achieving those purposes, and (3) the integration of the information gained through cross-examination into the rest of the debate.

The importance of a strategic view is implicit in nearly all of the writings on cross-examination in law, and it is explicitly indicated in the titles of numerous works, e.g., *Successful Cross Examination Strategy*[8] and "Psychology and Courtroom Strategy: Cross-Examination."[9] That college debaters sometimes lack this strategic perspective is most apparent in those rounds where the cross-examiner begins with some irrelevant questions about the opposing debater's social life and then proceeds to ask questions which in effect only restate the opposition's arguments. While such examples are extreme, they are not necessarily uncommon.

The NDT sample cross-examinations provided no such glaring failures. In almost all cases, the NDT debaters seemed to have a sense of purpose in their questioning, and they generally used an appropriate mix of closed factual questions, open-ended clarification questions, and leading questions to achieve their objectives. Although the NDT debaters sometimes failed to follow up on useful exchanges, this was not generally true. An initial impression that cross-examination was not integral to the overall clash of arguments is created by the fact that there were few specific references to cross-examination in the constructive or rebuttal speeches. However, nearly every cross-examination exchange produced some data which was used in a later speech, and most exchanges produced three or four vital pieces of information.

Both legal experts and the NDT debates provide some insights into how a strategic perspective can be facilitated. Professor Paul Bergman of the UCLA Law School emphasizes the importance of having an overall theory of the case to guide the selection of questions for cross-examination. He explains:

> The decision as to which, if any, of these factors should be focused on during cross should be based on the cross-examiner's theory of the case. The theory of the case may be thought of as the blueprint upon which the attorney's case is built.[10]

The increasing emphasis within the academic debate community on strategies of argument and on debate paradigms, in general, and policy systems comparisons, in particular, suggests a considerable awareness of this need for "an overall theory of the case." The contribution of Professor Bergman is not so much in the idea of a theory *per se*, but in his emphasis on the need for that theory to *guide* the cross-examination. He continues:

> The need to tie the factual testimony to the legal elements is for some reason more apparent with direct examination and closing argument than it is with cross-examination. But this should not be so. The fact that different techniques are used on cross than during direct or closing should not mask the basic point that questions asked on cross should be tied into the attorney's blueprint.[11]

How to facilitate the tying of the cross-examination into the debater's overall blueprint is suggested by an examination of the NDT final rounds. These debates indicate that questions relating to disadvantages, topicality, and counterplans were most frequently asked and were most likely to be used in developing constructive and rebuttal arguments. Because these areas of analysis are fairly generic, it is likely that debaters have more experience with them and are better able to anticipate where their partners will use them. Moreover, topicality arguments and counterplans inherently involve case theories, while disadvantages generally incorporate the basic rationale for negative case theories. Thus, the NDT sample debates suggest that it may be easier to utilize a strategic perspective in cross-examination by focusing on topicality, counterplans, or disadvantages.

This is not to suggest that questions on significance, inherency, and solvency were never used by the NDT debaters. Obviously, they were, but not as often or with as much overall impact. Such arguments generally require more specific adaptation to the opposing analyses and, therefore, may not be as easy to use. It is also probably true that current approaches to judging and coaching academic debate view these areas of analysis as less critical to negative case theories.

Cross-Examination Topoi

In addition to developing a strategic perspective, a second way in which instruction in cross-examination could be improved is through the systematic development of what might be called cross-examination topoi for debate. In classical rhetorical theory topoi, or topics, are "hunting grounds" for arguments or places where one can go to discover arguments. Many of the books and articles in the field of law do little more than provide elaborate lists of standard questions which can be asked of particular kinds of witnesses or in particular kinds of cases--in essence, they are offering a list of cross-examination topoi.[12] While no such published list of standard questions exists for debaters, analysis of the cross-examinations at the National Debate Tournament reveals that debaters do tend to ask similar questions when dealing with the same kinds of data or with the same issues. This similarity of approach to questioning suggests that most experienced debaters and coaches probably already have informal checklists of questions which they mentally refer to in questioning or in teaching cross-examination.

If coaches were to make such checklists more formal and more systematic, they would make it easier for beginning students to approach the process of cross-examination. As long as debaters feel they must confront each debate as if it is a totally new experience, they cannot be expected to engage in consistently productive cross-examination.

Tests of Evidence and Reasoning

At least three different kinds of cross-examination topoi are possible. Both the NDT final debates and the writings of legal experts indicate that one major category of topics can be drawn from the tests of evidence and reasoning. There are numerous legal articles on how to cross-examine in response to particular kinds of evidence, such as expert witnesses or eye witnesses.[13] The NDT debates also illustrate the applications of standard tests of argument (1978 NDT - Singer questioning Cassanelli, "Well, where have you indicated any other but that one anecdotal example?")[14] and of evidence (1976 NDT - Cross questioning Ottoson, "Are those studies controlled for anything? . . . Do they control for other variables? . . . How are those studies longitudinal or cross-sectional?").[15] Since the tests of evidence and reasoning given in most debate textbooks are often expressed in question form, it would not be difficult to rephrase and refine these tests into usable cross-examination checklists.

Areas of Analysis

A second category of cross-examination topics could be developed relevant to standard substantive areas of analysis, such as topicality, inherency, counterplans, disadvantages, etc. As the NDT transcripts indicate, negative debaters often find it useful to question the affirmative team regarding its definitions of critical terms before developing their own topicality arguments or offering a counterplan. Affirmative teams, in turn, find cross-examination helpful in setting up responses to disadvantages. From the transcripts one could put together a series of stock questions which could aid affirmatives in developing questions in response to disadvantages: What is the probability of the impact? At what point in time will the disadvantage occur? What is the threshold? and so on.

The questions in this category would probably not need to be directed to any particular subject matter but could focus on analytical requirements specific to the general nature of the issue. Those law journal articles which offer checklists for particular fields of law do exactly this sort of thing. They provide analytical questions directed to the problem area but not specific to the facts of a given case.

Specific Content

A third category of topics for cross-examination might be drawn out of the specific content of a given proposition. Deterrence theory, for example, provided repeated opportunities for content specific questions during the 1977-78 debate season, just as the Brenner study did in 1978-79 and First Amendment rights did in 1979-80. Once a debate squad developed the first two categories of cross-examination topics they could be used year after year with only occasional revisions; this latter category of topoi would, however, have to be developed with each new debate proposition.

Priority of Types of Questions

The first two suggestions for improving cross-examination were aimed at helping the student know *what* to question about; the final suggestion for improvement concerns *how* cross-examination questions are asked. Most works on cross-examination advise students to ask only factual questions to which they know the answer and to avoid open-ended questions and undirected "fishing" inquiries.[16] While this advice is generally sound, scrutiny of both the NDT cross-examinations and sample cross-examinations offered as models in legal articles and textbooks reveals that, in practice, this advice is often ignored.

The primary rationale underlying the advice to ask only questions with known responses is that such an approach avoids unexpected answers which can be damaging to the interrogator's cause. As an ideal, this is a wise objective, and for attorneys who have preliminary hearings and depositions available to them, it is a reasonably attainable goal. For the academic debater, however, the avoidance of the unexpected is not so easy. New cases--even new case areas--appear at tournaments throughout the year, including the final rounds of the National Debate Tournament, and in spite of a recommendation from the National Developmental Conference on Forensics, no system of formal discovery has ever been instituted.[17]

In light of these differences between academic debate and the field of law, some more realistic advice needs to be given to students of debate. Professor Bergman of the UCLA Law School has offered a "safety model" for cross-examination which, with some minor modifications, seems well suited to the academic debate context and which provides clear guidelines on what forms of questions to use and when.[18] The Bergman model does not tell students *never* to ask open-ended questions. Rather, it establishes a priority order of question forms from high safety to low safety, and it even offers specific advice on how to ask low safety "fishing" questions with a greater likelihood of success. The degree of risk in asking a question is determined by the possibility of refuting an answer not desired by the cross-examiner.

High Safety Questions

According to the model, cross-examiners should first consider asking questions from the high safety category. High safety questions are ones which can be extrinsically verified; they are questions which are drawn directly from the constructive speeches of the opposition. High safety questions may point out weaknesses in the support for an argument. "Did you offer any evidence to support that point?" "Was the one

example the only empirical evidence cited?" Or, they might point out the failure to clash with a specific part of the case or with specific evidence. "Did you deny the solvency evidence presented in the first affirmative constructive?" Sometimes an opponent will unintentionally say something or read a piece of evidence that contains something which can be useful in providing an argument for the cross-examiner. In such instances the interrogator can safely ask the witness to repeat those statements. All of the preceding types of questions are safe because the judge and the debaters can refer back to earlier statements for verification of their accuracy.

Medium Safety Questions

If productive high safety questions are not available, the cross-examiner should consider what medium safety questions are possible. Medium safety questions are "those where the specific context of the cases furnishes the cross-examiner the *likelihood* of receiving an expected answer."[19] Questions involving facts which are consistent with human experience are relatively safe to ask. While our perception of human experience is not an infallible guide, in most instances, past experience or past perceptions are fairly reliable indicators. In the following cross-examination exchange from the 1979 National Debate Tournament the cross-examiner relied on past experience as a basis for his cross-examination.

> Cotham: Now, in terms of this energy shortage card, one of the impacts is that things will happen like New York City? That the entire. . . . King: Yes, I mean--what I am just suggesting is you are playing with the breakdown of the social system for a period of time. Cotham: OK. Now, what's the last strike which caused an entire breakdown of the social structure? King: The United States has never experienced a general economic strike.[20]

A second category of medium safe questions consists of request for information consistent with other information presented earlier by that witness or his/her partner. While it is possible for a witness to answer in a manner inconsistent with previous statements, to do so would undermine his/her credibility.

A final type of medium safe questions calls upon the witness to provide information which is generally known but which has not yet been cited in the round. If the witness responds with data different from that expected by the cross-examiner, that information can be refuted with evidence in a following speech. With all medium safe questions there are restraints operating on the witness which make it likely that the anticipated response will be given.

Low Safety Questions

As a general rule, low safety questions should be used only when safer questions cannot be developed or when safer questions fail to explore the "theory of the case" adequately. In some situations, however, the use of low safety questions may be unavoidable since failure to "fish" for leads may mean losing the round automatically. Low safety questions are less able to control the witness's response, because they tend to be more open-ended. They are asked in the hope of receiving useful information, but without the means of refuting unfavorable responses.

One form of low safety questions are questions of clarification. Questions aimed at gaining a better understanding of the affirmative plan, the negative's counterplan, or complicated lines of analysis may be essential to avoid misdirected attacks. Nevertheless, these questions are risky, because they involve responses of an unknown nature, afford the opposition additional opportunity to explain its analysis, and make control of time more difficult. One way in which the risk of clarification inquiries can be reduced is to use leading or directed questions. Rather than asking, "How will your plan be enforced?" the negative should attempt to direct the response by asking a leading question such as, "Does your plan rely on civil and/or criminal suits for enforcement?"

When debaters are faced with an unfamiliar case and lack sufficient evidence of their own, they can probe the conclusions of the opposition and try to show that insufficient factual evidence exists to support those conclusions. Mark Cotham of Northwestern used cross-examination very effectively for this purpose in 1978. Notice how Mark begins his inquiry with fairly closed questions and how he pieces together affirmative data to press his attack.

> Cotham: What is the total cost of the plan? Combs: About 10 billion dollars. Cotham: And that comes from? . . . Combs: Oh, where did we get that estimate? We looked at different treatment devices; it's our own. Cotham: . . . You indicate that the prime reason right now we do not do this is economic consideration. Now, why should we just accept SC saying, hum, sounds like $10 billion to us? Combs: Well, we're pretty reasonable people. Consumer Report says that . . . ozonization of water costs "less than 4¢ per month for a family of four." I think it's closer to $10 billion. Cotham: All right. Now, the solvency in terms of ozonization is never proven, correct? Combs: Oh, no, that's just one example of solvency. . . . Cotham: That's right. It's only one example of costs, unfortunately. Isn't it? Combs: You're right.[21]

Another basic "fishing" technique, related to the first, is to ask,

> "If what the witness says is true, what other things would also be true?" To phrase it another way, "If A is true, then common human experience tells us that facts B, C and D are likely to be present." The cross-examiner can then fish to see whether facts B, C and D are indeed present. If they are not, then the cross-examiner can argue that fact A is not true.[22]

Mark Cotham used this approach when he tried to demonstrate that (A) if the affirmative case was topical, then (B) the failure to provide soft water must already be a felony, and (C) felonies can be prosecuted under the present system. If (B) and (C) were not true, then (A) must not be true.

> Cotham: Under the FWPCA where do you prove that soft water is pollution? Combs: It's not; it's under the Safe Drinking Water Act. . . . Cotham: So, in other words, we could enforce that as a felony? Combs: No, not now. Cotham: What laws are these felonies under? Combs: You can't do it given the inherencies. Cotham: I know, but I'm afraid the inherencies make the case not topical. Where do you ever indicate that these things are currently felonies under current regulations? . . . Combs: All drinking water must be effectively treated, if it goes through a treatment process. Cotham: Oh, effective treatment. OK. Right now we do not define effective treatment as soft water, correct? Combs: I don't know, or not.[23]

Low safety questions may be less desirable to use, but by asking leading questions, probing for insufficiencies in proof, and exploring the validity of corollary conclusions, the risk of "fishing" questioning can be limited.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the art of cross-examination requires some minimal aptitude and intelligence, but like other arts, it also requires direction, training, and discipline. Hopefully, the three suggestions outlined here will make it easier to provide more systematic and useful guidance to students. A strategic perspective based on the theory of the particular case should help direct students to important areas for interrogation. The use of cross-examination topoi can simplify and systematize the search for appropriate questions. And an awareness of the various question forms can make it easier to control the nature and extent of witnesses' responses.

FOOTNOTES

[1] "Minutes of AFA Business Meeting," *Journal of American Forensic Association* 8 (Winter, 1972), pp. 156-57.

[2] James H. McBath, ed., *Forensics as Communication* (Skokie, Ill.: National Textbook Co., 1975), p. 28.

[3] Ibid.

[4] The first use of cross-examination at the NDT occurred in 1976.

[5] Ibid.

[6] The texts of these final rounds of the NDT can be found in the summer issues of the *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 1976-83.

[7] Paul B. Bergman, "Practical Approach to Cross-Examination," *Criminal Law Bulletin*, 15 (March/April, 1979) 119.

[8] Noel C. Stevenson, *Successful Cross Examination Strategy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Executive Reports Corp., 1981).

[9] Ted M. Warshafsky, "Psychology and Courtroom Strategy: Cross-Examination," *Wisconsin Bar Bulletin*, 51 (August, 1978), pp. 9-12.

[10] Bergman, "Practical Approach," p. 121.

[11] Ibid., p. 122.

[12] See for example, Louis E. Schwartz, *Proof, Persuasion, and Cross-Examination*, vol. 2 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Executive Reports Corp., 1973), pp. 1601-2249, and O. J. Weber, "Attacking the Expert Witness," *FIC Quarterly*, 31 (Summer, 1981), pp. 299-319.

[13] See for example, Michael F. Hupy, "Preparation for and Cross-examination of Identification Witnesses at Trial, *Wisconsin Bar Bulletin*, 55 (June, 1982) pp. 14-16, and William M. Getzoff, "Direct and Cross-examination of an Expert," *Trial Lawyer's Guide*, 22 (Fall, 1978), pp. 267-88.

[14] John K. Boaz, ed., "1978 National Debate Tournament Final Debate," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 15 (Summer, 1978), p. 26.

[15] Stanley G. Rives, ed., "1976 National Debate Tournament Final Round," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 13 (Summer, 1976), p. 7.

[16] "Always know answers to questions asked. Never ask questions unless you know what answer will be and that it cannot hurt you. This principle is fundamental. Don't question in hope of favorable answers. Reply might be disastrous." F. Lee Bailey and Henry Rothblatt, *Successful Techniques for Criminal Trials* (Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers Cooperative Printing Co., 1971), quoted in James M. Copeland *Cross-Examination in Debate* (Skokie, Ill.: National Textbook Co., 1981), p. 18.

[17] McBath, *Forensics as Communication*, p. 32.

[18] Bergman, "Practical Approach," pp. 117-30.

[19] Ibid., p. 135.

[20] John K. Boaz, ed., "1979 National Debate Tournament Final Debate," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, 16 (Summer, 1979), p. 48.

[21] Boaz, "1978 NDT Final Debate," p. 34.

[22] Bergman, "Practical Approach," p. 149.

[23] Boaz, "1978 NDT Final Debate," p. 35.

A JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACH TO THE FINAL REBUTTAL

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The nature of any competitive activity creates a tension between the desire to win and the need to play fairly. Paradoxically, it is the desire for fairness which elevates competitive debate above arguments which take place in less formal settings. The nature of academic debate requires us to strive to provide an equitable forum for the presentation of both sides of a controversy.[1] Lahman suggested, "the first requirement for the effective presentation of refutation is an attitude of fairness."[2] Goodnight noted, "Advocates are supposed to meet the requirements of fairness, honesty, and truthfulness."[3]

It is unfortunate that the pressures of competition frequently eclipse notions of fair play. In contemporary debate practice, a rift has developed between the need for equity and the desire to win. In an effort to maximize their competitive advantage, affirmative teams have begun to utilize the final rebuttal in ways which take unfair advantage of their right to speak last. The primary strategy has involved the presentation of new arguments in the final rebuttal. Judges have been hesitant to chasten this ignominy, because there is confusion concerning the definition of new arguments in that speech.

The purpose of this essay is to establish a frame of reference which both debaters and judges can utilize in the determination of unfair rebuttal strategies. In order to discover such a frame, this essay will borrow from the regulations governing summations during civil litigations in the courtroom. A review of these procedures offers some practical suggestions for the debate realm. It is important to note that this paper does not intend to propose a set of rules, rather it offers a source of reference for reconciling disputes over new argumentation in the final speech.

This essay will be divided into four sections. The first will discuss the historical concern for new argument in rebuttals. The second section will explain the applicability of the judicial setting as a potential source of guidance. The third section will offer some guidelines for the identification of new arguments, and the final segment will discuss the options available when new arguments are discovered.

Historical Concern

During the early part of this century, argumentation scholars searched for the ideal approach to intercollegiate debate. Early argumentation texts advised students to pursue a variety of techniques and strategies. One controversial issue involved rebuttal strategies. Some authors suggested that an effective approach involved holding back one's best arguments until the end, in order to surprise one's opponents. Foster describes one text:

> A book on debate advises a speaker to hold his fire till the end and surprise his enemy with new arguments, to which reply is thus impossible. The book commends this 'wise strategem' to an intercollegiate debater, since he thus 'deprives his opponent of any chance to reply, and so may hope to conceal his deficiency and make his own proof seem plausible.[4]

Other scholars argued that such practices should not be allowed. Foster charged that, "Such advise is not in keeping with that fine sense of courtesy and that desire for truth which governs the highest type of the gentleman and the scholar."[5] Other authors made harsher challenges to this practice. One text argued, "To introduce into a final speech in rebuttal new material that has been carefully reserved for the purpose is dishonest."[6] In addition, efforts were made to discourage use of new arguments in rebuttals by claiming that they were counter-productive.[7] While the majority of early writers opposed the use of new arguments in the rebuttals of a debate, others went further and condemned the use of new evidence in rebuttals as well.[8] Most authors responded, however, that without new evidence rebuttals would consist only of pointless repetitions.[9] Others suggested that it was wrong to condemn completely the use of evidence in rebuttals only because some might abuse the privilege.[10] Still others commended the strategy of saving the best evidence for the final rebuttals and recommended it as a general practice.[11]

Since those early years, the notion that no new constructive arguments should be presented during rebuttal speeches has become one of the accepted norms of competitive debate. Numerous textbooks describe it as "an inviolable rule of debate."[12] The rationale for the emphasis placed on this concept is clear: without such a construct, it becomes nearly impossible to preserve fairness in the debate process.

In the modern era, the focus of concern for the legitimacy of argumentation in rebuttals has stressed the final affirmative rebuttal. This speech, by nature, is a critically important speech which gives inherent advantages to the affirmative team. Nichols and Baccus noted:

> The last affirmative speech is probably the most difficult and the most important position in the entire debate. Decisions are often won at the last moment in close debates, for the final impression may be a powerful influence. Negative debaters dread the final affirmative rebuttal more than any one speech, for they must sit helpless and see their cherished plans go astray as some skillful adversary sweeps their arguments away as if they were a house of cards.[13]

Paul concurs: "A good 2AR is a magician that can pull wins from thin air leaving the negative scratching their heads and wondering how they could have lost."[14]

Given the potential of this speech to influence the outcome of a debate, it becomes especially important to ensure that the behavior of the final speaker conforms to norms which provide fairness in the process. An area of particular concern continues to be the presentation of new arguments in the final rebuttal. If the final speaker presents new arguments, it becomes impossible for the negative to obtain a fair hearing, since they will be unable to respond. McGinnis noted, "if the last speaker in the debate were to introduce a new issue, there would be no opportunity whatsoever for an answer by the opposition."[15] It was in response to such a risk that the concept, mentioned earlier, of "no new constructive arguments in rebuttals" was established. While this general principle is important, it provides little practical guidance to enable judges to determine the legitimacy of certain kinds of argumentation. Bill Newnam indicated the difficulty of applying the general concept in his judging philosophy, "I try to be critical of new arguments in second affirmative rebuttal though this may be one of the most difficult burdens of judging."[16] It is little wonder that, at the typical debate tournament, second affirmatives often resort to strategies which could give them an unfair advantage. One need not look far to find final rebuttalists: give new answers to plan objections, cross-apply answers used against one negative position to another argument, amend the affirmative plan, claim new applications of affirmative intent, answer arguments for the

first time in the debate, and practice a variety of other strategies which have left the negative team gnashing their teeth.

Judicial Approach

A guide is needed which can assist debaters and judges in determining what constitutes fair argumentation in the final rebuttal. It is surprising that current argumentation literatuse fails to provide such guidance. The best selling debate texts fail to even mention the need for any restraint on the final speaker's argumentation.[17] Some older texts offer a few isolated suggestions, but none offer any comprehensive direction. Macewan idealistically suggested that the debater should follow the Golden Rule in deciding which arguments to use, "The best practical test of what are allowable epithets or imputations in debate is to ask, 'Should we consider this fair debate if applied to ourselves?'--a test which is at once good morals and good sense."[18] Musgrave defines new arguments in an equally vague manner, "The affirmative must, if possible, reply to the major negative arguments before the last rebuttal."[19] Kruger merely suggested that in adjudicating a dispute on what "constitutes a new argument, the judge should be liberal and give the debater the benefit of the doubt."[20] None of these recommendations offers much guidance to the judge or debater who seeks to determine whether or not arguments raised in a particular final rebuttal are new.

Since the argumentation literature fails to provide guidance, an alternative source must be discovered. One potential referent is legal argument in a civil setting. This arena was suggested as a source as early as 1910.[21] Legal argument operates under a structure similar to that of academic debate: in both instances, the party with the burden of proof is allowed to speak last. As Vogel noted, "It is uniformly recognized that this right to have the last word belongs to the party who has the burden of proof."[22] In academic debate this burden of proof rests on the affirmative, while in civil litigation it resides with the plaintiff. *The Practical Lawyer* observed, "Plaintiff is given the last word because he has the burden of proof."[23] The final summation speech in a court of law functions somewhat like the final rebuttal in debate. The summation period is generally divided into three speeches, two by the plaintiff, sandwiched around one by the defense. The first two presentations are similar to the 1AR and 2NR in debate. The affinity between the final presentation in court and the 2AR in debate can be seen in Vogel's description of a final summation:

> A proper analysis of the case should result in a reduction and simplification of the issues involved. The undisputed evidence will be separated from the disputed, the strong and weak points will stand out, and the controlling issues will emerge from the mass of evidence which was introduced.[24]

This description could have easily been taken from any argumentation text discussing the duties of the final rebuttalist in an academic debate.

Courts have recognized the inherent advantages that stem from having the final speech. Attorney Lawrence Smith pointed out, "Close cases often turn on closing arguments. Even long shots are sometimes brought home by it."[25] In order to ensure equity, the courts have adopted rules and regulations to preclude unfair practices by the final speaker. Smith explains the function of these rules: "Regardless of their source, the procedures that have been developed have a common function--to provide an opportunity for all parties to summarize and argue their cases and the prevention of any party gaining an unfair advantage through unfair tactics in the closing."[26]

Academic debate has no such regulations to preserve fairness. It is left to the discretion of the individual judge to determine what the final speaker is permitted to do. It is fortuitous that the standards developed for the regulation of behavior in the courtroom are applicable to the realm of academic debate.

Judicial Guidelines

An application of the regulations of civil litigation to academic debate yields three general categories of unfair strategies in final rebuttal. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all possible unfair strategies, but it is intended to provide some guidance for making such determinations.

Initially, the final rebuttal should be limited to the extension of arguments already presented in the debate. In the judicial setting, arguments in the final summation are limited to arguments which have already been presented. Lawrence Smith points out that this is an established principal in civil procedures: "Generally, it has been held improper for the plaintiff's attorney to argue new matter in his closing argument which he did not raise in his opening argument."[27] The extension of this requirement to the final rebuttal would have several implications. The final rebuttal would be limited to those arguments which have been presented earlier in the debate.

If responding to a plan objection, the 2AR should be able to clearly identify the response which is being extended. This does not mean that the final speaker should be limited to repeating arguments; it simply means that arguments should be logical extensions of positions already presented and to which the second negative had a reasonable opportunity to respond. In addition, this means that the affirmative should not be permitted to amend their plan in the final rebuttal. This would constitute taking an unfair advantage of the negative's inability to respond. This requirement would also place limitations on the ability of the 2AR to resurrect arguments dropped by the 1AR. The structure of NDT debate requires the first affirmative rebuttalist to respond to fifteen minutes of argumentation in five minutes. In this situation, the 1AR often fails to deal with numerous arguments. Ideally, the 1AR should address all those arguments which are critical to the affirmative analysis. It is not necessary that every argument be mentioned. However, in those areas where the negative has offered legitimate extensions of constructive positions, the first affirmative is compelled to respond. In a court case, the plaintiff cannot omit arguments in his opening presentation during summation and then address those arguments in his final speech. The closing argument is limited to reply.[28] Similarly, the 2AR should be limited to two options. First, the speaker can explain how the original affirmative constructive position was adequate to refute the dropped argument. Second, the 2AR may offer reasons as to why the argument in question is not critical to the outcome of the debate. Neither of these options would be unfair to the negative team.

The final rebuttalist should also be precluded from presenting new explanations of arguments. In the final summation in court, the plaintiff is not permitted to offer new explanations of arguments.[29] Application of this construct to academic debate would subsume a number of practices. First, it means that explanations of arguments different than those offered earlier in the debate should not be accepted. For example, if the first affirmative explains an argument to mean one thing, the second affirmative should not be allowed to use it in a totally different way. In addition, it means that the 2AR should refrain from explaining those arguments which the 1AR has not. One common practice entails the presentation of unexplained labels in 1AR, to which the 2NR is forced to respond in the best manner possible. The second affirmative then expounds on one of these unexplained arguments for several minutes. It should be fairly obvious that this creates unreasonable burdens for the second negative. In the legal setting, such strategies have been ruled illegitimate.

> For example, in one case, plaintiff's counsel, in the opening portion of his closing argument, discussed the issue of damages in such brief terms that it was called a 'bikini' of the damages. In fact, the attorney's only statements as to damages included the amount of out of pocket expenses and a brief reference to loss of income and pain and suffering. In the rebuttal portion of his final argument, for the first time, the attorney brought out a chart reflecting his calculation of damages and spent a large amount of time in a discussion of those damages. In addition he also used a per diem argument for the first time in his closing argument. On appeal, the court held that the introduction of these arguments in closing was improper...[30]

Another implication of this concept is that affirmatives should not be allowed to assert a position up until the last speech and then read their evidence. This practice also denies the negative a reasonable opportunity to respond. The final rebuttalist should be limited to reading additional evidence or evidence necessitated by second negative extensions.

The third category of argumentation involves arguments about which it is difficult to draw clear guidelines. This category consists of the use of cross-application of arguments in the final rebuttal. Cross-application refers to the practice of using arguments to answer different positions than those to which they were originally applied. Freeley's survey of coaches, guest judges, and participants at the 1981 NDT indicates the wide discrepancy of opinions held toward this practice. Thirty-six percent of the coaches surveyed reject the use of this strategy outright, while twenty percent accept it without reservation. Thirty-two percent will allow them with reservations. The break-down of opinions among the other two groups was fairly similar.[31] Given the diversity of beliefs toward cross-applications, it is particularly important to establish some guidelines in this area.

Experience in the legal setting suggests that it would be inappropriate to totally condemn cross-applications. Vogel contends that the defense should be prepared to anticipate strategic maneuvers which may take place in the final speech, and it is their obligation to do so.[32] The evolution of argument during the course of a trial often makes strategic maneuvering in the final summation necessary:

> It is frequently found, however, that modifications and alterations of the original analysis must be made as the trial proceeds. Such changes or modifications become necessary, when, because of surprising testimony, obscure theories of the law or unforeseen facts arise to controlling importance. Counsel must therefore be alert to make changes in his analysis of the case as the trial progresses. In this way, the entire case will have been analyzed and the issues of greatest importance will be clearly in mind at the close of the evidence.[33]

Likewise, the progression of arguments in an academic debate often requires the 2AR to reorganize some of the arguments in the debate. Some flexibility must be left to the final speaker. The critical question becomes, under what situations should cross-applications be considered illegitimate? In the legal setting, arguments cannot be applied to different issues in the summation. Arguments which are presented on the issue of damages cannot be suddenly applied to the issue of remedy. Such shifts cannot be reasonably anticipated by the defense and, hence, constitute unfair arguments.[34] This standard might serve as a useful guide in academic debate. The 2AR should be permitted to use cross-applications only within a single issue. The appropriateness of the application is determined by the clarity of the relationship existing between the arguments. As long as the argument being cross-applied was presented originally as relating to the issue to which it is applied, and the 2NR could reasonably have anticipated its use, the cross-application should be considered legitimate. In addition, the 2AR should be permitted to refocus the issues in the debate, conceding arguments where necessary, in order to present the affirmative case in the best possible light.

Judicial Remedies

Having delineated parameters that can be used to govern 2AR behavior, it is necessary to determine the proper course of action when unfair strategies are employed. Legal jurisdictions offer a variety of techniques for dealing with unfair tactics in the closing speech. All of these options have been used in academic debate at various times.

One enforcement option is to allow the defense to interrupt the plaintiff's attorney and object to his behavior.[35] A similar practice was employed earlier in the history of academic debate. In 1946, Musgrave recommended this method as the appropriate means for dealing with new arguments in 2AR.

> If the negative believes that the affirmative is making unfair use of the last rebuttal, it may ask for the floor to point out the situation. The affirmative may then defend the statements in question or correct them and apologize.[36]

Experience in the courtroom indicates that this approach is not a viable option. The constant interruptions that result tend to break down the debate process. Leslie Vogel documented:

> It is sometimes difficult to exert sufficient restraint to avoid interruption and correction of the opponent's argument on such occassions. In some of the courts such interruptions are common practice in non-jury trials and, as a result, arguments have descended to the level of street corner brawls and debates.[37]

A second option is equally undesirable. The judge could allow for a third negative rebuttal on these particular issues. This practice has also been experimented with in the courtroom. Lawrence Smith explained:

> One method used to prevent prejudice and thus obviate the necessity for a new trial is the granting by the court of additional time for the defendant to answer the new matter which was raised by the plaintiff in his closing argument. For example, where the trial court felt that the failure of the plaintiff to argue damages in his opening statement was inadvertent, the court allowed plaintiff's counsel five minutes to argue damages in closing and granted defense counsel five minutes to reply.[38]

This approach would not be very practical in the debate round. A debate judge, unlike a member of the judiciary, is not empowered to adjust speaking times. The times are generally prescribed by the tournament host. In addition, it could lead to a degradation of the debate process: it might become necessary to allow the affirmative to respond to the 3NR; then the negative might require another speech, ad infinitum. Some debate judges have attempted to overcome these objections by taking it upon themselves to perform a 3NR in response to unfair affirmative arguments. This approach is equally unacceptable. It requires the judge to enter the debate process as a participant, and make arguments in the debater's stead--thus distorting the nature of the debate. There is no reason to believe that the negative team would view the arguments from the same perspective as that of the judge. Consequently, the judge's argument selection might not accurately reflect that of the debaters.

A more realistic solution also stems from the judicial analogy. Some courts simply disregard those arguments which violate proper procedure.[39] In a debate round, the judge should ignore all 2AR arguments which are deemed improper. These arguments should have no influence on the decisional outcome. In the judicial setting, some recourse is available to the participants if the judge errs in his decision, since these procedural violations may provide grounds for appeal. The debater has no such recourse. A mistake made by a debate judge is final: it is incumbent upon the judge to make certain that his decision is not influenced by unfair practices in the final rebuttal.

One note should be added. It should not be considered the responsibility of the 2NR to preempt 2AR "song and dance" routines. The judge should disregard these behaviors without the negative advising him to do so. However, it is advisable for the negative to preempt these strategies, if they believe that they may be forthcoming. It increases the judge's awareness of these tactics and offers a specific argument to be applied to them. Noted attorney Lawrence Smith advises beginning attorneys to use this technique when unfair tactics are anticipated.[40] In the final round at the 1981 NDT this strategy was successfully employed in 2NR. Charles Woodbury's ballot notes:

> The 2NR spent nearly a minute emphasizing the lack of affirmative response, the "illegitimacy" of a potential 2AR response or shift, and claimed "caverns" (actually deep mines or caves) increase the likelihood of preemptive strike.

Woodbury suggests that, absent this standard, the negative might not have won this issue.

> The 2AR dropped the standard as to "no 2AR response" and off-handedly remarked that the evidence refers to the present system....This might, absent the standard set in the 2NR, be enough for affirmative solvency.[41]

Conclusion

This essay attempts to provide clear guidelines which judges and debaters can use to analyze the behavior of second affirmative rebuttalists. It is not the purpose of these guidelines to unreasonably restrict the freedom of the 2AR. The 2AR should retain substantial flexibility in presenting the affirmative proposal in as desirable and persuasive a manner as possible. The recommendations noted here are simply intended to limit this freedom to those practices which provide equity in the debate process. Such a limitation is not unreasonable, for as Wendell Phillips noted, "He does not really believe his opinion who dares not give free scope to his opponent."[42]

NOTES

[1] Egbert R. Nichols and Joseph H. Baccus, Modern Debating (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1936), p. 21.

[2] Caroll P. Lahman, Debate Coaching, 2d ed., rev. and enl. (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1936), p. 151.

[3] G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Re-Union of Argumentation and Debate Theory," in Dimensions of Argument, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale: Speech Communication Assoc., 1981), p. 421.

[4] William T. Foster, Argumentation and Debate, rev. ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1917), p. 298.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Joseph V. Denney, Carson S. Duncan and Frank C. McKinney, Argumentation and Debate (New York: American Book Co., 1910), p. 115.

[7] Foster, p. 298.

[8] George P. Baker and Henry B. Huntington, The Principles of Argumentation (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1925), pp. 398-9.

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[10] Baker and Huntington, p. 399.

[11] Lahman, p. 155.

[12] Victor A. Ketcham, The Theory and Practice of Argumentation and Debate (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1916), p. 128; J. Walter Reeves, The Fundamentals of Argumentation and Debate (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1920), p. 79; Warren Choate Shaw, The Art of Debate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1922), p. 42; James M. O'Neill, Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales, Argumentation and Debate (New York:

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[13] Nichols and Baccus, p. 165.

[14] Gerry Paul, "Affirmative Rebuttals: A Practical Way to Win," in Debater's Research Guide, ed. Allan Louden and Roger Solt (Winston Salem: Wake Forest University, 1982), p. 20.

[15] Ralph Y. McGinnis, "Refutation and Rebuttal," in Argumentation and Debate: Principles and Practices, ed. James H. McBath, rev. ed. (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 230.

[16] Bill Newnam, "My Judging Philosophy," in Judging Philosophies at the 1980 NDT, ed. Jan Trapp (Colorado: University of Northern Colorado Press, 1980).

[17] See for example, Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate: Reasoned Decision Making, 5th ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth Pub., 1981), and George W. Ziegelmueller and Charles A Dause, Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1975).

[18] Elias J. Macewan, The Essentials of Argumentation (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1907), p. 209.

[19] George M. Musgrave, Competitive Debate: Rules and Techniques, 3d ed. (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1957), p. 29.

[20] Arthur N. Kruger, Modern Debate: It's Logic and Strategy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), p. 366.

[21] Denney, Duncan and McKinney, p. 115.

[22] Leslie Vogel, Final Argument (New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1954), p. 1.

[23] "Voir Dire, Opening Statement, and Argument," The Practical Lawyer, October 15, 1977, p. 28.

[24] Vogel, pp. 9-10.

[25] Lawrence Smith, The Art of Advocacy: Summation (New York: Matthew Bender Co., 1981), p. vii.

[26] Ibid, p. 2.10.

[27] Ibid, p. 2.13.

[28] Leslie Vogel, "Final Argument," in Civil Litigation and Trial Techniques, ed. Harry S. Bodin (New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1976), p. 647.

[29] Vogel, Final Argument, p. 13.

[30] Smith, p. 2.14.

[31] Austin J. Freeley, "Judging Paradigms: The Impact of the Critic on Argument," in Dimensions of Argument, ed. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale: Speech Communication Assoc., 1981), p. 446.

[32] Vogel, Civil Litigation and Trial Techniques, pp. 658-9.

[33] Vogel, Final Argument, p. 9.

[34] Smith, p. 2.13.

[35] Vogel, Final Argument, p. 24.

[36] Musgrave, p. 29.

[37] Vogel, Final Argument, p. 24.

[38] Smith, p. 2.14.

[39] Vogel, Civil Litigation and Trial Techniques, p. 670.

[40] Smith, p. 2.13.

[41] Final Round, National Debate Tournament, Journal of the American Forensic Association, 18 (Summer 1981):58-9.

[42] Lahman, p.162.

RHETORICAL CRITICISM AS ARGUMENT: A NEED FOR SOCIAL CRITICISM

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The 1974 Sedalia Conference stated that individual events, as well as debate, should study "the reason-giving by people as justification for acts, beliefs, attitudes, and values."[1] While not all individual events fit neatly into the argumentative perspective,[2] rhetorical criticism inherently examines and consists of reason giving. The Conference also wanted forensics to be "laboratories for helping students to understand and communicate various forms of argument more effectively in a variety of contexts with a variety of audiences."[3] Again, rhetorical criticism seems very well-suited to fulfill this function. Students must not only present "various forms of argument--in a variety of settings with a variety of audiences," they study other people engaged in the same kind of activity. Rhetorical Criticism appears readily able to achieve the goals of the Sedalia Conference.

If the event looks so good, then why does it have such problems? At each tournament, it is almost invariably the smallest event. Many tournaments have even dropped it from the schedule. The reason for this decline is clear. Students, coaches, and judges do not agree on the goals, methods or criteria of rhetorical criticism. The few attempts at resolving this confusion have centered on clarification.[4] If we could just lift the fog, it is thought, we can rehabilitate the event. I believe the problems are more intractable than that. This paper will attempt to attack those problems by addressing two crucial issues in rhetorical criticism. First, the event must return to argument. Does the event fulfill the function envisioned by the Sedalia Conference? The answer is no. Due to an inordinate emphasis on the methodology, the event has encouraged classification rather than argumentation. This emphasis came about because the event adopted the norms of its academic counterpart. Academic and competitive rhetorical criticism are inherently different. By forcing students to use the standards of academic criticism, specifically, the need to make a contribution to rhetorical theory, we damage competitive rhetorical criticism. The second part of this paper argues that Karlyn Campbell's distinction between ephemeral and enduring criticism offers another option.[5] Competitive rhetorical criticism can best serve its goals by fulfilling the social function of criticism. Finally, the paper will sketch a few implications of these contentions for forensics and argument.

I.

Since Edwin Black's seminal book Rhetorical Criticism[6], most theorists have believed that rhetorical criticism functions as argument. Lawrence Rosenfield put it clearly when he stated "that criticism is most sensibly conceived of as a special form of reason-giving discourse." If both academia and forensics place argument at the center of rhetorical criticism, it seems logical to view the event through an argumentative perspective.

This essay will use Stephen Toulmin's model.[8] The purpose of this use is not to engage in an argument over Toulmin's system. Rather, this essay seeks merely to use the most universal vocabularly possible, and Toulmin's claim, evidence and warrant fulfills that need.

Two different levels of claims are found in rhetorical criticism, an overall evaluation of effectiveness and individual claims made in the course of the speech to support this judgement. It seems as if very few in forensics believe that evaluation need exist. Neither the National Forensic Association nor the American Forensic Association rules specifically ask for evaluation. The NFA definition calls for "an original critical analysis of any significant rhetorical artifact."[9] The AFA definition wants the student "to offer an explanation and/or evaluation of a communication event."[10]

If rhetorical criticism is to best fulfill its educational function, it should demand evaluation for two reasons. First, many theorists realistically note that evaluation inevitably exists in any criticism. Edwin Black makes this very clear in a 1965 lecture:

> Even the purely technical objective of understanding how a discourse works carries with it the assumption that it does work, and that assumption is an assessment. Similarly, to understand why a thing has failed is at least to suspect it has failed, and that suspicion is an assessment...however faint the judicial element in criticism may become, it abides.[11]

If evaluation does exist, we should not teach students to try and ignore it and thus risk obscuring the criteria they use to judge the speech. Educationally, we should prepare students to present their standards and defend them vigorously. The second reason flows from the first. Lawrence Rosenfield has compared criticism to forensic argument. Lawyers may apply standards, dispute them, argue about their applicability and so on all in search of a proper evaluation, the verdict.[12] Since critics use criteria, they too use forensic argument. By requiring students to risk evaluation, we automatically ask them to argue in support of that evaluation. Even if one contends that criticism can be nonevaluative, it adds to the educational value of the event to have evaluation because students must argue in support of their judgements.

While making an evaluation will help, difficulties still remain. Currently, many students do make evaluations. Those evaluations, however, are often confined to a statement indicating that this speech fulfilled the criteria set down by a renowned critic and thus was wide applause. The claims made in the course of the speech and the final claim of effectiveness flow almost solely from the methodology, not from the speech. A student will, for instance, find a politician in trouble, demonstrate the presence of Ware and Linkugel's typology, and, from that presence, infer success.

This tendency perverts the argumentative function of the event. The student simply classifies. As Brockriede notes, when a critic classifies, s/he "makes no inferential leap."[13] A warrant does not exist and an argument cannot take place without a warrant. Naturally, this classifying also affects the use of evidence. Even the best critics can give into the temptation of finding only what the system tells them to find. Rather than conducting a careful textual analysis to discover what happened within the rhetorical act, the critic engages in "cookie-cutter" analysis and ignores crucial evidence. Wayne Brockriede puts it this way:

> My complaint with this kind of criticism is not that a critic uses categories; no critic can manage any kind of analysis without having some categories in his head. My objection is that he uses a category system slavishly, determined to force a concrete rhetorical experience into the confines of a closed system, a system that is closed because the critic will not allow himself to discover or create new categories while in the process of his analysis.[14]

The effects of this kind of criticism on the event of rhetorical criticism are profound. We want to teach reason-giving activity. Yet, neither national organisation encourages or demands evaluation. The norms of the event have evolved to focus almost completely on the method, rather than the speech. This often leads to classification, rather than argument. This complaint of "cookie-cutting" surfaces nearly every time judges of rhetorical criticism gather together. Despite efforts at attitudinal change, this problem has not gone away. The structure of the event plays a major role in causing this difficulty. The event has adopted the standards of its academic counterpart and this model has not helped further the goal of teaching argument. Another option is available.

II.

In 1974, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell distinguished between ephemeral, or social, criticism and enduring, or what I have termed academic, criticism.[15] According to Campbell, criticism serving a social function examines and evaluates the discourse that takes place all around us all of the time. The critic seeks to evaluate "the ways in which issues are formulated and policies justified, and the effects of both on society at a particular historical moment."[16] The object is social criticism:

> The social function of criticism is to raise issues and encourage public discussion. This function requires that critics appraise both the techniques used and the ends advocated in rhetorical acts, in addition to the immediate and long-range effects of both.[17]

A good example of social criticism recently appeared in a New Republic editorial entitled, "Reverend Reagan."[18] The editors take the President to task for his March speech to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida. The editorial begins by justifying the need to evaluate the speech: "To date we have had no more comprehensive communication of the President's picture of American society, or of the moral ambitions he has for it."[19] They quickly summarise the speech, noting that Reagan feels "History is reaching a climax."[20] The enemy without is Communism, "the focus of evil in the modern world."[21] The enemy within is "modern-day secularism."[22] Both work to weaken America. The editors claim "the President's larger point was that political struggles are spiritual struggles."[23] They closely examine the President's speech and condemn it on ethical grounds. The President "raised the emotional pitch of politics."[24] They question his authority "to administer the Judeo-Christian tradition."[25] They contend he misconstrued the traditional relationship between church and state in America. To support their arguments, they dispute Reagan's use of history as evidence, arguing that he told "very poor history."[26] Reagan's call for religion in politics, they conclude, would hurt both religion and politics.

Such criticism serves a social function. The New Republic has sought to expose the President's fallacious reasoning and misuse of evidence. They have taken to heart Abraham Lincoln's attack on Stephen Douglas and applied it to Ronald Reagan on this issue: "But he has no right to mislead others, who have less access to history, and less leisure to study it, into the false belief that 'our fathers who framed the Government under which we live' were of the same opinion—thus substituting falsehood and deception for truthful evidence and fair argument."[27] A social critic seeks to enforce Lincoln's standards of "truthful evidence and fair argument" in the contemporary rhetorical arena.

Campbell labelled the second kind of criticism enduring because it illuminates the symbolic activity of human beings. The act itself, vital in social criticism, fades into the background as the skilled critic tells us about "the nature of symbolic processes."[28] As Campbell notes, the best way to define this type of criticism is to examine the touchstones, such as Edwin Black's treatment of the Coatesville Address. The speech itself did not fetch results at the time, and, as Black says "But for a recent revival of interest in Chapman's work, it might have remained obscure indefinitely."[29] Yet Black's discussion of this address as a scene in a morality play provides a unique insight into the symbolic activity of human beings.

The difference between these two functions is clear. The social critic concentrates on contemporary rhetorical acts. He or she enters the social arena, exposing unfair use of evidence, fallacious reasoning or unethical tactics and challenging the conclusions that rest on those tactics. S/he naturally praises good rhetoric, pointing out conclusions that rest on solid lines of reasoning. The academic critic explores the symbolic activity of humans, seeking to discover the processes, explicate the theory, that governs our communication. The particular act is simply a vehicle used to achieve that goal.

Probably because coaches are academicians, students have tried to adopt the latter approach. They have sought to make a contribution to rhetorical theory. The AFA and the NFA winner, Sam Marcosson, concluded his speech on Lyndon Johnson's war rhetoric arguing that the rhetoric of a limited war was a sub-genre of Robert Ivie's war rhetoric.[30] This student, and many others, have established genres, sub-genres and generally sought to add to rhetorical theory because they know they will be rewarded. Mr. Marcosson gave a very fine speech. Certainly, he created some arguments. Yet not even he could make a very strong case for his conclusion because the nature of competitive forensics mitigates against it. The time limit is only ten minutes, and, practically, cannot be extended. Very few people can present a reasoned argument making an enduring contribution to rhetorical theory in ten minutes. Second, we must also remember this is a competitive speech. Stylistically, it must be different from a scholarly article in the Quarterly Journal of Speech. Oral style differs from written style:

> Oral style must be more redundant. Because you can reread material and pause to think between paragraphs, a writer need not repeat and restate. But listeners do not have such options. As a result, successful speaking requires internal summaries, transitions connecting ideas, repetition of the major steps in the argument and the like. Such redundancy increases both comprehension and impact for listeners.[31]

Such redundancy also takes valuable time during the course of the speech, and further reduces the chances of making an enduring contribution. Third, an enduring contribution requires a skilled critic. The event trains novices. A future Kenneth Burke may well exist among them. To expect a "Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle" at 19, however, is too much. Fourth, much of the concern about methodology is traceable to this approach. When winning requires an unhealthy focus on the method in an attempt to change the method, students will do that. They lose sight of the supposed focus of the speech, the rhetorical act under discussion. As noted earlier, this focus on methodology perverts the argumentative process. Finally, the need to make an enduring contribution excludes many students from the event. Only students who care strongly about rhetorical theory need apply and this exacerbates the decline in numbers.

As it stands now, rhetorical criticism cannot fulfill the injunction of the Sedalia Conference. The structure of competitive rhetorical criticism is inherently different from that of academic criticism. By forcing students to try and make an enduring contribution, we essentially force them to classify rather than argue. Bereft of the needed time and expertise, they find the evidence they want, fill the neat categories, and proclaim an enduring contribution. Certainly, I state the situation somewhat bleakly. Not all students turn out bad criticism. It can, however, improve enormously.

Social criticism provides a way out of this morass. With the burden of making a contribution removed, the focus would return to the speech itself. By definition, the reward would go to the student who best critiques the act, rather than the methodology. Certainly, this would not solve all of the problems with time, nor would we receive miracles from novice speakers. Yet this approach has promise. First, it would minimize the time problem. Right now, most students feel the burden of dividing time between the act and the method while making that enduring contribution. Social criticism does not abandon method, but it does reduce its importance. The student would have more time to spend on the speech or communicative act. Second, it seems logical that learning standards comes before making standards. Rhetorical criticism would return to the more realistic educational goal of teaching basic criticism and learning standards for analyzing speeches. Third, the event could do a much better job of teaching argument. The danger of classifying would be greatly reduced with a lesser emphasis on methodology. Further, students would be making clear and probably controversial evaluations of "techniques used and ends advocated." They will find themselves forced to defend their conclusions. Finally, we will broaden the focus of the event. With so few students, we currently run a very small laboratory for a very narrow real world situation, academia. By moving to social criticism, we reduce the jargon with the method and potentially interest all students concerned about social issues. The event will teach them to analyze the arguments occurring around them every day, and prepare them much more clearly for the contemporary, persuasive world. We as teachers and forensic educators say we want to accomplish this goal. Social criticism provides the means.

The event could also then fulfill a responsibility of the field left long neglected. In 1970, Karl Wallace commented: "It seems to be generally agreed among rhetoricians that one of their signal failures in the last seventy years is the failure to produce in any significant numbers practicing critics of public discourse."[32] Karlyn Campbell repeated this lament in 1974 and pointed out: "Given our professional committment to freedom of speech and discussion, the discipline of speech communication needs to honor and encourage the trained critics who enter the public arena to critique contemporary persuasive acts."[33] So far, rhetorical critics have left the task to journalists, who may or may not do a good job. By grounding literally thousands of students over a number of years in rhetorical criticism, we have the opportunity to finally make a contribution to this ongoing social dialogue. Perhaps a few of these students will enter the public arena and this event offers the opportunity to begin the process of training and encouraging them.

The best way to implement this switch to social criticism would be to change the event description. That description should require evaluation. It should also state that the focus of the speech should be the rhetorical artifact rather than the methodology. Finally, students should only analyse acts less than a year old on September of the fall semester. These suggestions for changing the event are not etched in concrete. I merely seek to accomplish this switch to social criticism.

III.

This essay has argued that argument should be the focus of competitive rhetorical criticism, and that social criticism offers the best hope for achieving that focus. A number of implications for argument in individual events flow from this position. First, the basis for evaluating the argument in the activity should be the purpose of the activity. In this case, it is impossible for students to argue effectively in rhetorical criticism because the academic model does not fit the event. This leads to the second conclusion. We should examine the rules and norms of individual events to determine whether they encourage argument, if that is what we want them to do. Right now, rhetorical criticism encourages classification rather than argument. A modification of the definitions could change this balance. Finally, we can best serve as laboratories for argument if we decide what we want to be laboratories for, and what the limitations of the event can accomplish. By automatically adopting the academic model, we unnecessarily limit the event. The social criticism approach broadens the horizons of the event and offers more students the chance to learn the kind of argument that actually takes place in the real world. Academic rhetorical criticism serves a different function than social criticism and is ill-suited to the event. We need to examine other forensic activities to discover whether we are burdening students with assumptions from the academic world that do not encourage argument in the event, or resemble argument in the real world.

If nothing else, this paper should open up the debate about rhetorical criticism. The event is in serious trouble. Students are not participating and the quality of argument is not good. The event can serve an important function, both for the students and for our field. We need to continue to explore the assumptions underlying the event and implement concrete changes to make sure it studies "the reason-giving by people as justification for acts, beliefs, attitudes and values."

Notes

[1] Quoted in Jack Rhodes, "On the Current State of Scholarship in Individual Events," *Speaker and Gavel*, 16 (Fall 1978), p. 14.

[2] Rhodes, pp. 14-15.

[3] Quoted in Rhodes, p. 14.

[4] See Shawn L. McGee, "Judging Criteria for Rhetorical Criticism," a paper presented at the Central States Speech Association Convention, Lincoln, Nebraska, April 7, 1983.

[5] Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Criticism: Ephemeral and Enduring," *Speech Teacher*, 23 (January 1974).

[6] Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

[7] Lawrence Rosenfield, "The Anatomy of Critical Discourse," *Speech Monographs*, 35 (March 1968), p. 50.

[8] Stephen Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1958).

[9] Donald F. Peters, *NFA Newsletter* (invitation), March 1983, p. 3.

[10] "Description of Events," *A.F.A.N.I.E.T.*, April 11, 1983.

[11] Quoted from Rosenfield, "The Anatomy of Critical Discourse," p. 54.

[12] Rosenfield, "The Anatomy of Critical Discourse," p. 55.

[13] Wayne Brockriede, "Rhetorical Criticism as Argument," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 60 (April 1974), p. 167.

[14] Brockriede, "Rhetorical Criticism as Argument," pp. 169-170.

[15] Campbell, "Criticism: Ephemeral and Enduring."

[16] Campbell, "Criticism: Ephemeral and Enduring," p. 11.

[17] Campbell, "Criticism: Ephemeral and Enduring," p. 10.

[18] "Reverend Reagan," *The New Republic*, 4 April 1983, pp. 7-9.

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[19] "Reverend Reagan," p. 7.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] "Reverend Reagan," p. 8.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] Abraham Lincoln, "Cooper Union Address," *American Speeches* ed. Wayland Maxfield Parrish and Marie Hochmuth (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954), p. 293.

[28] Campbell, "Criticism: Ephemeral and Enduring," p. 12.

[29] Black, "Rhetorical Criticism," p. 82.

[30] From a manuscript furnished by the author.

[31] Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, *The Rhetorical Act*, (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1982), p. 263.

[32] Quoted in Campbell, "Ephemeral and Enduring," p. 9.

[33] Campbell, "Ephemeral and Enduring," pp. 10-11.

RAPPROCHEMENT OF,WORLD$_1$ AND WORLD$_2$: DISCOVERING THE TIES BETWEEN PRACTICAL DISCOURSE AND FORENSICS

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For the last five years I have been a staunch supporter of competitive individual events at the intercollegiate level. My students have been very active on the college individual events circuit, achieving a modicum of success at both the National Forensic Association's and the American Forensic Association's National Individual Events Tournaments. When asked by my college administration to justify the support for individual events I have easily responded, proclaiming the tremendous educational benefits achieved by students participating in events which further their liberal arts education. In addition, I have frequently made the claim that individual events provide a realistic laboratory for the testing of argument and ideas. Consequently, I was delighted to be asked to prepare a paper addressing the issue of the relationship between individual events competition and the "real world". However, as I began researching the question disillusionment soon occured. I discovered that except for a few anecdotal accounts, virtually no serious scholarship is extant documenting either the value of individual events competition or the relationship between such competition and the speaking experiences students will face when they enter the "real world."

This paper examines the value of competitive individual events as a laboratory for argument. Specifically, I contend that individual events as currently structured provide students with a highly abstract, sterile and non-interactive environment in which to test argumentation strategies--an environment which fails to provide much insight into how argument is used or may be better used in such practical discourse contexts as politics, interpersonal settings, or teaching. To better serve as a laboratory for argument individual events should be analogized to "real world" argumentation/communication situations. This rapprochement is the fundamental concern of this paper. The argument is advanced by examining three important questions: (1) What is meant by a "laboratory for argument"? (2) Are individual events, as currently practiced, a laboratory for argument? (3) Can an analogue approach to individual events provide a more effective laboratory for argument?

Laboratory for Argument

During and after the Sedalia Conference the notion of forensics as a laboratory took on considerable popularity. In a definitional statement Sedalia conferees note that forensic activities "are laboratories for helping students to understand and communicate various forms of argument more effectively in a variety of contexts with a variety of audiences."[1] The term "laboratory" is variously defined. Bartanen, for example, tells us that a laboratory is "a place for experiment, where theories and ideas are critically tested and ultimately validated, modified or discarded."[2] Thomas draws upon the Sedalia conference and interprets the laboratory as potentially filling several goals:

1. The laboratory may be a *production workshop* where something is made or analyzed as a public service.
2. The laboratory may be a *teaching and learning environment*.
3. The laboratory can be *the setting for controlled scientific research*.[3]

Applying these definitions to competitive forensics is certainly laudable. However, most of the time the laboratory notion is invoked without carefully considering precisely what it is we are linking to that laboratory. This indictment is frequently issued. Zarefsky, for example, argues that:

> The distiction between 'forensics' and 'forensic activities' is not trivial. Rather, the first stands to the second as genus to species. But people in forensics, by and large, identify themselves with the species rather than the genus. They define their professional roles by reference to activity programs rather than to the object of their study.[4]

If we are to invoke the laboratory metaphor the first issue that must be addressed concerns the nature and purpose of that laboratory. My fundamental belief is that individual events enjoy far greater pedagogical worth if they are viewed as argumentative endeavors rather than "delivery" or "public speaking" activities. The inclusion of papers on individual events at the second Alta Conference on Argumentation suggests that a growing number of argumentation study professionals believe individual events does belong within the genus of argumentation. Those papers provided many well-reasoned arguments demonstrating that individual events do indeed employ an argumentation perspective. Hanson, for example, borrowing from Wallace and Perelman, notes that "speaker-act" is an appropriate argumentation paradigm for individual events. He concludes:

> Individual events seem most appropriately tied to the rhetorical dimension of argumentation. There is much room for the investigation of the relationship between argumentation and individual events. Claim-making is indeed an intricate part of the activity in individual speaking events. In substance, matter, and form, individual speaking events exhibit many definitive links to the field of argumentation.[5]

The claim that individual events is (or should be) fundamentally concerned with argumentation is no longer a controversial one.

Having established that the most appropriate way of viewing individual events is as a laboratory in which the genus argumentation is studied, I turn to what it is that we should expect from such a laboratory. In a paper presented at the last Alta Conference on Argumentation I argued that forensics is deeply concerned with pedagogy.[6] As such, a critical function of the individual events laboratory is pedagogical--the laboratory must teach students about argumentation. The individual events laboratory should acquaint students with a variety of perspectives on argument, provide a forum for testing these perspectives, and be transferable to the genus when removed from the laboratory. In addition to the pedagogical function, the individual events laboratory should also "create" knowledge. The laboratory in the physical sciences is an appropriate analogy. In this laboratory students perform experiments to learn about various principles. After gaining the rudimentary knowlegdge they then experiment to discover new principles--principles which may later be transferred to the real world. The forensics laboratory may create knowledge in several areas: knowledge about argumentation strategies, knowledge about the subject matter of the argument, and knowledge about argumentation theory. Goodnight claims that the debate laboratory can be valuable to argumentation research:

> Whether in the area of argument fields, value disputation, social analysis, or political assessment, development of debate theory has much to offer students of argumentation. Beyond that knowledge which can be provided by philosophical speculation or in field research among naive social actors, debate offers a challenge to those who construct theories of argument to test those theories through an impartial and intense encounter of advocates. As practices of argument in debate continue to evolve, there is much of worth that can be shared with those who would study argumentation.[7]

If individual events is also concerned with argument and offers a chance for this intense interaction, there is no reason it too can cannot fulfill the goals articulated by

Goodnight.

Current Practice of Individual Events

Do individual events, as currently practiced, provide an effentive laboratory for argument? The answer is sometimes, but not inherently. The starting point for this claim is in the theoretical base (or better put, the lack of such a base) for individual events. In the paper I presented at the last Alta conference I spent a great deal of time describing the schism that exists between the scholar of argumentation and the coach of forensics.[8] The impression I gave was that the schism is due to the scholar being unconcerend with the practical needs of the forensics coach. My position has changed a bit. In the case of individual events, the educator often has been unconcerned with a "theory of argument." The point is made over and over again in the literature. Bartanen, for example, argues:

> Even more significant to the confusion about the role of individual events in argumentation is the absence of theoretical discussion about individual events and argument. Recent years have found numerous studies of the relationship between debate and decision making, as well as the implementation of many decision making concepts into the actual practice of academic debate. No similar relationship exists between individual events and decision making.[9]

Larson and O'Rourke make a similar claim:

> Even though there has been an increase in the number and frequency of individual events offerings at forensic tournaments the literature on the use of argumentation in individual events is almost nil. Coaches and forensic experts have not taken the time to think out the argumentation dimensions related to individual events like they have in the field of debate.[10]

The notion that our pedagogy must be grounded in theory, or as Faules, Rieke, and Rhodes state, "pedagogy is generated by theory,"[11] is not a controversial one. When practice exists independent of theory (or only loosely connected to that theory), the laboratory cannot be judged adequate.

In addition to the lack of theoretical grounding, the practice of forensics in the tournament environment also demonstrates the inadequacy of the current forensics laboratory. The overall point is well stated by Bartanen:

> ... equally as important are some of the actual practices of individual events which detract from the ability of individual events to successfully teach argumentation. Henry McGucken, for example, criticizes the performance and analytical weaknesses of the individual events: "Extemp and impromptu frequently seem to stress the glib over the thoughtful, interp to stress the actor's finesse over the literary insight, and oratory may be the saddest event of all, for that event possesses the greatest potential for exercising reasoned eloquence. Instead, tournament oratory has given rise to a specialized form of discourse, a 'third sophistic' plumbing the affective depths of style and delivery, poor rhetoric and worse poetry, a kind of speech presently unheard and unheard of anywhere except in oratory contests.[12]

Although many factors contribute to poor practice of argumentation in individual events, three factors stand out. First, with a few exceptions, most individual events do not bear much resemblance to practical discourse situations students will face when they leave the contest environment. In their study of argument forms in individual events Larson and O'Rourke conclude:

> There needs to be a stronger connection between forensic contest speeches and the actual public speaking situations students are likely to experience in real-life. In real-life a speaker seldom draws a national topic, outlines a speech, and then delivers the speech 30 minutes later. It is also highly unlikely that a speaker will memorize a persuasive speech on a serious social problem and propose a means of correcting the evil--all within a ten minute time limit.[13]

Without this link to "real-life," the individual events laboratory is too sterile.

A second factor contributing to the poor practice of individual events is the failure to incorporate intense interaction into the tournament model. The typical individual events tournament and the typical events involve students entering a room in which sits a single judge. The student performs a speech and then leaves. Very rarely do students have the opportunity to challenge the ideas presented by other speakers. Aside from a single sheet of paper the judge has very little opportunity to interact with the student. The absence of interaction and intense challenging of ideas further divorces individual events from practical discourse.

The third factor contributing to poor individual events practice is both situational and theoretical. This factor involves the nature of the audience which the individual eventer addresses. The nature of the audience in academic debate has undergone significant change--ranging from the general lay audience to the more specialized hypothesis tester and policy maker. The nature of the audience in individual events is much less clear. In some ways the individual events audience resembles the "universal audience" advocated by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.[14] The vagueness of such a concept, especially as applied to ten different individual speaking events, makes it difficult for the student and the coach to understand how argumentation should best occur. If we buy into the conclusions being generated by argument fields research, that different fields involve different standards for argument, then the universal audience concept is certainly inadequate and fails to contribute to a sound pedagogiccl experience.

The Analogue Approach

The analogue approach to individual events is presented as a means to improve the laboratory experience available to students as well as to provide a more realistic environment in which theory can be tested and social action can be critiqued. In its essence, the analogue approach seeks to model specific individual events based upon real world situations.

Before detailing the application of the analogue approach it is necessary to posit several assumptions and caveats. Assumption one is that forensics is and should continue to be deeply concerned with pedagogy.[15] The National Developmental Conference on Forensics makes the point quite well:

> Conferees recognized that educators in forensics, like their colleagues in all fields, play many significant roles. But the raison d'etre for the educational process, now as in classical times, is the mutual teaching-learning relationship that exists between student and teacher. Other roles have developed over time as auxiliary to this relationship. Accordingly, the primary function of the forensics educator is to teach students--to help them develop skills, to cultivate high ethical and scholarly standards, and to establish a climate in which students have an exciting and enjoyable intellectual and social experience. The general goal of the teaching mission is to make people more proficient in argumentation, both while they are students and after.[16]

This assumption carries with it two implications. First, we must as teachers and scholars do more than simply describe phenomena. We must instruct. Second, we must be concerned with improving the process of argumentation. It is not enough for a teacher of forensics to tell students how argument occurs in everyday discourse or in some specialized arena. The teacher has a critical function as well. In addition to the "is" question, the educator must also be concerned with the "should" question.

The second assumption is that the content of our pedagogy must be rooted in theory. The importance of theory to pedagogy has already been discussed. If we are to avoid the schism between scholar and educator and truly live a mutually supportive existence forensic educators must recognize the importance of theory.

The third assumption is that forensics must be grounded in adaptive, normative theories which emphasize synthesis and promote rationality. The analogue approach calls for modeling individual events more closely to practical discourse situations. This in no way means that I am calling for students to "imitate" this practical discourse. Rather, the forensics events would borrow the context of the practical speaking situations and use these contexts to both learn how to argue and to learn how argument in practical discourse may be improved.

Several terms within this third assumption merit closer attention. Perhaps the most problematic term is "rationality," a construct that seems to have lost favor among argumentation scholars. Cox and Willard explain the extinction of the cocept "rationality" in contemporary argumentation research:

> It is remarkable, given the historical importance of the rationality notion to argumentation, how little it gets explicitly discussed in these essays. This reflects several developments. It reflects, e.g., the general rejection of a priorism and the logical principles attendant to it. The theorists who used "rationality" to name demonstrative reasoning were forced, over time, to so narrow the range of questions that could be called "rational" that the term lost its usefulness to students of ordinary utterance. . . . Within philosophy there emerged more expansive views of rationality, some equating it with "reason-giving" without regard to evaluations to the content of the reasoning per se. Willard . . . calls this a "trivialization of rationality" because (a) rationality becomes a redundant word standing for the effects of some concept (like consistency or reason-giving) and (b) rationality has no particular results, i.e., consistency or reason-based claims are as apt to be evil, foolish, or unjust as they are to be the opposites of these. Rationality, for whatever reason, does seldom appear in the essays here; perhaps its trivialization is the reason.[17]

A second term coming under recent attack is "normative." Lately it seems that it is more popular than ever to indict textbooks on argumentation, and by extension, textbooks in individual events, on the grounds that such texts simply list a priori standards, failing to ground the standards in "a carefully defined descriptive base."[18] Willard labels this behavior "academic conceit" because it presupposes the superiority of those a priori standards before demonstrating that "naive theories are somehow inferior."[19] A perusal of argumentation texts demonstrates that considerable time is spent justifying the rationality-based normative approach--the authors very rarely seem to *presuppose* superiority.[20]

Two additional terms contained in the assumption need brief clarification: "adaptive" and "synthesis." The "adaptive" aspect of the assumption is premised upon the idea that forensics, rooted in pedagogy, requires that educators have something to teach. They cannot wait for the new "Theory. Thus, while researchers are busy gaining a better understanding of how argument occurs in naturalistic settings, the educators must continue with their instruction. However, they must also be willing to integrate new ideas in teaching. As the researchers gain more insight into argumentation the educators must be willing to incorporate this. In this sense the forensics laboratory must be adaptive. Similarly, the individual events laboratory must continue to rely upon synthesis. The laboratory must draw upon many disciplines to gather the "stuff" that is taught.

These assumptions and caveats are important in establishing the context of the analogue approach to individual events. The context is one in which students learn, teachers teach, researchers research, and social critics criticize, hopefully with considerable interaction.

The analogue notion stems from both my concern with the current state of individual events practice and with my empirical investigation into argumentation within practical discourse settings. The empirical investigation, drawing heavily upon what has been learned by argument fields researchers, is at this stage quite preliminary, but seems worthy of further study. For the past several months I have been gathering transcripts of argument occurring in natural public settings. The specific arenas include press conferences by political and non-political figures, news media editorials (including reader/viewer responses), and exhortative speeches related to controversial social and political issues (involving speeches given by state legislators on the floor of the legislature and by individuals not holding government office). The research is concerned with such ideas as the nature of proof in these public settings, the types of appeals used, the nature of the audience being addressed as viewed by the message utterer, and the manner in which controversy is addressed.[21]

Preliminary findings suggest that argument in these public settings, as compared to argument in individual speaking events, involves more direct interaction (either

during the presentation or following it), demonstrates greater concern for treating opposing arguments, shows greater concern by the utterer for the immediate and potential audiences, and, especially with legislative speeches, involves greater reliance upon proof from social science and science experts. This research is used as a starting point for the analogue approach to individual events, serving to develop some of the event descriptions and procedures. Additional study is obviously needed. A question that is especially worthy of more study involves the standards used by the various audiences in evaluating and resolving controversy.

At this point I am not ready to offer a complete set of analogues that can be used in the individual events laboratory. Such a listing requires much more research into the nature of the discourse arenas that are potentially worth analogizing. However, some possibilities are offered.

Traditional public speaking events such as extemporaneous speaking, impromptu, oratory, and informative speaking, to maximize the laboratory experience of students, educators, and scholars, need to be given a more specific real-world context. One possibility is to establish an event called "press conference speaking" in which students are given a series of informational and judgmental questions drawn from newsmagazines and more specialized sources such as the *Congressional Record*. The imagined audience students would be told to address is one which includes both the media (immediate audience) and the general public (removed audience). Students and judges could be used to ask the questions. Specific judging criteria could be developed that include adaptation to audience, treating opposing argument, synthesis of ideas, depth of knowledge, etc.

Similarly, an event called "legislative speaking" could be developed in which a student is required to prepare a bill on a controversial social/political issue and then present a sponsorship speech in favor of the bill. Again the audience could be specified as legislators, the media, or the general public. Students and judges could serve as questioners, with students required to provide speeches of opposition.

The potential for developing real world analogues for the individual speaking events laboratory is endless. Several tournaments have experimented with analogues, even including such interpersonal argumentation events as negotiation. Firmly entrenching the analogue approach would yield a laboratory that enriches the students learning about argumentation by providing an interactive, audience based, real world context. This context could also be useful to researchers in testing theory. In short, a rapprochement of World_1 and World_2 is provided.

Notes

[1] James H. McBath, ed., *Forensics as Communication: The Argumentative Perspective* (Skokie: National Textbook, 1975), p. 11.

[2] Michael D. Bartanen, "Are New Events Needed to Enhance a Laboratory Experience in Argumentation?" In *Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation* (hereafter, *Dimensions*), eds. George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale: SCA, 1981), p. 405.

[3] David A. Thomas, "Sedalia Plus Five: Forensics as a Laboratory," in *Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation* (hereafter, *Proceedings*), eds. Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell (SCA/AFA, 1980), pp. 246-48.

[4] David Zarefsky, "Argumentation and Forensics," in *Proceedings*, p. 22.

[5] Colan T. Hanson, "A Search for an Appropriate Argumentative Paradigm," in *Dimensions*, p. 302.

[6] Jack Kay, "Evidentiary Concerns in the Community of Individual Events," in *Dimensions*, pp. 338-55.

[7] G. Thomas Goodnight, "The Re-union of Argumentation and Debate Theory," in *Dimensions*, p. 428.

[8] Kay, pp. 338-55.

[9] Bartanen, p. 408.

[10] Suzanne Larson and Sean Patrick O'Rourke, "Predominant Forms of Argument in Individual Events," in *Dimensions*, p. 325.

[11] Don F. Faules, Richard D. Rieke, and Jack Rhodes, *Directing Forensics: Contest and Debate Speaking*. (Denver: Morton, 1978), pp. 1-31.

[12] Bartanen, citing Henry McGucken, "Forensics in the Liberal Education," *Western Speech*, 34 (Spring 1970), p. 137.

[13] Larson and O'Rourke, p. 324.

[14] Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrects-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, trans. by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969).

[15] For a more complete discussion of this assumption and the following assumptions, see Kay.

[16] McBath, p. 18.

[17] J. Robert Cox and Charles Arther Willard, *Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research*, (working copy, 1981), pp. 42-43.

[18] Charles Arthur Willard, "Some Speculations About Evidence," in *Proceedings*, p. 281.

[19] Ibid.

[20] See Kay, p. 353.

[21] Research in progress.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE JUDGE ON THE DEBATE ROUND

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In recent years there has been a great deal of discussion about the role of the judge in academic debate. While much of the literature of the 1960's and early 1970's was devoted to discussing theoretical concepts such as inherency and the development of new case strategies, in recent years it has been recognized that guidelines that apply to the judging of debate are different from the advice we give our debaters. A debater, for example, is expected to be partisan, while a judge is expected to have at least a minimal amount of objectivity. The debater is expected to search for weaknesses in arguments, while a judge is expected to develop standards for evaluating competing arguments when both sets of arguments may be weak.

Much of the literature on judging has focused on a discussion of debate paradigms.(1) Some of the literature has addressed the issue of whether debate theory should be debatable in debate rounds.(2) Other articles have explored various potential paradigms for evaluating debates.(3) In developing these theoretical perspectives, coaches and judges have attempted to formulate theories to promote two general goals. First, judging theories have been developed in an attempt to enhance the educational goals of debate. Rowland has argued extensively that one major test for any paradigm of debate is its ability to promote the educational goals of debate.(4) It is not enough, however, for a paradigm to promote the educational value of debate and many theorists (including Rowland) have argued that a good paradigm should also ensure that the decision rendered by the judge is a fair one.(5)

These twin goals of promoting both education and a fair decision should guide not only the paradigm choice of a judge, but should also influence such things as how a judge evaluates evidence, develops mechanical rules for assigning responsibilities to individual debaters, and justifies a decision. Unfortunately, these two goals are extremely difficult to meet. Frequently, these two goals conflict, as is the case when a decision that is required to promote fairness hinders the educational goals of the activity. What is more difficult is

developing judging standards that can promote either of the twin goals of education and fairness. This paper will address the problems a judge encounters in promoting these two goals.

CAN A JUDGE EDUCATE DEBATERS?

Criticisms of the current practices in academic debate have been almost commonplace in recent years. Debaters have been accused of speaking too rapidly, advancing shallow arguments, and using tricks to win rounds. One frequently cited scapegoat for these problems is the debate judge. It is argued that the debate judge is responsible for many of the poor practices since the judge has failed to punish those debaters that employ poor argumentative techniques. This attitude has manifested itself in several proposed solutions to the evils of debate. The growth of CEDA is partly in response to a perceived failure of NDT judges to punish teams that debate using undesirable strategies. The demand that judges be assigned randomly has as its basis the assumption that, if the judges of debate rounds are changed, the result will be better debates. The assumption is widespread that judges do make a difference, and a change in the judges who hear debates will alter the nature of the activity.

It is probably true that replacing one judge with another will change the outcome of many individual debate rounds, and some judges may be better able to follow the arguments in some of the more complex debate rounds. It is less clear that individual judges can, without some changes in the debate format, have any significant effect on the educational value of debate.

Initially, any judge faces a problem of identifying what educational values debate should promote. Zarefsky is correct in arguing that there is no consensus within the community about which educational goal of debate is of the greatest importance.(6) For some, the goal of debate is to promote skills in communicating argument. Others will suggest that debate is important since it forces students to research one topic in depth and to develop analytical skills. Others will suggest that debate should promote creativity in debaters.(7) This creates serious problems for a judge, especially when the judge has a goal for the activity that is inconsistent with that of the debaters. If a debater believes the activity should promote research, but the judge decides that promoting rhetorical skills is more important, the judge could easily develop a judging standard that would hinder, rather than promote, the educational goal of the debater. It is questionable if the judge has the right to impose on the debaters an educational goal that is inconsistent with the goals set by the participants in the round. There are several, legitimate goals that debate can promote. Those who are drawn to the activity because of one of these goals should not be penalized because the judge thinks an alternative goal should be promoted by the activity. While it may be difficult to avoid imposing some educational philosophy on the round, it is important to question whether that educational goal is the most appropriate one.

To further complicate the matter, it is important to distinguish between debate as an end, and debate as a means to an end. Even if debate serves an educational function, it is not always true that the individual round will reflect the desired end product. If the goal of debate is to promote public speaking, for example, the success in training students to speak publicly should be based, not on the performance of students in debate rounds, but on their performance outside the debate round. While there may be some correlation between the two, the most important measure of the success of any educational technique is the results of that technique, not what the technique looks like to an outside observer. To evaluate the effectiveness of a speech pathologist's teaching technique, for example, we do not look at whether an administrator would understand the technique; we look at the results of the treatment.(8) Unfortunately, it is often difficult to measure the effect of a judging philosophy (or a debating style) on the intended goal of the activity.

Even if the judge were able to develop an appropriate goal for debate and could demonstrate that a style of debate would, indeed, promote that goal, there are severe limitations that prevent a judge from influencing the debate process. The most important limitation on the judge is the fact that the judge is just one part of the debate process. There are many other forces with equal or greater influence on the debate process. The debate format and rules will encourage certain behavior regardless of the nature of the judge. The coach of the teams is in a much better position to influence debate behavior than the judge, for example, since the coach can provide much more extensive feedback and can enforce standards for debate. The debaters are also influenced by peer pressure and other teams that force certain teams to use certain strategies.

Even if judges, as a class, could influence the behavior of debaters, there are limits on the potential influence of an individual judge. Any given judge will have only limited interaction with any given team. Even that interaction is often delayed, since there is a period between when the debate takes place and when the debaters receive the judge's feedback. Even when this feedback is provided, it is post facto. The judge explains what he or she disliked after the debate, when it is too late to change their behavior. Since the team is unlikely to be heard again by this judge and since other judges may not share the bias of this individual judge, there is no reason for the team to change their behavior. Attempts to punish debaters for poor practices thus often serve not to educate the debater (since the punishment is after the fact), but to penalise those debaters who happen to be heard by this judge. Since a different judge may view other behavior as being desirable, there is no incentive for the teams to alter their behavior for future judges who may not share the first judge's views of the activity. The punishment paradigm does not help to drive out poor debate practices.

There are other limits to the punishment view of judging. Often, both teams are guilty of poor debate practices, making it hard for the judge to decide who is more guilty and which team initiated the poor debate practices. Even if one team with poor debate techniques loses the round, the other team with poor practices is rewarded with a win. In addition, often the team that uses a poor technique may be clearly superior to the other team (for example, a team of good speakers that is well-researched but that uses bad theoretical arguments against a novice team). The judge can use points to penalise a team, but this strategy is useful only in preliminary rounds (and the practice of dropping high and low speaker points decreases the impact of this penalty). In addition, it may be unfair to penalise one team because they happened to be heard by one judge instead of another judge.

Even comments by a judge are of limited value. Judges have a finite amount of space to discuss the reasons for decision on the ballot. Any discussion of an hour debate on one page cannot cover all the issues. As a result, the judge often presents only an abbreviated version of the reasons for decision. Even if the judge employs a detailed method of resolving a dispute, the judge often will not be able to explain all that was involved in reaching that decision. The judge may use a sophisticated judging theory, but often that theory will not be exposed or explained on the ballot.(9) As a result, debaters often do not know the entire process used by a judge in reaching a decision. The debaters may also not know if a comment on the ballot was critical to the judge's final decision or if it was merely a minor suggestion to the teams. Even if the ballot were detailed, it would also be only one ballot out of several hundred that the debater would read over a debater's career.

What, then, can be done so that judges can promote the educational goal of the activity? Two alterations seem promising. First, the debate community should view matters of style as being debatable. We have long recognized that matters of substance are debatable, as well as matters of theory. By permitting teams faced with undesirable strategies to argue against those strategies we may help to stop abuses of the activity.(10) Stylistic standards would be imposed if both teams disagree on the goals of debate, not if they are satisfied with the practices that they are using. If both teams feel that the goal of debate should be to process massive amounts of information; a judge that views debate as being a communicative activity should not impose his or her goal on the team (subject to the reservation in the next section). If the two teams disagree on the goal of the activity, they should either attempt to reconcile the two divergent goals or, if one goal competes with the other goal, they should attempt to resolve through argument the goal that should guide the judge in evaluating the round.

There is one exception that I would make to this procedure. One problem that I have had with the current literature on the juging of debate is that it has emphasized the judging of one type of debate: a high level, college debate. While many of our judging paradigms may be useful for varsity college rounds, I am not convinced that they are useful for all rounds. A novice high school round should be judged in a fundamentally different manner than the final round of NDT. Unfortunately, we have not addressed the other levels of the debate activity.

I will argue elsewhere(11) that we need to develop two types of judging paradigms, horizonal and vertical. Horizontal paradigms are those that develop alternative ways of looking at college varsity debate rounds. Most, if not all, of the literature on paradigms addresses these types of paradigms. We also, however, need to develop vertical paradigms; methods of looking at debates occurring at other levels of debate. How should novice debates be evaluated? What levels of debate are distinct? One of the reasons that the style of debate in CEDA rounds and NDT rounds is often quite similar, for example, may be that CEDA rounds are often judged using the same types of paradigms that have been used in NDT. This development requires some alteration in the way tournaments are structured. It may be desirable to develop levels of tournaments on a voluntary basis to encourage the development of new vertical judging paradigms.(12) For example, while I think there are strong arguments for permitting debate on theoretical and stylistic matters in varsity college tournaments (and some major high school tournaments), I do not think these arguments apply to novice rounds. It may be desirable for the debate community as a group to agree on some basic goals for novice tournaments and to impose these goals on the debaters (along with some more specific guidelines on case areas, limits on theoretical arguments, and so on). Once debaters have achieved these basic goals, they would be free to pursue other goals at other tournaments. Without a ranking of tournaments, judges should develop separate standards for the various levels of competition only if they can give advanced warning to teams about their philosophy, preferably in the form of a written judging statement personalized for the specific level of competition.

THE PROBLEM OF FAIRNESS/OBJECTIVITY

A good judge does more than make decisions that promote the educational value of debate; the judge's decision should be fair. A decision reached based on the debaters grades or GRE score might encourage debaters to become educated, but it would not be perceived as a fair way to evaluate debates. The assumption is made that a judge should attempt to be fair in reaching a decision.

When we talk about a "fair" decision, it is often unclear what is meant. One aspect of fairness is that the decision should not be based on the whims of the judge; there should be some objective method used to reach the decision. At the heart of the fairness issue is the nature of judge objectivity. A fair judge is perceived to be objective. Decisions that are based on the subjectivity of the judge are thought to be undesirable. As a result, theories or arguments that require a judge to make a subjective decision are discouraged. If there is no objective way to determine the meaning of "significantly" or "best", these terms should be ignored or objective standards should be used.

The view that objectivity is an absolute goal of debate and that subjectivity has no function in debate may be unrealistic. It is true that total subjectivity is undesirable. A judge that votes for a team by flipping a coin, picking an argument a random, or other arbitrary means is not highly respected. At the same time, a totally objective system may be undesirable. The critics of the Tabula Rasa approach to judging may be correct in arguing that no judge can be totally objective. Judges must apply some subjective standards in evaluating arguments. If a 2AR stands up and says "All 2NR arguments are dumb," the judge does not automatically vote affirmative; the judge must evaluate the affirmative responses against the negative positions that they attempt to refute. A degree of subjectivity is inevitable.(13) Both extreme objectivity and subjectivity are to be avoided. Davis argues: "Discretionary power can be either too broad or too narrow. When it is too broad, justice may suffer from arbitrariness or inequality. When it is too narrow, justice may suffer from insufficient individualizing."(14) The question becomes how we can develop a method of developing a system of judging that permits judging discretion while placing constraints on that discretion so that the judge does not become too constrained.(15) This is vital not only for our choice of paradigms, but for our weighing of arguments and our resolution of issues prior to applying a paradigm. In short, we need to discover a set of standards that place restraints on the discretion available to the debate judge.

The problem of judge discretion has been discussed extensively in legal literature. The issues in the legal setting are similar to those in debate; in both instances it is necessary to develop guidelines placing limits on the discretion of the judge. One theorist who has addressed this issue in depth is Ronald Dworkin.(16) Dworkin argues that there are two senses of the term discretion. In the weak sense, all judges have discretion in that, among other things, the decision of the judge is often final. For example, the umpire in a baseball game can be said to have discretion in the weak sense since the decision of the umpire is final; we may argue about the correctness of the decision, but once the decision has been made, there is no appeal that can be made. In a similar manner, we can say that a debate judge has discretion; a judge can make a decision without worrying about external authorities. Once the judge makes a decision there is no check on the judge's discretion.

This view of discretion does not tell us much about the way judges should decide debates; it merely indicates that judges have discretion in the sense that no one can direct a judge to vote in a certain way. When we talk about judge discretion and judge subjectivity, we usually refer to discretion in the strong sense; that the judge can make a decision in an arbitrary manner. Dworkin argues that in law, judges may have discretion in the weak sense, but they should not have discretion in the strong sense; there are always constraints that govern the judge. The baseball analogy helps explain this distinction. While the umpire has discretion in determining if a pitch is a strike or a ball; there are limits on this discretion. If a ball is thrown over the backstop, or if the pitcher rolls the ball across the plate, the umpire theoretically could decide that the pitch was a strike, but in reality the umpire does not have that much discretion. Similarly the debate judge may be forced to make a subjective decision, yet those subjective decisions are subject to some constraints. We may argue that determining the meaning of terms such as "reasonable" or "significantly" requires some judge discretion, but that does not mean that this subjectivity must inherently be undesirable. If the judge develops rigorous standards to reach the subjective conclusion the harmful effects of subjective decisions are minimized. What is undesirable is not subjective decisions per se, but arbitrary subjective decisions. Some subjective decisions by judges are inevitable. We must make subjective decisions in evaluating evidence, weighing arguments, and determining how to weigh values.(17) The issue becomes, how do we develop standards for making subjective decisions?

The developing of standards for evaluating arguments is a difficult task. It requires drawing a line between legitimate use of judge discretion and illegitimate discretion of the judge. There are a few rounds where this distinction may be clear. For example, in a round where one team advances an

argument and the other side ignores the argument, it is arguable that the judge has no discretion; the judge must award the issue to the team advancing the unrefuted argument. This view is similar to that of the Supreme Court, which cannot rule on an issue that is not raised by the litigants.(18) There are two issues that complicate this type of argument. First, the judge needs to determine what constitutes an argument. A mere assertion that an issue is a voting issue, for example, may not make it one. Each judge needs to develop certain minimum standards for an argument.(19) In addition, there is a distinction between deciding which team has won an argument and deciding how much impact to give an argument. An affirmative team may ignore a plan-meet-need argument, for example, but it is up to the judge to determine if this argument is absolute, or how much impact the argument will have on the round.

The number of rounds where one team advances an important argument and the other team ignores the argument is small. Often there is at least some response to a position. The examples of arguments that Rowland gives in his attack on tabula rasa are not likely to go untouched; instead the other team is likely to group these responses and present some counter arguments. The judge is thus forced to weigh the strength of these two positions. Are the ten arguments advanced in favor of a position stronger than the three arguments responding to the ten arguments. This evaluation should not be based on the simple quantity of the arguments, or the amount of time spent on the argument, but it should be based on some other objective standards.

It is at this point that subjectivity begins to enter the debate. One justification for this judge subjectivity is that the judge theoretically (as a critic of argument) knows more about argument than the debaters. This view is often inaccurate. In evaluating a debate, there are two types of issues. The first types of arguments are field variant; they are specific to the topic being debated. The second type of arguments are field invariant; they cross types of argument.(20) By far the largest number of arguments in a debate fall into the first category; they are specific arguments to the topic being debated. For these arguments, it is unlikely that in most rounds the judge does know more than the debaters. Few, if any judges know more about the topic than those teams that spend countless hours researching the arguments made in debates. Even a mediocre team may know more about its affirmative case than all but a handful of debate judges. In short, most debate judges do not know more about the field variant arguments than the debaters they judge.

Even in those few debates where field invariant arguments are important, it is unclear if the judge is in the best position to apply these rules, since the application of general rules may require knowledge about the specific topic.(21) This does not mean that the judge should not evaluate arguments, but it does mean that the judge evaluates arguments, not because of superior knowledge, but because there is no other way for the judge to make a decision without some method of evaluating positions.

This view of judging does have some implications. The judge is expected to evaluate positions, not to impose a superior view of argument on the debate round, but because some structure is needed to make sense of the round. This inherently requires the exercise of some discretion by the judge. This discretion is not absolute, however. There are some constraints that should govern the judge in making these subjective determinations.

First, the judge must justify his or her decision. Like the baseball umpire, the decision of the judge is viewed by any observer of the activity. Ultimately, the credibility of the judge is based on the ability of the judge to explain the decision to the participants. This limits the judge in making some decisions. For example, the decision of what constitutes a "reasonable" or the "best" definition is subjective, but if the judge is forced to explain why a case does not meet (or does meet) a standard, the judge is forced to develop some standard that can be communicated to a team.

Second, the judge must base the decision by appealing to a general rule. When a judge is faced with a choice that is not governed by a rule provided by the debaters, the judge must develop some general principle to govern the decision. The judge does not arbitrarily decide one team should win or lose an issue; the judge must create some guidelines to govern the resolution of disputes in general.(22) These rules ideally should be developed in such a way that they are not affected by the participants in the round or the side that advances an argument. For example, in weighing an argument, the weight given an argument should not be based on the status of the side that advances it, but it should be based on other universally applied standards (such as the weight given to the argument by both teams, the evidence supporting the position, and so on).

Third, the judge should attempt to be open to all positions. Since the judge evaluates arguments, not because of superior knowledge, but because of the need to develop some way to resolve conflicts it is important that the judge keep an open mind to new viewpoints. Positions that may seem to be weak may, on reflection (or after hearing all the evidence on the position), be strong arguments. This does not mean that the judge should read more into an argument than was contained in the argument advanced by the debaters, but it does suggest that each argument be given some weight. Hoffmaster argues:

> The judicial point of view requires a judge to study a case carefully, paying close attention to relevant legal standards and legally significant facts, to be impartial, to disqualify himself if any conflict of interest exists, and to be sincerely rational.(23)

The judge needs to be able to walk the line between arbitrarily ignoring arguments that he or she disbelieves, and making arguments stronger than warranted. This requires keeping an open mind and trying to give each argument the appropriate weight.

Finally, the judge should develop standards consistent with the activity being evaluated.(24) In developing guidelines for resolving disputes, the judge should attempt to develop some concept of the goals of the activity and the philosophy behind the activity. In determining whether to penalize a strategy, the judge needs to develop a philosophy of the purpose of debate. Is debate primarily an intellectual activity, or is communication its principal aim? What types of behavior should be rewarded? These views (though open to debate in the round), will provide the judge with guidance in developing more specific rules to govern the decisionmaking process of the judge.

The judge cannot making avoid making subjective decisions. What distinguishes a good judge from a poor judge is the skills used to make decisions and the ability to communicate the reasons behind these decisions to other individuals. The judge should not be able to make arbitrary judgements; the resolution of arguments by the judge should be done by evaluating all the arguments in the round and by considering the implications of various decision rules, not only on the immediate debate round, but on future (and past) debate rounds. As with the problems involved in creating an educational judging philosophy, there are external constraints imposed on the judge in making a subjective decision in a fair manner. It is these type of issues, even more than the judging paradigms utilized by the judges, that ultimately will shape the nature of debate in the future.

NOTES

(1) See, for example, "Special Forum: Debate Paradigms," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, XVIII (Winter, 1982), 133-160.

(2) See Walter Ulrich, "Tabula Rasa as an Approach to the Judging of Debates," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Minneapolis, Minnesota, November, 1979; Walter Ulrich, "In Search of Tabula Rasa," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Anaheim, California, November, 1981; Robert C. Rowland, "Substance or Procedure: Misapplication of the *Tabula Rasa* Approach," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Anaheim, California, November, 1981; and Michael Weiler, "Debate Theory: Delusion and Snare?" paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Annual Convention, November, 1981.

(3) See David A. Thomas, ed., *Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching* (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook Company, 1979), especially part VIII, "New Ideas:The Green Growing Edge." See also Robert C. Rowland, "Debate Paradigms: A Critical Evaluation," in *Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation*, edited by George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, Virginia: Speech Communication Association, October 15, 1981), pp. 448-475) and Robert Rowland, "The Debate Judge as Debate Judge: A Functional Paradigm for Evaluating Debate," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, November, 1982.

(4) Robert C. Rowland, "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, XVIII (Winter, 1982), 133-140. See also the articles by David Zarefsky ("The Perils of Assessing Paradigms") and Rowland's rejoinder ("The Primacy of Standards for Paradigm Evaluation: A Rejoinder") in the same issue.

(5) See Ralph E. Dowling, "Debate as Game, Educational Tool, and Argument: An Evaluation of Theory and Rules," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Anaheim, California, November, 1981. (ED 210-759)

(6) Zarefsky, p. 142. Compare, for example, Rowland, "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation," pp. 133-140 with Marjorie Keeshan and Walter Ulrich, "A Critique of the Counter-Warrant as a Negative Strategy, *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, XVI (Winter, 1980), p. 203; and Vincent F. Follert and William L. Benoit, "Argument about Argument," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, November, 1981, for examples of various proposed standards for evaluating paradigms. Obviously some theorists will value some of these goals more than others.

(7) See Tom Biggers, "The Creativity Paradigm," paper presented at the Georgia State Speech Association Convention, February, 1983.

(8) It could be argued, for example, that by deemphasizing delivery, we may help debaters avoid stage fright by forcing them to concentrate on the content of the speech. Similarly it could be argued that the spread may train debaters to be concise and well organized. This does not justify abuses of the spread, but it does suggest that the issue is a complicated one.

(9) For a discussion of this problem in law, see Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 104.

(10) See Lane Bearden and Walter Ulrich, "Bad Theory as a Voting Issue," *Debate Issues*, XV (March, 1982), 3-6. For an example of where this strategy was used (unsuccessfully), see the second negative speech of the 1980 final round of the National Debate Tournament.

(11) Walter Ulrich, *The Judging of Academic Debate* (forthcoming), chapter V.

(12) See Walter Ulrich, "Diversity in Debate Tournaments," *Rostrum* 56 (March, 1982), 8-10.

(13) See Arthur Miller and Ronald F. Howell, "The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication," *University of Chicago Law Review*, XXVII (1960), 661-691; and Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., "The Judgement Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial Decision," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, XIV (1929), 274-288.

(14) Kenneth Culp Davis, *Discretionary Justice* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 52.

(15) Kent Greenawalt, "Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges," *Columbia Law Review*, 75 (1975) 359-399.

(16) Dworkin, pp. 14-130. See also Ronald Dworkin, "Judicial Discretion," *Journal of Philosophy*, 60 (1963), 624-638; Ronald M. Dworkin, "Is Law a System of Rules," in *Essays in Legal Philosophy*, edited by Robert S. Summers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 25-60; and Barry Hoffmaster, "Understanding Judicial Discretion," *Law and Philosophy*, I (April, 1982), 21-56.

(17) See Miller and Howell, pp. 661-689. In debate, the growth of the *tabula rasa* judging philosophy has partly been in response to this problem. Some theorists view the *tabula rasa* approach as simply meaning that all theoretical issues are debatable; a relatively limited view of this approach to debate.

This narrow view this approach to judging does not indicate how theoretical issues should be evaluated, and as a result judges are now forced to develop standards for evaluating theoretical, as well as substantive arguments in a debate.

(18) See, for example, *Whitney v. California*, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

(19) See Rowland, "Substance or Procedure," pp. 7-8, and Ulrich, "In Search of Tabula Rasa".

(20) This distinction is drawn by Stephen Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 14-15.

(21) Ironically, probably the type of argument that debate judges are best able to evaluate are arguments about debate theory. Most judges, however, view these arguments as being somehow inferior to substantive arguments, even though the judge is in a better position to evaluate theory disputes.

(22) See Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, p. 103, and Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," *Harvard Law Review*, 73 (1959), 1-35.

(23) Hoffmaster, pp. 39-40.

(24) See "Special Forum: Debate Paradigms," especially the articles by Rowland and Zarefsky. This position is also developed by Dworkin in *Taking Rights Seriously*, pp. 102-104.

SUMMARY OF THE WORKSHOP IN PEDAGOGY AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

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The Workshop on Argumentation Pedagogy and Curriculum Development consisted of three phases. Phase I included an opening assembly, orientation, and the presentation of the four formal papers. Phase II consisted of group discussion periods conducted by designated group leaders who focused their group's attention on specific aspects of the workshop topic. Phase III was the concluding assembly for the workshop in which the group leaders reported the results of their group discussions, and the workshop participants shared ideas and impressions stemming from their work together.

In Phase I, William L. Benoit presented the results of a survey of "Graduate Courses in Argumentation Theory" he and Vincent L. Follert conducted. The survey was based on returns from twenty-one schools which offer graduate courses their returns came mostly from public institutions, which offer a Ph.D., and have an enrollment of over 10,000 students. The theorists most often studied in these courses are Aristotle, Toulmin, Perelman, Plato, Whatley, Mill and Johnstone. The four most frequently taught historical concepts are: enthymeme, topoi, dialectic and stasis. Most courses include materials on basic concepts such as types of reasoning, propositions, burden of proof, stock issues and the like. There is little attention to academic debate. Argument in interaction was surprisingly popular.

The survey included a designation of the most frequently used books and articles and a followup study was done to check survey results against catalog descriptions.

Laurie Schultz Hayes presented a paper on "Teaching Oral Argument to Beginning Public Speakers." She argued that too little attention has been paid to the teaching of argument by article writers and textbook authors in both speech and English. As a step toward giving more serious attention to teaching argument she proposed "three starting points: (1) Beginning students of oral argument cannot learn everything about oral argument all at once; (2) Beginning students of oral argument have a high degree of oral communication apprehension; (3) Beginning students of oral argument tend to be almost exclusively speaker-centered."

To meet these three problems she proposed the "Safe Speech Assignment" to be used early in the course. In this assignment "students are told to prepare brief (three minute) speeches articulating an attitude or position that they believe they share with the rest of the class. In other words, they are to present an argument that they believe would be celebrated, reinforced and/or affirmed by each member of their audience. As a measure of each speaker's efforts to be "safe," audience members complete a "safe speech response form." By this form the audience indicates its agreement with the speaker which constitutes part of the evaluation of the assignment. Students are also evaluated on the purpose and organization of the argument. Clarity is a major emphasis. While her study of the use of this assignment was not experimentally rigorous, Professor Hayes' observation was that it helped meet the problems of the three starting points mentioned above.

Maridell Fryar's paper, "Teaching the Forensic Progression," was read by Sharon Porter. In it she developed the idea that successful academic debaters need to be educated through a series of skills development activities. The argument for her proposed progression was rooted in the curriculum development theories of such persons as Allen A. Glatthorn and W. James Popham as well as those of forensics educators. The core of "forensic progression" was contained in this argument: "It is my opinion that the students who practice debate without first understanding and practicing the thought process out of which grow the inherent issues is disabled. Further, in order to really assess the strength and weakness of each of the identified inherent issues, a student needs to apply intensified skills of persuasive discourse. Then, having explored and studied, he is ready to apply argumentation in the debate setting. In its simpliest terms, students are first taught the use of group dynamics as a method of identifying and resolving conflicting positions. They are then led to see that, failing consensus in the group setting, one would logically attempt to persuade others to one's own position. Finally, when persuasion fails, confrontation can follow, with an independent judge deciding which side has the stronger position. Upon understanding this decision making model as used outside the classroom, the debater is given the instruction and practice necessary to apply each of those progressive steps within the classroom. in essence, this sequences the program goals of the course. Within each of those elements, additional sequencing occurs."

Gary T. Hunt presented "The California 'Critical Thinking' Requirement and Its Impact at the Department Level." He explained that the California State University System (300,000 students, 19 campuses) are now mandated to provide courses to meet a general education requirement in critical thinking. The requirement is stated as follows:

Instruction in critical thinking is to be designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which should lead to the ability to analyze, criticize, and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions

based on sound inferences drawn from unambiguous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive and deductive process, including an understanding of the formal and informal fallacies of language and thought."

Although different campuses have different responses to the requirement we can expect argumentation to be one of the campus courses which meet this requirement on most campuses as it is at California State University, Los Angeles. For the CSULA campus this means, conservatively, a potential enrollment of 750 to 1,000 students per year. The problems this will bring caused Professor Hunt to identify four specific implications:

1. The communication discipline generally and argumentation theorists specifically will be well served by association with movements on college campuses to strengthen or implement basic skill requirements.

2. Resources devoted to GE will drain resources from other aspects of the communicaton curriculum.

3. The California critical thinking requirement is already having an impact on the communication curriculum at the community college and high school level.

4. The relationship between "critical thinking" and "argumentation" may need further study and analysis.

The following are the summaries of the workshop sessions in Phase II:

1. Malcolm Sillars and Sharon Porter met with the group whose interest was focused on "Teaching the General Argumentation Course." The group examined the purpose and nature of the general course in argumentation. The major interests of the group were to define the purpose, description, specific focus, time management techniques, and useful exercises for such a course. The group was interested in a course for general student populations, not one narrowly focused for debaters or pre-law majors, etc. Some responses of the group were; The California State University statement seems an acceptable statement of the purpose of a course, although perhaps too idealistic. The group examined the advantages and disadvantages of several sequences of instruction. Several types of group analysis assignments, individual short assignments (including debate assignments), and writing assignments were discussed.

2. Joseph Wenzel and William Benoit met with the group whose focus was on "Graduate Courses in Argumentation." The group discussion explored varieties of graduate (and advanced undergraduate) courses in argumentation--their objectives, structure, materials, and suitability for different kinds of students. The major concerns of members of the group included: how to target appropriate materials to students'

levels of ability; how to sustain enrollment to ensure courses making; and how various advanced courses fit into the overall curriculum of the department. In response to these concerns, several course designs were examined. Much discussion focused on particular texts and readings. There was some discussion of tailoring courses to specific interests -- e.g., law or marketing strategy.

3. Laurie Schultz Hayes met the group whose focus was "Teaching Oral Argument to Beginning Public Speakers." The aims of the discussion followed the aims of Hayes' paper generally, and spent most of the time on the first of those stated aims -- developing argumentative competence incrementally. In response to that concern, the interactants shared classroom syllabi and exercises, and then agreed that: incremental/sequential instruction is important, but there is a question of what order should be followed; a certain level of argumentative competence ought to be expected at the end of a beginning public speaking course; and methods for assessing the argumentative ability of naive speakers need to be developed in order to plan effective curricula.

4. Pamela Benoit met with the group whose focus was "Discourse Analysis as a Research Method in Argumentation." The aim of the discussion was to discuss how studies from a discourse analytic method might be incorporated in an argumentation course and to discuss how the research method is accomplished. The major concerns expressed were (1) What are the problems that can be usfully approached from discourse analysis? (2) How does discourse analysis deal with various criticisms of the approach?